Development of Siberia (briefly). Formation of the Russian Empire in the 18th century

industrialization construction five-year plan

At the beginning of 1933, it was announced that the five-year plan had been completed 4 years and 3 months after its approval. Summing up, Stalin slyly used the figures of the original version of the plan, adopted in April - May 1929, and not the much bolder version approved somewhat later (in 1930). Experts still assess the results of the first five-year plan differently. According to different researchers, the annual growth rate of production ranges from 10.5 to 21%, depending on whether it is calculated by volume or value (in the latter case it is also important to establish what prices we're talking about: about wholesale or retail). However, without going deeply into the debate about the numbers, we can say that today the majority of both Western and Russian scientists agree on the following points:

• --The growth in the production of equipment, semi-finished products of heavy industry, extraction of raw materials and electricity production was very significant, but did not reach the levels planned in 1929 (coal -64 million tons instead of 75; cast iron -6.2 million tons instead 10 million tons according to the 1929 plan or 17 million tons according to the 1930 plan; electricity - 14 billion kWh instead of 20).
• --Production of light industrial goods and consumer consumption was not given due attention (the plan was approximately 70% fulfilled).
• --Huge investments were made in industry (volume of capital investments in industry in relation to gross national product increased by 3.5 times over five years). True, to the detriment of the people's standard of living.
• --The need for investment in the social and cultural spheres was constantly ignored.
• --Industrialization was carried out using extensive methods, at enormous costs. It was accompanied by high inflation (an increase in the money supply by 180% over five years, an increase of 250-300% in retail prices for industrial goods), which led to a decrease in the purchasing power of workers by approximately 40%.
• --Labor productivity, which according to the plan was supposed to increase by 110%, remained at the same level and (according to R.V. Davis and S.G. Wheatcroft) decreased by 8%, which in itself already indicates how The difficulties of the first five-year plan were great and the projects of accelerated development met with great resistance.

Disorderly, “bacchanalian” (in the words of N. Yasny) industrialization, subject to endless improvisations (“turning points” of April - May 1929, January - February 1930, June 1931), plunged the country into a permanent state of universal, as in war, mobilization and tension, because plans, as a rule, were impracticable. It increased the degree of economic chaos and social disorder. She was becoming more and more necessary political leadership economic sphere. The administrative-command system replaced the laws of the market economy N. Werth, History of the Soviet State, pp. 222-223.

Understanding the results of industrialization policy is especially important important both to understand what was accomplished by 1941, and to understand the problems that remained unsolved at that time.

Usually these results are associated almost exclusively with the industrial transformation of the country. This still reflects Stalin's understanding of the essence of industrialization. Indeed, it was then possible to make a breakthrough in the industrial sector that provided powerful potential. New industries were created: tractor manufacturing, automobile manufacturing, chemical industry, including the production of synthetic rubber.

In general, there has been some shift in the very distribution of the industrial potential of the USSR. Especially in the mining industry to the east. Thus, the share of the eastern regions in coal production almost doubled in 1940 compared to 1928, steel production - by 10%, cast iron - by 7%. Oil production and the electric power industry developed somewhat faster than the national average in the east. Sharply stepped to the east non-ferrous metallurgy. Some changes have occurred in the location of mechanical engineering, although not as noticeable as in the mining industry. Thus, the share of the Urals in mechanical engineering increased in 1937 compared to the pre-revolutionary period from 3 to 8.5%, mainly due to such giants as Uralmash and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant. However, most machine-building plants were built in the pre-war period on the European territory of the USSR (Ukraine, Volga region, Center).

At the same time, the process of urbanization was proceeding at an unprecedentedly high pace. The number of industrial workers alone increased during the pre-war five-year plans by 2.5 times (up to 10 million people); the stratum of engineering and technical workers increased much faster. However, in 1940 capital productivity remained virtually the same as in 1928. Changes in the composition of the industrial production personnel made themselves felt , the difficult conditions of his work, life, the contradictions of his way of life. The slogan “Technology decides everything!” didn't justify itself. It reflected technocratic ideas about conveyor lines, the omnipotence of machines, the approaching era of automatic machines, robots, and “push-button” civilization. Emphasis on training skilled workers, on quality training in universities, increased attention to mastering new technology was done late.

But despite all the difficulties and obstacles, largely contrary to the forms and methods of the policies being pursued, industrialization was accompanied by the emergence of new cities, enterprises, residential areas, cultural and recreational institutions. At this time, the old economic structure was forcibly overcome in the villages; at first, the productive forces were even destroyed, and centuries-old traditions were being brutally broken. Here the evictions and famine of 1932-1933 had the most painful impact. In industrial centers, millions of people were daily involved in the work and life of production teams, in the practice of party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations. The city dweller, unlike the peasant, had a passport, received a salary and ration cards, enjoyed the right to an 8-hour working day, on weekends, on annual leave, etc. The main thing is that, as a rule, he was not just a witness, but also a participant in the creative process, which was especially important for young people, who numerically predominated in most plants and factories.

The industrial transformation of the country was the main result of the industrialization policy. At the same time, as Stalin outlined, the essence of the course was the practice of the comprehensive development of heavy industry. The light industry (despite numerous decisions and assurances) was not given due attention. The latter circumstance prevented, on the one hand, the rise in the living standards of workers, and, on the other, the active accumulation of funds for the development of society.

The emphasis on the development of heavy industry has become an end in itself and has acquired an inertial and samoyed character. In the heaviest industry, under the influence of many circumstances, the positions of industries related to the production of weapons were increasingly strengthened, which led already in the pre-war years to the beginning of the formation of the military-industrial complex (MIC). Many enterprises were built taking into account their conversion for military needs; closed workshops and areas related to military production were created. The more the scope of the “iron syndrome” expanded, expressed in the numbers of tons of iron and steel produced, the number of tractors, combines, tanks, guns, airplanes, etc., the more more economics was confined to heavy industry itself, exacerbating the lag of a number of industries and imbalances in the national economy. The system of priorities and sequence actually replaced planned development and became one of the essential features of the Soviet economy in for many years forward. Under these conditions, the “plan at any cost” attitude contributed to the deformation of the entire society, as it put pressure on all economic, social and cultural processes.

It is also worth noting a fundamental change in the management system of state-owned enterprises. Formally, self-financing was preserved, but in fact it was eliminated. Internal industrial accumulations, which, according to the decision of the XV Party Conference, were to become the main source of funds for industrialization, turned out to be less than planned. The policy of “pushing” led to the fact that the volume and scale of tasks associated with industrialization were not fully understood by management, especially in conditions requiring significantly larger capital investments to ensure organic and proportionate development national economy. Moreover, as it shows historical experience, the tasks of transforming a number of spheres of the economy are not limited only to their industrial transformation, but depend on a combination of many factors not only of the economic order, but also historical, natural-geographical, social, etc. Jeffrey Hosking, History of the Soviet Union, p. 176-178.

Socialist industrialization of the USSR (Stalin's industrialization ) - the process of accelerated expansion of the industrial potential of the USSR to reduce the gap between the economy and developed ones capitalist countries, carried out in the 1930s. The official goal of industrialization was to transform the USSR from a predominantly agricultural country into a leading industrial power. Although the main industrial potential of the country was created later, during the seven-year plans, industrialization usually refers to the first five-year plans.

The beginning of socialist industrialization as an integral part of the “triple task of a radical reorganization of society” (industrialization, collectivization agriculture and cultural revolution) was laid down by the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (1928-1932). At the same time, private commodity and capitalist forms of economy were eliminated.

During the pre-war five-year plans in the USSR, a rapid increase in production capacity and production volumes of heavy industry was ensured, which later allowed the USSR to win the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War. The increase in industrial power in the 1930s was considered within the framework of Soviet ideology one of most important achievements USSR. Since the late 1980s, however, the question of the actual scope and historical significance of industrialization has become the subject of debate concerning the true goals of industrialization, the choice of means for its implementation, the relationship of industrialization with collectivization and mass repressions, as well as its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society.

GOELRO

V. I. Lenin paid great attention to the development domestic economy. Already in the years Civil War the Soviet government began development long-term plan electrification of the country. In December 1920, the GOELRO plan was approved VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and a year later it was approved by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The plan provided for the rapid development of the electric power industry, tied to territorial development plans. The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, provided for the construction of 30 regional power plants (20 thermal power plants and 10 hydroelectric power stations) with a total capacity of 1.75 million kW. The project covered eight main economic regions (Northern, Central Industrial, Southern, Volga, Ural, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan). In parallel, development was carried out transport system countries (reconstruction of old and construction of new railway lines, construction of the Volga-Don Canal).

The GOELRO project laid the foundation for industrialization in Russia. Electricity production in 1932 compared to 1913 increased almost 7 times, from 2 to 13.5 billion kWh.

Discussions during the NEP period

Until 1928, the USSR pursued a relatively liberal “New Economic Policy” (NEP). While agriculture, retail trade, services, food and light industry were largely in private hands, the state retained control over heavy industry, transport, banks, wholesale and international trade. State enterprises competed with each other, the role of the USSR State Planning Committee was limited to forecasts that determined the directions and size of public investment.

From a foreign policy point of view, the country was in hostile conditions. According to the leadership of the CPSU(b), there was a high probability new war With capitalist states, which required thorough rearmament. However, it was impossible to immediately begin such rearmament due to the backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the existing pace of industrialization seemed insufficient, since the lag behind Western countries, which experienced economic growth in the 1920s, increased. Serious social problem There was an increase in unemployment in cities, which by the end of the NEP amounted to more than 2 million people, or about 10% of the urban population. The government believed that one of the factors hindering the development of industry in the cities was the lack of food and the reluctance of the countryside to provide the cities with bread at low prices.

The party leadership intended to solve these problems through a planned redistribution of resources between agriculture and industry, in accordance with the concept of socialism, as stated at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925. The choice of a specific implementation of central planning was vigorously discussed in 1926-1928 Supporters genetic approach (V. Bazarov, V. Groman, N. Kondratyev) believed that the plan should be drawn up on the basis of objective patterns of economic development, identified as a result of an analysis of existing trends. Followers teleological approach (G. Krzhizhanovsky, V. Kuibyshev, S. Strumilin) ​​believed that the plan should transform the economy and proceed from future structural changes, production capabilities and strict discipline. Among party functionaries, the first were supported by supporters evolutionary path to socialism N. Bukharin, and the latter L. Trotsky, who insisted on immediate industrialization. Secretary General Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. Stalin initially stood on Bukharin’s point of view, but after Trotsky was expelled from the party’s Central Committee at the end of 1927, he changed his position to the diametrically opposite one. This led to a decisive victory for the teleological school and a radical turn away from the NEP.

First Five Year Plan

The main task the introduced planned economy was the expansion of economic and military power states at the highest possible pace, at initial stage this boiled down to the redistribution of the maximum possible amount of resources for the needs of industrialization. In December 1927, at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, “Directives for drawing up the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR” were adopted, in which the congress spoke out against over-industrialization: growth rates should not be maximum, and they should be planned so that failures. The draft of the first five-year plan (October 1, 1928 - October 1, 1933), developed on the basis of directives, was approved at the XVI Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 1929) as a set of carefully thought out and realistic tasks. This plan, in reality much more intense than previous projects, immediately after its approval by the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1929, gave grounds for the state to carry out a number of measures of an economic, political, organizational and ideological nature, which elevated industrialization to the status of a concept, the era of the “great turning point”. The country had to expand the construction of new industries, increase production of all types of products and begin producing new equipment.

First of all, using propaganda, the party leadership ensured the mobilization of the population in support of industrialization. The Komsomol members in particular received it with enthusiasm. There was no shortage of cheap labor, since after collectivization rural areas moved to cities due to poverty, hunger and arbitrariness of the authorities large number yesterday's rural residents. Millions of people selflessly, almost by hand, built hundreds of factories, power plants, laid railways, metro. Often I had to work three shifts. In 1930, construction began on about 1,500 facilities, of which 50 absorbed almost half of all capital investments. A number of gigantic industrial structures were erected: DneproGES, metallurgical plants in Magnitogorsk, Lipetsk and Chelyabinsk, Novokuznetsk, Norilsk and also Uralmash, tractor factories in Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov, Uralvagonzavod, GAZ, ZIS (modern ZIL), etc. In 1935, the first stage of the Moscow metro opened total length 11.2 km.

Attention was also paid to the industrialization of agriculture. Thanks to the emergence of the domestic tractor industry, in 1932 the USSR refused to import tractors from abroad, and in 1934 the Kirov Plant in Leningrad began producing the Universal row crop tractor, which became the first domestic tractor exported abroad. During the ten pre-war years, about 700 thousand tractors were produced, which amounted to 40% of their world production.

Engineers were invited from abroad, many well-known companies such as Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG And GeneralElectric, were involved in the work and carried out deliveries modern equipment, a significant part of the models of equipment produced in those years at Soviet factories were copies or modifications of foreign analogues (for example, the Fordson tractor assembled in Volgograd). To create your own engineering base, a domestic system of higher education was urgently created technical education. In 1930, universal primary education, and in cities it is compulsory for seven years.

In 1930, speaking at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin admitted that an industrial breakthrough is possible only by building “socialism in one country” and demanded a multiple increase in the five-year plan targets, arguing that the plan could be exceeded for a number of indicators.

To increase incentives to work, pay became more closely tied to productivity. First of all, the drummers at the factories were simply better fed. (In the period 1929-1935 urban population was rationed with essential food products). In 1935, the “Stakhanovite movement” appeared, in honor of the mine miner A. Stakhanov, who, according to official information of that time, on the night of August 30-31, 1935, completed 14.5 norms per shift.

Since investment in heavy industry almost immediately exceeded the previously planned amount and continued to grow, money emission (that is, the printing of paper money) was sharply increased, and throughout the entire first five-year plan, the growth of the money supply in circulation was more than twice as fast as the growth in the production of consumer goods, which led to rising prices and shortages of consumer goods.

To obtain foreign currency necessary to finance industrialization, methods such as the sale of paintings from the Hermitage collection were used.

In parallel, the state moved to a centralized distribution of the means of production and consumer goods belonging to it, the introduction of command-administrative management methods and nationalization was carried out private property. A political system emerged based on the leading role of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), state ownership of the means of production and a minimum of private initiative. The widespread use of forced labor of Gulag prisoners, special settlers and rear militia also began.

The first five-year plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million, of whom 8.5 million were rural migrants. However, the USSR reached a share of 50% of the urban population only in the early 1960s.

At the end of 1932, the successful and early completion of the first five-year plan was announced in four years and three months. Summing up its results, Stalin said that heavy industry fulfilled the plan by 108%. During the period between October 1, 1928 and January 1, 1933, the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased by 2.7 times. The first Five-Year Plan was followed by a Second, with somewhat less emphasis on industrialization, and then a Third Five-Year Plan, which took place during the outbreak of World War II.

Results

The result of the first five-year plans was the development of heavy industry, due to which GDP growth during 1928-40, according to V. A. Melyantsev, amounted to about 4.6% per year (according to other, earlier estimates, from 3% to 6 .3%). Industrial production in the period 1928-1937. increased by 2.5-3.5 times, that is, 10.5-16% per year. In particular, the production of machinery in the period 1928-1937. grew at an average of 27.4% per year.

By 1940, about 9 thousand new factories were built. By the end of the second five-year plan, the USSR took second place in the world in terms of industrial output, second only to the USA (if we consider the British metropolis, dominions and colonies as one state, then the USSR will be in third place in the world after the USA and Britain). Imports fell sharply, which was seen as the country gaining economic independence. Open unemployment was eliminated. Employment (full-time) increased from one-third of the population in 1928 to 45% in 1940, accounting for about half of GNP growth. For the period 1928-1937. Universities and technical schools have trained about 2 million specialists. Many new technologies were mastered. Thus, only during the first five-year plan was the production of synthetic rubber, motorcycles, wristwatch, cameras, excavators, high-quality cement and high-quality steel. The foundation was also laid for Soviet science, which individual directions Over time, it reached leading global positions. On the created industrial base, it became possible to carry out large-scale rearmament of the army; During the first five-year plan, defense spending increased to 10.8% of the budget.

With the beginning of industrialization, the consumption fund and, as a consequence, the standard of living of the population sharply decreased. By the end of 1929, the card system had been extended to almost all food products, but there was still a shortage of ration goods, and huge queues had to stand in order to purchase them. Subsequently, the standard of living began to improve. In 1936, cards were abolished, which was accompanied by an increase in wages in the industrial sector and more big increase state ration prices for all goods. Intermediate level per capita consumption in 1938 was 22% higher than in 1928. However, the greatest increase was among the party and labor elite (who fused with each other) and did not affect the vast majority of the rural population, or more than half of the country's population.

The end date of industrialization is defined differently by different historians. From the point of view of the conceptual desire to raise heavy industry in record time, the most pronounced period was the first five-year plan. Most often, the end of industrialization is understood as the last pre-war year(1940), less often the year before Stalin’s death (1952). If we understand industrialization as a process whose goal is the share of industry in GDP, characteristic of industrialized countries, then the USSR economy reached such a state only in the 1960s. The social aspect of industrialization should also be taken into account, since only in the early 1960s. The urban population exceeded the rural one.

Criticism

In the years Soviet power the communists argued that industrialization was based on a rational and feasible plan. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the first five-year plan would come into effect at the end of 1928, but even by the time of its announcement in April-May 1929, work on its preparation had not been completed. The original form of the plan included goals for 50 industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the relationship between resources and capabilities. Over time main role achievement of predetermined indicators began to play a role. If the growth rate of industrial production initially set in the plan was 18-20%, then by the end of the year they were doubled. Despite reporting the success of the first five-year plan, in fact, the statistics were falsified, and none of the goals were even close to being achieved. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in agriculture and in industrial sectors dependent on agriculture. Part of the party nomenklatura was extremely indignant at this; for example, S. Syrtsov described reports about achievements as “fraud.”

On the contrary, according to critics of industrialization, it was poorly thought out, which was manifested in a series of declared “turning points” (April-May 1929, January-February 1930, June 1931). A grandiose and thoroughly politicized system arose, the characteristic features of which were economic “gigantomania”, chronic commodity hunger, organizational problems, wastefulness and unprofitability of enterprises. The goal (i.e., the plan) began to determine the means for its implementation. Neglect material support and infrastructure development over time began to cause significant economic damage. Some of the industrialization efforts turned out to be poorly thought out from the start. An example is the White Sea-Baltic Canal, built in 1933 with the help of the labor of more than 200,000 prisoners, which, according to J. Rossi, turned out to be practically useless.

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out predominantly by extensive methods, since as a result of collectivization and sharp decline the standard of living of the rural population, human labor has greatly depreciated. The desire to fulfill the plan led to an overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill inflated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers began to be held liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and penalties for theft of state property were introduced. death penalty. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as “tsarist backwardness and despotism.” The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous week working week, the days of which, without having names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day there was a day off, established for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. Prisoner labor was actively used (see GULAG). In fact, during the years of the first Five-Year Plan, the communists laid the foundations for forced labor for the Soviet population. All this has become the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, not only from liberals, but primarily from Social Democrats.

Industrialization was largely carried out at the expense of agriculture (collectivization). First of all, agriculture became a source of primary accumulation, due to low purchase prices for grain and re-export at more than high prices, and also due to the so-called. “super tax in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods.” Subsequently, the peasantry also provided the labor force for the growth of heavy industry. The short-term result of this policy was a drop in agricultural production: for example, livestock production decreased almost by half and returned to the 1928 level only in 1938. The consequence of this was the deterioration economic situation peasantry. The long-term consequence was the degradation of agriculture. Additional expenses were required to compensate for the village's losses. In 1932-1936, collective farms received about 500 thousand tractors from the state, not only to mechanize land cultivation, but also to compensate for the damage from the reduction in the number of horses by 51% (77 million) in 1929-1933.

As a result of collectivization, famine and purges between 1927 and 1939, mortality above the “normal” level (human losses) amounted, according to various estimates, from 7 to 13 million people.

Trotsky and other critics argued that despite efforts to increase labor productivity, in practice average labor productivity was falling. This is confirmed modern works, according to which for the period 1929-1932. value added per hour worked in industry fell by 60% and returned to 1929 levels only in 1952. This is explained by the emergence of a chronic commodity shortage in the economy, collectivization, the famine of 1932, the massive influx of untrained labor from the countryside and the increase in enterprises of their labor resources. At the same time, the specific GNP per worker over the first 10 years of industrialization increased by 30%.

As for the records of the Stakhanovites, it is noted that, firstly, their methods represented a newly discovered continuous method of increasing productivity, previously popularized by F. Taylor and G. Ford. Secondly, the records were largely staged and were the result of the efforts of their assistants, and in practice they turned into a pursuit of quantity at the expense of product quality. Due to the fact that wages were proportional to productivity, the salaries of Stakhanovites became several times higher than the average wages in the industry. This caused a hostile attitude towards the Stakhanovites on the part of the “backward” workers, who reproached them for the fact that their records lead to higher standards and lower prices. Newspapers were full of stories about “unprecedented and blatant sabotage” of the Stakhanov movement on the part of craftsmen, shop managers, and trade union organizations.

The expulsion of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) gave rise to a wave of repression in the party, which spread to the technical intelligentsia and foreign technical specialists. At the July plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928, Stalin put forward the thesis that “as we move forward, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify.” In practice, this resulted in a campaign against sabotage. The "saboteurs" were blamed for failures to achieve plan targets. First loud process in the “saboteurs” case, the Shakhty case became the case, after which accusations of sabotage could follow for the enterprise’s failure to fulfill the plan, which led to the falsification of statistics.

One of the main goals of accelerated industrialization was to overcome the gap with developed capitalist countries. Some critics argue that this lag itself was primarily a consequence of the October Revolution. They draw attention to the fact that in 1913 Russia occupied fifth place in the world industrial production and was the world leader in industrial growth with a rate of 6.1% per year for the period 1888-1913. However, by 1920 the level of production had fallen nine times compared to 1916.

Soviet propaganda claimed that economic growth was unprecedented. Research shows that the GDP growth rate in the USSR (mentioned above 3 - 6.3%) was comparable to similar indicators in Germany in 1930-38. (4.4%) and Japan (6.3%), however, significantly exceeded the indicators of countries such as England, France and the USA, which were experiencing the “Great Depression” at that time.

Both the USSR and Germany of that period were characterized by authoritarianism and central planning in the economy. At first glance, this gives weight to the widespread opinion that the USSR owed its high rate of increase in industrial output precisely to the authoritarian regime and planned economy. However, a number of economists believe that the growth of the Soviet (as well as the German) economy was entirely due to its extensive nature and was ensured by an increase in the rate of gross accumulation in fixed capital, the rate of savings (due to a fall in the rate of consumption), the level of employment and exploitation natural resources. Arguments have been made that if the NEP remained in place, industrialization and rapid economic growth would also be possible.

The subject of discussion is also the relationship between industrialization and the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War. IN Soviet era the point of view was accepted that industrialization and pre-war rearmament played decisive role in victory. Critics point out that by the beginning of the winter of 1941, the territory was occupied, in which 42% of the population of the USSR lived before the war, 63% of coal was mined, 68% of cast iron was smelted, etc. As V. Lelchuk writes, “the victory was due forge not with the help of the powerful potential that was created during the years of accelerated industrialization.” Supporters of the traditional point of view object that industrialization most affected the Urals and Siberia, while the occupied territories were predominantly dominated by pre-revolutionary industry. They also indicate that the evacuation of industry to the Urals, Volga region, Siberia and Central Asia. Only during the first three months During the war, 1,360 large (mostly military) enterprises were relocated.

Professor N.D. Kolesov points out that without the implementation of the industrialization policy, the political and economic independence of the country would not have been ensured. The sources of funds for industrialization and its pace were predetermined by economic backwardness and too short term, released for its liquidation. Soviet Union managed to eliminate backwardness in just 13 years.

Industrialization in literature and art

Poetry

• V. Mayakovsky. Khrenov's story about Kuznetskstroy and the people of Kuznetsk. (1929)

Prose

• Andrey Platonov. Pit. (1930)

Sculpture

• V. Mukhina. Worker and collective farmer. (Moscow, 1937)
• A. E. Zelensky and V. N. Bogun. Metallurgist. (Magnitogorsk, 1958)

Movie

• "Ivan." Dir. A. P. Dovzhenko (1932)
• Czlowiek z marmuru = Man of marble. Dir. A. Wajda (1977) - The film is dedicated to Poland in the 1950s, but there is a parallel with Soviet movement Stakhanovites.