The significance of the Congress of Vienna is brief. The Congress of Vienna and its significance for the development of international relations

The Vienna System of International Relations (Concert of Europe System) is a system of international relations that developed after the Napoleonic Wars. It was normatively enshrined by the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. The congress, held in Vienna under the chairmanship of Metternich, was attended by representatives of all European states with the exception of the Ottoman Empire. Within the framework of this system, the concept of great powers was formulated for the first time (then primarily Russia, Austria, Great Britain), and multilateral diplomacy finally took shape. Many researchers call the Vienna defense system the first example of collective security, which was relevant for 35 years, before the start of the Crimean War. Diplomatic ranks (ambassador, envoy and charge d'affaires) and four types of consular posts were also systematized and unified. Diplomatic immunity and diplomatic valise were defined.

1. Features Vienna system international relations

The Congress of Vienna played a key role in the formation of a stable paradigm of relations between leading European states. The era of the “Concert of Europe” began - the balance of power between European states. The European concert was based on the general consent of large states: Russia, Austria, Prussia, France, Great Britain. Any aggravation of relations between them could lead to the destruction of the international system.

In contrast to the Westphalian system of international relations, the elements of the Vienna system were not only states, but also coalitions of states.

One of the foundations of the European concert was the principle of maintaining a balance of power. Responsibility for this rested with large states. This responsibility was realized through the holding of a large number of international conferences to resolve problems that threatened the world. Among such conferences, the Paris Conference of 1856, the London Conference of 1871, and the Berlin Conference of 1878 were important.



Within the limits of the balance of power, states could change the composition of their allies to ensure their own interests, without violating the general structure of alliances and the nature of international relations. The Concert of Europe, while remaining a form of hegemony for large states, for the first time effectively limited the freedom of action of these states in the international arena. Although annexations indemnities remained forms of international practice; large states no longer considered the dismemberment or liquidation of another big power as a real goal. During the existence of the Vienna system, the concept of political balance acquired a broader interpretation. Thanks to the balance of power established by the Vienna system, wars and armed conflicts in Europe temporarily almost cease, with the exception of minor ones. The Vienna international system was aimed at establishing the balance of forces established as a result of the Napoleonic wars and consolidating the borders of national states. Russia finally secured Finland, Bessarabia and expanded its western borders at the expense of Poland, dividing it among itself, Austria and Prussia. The Vienna system recorded a new geographical map of Europe, a new balance of geopolitical forces.

This system was based on the imperial principle of control of geographical space within the colonial empires. During the Vienna system, the empires were finally formed: British (1876), German (1871), French (mid-19th century). In 1877, the Turkish Sultan took the title “Emperor of the Ottomans.” Russia became an empire much earlier - in 1721. Despite the end of the global isolation of civilizations and cultures, the Vienna system, like the previous Westphalian, had a Eurocentric character. The Westphalian system at first did not have a global character, it covered Western and Central Europe. Later it integrated Eastern Europe, Russia, the Mediterranean, and North America into its sphere of action. The Vienna system of international relations covered, in fact, only the European space, and to some extent, those territories for which the leading states of the Concert of Europe fought colonial struggles or were ruled as colonies. China remained outside the Vienna System, which, as a result of the Opium Wars and unequal treaties imposed by leading European states, was placed in a semi-colonial position. Japan, which began to “open up” to the world in the second half of the 19th century, was also not included in the Vienna System. At the same time, during the period of the Vienna system, European history began to gradually turn into world history.

The peculiarities of the Vienna system consisted not only in the general interest in maintaining the status quo, but also in the difference in the civilizational and modernization levels of its participants. Great Britain and France have already entered the process scientific and technological progress; Austria and Prussia lagged significantly behind in this area. A feature of the geopolitical reality of that time was that Russia, the leading state Congress of Vienna, guarantor of peace and stability in Europe, technical progress in general has hardly touched on yet. Since at all stages of development the leading actors were monarchies, for the Vienna system, especially during the phases of formation, consolidation and sustainable development, was characterized by homogeneity, the identity of the essence of its actors. Researchers note the exceptional stability of the system. Despite wars, revolutions, and international crises, the defense system has remained virtually unchanged. In fact, from the time of the Congress of Vienna until the start of World War I, the list of leading powers did not change. The principles that were shared by the ruling elites of the leading powers were distinguished by their similarity in their vision of international situations. In fact, this led to the desire of the leading powers to solve international problems through compromises and coalition agreements. The existence of the Concert of Europe became a period of development of classical diplomacy. The Concert of Europe system covered the political sphere, and the influence of internal economic processes on foreign policy was indirect, manifesting itself only in the most critical situations.

The sphere of diplomacy had exceptional autonomy in solving certain problems. Therefore, diplomats were not limited by any internal political or economic factors. During the existence of the European Concert system, uniform regulations on the peaceful resolution of conflicts, as well as on the conduct of military operations, on the treatment of prisoners, etc.

The interests of almost all the great European powers (except Great Britain and Russia) were concentrated in Europe. At the same time, colonization was actively taking place in the world.

Question 01. Tell us about the life of the Parisian nobility during the empire. How was Napoleon's power exalted?

Answer. The nobility was new, formed from the big bourgeoisie and the top of the army. She tried in many ways to copy the life of the pre-revolutionary nobility with new slogans (toasts, songs). It was possible to copy the old aristocracy, first of all, in luxury, but in the field of taste, sophistication of manners new nobility there was a lack of upbringing and education. The exaltation of Napoleon's power was the main manifestation of loyalty and the key to career growth. The emperor's birthday was added to national holidays, all masses in churches ended with a prayer for the emperor, etc.

Question 02. List the reasons for the weakening of the Napoleonic Empire.

Answer. Causes:

1) severe crop failures for two years;

2) the continental blockade caused a decline in production;

3) due to constant wars, taxes increased;

4) the ongoing war on the Iberian Peninsula required more and more resources;

5) the death of almost the entire Great Army in Russia dealt a huge blow to the empire.

Question 03. On what occasion were the words “brilliant chimera” spoken? Explain their meaning. Do you agree with Fouche's opinion?

Answer. Minister Fouché allegedly said these words about Napoleon’s plans to conquer Russia. But this is known only from his memoirs, so perhaps he attributed this phrase to himself when the result of the campaign had long been known. Regarding the correctness of this phrase, it is worth recalling that Napoleon did not intend to conquer Russia, he wanted to defeat its army (preferably not far from the border) and thereby force Alexander I to actually observe the continental blockade.

Question 04. What events in history were called “Napoleon’s Hundred Days”? Tell us about them.

Answer. This is the name given to the period between Napoleon’s return from the island of Elba until his second abdication of the throne, as a result of which he ended up on the island of St. Helena. Napoleon voluntarily left his place of exile with a handful of soldiers and landed on the French coast. The government sent troops against him several times, but they went over to the side of the emperor. Napoleon even sent a humorous message to Louis XVIII: “King, my brother, do not send me more soldiers, I have enough of them.” Very quickly, Bonaparte again subjugated all of France and went to Belgium, where he was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo by the combined army of Great Britain, Prussia, the Netherlands, Hanover, Nassau and Brunswick-Lüneburg. After this, the emperor hastily arrived in Paris and signed his second and final abdication there.

Question 05. Complete the table (see tasks in § 11).

Question 06. Determine the significance of the decisions of the Congress of Vienna in the history of Europe. Show territorial changes on the map.

Answer. The Congress of Vienna determined the post-war structure of Europe. For the first time in history, he documented the principles of international relations, which were supposed to prevent new pan-European wars. However, many others possible consequences succeeded in preventing French diplomacy led by Talleyrand. The latter was able to sow mutual distrust between the delegations of the victorious countries; as a result, France did not suffer significant territorial losses and retained its status as a great European power.

Question 07. Which countries formed the Holy Alliance? What tasks did they set for the organization?

Answer. The Holy Alliance was created by Austria, Prussia and Russia, but soon all other European sovereigns and governments joined it, not excluding Switzerland and the German free cities; Only the English Prince Regent and the Pope did not sign to it, which did not prevent them from being guided by the same principles in their policies; The Turkish Sultan was not accepted into the Holy Alliance as a non-Christian sovereign.

The members of the union set themselves the task of preserving the legitimate rulers in all European countries and countering any manifestations of revolution by all means, including introducing their troops into the territory of other states, even without the consent of the monarchs of these states.

At the very beginning of the Congress of Vienna, its main participants almost quarreled among themselves over the division of those lands in Europe, which they considered their rightful reward for their contribution to the victory over Napoleon.

Russia, which played an extremely important role in the final stage of the Napoleonic Wars, actively sought to satisfy its territorial claims. It demanded that other countries recognize the legality of Finland joining it in 1809 and Bessarabia in 1812. The difficulty of this


the issue was that all these acquisitions were made with the approval Napoleonic France, with which Russia was in allied relations at that time. But most importantly, Russia laid claim to the territory of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon in 1807. All major states objected to this. Prussia and Austria - because in this case we were talking about Polish lands that were transferred to these countries under treaties of the 18th century. about the divisions of Poland. Great Britain and France - because they believed that this would lead to an imbalance of power in favor of Russia.

Sharp disagreements arose between Austria and Prussia in connection with the latter's intention to seize Saxony - a relatively small German state, the whole fault of which was that it was a loyal ally of Napoleonic France: Saxony continued to fight on its side even when all its other allies had already left.

In the end, Russia and Prussia managed to come to an agreement among themselves. Prussia agreed to transfer the territory of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to Russia in exchange for agreeing to support its claims to Saxony. However, other states stubbornly refused to make any concessions.

The contradictions reached such intensity that it seemed that a split between yesterday's allies was inevitable. On January 3, 1815, Great Britain, France and the Austrian Empire entered into a secret military alliance, actually directed against Russia and Prussia. There was a smell of a new war in Europe.



Napoleon Bonaparte, who closely followed political events, decided to take advantage of the favorable moment to restore his power in France. In March 1815, he escaped from the island of Elba, where his allies had exiled him after his abdication, landed in France and tried to regain his throne. He was supported by the army and wide sections of the population dissatisfied with the Bourbon restoration. Arriving in Paris, Napoleon occupied the Tuileries Palace, from where Louis XVIII had just fled in panic. Here he discovered a copy of the secret treaty of the three powers that had been accidentally left behind. Delighted with his luck, Napoleon handed it over to Alexander I in the hope of driving a wedge between the countries of the former anti-French coalition. However, he underestimated the sanity of the Russian emperor. Alexander, having familiarized himself with this document, limited himself to an ironic remark about the “weakness, frivolity and ambition” of European monarchs. He did not slacken his efforts to recreate an anti-French coalition to fight Napoleon. In his opinion, the rebel from


The ashes of the Napoleonic Empire posed a much greater danger to Russia than the intrigues of the Allies.

On March 13 (25), 1815, Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia signed a new treaty of alliance in Vienna for the purpose of war with Napoleon. The rest of the European states, including the government of Louis XVIII, received an invitation to join him. Russian troops were sent to Europe, but they did not have time to take part in hostilities. The denouement came quickly: in the battle of June 18, 1815 at Waterloo in the Netherlands, Napoleon was defeated and abdicated the throne again. This time, by agreement between the allies, he was exiled to the ends of the earth, away from Europe - to the island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic Ocean, where he died in 1821.

Napoleon's attempt to regain the throne (known as the "Hundred Days") was very costly for France. On November 8 (20), 1815, the allies concluded a new peace treaty with her, according to which she lost a number of fortresses on the eastern border, as well as Savoy and Nice, and pledged to pay 700 million francs. indemnities. In addition, for a period of 3 to 5 years, France was subject to occupation by a 150,000-strong Allied army, which it itself had to support.

These actions of Napoleon and the fear of the “usurper” that gripped European courts helped smooth out the contradictions between the powers and pushed them to mutual concessions. As a result, Russia received the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Poznan remained part of Prussia, Galicia was retained by Austria, and Krakow was proclaimed a “free city.” As part of Russia, Polish lands received the status of an autonomous Kingdom (Kingdom) of Poland. In addition, participants in the Congress of Vienna recognized Russia's rights to Finland and Bessarabia. In both cases this was done in violation of historical law. The territory of the Duchy of Warsaw never belonged to Russia, and ethnically (language, religion) it had little in common with it. The same can be said about Finland, which has long been a possession Swedish kings. As part of Russia, it was an autonomous Grand Duchy (principality) of Finland.

As compensation for the loss of Finland, Sweden, as an active participant in the wars against Napoleonic France, received Norway. This country was in a union with Denmark for several centuries. What did Denmark do wrong before the allies? The fact that until the last moment she maintained an alliance with Napoleon, although the most shrewd European monarchs managed to break with him in time.


The dispute between Prussia and Austria over Saxony was settled amicably. Prussia eventually received part of Saxony, although it counted on its entire territory. But this was strongly opposed by Austria, which wanted to maintain a small, as they said then, buffer state between itself and Prussia. According to the views of that time, the presence small states along the perimeter of its borders was considered major powers as the most important guarantee of one’s own safety. Prussia was quite happy with this decision controversial issue, since it additionally received vast territories: Westphalia and the Rhineland in western Germany, part of the Polish lands, including Poznan and Thorn, as well as Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen.

Austria also did not remain offended. Part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was returned to her, as well as possessions on the Balkan Peninsula, previously taken away by Napoleon. But Austria received the main reward for its contribution to the war against Napoleonic France in Northern Italy. She has been there since the beginning of the 18th century. owned Lombardy (capital Milan). Now in addition to this she received the territory of the Venetian Republic, including Dalmatia. The small states of central Italy - Tosca - ;| on, Parma, Modena, etc.

The small Sardinian kingdom (capital Turin), captured by the French back in the 90s of the 18th century, was restored as an independent state. Savoy and Nice, previously annexed by France, were returned to him. In recognition of its merits, it received the territory of the Genoese Republic, which was abolished at one time by the French and was never restored at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

Destiny largest republics The Middle Ages - Genoese and Venetian - abolished by Napoleon and not restored by the Congress of Vienna at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, were also divided by the Republic of the United Provinces (Holland). Its territory, together with the Southern Netherlands, as well as Luxembourg, became part of the rather large Kingdom of the Netherlands. Such a state did not exist before. Its territory in the 15th century. belonged to the Duchy of Burgundy in the 16th-18th centuries. - in turn to the Austrian, Spanish and again the Austrian Habsburgs. The Kingdom of the Netherlands was supposed to serve as a buffer between France and the German states, which saw in it an additional guarantee of their security.

Only the Swiss Confederation escaped the common fate of these republics of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era. Up-


dismembered by the French Republic and restored by Napoleon as a protectorate, it was preserved by the Congress of Vienna and received the status of a neutral state.

The principle of legitimism in its historical interpretation fully triumphed in Spain, where the Bourbon dynasty was restored, and in southern Italy. In 1813, the Neapolitan king Murat, one of Napoleon's military leaders, married to his sister, broke with his father-in-law and joined the anti-French coalition, hoping to retain the royal crown. The European powers did not touch him for some time. But when, during Napoleon’s “hundred days,” Murat did not show zeal in the fight against the “usurper,” he was deposed, arrested and executed. And the Kingdom of Naples was returned to the legitimate Bourbon dynasty (an offshoot of the Spanish Bourbons), which had ruled the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies since the 18th century.

European monarchs decided not to restore the Holy Roman Empire to the German people. In fact, they came to terms with many of the territorial changes that Napoleon carried out in Germany. In particular, they did not live up to the hopes of the rulers of the hundreds of small estates he abolished. Most of them dissolved into Austria, Prussia or other larger German states.

At the Congress of Vienna, it was decided to form a new confederation within the borders of the Holy Roman Empire called the German Confederation. If in the Holy Roman Empire the relations between the head (emperor) and the members of the Empire (individual states) were of a feudal nature - the emperor was a lord, and the heads of individual states were his vassals - then in the German Confederation relations between members of the confederation were built on the basis of a treaty. It was signed by 34 monarchies and 4 free cities (Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck and Frankfurt am Main). In accordance with this agreement, a union diet (assembly) was created, which constantly met in Frankfurt. Each of the members of the German Confederation was represented in it by delegates. The Chairman of the Sejm was an Austrian representative. His decisions were made unanimously. There were no executive institutions, and there was no independent budget. Members of the German Confederation retained the right to pursue an independent foreign policy and sign any treaties with foreign states, if they were not sent to the members of the union.

The German Confederation inherited a number of archaic features from the Holy Roman Empire. Part of the Prussians (East Prussia)


Siya, Poznan) and Austrian possessions (Hungary, Northern Italy, etc.) were not part of the union. Meanwhile, participation in the union of Hanover (the hereditary possession of the English kings), Holstein (a German duchy under the rule of the Danish kings) and Luxembourg (belonging to the Dutch king) provided the opportunity for foreign states to interfere in its affairs. Germany existed in this form until the middle of the 19th century.

These decisions on territorial issues were for the most part enshrined in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. It also contained a declaration on freedom of river routes. As an annex to it, a declaration was adopted on the prohibition of the slave trade and regulations on the ranks of diplomatic representatives.

But not all the issues that caused concern to the powers and were discussed during the congress were reflected in the Final Act. In particular, it said nothing about the French and Dutch colonies captured by Great Britain during the war. Ultimately, she managed to retain the island of Malta in the Mediterranean Sea, the Cape Colony in southern Africa and the island of Ceylon.

The Final (General) Act was signed on May 28 (June 9), 1815 by representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Russia, France, Prussia, Sweden, Spain and Portugal. Subsequently, all other European states joined it. Bavaria was the last to sign it in May 1820.

As for the political and ideological issues of the structure of Europe, the monarchs who gathered at the Congress of Vienna showed a certain willingness to take into account the spirit of the times and the moods of the people. Moreover, these qualities were demonstrated, first of all, by Russian Emperor. Alexander I personally prevented the desire of his “brothers,” as it was customary to address each other among European monarchs, to restore absolutist orders in Europe and in their countries. He persistently advised Louis XVIII to give the French people a liberal constitution, to preserve the legislation under which the French had lived for the last quarter of a century. It must be said that Louis XVIII followed this advice and “bestowed” on his subjects a constitution - a Charter, which enshrined civil equality, basic social, economic and political freedoms. Until the middle of the 19th century. The Charter served as a model for liberal constitutions in many European countries.

Even the Prussian king promised at the Congress of Vienna to introduce a constitution in his state in the near future. True, he did not fulfill his promise. Only the Austrian imperial


Rator and the Spanish king stubbornly refused to bind themselves to such promises.

As a result, after the Congress of Vienna, the principle of constitutional government became more widespread than ever before. The monarchs of Europe turned out to be more liberal in their domestic policies than Napoleon, that heir and executor of the revolution, who in the field of domestic policies showed himself to be a real despot. After 1815, constitutions were in force not only in Great Britain (where an unwritten constitution had previously been formed, i.e. a set of fundamental laws, political procedures and customs limiting the power of the king), but also in France, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway. Soon after the Congress of Vienna, constitutions in the image and likeness of the French Charter were introduced in a number of West German states (in Bavaria and Baden - in 1818, Württemberg - in 1819, Hesse-Darmstadt - in 1820, etc.). Alexander I granted constitutions to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Finland, which enjoyed autonomy within Russian Empire. The struggle for the introduction of constitutions unfolded in Spain, Prussia and the Italian states. True, it took the revolutions of the early 20s in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, as well as the revolutions of 1830 and 1848-1849, for the principle of constitutional government to be accepted by the majority of European states. However, after the Congress of Vienna, Europe became incomparably more liberal, freer in politically than before.

European Concert"

The new international order established at the Congress of Vienna could be nothing more than a balance of power among the major powers. It remained in general terms for almost half a century - until the mid-50s. It was seriously shaken only by the revolutions of 1848-1849, and was finally destroyed by the Crimean War of 1853-1856.

But the Vienna Order was based not only on maintaining the balance of power in Europe, but also on the so-called “Concert of Europe”. This was a new phenomenon in the history of international relations. This was the name given to the policy of the main powers of Europe, aimed at the peaceful resolution of contradictions among themselves, at the collective solution of all controversial problems. None of the powers sought to bring international contradictions to war. They resolved all controversial issues concerning even third, small countries on the basis of a general agreement between the main powers.


All this assumed regular meetings of heads of government, monarchs, ministers, and ambassadors to discuss all topical issues of world politics. The parties were in constant contact with each other, clarified the positions of the parties in detail, coordinated them for a long time in order to ultimately come to a mutually acceptable compromise. Those countries on which the new order relied and on which the “European concert” depended, since the Congress of Vienna received unofficial name great powers. These included the Allied powers Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, as well as France, which soon joined them. The special position of these countries in Europe was emphasized by the fact that among themselves they maintained diplomatic relations at the highest level - ambassadors, i.e. diplomatic representatives of the highest "class".

The “European Concert” has found loyal supporters in the persons of many statesmen Europe in the second quarter of the 19th century. Among them was Russian Foreign Minister K.V. Nesselrode. His star rose during the final stages of the Napoleonic Wars and during the creation in Vienna and at the congresses of the Holy Alliance of a new European order. For several years, Nesselrode managed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with I. Kapodistrias (who resigned due to the election of the first president of the independent Greek Republic), until he was finally confirmed as minister. His name is associated with such unpopular measures as the fight against the revolutionary and liberation movements in Europe. He carried them out in agreement with other participants in the “European Concert” and in accordance with the goals of the conservative policy of the Holy Alliance. At the same time, we must not forget about Nesselrode’s merits, such as helping the Greek rebels who fought for the liberation of their homeland from Ottoman rule, concluding the first treaty in the history of relations between Russia and the United States, recognizing the government of Louis-Philippe d’Orléans, which came to power as a result of the July Revolution of 1830 ., London Conventions on the closure of the Black Sea Straits to foreign warships and other measures that helped strengthen peace in Europe and increase the authority of Russia.

5. The Holy Alliance and the struggle of peoples for self-determination

The Congress of Vienna ended in June 1815. And on September 14 (26) of the same year, the monarchs of Russia, Prussia and Austria signed an agreement on the creation of the so-called Holy Alliance. His text was imbued with Christian mysticism. As follows-


came from the preamble of the treaty, it obliged the monarchs “in the name of the most holy and indivisible Trinity” to be guided in their actions “not by any other rules, but by the commandments of the holy faith, the commandments of love, truth and peace, which must directly govern the will of the kings and guide all their deeds." It was clear from the agreement that the three monarchs pledged to protect Christian values, peoples and sovereigns from the machinations of revolutionaries, atheists and liberals. Subsequently, most other European states joined the Holy Alliance. Great Britain did not formally become part of the Holy Alliance, but participated in its activities until the early 30s of the 19th century, actively cooperating with its members. Didn't join him Ottoman Empire.

In the first years after the Congress of Vienna, the Holy Alliance represented one of the main forms of international cooperation between European states. Three congresses of the Holy Alliance took place. The first of these was from September 30 to November 21, 1818 in the city of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) in western Germany. At this congress France was finally recognized as an equal by the four other powers. On November 15, 1815, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, Russia and France signed a protocol, according to which they returned “the place that belonged to it in the system of European politics.” The so-called “quintuple union” or “pentarchy” arose, which formally remained until the middle of the 19th century. He ensured the peace and stability of Europe during this time.

At the end of 1819 - beginning of 1820, the second, “double” congress of the Holy Alliance took place. It started in Troppau (Opava) and ended in Laibach (Ljubljana) in Austria. Finally, the third congress took place from October 20 to December 14, 1822 in Verona (Italy). Since then, congresses of the Holy Alliance, at which all the great powers and other states would have been represented, have not been convened. The main form of interaction largest states In the international arena, conferences of foreign ministers or other official representatives, convened for some specific reason, or consultations of ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg or the capitals of other powers have become.

What issues were discussed at the congresses of the Holy Alliance? The most important issue that occupied the monarchs was the rise of national and liberal movements in Europe.

The French Revolution and Napoleon awakened nationalities. Revolutionary France based its foreign policy on the principle of national sovereignty and recognized the right of nations to self-determination. This caused fire


A strong resonance throughout Europe gave a powerful impetus to the development of civic feelings and national identity. The closest precedents for this were the liberation war of the 16th century. in the Netherlands and the Revolutionary War in North America. But the first of them was largely of a religious nature and was associated with the conflict between Protestants and Catholics. Therefore her experience for a long time remained unclaimed. While the second occurred overseas, in a semi-wild, according to Europeans, country that bore little resemblance to the Old World. It is a completely different matter when in the heart of Europe, in the bosom of a civilization dating back hundreds of years, the peoples were told: you are not just subjects, you are citizens, you are a nation, and therefore you have natural and inalienable rights.

Napoleon neglected the principle of national sovereignty. He redrew borders and created new states at his own discretion. But in his own way, paradoxically, he contributed to the awakening of patriotic and freedom-loving feelings among European peoples, on whose part this was a reaction to his violation of the rights of other peoples and states, to his desire to subordinate them to his state, dynastic and military-strategic interests. The wars waged by European monarchs against Napoleon were largely of a patriotic, liberation nature. One of the reasons for the Allies' victory over Napoleonic France is that they actively used an important ideological resource - patriotism, national feelings.

The Congress of Vienna, guided by the principle of legitimism, whether in its historical or legal interpretation, completely neglected the interests of nationalities. A clear example of this is the decisions on the territorial issue and borders in Poland, Scandinavia and Northern Italy. His decisions, as well as the policies of most European monarchies, were far from meeting the freedom-loving aspirations of the peoples. Therefore, in the early 20s, liberal-patriotic in nature emerged in many European countries; movements, and in some places liberal-patriotic revolutions are taking place.

The impetus for these revolutions came from South America, where, during the Napoleonic Wars, a movement for liberation from colonial dependence developed. Napoleon occupied Spain in 1808, removed the rightful king and appointed his brother in his place. The Spanish colonies in America did not accept the French protege and refused to obey him. This was the impetus for the rise of the patriarchy


otic movement in the colonies, which gradually developed into a war of liberation against Spanish colonial rule.

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Spain tried to suppress the uprising in the colonies by force, sending its troops there. However, many soldiers and officers of the Spanish army, inspired by the liberation goals of the war against Napoleonic France, did not want to act as a strangler of the freedom of other peoples. In 1820, an expeditionary force intended to be sent to America rebelled in the city of Cadiz. A revolution began in Spain itself. The king was removed from power, and a liberal constitution was declared, which provided citizens with much broader rights and freedoms than the French Charter. Following Spain, in the same 1820, military garrisons in Portugal rebelled.

Following the example of these countries, uprisings broke out in Naples and Piedmont (the mainland of the Sardinian kingdom). In 1821, the Greeks rose up to fight for liberation against the rule of the Ottoman Turks. The Greeks who lived in the south of Russia were the first to take up arms. In March 1821, their troops entered the territory of the principality of Moldavia, dependent on the Sultan, with the aim of raising a general uprising against Ottoman rule. In 1822, an uprising broke out in Greece itself. European revolutions echoed in Russia, where in December 1825 there were anti-government protests by the military, including on Senate Square in St. Petersburg.

All these revolutions had two things in common. They proclaimed liberal slogans, the main one of which was the demand for the introduction of a constitution. The attractiveness of this slogan was due to the fact that the revolutionaries viewed the constitution as a law binding on everyone, including those in power, including the hereditary monarch by the grace of God. They pinned their hope on limiting the power of the monarch to the constitution. In addition, these revolutions were patriotic and national. They expressed the interests of peoples and nationalities who sought to independently determine the path of their development. The patriotic character of revolutions was especially clear in countries that were under foreign domination, such as Greece, or divided into many states, such as Italy.

The monarchs of Europe interpreted the revolutionary actions in America and Europe as an encroachment on the legitimate order. At the request of the King of Naples, participants in the second congress of the Holy Alliance decided in Laibach on armed intervention in Naples and Piedmont in order to restore absolutist order. Against this decision


Only Great Britain and France objected. In the spring of 1821, Austrian troops suppressed the revolutions in Italy. Alexander I also intended to send his troops to Italy, but the Austrians got the job done before Russian help arrived. In 1822, the third congress of the Holy Alliance in Verona decided to intervene in Spain. It was entrusted to France, whose government itself sought this dubious privilege in order to increase the international prestige of its country. Louis XVIII saw in this order a sign of confidence in France, evidence that the allies had finally forgotten past grievances. In the spring of 1823, a French expeditionary force invaded Spain and crushed the revolution. This contributed to the success of the counter-revolutionary coup in Portugal.

The Verona Congress also discussed the possibility of armed intervention by the Holy Alliance in Latin America with the aim of restoring Spanish colonial rule. Unable to independently cope with the liberation movement in its colonies, Spain turned to him back in 1817 with a request for help. However, this plan was not destined to come true mainly for two reasons. Great Britain objected to intervention in Latin America; it not only sympathized with the liberation movement, but also defended its commercial interests (back in the 18th century, the American continent became the largest market for its industrial products). And most importantly, the plans for intervention were strongly condemned by the United States.

On December 2, 1823, US President Monroe delivered a message to the Senate. The ideas expressed in it went down in history as the “Monroe Doctrine.” The reason for this speech was rumors about the impending intervention of the Holy Alliance against independent Latin American states. Of no small importance was the concern of the Americans in connection with the expansion of Russia in the northeast of the American continent. The Russian-American company, created in 1799 to develop the fur resources of Alaska, gradually expanded its activities to the California coast, where Fort Ross was founded in 1812. All this explains the main point of the “Monroe Doctrine”: the United States declared Western Hemisphere a zone free from European colonial expansion. Without questioning the rights of European states to the colonies that they actually owned, the United States stated that it would not tolerate any new colonial expeditions or conquests. The United States recognized the right of the peoples of America to independently choose the form of government and government in their states, without outside interference. They are Dec-


declared their neutrality in the conflict between the former Spanish colonies and the mother country. While objecting to the intervention of European states in American affairs, the United States simultaneously committed itself not to interfere in European affairs.

In fact, this US position helped the young Latin American states defend their independence from Spain's attempts to restore its dominance with the support of the Holy Alliance. By the mid-20s of the 19th century. Most of the Spanish colonies in Latin America declared their independence. The independent states of Paraguay (1811), Argentina (1816), Chile (1818), Colombia and Venezuela (1819), Mexico and Peru (1821), Bolivia (1825), etc. arose. Only the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico remained colonially dependent on Spain. As the liberation struggle succeeded, a movement arose to unite them into a union state, like the United States in North America. An ardent champion of unity was Simon Bolivar, one of the main leaders of the liberation war, who became president in 1819 federal republic Gran Colombia, which included Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia), Panama and Ecuador. On his initiative, a unifying conference of Latin American states was held in Panama in 1826. However, for many reasons - territorial and other contradictions, weak economic and other ties, etc. - centrifugal tendencies have triumphed in the development of Latin America.

Simultaneously with the Latin American problem, the issue of the Greek uprising was discussed at the Verona Congress. And the opinions of the great powers were divided on it. Most European monarchs, including the Russian emperor, condemned the Greek rebels as violators of the legitimate order, as rebels who encroached on the prerogatives of their legitimate monarch, the Turkish Sultan. Alexander I did not even want to take into account the fact that the uprising in Moldova was led by Alexander Ypsilanti, a general in the Russian service, his personal adjutant. Only Great Britain spoke out in favor of mediation between the Sultan and the rebels, whom it proposed to recognize as a belligerent party. Such an initiative was taken in 1822 by the new British Foreign Secretary George Canning, a supporter of the “free hands” policy, i.e. greater freedom of maneuver in the field of foreign policy. This signaled Britain's departure from the principles of the Holy Alliance. In 1824, the British government unilaterally recognized the Greeks as a belligerent party and began to provide them with support.


This change in British policy was partly due to the fact that the Greek uprising led to an aggravation of the Eastern Question, or the question of the fate of the Ottoman Empire, especially its European provinces. Great Britain was especially sensitive to it, since the Balkan Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean had long been in the field of its trade and strategic interests. It was through this area of ​​the world that the shortest route from Western Europe to South Asia passed, which Great Britain, as the largest maritime, trading and colonial power, sought to control.

Part of the changes in British foreign policy were due to the fact that the government of this parliamentary monarchy could not ignore the sentiments of the public in its country for long. The British public, including voters, disapproved of the reactionary policies of the Holy Alliance and sympathized with the liberation movements of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Reports of violence committed by the Ottoman authorities during the fight against the rebels caused outrage in Britain and other European countries. Europeans in particular were shocked by the massacre of civilians on the island of Chios in the Aegean Sea in the spring of 1822.

Active actions Great Britain in the Balkans, awareness of the importance of the Eastern Question, as well as public pressure all prompted other European powers to reconsider their position in relation to the Greek uprising. Shortly before his death in 1825, Alexander I began to lean towards this. He decided to refuse the unconditional support of the Sultan and recognize the need to resolve the conflict on the terms of granting the Greeks self-government within the Ottoman Empire. But he didn’t have time to do anything. Only when his brother Nicholas I became emperor did Russia take practical steps in this direction. At the beginning of 1826, she demanded from the Ottoman government that the Turks stop violence against the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. Soon, on March 23 (April 4), 1826, Russia and Great Britain signed a protocol on joint actions, seeking to grant internal self-government to Greece within the Ottoman Empire. France supported the initiative of both powers. Under these conditions, on June 24 (July 6), 1827, Great Britain, Russia and France signed a corresponding convention in London. However, Austria and Prussia did not support their actions, considering it a violation of the principles of the Holy Alliance.


Since the Ottoman Empire rejected the Allies' demands, they sent their warships to the shores of Greece. On October 8 (20), 1827, in the battle of Cape Navarin, the allied fleet defeated the combined naval forces of the Turkish Sultan and the Egyptian Pasha, his tributary. However, the Sultan did not heed this warning and called on Muslims to wage a holy war against the “infidels.” Under these conditions, Great Britain, Russia and France intensified military preparations. They signed the “Protocol of Selflessness,” according to which they pledged to adhere to the terms of the London Convention of 1827 in the coming war with the Ottoman Empire.

April 14(26), 1828 Russia declared war on Turkey. The Russian army crossed the Prut River, which served as the border between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, occupied the Danube principalities and began to develop an offensive towards Istanbul. Fighting between Russians and Turkish troops deployed in Transcaucasia. At the same time, the French expeditionary force, with the support British Navy landed on the coast of the Peloponnese Peninsula, where he joined forces with the Greek rebel forces operating in the Morea. The decisive battles in this war were won by Russian troops in the Balkan theater of operations. In August 1829, they captured the city of Adrianople (Edirne) near the Ottoman capital without a fight.

In Adrianople on September 2 (14), 1829, a peace treaty was signed, according to which the Ottoman Empire granted independence to Greece and confirmed the autonomous rights of the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as Serbia. The mouth of the Danube and the entire Caucasian coast of the Black Sea from the mouth of the Kuban River to the border of Adjara went to Russia. The Ottoman Empire recognized Georgia, Imereti, Mingrelia, Guria and other regions of Transcaucasia as Russian possessions. It granted Russian citizens the right to free trade on its territory, and also opened the Black Sea straits for the free passage of Russian and foreign merchant ships.

Beginning of the Congress of Vienna

After the failure of Napoleonic army in Europe, a number of significant changes occurred that concerned the balance of political forces. In this regard, in September 1814, the so-called Congress of Vienna began, the name of which came from the city where it was held - the Austrian capital. The top officials of the victorious countries of Napoleon's army arrived here. The initiator of the congress was the local Emperor Francis I, and the venue was his official residence - the State Department building. Most historians claim that everything was organized on top level. Letters from contemporaries once again prove that the entire European political elite gathered in Vienna and was responsible for the key decisions of that era.

Goals of the Congress

According to the plans of the organizers, the Congress of Vienna and its decisions were supposed to ensure a settlement (in politically) a large number of problems that arose at that time in Europe. The vast majority of them were caused not so much by the French Revolution as by the abdication of Napoleon's power. In connection with these events, the problem of redistributing borders between European states arose. This is what the representatives of the countries should have agreed on in the first place. Despite everything, absolutely everyone cannot remain a winner, so it is not surprising that the result of positive decisions for some states was the infringement of the interests of others, in terms of loss of population and territory. On June 9, 1815, the Congress of Vienna was completed.

Fundamental decisions

Many of the decisions made as a result of long-term discussions were quite radical. In particular, they decided to divide the territory of Poland between Prussia and Russia. Many small states of the collapsed Roman Empire, of which there were about three hundred at that time, united into larger ones in terms of population and size. Now there are ten times fewer of them. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 restored the power of the Roman Pontiff over the Vatican and the Papal States. Many experts call this event the beginning of a long period of increasing German power. This is due to the creation of the Confederation on the basis of Prussia and the Austrian Empire. They were also joined by Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Württemberg. Another important decision was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in France, which was then headed by Louis XIII. Present-day Belgium became part of the United Kingdom with the Netherlands. The Congress of Vienna took Norway from Danish rule and gave it to Sweden. In turn, Austria received Parma, Tyrol, Tuscany, as well as the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia.

Estimates of the Congress of Vienna

Now there are many expert opinions regarding the decisions of Congress. Critics insist that politicians did not take into account the ethnic composition of the population when changing borders. This is especially true for Poland. Their opponents claim that the Congress of Vienna made it possible to prevent military conflicts in Europe for a long time. At the same time, everyone agrees with the fact that after 1815 the political power and influence of monarchical states significantly strengthened, joint efforts which Napoleonic army was defeated.

Introduction

The Congress of Vienna is a unique phenomenon for its time; As a result of the work of the congress, not only was territorial redistribution carried out in Europe; those principles were developed that formed the basis of diplomatic practice throughout the world, and not just in Europe.

The role of the Congress of Vienna can hardly be overestimated. The catastrophic expansion of the borders of classical France to the size of Europe under Napoleon I forced politicians to part with benign models of development and soberly consider the current situation. The narrowing of the Big Five to three, excluding the defeated Austria and Prussia, in the absence of any desire for negotiations between the parties, led the world to a state of much greater competition. Paradoxically, the reduction in the number of possible geopolitical elections with three participants did not lead to the division of the world and an increase in “living spaces” at the expense of the losers. Therefore, the defeat of the Napoleonic empire and the restoration of the European powers to a quartet raised hopes for “mutual understanding” in line with the old multi-step diplomacy of palace intrigues.

Understanding the consequences of the redrawing of Europe took place in Vienna in 1814–1815. The quartet of great powers - except for France - confidently conducted Europe. At the legal level, the Congress of Vienna introduced into political use such fundamental terms of geopolitics on the plane as equilibrium and balance of power, transformation of the power of the state; means of curbing the aggressor or dominant power; coalition of powers; new borders and territories; bridgeheads and fortresses; strategic points and boundaries.

What happened at the Congress of Vienna (1814 - 1815)?

According to E. Saunders, “this was a meeting of representatives of dynasties in search of a compromise on the basis of which future diplomacy could protect their ruling houses from the dangers of war and revolution.” Representatives of all the great European powers gathered to jointly discuss problems of mutual interest; At the same time, two emperors took an active part in the work of the congress - Franz I and Alexander I. Before that, even bilateral summit meetings (like the meeting between Napoleon and Alexander in Tilsit) were very rare.

Although (for obvious reasons) the tone at the congress was set by the great victorious powers in the war with Napoleon (England, Austria, Prussia and Russia), nevertheless, both the defeated power (France) and second-rate powers (Sweden, Spain, Portugal).

Chapter 1. Congress of Vienna (beginning and first results)

1.1 Beginning of the Congress of Vienna (1814)

The year 1814 ushered in one extremely significant trend in the history of European diplomacy, which was subsequently repeated with mirror precision. As soon as the battles of the Napoleonic Wars died down, which we can safely call the first “world war” in the history of mankind, the political elite of the then world (we are talking about Europe, other continents at the beginning of the 19th century could not even dream of the status of a “civilized space of the Earth ") considered it necessary to hold its own congress at the highest level. The goal was declared to be the best: to find out the root cause of the terrible wars that disturbed and drenched Europe in blood for two decades and, with the joint mind of the monarchs of the victorious countries, to establish in the sublunary world a device that would once and for all make it impossible to repeat such a nightmare. In the autumn of 1814, beautiful Vienna, which had not yet forgotten the roar of Napoleonic batteries near Wagram, magnificently greeted the sovereign men of Russia, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain. In their hands, studded with precious rings, the post-war fate of the world rested, like a golden apple.

On October 1, 1814, an international congress opened in Vienna, which was supposed to determine the structure of post-war Europe. Representatives of all European states, even the tiny German and Italian principalities, formally took part in it. But in reality, all decisions were made by the great powers: Russia, Austria, Prussia and England. The remaining participants in the Congress of Vienna mostly indulged in social entertainment, so contemporaries often called the congress “dancing.”

However, the apparent ease of mutual communication for verification turned into serious diplomatic disagreements and international intrigues. “The allies easily found common ground while they were bound together by the goal of defeating Napoleon, but now that the danger had passed, their interests were divided, each of them felt the need to pursue his own, and the meetings were stormy.”

France, represented by the experienced and resourceful diplomat Talleyrand, who betrayed Napoleon and became the foreign minister of the new royal government, was able to influence the decisions of the great powers from the very beginning of the Congress of Vienna. She achieved this by exploiting the differences of former coalition members.

On September 23, 1814, the French delegation arrived in Vienna. Talleyrand's program of action by that time had already been quite clearly worked out, but at the same time his position remained unenviable: a personally despised representative of a defeated power. He presented 3 main demands to Congress. Firstly, France recognizes only those decisions of the Congress that were adopted at plenary sessions in the presence of representatives of all powers. Secondly, France wants Poland to be restored either to the state of 1805 or to its state before the first partition. Thirdly, France will not agree to the dismemberment, much less the deprivation of Saxony’s independence. At the same time, the minister spread a wide network of intrigues aimed at turning Russia and Prussia against Austria and England. These agitations were aimed at spreading alarm among the countries participating in the congress about the supposedly impending threat to the hegemony of the Russian emperor.

Despite the obvious weakness, France, represented by its minister, decided to take the most active position at the congress, clearly exaggerating its capabilities. But all attacks on Alexander regarding Poland were decisively repulsed. Realizing that the issue with Poland was completely and irrevocably lost, Talleyrand actively began to resolve the Saxon issue, which interested France much more. However, the diplomat failed to defend his position on the inadmissibility of the dismemberment of Saxony. The territory of Saxony was divided in half. True, the best part with the cities and the richest remained under the rule of the Saxon king. industrial places.

Having lost the Polish case, and, in fact, “failed” the Saxon one, Talleyrand, however, completely won his main bet: bourgeois France not only was not snatched up piece by piece by the feudal-absolutist great powers, but also entered as an equal among the great European powers . In addition, a coalition that was formidable for the French was defeated. These are the main results of the intense activity of Foreign Minister Talleyrand during this period in the international arena.

On October 8, 1814, the 4 victorious powers signed a declaration, according to which the preparatory committee of the Congress of Vienna was to include not only Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, but also France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden. Only during the plenary sessions of the congress could they be adopted final decisions; Finally, future regulations must comply with the principles of international law. In essence, this was a victory for French diplomacy.

This was the first, but not the only success outstanding diplomat: by March 1815, he managed to completely upset the anti-French coalition; The victorious powers, and above all Austria and Great Britain, very soon realized that they could not do without France. Indeed, Austria needed a strong France to restrain Prussian claims on Saxony, and Russian claims on Poland. In turn, London needed a partner on the continent capable of countering the excessive strengthening of Russia in the East. Finally, although the Congress of Vienna was a kind of diplomatic duel between Alexander I and Talleyrand, nevertheless, the Russian Tsar was aware that he might need a force in the west of Europe capable of balancing the overly strengthened Prussia.

The recent allies pursued completely different goals at the Congress of Vienna. Emperor Alexander I of Russia sought to increase his possessions. To do this, he wanted to create a Polish kingdom within the Russian Empire, uniting all Polish lands, including those that belonged to Prussia. As compensation, Alexander offered to transfer the kingdom of Saxony to Prussia.

However, this plan did not suit Austria, England and France. Austria, which sought dominance in Germany, did not want Saxony to join Prussia, realizing that in this case Prussia would become a very dangerous rival. England, pursuing its traditional policy of maneuvering, was afraid of Russia's excessive strengthening. France, in the person of Talleyrand, opposed the aspirations of Alexander I, since they contradicted the principle of legitimism, and only this principle prevented the dismemberment of France: it remained within its pre-revolutionary borders.

Based on common interests, Austria, England and France entered into a secret alliance directed against Russia and Prussia. Eventually most of Poland went to Russia (it was called the Kingdom of Poland; Alexander I promised to “grant” it a constitution and proclaim it an autonomous entity within the Russian Empire), Prussia received only part of Saxony. Thus, Alexander I's plan was only partially successful. This was a serious defeat for Russian diplomacy.

Among other issues discussed in Vienna, the most important was the German problem. The people of Germany, inspired by the liberation struggle against Napoleon, hoped for the unification of the country. However, instead of a unified Germany, a vague German Confederation was created from four dozen independent small German principalities. This union was to be chaired by Austrian Emperor. By decision of the Congress of Vienna, Italy also remained politically fragmented. European monarchs were terrified of revolutions and did everything to prevent them. They sought to erase all the consequences of the French Revolution from the map of Europe.

The Russian Empire entered the Congress of Vienna with the firm and majestic tread of the most influential power in Europe. Three main factors were the reason for this:

Moral: Russia was deservedly crowned with the glory of the savior of Europe from Napoleonic rule - it was its victorious troops that brought freedom to both Berlin and Vienna, it was she who absorbed Napoleon's Grand Army with a nationwide feat of resistance and the vastness of its open spaces.

Military: Russia had the most powerful land army in 1814 European continent- the most numerous, well-disciplined, battle-hardened and, most importantly, accustomed to winning (without the “winner-loser” complex, like the Prussian and Austrian soldiers beaten by Napoleon).

Personal and diplomatic: Emperor Alexander I was for Russia a figure of not only national but also global scale. The inspirer and organizer of the coalition that crushed Napoleon, he was convinced of the special mission of Russia as the hegemon of Europe and the guarantor of security on this continent. The Congress of Vienna can rightly be called his brainchild on the path to achieving these goals.

Russia went to the congress in Vienna with its clear program for preserving and strengthening peace in Europe. Emperor Alexander saw the reason for the Napoleonic Wars that shook the world much deeper than in the “demonic” personality of Napoleon himself. He considered the “Corsican usurper” to be the brainchild of the French Revolution, which destroyed the foundations on which the status quo of the world to which Alexander belonged had rested for centuries: Christian faith, monarchical structure of states. Stability of the social system. Let's not judge Alexander with modern positions: the achievements of the French Revolution in the field of universal human rights and freedoms are really great, but it brought these fertile shoots only decades later, and in the 10s. XIX century its only obvious results were bloodshed and lawlessness! A perspicacious analyst, Alexander understood perfectly well that with the fall of Napoleon the trunk of the tree of violence was cut down, but its roots were not uprooted. Revolutionary ideas, according to the Russian emperor, continued to excite minds throughout Europe, indirectly preparing new potential Napoleons. To unite all the forces of traditional Europe with Russia at its head to combat this danger - this is what Alexander saw as his most important task in Vienna in 1814.

What our world would look like if Russia could build its building of a new Europe is not for anyone to judge. History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood... However, there is no need to hastily accuse Alexander of trying to slow down the course of history. Grandiose plans Russia was not destined to realize itself at the Congress of Vienna.

At the Congress of Vienna, Russia faced an enemy who turned out to be much more dangerous for it than Napoleon with his Grand Army. This enemy was Great Britain, its weapon was secret diplomacy (in which the British have no equal), and the battlefield was some kind of genetic fear of European states of their great eastern neighbor - with its vast spaces, multi-million population and original soul unknowable by European pragmatism...

As for Great Britain, the latter did not lay claim to any territories in Europe. All the territorial acquisitions that the British made during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars - and primarily in India (Bengal, Madras, Mysore, Carnatic, the Delhi region and many others) - were carried out far beyond the continent. The British had achieved their goal by crushing the former colonial power of France in India and the West Indies, and now they also needed a strong France as the most important factor in the European balance.

Great Britain also claimed to be the hegemon of Europe. Acting with behind-the-scenes intrigue, maneuvering trade and credit policies, and not disdaining direct bribery, she held in her hands many of the threads of governing pre-Napoleonic Europe. “Divide and conquer” was the main slogan of British foreign policy. The British crown built its dominant position in the family of European nations on their disunity and indulgence in bloody conflicts that weakened them. Russia, with its concept of a united union of the greatest monarchies of Europe, did not leave British hegemony a single chance.

It should be noted that even during the military and diplomatic struggle of the summer and autumn of 1813, an Anglo-Austrian rapprochement was taking place. British diplomacy seeks to involve Austria in the anti-Napoleonic coalition and use it as a counterweight to France (especially in Italy). Without Austria, from the British point of view, the German problem could not be solved. Castlereagh again puts forward the long-standing English demand for the creation of a large Dutch kingdom that could become integral part anti-French barrier, and insists that the territory of the Austrian Netherlands be included in it.

In August 1813, after the end of the truce, hostilities between Napoleon and the allies, which Austria joined, resumed. Castlereagh noted with satisfaction that the new coalition against Napoleonic France meant the unification of all of Europe “against the unbridled ambition of a man without conscience and faith.”

The improvement of Anglo-Austrian relations was expressed in the Anglo-Austrian Treaty of Teplitz (October 3, 1813). Austria received the subsidy despite already having a significant debt that it was unable to pay. The base of the coalition increased significantly, and fears about the “family union” of Austria and France disappeared.

The British representative at the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh, skillfully probed the ground for subversive activities. By the way, the fact that Castlereagh was forced to go to negotiations created a real sensation. Metternich wrote: "... a Foreign Secretary heading to the Continent is, without a doubt, an exceptional event in the history of Great Britain."

The English delegation arrived in Vienna on September 13, 1814. The main work was carried out personally by Castlereagh, allowing the remaining members of the delegation only to minor issues. At the congress, the British minister acted as a defender of a “fair balance of power,” a mediator caring for the good of “all Europe.” In fact, in their foreign policy, the European monarchies of the early 19th century. accustomed to being guided not by global and long-term ideological principles (which was proposed to them by the Russian Emperor Alexander), but by national interests interpreted in a momentary manner. These immediate interests - implementation territorial claims, the division of the “legacy” of the Napoleonic Empire - Russian hegemony undoubtedly hindered for the sake of something greater - a long-term system of peace and security in Europe. British diplomacy operated in terms of “selfish” interests, but in 1814–1815. Europe was ready to rally around Great Britain for the same reasons it rallied around Russia a couple of years earlier - a force appeared on the continent that limited the “independence” of European states...

British diplomacy did not fail to take advantage of the fact that the Austrian Emperor Franz and the Prussian King Wilhelm were absent from the congress: connected with the Russian Tsar by a long history of personal relationships during the Napoleonic Wars, they could prevent a conspiracy against Russia - sometimes friendly sympathy turns out to be higher than political expediency, and Emperor Alexander knew how to inspire sympathy! Behind-the-scenes negotiations were conducted by British Prime Minister Pitt with the cautious Prussian Baron Hardenberg (who thought in Teutonic stereotypes about the “Russian danger”) and the unprincipled Austrian Metternich (about whom Napoleon used to say: “He knows how to lie so well that he can be called almost a great diplomat”) - in the second In this case, historians do not rule out the possibility of bribery. As for Talleyrand, this comrade-in-arms of Napoleon had not yet abandoned the thought of historical revenge for the defeat in Russia, and not only involved France in the conspiracy as an active member, but also skillfully incited the anti-Russian sentiments of the Austrians and Prussians. Of course, an atmosphere of heightened secrecy surrounded the European conspiracy: the invincible Russian regiments were a constant warning about maintaining secrecy, but they did spur European aggressive fear.

England's position was of particular importance in solving the German problem. Castlereagh developed two different plans for the organization of Europe. The original plan was to create an alliance between Austria and Prussia with the support of England; this alliance, together with the small and medium-sized German states and the sharply strengthened Netherlands, was supposed to form a reliable barrier against France. Castlereagh considered it necessary to strengthen the territorial strength of Prussia, as well as the Netherlands, to repel a possible attack from France; in addition, he hoped that territorial acquisitions would satisfy Prussia and contribute to its rapprochement with Austria. Therefore, Castlereagh agreed to expand the territory of Prussia at the expense of lands on the left bank of the Rhine.

By the end of 1814 it became clear that Castlereagh's plan was not feasible. Prussia was clearly moving closer not to Austria, but to Russia, with which it managed to come to an agreement on the Polish and Saxon issues. Its relations with Austria became increasingly strained because of Saxony. Therefore, Castlereagh had to abandon the original plan and turn to the second, which provided for an alliance of Austria, France and the South German states with the active support of England, directed primarily against Russia.

In January 1815, England entered into a secret alliance with opponents of any form of German unity - Austria and France. In the English Parliament, Castlereagh was forced to explain the change in his position on the issue of Saxony: he referred to the fact that public opinion in England, in the German states and in other countries, there was alarm at the violation of the rights of so ancient a dynasty as the Saxon, and that the seizure of Saxony by Prussia would arouse everywhere hostility towards this German power - an interpretation clearly calculated to attract the attention of the Whigs. But despite the abandonment of the original project, Castlereagh advocated the expansion and strengthening of Prussia on the Rhine.

Talleyrand correctly understood the changed nature of relations in the victorious anti-French coalition, and above all the desire of Vienna and London to oppose a reliable barrier to the emerging “axis” of St. Petersburg - Berlin. The French minister had no doubt that Paris's support for Vienna's position on the Saxon question would predetermine Franco-Austrian rapprochement. Therefore, throughout the autumn of 1814, his main efforts were aimed at restoring Franco-British relations.

The stubborn reluctance of the British to agree to a rapprochement with France was largely explained by the ongoing war with the United States. The signing of the Anglo-American peace treaty in Ghent on December 24, 1814, however, gave the British a free hand, and already on January 3, 1815, Talleyrand, Metternich and Castlereagh signed the “Secret Treaty on the Defensive Alliance concluded in Vienna between Austria, Great Britain and France , against Russia and Prussia." In accordance with this treaty, in the event of an attack on any of the signatory powers, they all undertake to field 120 thousand infantry and 30 thousand cavalry, with a corresponding amount of artillery, on the battlefield. There was a clause that if Great Britain did not supply the agreed number of soldiers, it would pay 20 pounds sterling for each absent soldier.

This agreement was aimed against increasing Russian influence in Europe. The conspiratorial countries pledged to act as a united front against Russia in the event of the latter’s interference in the interests of one or more of them, if this “would entail the opening of hostilities.” Nominally, it would be enough for one of these powers to declare war on Russia - and the Russians would have to face a coalition equal in strength to the anti-Napoleonic one.

This agreement, undoubtedly, was the crown of the diplomatic art of Prince Benevento. Of course, he had no intention of fighting either Russia or Prussia; he was “only” going to destroy the anti-French coalition - and he did it. “Now, sire, the [anti-French] coalition is destroyed, and destroyed forever,” Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII. “Not only is France no longer isolated in Europe, but Your Majesty finds itself in a system of alliances that fifty years of negotiations could not have provided.”

1.2 History and politics during the Vienna Accords

During the Congress of Vienna, a number of agreements were concluded between the participants, numerous declarations and resolutions were adopted, a significant part of which was included in the final general act of the Congress of Vienna and its annexes. As a result of the Congress of Vienna, all of Europe, except Turkey, was for the first time covered by a system of general treaties. Russia, England, France and the German states were not previously bound by such treaties. The system of relations created at the Congress of Vienna lasted almost until the 50s. XIX century The first main task of the Congress of Vienna was to restore the pre-war order and a number of former dynasties in states previously conquered by Napoleon, and to fight the national movement. The second task of the Congress of Vienna was to consolidate the victory and create lasting guarantees against France's return to the Bonapartist regime and new attempts to conquer Europe. The third task of the victors was to satisfy their own territorial claims in the redistribution of Europe and establish new state borders.

The winners of Napoleonic France (Russia, Austria, England and Prussia) failed to maintain complete unity at the Congress of Vienna, although the main issue of the future borders of France was resolved by them in full agreement, but serious contradictions were caused by questions about Poland and Saxony. Russian government sought to annex almost all Polish lands to Russia, and Prussia laid claim to the entire territory of Saxony. These projects met with opposition from the English government, which did not want Russia to become so strong, as well as the Austrian government, which feared the strengthening of both Russia and Prussia. The Austrian court wanted to retain Galicia and prevent Saxony from falling into the hands of Prussia. The French government also wanted to prevent the inclusion of all of Poland into Russia and the growth of the power of the Prussian kingdom. The French representative to the Congress of Vienna, S. M. Talleyrand, took advantage of the differences between the allies and won the right to participate in the negotiations on an equal basis with the four allies. In fact, this meant the recognition of France as one of the great powers. Meetings of representatives of five states became the basis for all activities of the Congress of Vienna.

Negotiations at the Congress of Vienna were conducted in an atmosphere of continuous festivities, balls, celebrations, receptions and other entertainment, which gave rise to the Austrian Field Marshal Prince de Ligne to call this meeting of diplomats and sovereigns the “dancing congress.” But with sovereigns and ministers or persons engaged in the preparation of diplomatic documents, festivities served as an occasion for informal meetings. In order to prevent the plans of Russia and Prussia regarding Poland and Saxony, Talleyrand entered into secret separate negotiations with Castlereagh and K. Metternich. On January 3, 1815, a secret treaty between France, England and Austria was signed, directed against Prussia and Russia (the so-called Vienna Secret Treaty of 1815). Russia and Prussia were forced to make concessions on the Polish and Saxon issues. Prussia received only the northern half of Saxony, while the southern part remained independent. Only part went to Russia Duchy of Warsaw, called the Kingdom of Poland. Poznan remained in the hands of Prussia, Galicia remained in Austria. Krakow was designated a “free city” (the so-called Krakow Republic).

The Congress of Vienna was nearing its end when news arrived that Napoleon, having left Fr. Elba, landed in France and moved towards Paris. The participants in the Congress of Vienna stopped all disputes and immediately formed a new, seventh coalition. The allied Chaumont Treaty of 1814 (England, Russia, Austria and Prussia) was renewed. A few days before the Battle of Waterloo, June 9, 1815, representatives of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England. France, Spain, Sweden and Portugal signed the General Act of the Congress of Vienna. The act provided for the deprivation of France's conquests and the creation of barrier states at its borders. Belgium and Holland were united into the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which, together with Prussia and Austria, was supposed to serve as a counterweight to France. The Congress of Vienna declared the Swiss Confederation of 19 cantons a neutral state. Switzerland's borders were expanded to include strategically important mountain passes. In northwestern Italy, the Sardinian kingdom was restored: Savoy and Nice were returned to it. England retained its commercial and maritime superiority and secured some of the colonies and naval bases that it captured from Holland and France. The most important of them were Fr. Malta on the Mediterranean Sea, Cape Colony in southern Africa and about. Ceylon. In addition to part of the Polish territory, Austria received the Tarnopol district, as well as Lombardy and Venice. Sovereigns from the House of Habsburg were seated on the Tuscan and Parma thrones. From the German states and parts of the Austrian Empire, the Congress of Vienna created the German Confederation under the leadership of Austria. Norway was separated from Denmark, Napoleon's former ally, and joined Sweden on the basis of a personal union.

The Congress of Vienna secured political fragmentation Germany and Italy: the reactionary rulers and nobility of these countries themselves did not want unity, and the bourgeois national unification aspirations in them were still weak. Austria and Prussia pursued not a national but a noble-dynastic policy. Austrian and other reactionary governments sought to suppress bourgeois-nationalist, liberal and revolutionary movements. Prussia, having received northern Saxony and Posen, was compensated for its forced abandonment of southern Saxony by a significant expansion of its possessions on the Rhine. She received two regions: the Rhine Province and Westphalia, the largest in Germany in terms of economy, development and important in strategic location. Their accession provided the future opportunity for militaristic Prussia to become the head of Germany. Prussia also acquired the island of Rügen and Swedish Pomerania. Special articles of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna prescribed the establishment of international rules for the collection of duties and navigation on rivers that served as borders of states or flowed through the possessions of several states, especially the Rhine, Moselle, Meuse and Scheldt. A number of annexes were attached to the general act of the Congress of Vienna; one of them contained a ban on trade in blacks. The Congress of Vienna for the first time established a single division into “classes” of diplomatic agents. To fight the national liberation and revolutionary movement European and other peoples, the system of relations created by the Congress of Vienna was supplemented on September 26. 1815 Holy Alliance, which became a stronghold of European reaction.

The treaties and agreements concluded at the Congress of Vienna, as well as part of the diplomatic correspondence reflecting their preparation, were published several times. The most complete is the collection of acts of the Congress of Vienna, published by Klüber. In the collection of documents compiled by Anzhbert (Khodako), special attention is paid to Polish question. Of the Russian editions of sources, the most important are III and IV. Volumes XI and XIV of the famous collection of treaties between Russia and other states by F.F. Martens. Martens's extensive notes on the treaties set out a number of instructions to the Russian delegates to the Congress of Vienna on the question of Poland and German affairs. Many Russian archival documents are retold and partially reproduced in the book of Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich about Alexander I, which represents a collection of raw material selected from the official noble-dynastic point of view. Some Russian documents are included in the correspondence of the Russian delegate to the Vienna Congress - K.V. Nesselrode.

Austria, the sources were partially published in the memoirs of Metternich and the reactionary Austrian dignitary and publicist-secretary of the Vienna Congress F. Genz. The memoirs of Metternich and especially the French representative Talleyrand give an extremely one-sided view of the history of the Congress of Vienna, exaggerating the role of their authors. Much more valuable are the later editions of Talleyrand's secret diplomatic correspondence. The position of the English government during the Congress of Vienna is reflected in the correspondence of the English commissioners - Castlereagh and A.W. Wellington. The collection published by the English historian Charles Webster is also very useful selected documents on British foreign policy in 1813-15. The study of archival, in particular Russian, sources on the policies of European states during the Congress of Vienna cannot be considered complete.

The Congress of Vienna was covered many times in general historical and journalistic works and special articles and monographs. K. Marx and F. Engels gave a vivid account of the feudal-aristocratic reaction in the context of which the Congress of Vienna took place, and its decisions, which consolidated the political fragmentation of Italy and Germany, the oppression and dismemberment of Poland by Prussia, Tsarist Russia and Austria. Engels wrote that it was “a great congress of large and small despots” to divide the spoils and restore, as far as possible, the pre-revolutionary state of affairs. At the Congress of Vienna, “peoples were bought and sold, divided and united, based only on what best suited the interests and intentions of their rulers.” In domestic historiography V.V. Tarle and other authors described in their works the activities of the Congress of Vienna.

Of the Russian pre-revolutionary historians, the most complete description of the Congress of Vienna was given by S.M. Soloviev and N.K. Schilder. In Western European historiography 19th and early. 20th centuries Many historians of the liberal-bourgeois and conservative schools wrote about the Congress of Vienna. A. Debidur covered the activities of the Congress of Vienna from the standpoint of French bourgeois liberalism. Debidour had a negative attitude towards the Bonapartist regime and at the same time condemned the deprivation of France of almost all its conquests as a result of the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. A conservative and pronounced nationalistic point of view is expressed in the works of the famous French historian A. Sorel. However, the merit of Sorel's work is that he gave a picture of the Congress of Vienna against the broad background of international relations. The reactionary German historian G. Treitschke characterized the activities of the congress from the standpoint of Junker-bourgeois Prussian-German nationalism of the late 19th century. and praised first of all the Prussian statesmen G.F.K. Stein, K.A. Hardenberg et al.

The repartition of Europe after World War I gave new impetus to the study of the Congress of Vienna as the largest of the diplomatic congresses that preceded the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920. In the works of C. Webster, W. Phillips and other authors on the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh's foreign policy and European alliances of 1814-23. Extensive and valuable material from British and other archives was introduced into scientific circulation. At the same time, books about the Congress of Vienna that appeared after 1918 reflected the strengthening of the conservatism of bourgeois historiography and the praise of the reactionary figures of the Congress of Vienna and the treaties of 1815.

Reactionary tendencies manifested themselves with even greater certainty in bourgeois literature published after the Second World War, when issues of the post-war peace settlement once again revived interest in the history of the Congress of Vienna. The English publicist G. Nicholson, in his book about the Congress of Vienna, devoted a lot of space to the disagreements between Napoleon's victors on German affairs and the anti-Russian policy of England, Austria and France in 1814-15. He praised the Holy Alliance and passed over the aggressive goals of British policy towards the colonies in silence. J. Pirenne (grandson of the famous Belgian scientist Henri Pirenne), in his book on the Holy Alliance, dwells in detail on the Congress of Vienna and the treaties of 1814-15 from the point of view of their significance for establishing the political hegemony of Napoleon's victors on land and at sea in a new political balance between the great powers. This book leaves in the shadows Central European issues and the anti-revolutionary goals of the treaties of 1815. The American historian H. Strauss studied the position of the Congress of Vienna regarding national movement in Germany, Italy and Poland. She emphasizes the influence of the weakness of these movements on the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, underestimating, however, the reactionary orientation of the treaties of 1814-15. In the literature of the 50s. Of the 20th century, the 2nd edition of the monograph on the Congress of Vienna and the European restoration of 1814-15 by K. Grievank, a German progressive liberal-democratic historian, which was published in the GDR, stands out. His work is based on materials from Paris, Vienna and Berlin archives and a thorough study of printed sources and literature. The author focuses on the decisions of the Congress of Vienna related to Germany. K. Grivank showed how, under the pressure of events, the Congress of Vienna was unable to fully restore the situation that existed before the war, and worked out compromise agreements.

Chapter 2. Congress of Vienna (Russia’s attitude and the main results of the congress)

2.1 Alexander’s attitude towards the main participants of the congress.

In April - May 1814, Emperor Alexander, in terms of the military forces that were at his disposal at that moment, was undoubtedly the most powerful of all the other monarchs and rulers of devastated and bloodless Europe. That is why Metternich did everything possible to postpone the congress until the fall and allow Austria to recover somewhat. Alexander agreed to such a delay, despite the fact that he could not stand Metternich and well understood his intrigues and the game of politicians hostile to Russia, although touchingly flattering the tsar in the eyes - Lord Castlereagh and the king French Louis XVIII. They all looked with concern to see if Alexander would want to play the role of the new Napoleon, ruler of Europe. In advance, but still very unfriendly, they were preparing to fight back. The secretary and confidant under Metternich, the publicist Gentz, later wrote as an eyewitness: “Having arrived in Vienna, Emperor Alexander was already more or less at odds with Austria, England and France.” Lord Castlereagh was less unpleasant to Alexander than Metternich. Inflexible, afraid of revolution in England itself, and distrustful of Russian diplomacy, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs received from Alexander the qualification of a “cold pedant”; but at least Castlereagh did not lie as continuously and selflessly as Metternich. Alexander did not “tremble before the British government,” as Gentz ​​writes; he only considered it at that moment the strongest after Russia and drew the appropriate conclusions from there. Whom the king absolutely could not stand was the most Christian king by god's grace France and Navarre of Louis XVIII. Alexander did not really want to place Louis on the vacant French throne. For some time he even toyed with the thought of the accession of “Napoleon II,” the little Roman king. When Louis finally reigned, Alexander resolutely insisted on the need to give France a constitutional charter, not, of course, because the king liked constitutional institutions. But both the king and the smart, dexterous Corsican Pozzo di Borgo, the king’s adviser on French affairs, were convinced that the Bourbons would be swept away by a new revolution if a constitution was not established in France as a lightning rod. Alexander despised both King Louis XVIII and his brother Charles of Artois, and they were afraid of him and were ready for all sorts of machinations in order to get rid of his tutelage.

2.2 Talleyrand's speech

On September 23, a week before the opening of the congress, scheduled for October 1, 1814, the representative of Louis XVIII, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Talleyrand-Périgord, arrived in Vienna. Alexander knew Talleyrand well. It was not for nothing that he asked and received money from the king so many times, without being very offended if he was refused. But Talleyrand’s brilliant mind, his inimitable dexterity, resourcefulness, knowledge of people - all this made him an adversary incomparably more dangerous than Metternich, who only loved to attribute to himself all these qualities, without actually possessing them. The only weak side of Talleyrand's position was that at the Congress of Vienna he was the representative of a defeated country. Talleyrand therefore needed to show maximum intelligence and ability to maneuver through the diplomatic sea. When Talleyrand arrived in Vienna, he already knew what problem would occupy the attention of Congress in the first days. It was a complex “two-pronged”, as it was called, Polish-Saxon question. Alexander, whose troops occupied the Duchy of Warsaw after Napoleon's retreat, openly declared that he would not yield this booty to anyone. And since the Duchy of Warsaw consisted mainly of lands seized by Prussia through three more divisions of Poland and only in 1807 taken from Prussia by Napoleon, the Prussian king Frederick William III claimed compensation. Alexander promised him this compensation in the form of annexing the kingdom of Saxony to Prussia. The king planned to take Saxony away from the Saxon king under the pretext of punishment for the fact that he had been a loyal ally of Napoleon for so long and left the emperor too late. Talleyrand immediately saw that it would be most advantageous for him to fight on this basis. And the battle was necessary to achieve Talleyrand’s main goal: it was to break the Chaumont alliance, i.e., in other words, to drive wedges between Austria, Russia, England and Prussia, which defeated France in 1814.

2.3 The principle of legitimism.

Talleyrand, even before arriving in Vienna, realized that in this case, from the point of view of protecting the interests of France, it was most rational to put forward the so-called “principle of legitimism.” This principle was as follows: Europe, which gathered in the person of its sovereigns and diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, must, when redistributing lands and changing territorial borders, leave inviolate what existed before revolutionary wars, i.e. until 1792. If this principle had been accepted and implemented, then not only France would have gained confidence in the integrity of its territory, which it must defend military force she was not able to do so at that moment, but both Prussia and Russia would have been curbed in their desires for territorial expansion. It would, of course, be advantageous for Talleyrand to first come to an agreement with Metternich, who also did not want to give Poland to Russia, and Saxony to Prussia, and with Lord Castlereagh, who held the same opinion on this issue as Metternich. But such a general conspiracy had not yet taken place, and it was rather difficult to establish. Both Metternich and Castlereagh were suspicious of Talleyrand, admitting the possibility of new betrayal on his part.

2.3 Polish-Saxon question.

On October 4, 1814, Talleyrand came to Alexander, and an unpleasant explanation took place between them. Talleyrand put forward his notorious “principle of legitimism.” Alexander must give up parts of Poland that did not belong to Russia before the revolutionary wars, and Prussia must not lay claim to Saxony. “I put rights above benefits!” - said Talleyrand in response to the Tsar’s remark that Russia should receive the benefits it deserved from its victory. Apparently, this blew up Alexander, who, generally speaking, knew how to control himself. The sermon on the sanctity of law was read into his eyes by the same Talleyrand, who in Erfurt sold Napoleon to him, Alexander, and received payment for this from the sums of the Russian treasury. “Better than war!” - said Alexander. Then it was Lord Castlereagh's turn. Alexander told Lord Castlereagh that he had decided to “correct the moral sin committed during the partition of Poland.” The Tsar does not set himself the task of immediately, right there, at the Congress of Vienna, to reunite all parts of the former Poland. For now, he can only talk about the Polish territory that is now, in 1814, occupied by his troops. He will create the Kingdom of Poland from this part of Poland, where he himself will be a constitutional monarch. He will not only restore the Kingdom of Poland from areas that, by right of conquest, he could simply annex to Russia; he would even donate to this constitutional kingdom both the Bialystok region, acquired by Russia in 1807, and the Tarnopol region, acquired by it in 1809. Castlereagh recognized the proposed constitution that the Tsar wants to give to his Poland as too dangerous for Austria and Prussia: he expressed fears that the Austrian and Prussian Poles would become agitated, jealous of their fellows enjoying the constitution. That's all the king wanted. It turned out that he was so concerned about the independence and freedom of the Poles that even the Minister of Free England urged him not to be so liberal. Metternich was so afraid of Alexander that he had already agreed to the concession of Saxony to the Prussian king, which Alexander demanded. But the exorbitant, as Metternich imagined, strengthening of Russian power by annexing part of Poland greatly worried the Austrian chancellor. Metternich then offered Castlereagh the following way out: to let the Prussian Commissioner Hardenberg know that the matter could be settled differently. Austria and England agree to give all of Saxony to the Prussian king. But Prussia must immediately betray Alexander, join Austria and England, and together with them prevent Alexander from taking possession of Poland (the Duchy of Warsaw). Thus, Saxony was supposed to serve as payment to the king for betraying Alexander.

King Frederick William III, after reflection, decided to abandon this plan. It was clear that it was not without reason that Metternich and Castlereagh did not involve Talleyrand in the planned deal. For the King of Prussia, the full danger of his position was suddenly revealed: what would happen if Talleyrand told Alexander about everything, and most importantly, offered Alexander joint diplomatic, and, perhaps, not only diplomatic actions of France and Russia against Prussia? The nightmare of the Franco-Russian alliance, the bitterness of the Tilsit and post-Tilsit times were all too vivid. In the end, King Frederick William III recognized it as good to inform Alexander about everything in order to prove the nobility of his own intentions. Alexander called Metternich and had a clear conversation with him. On this occasion, Talleyrand gloatingly informed Louis XVIII that they did not even speak like that to a guilty footman.

2.4 Secret agreement of Austria, France and England against Russia and Prussia (January 3, 1815)

The work of the Congress, delayed by stubborn internal struggles, did not move forward. Then Talleyrand changed tactics. France was interested not so much in opposing Russia in order to prevent the strengthening of Russia, but in preventing Prussia, France’s immediate neighbor, from strengthening. And so Talleyrand makes it clear to Alexander that France will not support England and Austria in their opposition against the creation of the Kingdom of Poland within Alexander’s empire; however, France will under no circumstances agree to the transfer of Saxony to the Prussian king. Frederick William III himself, like his diplomatic representatives Hardenberg and Humboldt, played a very minor role at the congress. He was promised Saxony. Alexander called the Saxon king a traitor, said that he would send him to Russia, assured that Prussia would receive Saxony in exchange for the part of Poland it had lost - and the king was calm for some time. However, Talleyrand managed to convince Metternich and Castlereagh of the need to conclude an agreement between the three powers - Austria, France and England, in order to enter in close formation into a decisive diplomatic struggle against Russia and Prussia and prevent the inclusion of Saxony into Prussia, or at least even the transfer of Saxony to the Prussian king in the form a separate kingdom.

On January 3, 1815, this agreement was signed by representatives of three powers: Austria, France and England. Of course, it had to remain in the strictest confidence from Alexander and from anyone else in general. One copy of it remained in Vienna with Metternich; the other was handed over to Talleyrand and immediately sent to Paris to King Louis XVIII; the third was received by Castlereagh and taken to Prince Regent of England George.

This secret agreement so strengthened the energy of resistance to the Saxon project that Alexander could either decide to break and, perhaps, go to war, or give in. Having received everything he wanted in Poland, Alexander did not want to quarrel over Prussia, much less fight with the three great powers. He yielded, and the Saxon king was finally established in his possessions. The Prussian king, of course, could only submit to his fate.

2.5 Organization of the German Confederation (1815).

Next, the congress took up the organization of German affairs. There wasn't much controversy here. Alexander, like Austria, considered it expedient to consolidate the feudal fragmentation of Germany. England was completely indifferent to this issue, and Prussia was powerless, even if it wanted to fight. The whole mentality of the leaders of the Vienna Congress testified to their reluctance to at least in some way meet the aspirations of the rising bourgeoisie: the failure of German hopes for unification was another characteristic stroke in the picture of the complete triumph of reaction.

According to Metternich's plan, the congress outlined the creation of an absurd institution, which was called the "German Confederation" and allocated for the conduct of affairs the so-called "German Diet" or "Diet of the German Confederation." This union included Austria, Prussia and all other German states (38 in number); The "sejm" consisted of representatives appointed by these states. Sejm decisions could only be valid where the local government agreed with it. This ugly creation of Metternich's thought was not designed to unite the German people, but, on the contrary, to perpetuate its fragmentation. The Congress was already beginning to sum up the results, when suddenly its participants were shocked by unexpected news: on March 1, Napoleon landed in France. And three weeks later, on March 20, 1815, Napoleon had already entered Paris.

2.6 "One Hundred Days" (March 20 - June 28, 1815).

The Empire was restored. Undoubtedly, rumors about the disagreements that tore apart the Congress of Vienna played a significant role in Napoleon’s decision to leave Elba. A completely amazing surprise awaited him in Paris. In the office of the king, who fled Paris only a day before Napoleon's entry, late in the evening of March 19, Napoleon found that same secret agreement of January 3, 1815, one of the three copies of which, as it is said, was sent to Louis XVIII from Vienna by Talleyrand. The king fled so suddenly that in his haste he forgot this document in his desk. Napoleon immediately ordered the courier to be equipped, and he rushed with this package to Vienna. Napoleon ordered the document to be presented to Emperor Alexander.

According to the testimony of Butyakin, in whose presence Alexander first read the secret treaty directed against him, the tsar blushed with anger, but restrained himself. When Metternich came to him, who since the return of Napoleon had been waiting mainly for the salvation of Europe from the tsar, Alexander silently handed him the secret fruit of the diplomatic creativity of the Austrian chancellor. Metternich was so confused that, apparently, at first and last time I couldn’t even find something to lie about in my life. The surprise was very great.

However, Alexander immediately hastened to reassure Metternich, saying that they had only one enemy - Napoleon.

After Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, the second Bourbon restoration took place in France.

2.7 The contribution of the Vienna (1814-1815) Peace Congress to the establishment of the institution of interstate organizations, the prohibition of the slave trade, the division into classes of diplomatic representatives and the approval of the rule of alternative.

The Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815 had a significant influence on international law of the classical period. One of the results of the congress was the approval of the Declaration of the Powers on the cessation of trade in blacks on February 8, 1815 as “contrary to the laws of humanity and general morality,” and as a response to “the general opinion of all educated peoples.” It noted that the representatives of the states gathered at the congress expressed “the zealous desire that an end should be put to the source of disasters that have so long devastated Africa, usually shameful to Europe and offensive to humanity.” However, it did not precisely indicate the time that each power “will consider most appropriate for the final trade in blacks, and, therefore, the determination of the period by which this hated trade should be stopped everywhere remains a subject of negotiations between courts.”

Further consolidation of the recognition of slavery as an international crime dates back to the second half of the 19th century. (General Act on the Congo, Berlin Conference in 1885, General Act signed at the Brussels Conference in 1890), and the first universal international agreements on the eradication of slavery appeared only in the 20th century. Among them are the Slavery Convention of 1926 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, Art. 4 which states that “no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade are prohibited in all their forms." In addition, in 1956, the Geneva Conference of representatives of 43 states approved the Supplementary Convention for the Abolition of Slavery.

The first international treaty on the law of external relations was adopted at
Vienna Congress. In the annex to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, in order to “prevent difficulties and troubles that have often occurred and could henceforth arise from the demands of different Diplomatic Agents for the presidency,” the Vienna Protocol of March 7, 1815 (Article 1) introduced a single division diplomatic agents into three classes: “1st - Ambassadors and Papal Legates or Nuncios; 2nd - Envoys, Ministers and other Representatives under the Sovereigns; 3rd - Charges d'affaires, who are authorized under the Ministers managing foreign affairs." Art. 2 of the protocol states that “only Ambassadors and Papal Legates or Nuncios are honored as representatives of their Sovereigns.” Additions to the protocol were made by the Aachen Protocol on November 21, 1818. Further partial codification of ambassadorial law was first attempted on a regional scale only in 1928 in Latin America. On February 20, 1928, 20 Latin American countries and the United States signed the Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officials, which is still in force for these countries. In addition, the following are currently in force: the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (establishes, among other things, the classes of heads of missions and their seniority), the Convention on Special Missions of 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations universal character of 1975, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (regulates, among other things, classes of heads of consular posts), the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946 and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities specialized institutions UN 1947

An alternative is beginning to develop, as a rule, the design of the texts of international treaties.

In addition, by confirming the decisions of March 24, 1815 on free navigation on international rivers, the Vienna Final Act left the final development of the relevant rules to international river commissions. (It may be noted that experts in the field of international organization law believe that the first intergovernmental organization in its classical sense was Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine, created in 1831).

The Congress of Vienna also contributed to the emergence of Switzerland's permanent neutrality status. The permanent neutrality of this country was proclaimed by the Congress of Vienna adopted on March 20, 1815.

Declaration of the Affairs of the Helvetic Union. In November 1815, representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Portugal signed an agreement on the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. The Great Powers recognized that Switzerland should not participate in wars for all future times and gave a guarantee of maintaining this status. At the same time, the inviolability of Swiss territory was guaranteed. The Congress of Vienna thus laid the foundation for permanent neutrality as an international legal institution.

One of the results of the congress was an agreement between Russia, Austria and Prussia on the creation of the Holy Alliance (Act of the Holy Alliance, concluded in Paris on September 26, 1815). Soon many states joined this treaty. Through the creation of the Union, which dominated from the mid-17th century. the principle of political balance was supplemented by the principle of legitimism, which was intended to recognize the legitimacy of the intervention and maintain intact the restructuring of European borders that was carried out at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Thus, the Congress of Vienna touched upon many issues of the formation of new states - it was proclaimed
The Kingdom of the Netherlands, the German states and part of the Austrian possessions entered the German Confederation. The split between the member countries of the Union led to its collapse with the outbreak of the Crimean War. The Paris Congress that ended this war replaced the system of the Holy Alliance with a system
"European concert", i.e. coordinated decision system international issues circle of European great powers.

2.8 Results of the Vienna Congress.

A few days before Waterloo, on July 15, 1815, the last meeting of the Congress of Vienna took place and the signing of its “final act”. It seemed to the congress participants that they had created something very lasting. In fact, they built a building that soon began to crumble. The reactionary utopia of the congress was to keep this part of the world within the framework of the outdated system, regardless of the new relations of production or the twenty-five-year storm that destroyed the old foundations of absolutism and feudalism in Europe. This utopia underlay all the activities of the Congress.

Belgium was given to the Dutch king; Denmark was approved by German Schleswig and Holstein; Austria was given the purely Italian population of Lombardy and Venice; Germany remained divided into 38 independent states; Poland was again divided into three parts... Old dynasties were returning everywhere, trying to restore the old order.

European diplomats left Vienna with the knowledge that, although formally there were five “great powers” ​​in Europe, in reality the direction of the whole international politics concentrated in the hands of Russia, Austria and England. As for Prussia and France, they still had to make a lot of efforts to take a completely independent position. Metternich was one of those participants in the congress who - especially at first - were satisfied with the results of the work of the congress and were convinced of the strength of their achievements. Alexander was not at all confident in this strength. Immediately after the congress, he began to look for a form of constant communication and cooperation between the monarchs with the aim of organized defense of the old system.

For some time, it seemed not only to the Tsar, but to all of Europe that such a form was found in the “Holy Alliance.” But at the end of his life, Alexander became convinced of the fragility of the “union.”

The main participants of the congress parted with hostile feelings towards each other. More willingly than ever, Metternich repeated his usual judgment about the tsar: “the fickle character of the Russian emperor, who is offended over every trifle, and whose favor cannot be bought by any sacrifice, makes it extremely difficult for us, as for other powers, to make a serious and lasting friendship with the Russian Empire. Having internal resources that other civilized countries do not know..., having the opportunity to renounce any alliance with impunity and put an end to any war by recalling its army, Russia, thanks to its geographical and political situation should always arouse fears, especially under such a government, which has no firm principles, and which acts only on a whim, according to the circumstances of the moment.”

Alexander returned from the congress convinced that Metternich was a liar and a traitor and that Austria was a ready ally for any enemy who wanted to oppose Russia.

But Metternichism in Europe protected Arakcheevism in Russia, and Arakcheevism in Russia protected the Metternichian system in Europe. Both Alexander and Metternich had to hide their true mutual feelings far away, meet affectionately at congresses, and try to keep up. Metternich often forgot his own opinion about the strength of Russia, and it seemed to him that he was leading Alexander. So it might have seemed to Talleyrand that with his “principle of legitimism” he successfully defeated the tsar. Engels very astutely noted that it was precisely the principle of legitimism that Alexander used most of all to strengthen his influence in Europe. In the same way, Metternich had to make sure that the true ruler, on whom the strength of the entire edifice erected at the Congress of Vienna ultimately depends, is not he, but precisely this king, smiling affectionately, supposedly soft, but in fact stubborn, not caring for anyone. trusting, but now well aware of his strength. A king who occasionally scolds very viciously, but is most dangerous when he is especially kind.

Conclusion

Representatives of all European states, even the tiny German and Italian principalities, formally took part in the Congress of Vienna. But in reality, all decisions were made by the great powers: Russia, Austria, Prussia and England.

Each of these countries had their own interests.

The recent allies pursued completely different goals at the Congress of Vienna. Emperor Alexander I of Russia sought to increase his possessions. To do this, he wanted to create a Polish kingdom within the Russian Empire, uniting all Polish lands, including those that belonged to Prussia.

Austria, which sought dominance in Germany, did not want Saxony to join Prussia, realizing that in this case Prussia would become a very dangerous rival.

England, pursuing its traditional policy of maneuvering, was afraid of Russia's excessive strengthening.

France, in the person of Talleyrand, opposed the aspirations of Alexander I, since they contradicted the principle of legitimism, and only this principle prevented the dismemberment of France: it remained within its pre-revolutionary borders.

Talleyrand planned to ensure that Poland was restored either to the state of 1805 or to its state before the first partition, and Saxony was not dismembered. He failed to achieve this, but he completely won his main bet: bourgeois France not only was not snatched up piece by piece by the feudal-absolutist great powers, but also entered on an equal footing among the great European powers.

At the same time, the minister spread a wide network of intrigues aimed at turning Russia and Prussia against Austria and England.

Based on common interests, Austria, England and France entered into a secret alliance directed against Russia and Prussia. In addition, Talleyrand's efforts were aimed at restoring Franco-British relations. The signing of the Anglo-American peace treaty in Ghent on December 24, 1814, however, gave the British a free hand, and already on January 3, 1815, Talleyrand, Metternich and Castlereagh signed the “Secret Treaty on the Defensive Alliance concluded in Vienna between Austria, Great Britain and France , against Russia and Prussia." This agreement was aimed against increasing Russian influence in Europe. Nominally, it would be enough for one of these powers to declare war on Russia - and the Russians would have to face a coalition equal in strength to the anti-Napoleonic one.

In conclusion, it should be noted that during the work of the Vienna Congress, a system of international relations was created, which increased the manageability of these relations; The structure of this system was based on:

1) codification in international practice of the leading position of the great powers-members of the European Concert;

2) expanding the practice of diplomatic contacts, including at the highest level;

3) development of international law. From today's perspective, one cannot help but recognize the extreme weakness and ineffectiveness of this structure.

For example, regional and global security organizations were completely absent at that time; International monitoring was at an extremely primitive level; There was absolutely no such powerful means as, for example, peacekeeping operations.

However, the Congress of Vienna set a precedent for the regular convening of international great power conferences, during which the great powers were given the opportunity to discuss and find solutions to international problems. In the early years of the European Concert, mainly pan-European problems were discussed; in subsequent years, the powers convened their representatives to solve specific international problems (for example, the Paris Congress of 1856, at which the results of the Crimean War were summed up). At the same time, the powers took into account the decisions of the congresses - at least until new decisions were made (thus, the territorial establishments of the Congress of Vienna were ultimately canceled in the part that concerned Italy and Germany, but their cancellation was confirmed openly or tacitly consent of the great powers).

But it was not only more or less regular international conferences that distinguished the European concert system. Huge development occurred during that period various industries international law (from the regulation of navigation on international rivers in 1815 to the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War of 1900 - 1907).


List of used literature

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2 History of diplomacy. In 5 vols. Ed. 2nd. T. 1 / Ed. V. A. Zorina et al. M., 1959.

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4 Manfred A.Z. Napoleon Bonaparte. M., 2002.

5 Mussky I. A. 100 great diplomats. M., 2001.

6 Saunders E. One Hundred Days of Napoleon. M., 2002.

7 Tarle E.V. Talleyrand. M., 1992.

8 Tarle E.V. History of diplomacy, vol. 1, 2 - M., ed. “Enlightenment”, 1979, Narochitsky A.L., International relations of European states from 1794 to 1803. -M., ed. "International Relations", 1982.

9 Soloviev S.M. Emperor Alexander I. Politics and diplomacy, Leningrad, Leningrad State University Publishing House, 1991.

10 Great Soviet Encyclopedia. –M, 1976

11 Soloviev S.M. About history new Russia. M.: Education, 1993.

12 Malkov V.V. A manual on the history of the USSR for applicants to universities. M.: Higher School, 1985.

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14 Anisimov E.V., Kamensky A.B. Russia in the 18th - first half of the 19th centuries: History. Historian. Document. - M.: MIROS, 1994.


Tarle E.V. History of diplomacy, vol. 1, 2 - M., ed. "Enlightenment", 1979, p. 403-505;

Marx K. and Engels F., Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 668

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. –M, 1976, p. 619-621.



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