The first landing on the moon of the USSR. Soviet lunar program

Only a few years later, with a great delay relative to the United States, on August 3, the government decree approved the lunar manned program of the USSR and real large-scale work began on two parallel manned programs: a flyby of the Moon (“Proton” - “Zond/L1)” by 1967 and landing on it (N-1-L3) by 1968 with the start of flight design tests in 1966.

The resolution contained a complete list of all participants in the development of systems for L1 and L3 and prescribed multilateral work in which, it seemed, “no one is forgotten and nothing is forgotten.” Nevertheless, questions about the detailed distribution of work - who issues requirements to whom and for which systems - were debated and the answers to them were signed with private decisions and protocols for another three years.

The design of the L1 and L3 spacecraft and the N-1 rocket units, as well as the development of schemes for expeditions to and to the Moon, began even before the adoption of the program - in 1963. In two next year working drawings of the N-1 rocket were released and the first preliminary designs of lunar spacecraft appeared.

Dozens of government officials needed to understand the production and technical scale of the entire lunar program, determine the full volume of capital construction and make preliminary calculations total necessary costs. The economy of those years did not allow particularly accurate calculations. Nevertheless, experienced Gosplan economists, with whom Korolev usually consulted, warned that the real figures for the necessary costs would not pass through the Ministry of Finance and Gosplan. Not to mention the costs of a nuclear missile shield, it was necessary to find funds for new proposals for heavy missiles from Chelomey and Yangel.

The calculations submitted to the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were underestimated. Officials of the State Committee for Defense Equipment, the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee made it clear that the documents should not intimidate the Politburo with many billions. There should be no extra costs in the project estimate. Chelomey and Yangel began to prove that their projects were much cheaper. Pashkov, highly knowledgeable in Gosplan policies, advised:

Deploy production with at least four media per year, involve everyone who is needed in the work, but according to a single schedule. And then we will issue more than one resolution. It is unlikely that anyone would dare to close down a work of such magnitude. There will be success - there will be money! Involve as many businesses as possible without delay.

In order to understand the design contradictions between Korolev, Chelomey and Yangel, D. Ustinov instructed NII-88 to carry out an objective comparative assessment of the possibilities of lunar exploration using carrier variants N-1 (11A52), UR-500 (8K82) and R-56 (8K68). According to the calculations of Mozzhorin and his employees, in order to unconditionally ensure priority over the United States, it is necessary to assemble a 200-ton rocket system in orbit near the Earth with the help of three N-1s. To do this, you will need three N-1 missiles or twenty UR-500 missiles. In this case, a ship weighing 21 tons will land on the Moon and a ship weighing 5 tons will return to Earth. All economic calculations were in favor of N-1. Thus, N-1 became the main promising carrier for the implementation of the Soviet lunar program and, as it turned out later, the main reason for its failure.

• E-1 - collision with the Moon. Four launches. 1 partial success (Luna-1).
• E-1A - collision with the Moon (Luna-2).
• E-2 - photographing the far side of the Moon. The launch was planned for October-November 1958. Canceled.
• E-2A - photographing reverse side Moon using the Yenisei-2 photosystem. Completed (Luna-3).
• E-2F - canceled due to problems with the Yenisei-3 photosystem. The launch was scheduled for April 1960.
• E-3 - photographing the far side of the Moon. Launched in 1960.
• E-4 - Atomic explosion on the surface of the Moon. Canceled.
• E-5 - entry into lunar orbit. Was planned for 1960.
• E-6 - soft landing on the Moon. Was planned for 1960.
• E-7 - photographing the surface of the Moon from orbit. Was planned for 1960.

Implementation of the program

The program was implemented according to the same principles as in the United States. At first, attempts were made to reach the surface of the Moon using AMS.

With their help, it was planned to perform a number of important applied tasks:

• understand better physical properties lunar surface;
• study the radiation situation in near space;
• develop technologies for creating delivery vehicles;
• demonstrate a high level national science and technology.

However, unlike the Americans, some of the work, especially those related to the manned aspect of the program, was classified. Before this year, only a few Soviet sources (“Yearbook of TSB” and the encyclopedia “Cosmonautics”) casually mentioned that the “Zond” apparatus was an unmanned prototype of a ship for circling the Moon, and general and non-specific phrases about future landings of Soviet cosmonauts on the Moon were mentioned in official sources stopped appearing even earlier - after a year.

In addition, imperfect technology has necessitated redundancy. individual systems. Since a manned flight around the Moon and landing on its surface was a matter of prestige, it was necessary to take maximum measures to prevent casualties in case of emergency situations.

To study the lunar surface, as well as for detailed mapping of possible landing sites for Soviet lunar spacecraft, the Luna series of satellites (representing vehicles for various purposes) were created. Also, special versions of lunar rovers were designed to support landing expeditions.

Lunar Cosmonaut Squad

The lunar group of the Soviet detachment of civilian cosmonauts at the TsKBEM in the Cosmonaut Training Center was actually created in the year. At the same time, before the strictest secrecy was imposed on the Soviet lunar program, Tereshkova spoke to foreign journalists about this and the fact that Gagarin was initially the head of the group during a visit to Cuba. Since then, the group has been documented (as a department for training cosmonaut commanders and researchers for the lunar program), in May it was approved by the Military-Industrial Commission, and in February it was finally formed.

Manned flyby of the Moon (UR500K/Proton-L1/Zond complex)

In different design bureaus there were a number of projects to fly around the Moon, including several launches and assembly of a spacecraft in low-Earth orbit (before the advent of the Proton rocket) and direct flight around the Moon. For the implementation of the flight program, a project was selected and brought to the stage of the last unmanned development launches and flights from the newly created OKB-1 Korolev 7K-L1 spacecraft as part of the Soyuz family and the Chelomey OKB-52 Proton launch vehicle created somewhat earlier.

• submit a schedule for the production and testing of the UR-500 missile within a week;
• together with the heads of OKB-1 and OKB-52, S. P. Korolev and V. M. Chelomey, within two weeks, consider and resolve issues about the possibility of unifying the manned spacecraft being developed for flying around the moon and landing an expedition on its surface;
• within a month, submit the LCI program for the UR-500 rocket and manned spacecraft.

Nevertheless, both the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of General Machinery found it expedient to continue work based on the use of the Soyuz complex (7K, 9K, 11K) as another option for solving the problems of orbiting the Moon, and also instructed OKB-1 and OKB-52 to work out all the issues use of the UR-500K launch vehicle in the Soyuz complex program.

To fulfill the assignment of the Ministry and the issued instructions, during September-October, a comprehensive assessment of the state of work in OKB-52 and OKB-1 was carried out to implement the tasks of flying around the Moon with the involvement of employees of NII-88 (now TsNIIMASH), the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry, the heads of the Ministry, representatives of the government and the Central Committee of the CPSU. During the review, it became clear that OKB-52 is not able to resolve in a timely manner all issues related to the creation and testing of the UR-500 rocket, the rocket upper stage and the LK-1 lunar orbital vehicle. In OKB-1, on the contrary, the state of development of a manned spacecraft of type 7K and upper stage D for the N1-L3 complex was more favorable. This created the basis for the reorientation from OKB-52 to OKB-1 of work on the spacecraft and upper stage D for the flyby of the Moon, including solving a number of problems related to the implementation of the lunar expedition program carried out by the N1-L3 complex.

Flight schedule of 7K-L1 spacecraft (from the beginning of 1967):

There were turtles on the Zond-5 ship. They became the first living beings in history to return to Earth after flying around the Moon - three months before the Apollo 8 flight.

IN nervous conditions“lunar race”, due to the USSR conducting two unmanned flights around the Moon and concealing failures in the L1 program, the United States made a risky rearrangement in its lunar program and made a flyby flight before the previously planned complete testing of the entire Apollo complex in low-Earth orbit. The Apollo 8 lunar flyby was carried out without a lunar module (which was not yet ready) following the only near-Earth manned flight of an orbiter. This was the first manned launch for the Saturn 5 super-heavy launch vehicle.

In the USSR, to ensure priority for the world's first manned flight, the launch of the Zond-7 manned spacecraft as part of the L1 program was planned for December 8, 1968. Due to the fact that previous unmanned flights of the L1 spacecraft were completely or partially unsuccessful due to the lack of development of the ship and the carrier, such a risky flight was canceled - despite the fact that the crews wrote a statement to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee asking for permission to fly to the Moon immediately to get ahead of the United States . Even if permission had been received, the USSR would not have won the flyby stage of the “lunar race” - on January 20, 1969, when trying to launch the Zond-7 spacecraft in unmanned mode, the Proton launch vehicle exploded (the descent module was saved by the emergency rescue system) .

The last unmanned flight of the Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft, called Zond-8, was made in October, after which the L1 program was finally closed, since the non-stop flight Soviet cosmonauts The moon, after the Americans landed on it twice, lost its meaning.

Moon landing (complex N1-L3)

The leadership of the USSR set the task of ensuring priority also for the world's first landing on the Moon. This was provided for by the first decree of the year in general, and by decree from the beginning of the year the first expedition was prescribed for the third quarter of the year. The Soviet lunar landing program N1-L3 (parallel to the lunar flyby), which actually began in 1966, lagged far behind the American one, mainly due to problems with the carrier. The first two of the year (before the first American expedition), as well as the two subsequent ones, test launches of the new super-heavy launch vehicle N-1 ended in failure. The lunar orbital ship-module 7K-LOK of the L3 complex made one, and the lunar-landing ship-module T2K-LK made three test near-Earth unmanned launches after the first US landing. According to the N1-L3 program, which continued for some time even after the triumph of the United States, the first Soviet expedition could take place only in the year , followed by one to five subsequent ones.

A number of different lunar landing projects were considered: several launches and assembly of a lunar ship from compartments in low-Earth orbit, direct flight to the Moon (without undocking for about lunar orbit) etc. For a “direct” flight, OKB-52 Chelomeya proposed to develop its own ship LK-700 based on its carrier UR-700. This project was rejected as more technically complex and longer to implement. Due to greater developments and less technical risk, the Korolev Design Bureau N1-L3 project with a single-launch launch from the Earth and the division of ship-modules near the Moon into two - remaining on the lunar one - was selected and brought to the stage of unmanned test launches and flights. orbit and landing followed by takeoff and docking. During the development of this project, the “replanting” option with the launch of the entire L3 complex with one launch of the N-1 rocket, but without the cosmonauts, who were to be delivered on board the L3 by a separate launch of the Soyuz spacecraft, was considered as an option, but was ultimately rejected.

The main parts of the rocket and space system for landing on the Moon according to the N-1-L3 project were the Soyuz-7K-LOK lunar orbital ship, the LK lunar landing ship and the N1 super-heavy launch vehicle.

The lunar orbital vehicle was very similar and significantly unified with the near-Earth orbital vehicle Soyuz-7K-LOK and also consisted of a descent module, a living compartment, on which a special compartment was located with orientation and mooring engines and a docking system unit, instrumentation and energy compartments, which housed the “I” rocket unit and units of the oxygen-hydrogen power supply system fuel cells. The household compartment also served as an airlock during the astronaut’s transition to the lunar spacecraft through open space(after putting on the Krechet lunar suit).

The crew of the Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft consisted of two people. One of them had to go through outer space to the lunar ship and land on the Moon, and the second had to wait for the return of his comrade in lunar orbit.

The Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft was installed for unmanned flight tests on the N-1 carrier during its fourth (and last) launch in November, but due to a carrier accident it was never launched into space.

Lunar ship The LC consisted of a sealed cosmonaut cabin, a compartment with attitude control engines with a passive docking unit, an instrument compartment, a lunar landing unit (LAU) and rocket block E. The LC was powered by chemical batteries installed externally on the LPA frame and in the instrument compartment. The control system was built on the basis of an on-board digital computer and had a manual control system that allowed the astronaut to independently select the landing site visually through a special window. The lunar landing module had four legs - supports with honeycomb absorbers of excessive vertical landing speed.

The lunar spacecraft LK T2K was successfully tested three times in low-Earth orbit in unmanned mode under the names “Cosmos-379”, “Cosmos-398” and “Cosmos-434”, respectively, in November and February and August.

Flight schedule of L3 ships (from the beginning of the year):

In the USA, when developing powerful carriers of the Saturn series, very large volume ground testing of their individual components and assemblies. This allowed the Americans to carry out all test and manned launches of the Saturn 5 rocket without any accidents. The N-1 rocket was developed in the same way as previous less powerful launch vehicles: by eliminating the causes of malfunctions identified during test launches. However, for a structure of this size and complexity, this path turned out to be too long and expensive. A total of four launches of the N-1 rocket were made. All of them ended in accidents even before the end of the first stage. The real disaster was the second launch of the N-1: immediately after taking off from the ground, the rocket caught fire and fell on the launch complex, almost completely destroying it.

The last launch of the N-1 rocket took place on November 23, less than a month before the last flight to the Moon under the Apollo program. After which it was decided that the prospect of visiting the Moon was much later than that How the Americans completed their lunar program does not justify the effort and money spent on it. In May further work with the N-1 carrier - and with them the entire N-1-L3 program - were finally closed.

These photographic materials are some of the remaining evidence today that the USSR also tried to land a man on the Moon - obviously, after they could not do this, or, more precisely, did not have time to do it, the program was forgotten.

However, fortunately, few things disappear irrevocably and without a trace. The photographs that we can see show one of the laboratories of the Moscow Aviation Institute, as well as aerospace equipment, including spacecraft and landing lunar module.

The “Moon Race” is well known to many contemporaries: before American President John Kennedy initiated the launch of the Apollo program, Soviet Union noticeably ahead of the United States in matters of lunar exploration. In particular, in 1959 an automatic interplanetary station Luna 2, and in 1966 a Soviet satellite entered its orbit.

Like the Americans, Soviet scientists developed a multi-step approach to accomplishing the task. They also had two separate modules for orbit and landing.

While the Apollo 11 crew included three members, the entire burden of the Soviet lunar program had to rest on the shoulders of one cosmonaut - thus, the weight of the equipment was significantly reduced. In addition, there were other differences that made the Soviet apparatus lighter. First of all, these include the comparative simplicity of the design, the use of the same engine for landing and takeoff, as well as the lack of a direct connection between the orbital and lunar module. This meant that the astronaut would need to do a spacewalk to transfer to the lander before landing and, later, to climb back into the orbital module after returning from the Moon. After this, the lunar module was disconnected, and the spacecraft was sent to Earth without it.

The main reason that prevented Soviet side to land a man on the Moon, there were failures with launch vehicles. Although the first two test launches were successful, the rocket crashed during the third. In the fourth test, conducted in 1971, the test spacecraft returned to Earth on the wrong trajectory, ending up in Australian airspace, which could have caused an international scandal: Soviet diplomats allegedly had to convince the Australians that the object falling on them was the Cosmos-434 test space module, and not a nuclear warhead.

After several failures, the program became too expensive, and after the Americans presented the world with documentary evidence of the success of the Apollo 11 mission, it made no sense at all. As a result, space equipment has become something of a museum piece.

The Moon was destined to become the celestial body with which perhaps the most effective and impressive successes of humanity outside the Earth are associated. Direct Study natural satellite our planet began with the start of the Soviet lunar program. January 2, 1959 automatic station Luna 1 made its first flight to the Moon in history.

The first launch of a satellite to the Moon (Luna 1) was a huge breakthrough in space exploration, but main goal, flight from one celestial body to another was never achieved. The launch of Luna-1 provided a lot of scientific and practical information in the field space flights to others celestial bodies. During the flight of Luna-1, the second escape velocity was achieved for the first time and information was obtained about radiation belt Earth and outer space. In the world press, the Luna-1 spacecraft was called “Dream”.

All this was taken into account when launching the next satellite, Luna-2. In principle, Luna-2 almost completely repeated its predecessor Luna-1; the same scientific instruments and equipment made it possible to fill in data on interplanetary space and correct the data obtained by Luna-1. For the launch, the 8K72 Luna launch vehicle with the “E” block was also used. On September 12, 1959, at 6:39 a.m., the Luna-2 spacecraft was launched from the Baikonur RN Luna cosmodrome. And already on September 14 at 00 hours 02 minutes 24 seconds Moscow time, Luna-2 reached the surface of the Moon, making the first flight in history from the Earth to the Moon.

The automatic interplanetary probe reached the surface of the Moon east of the “Sea of ​​Clarity”, near the craters Aristil, Archimedes and Autolycus (selenographic latitude +30°, longitude 0°). As data processing based on orbital parameters shows, the last stage of the rocket also reached the lunar surface. Three symbolic pennants were placed on board Luna 2: two in the automatic interplanetary vehicle and one in the last stage of the rocket with the inscription “USSR September 1959”. Inside Luna-2 there was a metal ball consisting of pentagonal pennants, and upon impact lunar surface the ball scattered into dozens of pennants.

Dimensions: Total length was 5.2 meters. The diameter of the satellite itself is 2.4 meters.

RN: Luna (modification R-7)

Weight: 390.2 kg.

Objectives: Reaching the surface of the Moon (completed). Achieving the second escape velocity (completed). Overcome the gravity of planet Earth (completed). Delivery of "USSR" pennants to the surface of the Moon (completed).

JOURNEY INTO SPACE

"Moon" - name Soviet program exploration of the Moon and a series of spacecraft launched in the USSR to the Moon since 1959.

The first generation spacecraft (“Luna-1” - “Luna-3”) flew from the Earth to the Moon without first launching an artificial Earth satellite into orbit, making corrections on the Earth-Moon trajectory and braking near the Moon. The devices flew over the Moon (“Luna-1”), reached the Moon (“Luna-2”), flew around it and photographed it (“Luna-3”).

Second-generation spacecraft (“Luna-4” - “Luna-14”) were launched using more advanced methods: preliminary insertion into orbit of an artificial Earth satellite, then launch to the Moon, trajectory correction and braking in cislunar space. During the launches, they practiced flying to the Moon and landing on its surface (“Luna-4” - “Luna-8”), soft landing (“Luna-9” and “Luna-13”) and transferring into orbit an artificial lunar satellite (“Luna -10", "Luna-11", "Luna-12", "Luna-14").

More advanced and heavier third-generation spacecraft (“Luna-15” - “Luna-24”) flew to the Moon according to the scheme used by second-generation satellites; Moreover, to increase the accuracy of landing on the Moon, it is possible to make several corrections on the flight path from the Earth to the Moon and in the orbit of an artificial satellite of the Moon. The Luna devices provided the first scientific data on the Moon, the development of a soft landing on the Moon, the creation of artificial lunar satellites, the taking and delivery of soil samples to Earth, and the transportation of lunar self-propelled vehicles to the surface of the Moon. Creation and launch of various automatic lunar probes is a feature of the Soviet lunar exploration program.

MOON RACE

The USSR started the “game” by launching the first artificial satellite. The United States immediately became involved. In 1958, the Americans hastily developed and launched their satellite, and at the same time formed “for the benefit of all” - this is the motto of the organization - NASA. But by that time, the Soviets had overtaken their rivals even further - they sent the dog Laika into space, which, although it did not return, proved with its own heroic example the possibility of survival in orbit.

It took almost two years to develop a lander capable of delivering a living organism back to Earth. It was necessary to modify the structures so that they could withstand two “travels through the atmosphere”, to create a high-quality sealed and resistant high temperatures sheathing And most importantly, it was necessary to calculate the trajectory and design engines that would protect the astronaut from overloads.

When all this was done, Belka and Strelka got the opportunity to show their heroic canine nature. They completed their task - they returned alive. Less than a year later, Gagarin flew in their footsteps - and also returned alive. Americans in that 1961 airless space only Ham the chimpanzee was sent. True, on May 5 of the same year, Alan Shepard made a suborbital flight, but this achievement of space flight was not recognized by the international community. The first “real” American astronaut, John Glenn, ended up in space only in February 1962.

It would seem that the United States is hopelessly behind the “boys from the neighboring continent.” The triumphs of the USSR followed one after another: the first group flight, the first man in outer space, the first woman in space... And even the Soviet “Moons” reached the natural satellite of the Earth first, laying the foundations for the technique of gravitational maneuvers so important for current research programs and photographing the far side night luminary.

But it was possible to win such a game only by destroying the opposing team, physically or mentally. The Americans were not going to be destroyed. On the contrary, back in 1961, immediately after Yuri Gagarin’s flight, NASA, with the blessing of the newly elected Kennedy, set a course for the Moon.

The decision was risky - the USSR achieved its goal step by step, systematically and consistently, and still it did not do without failures. A space agency The US has decided to take a step, if not a whole flight of stairs. But America compensated for its, in a certain sense, arrogance by carefully working out the lunar program. The Apollos were tested on Earth and in orbit, while the USSR launch vehicles and lunar modules were “tested in combat” - and did not withstand the tests. As a result, the US tactics turned out to be more effective.

But the key factor that weakened the Union in the lunar race was the split within the “team from the Soviet court.” Korolev, on whose will and enthusiasm the astronautics rested, first, after his victory over the skeptics, lost his monopoly on decision-making. Design bureaus grew like mushrooms after rain on black soil unspoiled by agricultural cultivation. The distribution of tasks began, and each leader, whether scientific or party, considered himself the most competent. At first, the very approval of the lunar program was late - politicians, distracted by Titov, Leonov and Tereshkova, took up it only in 1964, when the Americans had already been thinking about their Apollo for three years. And then the attitude towards flights to the Moon turned out to be not serious enough - they did not have the same military prospects as the launches of Earth satellites and orbital stations, and they required much more funding.

Problems with money, as is usually the case, “finished off” grandiose lunar projects. From the very start of the program, Korolev was advised to underestimate the numbers before the word “rubles”, because no one would approve of the real amounts. If developments were as successful as previous ones, this approach would be justified. The party leadership still knew how to count and would not close a promising business in which too much has already been invested. But combined with a confused division of labor, the lack of funds led to catastrophic delays in schedule and savings in testing.

Perhaps the situation could be rectified later. The astronauts were burning with enthusiasm, even asking to be sent to the Moon on ships that did not survive the test flights. Design bureaus, with the exception of OKB-1, which was under the leadership of Korolev, demonstrated the inconsistency of their projects and quietly left the scene. The stable economy of the USSR in the 70s made it possible to highlight additional funds to refine the missiles, especially if the military got involved. However, in 1968, an American crew flew around the moon, and in 1969, Neil Armstrong took his small victorious step in the space race. The Soviet lunar program has lost its meaning for politicians.

Why didn't we end up on the moon? Most often you can hear about the imperfection of the technological base of Soviet industry, which was unable to create a rocket and spacecraft for the lunar project. It was reported that the Soviet Union was doomed to lose to the United States in the lunar race. But this is not entirely true. The main reason for the failure of the most expensive space project (4 billion rubles in 1974 prices) was the inconsistency of the actions of various departments and the ambitions of a number of leaders of that period.

Why did we need the Moon?

In reality, the Soviet lunar program was a symmetrical response to the American lunar program. The leaders of OKB-1 were absolutely not interested in the moon. Korolev and the N-1 rocket project were a modernized version of an earlier royal project. Intended for the delivery of a hydrogen super-bomb and for the launch of large-sized orbital complexes, the dimensions of which were supposed to be several times larger than the Soyuz and Mir that appeared later. It was completely unfeasible to implement the lunar program.

But the CPSU Central Committee decided to accept the challenge of the Americans. In 1960, a decree was issued by the Government Decree of June 23, 1960 “On the creation of powerful launch vehicles, satellites, spacecraft and space exploration in 1960-1967.” was planned to take place in the 1960s. design development and the necessary amount of research in order to create a new spacecraft in the coming years missile system with a launch mass of 1000-2000 tons, ensuring the launch of heavy interplanetary spacecraft into orbit around the Earth