Gorchakov Minister of Foreign Affairs biography. Prince Gorchakov: great chancellor of the empire, last lyceum student

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he managed to keep the Russian Empire away from acute European conflicts.

Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov is one of the best diplomats in Russian history. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he managed to keep the Russian Empire away from acute European conflicts and return his state to its former position as a great world power.
Rurikovich

Alexander Gorchakov was born into an old noble family, descended from the Yaroslavl Rurik princes. Having received a good education at home, he brilliantly passed the exam and was admitted to the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum. This was the first intake of the educational institution, which in the future included the most prominent people of their time. One of Gorchakov’s friends from the Lyceum was Pushkin, who wrote about his comrade “fashion’s pet, big world friend, a brilliant observer of customs.” For his excessive zeal and ambition, Sasha Gorchakov received the nickname “dandy” at the lyceum.

The liberal lyceum atmosphere nurtured the future diplomat valuable qualities, affecting his internal and foreign policy convictions in the future. While still at the Lyceum, he advocated the introduction and spread civil rights and freedoms and restrictions on serfdom. Already at the Lyceum, Gorchakov knew what he wanted and confidently set his sights on the diplomatic service. He was well educated, distinguished by his excellent knowledge of several languages, wit and breadth of outlook. In addition, young Gorchakov was extremely ambitious. He recalled his younger self with irony and claimed that he was so ambitious that he carried poison in his pocket if he was passed over.

Fortunately, Alexander did not have to use poison; he resolutely began his career. Already at the age of twenty-one, he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Tropau, Ljubljana and Verona. Gorchakov's career developed rapidly. By that time he hardly remembered about the poison in his pocket.

After Crimean War

Gorchakov's main achievements in the diplomatic service are associated with his work in settling international politics after the Crimean War, in which Russia's defeat put the country in a disadvantageous and even dependent position.
The international situation in Europe changed after the war. The Holy Alliance, in which Russia played a leading role, collapsed and the country found itself in diplomatic isolation. Under the terms of the Peace of Paris, the Russian Empire practically lost the Black Sea and lost the opportunity to station a fleet there. According to the article “on the neutralization of the Black Sea,” Russia’s southern borders remained exposed.

Gorchakov urgently needed to change the situation and take decisive steps to change Russia’s place. He understood that main task his activities after the Crimean War should be a change in the conditions of the Paris Peace, especially on the issue of neutralization of the Black Sea. The Russian Empire was still under threat. Gorchakov needed to look for a new ally. Prussia, which was gaining influence in Europe, became such an ally.
Gorchakov decides to make a “knight’s move” and writes a circular in which he unilaterally breaks the Paris Peace Treaty. He bases his decision on the fact that the remaining countries do not comply with the terms of previous agreements. Prussia supported the Russian Empire; it already had enough weight to influence the international situation. France and England were, of course, unhappy with this, but during the London Conference of 1871, the “neutrality of the Black Sea” was abolished. Russia's sovereign right to build and maintain a navy here was confirmed. Russia rose from its knees again.

Great Power Neutrality

The policy of neutrality has become a credo foreign policy Gorchakova. He himself repeated more than once: “There are no divergent interests that cannot be reconciled by zealously and persistently working on this matter in a spirit of justice and moderation.”
He managed to localize the flaring wars, preventing them from growing to a continental scale when crises broke out - Polish, Danish, Austrian, Italian, Cretan...

He knew how to keep Russia away from acute conflicts, protecting it from military involvement in European problems, for more than twenty years.
Meanwhile, Europe was rocked by endless conflicts: the Austro-Franco-Sardinian War (1859), the war of Austria and Prussia against Denmark (1865), Austro-Prussian War(1866), Austro-Italian War (1866), Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871).

Permission Polish crisis

The key link in European politics in the 60s of the 19th century was the Polish crisis, which erupted as a result of the strengthening of national liberation movements. Events in Poland served as a pretext for the intervention of France and England in Polish affairs: the governments of these countries demonstratively demanded that Russia meet the demands of the rebels. A noisy anti-Russian campaign developed in the English and French press. Meanwhile, weakened after the Crimean War, Russia could not afford to lose Poland as well, refusal of it could lead to collapse Russian Empire.

The culmination of the diplomatic battle came on June 5, 1863, when English, French and Austrian dispatches were handed over to Gorchakov. Russia was asked to declare an amnesty for the rebels, restore the constitution of 1815 and transfer power to an independent Polish administration. The future status of Poland was to be discussed at a European conference.
On July 1, Gorchakov sent reply dispatches: Russia denied the three powers the legitimacy of their third-party suggestions and vigorously protested against interference in its own internal affairs. The right to consider the Polish question was recognized only by the participants in the partitions of Poland - Russia, Prussia and Austria. Thanks to Gorchakov’s efforts, another anti-Russian coalition did not take shape.

He managed to play on the Anglo-French contradictions around the Vienna Convention of 1815, and on Austria's fear of getting into a new war. Poland and France were left alone. Overcoming the Polish crisis through classical and public diplomacy is considered to be the pinnacle of Gorchakov’s political career.

Finding a new ally

Against the background of the betrayal of Austria and the unfriendly neutrality of Prussia during the Crimean War, as well as international isolation following the conflict, the Russian Empire had an urgent need to find a new ally. It turned out to be the USA, one of the main enemies of England, which at that time was covered Civil War between North and South.
In 1863, Alexander II authorized a very risky action - the hidden transition of two squadrons Russian fleet to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, thereby demonstrating support for the North. For the fragile American statehood, the certainty of Russia's position turned out to be very useful. According to the organizers of the campaign, the expedition was designed to show the whole world Russia's self-confidence, despite the threats made against it in connection with Polish events. It was a real challenge.

Nevertheless, this bold step, at that time, gave Russia a new promising ally, to whom, subsequently, on Gorchakov’s initiative, Alaska would be sold. Today, this political move seems unjustified, but in the second half of the 19th century it made it possible to complete Alexander’s reform reforms and restore the country’s economy.

: Goa - Engraver. Source: vol. IX (1893): Goa - Engraver, p. 340-344 ( · index) Other sources: VE : MESBE :

Gorchakov(Prince Alexander Mikhailovich) - famous diplomat, Russian sovereign. Chancellor, b. July 4, 1798; was brought up in Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was Pushkin's comrade. In his youth, “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters), G., until his late old age, was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat; but, in addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also possessed a significant literary education, which was subsequently reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe. In 1820-22 he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Laibach and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a charge d'affaires, in 1833 - as an embassy adviser in Vienna. In 1841 he was sent to Stuttgart to arrange the proposed marriage of Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna with crown prince Württemberg, and after the marriage he remained envoy extraordinary there for twelve years. From Stuttgart he was able to closely follow the progress revolutionary movement V Southern Germany and the events of 1848-49. in Frankfurt am Main. At the end of 1850, he was appointed commissioner to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his previous post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence then dominated the political life of Germany. In the restored Union Sejm Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common world" Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close friends with the Prussian representative, Bismarck. Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Sejm after G., D. G. Glinka). G., like Nesselrode, did not share the passions of Emperor Nicholas on the Eastern issue, and the diplomatic campaign that had begun against Turkey aroused great fears in him; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts. In the summer of 1854, G. was transferred to Vienna, where at first he temporarily managed the embassy instead of Meyendorff, who was closely related to the Austrian minister, Count. Buol, and in the spring of 1855 he was finally appointed envoy to the Austrian court. This critical period, when Austria “surprised the world with its ingratitude” and was preparing to act together with France and England against Russia (under the treaty of December 2, 1854), the position of the Russian envoy in Vienna was extremely difficult and responsible. After the death of the emperor. Nicholas, a conference of representatives of the great powers was convened in Vienna to determine the conditions of peace; but the negotiations in which Drouin de Luis and Lord John Rossel participated did not lead to positive result, partly thanks to the art and perseverance of Germany, Austria again separated from the cabinets hostile to us and declared itself neutral. The fall of Sevastopol served as a signal for a new intervention by the Vienna cabinet, which itself, in the form of an ultimatum, presented Russia with well-known demands for an agreement with the Western powers. The Russian government was forced to accept the Austrian proposals, and in February 1856 a congress met in Paris to develop a final peace treaty.

The Treaty of Paris on March 18/30, 1856 ended the era of Russia's active participation in Western European political affairs. Count Nesselrode retired, and Prince G. was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (in April 1856). G. felt all the bitterness of defeat more than anyone else: he personally endured the most important stages of the struggle against political hostility Western Europe, in the very center of hostile combinations - Vienna. The painful impressions of the Crimean War and the Vienna conferences left their mark on G.'s subsequent activities as a minister. General views him for tasks international diplomacy could no longer seriously change; political program his position was clearly determined by the circumstances under which he had to take over the management of the ministry. First of all, it was necessary to observe great restraint in the early years, while great things were being accomplished. internal transformations; then Prince Gorchakov set himself two practical purposes- firstly, to repay Austria for its behavior in 1854-55, and secondly, to achieve gradual destruction Treaty of Paris.

In 1856, Prince. G. avoided participating in diplomatic measures against the abuses of the Neapolitan government, citing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign powers (circ. note 22/10 September); at the same time, he made it clear that Russia was not giving up its right to vote in European international issues, but was only gathering strength for the future: “La Russie ne boude pas - elle se recueille.” This phrase had great success in Europe and was accepted as an accurate description political situation Russia after the Crimean War. Three years later, Prince. G. stated that “Russia is leaving the position of restraint that it considered obligatory for itself after the Crimean War.” The Italian crisis of 1859 seriously worried our diplomacy: G. proposed convening a congress for a peaceful resolution of the issue, and when war turned out to be inevitable, he kept the minor German states from joining the policy of Austria and insisted on the purely defensive significance of the German Confederation (in note 15/27 May 1859). From April 1859, Bismarck was the Prussian envoy in St. Petersburg, and the solidarity of both diplomats regarding Austria did not remain without influence on the further course of events. Russia openly stood on the side of Napoleon III in his conflict with Austria over Italy. There was a noticeable turn in Russian-French relations, which was officially prepared by the meeting of the two emperors in Stuttgart in 1857. But this rapprochement was very fragile, and after the triumph of the French over Austria under Magenta and Solferino, G. again seemed to be reconciled with the Viennese cabinet. In 1860, he considered it timely to remind Europe of the disastrous state of Christian nations subject to the Turkish government, and expressed the idea of international conference for the revision of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris on this subject (Note 20/2 May 1860); He expressed at the same time that “events in the West responded in the East as encouragement and hope” and that “conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East.” The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature. In October of the same 1860, Prince. G. already speaks of the general interests of Europe, affected by the successes of the national movement in Italy; on the note 10 Oct. (Sept. 28) he hotly reproaches the Sardinian government for its actions regarding Tuscany, Parma, Modena: “this is no longer a question of Italian interests, but of the common interests inherent in all governments; this is a question that has a direct connection with those eternal laws, without which neither order, nor peace, nor security can exist in Europe. The need to fight anarchy does not justify the Sardinian government, because one should not go along with the revolution in order to take advantage of its inheritance.” Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, G. retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and involuntarily returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and Holy Alliance; but his protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. At the head of the Prussian government in September. 1862 Bismarck rose. Since then, the policy of our Minister has paralleled the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as far as possible. Prussia concluded a military convention with Russia on February 8. (March 27) 1863 to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against the Polish uprising. The intercession of England, Austria and France for the national rights of the Poles was decisively rejected by the prince. G., when it took the form of direct diplomatic intervention (in April 1863). Skillful and, in the end, energetic correspondence on the Polish issue gave G. the glory of a top diplomat and made his name famous in Europe and Russia. This was the highest, culminating point of the prince’s political career. G. Meanwhile, his ally, Bismarck, began to implement his program, equally taking advantage of both the dreamy gullibility of Napoleon III and the constant friendship and assistance of the Russian minister. The Schleswig-Holstein dispute escalated and forced the cabinets to postpone concerns about Poland. Napoleon III again floated his favorite idea of ​​a congress (at the end of October 1863) and again proposed it shortly before the formal break between Prussia and Austria (in April 1866), but without success. Book G., approving the French project in principle, objected both times to the practical expediency of the congress under the given circumstances. A war began, which with unexpected speed led to the complete triumph of the Prussians. Peace negotiations were carried out without any interference from other powers; The idea of ​​a congress came to the prince. G., but was immediately abandoned by him, due to his reluctance to do anything unpleasant to the victors. Moreover, Napoleon III this time abandoned the idea of ​​a congress in view of Bismarck’s tempting secret promises regarding territorial rewards for France.

The brilliant success of Prussia in 1866 further strengthened its official friendship with Russia. Antagonism with France and mute opposition from Austria forced the Berlin cabinet to firmly adhere to the Russian alliance, while Russian diplomacy could completely retain freedom of action and had no intention of imposing on itself unilateral obligations beneficial exclusively for the neighboring power. The Candiot uprising against Turkish oppression, which lasted almost two years (from the autumn of 1866), gave Austria and France a reason to seek rapprochement with Russia on the basis of the eastern question; the Austrian minister Count Beist even admitted the idea of ​​revising the Treaty of Paris for the general improvement of the life of Christian subjects of Turkey. The project of annexing Candia to Greece found support in Paris and Vienna, but was coldly received in St. Petersburg. The demands of Greece were not satisfied, and the matter was limited to the transformation of the local administration on the ill-fated island, allowing for some autonomy of the population. For Bismarck, it was completely undesirable for Russia to achieve anything in the East before the expected war in the West with the assistance of outside powers. Prince G. saw no reason to exchange Berlin friendship for any other; Having decided to follow Prussian policy, he chose to surrender to it with confidence, without doubts or worries. However, serious political measures and the combinations did not always depend on the minister or the chancellor, since the personal feelings and views of the sovereigns constituted a very important element in the international politics of that time. When the prelude to bloody struggle, Prince G. was in Wildbad and - according to the testimony of our diplomatic body, “Journal de St. Pétersbourg,” was no less amazed than others by the unexpectedness of the gap between France and Prussia. “Upon my return to St. Petersburg. he could only fully join the decision taken by Emperor Alexander II to keep Austria from participating in the war in order to avoid the need for intervention from Russia. The Chancellor expressed only regret that reciprocity of services had not been agreed upon with the Berlin cabinet for the proper protection of Russian interests” (“Journ. de St. Pet.”, March 1, 1883). The Franco-Prussian war was considered inevitable by everyone, and both powers had been openly preparing for it since 1867; therefore, the absence of preliminary decisions and conditions regarding such important issue, as support for Prussia in its struggle with France. Obviously, Prince G. did not foresee that the empire of Napoleon III would be so brutally defeated; and yet the Russian government took the side of Prussia in advance and with complete determination, risking drawing the country into a clash with victorious France and its ally Austria and not caring about any specific benefits for Russia, even in the event of the complete triumph of Prussian weapons. Our diplomacy not only kept Austria from interfering, but carefully protected the freedom of the military and political action Prussia throughout the continuation of the war, until the final peace negotiations and the signing of the Frankfurt Treaty. The gratitude of Wilhelm I, expressed in a telegram on February 14/26, 1871 to the Emperor, is understandable. Alexander II. Prussia achieved its cherished goal and created a powerful new empire with the significant assistance of Prince G., and the Russian chancellor took advantage of this change in circumstances to destroy the 2nd article of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea. The dispatch of October 17 / 29, 1870, notifying the cabinets of this decision of Russia, caused a rather sharp response from Lord Grenville, but all the great powers agreed to revise the said article of the Treaty of Paris and again allow Russia to keep a navy in the Black Sea, which was what happened approved by the London Conference in 1871

After the defeat of France, the mutual relations between Bismarck and Gorchakov changed significantly: the German chancellor outgrew his old friend and no longer needed him. From this time on, a series of bitter disappointments began for Russian diplomacy, which gave a sad, melancholy shade to everything. last period activities of G. Anticipating that the Eastern question would not be slow to arise again in one form or another, Bismarck hastened to arrange a new political combination with the participation of Austria as a counterweight to Russia in the East. Russia's entry into this triple alliance, which began in September. 1872, made Russian foreign policy dependent not only on Berlin, but also on Vienna, without any need for that. Austria could only benefit from the constant mediation and assistance of Germany in relations with Russia, and Russia was left to protect the so-called pan-European, i.e., essentially the same Austrian, interests, the range of which was increasingly expanding in the Balkan Peninsula. Having bound himself to this system of preliminary agreements and concessions, Prince G. allowed or was forced to allow the country to be drawn into a difficult, bloody war, with the obligation not to derive any corresponding benefit from it for the state and to be guided in determining the results of victory by the interests and desires of alien and partly hostile cabinets. In minor or extraneous matters, such as, for example, in the recognition of the government of Marshal Serrano in Spain in 1874, Prince. G. often disagreed with Bismarck, but in the essential and most important things he still trustingly obeyed his suggestions. A serious disagreement occurred only in 1875, when the Russian chancellor assumed the role of guardian of France and general peace from the encroachments of the Prussian military party and officially informed the powers of the success of his efforts in a note on April 30 (May 12) of the same year. Book Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria and, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, Triple Alliance again came into his own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

In April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of authority from Europe, so that the paths to independent and open defense of Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifices of the two-year campaign were cut off in advance. Prince G. promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England it was entrusted to gr. Shuvalov to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests. Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. The Treaty of San Stefano on February 19 (March 3), 1878 created a vast Bulgaria, but increased Serbia and Montenegro with only small territorial increments, leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish authorities and did not give anything to Greece, so that almost all the Balkan nationalities were extremely dissatisfied with the treaty, and precisely those who made the most sacrifices in the fight against the Turks - the Serbs and Montenegrins, the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians. The Great Powers had to intercede for the offended Greece, make territorial gains for the Serbs and arrange the fate of the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, whom Russian diplomacy had in advance placed under the rule of Austria (according to the Reichstadt Agreement of July 8/June 26, 1876). There could be no question of avoiding the congress, as Bismarck managed after Sadovaya. England was apparently preparing for war. Russia proposed to the German Chancellor to organize a congress in Berlin; between gr. Shuvalov and the Marquis of Salisbury reached an agreement on May 30/12 regarding issues to be discussed between the powers. At the Berlin Congress (from June 1/13 to July 1/13, 1878), Prince G. rarely and rarely participated in meetings; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; book G. also spoke out for the occupation (meeting June 16/28). The German Chancellor supported everything positively stated Russian demand, but could not, of course, go further than Russian diplomats in protecting political interests Russia - and our diplomacy, from the beginning of the crisis to the end, acted without clearly defined goals and without deliberate methods of execution. Blaming Bismarck for our military-political mistakes and shortcomings would be too naive; he himself was sure that Russia would put an end to this time eastern question and will be able to take advantage of the principle of “beati possidentes”, giving Austria and England a certain share of participation in the Turkish inheritance. Prince G. cared primarily about the consent of the powers, about the interests of Europe, about the selflessness of Russia, which, however, did not require such bloody and difficult evidence as war. The destruction of individual articles of the Treaty of Paris, which was more a matter of diplomatic pride than a serious state interest, came to the fore. Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as the main culprit of our failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna. Political career Prince Gorchakov ended with the Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He died in Baden on February 27. 1883. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, in March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

To correctly assess Gorchakov’s entire activity, it is necessary to keep in mind two circumstances. Firstly, its political character was developed and finally established during the reign of Emperor Nicholas, in that era when it was considered obligatory for Russia to take care of the fate of various European dynasties, to work for balance and harmony in Europe, even to the detriment of the real interests and needs of its own country . Secondly, Russian foreign policy is not always directed solely by the foreign minister. Next to Gorchakov, although under his nominal leadership, Count Ignatiev and Count acted on behalf of Russia. Shuvalov, who had little agreement among themselves and were hardly in solidarity with the Chancellor himself in many respects: this lack of unity was expressed especially sharply in the drafting of the Treaty of San Stefano and in the way it was defended at the congress. Book G. was a sincere supporter of peace and, nevertheless, had to, against his will, bring matters to war. This war, as was stated frankly in the Journal de St.-Pétersbourg after his death, “was a complete overthrow of all political system book Gorchakov, which seemed to him mandatory for Russia for many years to come. When war became inevitable, the Chancellor stated that he could guarantee Russia against a hostile coalition only under two conditions - namely, if the war was short and if the goal of the campaign was moderate, without crossing the Balkans. These views were accepted by the imperial government. Thus we were undertaking a half-war, and it could only lead to half-peace.” Meanwhile, the war turned out to be real and very difficult, and its comparative futility was partly the result of the semi-politics of Prince Gorchakov. His hesitations and half-measures reflected, as it were, a struggle between two directions - the traditional, ambitiously international one, and the practical one, based on an understanding of the internal interests of the state. This vagueness of the initial point of view and the absence of a precise practical program were revealed primarily in the fact that events were never foreseen in advance and always took us by surprise. Bismarck's sober, vital methods did not have a noticeable impact on the diplomacy of the prince. Gorchakova. The latter still adhered to many outdated traditions and remained a diplomat of the old school, for whom a skillfully written note is a goal in itself. The pale figure of G. could seem bright only due to the absence of his rivals in Russia and the calm course of political affairs.

Since with the name of the prince. G. is closely related political history Russia during the reign of the Emperor. Alexander II, then information and discussions about him can be found in every historical essay, relating to Russian politics over this quarter of a century. A more detailed, although very one-sided, characterization of our chancellor in comparison with Bismarck was made in the famous French book by Julian Klyachko: “Deux Chanceliers. Le prince Gortschakoff et le prince de Bismarck" (P., 1876).

02/27/1883 (03/12/2018). – Diplomat Prince died. A.M.Gorchakov

Gorchakov and Russian politics in Europe

(4.6.1798–27.2.1883) - His Serene Highness Prince, Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Chancellor of Russia, came from a family. Born on June 4, 1798 in the family of a major general. He studied at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum and was a classmate. In 1817 he entered the diplomatic service and took part in the work of congresses. In 1824 he was appointed first secretary at the Russian embassy in London, in 1827 he was transferred to the same position in Rome, then served in the embassies in Berlin, Florence and Vienna. All this allowed him to thoroughly study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe.

His fate was especially connected with Germany, which at that time consisted of many small monarchies. In 1841 he was sent to Stuttgart to arrange a marriage Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna with the Crown Prince of Württemberg, and after the wedding he remained envoy extraordinary there for twelve years. From the end of 1850, he also served as envoy extraordinary to the German Confederation in Frankfurt am Main (until 1854); made efforts to strengthen Russian influence in German states connected with Russia by dynastic ties; during this period he became close to O. Bismarck, the Prussian representative to the German Confederation, which later played a role important role for both countries. In 1854, at the Vienna Conference, Gorchakov managed to prevent Austria from entering the war on the side of Russia's opponents.

After Russia's humiliating defeat in March 1856, the era of Russia's active participation in Western European political affairs ended. It was at this moment in April 1856 that Gorchakov headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replacing K. Nesselrode, who had ruled there for 40 years. He had a reputation as a person who cared little about the interests of Russia and did not hide his pro-Austrian sympathies. During his time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employed many foreigners who were also of little interest in the fate of Russia. Nesselrode valued above all the consent of the monarchs of Europe, when the interests of an individual country were subordinated to common objectives.

Gorchakov not only replaced him, but also decisively changed this “internationalist” policy to a distinctly Russian one throughout his 25-year leadership of the Foreign Ministry. In the famous circular Russian ambassadors V European capitals dated August 21, 1856, Gorchakov formulated the basic principle of the new political course for the first time as “Russia is concentrating.” This meant that she was only temporarily abandoning her previous active role and traditional politics while recovering from the losses she had suffered. At the same time, A. M. Gorchakov stated that Russia would no longer sacrifice its interests for the sake of selfish goals alien to it. Gorchakov intended to strengthen the Christian legal foundations international relations: “It is less permissible than ever before in Europe to forget that rulers are equal among themselves and that it is not the size of territories, but the sanctity of the rights of each of them that lies at the basis of the relationships that can exist between them.”

The main task of Russian foreign policy in that period was the struggle for the revision and abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Peace Treaty, which consolidated the results of the Crimean War, which was unsuccessful for Russia (neutralization of the Black Sea and the ban on Russia from maintaining the Black Sea Navy). Gorchakov managed to achieve this by playing on the contradictions of the European powers.

After Napoleon III’s attempt to use it to the detriment of Russia’s interests, Gorchakov began a rapprochement with Prussia, whose government was headed by Bismarck and relations with which became the most friendly in the entire Russian-German history. Prussia supported Russia in the fight against the Polish uprising. In exchange for Russia's promise not to interfere with the unification of Germany under Prussian supremacy (otherwise this would not have happened), Bismarck pledged to assist in revising the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty. The defeat of France by Prussia with diplomatic assistance from Russia allowed Bismarck to proclaim a united German Empire(led by the Prussian Kaiser Wilhelm I), and Gorchakov - to announce the abandonment of the restrictions of the Treaty of Paris (Russia's rights in the Black Sea were restored at the London Conference). The highest stage in the political rapprochement of Russia with Germany and Austria-Hungary was (1873), and if it had turned out to be lasting, the Jewish bankers would not have been able to provoke it. But united Germany decided that it no longer needed Russia.

To others important direction Gorchakov's policy was to protect Christian peoples from the Turks in the Balkans. Gorchakov managed to ensure the neutrality of the European powers during the successes of the Russian troops led to the conclusion. However, at the Berlin Congress (June-July 1878) he had to, despite the victory of Russian weapons and the achievement of independence from Turkey of the Balkan states, make serious concessions in the face of a united front of Western powers, including already unfriendly Germany, in particular, agree to the occupation of Austria -Hungary Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Diplomatic successes and the growth of Russia’s international authority strengthened A.M.’s position. Gorchakov in the ruling circles of the Empire. In 1862 he became a member State Council and vice-chancellor, in 1867 - chancellor. wrote about Gorchakov: “Standing guard of Russian honor and Russian interests..., you not only managed to restore the proper importance of Russia among the great European Powers, but also achieved, without sacrifice or bloodshed, the abolition of the embarrassing consequences of the difficult Crimean War for us.” The Emperor noted the “patriotism of a loyal and devoted employee to the true interests of Russia,” who “with complete triumph brought our dear fatherland out of the difficulties generated by the claims of foreign cabinets to interfere in our internal affairs.” The monarch especially noted the active participation that Gorchakov took “in the great cause of the revival of Christian peoples on the Balkan Peninsula.”

Since 1879, Gorchakov retired due to illness, and in 1882 he retired. During his service he was awarded all the highest Russian orders and many foreign awards, and was also awarded the title of His Serene Highness Prince (1871). He died on February 27, 1883 in Baden-Baden, and was buried in St. Petersburg. He left a memory of himself as outstanding diplomat, who not only managed to bring the state out of difficult foreign policy situation, but also laid the foundations of Russian national foreign policy.

Origin

The surviving documents leave the question of the origin of the Gorchakovs open, because Early generations, due to their insignificance, are mentioned in sources very sporadically. Moreover, in the documents of the 1st half XVI centuries, the nickname “Gorchak” was worn by several princes at once. Hoping to resolve this difficulty, P. N. Petrov tried to remove the Gorchakovs from the Yaroslavl princes Mortkins (which, however, is contradicted by the location of the Gorchakov estates in the upper reaches of the Oka, in particular, in the Bolkhov district). It cannot be ruled out that all three main branches of the Gorchakovs have completely different origins.

The nickname of the ancestor of the princely family “Gorchak” can be explained from the name of the fish “gorchak” (from the word “bitter”) or from the name of the plant, better known today as bison. N. A. Baskakov admits Turkic origin this nickname.

Three branches

To late XVIII centuries, the Gorchakov family did not belong to the highest aristocracy. In pre-Petrine times, its representatives served at best as stolniks and governors; of their number, only one okolnichy is known. According to the research of G. A. Vlasyev, first branch The Gorchakovs (the only one still existing) are descendants of the prince Ivan Fedorovich Gorchak, who in 1538 was the governor of Karachev, in 1563-64. - governor in Ryazhsk.

• His son is a prince Pyotr Ivanovich Gorchakov in 1592 he built the city of Pelym in the Urals, and 2 years later - Tabory on Tavda. One of the leaders of the defense of Smolensk against the Poles. Died in Polish captivity.
  • Prince Dmitry Petrovich(d. 1642), the son of the previous one, was a commander at Black Yar and at the Dubensky outposts.
    • Vasily Dmitrievich, the son of the previous one, served with his brother Nikita, the patriarch, then the royal steward; in 1644-47 fought in Samara; All the Gorchakovs of modern times descend from his son Fyodor Vasilyevich.
    • Vasily Andreevich, nephew of Dmitry Petrovich (and cousin previous), governor in Tsaritsyn (1643-47), then in Tara.
      • His son Boris Vasilievich(d. 1695), since 1653 he has been mentioned as a voivode (in Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod, Astrakhan and other cities), finished his career with the rank of okolnik. He married his daughter and heiress Anastasia to Prince A.I. Volkonsky.

Second branch The Gorchakov princes originate from the nobleman of the Moscow prince Savva Yuryevich. From his descendants it is known Savva Semyonovich, steward and governor in Voronezh (1696). His son Fedor Savvich, steward and then captain (1740), left three daughters. Last Representative this branch, by name Vasily Sergeevich, also lived in the first half of the 18th century.

Third branch princes Gorchakov dates back to Danila Ivanovich, Belevsky landowner, one of whose grandchildren, steward and then colonel Pyotr Mikhailovich, was killed in the Battle of Poltava. He and his brother Roman died childless. Prince Danila Ivanovich has two daughters from his son Mikhail Danilovich: Princess Anna Mikhailovna was married to Mikhail Elizarovich Kamynin and died before 1742, leaving no children behind, and Princess Sofya Mikhailovna was married to Yuri Semenovich Lavrov, who died before 1742. Her children Peter and Sergei Yuryevich Lavrov in 1742 received an inheritance after their aunt Anna Mikhailovna Kamynina (Princess Gorchakova).

Gorchakovs XVIII-XIX centuries.

All Gorchakovs of modern times descend from the stolnik Fedor Vasilievich(1646-1699, son of Vasily Dmitrievich, see above) and his wife Nastasya Fedorovna, née Baskakova:

1. Prince Roman Fedorovich Gorchakov(1689-177), state councilor, married to Maria Ivanovna Trakhaniotova.
   1. Ivan Romanovich(1716-1801), lieutenant general; married to Anna Vasilyevna Suvorova, sister of the Prince of Italy.
      1. Alexey Ivanovich(1769-1817), general of infantry, minister of war in 1812; married to a prince Varvara Yuryevna Dolgorukova.
         1. Lidia Alekseevna(1807-26), wife of Count Vasily Alekseevich Bobrinsky, grandson of Catherine II.
      2. Andrey Ivanovich(1776-1855), infantry general, had no children in his late marriage with his cousin, Princess Varvara Suvorova.
      3. Agrafena Ivanovna(1768-1843), wife of the poet Count Dmitry Ivanovich Khvostov.
2. Prince Ivan Fedorovich Gorchakov(1694-1750), lieutenant colonel, governor in Suzdal, younger brother Prince Roman Fedorovich; married to Princess Tatyana Grigorievna Mortkina
   1. Nikolai Ivanovich(1725-1811), second major, leader of the nobility in Chernsky district; married to Ekaterina Alexandrovna Lukina.
      1. Pelageya Nikolaevna(1762-1838), heiress of the Nikolskoye-Vyazemskoye estate, wife of Count Ilya Andreevich Tolstoy, grandmother of Leo Tolstoy.
      2. Natalya Nikolaevna, wife of Major General Leonty Ivanovich Depreradovich.
      3. Vasily Nikolaevich(1771-18..), major general, exiled to Siberia for forging bills.
         1. Ekaterina Vasilievna, wife of Count Lev Alekseevich Perovsky.
   2. Pavel Ivanovich(1730-97), major
      1. 1. Nikolay Pavlovich(1830-1919), great-grandson of the previous one, major general
            1. His son Nikolai Nikolaevich(1856-1919), colonel, shot by the Bolsheviks.
   3. Pyotr Ivanovich(1722-after 1763), lieutenant of the Astrakhan Dragoon Regiment, owner of the village of Sofontevo
   4. Alexey Ivanovich(1737-1805), collegiate assessor; married to Anna Ivanovna Peshchurova

The offspring of Dmitry Petrovich

Prince Dmitry Petrovich Gorchakov(1758-1824), Kostroma vice-governor, writer; married to Natalya Fedorovna Boborykina

1. Pyotr Dmitrievich(1789-1868), infantry general, governor general Western Siberia; married to Natalya Dmitrievna Cherevina.
   1. Dmitry(1831-71), married to Prince. Elizaveta Alexandrovna Lvova.
      1. Olga, wife of D.N. Sverbeev Jr.
   2. Evdokia, wife of the Volyn governor P. N. Klushina.
   3. Varvara, wife of Jägermeister S.S. Sheremetev.
   4. Natalia, wife of Colonel A.F. Uvarov.
   5. Olga, wife of V. G. Bezobrazov; their grandson is the poet V. A. Komarovsky.
2. Mikhail Dmitrievich(1793-1861), artillery general, governor of the Kingdom of Poland; married to Agafoklea Nikolaevna Bakhmeteva
   1. Nikolai(1823-74), nicknamed the "hairy prince"
   2. Varvara, wife of V. N. Pankratiev
   3. Natalia, wife of General A. D. Stolypin, mother of Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin
   4. Sofia, wife of Baron E. E. Staal, ambassador to Great Britain.
   5. Olga, wife of Baron F. K. Meyendorff, mother of politician A. F. Meyendorff
3. Sergey Dmitrievich(1794-1873), colonel, state councilor; married to Anna Aleksandrovna Sheremeteva; the entire family is introduced in L. Tolstoy’s first story under the name of the Kornakov princes.
   1. Elena Sergeevna(1824-97), poetess
   2. Dmitry Sergeevich(1828-1907), master of the horse, owner and organizer of the Baryatino estate; married to Vera Ivanovna Beck.
      1. Sergey Dmitrievich(1861-1927), Vyatka and Kaluga governor, actual state councilor.

The offspring of Alexander Mikhailovich

His Serene Highness Prince Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov(1798-1883), Chancellor of the Russian Empire, ancestor of the Most Serene Princes Gorchakov; married to a prince Maria Alexandrovna Urusova, widow of the count

Alexander Gorchakov was born on June 15, 1798 in the Estonian city of Gapsala in the family of Major General Prince Mikhail Gorchakov and Baroness Elena Dorothea Fersen.

“Gorchakov came from an aristocratic family, albeit not a very rich one, and this largely determined him later life", the candidate said in an interview with RT historical sciences, Associate Professor, Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov Oleg Airapetov.

The young prince received his education at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he studied.

However, historians note that, contrary to some stories, Gorchakov was not a close friend of Pushkin.

According to the reviews of his contemporaries, Gorchakov, who was very capable in various fields of knowledge, nevertheless envied Pushkin’s literary talent and, at any opportunity, tried to emphasize his noble origin in the presence of the poet.

“Nevertheless, when Pushkin was sent into exile, Gorchakov was not afraid to visit him in 1825. This is a worthy act for a young official. Although their relationship was still cool then,” Airapetov noted.

• A.S. Pushkin. Portrait of Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov (1798-1883), future Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire and Chancellor

Despite this, the poet dedicated several famous poems to his lyceum friend, calling him “happy from the first days” and “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world.” It is interesting that of the entire “Pushkin” issue, the most long life It was Gorchakov who lived. It so happened that these lines of the great poet were addressed to him:

“Which of us, in our old age, has the day of the Lyceum
Will you have to celebrate alone?
Unhappy friend! among new generations
The annoying guest is both superfluous and alien,
He will remember us and the days of connections,
Closing my eyes with a trembling hand..."

"Solid back"

In 1819, Gorchakov entered service with the rank of chamber cadet. As his teachers said, he was destined to realize himself precisely as a diplomat. In the early 1820s, he was an official under the head of the Russian foreign policy department, Count Karl Nesselrod. Subsequently, Gorchakov served as secretary of the embassies in London and Rome, and also served in various diplomatic posts in Berlin, Florence and Vienna.

“Gorchakov was distinguished by a special feature that, unfortunately, was not characteristic of many other officials both in his era and in other times. He was a man with a strong back, not inclined to bend in front of anyone,” Airapetov noted in a conversation with RT.

The young diplomat did not curry favor with Nesselrode, and when, during a visit to Vienna, Count Alexander Benckendorff, chief of gendarmes and one of those closest to Nicholas I statesmen, demanded that Gorchakov serve him lunch, he defiantly rang the bell and noted that it is customary to address such issues to the servants. However, such “obstinacy” caused the promising diplomat a lot of trouble.

In 1838, Gorchakov proposed to the niece of his boss Dmitry Tatishchev, Maria, the widow of Ivan Musin-Pushkin and one of the first beauties of Russia. However, Tatishchev, who was looking for a more profitable match for his relative, was set against Gorchakov by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Metternich, who did not like the young diplomat for his intransigence and emphasized “Russianness.” Therefore, in order to get married, Gorchakov pointedly submitted his resignation. And Nesselrode accepted him without question.

• MM. Duffinger. Maria Alexandrovna Musina-Pushkina (detail of miniature)

After the wedding, Gorchakov decided to return to service, but it turned out to be difficult. He was never confirmed as envoy to Ottoman Empire, despite the help of sister Sofia Radziwill and father-in-law Alexander Urusov, the president of the Moscow Palace Office.

“Because of his character, Gorchakov found himself locked into relatively minor envoy positions in the principalities of the German Confederation for more than a decade,” Airapetov said.

Career rise

In 1854, during the Crimean War, Gorchakov served as Russian envoy in Vienna. A year later, he was officially confirmed in this post.

“It was a very responsible place, and Gorchakov showed himself worthily there,” noted Airapetov.

Austria, despite the help that Russia provided it during the revolution of 1848, supported the actions of England and France in the Crimean War. And Gorchakov made every effort to ensure that Vienna did not take new anti-Russian steps. After the death of Nicholas I Russian diplomats they even achieved Austria's transition to a policy of neutrality.

“Gorchakov did not go to the Paris Congress, which resulted in the adoption of enslaving conditions for Russia on the demilitarization of the Black Sea and the seizure of lands in Bessarabia. The diplomats of the outgoing era of Nicholas I had to turn this page. Gorchakov, with whom the future of Russian foreign policy was linked, had nothing to do there,” the expert emphasized.

• Fragment of the panorama “Defense of Sevastopol”

After the end of the Crimean War, Count Nesselrode resigned, and his successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs was Gorchakov, who had proven himself well in Vienna.

“Although Gorchakov is often contrasted with Nesselrode in historiography, this is not entirely true. They were both, as befits diplomats, “people of nuance.” The program tasks that Gorchakov set for the Foreign Ministry largely duplicated what Nesselrode planned to do. He then needed to avoid worsening relations with Austria, improve relations with Prussia and improve relations with France,” said Airapetov.

Also on topic

Two hundred years ago, Russian military engineer Eduard Totleben was born. During the Crimean War, he led the defensive work in...

Gorchakov needed to change the conditions of the political combination that had developed at any cost. This period of his activity dates back to the famous statement that Russian diplomacy plans to regain control of the Black Sea and Bessarabia without money and without shedding a drop of Russian blood, as well as the words: “Russia is not angry, Russia is concentrating.”

True, historians admit that at first Gorchakov made a mistake in believing that the French Emperor Napoleon III would support Russia. However, he made only vague promises, primarily solving his own foreign policy problems. During the Polish uprising of 1863, France, together with Great Britain and Austria, once again took a tough anti-Russian position. The only European power to side with St. Petersburg was Prussia.

After the Austro-Prussian-Italian War, which led to the strengthening of Prussia, its relations with France deteriorated sharply. For the French united Germany posed a danger, and a new war was almost inevitable. In this confrontation, Russia relied on Prussia, although domestic diplomats did not rule out that Paris and Vienna would gain the upper hand and then act against the Russians. However, France was the loser.

“Alexander II and Gorchakov decided that both victorious Germany and defeated France no longer cared about the demilitarization of the Black Sea, and England itself would not dare to active actions. And Russia announced that it would no longer comply with the demands of the Paris Congress,” Leonid Lyashenko, candidate of historical sciences, professor of the Department of Russian History at Moscow State Pedagogical University, told RT.

Gorchakov kept his promise. Russia actually reversed the decisions of the Paris Congress bloodlessly and without expense. According to Oleg Airapetov, this was “the peak of Minister Gorchakov’s career.”

For his achievements, the diplomat was awarded the title of lordship, as well as the highest civilian rank of the Russian Empire - chancellor.

In 1872, Gorchakov consolidated his success in Russian-German relations by becoming one of the initiators of the union of Russia, Germany and Austria.

Historians note that some narcissism and a tendency toward narcissism, which were characteristic of Alexander Gorchakov, only progressed with age, which sometimes greatly irritated those around him.

"IN national historiography They tend to idealize Gorchakov. But this was not an ideal, but a living person with his own advantages and disadvantages. Of course, it’s very bright,” Airapetov noted.

"The Blackest Day"

According to the expert, Gorchakov was a very cautious person.

“After the Crimean War, he was very afraid of creating a new anti-Russian military alliance and therefore kept the tsar from active politics in the Balkans and Central Asia,” Airapetov said.

And yet in 1877 Russian authorities under the influence of the military, they declared war on Turkey, which turned out to be very successful for St. Petersburg. And in 1878, a deal beneficial for Russia was concluded. However, the Europeans were not satisfied with his conditions, and they initiated the Berlin Congress.

“In those days, the elderly Gorchakov felt very bad, he could not even stand on his feet, he was carried in a chair. While communicating with a British representative, he mistakenly immediately showed him maps that showed the maximum concessions that St. Petersburg was ready for. And the British diplomat immediately told all the participants of the congress about this. As a result, the negotiations ended according to the worst scenario for Russia and its supporters. Gorchakov later told Alexander II that this was the darkest day in his life. Alexander II responded to this that it was his too,” Lyashenko said in an interview with RT.

• Berlin Congress July 13, 1878

After the Berlin Congress, Gorchakov actually retired and spent a lot of time receiving treatment abroad. In March 1882, he officially resigned as minister, and on April 9 of the same year he died in Baden-Baden. Gorchakov was buried in St. Petersburg. After his death, the rank of chancellor was no longer awarded to anyone.

According to Lyashenko, Gorchakov became one of the first statesmen in the history of the Russian Empire who thought in terms of national interests.

“However, he made the mistake of many of our other outstanding compatriots - he failed to leave on time,” the expert concluded.