Whose side was Kornilov on? Kornilov rebellion: did the Bolsheviks eliminate two of their inveterate enemies by cunning? “Kornilov program” and the political views of General Kornilov

The atmosphere in Petrograd had been turbulent since the spring of 1917. In a situation of complete impasse, in which by this time the army found itself (already practically not fighting and standing on the brink of complete decomposition), most people in army circles saw the introduction of a military dictatorship as the only way out of the current situation. The idea of ​​a “strong hand” also hovered in the circles of a significant part of the former tsarist officials, who associated hopes for a return to public service. Even in the Provisional Government itself there were moderate revolutionaries (mainly from among the “cadets”), who were disillusioned with the endless stream of slogans and exhortations at rallies, and also saw salvation in the establishment of a dictatorship.

The ministers of the Provisional Government and A.F. Kerensky himself were very afraid of the threat of a Bolshevik uprising, which was exaggerated at that time. Kerensky, after the July Bolshevik uprising, attempted to disband and withdraw from the city the regiments infected with Bolshevik propaganda (the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, however, denied the legality of this decision). Kerensky, realizing that he was losing control over the emerging situation, also decided to rely on the army and replaced the “socialist and republican” Brusilov with Kornilov as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army.

Kornilov's personality became famous in Russia after the events of 1916, when he managed to escape from Austrian captivity. On March 2, 1917, Kornilov, on behalf of the Chief of the Main Staff, General Mikhnevich, was appointed by Nicholas II as commander of the Petrograd Military District. Lavr Kornilov was a supporter of the most stringent measures in establishing order. Among his demands were: the introduction of the death penalty in the rear and at the front, the complete subordination of the transport industry to the high command, the involvement of industry exclusively for front-line needs and the abstraction political leadership from military affairs.

A separate point of Lavr Georgievich’s program was the “unloading” of Petrograd from unwanted and harmful military elements. It was planned, with the help of the front-line units that had retained combat readiness, to disarm the Petrograd garrison and bring the revolutionary troops to the front. The Kronstadt garrison was subject to complete liquidation, as the main center of revolutionary sentiment. Petrograd itself was supposed to be placed under martial law. The plans for the “unloading” of Petrograd are already showing differences in the political goals that its organizers set for themselves. A.F. Kerensky prepared the ground for getting rid of the influence of the Soviets and concentrating individual power in own hands. The military generals (generally opposed to the Provisional Government) relied on a military dictatorship.

Kornilov himself, feeling as if an electrified atmosphere, fueled by those tired of chaos and unrest ordinary people, as if at that moment he believed in his exclusivity and providence that it was he who should become the head of the country.

Despite the fact that Kornilov was considered bad politician Even in his immediate circle, Lavr Georgievich developed an entire political program before the rebellion. It included many points: the restoration of the disciplinary rights of commanders in the army and navy, the removal of commissioners of the Provisional Government from interfering in the actions of officers, the restriction of rights soldiers' committees, a ban on rallies in the army and strikes at defense factories. In addition, Kornilov intended to put the entire system under martial law railways, industry that worked for front-line needs, and the law on capital punishment was extended to the rear units.

Political part Kornilov's programs included the abolition of the Soviets in the rear and at the front, the prohibition of the activities of trade union committees in factories, and the introduction of censorship in the army press. Supreme power was to pass to the Council people's defense, which would include Kornilov himself, Kerensky, A.V. Kolchak, B.V. Savinkov and others. The All-Russian Constituent Assembly was supposed to be convened either after the end of the war, or to convene it and dissolve it in case of disagreement with the decisions made by the top military dictators.

Appointed in July 1917, first as commander of the collapsing Southwestern Front, and then as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Lavr Kornilov, as a contemporary wrote, “started with “demands” and ultimatums and even, as we know, published his appeals to the supreme power in newspapers ". “Every week I received some kind of ultimatum from General Kornilov,” Chairman Minister Alexander Kerensky later complained. The conflict between the head of the army and the head of government began with these ultimatums.

"Kornilov program". The beginning of the conflict between Kornilov and Kerensky

On the day of his appointment as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, July 19 (August 1, new style - hereinafter TASS note), Kornilov sent a telegram to the government, outlining the conditions under which he was ready to accept this position. Kornilov demanded non-interference in his operational orders and the appointment of senior command personnel, as well as the extension of the death penalty restored at the front to the rear. “I declare that if the government does not approve the measures I propose and deprives me of the only means of saving the army and using it for its true purpose - the defense of the Motherland and freedom, then I, General Kornilov, will voluntarily resign as commander in chief,” he threatened.

“Then in the Provisional Government I said that we must immediately dismiss Kornilov, that we must, if we want to restore discipline in the army, set an example at the top. This proposal of mine did not pass, and Kornilov understood this condescension of the authorities as clear evidence of its impotence. I admit myself guilty of not fully insisting on the immediate removal of Kornilov. But then it was like that. scary time, at the front there was such an urgent need for a strong-willed personality,” Alexander Kerensky later said to the investigative commission in the Kornilov case.

“During our failures near Tarnopol, General Kornilov, despite the abolition of the death penalty, was the first to decide to use executions, and nevertheless he, that is, the person who actually introduced the execution, was offered the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This appointment created and strengthened in him the consciousness that it is not compliance with the letter of the law, but the fulfillment of one’s duty, even a very difficult one, that finds justification and approval,” explained acting. O. Director of the Diplomatic Chancellery of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Prince Grigory Trubetskoy.

Kornilov issued a number of orders aimed at increasing the combat effectiveness of the army, strengthening discipline, combating fraternization, desertion, strengthening military revolutionary courts and limiting the activities of army committees. These actions ensured Kornilov's popularity among right-wing officers and its largest organizations, among which the Union of Army and Navy Officers and the Union of St. George Knights stood out.

Together with his chief of staff, General Alexander Lukomsky, Kornilov drew up a corresponding memo. On August 3 (16), he arrived in Petrograd with the intention of discussing it at a meeting of the Provisional Government. However, the head of the Military and Naval Ministry, Boris Savinkov, asked Kornilov not to submit the note for discussion by the cabinet, since he was already working on a similar document together with the Commissioner under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Maximilian Filonenko. Kornilov agreed to this. Alexander Kerensky explained Savinkov’s request by saying that Kornilov’s note “set out a whole series of measures, the vast majority quite acceptable, but in such an edition and with such argumentation that its announcement would lead to the opposite results. In any case, there would be an explosion, and publishing it would have been impossible to keep Kornilov as commander-in-chief.”

Maximilian Filonenko
Commissioner of the Provisional Government under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief

At the same time, the first meeting between Kerensky and Kornilov took place after the latter’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief. “In a conversation with me, A.F. Kerensky touched upon the issue, among other things, that since my appointment as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, my representations to the government have been too ultimatum in nature. I stated that these demands are not dictated by me, but by the situation,” recalled Kornilov.

“A personal meeting between the head of government and the head of the army in early August only fueled their mutual antipathy. “Does this lightweight talker want to command me? “- Kornilov had to say to himself. “Is this narrow-minded and ignorant Cossack going to save Russia?” - Kerensky could not help but think,” Leon Trotsky wrote about their meeting.

At a meeting of the Provisional Government on August 3 (16), an incident also occurred that made an extremely unpleasant impression on Kornilov. He himself later told the investigative commission about it this way: “When I touched upon the question of on which front it would be possible to go on the offensive if certain conditions were met, the minister-chairman, who was sitting next to me, leaned towards me and whispered a warning, “that you need to be careful in this matter." This warning was caused by a note that Kerensky received from Savinkov and from Tereshchenko (Foreign Minister Mikhail Tereshchenko - TASS note). "Is the minister-chairman sure,” asked the first of them, “that the permitted General Kornilov, state and allied secrets will not become known to the enemy in a comradely manner? " "I was terribly amazed and outraged that in the Council of Ministers of the Russian State the Supreme Commander-in-Chief cannot safely touch upon such issues that he considers necessary to inform the government of in the interests of the country's defense." "I, of course, did not mean accuse any of the ministers of having relations with the enemy, but I knew that some members of the Provisional Government were in constant and comradely communication with members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, among whom, according to counterintelligence information, there were persons suspected of relations with enemy,” Savinkov later explained about this.

“This lightweight talkative wants to boss me around?” - Kornilov had to tell himself.
“Is this narrow-minded and ignorant Cossack going to save Russia?” - Kerensky could not help but think"

Leon Trotsky about the meeting between Kornilov and
Kerensky

Despite Kerensky’s efforts not to disclose Kornilov’s report, “August 4 (17), that is, the next day, a copy of the report was already in the editorial portfolio of the Soviet officialdom Izvestia, and from August 5 (18) the printing of excerpts from it began and at the same time widespread persecution high command," recalled the commander of the Southwestern Front in those days, General Anton Denikin. Rumors about Kornilov's impending resignation began to spread widely. Pavel Milyukov recalled: “Messages that the issue of Kornilov’s resignation was serious, of course, could not help but reach Headquarters. At Headquarters and in circles friendly to it, these rumors caused extreme excitement. Council of the Union Cossack troops“he loudly and firmly declared his complete and all-round submission to his hero leader” and “considered it a moral duty to declare to the Provisional Government and the people that he abdicated the responsibility assigned to him for the behavior of the Cossack troops at the front and in the rear when replacing General Kornilov.” The Union of Officers, pinning “all their hopes on their beloved leader,” expressed their readiness “to fully support his legitimate demands to the last drop of blood.” In the meeting St. George Knights The meeting decided to “firmly declare to the Provisional Government that if it allows slander to prevail and General Kornilov is removed, the union will immediately give a battle cry to all St. George’s cavaliers to act together with the Cossacks.”

Against this background, on August 9 (22), the Supreme Commander-in-Chief again arrived in Petrograd to present his report at a meeting of the Provisional Government. In general, Kornilov did not want to go to the capital. “The reasons were fear of a trick on Kerensky’s part and the prevailing conviction that it was hopeless to carry out Kornilov’s measures. However, Savinkov and Filonenko convinced Kornilov, and he left on the 9th, not knowing that a telegram from the Minister-Chairman had been sent after him, indicating that his “arrival was not seems necessary and the Provisional Government relieves itself of responsibility for the consequences of his absence from the front,” wrote Anton Denikin. “General Kornilov, under the influence of the headquarters and the entire set of rumors, feared some unforeseen action regarding him,” Filonenko later testified. “Unforeseen action ", which was feared at Headquarters, was an alleged attempt on the life of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. "Having decided to go, Kornilov nevertheless took precautions,” explained Pavel Milyukov. Kerensky himself, who received Kornilov in the Winter Palace, subsequently complained to the commission investigating the Kornilov case: “He arrived and came to me with machine guns - that’s how friendly his attitude was. There was a car with a machine gun in front and a car with a machine gun behind. The Tekins brought in two bags of machine guns and placed them in the lobby." Natives of Central Asia, the Tekins were Kornilov's personal guard. They were unusually loyal to the general and called him the Great Boyar.

Alexander Kerensky
Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government

Nikolay Nekrasov
Deputy Minister-Chairman

Mikhail Tereshchenko
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Kornilov expected to receive the government’s final consent to the reforms he proposed, but Kerensky, without whose knowledge the general was summoned to Petrograd, stated that he was not familiar with the new version of the note, which contained previously missing sections on the militarization of factories and railways. He refused to consider the note at a cabinet meeting and submitted it only to the discussion of the “triumvirate” of the Provisional Government, consisting of himself, his deputy Nikolai Nekrasov and Foreign Minister Mikhail Tereshchenko. “After considering the report, I was told that the government agrees to all the measures I proposed, but the question of their implementation is a matter of the pace of government measures,” General Kornilov later testified.

At the same time, the actual compiler of the note, Boris Savinkov, was not allowed to attend the meeting, apparently because of Kerensky’s resentment for calling Kornilov without his sanction. In general, Kerensky’s relations with Savinkov deteriorated sharply during this period. When Kerensky said about Kornilov’s memo, “that he would not sign such a memo under any circumstances,” Savinkov replied that “in this case, General Kornilov himself would submit a memo to the Provisional Government,” and resigned. Further events around Savinkov's resignation is a separate little epic. Its essence is subjective, but very succinctly stated by Nikolai Sukhanov: “Before leaving for a meeting in Moscow, he (Savinkov - TASS note) resigned; this happened due to Kerensky’s hesitation to fully satisfy Kornilov’s demands. But this was not serious - it was obvious to everyone. This was naive extortion from the lax Kerensky, and Savinkov proceeded from the correct premise that there were no serious and fundamental disagreements between the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief. Upon his return from Moscow, it was officially announced that Savinkov was staying.”

"Members of the Provisional Government learned about the arrival of the Supreme Commander only on August 10 (23) from the newspapers, and in response to a question from Fyodor Kokoshkin (Fyodor Kokoshkin - cadet, state controller of the Provisional Government), the minister-chairman promised that the report would take place in the evening. But the day passed, and 11 ( On August 24, also from the newspapers, they learned about Savinkov’s upcoming resignation from his post due to disagreements with the Minister of War and the impossibility of carrying out well-known military reforms, and they also read with great amazement that Kornilov left for Headquarters at night. On the same day, Kokoshkin presented to the Minister. the chairman made an ultimatum demand that the government immediately become familiar with Kornilov’s note, threatening otherwise with the resignation of the entire cadet group. In the evening, a meeting was held in which Kerensky read Kornilov’s first note and gave very evasive explanations on it,” wrote Anton Denikin.

Kerensky delayed the consideration of the “Kornilov program” by the Provisional Government because he feared the reaction of the Soviets to such reforms, which would be perceived by them as an attack on the gains of the revolution and could cost him the premiership, since the Soviets were essentially Kerensky’s only support.

In such a situation, the country was approaching the State Conference, which was to be held in Moscow from August 12 to 15 (25–28).

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Appointed infantry general Lavr Georgievich Kornilov. There is an opinion that Kerensky appointed this particular general not at all because he appreciated his spiritual nobility, talents as a commander or his personal combat prowess: it was only the rank and file of the army that could be successfully demolished with the help of propaganda, non-resistance to “fraternization” at the front, etc. p.; It was no longer possible to force the leadership of the Russian Army by orders and committees to forget their duty to the Motherland. However, they could be taken out of the army delete. And for this it was necessary occasion. N.V. Starikov believes that Kerensky needed...

General Kornilov was extremely popular among the troops, the officers, the Cossacks, and the widest circles of the public began to close around him... The August State Meeting in Moscow, where Kerensky tried to deprive the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of his word, was, nevertheless, a triumph for General Kornilov. War hero, talented military leader, determined opponent of collapse. He was greeted enthusiastically, carried in their arms, and showered with flowers.

Liberal politicians, members State Duma, industrialists, and the commercial aristocracy promised the general their support. A huge mass of ordinary people pinned their hopes on him... Hopes for the establishment of a dictatorship and the salvation of the Motherland. And Kornilov’s plan really envisaged the establishment of a dictatorship. But not individually, but “ dictatorship government» .

After the successful and almost bloodless suppression of the April Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd, the authority of General Kornilov in the army and in Russia in general increased even more. However, antagonism soon arose between the Chairman of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief.

By decision of the Provisional Government and with the consent of A.F. Kerensky himself, the 3rd Cavalry Corps of General Krymov is sent to Petrograd with the goal of finally (after the suppression of the July rebellion) putting an end to the Bolsheviks and taking control of the situation in the capital:

“Kornilov program” and the political views of General Kornilov

Contrary to the assertions of some historians, General Kornilov never, either before or during his August speech, either officially or in private conversations and conversations, set a specific “political program.” He did not have it, just as he did not (along with Kerensky) have direct social and political slogans. The document, known in history as the “Kornilov Program,” was the result of the collective creativity of the Bykhov prisoners - individuals imprisoned in the Bykhov prison along with General Kornilov on charges of supporting him after the failure of the Kornilov speech. According to General Denikin, the co-author of this program, it was needed as a correction to the “gap of the past” - the need to announce a strictly business program to keep the country from final collapse and fall. The program, after being compiled, was approved by General Kornilov and appeared in print without a date and under the guise of the program of one of his past speeches, because in the conditions in which its authors were, it was difficult, according to General Denikin, to publish the “Bykhov Program”.

"Kornilov program":

During his appointment as Supreme Commander-in-Chief on July 19, 1917, General Kornilov demanded that the government recognize his responsibility “only to his own conscience and all the people,” thus establishing, in Denikin’s words, some “original scheme of sovereign military command.” The statement mainly concerned the military part, in particular - the provision of full autonomy to the Supreme Commander in all military matters - such as the solution of operational tasks, the appointment and removal of Command personnel. Kornilov also demanded the introduction of the death penalty at the front for deserters.

In conversations with a number of people, General Kornilov put forward various shapes“strong power”, for example, the reorganization of Kerensky’s cabinet on a national basis, a change of head of government, the introduction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief into the government, combining the positions of minister of chairman and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, directory, one-man dictatorship. General Kornilov himself was inclined towards a one-man dictatorship, without, however, making it an end in itself and attaching great importance to the fact of legitimacy and legal continuity of power.

On July 30, at a meeting with the participation of the ministers of communications and food, General Kornilov expressed the following views:

Without touching on the question of what measures are necessary to improve the health of workers and railway components and leaving it to specialists to sort this out, the general nevertheless believed that “for proper operation of these armies they must be subject to the same iron discipline that is established for the front army.”

General Kornilov’s note, prepared for the report to the Provisional Government, spoke of the need to carry out the following main activities:

• the introduction throughout the territory of Russia of the jurisdiction of military revolutionary courts over the rear troops and the population, with the use of the death penalty for a number of grave crimes, mainly military ones;
• restoration of the disciplinary power of military commanders;
• introduction to the narrow framework of the activities of committees and the establishment of their responsibility before the law.

On August 3, General Kornilov presented a note to Kerensky in Petrograd, but the latter, having previously expressed his fundamental agreement with the measures proposed by Kornilov, persuaded the general not to present notes to the government directly on that day, motivating this wish by the desirability of completing similar work at the War Ministry for mutual agreement on projects. However, the very next day, August 4, a copy of General Kornilov’s note was at the disposal of the Bolshevik newspaper Izvestia, which began printing excerpts from Kornilov’s note, at the same time a broad campaign of persecution of the high command began.

According to General Denikin, “the political appearance of General Kornilov remained unclear for many” and legends were built around this issue, which had their source in the circle of Lavr Georgievich, who, due to the excessive tolerance and gullibility of the general, who had a poor understanding of people, came up with “a small-state or completely unprincipled." In this Denikin saw the deepest tragedy of the activities of General Kornilov.

Chronology

Kornilov rebellion.

On August 26, State Duma deputy Lvov conveys to the Prime Minister various issues he discussed with General Kornilov the day before. wishes in the sense of increasing power.

Kerensky, during Lvov’s second visit to him, hid assistant police chief Bulavinsky behind a curtain in his office. Bulavinsky testifies that the note was read to Lvov and the latter confirmed its contents, but to the question “what were the reasons and motives that forced General Kornilov to demand that Kerensky and Savinkov come to Headquarters,” he did not answer.

On the evening of August 26, at a government meeting, Kerensky qualified the actions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief as a “rebellion”. However, even the Provisional Government did not take Kerensky’s side. During the stormy meeting that took place, Kerensky demanded “dictatorial powers” ​​to suppress the “rebellion,” but other ministers opposed this and insisted on a peaceful settlement.

On August 27, Kerensky dissolves the cabinet and arbitrarily assumes “dictatorial powers” single-handedly removes General Kornilov from office ( which he has no legal right to), demands the cancellation of the movement to Petrograd of the cavalry corps he had previously sent and appoints himself Supreme Commander-in-Chief. General Kornilov refuses to carry out such an order...

As a result, General Kornilov comes to the conclusion that:

...and decides not to submit and not to surrender the position of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Kornilov responds for his part with a number of heated appeals to the army, the people, and the Cossacks, in which he describes the course of events, calling Kerensky’s actions a provocation. Kornilov in one of his response appeals (dated August 27) inadvertently states that:

This careless generalization of all members of the Provisional Government, who, with the exception of perhaps one, could be accused of anything but serving the Germans, had a painful imprint on those who knew the actual relationship between members of the government, and especially on those among he were spiritual accomplices of Kornilov.

Assuming full power, General Kornilov promised to “save Great Russia" and "bring the people through victory to the convening of the Constituent Assembly." On the 29th, the general distributed another appeal, in which he declared a conspiracy between the government, the Bolsheviks and Germany, called the explosions in Kazan their planned action, and called on them not to obey government orders

General Kornilov’s speech was supported by the Union of Officers, Petrograd officer organizations, “ second checker of the Empire» General Kaledin joined the rebels; there was no doubt that the mass of the officers were entirely on Kornilov’s side and were watching with bated breath the vicissitudes of the struggle, which was vitally close to them; but, not attracted to it in advance on a large scale and in a solid organization, in the environment in which it lived, the officers could only provide moral support. The commanders of the four fronts declared their solidarity with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In a telegram without a number and signed “Kerensky,” the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was asked to hand over his position to General Lukomsky and immediately leave for the capital. This order was illegal and was not subject to mandatory execution - “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was not in any way subordinate to the Minister of War, or the Minister-Chairman, and especially Comrade Kerensky.” Kerensky is trying to appoint a new Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but both “candidate” generals - Lukomsky and Klembovsky - refuse, and the first of them, in response to an offer to take the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, openly accuses Kerensky of provocation.

On August 28, General Kornilov decides to refuse Kerensky to fulfill his demand (dated August 28) to stop the movement towards Petrograd (sent there earlier by decision of the Provisional Government and Kerensky himself) of General Krymov’s corps and decides:

...using for this purpose the same cavalry corps, already moving at Kerensky’s direction to Petrograd, and gives its commander, General Krymov, the corresponding instructions.

On August 28, Krymov's troops occupied Luga, disarming the local garrison. At the Antropshino station, the Kornilovskaya Native Division entered into a firefight with soldiers of the Petrograd garrison. In the face of a threat to the government's power, Kerensky is looking for opportunities for negotiations, but he is dissuaded from going to Headquarters because of the danger of reprisals - there are rumors that Kerensky has been sentenced to death in the army. The Soviets offered assistance to the government in suppressing the rebellion. The Provisional Government was forced to resort to the services of Bolshevik agitators to contact the rebel units and distribute weapons to Petrograd workers, which subsequently contributed to the Soviets in carrying out the October Revolution.

Kerensky issues a decree expelling General Kornilov and his senior associates from office and putting him on trial “for rebellion.”

On September 4, Colonel Samarin was promoted to major general for distinguished service and appointed commander of the troops of the Irkutsk Military District...

The advance of the rebel troops was stopped on September 11 (29) in the Vyritsa-Pavlovsk section as a result of sabotage (the railway track was dismantled). Thanks to the agitators sent to contact the rebels, it was possible to ensure that they laid down their arms.

Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General L. G. Kornilov, explaining the meaning of the events taking place (“Kornilov Speech”). August 29, 1917

General Kornilov refuses offers to leave Headquarters and “run away.” Not wanting bloodshed in response to assurances of loyalty from units loyal to him from the mouth of the General Staff of Captain Nezhentsev

the general replied:

General Staff General of Infantry M.V. Alekseev...

... agrees to arrest General Kornilov and his associates (generals Romanovsky, Lukomsky and a number of senior officers who were taken under investigation and placed in the city of Bykhov in the monastery building) at Headquarters, which he does on September 1, 1917. General Alekseev tried to ensure maximum security for the Kornilovites placed in the building of the Bykhov prison. However, this episode turned out to be misunderstood by General Kornilov and subsequently on the Don had a very negative impact on the relations between the two general leaders of the young Volunteer Army. General Kornilov, without a doubt, should also have previously been upset by the extreme caution of General Alekseev in terms of supporting the Performance, who sympathized with General Kornilov’s desire to restore order in the army and the country, but publicly did not agree on any point due to a lack of faith in the success of the risky event.

Immediately after this (a week later), General Alekseev resigns from the post of Chief of Staff under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - Kerensky; The general always spoke about this short, just a few days, period of his life with deep emotion and sorrow. Mikhail Vasilyevich expressed his attitude towards the Kornilovites in a letter to the editor of “Novoe Vremya” B.A. Suvorin in this way:

On August 28, Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front General A.I. Denikin, General S.L. Markov, General I.G. Erdeli and a number of others who expressed solidarity with the Kornilov speech were also arrested.

Public reaction

After the August days, a new word appeared in use among the people and in the army - “Kornilovtsy”, pronounced, according to General Denikin, either with pride or with indignation, but in any case expressing a sharp protest against the existing regime and its policies - “Kerenskyism” . In October 1917, the press launched a campaign for the rehabilitation of General Kornilov and his associates.

Belevsky said at this time:

A. I. Ilyin spoke much more directly and boldly in those days:

On September 9, 1917, the cadet ministers resigned as a sign of solidarity with General Kornilov.

Results

Kerensky's victory in this confrontation became prelude to Bolshevism, because it meant the victory of the Soviets, among whom the Bolsheviks already occupied a predominant position, and with which the Kerensky government was only able to conduct a conciliatory policy.

N.V. Starikov wrote:

“The Kornilov Rebellion” is 100% the merit of Alexander Fedorovich, his script, his dramaturgy. In reality, there was no rebellion: a group of patriotic generals tried to save the country at the request of... Kerensky, and then were slandered and betrayed by him.

During the imprisonment of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the Bykhov prison, Kerensky once said the following phrase, characterizing both the moral and ethical aspects of the policy of the minister-chairman and his plans for the future General Kornilov:

The consequences of the Kornilov mutiny played an important role in the history of the Civil War. Anti-Bolshevik socialists and officers never trusted each other, and under the Provisional Government this mistrust became even deeper. But it was Kornilov’s conspiracy that caused the final break. Neither side wanted to forgive or forget imaginary and real grievances, or, as they themselves called it, “betrayal.” Without a doubt main reason The victory of the Reds in the Civil War was due to the lack of unity in the camp of their enemies.

Versions

There is a version that General Kornilov, who had recently spoken at the Moscow State Conference demanding a “strong hand,” had agreed in advance on the armed action with the head of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, who, during the advance of Krymov’s Cossacks to Petrograd, under pressure from the Petrograd Soviet, changed his initial position and recognized General Kornilov rebel on August 27. According to Kornilov, with the knowledge of A.F. Kerensky, he sent the 3rd Cavalry Corps under the command of General Krymov to Petrograd. Thus, under the pretext of introducing “reliable troops” to neutralize the Bolsheviks, Kornilov received the opportunity to remove the Provisional Government and become a military dictator. According to another version, Kornilov misunderstood Kerensky. The rebellion could also have been a provocation by Savinkov (who agreed to the introduction of troops) or Lvov, who served as a truce between the commander-in-chief and the chairman of the government.

Notes

1. “The Kornilov “case”, “speech”, “conspiracy”, “rebellion” - these are the terms in which the tragic events of the end of August associated with the name of Kornilov were defined. The situation, however, by its nature was incomparably more complex and, affecting wide circles of the Russian public, cannot be squeezed into the narrow framework of such definitions. It would be much more correct to call these events the Kornilov movement, leaving behind the act that took place on August 27-31 the name Kornilov's speech» - Denikin A.I. ESSAYS OF THE RUSSIAN TROUBLES. [In 3 books] Book 2, volume 2. The struggle of General Kornilov; v.3. White movement and the struggle of the Volunteer Army - M.: Iris-press, 2006. - 736 pp.: ill. + on 16 pp. - (White Russia) - Vol. 2, 3 - ISBN 5-8112-1891-5 (Book 2)
2. Milyukov P. N. Liquidation of Kornilov's speech. (Enemies about the Bolsheviks and proletarian revolution.) MPKompaniya WATERCOLOR, 1991. According to the publication Revolution and Civil War in Descriptions of the White Guards. Compiled by S. A. Alekseev. In 5 volumes. Gosizdat, M. - L., 1926.
3. Stalin Collected Works T.3; Stalin “Trotskyism or Leninism”: “After the July defeat, a disagreement really arose between the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the fate of the Soviets. It is known that Lenin, wanting to focus the party’s attention on preparing an uprising outside the Soviets, warned against being carried away by the Soviets, believing that the Soviets, desecrated defencists, have already turned into empty space. The Central Committee and the VI Party Congress took a more cautious line, deciding that there was no reason to consider the revival of the Soviets out of the question. Kornilov speech showed that the decision was correct. However, this disagreement had no actual significance for the party. Subsequently, Lenin admitted that the line of the Sixth Congress was correct. It is interesting that Trotsky did not seize on this disagreement and did not inflate it to “monstrous” proportions. "
4. Zimina V.D. The white matter of rebellious Russia: Political regimes Civil War. 1917-1920 M.: Ross. humanist Univ., 2006. 467 p. (Ser. History and memory). ISBN 5-7281-0806-7
5. Trotsky L.D. History of the Russian Revolution in 3 volumes. - M.: terra, 1997
6. Denikin A.I. ESSAYS OF THE RUSSIAN TROUBLES. [In 3 books] Book 2, volume 2. The struggle of General Kornilov; v.3. White movement and the struggle of the Volunteer Army - M.: Iris-press, 2006. - 736 pp.: ill. + on 16 pp. - (White Russia) - Vol. 2, 3 - ISBN 5-8112-1891-5 (Book 2), p. 60
7. St. Petersburg Encyclopedia
8. Starikov N.V. 1917. Not a revolution, but a special operation!. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007. ISBN 978-5-699-24363-1, p.264
9. Shambarov V. E. White Guard. - M.: EKSMO, Algorithm, 2007. (History of Russia. Modern view). ISBN 978-5-926-50354-5, page 39
10. Shambarov V. E. Alien invasion: a conspiracy against the empire. M.: Algorithm, 2007. ISBN 978-5-9265-0473-3, p. 208
11. http://historydoc.edu.ru/catalog.asp?ob_no=13533&cat_ob_no=
12. Denikin A.I. ESSAYS OF THE RUSSIAN TROUBLES. - M.: Iris-press, 2006. - T.2, 3 - ISBN 5-8112-1890-7, p.54
13. Denikin A.I. ESSAYS OF THE RUSSIAN TROUBLES.
14. Denikin A.I. Savinkov. "On the Kornilov case." (ESSAYS OF THE RUSSIAN TROUBLES) - M.: Iris-press, 2006. - Vol. 2, 3 - ISBN 5-8112-1890-7, pp. 21-22
15. General A. I. Denikin-Reprint reproduction of the publication. Paris. 1922. J. Povolozky & C, Editeurs. 13, rue Bonapartie, Paris (VI). - M.: Nauka, 1991. - 376 pp. - ISBN 5-02-008583-9, pp. 14, 98
16. General A. I. Denikin Essays on the Russian Troubles. The fight of General Kornilov. August 1917 - April 1918 - Reprint reproduction of the publication. Paris. 1922. J. Povolozky & C, Editeurs. 13, rue Bonapartie, Paris (VI). - M.: Nauka, 1991. - 376 pp. - ISBN 5-02-008583-9, p. 98
17. http://scepsis.ru/library/id_1520.html
18. General A. I. Denikin Essays on the Russian Troubles. The fight of General Kornilov. August 1917 - April 1918 - Reprint reproduction of the publication. Paris. 1922. J. Povolozky & C, Editeurs. 13, rue Bonapartie, Paris (VI). - M.: Nauka, 1991. - 376 pp. - ISBN 5-02-008583-9, p. 15
19. Tsvetkov V.Zh. "Lavr Georgievich Kornilov"
20. Denikin A.I. ESSAYS OF THE RUSSIAN TROUBLES. - M.: Iris-press, 2006. - T.2, 3 - ISBN 5-8112-1890-7, p.53

Kornilov rebellion (in modern literature and reference books often use the term “Kornilov speech”) - an unsuccessful attempt to establish a military dictatorship undertaken by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Infantry General L.G. Kornilov in August (September) 1917 with the goal of restoring “firm power” in Russia and preventing left-wing radical forces (Bolsheviks) from coming to power.

But is everything so simple and unambiguous? To today Both domestic and foreign historians are debating: what really happened in Petrograd in August-September 1917? Almost a hundred years later, no one can give an exact answer: was the “Kornilov speech” an attempt at a political coup organized by the military elite? Was it an unplanned rebellion, a cry from the soul of caring patriots who could not calmly watch as their homeland plunged into chaos? Was there a provocation on the part of A.F., who imagined himself to be a dictator? Kerensky? Has there been an unfortunate misunderstanding? Or did Kornilov and Kerensky both act according to a scenario prepared in advance by someone, in which there should be no winners?..

In our opinion, all of the above versions have a right to exist. Today historians have documentary evidence, confirming but not completely refuting any of them.

In addition, in the history of Russia of the 20th century there was another important event, painfully reminiscent of the very “Kornilov revolt”. In August 1991, the security forces, who had overslept their country, suddenly launched an armed coup at the last moment, but thereby only accelerated the arrival of radical forces and the final collapse of the USSR.

Both speeches took place against the backdrop of an acute socio-political crisis, expressed in the decline of the authority of state power. In the conditions of the First World War, this situation led Russia to complete anarchy, and later to separatism and civil war, which could well have ended in the loss of statehood. This is what, most likely, was achieved by the forces that brought to power in Russia the beautiful-minded moderate liberals who made up the first and second Provisional Governments. This is exactly what they achieved by actively interfering in domestic policy countries during the period of civil conflict of 1917-1920.

After the August 1991 coup, fortunately, there was no open civil war, but in the 1990s no less terrible events took place, the consequences of which affected and will continue to affect the future fate of the peoples of the former USSR.

Background to the “Kornilov speech”

Held in Petrograd on June 3-24 (June 16 - July 7), the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and rejected the Bolshevik demand to end the war and transfer power to the Soviets.

But the failure of the June offensive launched by the Provisional Government at the front became a powerful catalyst for further revolutionary processes within the country.

Taking advantage of the general discontent of the masses with the general weakness of the central government, the radical left parties (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Left Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists) launched widespread campaigning in both capitals and other large cities.

The army, having lost most of its combat-ready strike units during the unsuccessful offensive, was unable to withstand the enemy’s further counter-offensive on Russian territories, as well as to provide support for the legitimate government.

In a situation of dual power (Provisional Government-Petrograd Soviet), real political power in Petrograd in June 1917 actually passed into the hands of the significantly Bolshevik Petrograd Soviet. The troops of the Petrograd garrison, agitated by the Bolsheviks and anarchists, did not want to carry out the orders of the Provisional Government and go to the front. All this created the basis for the July events in Petrograd, which were included in the literature under the name “July crisis of the Provisional Government.”

Unrest in the capital began with spontaneous protests by soldiers, Kronstadt sailors and workers under the slogans of the resignation of the Provisional Government, the transfer of all power to the Soviets and negotiations with Germany on concluding a separate peace.

The unrest was led by the Bolsheviks, who quickly united the dissatisfied under their slogans.

From July 3 to July 7, 1917, armed clashes and anti-government demonstrations continued in Petrograd. Only cadets and cadets from military schools, as well as a very few Cossack units, took the side of the Provisional Government in street clashes. The bloodiest and most destructive battle was in the area of ​​the Liteiny Bridge on July 4 (17), 1917, in which artillery was used by government troops.

In those same days, the Provisional Government arrested a number of leading Bolsheviks and destroyed the editorial office of the newspaper Pravda. Trotsky ended up in “Kresty”, and Lenin and Zinoviev had already been vacationing in Razliv since July 9.

On July 10 (23), 1917, the second coalition government was formed, headed by A.F. Kerensky, who at the same time retained the posts of military and maritime ministers. The composition of the government was predominantly socialist, it included Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and radical democrats.

During the July crisis, the Provisional Government managed to abolish the situation of dual power in its favor for several months (the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Petrosoviet submitted to its authority), but the political polarization of society after the July events reached its limit. After the shooting on the streets of the capital, few people trusted the Soviets and the promises of “moderate” politicians. The country was waiting for its dictator: right or left - it didn’t matter.

After the July events, the authority in military environment General L.G. Kornilov. The army, and all the right-wing forces, who were tired of the “main persuading” government commissars, looked at Kornilov as the savior of the Fatherland. The socialist ministers also understood that after the fiasco of the June offensive, they could save themselves only by calling Kornilov to power and fulfilling all his demands: from restoring the death penalty to banning card playing, rallies and party agitation in front-line units.

The figure of Kornilov - a tough military leader from the people - was attractive and Western allies, who still wanted to fight the war with Russian blood, but not share the fruits of a common victory.

On the advice of his deputy, former terrorist B.V. Savinkov, in July 1917 Kerensky appointed infantry general L.G. Kornilov as Supreme Commander-in-Chief instead of A.A. Brusilov.

B.V. Savinkov wrote about Kornilov:

“General Kornilov’s attitude to the issue of the death penalty... his clear understanding of the reasons for the Tarnopol defeat, his composure in the most difficult and difficult days, his firmness in the fight against “Bolshevism”, and finally, his exemplary civil courage, instilled in me a feeling of deep respect for him and strengthened the confidence that it was General Kornilov who was called upon to reorganize our army... ...I was happy with this appointment. The task of reviving the Russian army was entrusted to a person whose unyielding will and directness of action served as the key to success..."

A sensible opposition to the expanding revolutionary processes quickly began to rally around the figure of Kornilov. First of all, these were right-wing circles associated with the nobility and large property owners. According to the leader of the Right Socialist Revolutionaries V.M. Chernov, “Kornilov did not have to look for assistants. His defiant behavior became a signal for all of Russia. Representatives of the Union of Officers, led by Novosiltsev, appeared themselves and expressed a desire to work to save the army. Delegates from the Cossack Council and the Union of St. George Knights arrived. Republican Center promised Kornilov the support of influential circles and placed the military forces of Petrograd organizations at his disposal. General Krymov sent a messenger to the Committee of the Union of Officers with instructions to find out whether it was true that “something is afoot,” and to inform him whether he should accept the 11th Army, offered to him by Denikin, or remain with the 3rd Corps, which would be as he put it, “to go somewhere.” He was asked to stay with the 3rd Corps."

The largest Russian capitalists promised to provide financial support to the movement: Ryabushinsky, Morozov, Tretyakov, Putilov, Vyshnegradsky and others.

Back in April-May 1917, the idea of ​​establishing a military dictatorship gained popularity among officers dissatisfied with the new order; Many military organizations were formed. By mid-summer, the most influential were the Military League, the Union of St. George Knights (headquarters were in Petrograd) and the Union of Army and Navy Officers created at Headquarters in Mogilev. The aspirations of the military were also supported by some civilian organizations, including the Society for the Economic Revival of Russia, headed by A.I. Guchkov and A.I. Putilov. In the spring and summer, various candidates were nominated for the post of military dictator, including General M.V. Alekseev, who was offended and removed from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, A.A. Brusilov, Admiral A.V. Kolchak. However, after the appointment of L.G. Kornilov as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he turned out to be the main and only candidate for dictator.

Initially, Kerensky agreed with Kornilov’s views on the situation in the country and ways out of it. July 21 English ambassador Buchanan reports words spoken to him by Foreign Minister Tereshchenko, who was politically close to Kerensky:

“There is only one thing left: the introduction of martial law throughout the country, the use of courts-martial against railway workers and forcing peasants to sell grain. The government must recognize General Kornilov; several members of the government should remain at headquarters for constant communication with him. To my question about whether Kerensky shared his views, Tereshchenko answered in the affirmative, but said that the prime minister’s hands were tied.”

But Kerensky understood perfectly well that the introduction of a military dictatorship and the dispersal of the Soviet made Kerensky himself superfluous. He could maintain power only by maneuvering between the right and the Soviets as a kind of “reconciling” authority. At the same time, the minister-chairman had too great a risk of finding himself “between a rock and a hard place.” It was this very delicate situation that determined Kerensky’s inconsistent, ambiguous behavior in the matter of the Kornilov speech. Soon personal antipathy was added to the ambiguity in the Kornilov-Kerensky relationship. Each in his own way sought to save the Fatherland, but agreeing on joint actions turned out to be too difficult a task.

At the State Conference in Moscow (August 12-15, 1917), Kornilov for the first time clearly stated his political claims. This turned out to be a surprise for Kerensky, who was trying to remove Kornilov from political activity. The Minister-Chairman with great reluctance agreed to participate in the meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, stipulating that Kornilov speak only about military issues. But Kornilov made a bright political speech that made a great impression on the public. When leaving, Kornilov was showered with flowers, and the cadets and Tekins carried him on their shoulders.

At the Conference, a split occurred between moderate and revolutionary groups. In the speeches of L.G. Kornilova, A.M. Kaledina, P.N. Milyukova, V.V. Shulgin and other “rightists” formulated the following program: the liquidation of the Soviets, the abolition public organizations in the army, war to the bitter end, restoration of the death penalty, severe discipline in the army and in the rear - in factories and factories.

On the eve of the Meeting, the Union of Officers, the Union of Knights of St. George, the Union of Cossack Troops, the Congress of Non-Socialist Organizations and others also made public appeals of support to Commander-in-Chief Kornilov. All this gave Kornilov confidence in the sympathy of not only the generals and politicians, but also the officers and soldiers.

But while the Provisional Government was conferring and holding forums, on August 21 (September 3) German troops took Riga. The disintegrated army could not prevent this in any way, and Kornilov’s barrage detachments only intensified the bitterness of the soldiers against the officers who were trying to restore discipline.

Kornilov program

Contrary to the assertions of some historians, General Kornilov never, either before or during his August speech, either officially or in private conversations and conversations, set a specific “political program.” He did not have it, just as he did not (along with Kerensky) have direct social and political slogans.

According to General Denikin, “the political appearance of General Kornilov remained unclear to many.” Lavr Georgievich was neither a socialist nor a monarchist. According to the memoirs of General E.I. Martynov, who was in Austrian captivity with Kornilov, in the period 1915-1916 Kornilov clearly shared the views of the Black Hundreds and seethed with righteous anger against the entire liberal Duma brethren (Guchkovs, Milyukovs, etc.). After returning to Russia, the newspaper hype raised around the feat of General Kornilov, who escaped from captivity, Lavr Georgievich abruptly moved to positions close to (again, according to A.I. Denikin) “broad layers of liberal democracy.”

Like any military man who had never been involved in politics, Kornilov had little understanding of the contradictions of various political groups and classes Russian society. He saw no fundamental difference between the moderate socialist leadership of the Petrograd Soviet and the radical views of the Bolsheviks. After all, it was the Soviets who destroyed the army, issued stupid orders, introduced the institution of commissars, etc.

Unlike other military leaders, Kornilov had the courage and courage to openly oppose the destruction of the army and in defense of the officers, but could not offer any clear political program. In this Denikin saw the deepest tragedy of the activities of General Kornilov. Subsequently, it was this uncertainty in goals and objectives that played a cruel joke on the founders of the white movement.

The document, known in history as the “Kornilov Program,” was the result of the collective creativity of the Bykhov prisoners - individuals imprisoned in the Bykhov prison along with General Kornilov after the failure of the Kornilov rebellion.

General A. Denikin, one of the co-authors of this program, subsequently admitted that it was needed as a correction to the “gap of the past.” The future leaders of the white movement realized the urgent need to announce a strictly business program to keep the country from final collapse and fall. The program was approved by General Kornilov during the “Bykhov sitting” and appeared in print without a date, under the guise of the program of one of his past speeches.

"Kornilov program":

The establishment of government power, completely independent of any irresponsible organizations - until the Constituent Assembly.

Establishment of local authorities and courts independent of unauthorized organizations.

War in complete unity with the allies until a speedy peace is concluded, ensuring wealth and vital interests Russia.

Creation combat-ready army and an organized rear - without politics, without the interference of committees and commissars and with firm discipline.

Ensuring the life of the country and the army by streamlining transport and restoring the productivity of factories and factories; streamlining the food business by involving cooperatives and a trading apparatus regulated by the government.

The resolution of major state, national and social issues is postponed until the Constituent Assembly.

During his appointment to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief on July 19, 1917, General Kornilov demanded that the government recognize his responsibility “only before his own conscience and all the people.” The statement mainly concerned the military part, in particular - granting the Commander-in-Chief complete autonomy in all military matters - such as solving operational tasks, appointing and removing command personnel. Kornilov also demanded the introduction of the death penalty at the front.

In conversations with a number of people, General Kornilov put forward various forms of “strong power”, for example, the reorganization of Kerensky’s cabinet on a national basis, a change in the head of government, the introduction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief into the government, combining the positions of the Minister of the Chairman and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, a directory, a one-man dictatorship. General Kornilov himself was inclined towards a one-man dictatorship, without, however, making it an end in itself and attaching great importance to the fact of legitimacy and legal continuity of power.

General Kornilov’s note, prepared for the report to the Provisional Government, spoke of the need to carry out the following activities:

• the introduction throughout the territory of Russia of the jurisdiction of military revolutionary courts over the rear troops and the population, with the use of the death penalty for a number of grave crimes, mainly military ones;
• restoration of the disciplinary power of military commanders;
• introduction to the narrow framework of the activities of committees and the establishment of their responsibility before the law.

Regarding the key agrarian issue in those circumstances, Kornilov had a program developed for him by Professor Yakovlev. It envisaged the partial nationalization of land, allocating it not to all peasants, but only to soldiers returning from the front, with a number of exemptions in favor of landowners.

On August 3, 1917, General Kornilov presented a note to Kerensky. He, having previously expressed his fundamental agreement with the measures proposed by Kornilov, persuaded the general not to submit notes to the government directly on that day. Kerensky explained this by the desire to complete similar work of the War Ministry and first carry out mutual coordination of projects. However, the very next day, August 4, a copy of General Kornilov’s note was at the disposal of the Izvestia newspaper. The newspaper published excerpts from the note, at the same time a broad public campaign against Kornilov began.

March on Petrograd

During the days of the Moscow meeting, movements of units loyal to Kornilov had already begun. The cavalry corps of Major General A.N. advanced to Petrograd from Finland. Dolgorukov, to Moscow - 7th Orenburg Cossack regiment. They were stopped by the commanders of the Petrograd and Moscow military districts.

In the area of ​​Nevel, Nizhniye Sokolniki and Velikie Luki, the most reliable units from Kornilov’s point of view were concentrated: the 3rd Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General A.M. Krymova and Turkestanskaya (“Wild”) cavalry division. A springboard was created for the march on Petrograd.

According to the memoirs of the commander of one of the regiments, Prince Ukhtomsky, the officers understood this very well: “The general opinion was inclined to the fact that we were going to Petrograd... We knew that a coup d’etat would soon take place, which would end the power of the Petrograd Soviet and declare either a directory or dictatorship with the consent of Kerensky and with his participation, which in these conditions was a guarantee complete success coup."

When on August 11, Kornilov’s chief of staff, General Lukomsky, who had not yet been privy to the plans of the Commander-in-Chief, demanded an explanation, Kornilov told him that his goal was to protect the Provisional Government from attacks by the Bolsheviks and Soviets, even against the will of the government itself. After his next trip to Petrograd, Kornilov was absolutely sure that german spies infiltrated the government, and some ministers collaborate with the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Nevertheless, as Lukomsky recalled, on August 11 Kornilov said: “I am not going to speak out against the Provisional Government. I hope that I'm in last minute I’ll be able to come to an agreement with him.”

Many historians to this day believe that in August 1917 there was no real threat Bolshevik coup didn't exist. Trotsky was in prison, Lenin and Zinoviev were hiding in Razliv, defeated and discredited as spies after the July events. But, as time has shown, the Bolsheviks were only waiting for the right moment to appear on the stage. And Kornilov and Kerensky, with their uncoordinated actions, hastened to provide them with this moment.

The real threat to Petrograd in August 1917 was the German breakthrough near Riga.

This, of course, could become an objective reason for “restoring order.” The relocation of Headquarters to the territory of the Petrograd Military District also created an ambiguous and alarming situation for Kerensky. Kerensky, whose relations with Kornilov had become strained after the Moscow Conference, now decided to enter into an alliance with him. The agreement was worked out thanks to Savinkov, who took on the role of mediator and shuttled between Headquarters and Petrograd with enviable energy.

On August 20, Kerensky, according to Savinkov’s report, agreed to “declaring Petrograd and its environs under martial law and the arrival of a military corps in Petrograd to fight the Bolsheviks.” On August 21, the Provisional Government approved the decision to allocate the Petrograd Military District to direct subordination Rates. It was assumed that both military and civil power in the district would belong to Kornilov, but Petrograd itself would remain under the control of the government. The 3rd Cavalry Corps, as particularly reliable, will be transferred to Kerensky, however, not under the command of Krymov, but another, more liberal and loyal to the government, commander. It was supposed to form from reliable parts Special army at the direct disposal of the government. Savinkov was appointed governor-general of Petrograd. Thus, the fate of the country was in the hands of the triumvirate Kerensky - Kornilov - Savinkov. This decision was communicated to Headquarters on August 24.

After this, Kornilov issued an order to transfer command of the 3rd Cavalry Corps to the commander of the 1st Kuban Cossack Division P.N. Krasnov, but already on August 25 advanced the 3rd Corps (still under the command of Krymov), the Wild Division and Dolgorukov’s cavalry corps to Petrograd.

Thus, the movement of Kornilov’s troops towards Petrograd began absolutely legally. Formally, Kornilov set the task for Krymov: 1) “If you receive from me or directly on the spot (information) about the beginning of the Bolshevik action, immediately move with the corps to Petrograd, occupy the city, disarm parts of the Petrograd garrison that will join the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population Petrograd and disperse the Soviets; 2) Upon completion of this task, General Krymov was to allocate one brigade with artillery to Oranienbaum and, upon arrival there, demand from the Kronstadt garrison to disarm the fortress and move to the mainland.”

In order to obtain a pretext for sending troops into Petrograd, it was planned to organize a provocative pseudo-Bolshevik demonstration on August 27, and this task was entrusted to the chairman of the Council of the Union Cossack units General Dutov.

How Kornilov was made a “rebel”

On August 25-26, there was a feeling at Headquarters that the coup was developing without any obstacles. Everything was going suspiciously smoothly. Options for the structure of power were discussed. A draft Directory was put forward consisting of Kornilov, Savinkov and Filonenko (SR, assistant and confidant of Savinkov). The project of the Kerensky-Kornilov-Savinkov Directory was also put forward. The Directory was to become the highest authority until the convening of the Constituent Assembly.

Another project involved the creation of a coalition government - the “People's Defense Council”. It was supposed to include Admiral A. Kolchak (manager of the Naval Ministry), G.V. Plekhanov (Minister of Labor), A.I. Putilova (Minister of Finance), S.N. Tretyakova (Minister of Trade and Industry), I.G. Tsereteli (Minister of Posts and Telegraphs), as well as Savinkova (Minister of War) and Filonenko (Minister of Foreign Affairs). It was even planned to introduce into the cabinet the “grandmother of the Russian revolution” E.K. Breshko-Breshkovskaya. The chairman of the “Council” was to be Kornilov, his deputy was Kerensky.

From all of the above, the only conclusion suggests itself: if his speech was successful, Kornilov in no way planned to establish his personal dictatorship and take sole responsibility for governance huge country. For this he had neither the appropriate preparation, nor political experience, nor sufficient ambition. Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief did not even have any thoughts of causing any harm personally to Kerensky, Savinkov or any of the members of the Provisional Government. On the contrary, sweeping aside all likes and dislikes, the “silovik” Kornilov was going to do everything to ensure their safety, to protect them even “against their own will.”

For this, without coordination with the government, a draft order was prepared at Headquarters to impose a state of siege in Petrograd (curfew, censorship, ban on rallies and demonstrations, disarmament of units of the garrison resisting, courts-martial). The Union of Officers, with the knowledge of Kornilov, proposed using mobile officer-cadet detachments to liquidate the Soviet and arrest the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, thus presenting Kerensky with a fait accompli.

It should be noted here that until August 26, the Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government, Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky, fully approved of all the measures taken by the Kornilovites and saw in the Commander-in-Chief the only “savior of the Fatherland” at that time.

And on the evening of August 26, at a government meeting, Kerensky qualified the actions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief as a “rebellion.”

What happened?

Version 1. "Broken Phone"

From August 22, in addition to B.V., he became intermediaries between Headquarters and Kerensky. Savinkova, State Duma deputy and former Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod V.N. also signed up. Lvov (not to be confused with the first chairman of the Provisional Government G.K. Lvov!). V.N. Lvov lost his post in the government after the July events. A.V. was appointed as the new chief prosecutor. Kartashev, but there was no place for the old one. V.N. Lvov enjoyed a reputation as a narrow-minded, rather exalted and frivolous person. Moreover, he had every reason to hate Kerensky for his resignation. Having achieved an audience with the Prime Minister, Lvov told Kerensky that the Soviets were slowly but surely passing into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Threatening Kerensky with personal death in this “massacre” if he did not “break with the Soviets,” Lvov, on behalf of the pro-Kornilov forces, invited him to form a right-wing government and in the end, according to Lvov, even obtained words of agreement to relinquish power.

On August 24, the “impostor” Lvov appeared at Kornilov’s headquarters. Acting as a representative of Kerensky (who did not give him any instructions), the former chief prosecutor began to talk about the possibility of establishing the dictatorship of Kornilov with the sanction of the Provisional Government. In response, Kornilov outlined to him his conditions for accepting dictatorial powers, which had previously been discussed with Kerensky’s representative B.V. Savinkov (but without the participation of Lvov):

introduction of martial law in Petrograd;

concentration of power of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Minister-Chairman in the same hands (“of course, all this is before the Constituent Assembly”);

readiness to hand over the portfolio of Minister of Justice to Kerensky, and the portfolio of Minister of War to Savinkov.

Kornilov also asked Lvov to “warn Kerensky and Savinkov that I cannot vouch for their lives anywhere, and therefore let them come to Headquarters, where I will take their personal safety under my protection.”

On August 26, Lvov arrived to Kerensky and conveyed Kornilov’s message to him in such a form that the minister-chairman considered this an ultimatum demand to resign and appear at Headquarters, where his murder was already being prepared.

There are different versions of the motives for V.N.’s actions. Lvov these days - clouding of reason, deliberate provocation with the aim of removing Kerensky, an unsuccessful attempt to return to big politics, etc. In any case, the consequences of such an inadequate act by the former chief prosecutor turned out to be catastrophic.

Kerensky ordered Lvov to be arrested as an accomplice of Kornilov and sent to the Peter and Paul Fortress, and the Commander-in-Chief himself was immediately removed from office and declared a “rebel.”

Version 2. Kerensky's provocation

Of course, the Kerensky-Kornilov conflict had much deeper reasons than the personal hostility of these two figures towards each other. Russia continued to wage war. The provisional government, having accepted the obligations of the tsarist government to the Entente countries, did not refuse either foreign loans or military assistance from the allies. Thus, the United States, upon its entry into the war, provided the Provisional Government with a loan in the amount of $325 million in April 1917. In the Russian Revolution, the Americans saw an analogue of their war for independence and considered Russia, with its unlimited resources and open spaces, a very promising ally in the fight against the remaining members of the coalition (France and England). England also considered it necessary to support in Russia those forces that could ultimately continue the war.

According to a number of domestic historians, after the April crisis of 1917, the allies clearly placed their bets on Kerensky, choosing him from among all the leaders of the Russian revolution in order to exercise their further influence on Russia in the ongoing war.

However, the failure of the June offensive on the Eastern Front (the so-called “Kerensky offensive”) and the subsequent July events forced British and American agents to look for a new protege to carry out their interests. Kerensky was ready to conclude separate peace with the Germans, and the allies needed war.

The British would hardly have succeeded in making Kornilov an “agent of influence” in Russia, but using him to restore order and increase the combat capability of the army would be quite logical. Moreover, the Kornilov movement was carried out with the active assistance of the senior generals of the Headquarters, where there were many lobbyists for British interests (including the former Commander-in-Chief Alekseev) and supporters of the war “to the bitter end.”

Thus, in the event of Kornilov’s nomination to the leading roles (in the Directory, in any other government), as well as the implementation of the measures he had planned to restore order in the army and the country, Kerensky turned out to be a political dead man. The Allies, in any case, would prefer to communicate with those who have real power and control of the army in their hands. That is why Alexander Fedorovich rushed so hastily to eliminate the “threat from the right,” turning a blind eye to the real danger posed by the radical left.

Wanting to get rid of the “right opposition” in the military leadership once and for all, Kerensky “allowed” Kornilov’s troops to march on Petrograd. This was done solely to create the appearance of a military coup and discredit the politically naive general in the eyes of the allies and the general public.

The provocateur V.N., who appeared out of nowhere, fit perfectly into the script prepared by Kerensky for Kornilov. Lviv. Perhaps he was deliberately sent to Headquarters by Kerensky, so that later he would have someone to refer to in his evidence of General Kornilov’s treason.

This is indicated by the fact that in direct telephone conversations with Kornilov on August 26, Kerensky spoke on behalf of Lvov, who was not even there. The text of this conversation has been preserved and has been repeatedly cited in studies devoted to the Kornilov “rebellion.” Kerensky, on behalf of Lvov, asked Kornilov general questions so that the general’s answers would look like confirmation of his accusations of conspiracy. In fact, Kornilov in this conversation only confirmed the invitation of Kerensky and his associates to Mogilev (for the sake of their own safety), but did not sign in any way for the presentation of ultimatums to the Provisional Government.

According to A.I. Denikin, Kerensky was most afraid that “Kornilov’s answer on the most significant issue - about the nature of his proposals” - would refute his interpretation of the “ultimatum”, and therefore deliberately cast the essence of the question in “deliberately dark forms.”

Immediately after this conversation, on the evening of August 26, at a government meeting, Kerensky qualified the actions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief as a “rebellion.” However, the government did not take Kerensky's side. During the meeting, Kerensky insistently demanded “dictatorial powers” ​​to suppress the “rebellion,” but other ministers opposed this and insisted on a peaceful settlement.

As a result, a telegram signed by Kerensky was hastily drawn up and sent to Headquarters. Kornilov was asked to hand over his position to General A.S. Lukomsky and immediately leave for the capital.

The unnumbered telegram, signed simply “Kerensky,” was initially mistaken at Headquarters for a fake. Kornilov had just informed Kerensky that Krymov’s corps would be in Petrograd on August 28, for which he asked to introduce martial law on the 29th. Meanwhile, on the 27th, a statement by Kerensky was published in the morning newspapers, beginning with the words: “On August 26, General Kornilov sent me a member of the State Duma, V.N. Lvov, demanding that the Provisional Government transfer the entire military and civil authority, so that at his personal discretion a new government will be drawn up to govern the country ... "

Kornilov was furious. Only in response to Kerensky’s statement did he decide to openly oppose the Provisional Government, accusing it of treason: “...Russian people! Our great homeland is dying. The hour of her death is near. Forced to speak openly, I, General Kornilov, declare that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolshevik majority of the soviets, is acting in full agreement with the plans of the German General Staff and, simultaneously with the upcoming landing of enemy forces on the Riga coast, kills the army and shakes the country inside.(...) I, General Kornilov, the son of a Cossack peasant, declare to everyone that I personally do not need anything, except for the preservation of Great Russia, and I swear to bring the people - through victory over the enemy - to the Constituent Assembly, at which they themselves will decide their destinies and choose a way of new state life. I am not able to betray Russia into the hands of its primordial enemy, the German tribe, and make the Russian people slaves of the Germans. And I prefer to die on the field of honor and battle, so as not to see the shame and disgrace of the Russian land. Russian people, the life of your Motherland is in your hands!”

Kornilov categorically refused to surrender the position of commander-in-chief, and General Lukomsky refused to accept it. In response to the demand to stop Krymov’s movement, Lukomsky telegraphed Kerensky: “it is impossible to stop a business that began with your approval.” Refused to stop the trains and accept the position of commander-in-chief and commander Northern Front General V.N. Klembovsky. Of the five front commanders, he was one of two who openly supported Kornilov; the second was the commander of the Southwestern Front, A.I. Denikin, who declared her support for Kornilov immediately upon receiving Kerensky’s telegram.

Kerensky took command and summoned Alekseev to Petrograd to appoint him commander-in-chief. He also refused to carry out such an order.

On August 28, a decree was issued to the Governing Senate, formally declaring Kornilov a rebel and traitor. For his part, Kornilov stated that he assumed full power, took upon himself the obligation to “save Great Russia” and “bring the people through victory to the convening of the Constituent Assembly.”

However, the appeals signed by L. G. Kornilov on August 28 and 29 did not reach either the army or the general population, since the telegraph was under the control of the government. The general’s speech was supported only by the Union of Officers, some Petrograd officer organizations, as well as the commanders of the four fronts declared their solidarity with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Failure

While Kornilov and Kerensky “exchanged pleasantries,” calling each other rebels and traitors, General Krymov’s corps, according to the previous agreement, continued its movement towards Petrograd. The tasks of the corps continued to include saving the Provisional Government from the Bolshevik Soviets. On August 24, Krymov was appointed by General Kornilov as commander-in-chief of a separate Petrograd army. Krymov was entrusted with suppressing protests in the capital. In accordance with the previously developed plan, a provocative pseudo-Bolshevik demonstration was scheduled for August 27 in Petrograd, which was supposed to give rise to the entry of Krymov’s troops into the city, the dispersal of the Council and the declaration of the capital under martial law. The demonstration was supposed to be organized by the chairman of the Council of the Union of Cossack Units, Ataman Dutov, but he was unable to cope with this task.

On August 28, Kornilov and his deputy Lukomsky refused to comply with Kerensky’s demands to stop Krymov’s troops. On the contrary, Kornilov solves with the help military force force the Provisional Government:

exclude from its composition those ministers who, according to the information available to him (Kornilov), were obvious traitors to the Motherland;

rebuild in such a way that the country is guaranteed strong and solid power.

These were the instructions given by the Commander-in-Chief to General Krymov, whose troops occupied Luga on August 28, disarming the local garrison. At the Antropshino station, the Native (Wild) division entered into a firefight with soldiers of the Petrograd garrison.

During these days, Kerensky, Savinkov and other members of the Provisional Government were actively looking for opportunities for negotiations, but no one dared to go to Headquarters. There were rumors that Kerensky had been sentenced to death among the troops. But then the Soviets offered assistance to the government in suppressing the uprising. The government was forced to resort to the services of Bolshevik agitators to contact the rebel units and distribute weapons to Petrograd workers, who began to form their own militia units.

The advance of the Kornilov troops was stopped on August 29 (September 11) in the Vyritsa-Pavlovsk section, where Kornilov’s opponents dismantled the railway track. Bolshevik agitators sent to contact the rebel units ensured that the latter laid down their arms.

General Krymov was confused. He marched on Petrograd, convinced of the unanimity of Kornilov and Kerensky. On August 30, General Krymov, on behalf of Kerensky, was given an invitation to come to Petrograd, supposedly for negotiations. The invitation was conveyed by a close friend of the general, Colonel Samarin, who held the position of assistant to the chief of Kerensky’s office. (On September 4, Colonel Samarin was promoted to major general for distinguished service and appointed commander of the troops of the Irkutsk Military District).

Leaving the corps in the vicinity of Luga, Krymov went to Petrograd. He arrived at Kerensky, where he obviously realized that he was trapped, separated from his loyal units. The content of the conversation between Krymov and Kerensky remained unknown, but it is not difficult to guess that this conversation would inevitably be followed by the forced isolation or physical elimination of the military leader loyal to Kornilov. Realizing his position and the impossibility of changing anything, Krymov chose death over humiliating interrogations and arrest. Leaving Kerensky's office, he inflicted a mortal wound on himself in the chest and died a few hours later in the Nikolaev military hospital.

The new Commander-in-Chief Kerensky immediately gave the order to advance troops loyal to the government to Mogilev in order to defeat Headquarters. Kerensky needed to provoke Kornilov to resist, because evidence of the general’s “rebellion” was still lacking.

Having learned about this, General Kornilov did not dare to start a civil war, throwing loyal units against Kerensky. To assurances of loyalty from the units loyal to him from the lips of the General Staff of Captain Nezhentsev, the general replied: “Tell the Kornilov regiment that I order him to maintain complete calm, I do not want even one drop of brotherly blood to be shed.”

General M.V. Alekseev, in order to save the lives of the Kornilovites, agreed to become A.F.’s chief of staff. Kerensky. Great work he should have agreed with Kerensky to cancel the order to advance troops to Mogilev. On September 1, General Alekseev himself went to Headquarters, where he arrested General Kornilov and his associates (Generals Romanovsky, Lukomsky, Colonel Plyushchevsky-Plyushchik and other senior officers). The participants in the “rebellion” were placed under investigation and placed in prison in the city of Bykhov near Mogilev.

On August 28, by order of Kerensky, the entire command of the Southwestern Front that supported Kornilov (generals Denikin, Markov, Erdeli, Vannovsky, Orlov, etc.) was arrested. They were taken into custody in the Berdichev military prison.

When members of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, created by Kerensky to investigate the “rebellion,” arrived in Mogilev, they found Kornilov calm and ready to cooperate. He showed them the documents he had, including tapes with the text of his negotiations with Savinkov, Kerensky and others. From them, members of the commission learned that the supposedly rebel troops that were advancing on Petrograd were summoned to the capital by order of the Provisional Government. Then they learned about V.N.’s antics. Lvov (whom Kornilov, unfortunately, took seriously and who was used by Kerensky to create the legend of the “Kornilov rebellion”).

General Alekseev tried to ensure maximum security and decent living conditions for the Kornilovites placed in the monastery building in Bykhov. In the building they were guarded by Tekins loyal to Kornilov, external security was provided by a platoon of St. George's cavaliers.

Denikin and his entourage fell into the hands of the local Soviet commissioners. In Berdichev, the generals were subjected to constant insults and bullying. Even after the request of the Extraordinary Commission to transfer the prisoners to Bykhov, Kerensky chose not to give them special escort, hoping that the revolutionary crowd itself would punish the “rebels” as soon as they left the walls of the prison. He sent a telegram to the commissar: “...I am confident in the prudence of the garrison, which can choose two (!) representatives from among itself to accompany it.” General Denikin in “Essays on the Russian Troubles” described in great detail the episode of the walking convoy of prisoners to the Berdichev station, which most closely resembled the path to Golgotha. The crowd almost tore them to pieces. The participants in the Kornilov speech (they are also dangerous witnesses to Kerensky’s crime) remained alive by pure chance: the convoy officer - the head of the Zhytomyr school of ensigns - turned out to be decent person. He brought his cadets for protection, who fulfilled their duty to the end.

M.V. Alekseev resigned a week after Kornilov’s arrest. The general subsequently always spoke about this short, just a few days, period of his life with deep emotion and sorrow. Mikhail Vasilyevich expressed his attitude towards the Kornilovites in a letter to the editor of Novoye Vremya, B. A. Suvorin:

Russia does not have the right to allow the crime that is being prepared in the near future against its best, valiant sons and skilled generals. Kornilov did not encroach on the state system; he sought, with the assistance of some members of the government, to change the composition of the latter, to select honest, active and energetic people. This is not treason, not rebellion...

Consequences

One of the most important consequences of the Kornilov speech was what both Kerensky and Kornilov sought to avoid - the possibility of a Bolshevik coup.

The right political flank was crushed and discredited. For Kerensky, this meant that he could no longer pursue his previous policy of maneuvering. Relations with the army, officers, and military elite were ruined forever. The Provisional Government put itself in a situation of complete dependence on the support of the Soviets, which were increasingly Bolshevized.

The Bolsheviks, thanks to the organization of resistance to Kornilov, not only fully recovered and rehabilitated themselves in the eyes of the masses after the July disaster, but also went on an active offensive. September 4 L.D. Trotsky, the main organizer and executor of the October revolution, along with other Bolsheviks arrested after the July uprising, was released from the Kresty prison. Already on September 20, he became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and three weeks later, with the full connivance of the government, he formed the Military Revolutionary Committee to lead the uprising. The Kerensky government, deprived of support from the right, could not oppose anything at all to the Bolsheviks and was only capable of pursuing a conciliatory policy. Trotsky himself, in his memoirs, noted the rapid radicalization of Soviet circles already during the suppression of the Kornilov speech:

After the Kornilov days, a new chapter opened for the Soviets. Although the compromisers still had many rotten places left, especially in the garrison, the Petrograd Soviet revealed such a sharp Bolshevik tilt that it surprised both camps: the right and the left. On the night of September 1, chaired by the same Chkheidze, the Council voted for the power of the workers and peasants. Ordinary members of the conciliatory factions almost entirely supported the Bolshevik resolution.

If the Bolsheviks and Soviets in the August days appeared in the eyes of the masses as the saviors of revolutionary democracy, then the Provisional Government and Kerensky personally seriously discredited themselves, demonstrating, on the one hand, helplessness, and on the other, readiness to collude with the “counter-revolution.” The Cadets, clearly involved in the Kornilov movement, were also completely discredited politically. The demand for their withdrawal from the government became one of the main demands of Soviet circles in September-October. Kerensky himself gave every reason for Bolshevik propaganda to call himself (through the lips of Lenin) “a Kornilovite who fell out with Kornilov by accident and continues to be in the most intimate alliance with other Kornilovites.”

In the August days of 1917, the Bolsheviks were given the opportunity to arm themselves completely legally and create military structures, which they took advantage of during the coup. According to Uritsky, up to 40 thousand rifles fell into the hands of the Petrograd proletariat. These days, in the working-class areas, the intensified formation of Red Guard detachments began, the disarmament of which after the liquidation of the Kornilov uprising was out of the question. All that remained was to turn all these armed detachments towards the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government met.

The consequences of the Kornilov rebellion also played perhaps a key role in the history of the Civil War. Anti-Bolshevik socialists and officers never trusted each other, but it was Kornilov’s conspiracy that caused the final break. Neither side wanted to forgive or forget imaginary and real grievances, or, as they themselves called it, “betrayal.” The main reason for the Reds' victory in Civil War there was a lack of unity in the camp of their enemies. And here we need to talk not only about the contradictions between representatives of different anti-Bolshevik forces(Socialist Revolutionaries, Cadets, Monarchists), but also about the lack of unity in the ranks of the leadership White movement from its very beginning to its tragic end.

The Bykhov prison, the humiliations and insults experienced by the Berdichev group of generals involved in the Kornilov case only contributed to the desire for revenge for deception and violated honor. After the Kornilov “rebellion,” the split among the top military leadership worsened. Those military leaders who supported the Provisional Government aroused distrust among the Bykhov prisoners at best, and at worst they were enrolled in the enemy camp. In the winter of 1917-1918, i.e. already at initial stage formation of the White movement, there were open contradictions between Kornilov and Alekseev, who arrested him, mutual suspicions, repeated accusations of each other in conspiracies, etc., etc.

IN national historiography There is also a very popular version that it was M.V. Alekseev, a protégé of the cadet faction of the Provisional Government, was the main inspirer and organizer of the Kornilov “conspiracy.” On August 28, the cadets decided that the government should be headed by M.V. Alekseev. The latter agreed to this. Further, at a meeting in the Winter Palace, an unsuccessful attempt was made by voting (quite legally) to remove Kerensky from his post. If the officer organizations of the capital (again, subordinate to Alekseev) began to act, and Kornilov’s troops only supported them (and, at the same time, the cadets’ intrigue to bring General Alekseev to power succeeded), the coup would have every chance of success. At the same time, Kornilov would simply have to come to terms with the rights of dictator M.V. He would not have dared to challenge Alekseev, who was incomparably more authoritative in the army. But Kerensky refused to “surrender power” at the request of the cadets and himself went on the offensive.

Then it turns out that in case of failure, Alekseev simply “surrendered” his short-sighted protégé to Kerensky, and he himself remained free. General Kornilov may have thought so. His early death put an end to the hidden enmity, but the initial distrust and inconsistency in the actions of the leaders of the white forces made themselves felt more than once in the future.

Kornilov speech(“case”, “putsch”, “conspiracy”, “rebellion”, “uprising”) - an unsuccessful attempt to establish a military dictatorship on August 27-31 (September 9-13), 1917, undertaken by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army of the General Staff, an infantry general L. G. Kornilov in order to:

According to some sources, the purpose of the Kornilov speech was to prevent the radical left (Bolsheviks) from coming to power with the help of military force; according to other sources, Kornilov did not distinguish left-wing socialists from right-wing ones at all, and since April he considered the Petrograd Soviet, which at that time was headed by right-wing socialists, Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, to be his sworn enemy.

Background of events

In the summer of 1917, the situation in Petrograd was turbulent. Supporters of the Bolsheviks and the Petrograd Soviet held anti-government demonstrations calling for the overthrow of the government. On July 4 (17), the Provisional Government introduced martial law in the city. However, at the end of July, the composition of the government changed dramatically; it was headed by the Socialist Revolutionary Alexander Kerensky. Instead of General Brusilov, he, on the recommendation of his deputy and governor of Petrograd Savinkov, appointed Infantry General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov as commander-in-chief.

General Kornilov was extremely popular among the troops, the officers, the Cossacks, and the widest circles of the public began to close around him... The August State Meeting in Moscow, where Kerensky tried to deprive the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of his word, was, nevertheless, a triumph for General Kornilov. War hero, talented military leader, determined opponent of collapse. He was greeted enthusiastically, carried in their arms, and showered with flowers.

According to A.I. Spiridovich, March 2, 1917, Chairman of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko, ignoring the supreme authority, addressed General M.V. by telegram. Alekseev with a request to recall Adjutant General Ivanov from Petrograd and appoint Lieutenant General Kornilov to the post of commander of the Petrograd Military District. Alekseev, for whom supreme power still existed, he made a corresponding proposal to Nicholas II, noting that “the fulfillment of this wish may mark the beginning of the calming of the capital and the establishment of order in the units of the troops constituting the garrison of Petrograd and surrounding points.” Thus, L.G. Kornilov arrived in Petrograd on March 5 both at the request of the Provisional Government and by order of the Emperor. But it was already too late to “establish order”: it was established by the Petrograd Soviet; Nevertheless, Kornilov accepted the post of commander of the Petrograd Military District and, after an official visit to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council, went to Tsarskoye Selo to arrest the Empress.

When in April, after the publication of P.N.’s note. Miliukov, the regiments of the Petrograd garrison took to the streets, Kornilov called in artillery to protect the Provisional Government from the demonstrators; however, his order was immediately canceled by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Later, the Petrograd Soviet issued an appeal “To all citizens,” which also contained a special appeal to the soldiers:

Thus deprived of the right to dispose of the Petrograd garrison, Kornilov resigned and went to active army, to the Southwestern Front.

Already in April 1917, the idea of ​​establishing a military dictatorship gained popularity among officers dissatisfied with the new order; Many military organizations were formed, among which by mid-summer the most influential were the Military League, the Union of St. George Knights (headquarters were in Petrograd) and the Union of Army and Navy Officers created at Headquarters in Mogilev. The aspirations of the military were also supported by some civilian organizations, including the Society for the Economic Revival of Russia, headed by A.I. Guchkov and A.I. Putilov and the Republican Center, which even created its own military department to coordinate the actions of various officer organizations. Various candidates were nominated for the post of military dictator in the spring and summer, including M.V. Alekseev, A.A. Brusilov and A.V. Kolchak, however, already in the days of the Moscow State Conference, L.G. became the favorite. Kornilov, by that time - Supreme Commander-in-Chief; although many senior officers were very skeptical of him. For example, Alekseev believed that Kornilov had “a lion’s heart and a sheep’s head,” while Brusilov said: “This is the head of a dashing partisan detachment - and nothing more.”

After the resignation on July 7 (20) G.E. Lvov The Provisional Government was headed by the Socialist Revolutionary Alexander Kerensky. Instead of General Brusilov, he, on the recommendation of his deputy and governor of Petrograd Savinkov, appointed Infantry General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov as commander-in-chief.

There is an opinion that Kerensky appointed this particular general not at all because he appreciated his spiritual nobility, talents as a commander or his personal combat prowess: it was only the rank and file of the army that could be successfully demolished with the help of propaganda, non-resistance to “fraternization” at the front, etc. p.; It was no longer possible to force the leadership of the Russian Army by orders and committees to forget their duty to the Motherland. However, they could be taken out of the army delete. And for this it was necessary occasion. N.V. Starikov believes that Kerensky needed...

Liberal politicians, members of the State Duma, industrialists, and the trade aristocracy promised the general their support. A huge mass of ordinary people pinned their hopes on him... Hopes for the establishment of a dictatorship and the salvation of the Motherland. And Kornilov’s plan really envisaged the establishment of a dictatorship. But not individually, but “ dictatorship government».

However, antagonism soon emerged between the Chairman of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief.

Meanwhile, the situation at the front was deteriorating; On August 21 (September 3) German troops took Riga; Kornilov’s barrage detachments not only did not help, but intensified the bitterness of the soldiers against the officers.

By decision of the Provisional Government and with the consent of A.F. Kerensky himself, the 3rd Cavalry Corps of General Krymov is sent to Petrograd with the goal of finally (after the suppression of the July rebellion) putting an end to the Bolsheviks and taking control of the situation in the capital:

“Kornilov program” and the political views of General Kornilov

Contrary to the assertions of some historians, General Kornilov never, either before or during his August speech, either officially or in private conversations and conversations, set a specific “political program.” He did not have it, just as he did not (along with Kerensky) have direct social and political slogans. The document, known in history as the “Kornilov Program,” was the result of the collective creativity of the Bykhov prisoners - individuals imprisoned in the Bykhov prison along with General Kornilov on charges of supporting him after the failure of the Kornilov speech. According to General Denikin, the co-author of this program, it was needed as a correction to the “gap of the past” - the need to announce a strictly business program to keep the country from final collapse and fall. The program, after being compiled, was approved by General Kornilov and appeared in print without a date and under the guise of the program of one of his past speeches, because in the conditions in which its authors were, it was difficult, according to General Denikin, to publish the “Bykhov Program”.

"Kornilov program":

• 1) The establishment of government power, completely independent of any irresponsible organizations - until the Constituent Assembly.
• 2) Establishment of local authorities and courts independent of unauthorized organizations.
• 3) War in full unity with the allies until the conclusion of a speedy peace that ensures the wealth and vital interests of Russia.
• 4) Creation of a combat-ready army and an organized rear - without politics, without the interference of committees and commissars and with firm discipline.
• 5) Ensuring the life of the country and the army by streamlining transport and restoring the productivity of factories and factories; streamlining the food business by involving cooperatives and a trading apparatus regulated by the government.
• 6) The resolution of major state, national and social issues is postponed until the Constituent Assembly.

During his appointment as Supreme Commander-in-Chief on July 19, 1917, General Kornilov demanded that the government recognize his responsibility “only to his own conscience and all the people,” thus establishing, in Denikin’s words, some “original scheme of sovereign military command.” The statement mainly concerned the military part, in particular - the provision of full autonomy to the General Directorate in all military matters - such as solving operational tasks, appointing and removing command personnel. Kornilov also demanded the introduction of the death penalty at the front.

In conversations with a number of people, General Kornilov put forward various forms of “strong power”, for example, the reorganization of Kerensky’s cabinet on a national basis, a change in the head of government, the introduction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief into the government, combining the positions of the Minister of the Chairman and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, a directory, a one-man dictatorship. General Kornilov himself was inclined towards a one-man dictatorship, without, however, making it an end in itself and attaching great importance to the fact of legitimacy and legal continuity of power.

On July 30, at a meeting with the participation of the ministers of communications and food, General Kornilov expressed the following views:

Without going into the question of what measures are necessary to improve the health of workers and railway components and leaving it to specialists to figure this out, the general nevertheless believed that “for the proper operation of these armies, they must be subject to the same iron discipline that is established for the front army "

General Kornilov’s note, prepared for the report to the Provisional Government, spoke of the need to carry out the following main activities:

• the introduction throughout the territory of Russia of the jurisdiction of military revolutionary courts over the rear troops and the population, with the use of the death penalty for a number of grave crimes, mainly military ones;
• restoration of the disciplinary power of military commanders;
• introduction to the narrow framework of the activities of committees and the establishment of their responsibility before the law.

On August 3, General Kornilov presented a note to Kerensky in Petrograd, but the latter, having previously expressed his fundamental agreement with the measures proposed by Kornilov, persuaded the general not to present notes to the government directly on that day, motivating this wish by the desirability of completing similar work of the War Ministry for mutual coordination of projects. However, the very next day, August 4, a copy of General Kornilov’s note was at the disposal of the Izvestia newspaper, which began printing excerpts from Kornilov’s note, at the same time a broad campaign of persecution of the high command began.

According to General Denikin, “the political appearance of General Kornilov remained unclear for many” and legends were built around this issue, which had their source in the circle of Lavr Georgievich, who, due to the excessive tolerance and gullibility of the general, who had a poor understanding of people, came up with “a small-state or completely unprincipled." In this Denikin saw the deepest tragedy of the activities of General Kornilov.

Lavr Georgievich was neither a socialist nor a monarchist: like the overwhelming majority of the officers of that time, he was alien to political passions. Denikin believed that in his views and beliefs, General Kornilov was close to “broad layers of liberal democracy.” As Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov had more courage and courage than other military leaders to speak out against the destruction of the army and in defense of the officers.

On August 21, the Provisional Government approved the decision to allocate the Petrograd Military District to direct subordination to Headquarters, which was officially reported to Kornilov on August 24. The telegram emphasized a fundamentally important point - the power of the Provisional Government must remain in Petrograd itself. B.V. was proposed for the post of governor. Savinkov. At the disposal of the government, for “protection from attacks from anyone.” On August 25, without the consent of the government, a draft order was prepared to impose a state of siege in Petrograd (curfew, censorship, ban on rallies and demonstrations, disarmament of the garrison units offering resistance, courts-martial). In the evening of the same day, at Headquarters, in the presence of Filonenko, the list of the “People's Defense Council” was once again discussed and the Kerensky-Kornilov-Savinkov directory was discussed as highest form governance of the country until the convening of the Constituent Assembly.

On August 25, in full accordance with the government order, the cavalry corps headed to Petrograd. But these were Cossack units of the 3rd Cavalry Corps (as well as the Native (“Wild”) Division) under the command of Lieutenant General A.M. Krymov, although Kornilov promised Savinkov to send a corps of regular cavalry, led by a more “liberal” commander.

Kornilov hoped for the “Union of Officers” as an organization that could counteract the Bolsheviks in Petrograd itself by creating mobile officer-junker detachments. It was supposed to use funds from the Guchkov-Putilov organization to finance them (the 900 thousand rubles already received went to renting premises for officers, purchasing motorcycles, cars, weapons). The combat structures of the “Union of Officers” were actually subordinate to Kornilov himself, acting completely independently of the government. The officers hoped to confront the authorities with the fact of the liquidation of the Petrograd Soviet and the arrest of the Bolsheviks.

Chronology

On August 26, State Duma deputy Lvov conveys to the Prime Minister various issues he discussed with General Kornilov the day before. wishes in the sense of increasing power.

Kerensky, during Lvov’s second visit to him, hid assistant police chief Bulavinsky behind a curtain in his office. Bulavinsky testifies that the note was read to Lvov and the latter confirmed its contents, but to the question “what were the reasons and motives that forced General Kornilov to demand that Kerensky and Savinkov come to Headquarters,” he did not answer.

On the evening of August 26, at a government meeting, Kerensky qualified the actions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief as a “rebellion.” However, even the Provisional Government did not take Kerensky’s side. During the stormy meeting that took place, Kerensky demanded “dictatorial powers” ​​to suppress the “rebellion,” but other ministers opposed this and insisted on a peaceful settlement.

On August 27, Kerensky dissolves the cabinet and arbitrarily assumes “dictatorial powers” single-handedly removes General Kornilov from office ( which he has no legal right to), demands the cancellation of the movement to Petrograd of the cavalry corps he had previously sent and appoints himself Supreme Commander-in-Chief. General Kornilov refuses to carry out such an order...

As a result, General Kornilov comes to the conclusion that:

...and decides not to submit and not to surrender the position of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Kornilov responds for his part with a number of heated appeals to the army, the people, and the Cossacks, in which he describes the course of events, calling Kerensky’s actions a provocation. Kornilov in one of his response appeals (dated August 27) inadvertently states that:

This careless generalization of all members of the Provisional Government, who, with the possible exception of one, could be accused of anything but serving the Germans, made a painful impression on those who knew the actual relationships between members of the government, and especially on those among he was Kornilov's spiritual accomplices.

Assuming full power, General Kornilov promised to “save Great Russia” and “bring the people through victory to the convening of the Constituent Assembly.” On the 29th, the general distributed another appeal, in which he declared a conspiracy between the government, the Bolsheviks and Germany, called the explosions in Kazan their planned action, and called on them not to obey government orders.

General Kornilov’s speech was supported by the Union of Officers, Petrograd officer organizations, “ second checker of the Empire» General Kaledin joined the rebels; there was no doubt that the mass of the officers were entirely on Kornilov’s side and were watching with bated breath the vicissitudes of the struggle, which was vitally close to them; but, not attracted to it in advance on a large scale and in a solid organization, in the environment in which it lived, the officers could only provide moral support. The commanders of the four fronts declared their solidarity with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Subsequently, Kerensky, the triumvirate of Savinkov, Avksentyev and Skobelev, the Petrograd Duma with A. A. Isaev and Schrader at the head and the councils feverishly began to take measures to stop the movement of Krymov’s troops...

In a telegram without a number and signed “Kerensky,” the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was asked to hand over his position to General Lukomsky and immediately leave for the capital. This order was illegal and was not subject to mandatory execution - “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was not in any way subordinate to the Minister of War, or the Minister-Chairman, and especially Comrade Kerensky.” Kerensky is trying to appoint a new Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but both “candidate” generals - Lukomsky and Klembovsky - refuse, and the first of them, in response to an offer to take the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, openly accuses Kerensky of provocation.

On August 28, General Kornilov decides to refuse Kerensky to fulfill his demand (dated August 28) to stop the movement towards Petrograd (sent there earlier by decision of the Provisional Government and Kerensky himself) of General Krymov’s corps and decides:

...using for this purpose the same cavalry corps, already moving at Kerensky’s direction to Petrograd, and gives its commander, General Krymov, the corresponding instructions.

On August 28, Krymov’s troops occupied Luga, disarming the local garrison. At the Antropshino station, the Kornilovskaya Native Division entered into a firefight with soldiers of the Petrograd garrison. In the face of a threat to the government's power, Kerensky is looking for opportunities for negotiations, but he is dissuaded from going to Headquarters because of the danger of reprisals - there are rumors that Kerensky has been sentenced to death in the army. The Soviets offered assistance to the government in suppressing the uprising. The Provisional Government was forced to resort to the services of Bolshevik agitators to contact the rebel units and distribute weapons to Petrograd workers, which subsequently contributed to the Soviets in carrying out the October Revolution.

Kerensky issues a decree expelling General Kornilov and his senior associates from office and putting him on trial “for rebellion.”

Krymov headed to Petrograd, leaving his corps in the vicinity of Luga, at the invitation of Kerensky, which was transmitted through a friend of the general, Colonel Samarin, who held the position of assistant to the chief of Kerensky’s office. The details of the conversation between Krymov and Kerensky have not reached us. According to eyewitnesses, the angry voice of General Krymov was heard from behind the office doors, denouncing the minister-chairman.

According to the memoirs of Gen. A. Lukomsky, Krymov, through his adjutant, handed over a note to Kornilov. Kornilov received the note, but did not familiarize anyone with its contents.

The widow of the late General Krymov received permission from Kerensky exclusively to funeral at night and subject to the presence of no more than 9 people, including clergy.

On September 4, Colonel Samarin was promoted to major general for distinguished service and appointed commander of the troops of the Irkutsk Military District...

The advance of the rebel troops was stopped on September 11 (29) in the Vyritsa-Pavlovsk section as a result of sabotage (the railway track was dismantled). Thanks to the agitators sent to contact the rebels, it was possible to ensure that they laid down their arms.

General Kornilov refuses offers to leave Headquarters and “run away.” Not wanting bloodshed in response to assurances of loyalty from units loyal to him from the mouth of the General Staff of Captain Nezhentsev

The general replied:

General Staff General of Infantry M.V. Alekseev...

... agrees to arrest General Kornilov and his associates (generals Romanovsky, Lukomsky and a number of senior officers who were taken under investigation and placed in the city of Bykhov in the monastery building) at Headquarters, which he does on September 1, 1917. General Alekseev tried to ensure maximum security for the Kornilovites placed in the building of the Bykhov prison. However, this episode turned out to be misunderstood by General Kornilov and subsequently, already on the Don, had a very negative impact on the relations between the two general leaders of the young Volunteer Army. General Kornilov, without a doubt, should also have previously been upset by the extreme caution of General Alekseev in terms of supporting the Performance, who sympathized with General Kornilov’s desire to restore order in the army and the country, but publicly did not agree on any point due to a lack of faith in the success of the risky event.

Immediately after this (a week later), General Alekseev resigns from the post of Chief of Staff under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - Kerensky; The general always spoke about this short, just a few days, period of his life with deep emotion and sorrow. Mikhail Vasilyevich expressed his attitude towards the Kornilovites in a letter to the editor of Novoye Vremya, B. A. Suvorin, as follows:

On August 28, Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front General A. I. Denikin, General S. L. Markov, General I. G. Erdeli and a number of others who expressed solidarity with the Kornilov speech were also arrested.

(For more information about this, see the article Bykhov seat)

Public reaction

After the August days, a new word appeared in use among the people and in the army - “Kornilovtsy”, pronounced, according to General Denikin, either with pride or with indignation, but in any case expressing a sharp protest against the existing regime and its policies - “Kerenskyism” . In October 1917, the press launched a campaign for the rehabilitation of General Kornilov and his associates.

Belevsky said at this time:

A. I. Ilyin spoke much more directly and boldly in those days:

On September 9, 1917, the cadet ministers resigned as a sign of solidarity with General Kornilov.

Results

Kerensky's victory in this confrontation became prelude to Bolshevism, for it meant the victory of the Soviets, among whom the Bolsheviks already occupied a predominant position, and with which the Kerensky government was only able to conduct a conciliatory policy.

L.D. Trotsky wrote:

N.V. Starikov wrote:

“The Kornilov Rebellion” is 100% the merit of Alexander Fedorovich, his script, his dramaturgy. In reality, there was no rebellion: a group of patriotic generals tried to save the country at the request of... Kerensky, and then were slandered and betrayed by him.

During the imprisonment of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the Bykhov prison, Kerensky once said the following phrase, characterizing both the moral and ethical aspects of the policy of the minister-chairman and his plans for the future General Kornilov:

General Romanovsky, one of the Bykhov prisoners, said later: “They can shoot Kornilov, send his accomplices to hard labor, but “Kornilovism” will not die in Russia, since “Kornilovism” is love for the Motherland, the desire to save Russia, and these are high motives not to throw any dirt at, not to trample under any haters of Russia.”

The consequences of the Kornilov speech played an important role in the history of the Civil War. Anti-Bolshevik socialists and officers never trusted each other, and under the Provisional Government this mistrust became even deeper. But it was Kornilov’s conspiracy that caused the final break. Neither side wanted to forgive or forget imaginary and real grievances, or, as they themselves called it, “betrayal.” Without a doubt, the main reason for the Reds' victory in the Civil War was the lack of unity in the camp of their enemies.

In 1937, 20 years after the events described, another participant in the events, I. L. Solonevich, wrote in the Voice of Russia that the failure of General Kornilov’s conspiracy resulted in Stalin’s power over Russia, and also characterized the confrontation between Kerensky and Kornilov as follows:

Versions

There is a version that General Kornilov, who had recently spoken at the Moscow State Conference demanding a “strong hand,” had agreed in advance on the armed action with the head of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, who, during the advance of Krymov’s Cossacks to Petrograd, under pressure from the Petrograd Soviet, changed his initial position and recognized General Kornilov rebel on August 27. According to Kornilov, with the knowledge of A.F. Kerensky, he sent the 3rd Cavalry Corps under the command of General Krymov to Petrograd. Thus, under the pretext of introducing “reliable troops” to neutralize the Bolsheviks, Kornilov received the opportunity to remove the Provisional Government and become a military dictator. According to another version, Kornilov misunderstood Kerensky. The rebellion could also have been a provocation by Savinkov (who agreed to the introduction of troops) or Lvov, who served as a truce between the commander-in-chief and the chairman of the government.

L. D. Trotsky in his “History of the Russian Revolution” writes that Kornilov’s rebellion was agreed upon with Kerensky and was aimed at establishing the latter’s dictatorship, but Kornilov betrayed the agreements and tried to achieve dictatorship for himself.