Talented people with bad character. Own way

23.04.2014 09:47

Making a film can be a very difficult undertaking. Sometimes people on set lose their cool or just act badly and behave horribly. If you ever decide to make a film in Hollywood, think twice before working with celebrities who have extremely obstinate personalities.

Val Kilmer
Handsome Val is a public favorite and one of the most charismatic actors in Hollywood. He is also the popular superhero “Batman” in the 1995 blockbuster “Batman Forever”, and in life he is a tempter women's hearts, whose charms even the legendary supermodel Cindy Crawford once could not resist. It is not without reason that he is considered the most difficult actor in Hollywood.

At the age of 12, the young rebel got his first role in a hamburger commercial, where during filming he managed to infuriate the entire working group. In more mature age Val never got rid of his addiction to organizing " kindergarten"on the set.
“I know things can be difficult with me. But that only applies to idiots,” Val says.

Mike Myers
For many viewers, the famous Canadian comedian Mike Myers will forever remain the shrewd secret super agent and hilarious Doctor Evil from the Austin Powers comedy trilogy.

Katherine Heigl
It turns out that no one is particularly eager to collaborate with the former “Most Desirable” woman on the planet and Hollywood sex symbol because of her quarrelsome nature.
She managed to anger everyone film crew film "Life as We Know It" by the fact that she was constantly dissatisfied with everything. She was unhappy with her wardrobe, had to change clothes several times a day, and constantly demanded changes to the script, insisting that her character’s lines looked “dumb.”

“Character” is interpreted in psychology far from unambiguously. The difficulties of distinguishing between character and temperament have already been discussed above. Even more controversial issues arise when trying to separate the concepts of “character” and “personality”. In the psychological literature one can find all sorts of options for correlating these two concepts: character and personality are practically identified, that is, these terms are used as synonyms; character is included in personality and is considered as its substructure; on the contrary, personality is understood as a specific part of character; personality and character are considered as “overlapping” formations. You can avoid confusing the concepts of character and personality if you adhere to a narrower interpretation of them. The idea of ​​personality in the narrow sense has already been discussed at the beginning of the previous lecture. A more specialized understanding of character also exists, and I am going to introduce you to it.

Character in the narrow sense of the word is defined as a set of stable properties of an individual, which express the ways of his behavior and methods of emotional response.

With this definition of character, its properties, as well as the properties of temperament, can be attributed to the formal dynamic features of behavior. However, in the first case, these properties, so to speak, are extremely formal, while in the second they bear signs of somewhat greater content and formality. So, for the motor sphere, adjectives describing temperament will be “fast”, “agile”, “sharp”, “sluggish”, and character qualities will be “collected”, “organized”, “neat”, “lax”. To characterize the emotional sphere in the case of temperament, words such as “lively”, “impulsive”, “hot-tempered”, “sensitive” are used, and in the case of character - “good-natured”, “closed”, “distrustful”. However, as already mentioned, the boundary separating temperament and character is quite arbitrary. It is much more important to understand more deeply the difference between character and personality (in the narrow sense). Let us recall, for example, the personalities of outstanding people. The question arises: Are there any great men of bad character known to history? Yes, as much as you like. There is an opinion that F.M. Dostoevsky had a difficult character, I.P. had a very “cool” character. Pavlova. However, this did not stop both of them from becoming outstanding personalities. This means that character and personality are far from the same thing. In this regard, one statement by P. B. Gannushkin is interesting. Noting the fact that high talent is often combined with psychopathy, he writes that when assessing creative individuals, their character flaws are not important. “History,” he writes, “is interested only in creation and mainly in those elements of it that are not personal, individual, but have a general, enduring character.” So, the “creation” of a person is primarily an expression of his personality. Descendants use the results of the personality, not the character. But it is not descendants who confront a person’s character, but the people immediately around him: family and friends, friends, colleagues. They bear the burden of his character. For them, unlike descendants, a person’s character can become, and often becomes, more significant than his personality. If we try to very briefly express the essence of the differences between character and personality, we can say that character traits reflect how a person acts, and personality traits reflect what he acts for. At the same time, it is obvious that the methods of behavior and the orientation of the individual are relatively independent: using the same methods, you can achieve different goals and, conversely, strive for the same goal in different ways.

Now let's turn to character descriptions. Thus, Jung identified two main types of character: extroverted and introverted; Kretschmer also described only two types: cycloid and schizoid. Over time, the number of types increased. In Gannushkin we already find about seven types (or “groups”) of characters; Leonhard and Lichko have ten-eleven. Almost all authors of typologies emphasized that character can be more or less expressed. Character can be considered pathological, that is, regarded as psychopathy, if it is relatively stable over time, that is, it changes little throughout life. This first sign, according to A.E. Lichko, is well illustrated by the saying: “As in the cradle, so in the grave.” The second sign is the totality of character manifestations: with psychopathy, the same character traits are found everywhere: at home, at work, on vacation, among friends and among strangers, in short, in any circumstances. If a person, let’s say, is alone at home, but “in public” is different, then he is not a psychopath. Finally, the third and perhaps most important sign of psychopathy is social maladjustment. The latter lies in the fact that a person constantly faces difficulties in life, and these difficulties are experienced either by himself, or by the people around him, or by both. This is such a simple everyday and at the same time completely scientific criterion.

Let's consider two types of psychopathy described by Gannushkin.

The first type belongs to the asthenic group. This group includes two varieties (private types): neurasthenics and psychasthenics. Their common properties are increased sensitivity and rapid depletion. They are excitable and exhausted in a nervous and mental sense. In the case of neurasthenia, some other somatic disorders are added here: the person complains of periodic discomfort, pain, tingling, bad job intestines, bad dream, increased heartbeat, etc. All these problems in the functioning of the body are of a psychogenic nature; as a rule, there is no noticeable organic basis for them. They arise due to the neurasthenic’s too much attention to the functions of his body. By feeling anxiously about them, he upsets them even more. The weakness and exhaustion of asthenics leads to the fact that their activities, as a rule, turn out to be ineffective. They do not succeed well in business and do not occupy high positions. due to frequent failures they develop low self-esteem and painful pride. Their aspirations are usually higher than their capabilities. They are vain, proud and at the same time cannot achieve everything they strive for. As a result, they develop and strengthen character traits such as timidity, uncertainty, and suspiciousness. Psychasthenics do not have somatic disorders, but another quality is added - timidity, indecisiveness, doubts about everything. They have doubts about the present, future and past. Often they are overcome by false fears for their lives and for the lives of loved ones. It is very difficult for them to start a business: they make a decision, then retreat, gather their strength again, etc. It is difficult for them to make decisions because they doubt the success of any planned business. On the other hand, if a psychasthenic has already decided something, he must implement it immediately; in other words, he is extremely impatient. Constant doubts, indecision and impatience - this is such a paradoxical combination of properties. However, it has its own logic: the psychasthenic rushes things because he fears that something will prevent him from accomplishing his plans; in other words, impatience comes from the same uncertainty. Thus, asthenics mainly suffer from their own character. But they have some features that make those around them suffer. The fact is that minor grievances, humiliations and injections of pride, of which there are many in the life of an asthenic, accumulate and require an outlet. And then they break out in the form of angry outbursts, attacks of irritation. But this happens, as a rule, not among strangers - there the asthenic prefers to restrain himself, but at home, in the circle of loved ones. As a result, a timid asthenic person can become a real tyrant of the family. However, emotional outbursts quickly fade and end in tears and repentance.

The second type belongs to the epileptoid group. The characteristic signs of persons of this type, according to Gannushkin, are extreme irritability, leading to attacks of rage and anger; periodic mood disorders mixed with melancholy, fear, anger and, finally, certain moral defects. Epileptoids are people who are extremely selfish, intensely active, persistent and very affective. They are passionate thrill-seekers. They are prone to forming highly valuable ideas. At the same time, they may exhibit scrupulous pettiness, pedantry, and hoarding. They are also characterized by hypocrisy and hypocrisy. All manifestations of epileptoids contain elements of irritability, embitterment, and anger. This constant accompaniment of their life makes them extremely difficult for others and loved ones. They are aggressive, petty, picky, ready to criticize and correct everything, extremely vindictive and vindictive. They are also prone to violent actions, as a result of which they sometimes end up in the dock. The physiological basis of the epileptoid character, according to Gannushkin, is the strength of primitive drives, on the one hand, and the viscosity of nervous processes, on the other.

Accentuations of character

Accentuations are extreme variants of normal characters. At the same time, deviations of accentuations from the average norm also give rise to some problems and difficulties for their carriers (although not to such a strong extent as in psychopathy). That is why both the term itself and the first studies of accentuated characters appeared in the works of psychiatrists. However, no less, and perhaps to a greater extent, the problem of accentuated characters relates to general psychology. Suffice it to say that more than half of teenagers studying in regular secondary schools have accentuated characters. What is the difference between character accentuations and psychopathy? This is an important issue that should be understood, since it is associated with the difference between pathology and normality. In the case of character accentuations, there may be none of the above signs of psychopathy; at least, all three signs are never present at once. The absence of the first sign is expressed in the fact that the accentuated character does not run as a “red thread” throughout life. It usually worsens in adolescence, and smooths out with age. The second sign - totality - is also not obligatory: the traits of accentuated characters do not appear in any situation, but only in special conditions. Finally, social maladaptation with accentuations either does not occur at all or is short-lived. At the same time, the reason for temporary discord with oneself and with the environment is not any difficult conditions (as in psychopathy), but conditions that create a load on the place of least character resistance.

Types of accentuations

They basically coincide with the types of psychopathy, although their list is wider. A. E. Lichko highlights following types accentuations: hyperthymic, cycloid, labile, asthenoneurotic, sensitive, psychasthenic, schizoid, epileptoid, hysterical, unstable and conformal. As in the case of psychopathy, different types can be combined, or mixed, in one person, although these combinations are not arbitrary.

What situations are difficult for hyperthymic people? Those where their behavior is strictly regulated, where there is no freedom to show initiative, where there is monotonous work or forced inaction. In all these situations, hyperthymas give rise to explosions or breakdowns. For example, if a teenager of this type has overly protective parents who control his every step, then very early he begins to protest and give sharp negative reactions even to the point of running away from home. For persons with schizoid accentuation, it is most difficult to enter into emotional contacts with people. Therefore, they become maladapted where it is necessary to communicate informally (which is very suitable for hypertimus). Therefore, they should not be entrusted, for example, with the role of organizer of a new business: after all, this will require him to establish many connections with people, take into account their moods and relationships, fine orientation in a social situation, flexibility of behavior, etc. Representatives of this type also cannot tolerate when they “get into their soul,” they especially need careful treatment of their inner world. For a hysterical accentuator, the most difficult thing to endure is lack of attention to his person. He strives for praise, fame, leadership, but soon loses his position as a result of business immaturity and then suffers greatly. It is possible, and sometimes even necessary, to leave a schizoid or psychasthenic alone; to do the same with a hysteroid means creating a situation of psychological discomfort and even stress.

The problem of the biological foundations of character has long been a problem in psychology. It is discussed, relatively speaking, in weaker and stronger forms. In the "weak" version we're talking about specifically about the biological, or physiological, foundations of character; in a “stronger” version, the genetic basis of character is assumed. After all, as you already know, everything genotypic is also biological, but not everything biological has a genotypic nature. Let us consider this problem immediately in a stronger formulation: are there genetic foundations of character? Understanding character in a narrow sense, we can answer: yes, they exist. As evidence of this conclusion, the following facts are cited in the scientific literature: the similarity of characters traced in pedigree lines by many authors; the connection of character, especially in its pathological forms, with the bodily constitution (Kretschmer, Sheldon, etc.); early appearance and stability of the properties of abnormal characters throughout life; finally, the results of studies of normal characters using the twin method. The study of extreme anomalies of character suggests that in some cases a relatively greater contribution to the formation of anomalies is made by the genotypic factor, in other cases - by the environmental factor. Thus, the psychiatric literature describes “true” or “nuclear” psychopathy, in the origin of which adverse heredity plays a decisive role. In these cases, it is possible to establish the presence of the same type of character in parents, siblings and collateral relatives. The early manifestation of character anomalies and their relative constancy throughout life are also noted. Finally, it has been established, and it is important to emphasize, that psychopathy can occur even in the most favorable conditions education. At the same time, there are known cases of the exact opposite meaning: only severe cases can lead to the formation of psychopathy. social conditions with a completely normal background background. The same role can be played by biologically harmful environmental influences (brain injuries, infections), especially those occurring in the prenatal, natal and early postnatal periods. Finally, the middle position is occupied by cases (the majority of them) in which, according to A.E. Lichko, “the seeds of bad environmental influences fell on endogenously prepared soil suitable for them,” i.e., with a genetic predisposition, the child finds himself in conditions of unfavorable upbringing , which leads to the sharpening of certain character traits. So, analysis of the problem of “biological foundations of character” leads us to the following conclusions.

Firstly, the determinants of character traits should be sought both in the characteristics of the genotypic background and in the characteristics of environmental influences. Secondly, the degree of relative participation of genotypic and environmental factors in the formation of character can be very different. Thirdly, genotypic and environmental influences on character can, so to speak, be summed up algebraically: with an unfavorable combination of both factors, character development can result in strong degrees deviations up to pathological forms; with a favorable combination, even a strong genotypic predisposition to an anomaly may not be realized or at least not lead to pathological character deviations.

All these findings are very important for psychology. In particular, they force us to put forward as a very urgent task early diagnosis character deviations in children and the study of special conditions of upbringing that take into account and, possibly, correct these deviations. Each character type is not a random conglomeration of properties; a certain pattern emerges in their combinations; or "logic". Tracing this logic is an important task psychological research, the solution of which, unfortunately, is far from sufficiently advanced. In almost all descriptions of character types one can find combinations of very heterogeneous or, better said, very different-order properties. Simply put, they contain both character traits and personality traits in an undivided form. When characterizing schizoids, E. Kretschmer lists such formal, i.e., independent of the direction of behavior, properties (character traits) as unsociability, restraint, seriousness, timidity, sentimentality, and, on the other hand, much more meaningful, motivationally personality traits: “the desire to make people happy,” “the desire for doctrinaire principles,” “the unshakable firmness of convictions,” “purity of views,” “persistence in the fight for one’s ideals,” etc. In the description of the paranoid type of P. B. Gannushkin one can also find whole range psychological characteristics- from purely dynamic to ideological: intense affectivity, persistence, stubbornness, aggressiveness, rancor, complacency, selfishness, conviction of a special meaning self. These examples can be multiplied. The “different order” of traits included in descriptions of character types is, generally speaking, quite natural. Moreover, they testify to the completeness and impartiality of their authors’ perception of the psychological appearance of people. However, these holistic pictures require dismembering analysis. Such an analysis by the authors of descriptions of character, as a rule, is not completed: they do not record the transition in the descriptions from the actual characterological structures to the personal ones. If, in characterological complexes, we make a mental separation of character traits and personality traits, then much will fall into place. First of all, it will become clear that in fact, “character types” show typicality and, therefore. a pattern of combinations of certain character traits with certain personality traits. By the way, the latter are sometimes separated into special headings, where, under the names “social attitude”, “social meaning”, the features of social positions and relationships are traced, that is, personal traits typical of representatives of each character. And here a very important task arises: to trace why and how certain character traits contribute to the formation of certain personality traits. The psychological literature contains separate attempts to answer these questions, that is, to trace the mechanisms of occurrence personal qualities due to some pronounced character traits. Thus, S. Ya. Rubinstein gives the following explanation of the obsequiousness and hypocrisy of epileptics and epileptoid psychopaths. As already mentioned, the character of these individuals is characterized by increased anger and malice. Receiving legitimate “retribution” from peers and adults in response to frequent affective outbursts, a child with such a character looks for ways to defend himself. He finds them in the way of masking their malice and temper with obsequious behavior. It is known how crucial for the development of a teenager’s personality is his attitude to social norms and values. However, due to the characteristics of his character, a teenager may find different attitudes towards them. Thus, hyperthymia usually has a very pronounced “emancipation reaction,” i.e., separation from adults, which, of course, complicates the process of assimilation social norms. On the contrary, a sensitive teenager, as a rule, retains a childish attachment to adults and willingly submits to their demands. As a result, he early develops a sense of duty, a sense of responsibility, increased and even inflated moral demands on himself and others. Thus, we can say that the activity of society aimed at the formation of personality, as well as the entire process of personality formation as a whole, “meets” different soil in individual characters. And as a result of such meetings, typical combinations of characterological and personal properties arise. They are reflected in “character types,” although it would be more accurate to speak of “personal and characterological types.” I would like to emphasize once again that the typicality of the combinations under discussion does not mean that the personality is predetermined by character, but only a natural manifestation of the role of certain character traits in the process of personality formation.

Now about the reverse relationship, i.e. e. about the influence of personality on the fate of character. Manifestations of character are much more immediate than manifestations of personality. When a person “sends” his character, he is rather prompted by what is “natural” to him, what he “wants” or “doesn’t want.” When he begins to act as an individual, he is guided the sooner the more what “should”, what “should”, “as it should be”. In other words, with the development of personality, a person begins to live more normatively, not only in the sense of general orientation, but also in the sense of methods of behavior. This can be expressed by the general formula, according to which a personality “removes” character in its development. One cannot, however, think that the “removal” of character traits by a person always occurs. The above expresses only the most general tendency. Often this tendency is not fully realized, and sometimes encounters serious obstacles in the form of pronounced character traits, which are further aggravated by external conditions. In this case, the person is unable to overcome or “rework” his character. Then the latter turns out to be a significant determinant of behavior, and sometimes an inhibitor to personality development (which is what is observed in psychopathy).

Is there a normal character, and if so, how does it manifest itself? The formal answer to this question seems obvious; a normal character, of course, exists: it is a character without deviations. A person has a normal character if he is not too lively - and not too inhibited, not too closed and not too open, not too anxious - and not too carefree... - and here, continuing, it would be necessary to list all the main features that distinguish, For example, known types accentuations from each other. In other words, normal character is the “golden mean” of a number of qualities. Let us first try to understand how typical, i.e. widespread, such a hypothetical character is. Let "normal" be considered those degrees of deviation of some property from the mathematical average that half of the population possesses; then 1/4 of the population will be located at both poles of the “axis” of this property in the zones of “deviation from the norm.” If we now take not one, but two independent properties, then under the same conditions 1/4 of the population will already be in the “normal” zone, and the remaining 3/4 will fall into the “deviation” zones, with five independent properties“normal” will be one person out of 32, and with nine - one out of 1024! So it is very difficult to have a “normal” character, and such a phenomenon is quite rare.

Each person has certain characteristics that are expressed in emotional manifestations, selection of specific actions and reactions. All this happens automatically and is defined by people as character traits. There are many personality types to quickly determine what kind of person is experiencing this.

Everyone knows what character is. This is a set of qualities that are inherent in a particular person. Character is developed throughout life. As a child, he is flexible and quickly changing. Over the years he gains greater stability and at the end it is fixed.. What is it and what features does it have? this phenomenon, the article will tell.

What is personality character?

Every person encounters the character of another person. What it is? This is a characteristic of the psyche that combines permanent and stable qualities that determine the behavior and attitude of an individual. Translated from Greek, character means “trait”, “sign”. This is a stable characteristic that affects behavior, ways of reacting, activities and individual manifestations of a person.

We can say that the character of a person determines a person’s entire life, his destiny. They say that fate is predetermined. In fact, a person who does not obey specific rules and strategies creates his own destiny, which he then lives.

By changing your character, you can change your destiny, since character determines the reaction, behavior, and decisions a person makes in a specific situation. If you look closely, you can see that people who are similar in character live the same life. Only the details differ, but their methods and behavior are the same.

Character is formed throughout a person's life. It can be changed at any moment, which in adulthood is possible only under the influence of one’s own desire and willpower. If a person cannot change his character, then his life does not change and its development is predictable.

Personality Traits

Character changes depending on the type of activity, society, social circle, attitude towards oneself and the world as a whole. If any of these aspects change, this may affect the change in the quality of character. If everything in a person’s life remains unchanged, then character traits remain unchanged.

Personality traits

The character of a person is also formed under the influence of the values ​​and moral beliefs that a person uses. The more stable they are, the more people is consolidated in its behavior and manifestations. Main feature personal character is its certainty, where one can note the leading features, of which several always stand out. Definition of character disappears if there are no stable qualities.

Character is also based on the interests that a person has. The more stable and constant they are, the more a person becomes focused, persistent and integral in his manifestations.

You can determine the character traits of another person by his actions and their direction. Both actions and the results that he achieves after completing them are important. They are the ones who show a person's character.

Temperament and personality

The relationship between personality and character is also visible. Although these characteristics are determined by the human psyche, they are different quantities. Temperament is determined by structure nervous system, which makes it an innate quality, the manifestations of which cannot be changed, but you can simply do something.

Character is a flexible aspect that is formed throughout life. A person can change it, which is determined by his life activity.

Character is formed based on the temperament with which a person is born. Temperament can be called the basis on which the entire branch of his character qualities is built. At the same time, temperament does not change depending on external circumstances and type of activity.

Temperament is characterized by three directions, each of which has its own complex structure:

1. Mobility (activity). It manifests itself in active work, self-expression, manifestation of oneself, which can be either sluggish or overly active.
2. Emotionality. There is a variety of moods and feelings here. Defined by:

• Lability – the speed of change from one mood to another.
• Impressiveness - the depth of perception of external emotional stimuli.
• Impulsivity is the speed at which an emotion transforms into a motivating force for action without thinking it through and making a decision to carry it out.

1. Motor skills.

Personality types

Psychologists from different times tried to identify personality types to determine specific groups of people. E. Kretschmer identified 3 groups of people according to their body type:

1. Picnic people prone to typing excess weight, short, with a large face, neck, plump. They are easily adaptable to the conditions of the world, sociable and emotional.
2. Athletic people, characterized by well-developed muscles, are tall and broad-shouldered, hardy and with a large chest. They are not impressionable, domineering, calm and practical, restrained in gestures and facial expressions, and do not adapt well.
3. Asthenic people are characterized by thinness and undeveloped muscles, a narrow face, long arms and legs, and a flat chest. They are stubborn and serious, withdrawn and poorly adaptable to change.

K. Jung proposed another typology that divides people by type of thinking:

• Extroverts. Very sociable and active people who tend to make a lot of acquaintances. They are direct and open. They love to travel, have parties, and be the life of the party. They focus on objective circumstances, and not on the subjective opinions of people.
• Introverts. Very closed people, fenced off from the world. They have few friends because they find it difficult to make contacts. They constantly analyze everything that is happening. They are very anxious and prefer to be alone.

Another classification divides people into 4 psychotypes depending on their combination of character and temperament:

1. Cholerics are unbalanced, fast, impetuous, passionate people. They quickly become exhausted due to the senseless expenditure of energy. Prone to emotional outbursts and mood swings.
2. Phlegmatic people are stable in their manifestations, emotions and views, unhurried, unperturbed people. They tend to be calm and balanced, persistent in their work. Outwardly they do not show emotions.
3. Melancholics – vulnerable people prone to constant experience of emotions. Very impressionable, react sharply to external manifestations.
4. Sanguine people are lively, mobile and active people. They react quickly to external circumstances and tend to receive many impressions. They are productive at work. They easily endure failures and troubles.

Psychological character of personality

Changes that occur in the psychological character of a person are divided into natural (typical) and individual (atypical).

Natural changes occur as a person grows up and goes through certain changes in his body. Childish features disappear, replaced by adult ones. Childhood traits include capriciousness, irresponsibility, fears, and tearfulness. For adults - wisdom, life experience, tolerance, rationality, prudence, etc.

Much here is determined by the situations that a person often encounters. Communication with people, various circumstances, successes and failures, tragedies determine a person’s change of views and values. That's why people are alone age group differ from each other because everyone had their own life experiences. Here individual traits are formed, which depend on the life circumstances through which each person passes.

Traits are quickly replaced by others if they are similar to or include previous ones.

Social character of personality

The social character of a person is understood as those qualities that should be characteristic of absolutely all people of a particular society. When going out into society, a person must show not only individual traits, but also those qualities that are considered acceptable, approved, and normal. This set is formed by society, the media, culture, education, educational institutions, religion, etc. It should be noted that parents also raise their children depending on the framework and norms that are accepted in society.

According to E. Fromm, the social character of a person is a person’s way of adapting to the society in which he is located. This is an unpunished and free way of existing in a particular society. He believed that no society allows a person to self-realize in full force, because it always dictates its own rules and norms, which must be exceeded individual characteristics and desires. This is why a person is always in conflict with society, when he must obey in order to be accepted, or tries to protest, which can be punishable.

Society will never allow a person to express himself in full force, which prevents him from realizing his inclinations and harms the individual himself. A distortion of character must occur when everyone fits themselves into certain frameworks and norms accepted in society. Only through development in man social nature society makes it safe for itself. What is important here is not the personality, but its safe manifestations that will be acceptable in society. Otherwise, there will be punishment for any individual self-expression that does not fit into the framework.

Accentuation of personality character

The accentuation of a person’s character is understood as a set of qualities that are clearly manifested by an individual within normal limits. It is divided into:

• Hidden - traits that appear infrequently or never at all. However, under certain conditions they can appear.
• Explicit - traits that manifest themselves to the extreme of the norm and are characterized by constancy.

K. Leongrad identified types of accentuation:

1. Hysterical – thirst for attention, egocentrism, need for honor and approval, recognition of individual characteristics.
2. Hyperthymic – sociability, mobility, tendency to mischief, excessive independence.
3. Asthenoneurotic – anxiety, high fatigue.
4. Psychosthenic – indecision, a tendency to demagoguery, analysis and soul-searching, suspiciousness.
5. Schizoid – detachment, isolation, unsociability.
6. Excitable – periodic sad moods, accumulation of irritation.
7. Sensitive – increased touchiness, sensitivity, shyness.
8. Infantile dependent - a delay in childhood when a person does not take responsibility.
9. Emotionally labile – mood variability.
10. Unstable - a tendency towards idleness, pleasure, entertainment, idleness.

Bottom line

Personality character often helps in understanding the personality itself, since everything revolves around its inner world, which has manifestations in the form of reactions, emotions, behavior, actions and even achievements that this moment available. Consideration various types character can lead to the following result - a quick and easy understanding of people.

Character is a flexible characteristic that can be changed at any time. It can change both unconsciously and under the influence of the willpower of a person who controls the manifestation of a particular quality. The longer a person exhibits a particular quality, the more it is consolidated and becomes one of his characteristics that influences the future development of life.

“A talented person is too inconvenient for everyone and good for everyone. It should not be taken in large doses. A severe character is caused by reasons that are inconvenient for multiple explanations.

Such a person sees more meaning in words than the interlocutor puts into it, and is offended. His own fantasy terribly interferes with his life. He cannot be left offended. In his imagination he will go as far as murder.

He cannot call two or three jobs in a row bad: he will panic, try to give up his profession, make inept samples of another and go crazy inside. Outside, he will start drinking with just anyone and complaining to people he meets.

Trees bloom in moisture and sun, talent blossoms in an atmosphere of love and delight. It's not his fault: the role chose him.

He is so confident that he is doing something bad that praise is always pleasantly surprising. Conceit is impossible with talent; it comes later.

A difficult character is often mistaken for arrogance. It’s difficult for the interlocutor to answer out of place, asking again from being immersed in something. This irritates one, immediately offends the other, then imagination enters - and scandal.

It’s hard trying to call things by their proper names. Get to the bottom of your interlocutor’s character traits and name them. It is unbearable. Beautiful women, who generally tend to exaggerate their successes, are happy to discover that in front of them is a bad person. They are the authors of the formulations: “ Good poet, but a bad person."

At the same time, a talented person feels well how his appearance and presence are received, sees the flight of words and hits, which gives rise to delicacy in him. He utters offensive words only in a heated atmosphere. Imagination allows him to anticipate reactions. He is inconvenient because he is independent and brave. It’s not him, it’s his talent. He himself is dependent, gets used to the place. He is afraid of losing his life, but cannot say anything else, because he sees himself from the outside. Naive because he is not alert. He can be stingy because he fears for his life, unable to adapt.

Sometimes he is greedy in food, because he rarely gets pleasure. Gets used to the place, but is not monogamous. Seeks intoxication and does not know what exactly to avoid. He lets it happen, but he always comes back.

He is sincerely surprised to hear the scream. Absolutely cannot lead a family. Although he might agree on something. But another person must show iron consistency and perseverance in business. Again, because he, without realizing it, shows persistence where he is talented. It is good to attach it to someone or two and consider it as one whole.

We are drawn to talent. Listen to him. Sit next to me. We must understand its narrow purpose and help produce what it does best. We must bring him raw materials, and not disinterestedly. He will pull the whole cart. He will create.

Works of genius are the same creations of God as birds and animals; their non-appearance leaves this place empty.”

Zhvanetsky M.M., Heavy character / Collected works in 4 volumes, Volume 3 (Eighties), M., “Time”, 2001, p. 44-46.

A. V. Mikhailov

FROM THE HISTORY OF CHARACTER

In the book:Man and culture: Individuality in the history of culture. M., 1990, p. 43-72

We will talk about character, or more precisely, about those changes in the understanding of character that are obscured by the immutability of the word “character” itself. The latter is quite common in European languages, is used in everyday speech and is included in the language of science. Therefore, now it is not so easy to realize that the directly understandable meaning of this word, so rooted in the general consciousness, was formed as a result of its most radical rethinking, and such rethinking, apparently, took place in connection with the profound changes that the the very view of people of a certain type of culture on the world, in general on everything that becomes the subject of their understanding (and this is, in fact, “everything” - everything with which they come into contact, i.e. the entire totality of their life relationships) .

Before, however, speaking directly about character, we should begin with some remarks about history, about the historical movement. One can imagine, as a starting point for what follows, that people are immersed in what we might call mythosemiotic accomplishment. Such an accomplishment, or process, apparently has three inseparable aspects or perspectives.

1. One of its peculiarities is that the foundations of this entire process (its “why”, “from where” and “where”, etc.) are not known to people in each individual historical period; much (but not all) becomes clear after time, in hindsight. People seem to be moving in a space where almost everything is hidden from them by fog, or in a corridor where they can hardly see the walls.

2. Its other feature, or side, is in the predestination of this accomplishment, in the predestination with which what is happening unfolds. This creates the impression of regularity, purposefulness, and therefore meaningfulness of the process. Here, as it were, logos, a folded meaning, diverges into mythos, into a narrative - the initially given logos unfolds. We can analyze the known parameters of the process, the contours of space. It is very natural to feel that we are constantly touching upon a semantic process in which there is a connection and in which a huge number of significant moments are united by this connection.

3. The third feature, or aspect, is that the accomplishment that is taking place is constantly being comprehended, but (in accordance with the first and second features-aspects of the process) never happens and cannot be
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It is comprehended directly, directly, but is always comprehended only indirectly, indirectly, through something else - allegorically. In other words, those ideas about what is happening that people acquire point to what is happening, the essence of which is not comprehended as such, “in itself.” Then these representations are indications, hints, signs or, as they often say, symbols; however, this last word is not very suitable - it is overly binding, it diverts attention to itself. The reason for this is that the word “symbol”, as it is processed in the European tradition, presupposes the sensual embodiment of meaning (where such urgency of its existence for itself comes from) - as opposed to the abstractness of the concept and the greater abstraction of even allegory. But an abstract concept can also act as something in which what is happening historically is comprehended.

Among all the signs in which what is happening is comprehended, a special place is occupied by the ideas or concepts of internal and external. These are signs on the basis of which and, as it were, against the background of which much happens in the mythosemiotic process.

These ideas or concepts themselves, their very relation is not immutable, and we, for example, have no right to assert that they are generally abstract, and their relation is abstract (the relation of absolute opposition). They change historically in their understanding along with everything that comes with them in communication; they make sense of it all.

Thus, everything visible, for example, can be comprehended as a surface in which and through which the essence comes out and becomes accessible to the senses; the essence is then understood as internal - as the essence of a thing or, generally speaking, as the essence of the principle that creates the visible, the thing - as the image and appearance of its essence, everything visible - as the facet of the invisible. Destroying a thing, breaking a stone or kneading a lump of earth in our hands, we do not find any essence and see, touch only new surfaces, everything again finds only the external. The invisible is invisible in its essence, and yet it somehow appears in the external, is revealed in the external through the visible surface of things accessible to us. The visible and the invisible are interpreted together with the external and internal.

What we gradually encounter includes man. And in it we also find ourselves in connection with the external and internal, visible and invisible. Among all created things, visible and invisible, man belongs to the visible - in contrast, for example, to angels or demons, who, in order to reveal themselves to us, need to reveal themselves in the visible - in action or by taking on flesh. But a person, along with the visible - face, body - has an invisible, essence, which can, for example, be called a soul. You can imagine the matter in such a way that a person’s body is mortal and turns to earth after his death, while his soul is immortal and eternal. If the essence of a thing does not become more accessible because the thing is destroyed and what was inside it is exposed - in fact, there was nothing “inside” that would not become external as it was exposed - then it disappears all the more for us soul, if a person’s body is subjected to separation and destruction. In that visible thing that is characteristic of a person, his invisible invariably hides from us - the soul or, perhaps, the moral character of a person, whatever you call this invisible.
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However, everything that we could say about the external and internal, about the visible and the invisible, itself inevitably turns out to be in the mythosemiotic process - with all its inherent aspects. Thus, everything that was generally said about the visible image of a person, his holistic appearance, his soul and body and their connection - all this takes its rightful place in this process.

The process itself is characterized by constancy with a constant shift of emphasis - the signs and their relationships are rethought in this process; constancy can be considered the inevitable repetition of signs that were generally encountered in the process - once they appear, they can be assumed to be included once and for all in the mythosemiotic fund, the signs and motives of which are hardly ever truly forgotten, unless one considers oblivion a sharp transformation of their meaning, their rethinking. One might think that signs are more durable than meanings or are generally indestructible, while meanings, by their very essence, must be reproduced anew, must be re-formed in the very concreteness of historical circumstances. Such and such a mythological system of understanding the world may become obsolete and overcome, but the signs (or motifs) that have passed through it remain: they are subsequently either remembered - reproduced, reconstructed, analyzed, or they themselves appear in our ideas about the world, at first unnoticed and uncontrollable. The mythosemiotic, as we must consider, is broader than the mythological.

The texts of Hermes Trismegistus say the following: “The earth lies in the middle of everything, overturned on its back, and lies like a man looking at the sky, divided into parts into which man is divided.” Her head lies towards the south, her right hand - towards the east, her legs - towards the north, etc. The location of the body of man-Earth explains the distribution of physical properties, temperaments and abilities among the peoples inhabiting the Earth, so that, for example, the southern peoples are distinguished by the beauty of their heads , beautiful hair and are good archers - “the reason for this is the right hand”, and living in the center of the Earth, near the heart - the seat of the soul - the Egyptians are “reasonable and sensible, because they were born and raised near the heart” 1 .

Let's compare the text by V.V. Mayakovsky (“150,000,000”):

Russia
all
one Ivan,
and hand
him -
Neva,
and the heels are the Caspian steppes.

Both texts, despite the incomparability of their ideological tasks, have something obviously in common. At the heart of this commonality is the imposition human body on a figure or on a map of the Earth. Since the texts have this in common, they are involved in a well-known cultural tradition -
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True, not central, but rather lateral and hidden (since it seems to be not represented at all, for example, in Baroque emblems) - precisely to such a tradition that finds meaning in such an overlap and relies on it in its comprehension of the world 2 .

One text presents a mythological natural philosophy of a mystical orientation with its characteristic analogical thinking. In another text, modern poetic figurative thinking reigns. Moreover, the poet builds his images, who, it would seem, enjoys the greatest possible freedom in the choice and design of images. Precisely because the image chosen from the endless wealth of everything at the poet’s disposal is in this sense accidental, this same image is not devoid of its substantiality and necessity, since it bears the increased weight and consciousness of its choice: one can say that precisely for that reason that the image is, in fact, random (it is chosen from an immense variety of possible ones), it is all the more indispensable; It is not the poet who encounters his own image, but the image who encounters him.

The first text is by no means a mythology “in itself”; it absorbs methodologically carried out reflection and on its basis creates something similar to a scientific theory, a geography of human types as national types.

The second text absorbs an even richer reflection, establishing an analogy between a very specific historical situation of our time (which, as it were, gave birth to the image of the poet) and the mythological identity of the human body and the earth/world. However, it is precisely in the second text that something like a non-reflective mythological identity returns, for it is here that the image turns out to be something “in itself” - which cannot be derived from the artistic fabric of the text as something of any general significance, as a thesis and position (one should not think that in poetry this is usually the case - not only didactic poetry of the past accepts generally valid provisions or strives for them). Here this mythological image is a means poetic analysis life, is a means designed for one-time use, moreover, used meaningfully and with a view to the long tradition that opens up behind it. On the contrary, the first text is endowed with a very great cognitive meaning - however, for the modern reader, placed in a completely different place in the mythosemiotic process, this meaning is zero and only curious. The modern reader, enriched scientific experience of past centuries will most likely refuse to consider the text of Hermes Trismegistus as scientific; if the reader is scrupulous and meticulous, he will note everything that is unfounded in the text, everything that is unknown on what grounds is directly connected in it, and he will probably be inclined to attribute this text entirely to the realm of myth. And yet this text emerges from myth, so to speak, into the expanse of mythosemiotic accomplishment. The mythological in the narrower sense of the word begins to wash away, being preserved and generalized, just as two thousand years later it is still preserved and restored in the text of our poet and in the texts of other poets of our time. The ancient text, in its departure from the immediacy of myth, on the basis of which it continues to stand, achieves very great generalization - a model is created,
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which must explain all types of people living on earth as national types. With such generalization, it is in various respects consistent with the early Greek way of comprehending man, which goes back to mythological ideas. Moreover, this late antique text clings to the archaic and seeks to consolidate it - along with the fact that the text contains reflection, philosophical generalization, it relies on rationalized technical techniques associated with mythology (such as the liver fortune telling technique) and through this reconstructs the immediacy of mythological identifications , their pre-reflectiveness. So such a text is not just full of reflection - it deliberately and thoughtfully directs it.

What this text inevitably agrees with the early Greek way of comprehending man (and in which it even deliberately primitivizes the methods of comprehension that had developed by the turn of the millennium) is the following: everything that we would call internal - spiritual or mental in man - is derived from the material , from an external force and is firmly anchored in the external as its basis and cause. This is exactly how it is with the author of the Hermetic text: the place on the body-Earth determines what the physique of people will be, what their occupations and skills will be, what their mind will be. The action of external force passes from the body to the mind, being the same everywhere: thus, in the south, moist air, gathering in clouds, darkens the air like smoke and obstructs not only the eyes, but also the mind; the cold of the north freezes both body and mind. The bodily and mental here are completely similar to one another; everything grows equally in the bosom of the Earth, overturned on its back, like a man.

Cicero. In Pisonem I 1

In mythosemiotic development there are such various processes that seem to be characterized by rigor and consistency, at least if we consider history in large terms. This is the irreversible washing away of everything that is seemingly immediately given - so that over time, an increasing number of beliefs, opinions, judgments, givens are questioned, criticized and no longer exist as simple givens. Another such process directly affects a person in his fundamental relationship with the world (that is, with being in general, with “everything” that a person encounters, including the person himself) - this is a steady process of internalization, a process in which various contents of the world are found to belong to man, human personality, as dependent on it and directed
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We are taken by her, as rooted in her, as an internal human property. This process of internalizing the world can, of course, be interpreted in various terms; With it, we note, the so dramatically developing relationship between man and nature is also interconnected insofar as the objectification of nature, its opposition to man as something alien in its essence at the same time means mastery, i.e. that is, something similar to appropriating it as - let's say - peripheral property on the border of one's own and someone else's.

For historical and cultural research, it represents the main difficulty and now arises as the most urgent, finally ripe problem of reconstructing past phases, states of man - so to speak, “under-interiorized” (relative to the current situation) of his cultural states. The study of such states entirely belongs to historical disciplines, since all these problems relate to myphosemiosis and all processes take place “within the framework” (if one can speak “of the framework” of an all-encompassing) myphosemiotic accomplishment. The doctor may need to establish the “objective” state of the patient’s health, as opposed to his state of health, since sensations can deceive the patient; this is completely justified. However, if there is a science that is occupied with historical material and that strives to understand for itself something objective in this material, bypassing the “well-being” of people of the past, then it is quite possible that such a historical discipline is also completely justified and it has something to do in history, but it lies in aside from any historical and cultural research. Because for these latter, material begins to exist only when all the statements of a person of the past about his well-being, self-awareness and self-understanding, all his self-expression and self-revelation in word and sign are taken seriously. To put it simply, the image of an era consists of its “objectivity” and its self-interpretation; but only both are no longer separable, and “objectivity” is inseparable from the flow of self-interpretation.

And everything that is “under-interiorized” is in fact not removed from us, but is located close to us, next to our culture. Thus, as long as a feeling or passion takes possession of a person, this feeling or passion does not entirely belong to him; they rather exist as givens that come to him from the outside and which exist “in general” and “objectively” in nature, in the world. Man lives surrounded by such external forces; he, for example, must resist them, he falls victim to them. This situation is consolidated in many turns of speech that are almost completely automated; however, when all such experience related to the past and automatically fixed (“the experience of communicating with one’s feelings”) comes into actual conflict with a more recent interpretation of a person and his feelings, such turns of phrase cannot but be decisively suppressed or destroyed. Benjamin Constant's story "Adolphe" (1816) and much in the sublime Russian lyricism of the 1820s, the lyricism of Pushkin's circle, provide, in all likelihood, the last, and brilliant, rhetorical examples, in which - in harmony with a new mood of lyrical penetration, in self-deepening - reflected, perhaps with a certain sharpness, the previous situation: a person surrounded by passions! A person surrounded by feelings coming towards him, attacking him from the outside (his own!) is a turning point for the history of culture, reflected in these works with the greatest possible subtlety and delicacy.
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Moving now to thousands of years ago, we can perhaps be sure that those surprises of a psychological nature that the 19th century gives us, when archaeological excavations begin in it, in its culture, and not just communicate with it from memory, will prepare us to what should be expected in more ancient times. Probably, the proximity of those surprises that await us in the 19th century will prompt us to be careful not to look for something incredibly far from us in antiquity, but even here to count on a certain proximity to what is familiar to us. This is apparently the case.

Already Pindar speaks of “innate disposition” (Ol. XI, 19-20 Shell-Maehler):

And the innate disposition
Can't become anything else -
Neither the red fox nor the roaring lion 4 .
(Translated by M. L. Gasparov)

It is clear that “innate disposition” presupposes something internal that does not depend on anything external in this place; Moreover, the very combination of words even seems very familiar - does the English philosopher of the 17th century speak? About innate abilities, whether a modern biologist speaks of innate, genetically transmitted skills, they do not talk about something related or, perhaps, exactly the same thing as Pindar. Perhaps it is possible to assume a greater intensity of the Greek emphyes in comparison with innatus and innate. In another ode (Ol. XIII, 16) Pindar speaks of “innate disposition (to syggenes ethos), which cannot be hidden,” and here the root itself (“gene”) connects antiquity and modernity: “What is innate in people cannot be hidden.” !” (translated by M. L. Gasparov) 5 .

Sophocles, also without resorting to anything external, in a completely “modern” way, as something completely self-evident, speaks about the soul (psyche), about the mental makeup (phronema, as if “mentality”), about plans and intentions (gnome) a person who is difficult to recognize until he is tested in management (commanding) and in observing the laws (Ant. 175-177).

True, the Greek word psyche reflects the same connection with the material principle as in “soul”, “spiritus” and other similar words (asycho - blow, cool; psychros - cold, fresh). Thus, here too there is nothing specific and in any way removes us from our time - it is true that materiality, materiality cannot be imagined only as direct opposition to the spiritual, as is characteristic of modern times itself.

More specific is the dependence of words related to internal states the human spirit, from external, spatial ideas; for the 5th century BC e. this dependence was very close in time, established quite recently.
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“For understanding, homer. phrenes<. . .>Of exceptional interest is the nature of the verbal (and more broadly, predicative) constructions in which this noun is used. The peculiarity of these constructions is their media-passive meaning, or in any case the meaning of a state that excludes the participation of phrenes (phren) as a subject of mental activity: Dios etrapeto phren “Zeus’ mind turned.”
“The word phren each time denotes a passive container. Of particular interest is the phrase found four times in Homer, in which the process of recognition is described within this container, grammatically represented by the aorist egno, which in this case means that something is happening to someone (and not oneself he is actively doing something)" 6 .

It turns out that even what the hero recognized within himself, eni phresi (“learned and said”), does not entirely belong to himself - all this is extracted by him from within and from the outside, all of this is only in the process of interiorization, placed inside, remaining external in relation to himself, the hero.

This problem of the dependence of the internal on the external and spatial is very common for the Homeric epic. It is manifested, in particular, in the fact that the characters of the epic appear as making decisions and performing actions not independently, but under the guidance of the gods (with minor exceptions).

The following statement can hardly be considered true: “Without the feeling of human free will, the Greeks could not have imagined gods acting according to their own will,” as well as the argument cited in support of it: “. . The history of all religions teaches us that the specific traits that people attribute to deities are always the result of the transference of human properties and forms of behavior into the world of gods. Xenophanes already understood this in relation to Greek religion, and he, speaking about the immorality of Homer’s gods, of course, also saw how typically human impulses, often not the best in the moral sense, are transferred into the world of the gods in Homer.” 7 .

This position and this argument suffer from what I have called a naturalistic understanding of relations in the spirit of “objectivity”: here the matter is presented as if the world of the gods were opposed as an object to the world of man, including his inner world. But this is not so: the world of the gods is, first of all, a part of consciousness, precisely a part of consciousness alienated into the external and spatial; This consciousness itself puts the world, including man himself, into forms in which only it can comprehend it in such and such cultural conditions. Then the world of the gods appears as something external that has not been mastered by man and is not subordinated to him. But it is not at all the case that, say, some ability must first be mastered in the internal, belonging to a person, and then alienated into the external to him, to his consciousness. You can transfer as much as you want - in the work of mythological fantasy - the features of a person to the gods, but this will only be a free activity of fantasy, while the guidance of a person by the gods presupposes a certain, not free, but necessary, so to speak, forced, inevitable phase of understanding the motivation of one’s actions . The latter is understood only as coming from the outside, therefore, can only be presented as alienated and only in this way can it be mastered at this stage.
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It is not surprising that some things of a psychological nature are mastered in just such an intricate way: after all, feelings - and as you can see, there is nothing more “natural” and immediate than feelings - are mastered in such a way that at first and then over an extremely long time they are comprehended as not belonging to man himself, but belonging to the world. And this, of course, given the practically identical psychophysiological structure of a person - there is no sufficient basis to accept otherwise, in particular the hypothesis of J. Jaynes 8 . There seems to be no sufficient reason to look for the psychological roots of the idea that the actions of people are guided by the gods. 9 . These roots are rather “metaphysical”: in other words, for everything psychological there must be some kind of logic that guides it - a logic rooted in being, an existential logic. Here it is the logic of interiorization inherent in the mythosemiotic accomplishment. This logic determines the path leading from something to something, from some beginning to some goal, and the whole path begins, of course, with the fact that something has not yet been internalized. Here this “something” is the sphere of motivation for human actions that subsequently belongs to the inner world of the human personality. Not only the sphere of motivation, but also the entire internal (in the future!) world of a person appears as external in relation to the person himself, as alienated from him (if viewed from a position achieved later). This is perfectly consistent with the fact that the gods guide man exactly as he “himself” would act - if everything were different, there would be a relationship of real objectivity and opposition between the world of man (“internal”) and the world of the gods (“external”). whereas here there is a relationship between alienation and development - development through alienation and in its forms. To formulate more broadly: there is a development and internalization of the contents of the world, which become the internal content of the person himself.

And it would only be strange if a person first had to possess something that would then be transferred outside and no longer belong to him. True, the alienation of motivation, that is, the fact of its unmastered, could prompt the poet at some late stage of this process to use such alienation as a poetic device. But this is another question: how does Homer take advantage of this situation in his two poems? This in no way cancels what is, in fact, recorded in his texts - a genuine situation of undeveloped, under-interiorized. Perhaps poetically and aesthetically extended in its existence.

People first receive something from their gods and only then, like Lo-Xenophanes, give them everything they have.

In the same way, it would not be possible to demand from the Greeks that they first recognize their phren as their internal property, and then alienate it as external to “themselves” and spatially external to “themselves,” although already located inside “their” body. Among those concepts that have been internalized for the longest time is “character”.
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In recent centuries, a strong belief has developed that character belongs to the deepest and most fundamental thing that determines the human personality. This is known from life and from here passed on to science; curious that our " Philosophical Encyclopedia"and our "Philosophical encyclopedic Dictionary“give only a definition of character “in psychology”: this is “a holistic and stable structure of a person’s mental life, manifested in individual acts and states of his mental life, as well as in his manners, habits, mentality and the circle of emotional life characteristic of a person. A person’s character acts as the basis of his behavior and is the subject of the study of characterology.” 10 .

However, since the understanding of character is rooted in life itself and appears so firmly in it, life-practical expressions of the essence of character will tell more than scientific definitions. Of course, a huge number of them could be cited.

". . Much should be said about the ladies themselves, about their society, to describe, as they say, their spiritual qualities in vivid colors; but this is very difficult for the author.<. . .>It’s even strange, the feather doesn’t rise at all, as if some kind of lead were sitting in it. So be it: about their characters, apparently, we need to leave it to someone who has livelier colors and more of them on his palette, and we will only have to say two words about appearance and about what is more superficial.” 11 .

What can you “read” from this passage?
1) Character is, apparently, in general “mental qualities”;
2) character is “internal”;
3) “appearance” is, as it were, the “inverse” of character, but there are also more superficial layers of personality that are easier to convey than character;
4) between “appearance” as the most superficial and character, obviously, there is a connection about which the writer in this passage, however, does not say anything directly.

“Undoubtedly, there is such a qualitative certainty (So-Sein) of a person that rests deep under his properties and which is uniformly revealed in the lines of his body, the traits of spirit and character” 12 .

Again, character is known personality traits. However, the writer believes that the single principle that creates the spiritual, mental and physical appearance of a person is not the character itself; if character is the known qualities or properties of a person, then in this case it is natural to assume a deeper core, or the beginning of the personality, common to all properties, creating its integrity.

In general, the idea of ​​character in modern times is so widespread and indisputable that it sometimes forces even writers (whom no one forces to become scientific) to philosophize on the subject of character and burden it with a burden completely unusual for it - in the desire to say something “good”: “Character - this is, first of all, the ideological content of a person, her philosophy, her worldview. Then this
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The social role of a person, expressed by his professional activities. Then - the very essence of activity in the specific details of human labor. Finally, this is the personal life of the figure, the relationship between the intimate and the public, “I” and “we”.” 13 . The essence of character and all manifestations of personality are identified in vain.

So, the new European character is such self-evidence, on topics on which one can freely fantasize.

This new European “character” as a concept and idea originated from the Greek “character”, which at first meant something emphatically external. This emphatically external thing possessed, however, an inner essence that was, as it were, intended for its assimilation inside, for its internalization and, having been assimilated, could not help but reveal itself in the most unexpected light.

So, the Greek “character” is at first something purely external and superficial.

This does not mean that the Greeks were alien to the idea of ​​the inner beginning of personality. Quite the opposite - the Greeks had a word that is very often translated as “character” - ethos or ethe. This is how it is usually translated in prose. However, ethos was a word with rapidly unfolding semantics, the individual branches of which are even, apparently, difficult to trace 14 , is a word rich in shades of meaning, ambiguous, vibrating within itself and therefore, in fact, unsuitable for translating it into such obviousness and certainty as modern “character”. The poet-translator has every right to create variations of the meaning given by the Greek word, trying to capture its essence: the Russian translator, translating Pindar (the lines quoted above), speaks of “innate character” and “what is innate in people”; one German translator (K.F. Schnitzer) conveys the same passages like this - der Urart Sitte; anageborne Gemütsart 15 . The word ethos, having experienced a significant deepening (from “place” to “temper”, direction, as it were, the general line of the personality, and not only the personality - see the ethos of modes in music), was, however, not suitable for the role of the future “character”.

So, it turns out that in Greece we have two characters - one, which in one way or another means “internal” in a person, but does not coincide with what is understood by “character” in modern times, and the second - denoted precisely by the word character, but implying something completely external.

The meaning of this last word he had to energetically get used to it - he interiorized, got inside. It must be said that in ancient times, from the 5th century. By the era of Hellenism, this meaning had already gone through most of the path of such internalization - in any case, so much so that the word “character” in European languages ​​could absorb the direction of this movement, capture it in its semantics, and at the same time represent this meaning to a large extent in -new. In other words, the modern “character” (as can be seen) is a direct heir to the Greek character, only with the remarkable feature that in ancient times nothing similar to the modern European “character” was thought of for a wife.
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Let's jump ahead and say one thing: character gradually reveals its orientation “inward” and, as soon as this word comes into contact with the “inner” of a person, it builds this inner from the outside - from the external and superficial. On the contrary, the new European character is built from the inside out: “character” refers to the basis or foundation inherent in human nature, the core, as if the generative scheme of all human manifestations, and the differences can only concern whether “character” is the deepest thing in a person, or in his inner being an even deeper generative principle. Such discrepancies in themselves can be quite significant - and they look not too significant only when we compare them with the diametrically opposed understanding of “character” in antiquity. It is precisely this relationship between antiquity and modernity that interests us.

External and internal and, most importantly, the border between external and internal is what and within the limits of which the mythosemiotic process takes place here.

Apparently, the external and internal and their boundaries generally belong to the most central ideas for the mythosemiotic process. In any case, to the extent that the mythosemiotic accomplishment is understood and can be understood as a process of interporization.

Let us recall that this process is the process of mastering and appropriating by a person the contents of the world (the world - naturally including the person himself) - a process in which these contents are immersed “inside” a person; in this process, “man” himself is energetically rethought.

Then the voltus (see the epigraph from Cicero) of a person - his face, his body and much more - turns out to be on the very border, “around” which the process of internalization takes place. The face, body and everything else are surfaces that separate and connect the external and the internal. In other words, here lies a border that cuts the world into two parts in the most essential respect - but does not cut it completely. Here, on this border and edge, border operations that are most important for the history of man and his culture have been carried out for centuries.

The Pacific aborigines, who walked naked, responded to the reproaches of Christian missionaries: our whole body is a face.

An oriental beauty, who was visited by a European lady in crinolines, exclaimed in amazement: “How - and is it still you?!”

August Wilhelm Schlegel, recalling such a scene, continues, admiring the ancient sculptures: “Before a Greek statue depicted in robes, such a question would no longer be ridiculous. She really is entirely herself, and the vestments are almost indistinguishable from the person.” 16 .And further Schlegel explains it this way: “Not only the structure of the members is depicted through the close-fitting vestment, but also in the surfaces and folds of the flowing clothes, the character of the figure is expressed, and the animating spirit has penetrated to the very surface of the immediate surroundings.” 17 .
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A few years after Schlegel, one unpopular in the first half of the 19th century. the philosopher argued that “any existing objects, including one’s own body<. . .>, should be considered only as a representation" 18 . That the world is “my idea”, the very first Indologist in Europe, William Jones, helped the German philosopher to establish himself in this conviction 19 . True, the body is recognized as an object only indirectly; immediately, everything remains subjective, since the immediate perception of body sensations is unconditional 20 ; “that which knows everything and is not known by anyone is the subject” 21 .

All these motley judgments, border clashes on the dividing line between external and internal lead to the chaos of mythosemiotic development at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries. In this chaos, art criticism and philosophical topics and voices. The ancient and modern (modern for us) are reflected absolutely wonderfully in these texts. The ancient sometimes turns out to be very close to this era, our modern (way of expression and manner of thinking things) - very distant. And vice versa. Schlegel’s “character of a figure” implies something completely external and is consistent with Greek usage (unless such a phrase is reminiscent of the nonspecific, fluent and formal use of the word “character” in modern texts). But even less “modern”, along with such phraseological archaism (as it is perceived in the text), is what Schlegel achieves easily and on the fly - the identification of “statue” and “person”, i.e. the Greek statue seems to him to be completely complete and an authorized representative of the “Greek man” - not just in his image, but in his being. A strange phrase - “beautifully dressed Greek statue” or “beautifully dressed” (with a completely literal translation), which seems unjustified by brachylogy (the prudes who dressed statues and covered ancient nudity come to mind), in fact only betrays the simplicity of the identifications Schlegel succeeds in: the statue is not depicts a man or god in clothes, and she is this dressed man or god.

The distinctions turn out to be unnecessary or impossible for the new author here because identification is natural and simple for him. That is why in the thought of an ancient statue it is decided what relates to man in general and what concerns man, his essence; This is precisely why Schlegel, on the other hand, does not have to talk about “man,” his capabilities, boundaries, the boundary between man and the world, etc., that there is an ancient statue that directly reveals (besides all reflection and abstraction) the possibilities, say so - the existence of a person as a person, i.e., for example, the possibility of harmony of soul and body (the soul continues in the body, and their harmony is even exceeded with brilliance, and the human “inner” goes out into the outer world, turning its border with it into the image of its internal). And also to the same identifications: Schopenhauer’s ardor in conquering absolutely everything that exists for the “subject” 22 is directly proportional to his “naivety” with which he can say, for example, that “reason and brain are the same”, they are one and the same 23 ; It is unlikely that any of the later idealists, trying to separate the subjective and objects, would so easily repeat such a mistake of identifying the spiritual and material, internal and external in relation to the “I” 24 .
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Well-known, characteristic of the thought of the turn of the 18th-19th centuries. lack of differentiation, some of its confusion, as regards the problem of external/internal, and therefore, the general self-understanding of a person of this time (what is he? How should he imagine himself? What is he in the world?), are explained, apparently, by the nodal and apical the position of this era in the history of culture (or, more specifically, in the mythosemiotic process). This era echoes antiquity, reproduces many of its ideas, and what’s more, it actively strives for this. In many ways, it looks just like a condensed repetition of antiquity, its summary - but at the same time it is so different from antiquity in its foundations, so different from it in human understanding, that all this repetition of antiquity almost immediately comes into conflict with the new, and this new breaks out to freedom and goes on in the future on his own unexplored paths. So is the ancient “character”, the echo of which is heard at this time (in different respects, which will be discussed below). However, this whole “summary” is extremely important - it is, as it were, a clarifying reflection of ancient meanings in conjunction with the new that has already been fully outlined. The myphosemiotic accomplishment is not yet directed forward so long as ancient ideas are continued and reflected; only after they have been fundamentally overcome, overcome, and in art is it completely established new principle building, creating character.

The above examples also remind us that the external/internal boundary should not only be imagined as moving (there is a dispute over it, and until it is resolved, the boundary moves), but also needs to be represented spatially, with its own depth, and not geometrically -planar. She, this border, for the thought of the turn of the 18th-19th centuries. is drawn somewhere between the “I” (or “subject”) and the person’s immediate environment, and when it is drawn, it is most correct to consider that this is not a plane, but a kind of flattened, extremely flattened space, which is intersected by multidirectional (inside - out) , from outside - in) energy and where events of transition and revelation take place - incessant and therefore “ordinary” and at the same time carrying within themselves the fundamental dialectic of existence25.

Much has been said at different times about the extraordinary plasticity of the Greek perception of the world; in the 20th century it was possible to show that such basic concepts of Platonic philosophy as “idea” and “eidos” are involved in the Greek plastic, sculptural, volumetric comprehension, understanding of the world 26 . Now everyone has learned this, but until relatively recently, Plato’s “idea” was understood by analogy with the philosophical abstractions of modern times. Thus, I. Kant believed that in painting, sculpture, in general in all fine arts, the essential thing is a drawing (Zeichnung), sketch, outline (Abriss), - so, we emphasize, in sculpture; “the form of objects of the senses”, according to Kant, is Gestalt or simple game (game again Gestalt "s or sensations), and we must remember that Gestalt is one of the German correspondences to Plato’s “idea” (idea, eidos - this is an image, whole, form, figure, structure, etc., which
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taken together would convey well the semantics of the word “Gestalt”, if only the molecule of this German word collected its atoms like the Greek one, but this is not the case), the “Philosophical Dictionary” of I. G. Valhas immediately explains that “and in Latin” idea means “Vorbild” ", Muster, Entwurff, Gestalt" 27 . According to Kant, the basis of Gestalt and the game Gestalt" амисоставляет рисунок в одном и композиция - в другом случае !} 28 .

Gestalt is, therefore, a sensually (visibly) embodied meaning and is thus a reinterpreted Platonic idea in a certain way. The differences are profound; one can say that in one case, every representation is predicated on volumetricity as a form of contemplation, in the other - flatness, in which the scheme, the figure of the whole, which determines both the integrity and the beauty of Gestalt, is born 29 .

Far from abstract abstraction, the Greek “idea” and “eidos” precisely introduce any vision and understanding (closely related to both) into the facets of the original plastic form (“species”). The creative prototype, according to which both things and works of art are created 30 , is always close here to the artist, and he is not in the “pure” imagination (as the realm of the ideal, from which earthly reality has fallen), but in the things themselves and in language itself. An indicator of the depth at which volumetricity appears as a form of vision is the fact that, when creating funerary images - and the cult of the dead was, obviously, the most powerful impulse for the emergence of both portraiture and fine art in general - the ancient Greeks turned to round sculpture, then how other peoples gravitate towards flat images.

However, Greek culture, Greek vision, thinking and depiction of things are also characterized by a planar-graphic transmission of meaning. It is in connection and in contradiction with the fundamental three-dimensional “vision” of things. Probably this connection and this contradiction are rooted in the contradictory vision and understanding of the human body - and for Greek culture this is one of the main themes with which, especially in the classical era, the very vision-thinking of the idea is constantly measured. If we consider the extreme situation and starting point to be one when “the whole body is a face,” then among the Greeks, against the background of bodily unity, bodily integrity, supported by the plasticity of the “idea,” the dualism of face/body should have appeared, which in subsequent eras sharply increased and intensified. The face as a sign of a “person” (person, person) is also known in Ancient Greece; however, if the winner of the games is not given a “portrait” statue, but one depicting an ideal body-figure, if portrait images on coins appear only after the death of Alexander the Great, at the end of the 4th century, then it is obvious that the face/body dualism is given here only in the very beginnings , in potency. If one may venture to say so, then the generality and indistinguishability of the nature, the massiveness and energy of the growing flesh, that same indomitable phyein, almost completely absorbs everything into itself and keeps it to itself. Some kind of resistance is needed, some kind of counterforce coming from the outside is needed, so that something is implanted or crashed into such a flow of growth and grows with it, so that something emphyes or empephycos is obtained. On the contrary, in modern Europe the face/body dualism is almost absolute; the whole body is only the face, the whole body is reduced to the face"
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“Faces” suit the face, the whole person is one face, so that in mass portraits for a long time the face is only added to the finished uniform, like C. Brentano in his witty story about “Magyar national physiognomies”; attaching an ideal body to a portrait-like face (Anne-Louis Girodet - “Mademoiselle Lange in the guise of Danae”) is almost a public scandal. Painters study the nude assiduously, but do not think “bodily,” with the body as the central idea of ​​the imagination (after Michelangelo’s frantic attempts to resurrect such thinking).

Moreover, while in Greece sculptured bodies absorb space and exist as bodies-topoi, inseparable from their place-volume, in Michelangelo space dominates over bodies, being associated with them by energy lines that penetrate it and are revealed by the artist. Hence, Michelangelo has the freedom with which even sculptured bodies pose themselves, move, bend in space, take all sorts of poses in it, appear in the most unexpected angles, etc. It is more convenient to depict such space pictorially, and it is then revealed more visibly.

The Greeks did not create anything like a graphic sheet, nothing that, like the printed strip we are used to, destroyed any idea of ​​volume (to create such a strip without its own depth, it was probably necessary first to firmly grasp the idea of ​​uniform geometric three-dimensional space). Graphic flatness in new European art can reach an extreme consistency, starting with the romantic artistic “hieroglyphs” 31 ; Among the Greeks, the graphically planar is only outlined.

True, the Greeks had paintings unknown to us, except for the later ones, in which the flatness is enhanced. As for the early and completely unknown one, it can be assumed that, semantically, it exists within that continuous verbal-visual transition, within that verbal-visual continuity that is so characteristic of Greek culture and known from many texts (starting with Homer’s), which arose while ancient culture remained alive. Prose works arise in connection with artistic works, created and comprehended in the poetic word - such are some Greek novels, such is Cebet’s dialogue “Picture”, such is the genre of ekphrasis, studied with great results by N. V. Braginskaya 32 .

At the transition from the word of poetry to fine art, there is thus a poetically constructed artistic creation, the creation of which is associated with some still insufficiently studied aspects of Greek culture. Apparently, these consist in very specific techniques for preserving encryption, transmitting - according to the logic of reprimanding and hiding discovered by the Greeks - such meanings (semantic bundles) that could for some reason be considered vital. “A thing as a cosmos: in this meaning, many descriptions of skillfully made things have come down to us, which depict the primeval universe.<. . .>Glasses and cups, pots and vases, lamps, all kinds of vessels - they are born with a myth-creating meaning.” 33 .
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Forged in the word of Homer, the shield of Hephaestus, “the shield-sun, supremely connecting the functions of the eye and the mirror, it captures the entire cosmos in its basic natural (astral, divine, human, animal) and social (war, peace, trade, agriculture, hunting, wedding) horizons Hephaestus, its creator, forged the scenes of the shield, but in the epic narrative these scenes remain moving, for the shield is only a mirror of the universal circulation. True, this is a mirror that not only serves as armor for Achilles, but even guides his further actions and speeches.” 34 .

Apparently, the Greeks were interested in creating just such verbal-pictorial models-likeness of the world, in which the limited visual possibilities were complemented by a flexible and diversely expressive word, the silent sealing of the image - with verbal interpretation, exegesis, narrative development of the plot, and the visual unrealization of the word - with a sharp intensification of peering or inner vision. The word and the obvious appearance are aimed at each other, they complement each other, having a common basis - namely, a predetermined volume, the plasticity of comprehended meanings. One has to think that real ancient painting was consistent with this and took part in this system of continuity, which brought together the word and the visible appearance, in this system, based on general beginning three-dimensionality. One can also imagine that in general all the arts are united by this unique system, including music, which until the 5th century. was indivisibly connected with the word and even in a purely instrumental version was distinguished by a striking definiteness of the modal ethos 35 .

A clearer discrepancy between the basic plastic principle and the “graphically”-planar one, in addition to the hidden and potential that could exist between the body and the face in the statue (between the comprehension of both), seems to be reflected in more applied forms of art. So - between the material and sensory fullness and completeness of the statue, where the sacred and life-like are united and fused in an ideal body (whether “classical harmony” was ever actually achieved is another question and a matter of opinion) and the stinginess and abbreviation of the small relief image. Carved stones, labor-intensive work and requiring perfect craftsmanship, gravitate, despite all the amazing detailing in many examples, towards conciseness, towards laconism of features, towards hieroglyphics of a kind; The relationships between the volumetric and the planar are used and played out here. And if, in comparison with a flat hieroglyph, such an image is very spatial, three-dimensional, and vital, then in comparison with a large sculpture it is deprived of freedom and is squeezed into the planes and surfaces of the stone. The art of precious intimacy is close to generally acting as a sign of a sign - sometimes carved stones reproduced monumental works of art (which are sometimes known only from them). If a statue is the real presence of what is depicted, and a relief is a reminder of it, a sign of someone who is absent, then a carved stone is a reminder of such a sign or a reminder of some important meaning, and in the latter case it is quite natural to shrink to the extreme and acquire a direct graphic flatness.
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The coin, technologically imperfect, reveals the course of development: not alien to the depths of vision and knowledge, allowing for symbols 36 , the coin clearly displays the features of the graphic. The relief is flattened and placed in a circle or other shape: the closure is not determined by the integrity of the body, but is posited from the outside, posited by the very principle of “print” and imprint and approved by the mass of “circulation”. A coin is not “its own” being, not “what,” but “that on which”: a symbol, a “face,” letters—that which will turn a piece of matter into something else. And although this transformed “what” can acquire artistic value, the relief, the imprint of the sign of the sign, tends to be hidden in its graphicality, functional “sign”.

In contrast to this - inevitable (as a tendency) - graphic nature, the classical sculpture of the Greeks seems to be sculpted by an unmistakable plastic nature, which organically nurtured this body, bringing it to possible perfection. The internal and external in such an image - like the face and body - are in a state of indifferent mutual agreement. Indifferent - undramatic, conflict-free. Mutual agreement - unless the body exceeds the expressiveness of the face.

In such a sculpture, everything external, and, therefore, first of all the face, is an expression of the internal, and by no means, say, a seal impression (something imposed from the outside). However, this inner, having found its expression in the features of the face and the outlines of the figure, which only these features and these outlines can and should be, finds its peace in them: the inner has merged with the outer as if it has grown with it. It is not expressed internally as movement, as a moment of existence (as later in the famous group of Laocoön), but as essence, being, merging with the external. It was not unreasonable for Hegel to imagine this as follows: “The changeable and random that is inherent in empirical individuality, however, is extinguished in the sublime images of the gods, but they lack real, self-existent subjectivity in knowing and willing themselves.<. . .>The greatest creations of sculpture are devoid of sight, their interior does not look out from them as self-knowing self-absorption with the spiritual concentration that the eye reveals. The light of the soul lies completely outside their sphere and belongs to the viewer, who is not able to look inside the soul of these images, to be with them from the eye of the eye.” 37 .

The internal in the statue of the god has completely turned into the external, deliberately merging with the pressure of growth; the internal as such is not expressed at all. But if the predominance of the internal (as in later European art) deprives the figure and face of essential necessity, dooms them to the “accidentality” of their existence and turns them into a field of active, most energetic revelation (revelation of the internal), then a rupture is inevitable faces and bodies - in fact, only the face with its facial expressions, with its talking eyes remains. The face is as if almost open, naked inside. The face of a Greek statue is neither closed nor open; it remains in the constancy of its being. There is no soul that was not here as a body, but that is precisely why one cannot strictly talk about the harmony of internal and external, but it would be better to talk about them
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Inseparability, historically achieved at the moment when the abstract-sign in the artistic thinking of the Greeks was maximally combined with the intuition of the natural-corporeal and was maximally overcome in it. However, if the bodily appearance brings out existence in its constancy - the existence of a god or a hero, then here again the face/body dualism arises, barely outlined. Barely overcome in a round, ideally harmonious figure, it arises because the head, having acquired its life-like body, is more strongly affected by the tendency towards the existentially general. The face then tends to be “its” type. There naturally cannot be transitions between “types,” no matter how naturally life-like they are created (because each type conveys its own being, its own “image” of being, and, of course, also without any nuances of the accidental and without any psychologization). And then classical sculpture is a living typology; it refers to types of being that are recreated ideologically-plastically and carnally-naturally.

However, in this case, the face, no matter how much it grows into its body, so life-like in its ideality, still turns out to be close to the mask. And indeed, the face of a statue, expressing the type of being, is already very close to a mask in life itself - the face of a sculptural god and the mask of a theatrical god. ". . .The mask is the semantic limit of a continuously revealed face.<. . .>The mask gives the appearance of the face materially, objectively, statuesquely, like a complete set and specific alternation of bulges and depressions in a once printed and forever frozen imprint of a seal (character!)" 38 .

If the existential typification of the face tends to “tear off” the face as a mask from the body, then in the further development of art could go either through a new schematization (because the archaic schematization was only overcome, as far as possible), or by blurring the mask, its immobility, by introducing psychologism for this purpose , movements, etc., and sculpture took this last path.

Hegel, speaking about the Greek theater, reasoned as follows: “The facial features constituted an unchanging sculptural appearance, the plasticity of which did not absorb the multi-moving expression of private mental moods in the same way as the acting characters, who in their dramatic struggle represented a solid universal pathos - by no means deepening the substance of this pathos to the penetration of the modern soul (Gem üths) and without expanding it to the detail (Besonderheit) of current dramatic characters" 39 .

In the theater, the mask of a god or hero continues in the body and figure of the actor, and in such acting the dualism of face/body is quite obvious, although it is not discussed. The plasticity of the performance with its sculptural images-masks serves as a kind of middle link between round sculpture and the abbreviated plasticity of reliefs of small forms, serves as such a link in meaning. Moreover, theater combines something completely heterogeneous in terms of time - archaic schematism and the perfect physical embodiment of images. What is graphically flat and schematic, which in classical art is buried in an abundance of ideologically organized flesh, is still preserved by the theater, moreover, in the very center of the cultural life of the 5th century.

The face is conceptualized as a type, as a character.
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“The individual is immersed among the Greeks in timeless types of statues
archons, poets, philosophers, types that reflect clear order
human space" 40 .

“The Greek portrait typifies. Through the features of what is depicted, it allows one to discern something super-personal.” 41 . And this is the case if the person to whom the statue is erected is awarded a truly individual, i.e., portrait image 42 . Sculptural Sophocles IV century. transfers the great tragedian into the elevated world of types, and here there is no subjective individuality, which was easily found in the creations of antiquity, by analogy with what the spectators and readers of the 19th century took for granted. There is no subjective individuality in the ugly, Silenus-like Socrates, whose numerous images are mixed with the images of lower deities. The sculptor who depicted Socrates changed the features, which, according to the descriptions, were so ugly, and brought them closer to the image of Silenus; he didn’t have to smooth out the shape of his flattened nose, but he had to soften his eyes, which rolled forward, and the thick, inverted lips of his large mouth.” 43 .

Greek sculpture classical era- the result of the same unspeakably rapid development as the Greek tragedy of the 5th century, and this tragedy in the person of Euripides turns out to be on the verge of psychologized art, and in the tragedy “Rhea” - almost already within the limits of problematic fiction. All these are components of that “Greek miracle” and “cultural explosion”, to the essence of which A.I. Zaitsev again drew attention 44. Greek art extremely quickly goes from the aniconic sign-monument to the image and portrait 45 . Therefore, in the culture of the 5th century. At the same time, archaic and “ultra-modern” forms coexist, and the great innovator Socrates also poses the question to the sculptor Cliton that “the creator of statues is obliged to convey to appearance figures (to eidei) what the soul creates in him (ta erga tes psyches)" (Xen. Memor. III, 10, 8), and also talks to him about the shine of the eyes of those fighting, about the “radiant expression on the face of the winner” - about all kinds subtleties that became visible to this mind (thinking through the extreme possibilities of its era). Socrates' speeches draw him forward, and his very appearance is a hint for movement and a challenge to ideality.

On the border of the 5th and 4th centuries. in the consciousness and art of the Greeks, what had been temporarily united or mixed in classical art began to separate. The Greek tragedy, comprehending man, introduces us into a violent discord of the very principles of comprehension - questionable and opposing.

In her long monologues, Euripides’ Medea utters words that deprive the sculptural types of being with their fusion of internal and external, with their fusion of face and body:

O Zey, ti de chrysoy men hoscibdelos ei

tekmeri" anthropoisin opasas saphe

andron d" hotoi chre ton cacon diedenai,

oydeis character empephyce somati?

(Med., 516-519)

The translation of Innokenty Annensky conveys this passage quite accurately:

O Zeus, oh god, if you could for gold
Fake to reveal signs to people,
So why didn't you burn the brands?
On a scoundrel so that it catches your eye?. 46

So, “character” is not a mental phenomenon, but a “somatic” one: Zeus had to mark the body (soma -) of a bad person with his sign. So, “character” is a trait, a sign, a sign, everything incised, cut, scratched, then a seal , brand. Euripides' Medea finds the word already at a certain stage of its development 47 . Medea uses the word “character” as meaning something completely external, but her speeches, in their meaning, appeal to character as internal, to character as such internal. which should be especially revealed externally - in addition to and along with the “indifferent” mutual agreement between internal and external. It is obvious, however, that her thought is still predetermined by a kind of motionless conjugation of internal and external: the sign of “bad” must be a special brand printed on the outside. It is quite natural that Medea imagines things in such a way that this brand must be ingrained from the very beginning into the body. Medea's words were spoken 32 years before the death of Socrates, and Medea, one might think, is standing here in front of the same an insoluble problem, in front of which stood the sculptors depicting Socrates: they could hardly cope with their task - the contradictory wealth of the individual-internal, with duality and irony, could not possibly converge with the external and be seen through it. It is unlikely, however, that the sculptors felt their problems with the same acuteness as Medea. However, the sharpness is sharp, but Medea, in his despair, calling on God, finds himself in a dead end created by the ideas of the era. No matter how you shake the walls of your prison, one thing comes out - the motionless conjugation of internal and external and the creation of a seal from the outside - in the form of a brand embedded in the body.

Medea's speeches reflect a certain stage in the history of Greek "character". The internal development of its semantics leads to that knot of meanings in which, perhaps, only one thing is not fully envisaged - the further European fate of this word, in which it seems to be turned inside out. The peculiarity of thinking and vision inherent in the Greeks, the peculiarity of ideological-plastic thinking 48, is also imprinted in the naturally occurring history of the word “character”: the simplest element of visuality, figurativeness, contained in a sign, already indicates in relief a certain volumetricity, only that it can be flattened , and fade away. Grapho (cf. graphics) originally also means “dig”, “scratch”, like the verb charasso. All these are words from the everyday life of a carver, engraver, medalist, sculptor (although the activity of a sculptor is determined through the result of his work - andriantopoios, agalmatopoios 49 ). Characteres, like grammata, are runes, carved letters 50 ,
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Inscriptions merged with their meaning and therefore taken from the side of their integral image: as sacred signs worth labor, they show a tendency towards spiritualization. Hence the metonymically developed meanings - for example, the essay “Peri ton characteron. . ." Metrofana from Lebadei no longer means “about letters”, but “about styles” 51 ; but this is already the era of Hellenism, when the picture of the unfolding meanings of “character” is very different from the classical era and serves as a prologue to new times.

Thus, the wooden stake char akh, which turned into a carver's tool (character) and the imprint of a medal, seal impression, mark, marked the beginning of semantic development in the spiritual sphere, just as heavy hammer blows (typto) finally gave rise to relief images of seals, medals, coins (typoi ). In Plato, medals, seals, coins are placed in a row - all these are “characters”: (Polit., 289b).

For the Greek worldview, reliance on the “body” is extremely important: so the meaning of the word, developing, enriching and permeated with the spiritual principle, finds for itself a material, plastic design and, inseparable from it, does not part with it. Such is the Greek “character” associated with the activity of cutting and sharpening and having as its ancestor a stake and a support - it is not at all by chance that it almost coincided with the offspring of a hammer striking an anvil. Samislova are like imprints of meaning in the outline of a seal. Having developed to such an idea, they subsequently, right up to “style” and “type”, while the boundaries of language are not yet broken, constantly look back at this figurative-spiritual design of theirs that restrains them.

The moment of coincidence of internal and external, bodily, material, their non-separation - all this is as if one should rejoice in the fact that they can constantly be reflected in each other, rotating in their given circle! Pelasgus, the king of Argos, addresses the daughters of Danae this way - it seems, not without benevolent irony and with mistrust, rather feigned:

It can’t be, oh guests, I can’t believe it,
That you really come from Argos.
Look like a native of Libya
You are more than the women from the surrounding areas.
The Nile could have given birth to such a tribe,
And the Cypriot ones, perhaps, imprinted
The features on women's faces are from their fathers.
You also remind me of Indians
Nomads - near the border with Ethiopia
They ride camels, I heard, on horseback. . . 52
(Translated by S. Apta)

Two verses about the “Cypriot” character of persons clearly compress the necessary range of concepts:

Cyprios character t" en gynaiceiois typoys

eicos peplectai tectonon pros arsenon
(Hic., 282-283)

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The Cypriot “character” is embossed (from charasso - “I strike”) on the faces, so that the “character” is not just “traits”, but a once and for all given, more indelible seal impression, or even the instrument itself in the hands of the “creators”, “builders” "(tecton - related to the Russian "tesha"), with which the relief of the image is carved. " Female faces"(gynaiceioi typoi), "types" - the material of the relief image - are compared with "male creators" or "builders", the demiurges of these eternal seals, and the whole whole is described as a kind of sublimely creative and, moreover, constructively precise production - a forge of spiritual and material forms. The word tecton, meaning “builder”, “carpenter”, has a special role here: to show this imprinting of seals in the light of divine creativity, creating both all the materiality and all the spirituality of what is created 53 . This word returns again in the tragedy of Aeschylus - in the archaically powerful chanting of the eternal Zeus:

The Almighty himself, the wise father himself
All living things, the creator himself,
Zeus is the founder of my race.(592-594)
(Translated by S. Apta) 54

“Character” and “type” are, in the final sense, the imprinting of the creative principle, namely the primordial creative, eternal, wise principle (“the ancient-wise creator”).

“Characters” are produced by the undying power of divine creativity. But they also contain the end, the edge of such creativity and its goal: when imprinted, the “characters” do not further imply anything behind them, nothing internal or at least individual, and equally suited to the fifty daughters of Danae.

After quite a bit of time, Medea, as we have seen, only dreams of such simplicity of “character”, in which a “bad” person would immediately be marked by a sign of his “badness.” Speaking about “character”, Euripides expressed himself more precisely in this place than his translator: having chosen a “stamp” for “character”, I. Annensky went further on the lead of this word - the brand is burned out; with Euripides, as it is said, “character” had to be grown into the body. “Character” is simpler than “brand” - something like a sharp mark of fate. But Euripides’ Medea is convinced, on the contrary, that there is no such “mark” on the human body! The relationship between internal and external, essence and appearance becomes a mystery. This defines the tragedy of incomprehensibility: someone else’s soul is in the dark, it is not clearly revealed and understandable to someone else’s gaze. This confirms that the poet’s gaze is now directed into the depths of character - such as character is understood now; the gaze is fixed - but there is nothing there yet except a mystery! Everyone who has ever, like F. F. Zelinsky and many others, found in Euripides the modern martyrdom and disunited psychology of the soul, did so with good reason and was close to the essence of what was happening: Euripides’ psychologism is separated from the modern by an impenetrable thin barrier. What the psychological writer delved into with pleasure or with irritated impatience, for Euripides all this is hidden in the subtle and opaque. Everything happens - outside the inner, in front of the inner itself.
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Euripides still remembered very well - and could assure himself - that

. . .between people on a noble sign
Both menacing and beautiful. If valor
In whom it shines, the sign is brighter.

(Nes., 379-381)
(Translated by I. Annensky) 55

However, in the work of Euripides, one of the main themes is the divergence of appearance and essence, external and internal, the loss of their identity and deep disappointment in human nature. Confusion has settled in human nature: (El., 368). Nobility is now counterfeit, and many noble people are bad (550-551). “There is no point in honoring the gods if untruth prevails over the truth” (583-584). Finally, the chorus in “Hercules” is absorbed in the same concern - “there is no distinction from the gods between good and bad” (Her., 669): if the gods had understanding and wisdom in relation to people, then the virtuous would be given double youth - an obvious sign (character) of virtue, and baseness would live its life only once 56 .

The same theme - the discrepancy between the external and internal in a person - is also present in Sophocles, who, according to tradition, should have been considered before Euripides (one example from Sophocles was already given earlier). It is known that Sophocles calls man the most terrible or terrible force in the world, connecting with this the idea of ​​​​the uncontrollability, unbridledness, and godlessness of people. At the same time, Sophocles' tone, when he speaks about man, differs sharply from Euripides' frenzied drama in its restraint, concentrated wise enlightenment and patience. Therefore, it would hardly be possible to repeat now, following W. Wilamowitz, that Euripides is closer to the Sophocles of our time and that Sophocles amazes with the alienness of his views and motives 57 . At least, speaking about a person, Sophocles betrays his great closeness - of course, not with his calmer tone (the tone could have been completely restless), but with the simple obviousness with which he knows how to talk about the inner, which is inherent in a person. One could already be convinced of this: psyche, phronema, gnome - all this is “internal”, simply called, without the overtension of connection with the external that Euripides created. If the interior reveals itself to Euripides as a tragic riddle, impenetrable darkness, then Sophocles at least knows what to call this riddle, how to master it verbally. From this we can conclude that, as they expressed in ancient times, Sophocles has a completely different “pathos”. So it is; although he is concerned about the same obscurity and the same deception associated with the unidentification of the inner, he is able, it seems, to take a person much more completely, to feel confidence in his rather gloomy knowledge about him and is not ready to be deceived in him again and again, from the same sharp pain.
66

Sophocles dispenses with the word “character” (when speaking about a person), which was so necessary for Euripides, because it created a sharp contrast to the internal (not revealed). Sophocles has his own motive - the motive of time, when he talks about this lack of identification of the inner: you don’t recognize a person until such and such, obviously, has passed. big time. What character, what inner person is revealed in time (and, therefore, without a dramatic “collision” at the moment when you die, but put the “whole” person, as in Euripides - only this is impossible!) - in this Sophocles agrees, as will be clear from the history of the fate of “character”, with Goethe, who also, just as patiently, introduces the motif of time into this problem. The non-revealing of the inner, the non-revealing of man in his integrity is, of course, tragic, but to this tragedy, to this riddle, at least theoretically, there is some kind of key. Time will reveal what is not revealed.

And here are two passages from Sophocles where he argues in this spirit (“you won’t know until you don’t”):

But it's hard to know a person's soul,
Intentions and thoughts, if you(prin)
He will not show the authorities in the laws.
(“Antigone”, 175-177.
Per. S. V. Shervinsky, N. S. Poznyakov) 58

Only time will reveal the honest one to us, -
A day is enough for the vile to find out.

(O.R., 614-615)
(Translated by S.V. Shervinsky) 69

One more thing can be added to these two places - Deyanira talks about her fate: you don’t know a person’s fate until he dies, whether it was good or bad 60 (Deyanira herself is an exception in this sense):

Logos men est" archaios anthropon phaneis,

hos oyc an aion" acmathois broton, prin an

thanei tis, oyt" ei chrestos oyt ei toi cacos

(Trach., 1-3)

Sophocles refers to the ancient human “logos” 61 (a proverb, a judgment passed down from generation to generation), and in his full of patience view of the identification of human essence, Sophocles probably relied on the strength of popular experience.
67

At the end of the classical period of Greek culture, “character” was still extremely far from the modern European “character”. However, the fate of “characters” is now united with the fate of understanding a person as a problem of identifying the internal through the external and as a task of a person finding his inner. The connection of “character” with such an understanding of the human turned out to be persistent - this word seemed to find itself in favorable conditions for development.

The unfolding of this word and the “reversal” of its meaning is still, however, ahead.

1 Scriptores physiognomici graeci et latini / Rec. R. Foerster. Leipzig, 1893. T. 2. P. 347-349.
2 See, for example: Gandelman C. The poem as map: John Donne and the “anthropomorphic landscape)) tradition//Arcadia. 1984. Bd. 19, H. 3. S. 244-251.
3 Dostoevsky F. M. Complete. collection cit.: In 30 vol. L., 1976. T. 15. P. 94.
4 Pindar. Bacchylides: Odes. Fragments. M., 1980. P. 49.
5 Ibid. P. 51. Words with phy- are at the center of Pindar’s ideas; see about “das gewachsene Wesen” in Pindar: Marg W. Der Charakter in der Sprache des fruhgriechischen Dichtung: (Semonides, Homer, Pindar). Wurzburg, 1938. Nachdruck: Darmstadt, 1967 (Libelli, Bd. 117). S. 88-93; phya characterizes the entire existence of man in Pindar (Ibid. S. 97); thus, mamasthai phyai means “sich muhen unter Einsatz dessen, was einem angehort und zur Verfiigung steht, von Gott, dem gottgegriindeten Schicksal gegeben” (Ibid. S. 97-98); true knowledge is to phyai in contrast to routine techne; to de phyai cratiston hapan (Ol. 9, 100); here about the development of words with phy-in Attica to denote character properties like ous erpu oyc ephy Solon bathyphron (Solon, fr. 23, 1); pephycen esthlos host" philois (Soph. El., 322).
6 Ivanov Vyach. Sun. The structure of Homeric texts describing the psyche"
states//Text structure. M., 1980. S. 86, 88.
7 Zaitsev A.I. Free will and divine guidance in the Homeric epic // News, ancient. stories. 1987. No. 3. P. 140, 141.
8 See: Ivanov Vyach. Sun. Decree. Op. pp. 80-85.
9 See: Zaitsev A.I. Decree. Op. P. 141.
10 Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. M., 1983. P. 431; Wed: Philosophical encyclopedia. M., 1970. T. 5. P. 430.
11 Gogol N.V. Complete. collection Op. M., 1951. T. 6. P. 157-158.
12 Junger E. An der Zeitmauer. Stuttgart, 1959. S. 35.
13 Fedin K. Collection. cit.: In 12 volumes. M., 1985. T. 9. P. 487.
14 See, for example, “ethos” in the role of “irony”: Turasiewicz R. Zakres semantyczny ethosw scholiach do tragikow//Eos. 1978. Vol. 66. F. 1. S. 17-30.
15 Pindar. B.; Stuttgart, 1914. Bd. 1. S. 69, 79.
16 “Bey einer schon bekleideten Griechischen Statue ware die Frage nicht mehr lacherlich. Sie ist wirklich ganz sie selbst, und die Bekleidung kaum von der Person zu unterscheiden” (Athenaeum (1799). B., 1960. Bd. 2. S. 43). Our translation is deliberately clumsy - for the reason that important moments for meaning are not conveyed in a smooth form due to the alienness of the ideas embodied in the text for modern language. Let us also pay attention to words whose history is similar to the history of “character”. This is the Latin “persona” in its development from a mask, a guise (as a sign of an individual identified with him; see: Freudenberg O.M. Myth and literature of antiquity. M., 1978. P. 41) to “persona” as a person, personalities; Wed “parsuna”, which is “removed” from a person and which represents him, with a residual idea of ​​the identity of the mask and the person himself – the “face”. The function of the parsuna portrait is to “revive the dead,” in the words of Simon Ushakov (see: Evangulova O. S. Fine art in Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century. M., 1987. P. 119; cf. p. 126. See: Tananaea L. I. Sarmatian portrait: From the history of Polish portrait of the Baroque era, M., 1979; Portrait forms in Poland and Russia in the 18th century: Some connections and parallels // Sov. art history "81. 1982. No. 1. 85-125, especially p. 93 -
68

On the relationship between the icon and the portrait as a depiction of a saint at the moment of transition from earthly to eternal existence).
Wed. also Greek herm- in development from a support or rock, stone (herma, hermis)
to “herma” (hermes) as a type of image.
“Persona” demonstrates the process of interiorization, and the statue and herma are forms of awareness of the human through endowing the external with human content.
17 Athenaeum. S. 43.
18 Schopenhauer A. Sammtliche Werke: In 5 Bd. Leipzig, 1905. Bd. 1/2. S. 35.
19 Schopenhauer quotes from W. Jones (Ibid. S. 34): “The fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms."
20 Schopenhauer A. Op. cit. Leipzig, S. a. Bd. 3. S. 103.
21 Ibid. Bd. 1/2. S. 35.
22 “Subject” is one of the words that most clearly testifies to the process of internalization; historically, the subjectum directly “turns over”, plunging into the inner person and even being identified with “man” as one of its synonyms. Schopenhauer's subject claims to be what God was before - knowing everything and not being known by anyone. The history of hypoceimenon/subjectum is discussed in many of M. Heidegger's works.
23 Schopenhauer A. Op. cit. .Bd. 3. S. 103.
24 The subsequent development of philosophy dissected in a variety of ways the problematic that Schopenhauer often contained in its original state.
As for the history of ancient cultures, they usually make the opposite mistake, distinguishing and contrasting the spiritual and material in the spirit of abstractions of modern times. See, on the contrary, the analysis of the main ideas of Thales (including “water”) in the works of A.V. Lebedev: Lebedev A.V. Demiurge in Thales: (Towards the reconstruction of the cosmogony of Thales of Miletus) // Text: semantics and structure. M.. 1983. S. 51-66; Aka Thales and Xenophanes // Some categories of ancient philosophy in the interpretation of bourgeois philosophers. M., 1981.. P. 1-16.
25 According to fragment B 93 of Heraclitus about Apollo, who at Delphi oytelegei oyte cryptei alia semainei. These words not only name the topic we are talking about - about what is hidden and revealed on the border of external / internal - but, it seems, the topic of the entire science of culture: it is occupied precisely with what never exists for us “in itself” , as such - neither as accessible, nor as generally inaccessible, neither in its own adequate and self-identical existence, nor in complete alienation from itself and alienation to itself, that is, it never exists either completely openly or completely hidden, but always exists as giving a sign about itself, giving news, making itself known, pointing, nodding to itself, as connecting, mediating openness and mystery, revelation and hiddenness. This is what happens in the ceaselessly occurring events of revelation. In the history of culture, full of reflective manifestations (between people, between man and being, between people of different cultures, and finally, in man himself as a meaningful unity), what we call mythosemiosis takes place. The God of Heraclitus could, it seems, fully pronounce what he knows, but he probably must adapt to people and, using their language, both speak and hide. Having resorted to language, God is in language, within language. In the same sense, according to the poet, “a thought expressed is a lie” - to the extent that it is forced cryptei and is involved in the dialectic of revelation” in the “nodding” in place of direct articulation of the meaning (if such were possible), in semiosis .
26 See, for example: Losev A.F. History of ancient aesthetics: Sophists. Socrates. Platon.M., 1969. pp. 149-150.
27 Walch J. G. Philosophisches Lexicon. Leipzig, 1726. Sp. 1492; 2. Aufl. Leipzig, 1733. Sp. 1497.
28 Kant I. Kritik der Urteilskraft, A 41-42 / Hrsg. von R. Schmidt. Leipzig, 1956.S. 90.
29 Note that Gestalt also conveys Greek. schema, as if a laconically conceptualized appearance, a figure of something, a “scheme”. Gestalt is “schematic” in comparison with idea. Let us note that it is timely appropriate to emphasize the moment of abstract schematism in “eidos”: “. . “Eidos are the content of every “what” and the principle of explanation as such” (Dobrokhotov A.L. Category of Being in Western European Philosophy. M1986. P. 44).
69

30 There is no need to say once again now that this kind of judgment captures a very differentiated and historically highly modified situation. See: Schweizer B. Der bildende Kiinstler und der Begriff des Kunstlerischen in der Antike // Neue Heidelberger Jahrbucher, 1925. S. 28-132 ; Id. Mimesis und Phantasia //Philologus. 1934. NF 43 (89). S. 286-300.
31 Volkmaizn L. Die Hieroglyphen des deutschen Romantik // Mimchner Jahrbuchder bildenden Kunst. 1926. NF 3. S. 157-186; Traeger J. Philipp Otto Runge und sein Werk. Munchen, 1975. S. 118-119.
32 See: Braginskaya N.V. Ekphrasis as a type of text: (On the problem of structural classification) // Slavic and Balkan linguistics. M., 1977. P. 259-283"
It's her. Genesis of the “Paintings” of Philostratus the Elder // Poetics of Ancient Greek Literature. M., 1981. S. 224-289.
33 Freidenberg O. M. Decree. Op. P. 71.
34 Guseinov G. Ch. Grifos: objective and verbal embodiment of Greek mythology//Context-1986. M., 1987. P. 94. t
35 On this in a new light, see: Hertsman E. Ancient musical thinking. L., 1986; It's him. Ancient doctrine of melos // Criticism and musicology. L. 1987 Issue. 3. pp. 114-148. Especially with. 129-130.
36 As interest in symbols-signs and signs-hieroglyphs, emblems, etc. grows, the prestige of coins increases sharply: “Multa sub Numismatum corticelatent mysteria naturae”; “Uber Dip Ists Heite Zu Tage Dahin Gekommen / Da Ein Rechtschaffener Politicus in Alien Galanten WissensChaften Mu (3 Erfahren Seyn / Davon Zudiscurren / Raisioniren / Und Nach GE Legenheit Sich Hierdurch Wohl Gar Bey Grossen.herren und Der Galanten Gelehrten Welt Zu Recromendiren; . .die Redner-Kunstdadurch konne befordert werden. "(Olearius J. Chr. Curiose Muntz-Wissenschaft. .Jena, 1701. Nachdruck: Leipzig, 1976. S. 25, 23, 29).
37 Hegel G. W. F. Werke. B., 1837. Bd. 10/11. S. 125.
38 Averintsev S.S. Greek literature and Middle Eastern “literature”: (Confrontation and meeting of two creative principles) // Typology and relationships of literature of the ancient world. M., 1971. S. 217-218.
39 Hegel G. W. F. Op. cit. S. 518.
40 Schweizer B. Zur Kunst der Antike: Ausgewahlte Schriften. Tiibingen, 1963.Bd. 2. S. 181.
41 Ibid. S. 190.
42 Richter G. M. A. Greek portraits II: To what extent were they faithful likenesses? Bruxelles, 1959; Eadem. Greek portraits III: How were likenesses transmittedin ancient times? Bruxelles; Berchem, 1959 (Coll. Latomus, 36, 48); Schweizer B. Studien zur Entstehung des Portrats bei den Griechen // Berichte der Sachs. Akad.d. Wiss. Philol.-hist. KL, 1939. Leipzig, 1940. Bd. 91, N 4; auch. in: Id. Zur Kunstder Antike. Bd. 2. S. 115-167.
43 Schefold K. Die Bildnisse der antiken Dichter, Redner und Denker. Basel, 1943.S. 68.
44 Zaitsev A.I. Cultural revolution in Ancient Greece, VIII-V centuries. BC e.
L., 1985.
45 See in connection with language data and cultural history using the example of Greek names for “statues”: Benveniste A. Les sens du mot colossos et les noms grecs de la statue // Revue de philologie. 1932. Vol. 6, N 2. P. 118-135.
46 Euripides. Tragedies. M., 1969. T. 1. P. 128.
47 The earliest phases include character as nomen agentis (rarely). For “superficial” meanings of “character”, see Euripides in the scene of recognition of Orestes: the old teacher gazes intently at Orestes (“That he stared at me as at the brilliant character of a gold coin, argyroy<...>lampron character? -El., 558-559) and sees a scar above the eyebrow - a trace of a wound received while hunting; in the synonymous series the words are given: oyle, character, ptomatos tecmerion, sign of the fall, symboloi - 572-577). Wed. also the entire monologue of Orestes (367 et seq.), where the poet dispenses, however, with the word “character.”

To the history of the word: Korte A. Charakter // Hermes. 1929. Bd. 64. S. 69-86.
The work of V. Marg mentioned above (note 5) is devoted not to the word “character”, but to the words and ideas of the modern sphere of “character”. See also: Savelyeva O. M. On the relationship between thinking and personality in the interpretation of Greek lyric poets. VII-VI centuries. BC e. // Questions of classical philology. M., 1984. Issue. 8. pp. 47-57

48 That plasmata is in Greek and all sorts of “imaginaries” and that in “plastic” there is also something deceptive, and not just creative, is now impossible to discuss. One can only think that Greek thought well developed in language and deposited in it all sorts of subtleties regarding mythosemiosis , which now still needs to be reached.
49 While the first word indicates the reproduction of the human figure (andrias from aner - “husband”, “man”), the second reflects the archaic light aesthetics, which imparts shine to every valuable thing, an object of possession (agallo, agalma, etc.), and belongs to a group of words with an Indo-European root widely represented in Greek (see: Walde A. Vergleichendes Worterbuch der indogennanischen Sprachen / Hrsg. von J. Pokorny. B.; Leipzig, 1930. S. 622-624). Agalma in the meaning of “object of worship, statue” belongs to classical Greece, being, as it were, a product of aesthetic rationalization of the semantics of the word (cf.: Himmelmann N. Uber bildende Kunst in der homerischen Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden, 1969. S. 16, 29-31; Schmitz H. Goethes Altersdenken im problemgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang. Bonn, 1959. S. 183-184). Late ancient authors encountered such a use of the word magalma, which contains an intense reflection of its meaning and reflects a new sacralization of the Greek spiritual heritage. In Proclus, the soul contains “images and meanings of existing things” - “like their statues, agalmata ton onton” (ExProcli scholiis in Cratylum Platonis excerpta ed. Io. Fr. Boissonade. Lipsiae: Lugduni Bat., 1820. P. 7 ). For Olympiodorus, the names of the gods are “sounding statues”, agalmataphoneenta (In Phileb., 242); both quotes are from Diels and from S. Ya. Lurie: Lurie S. Ya. Democritus: Texts, translation, research. L., 1970. P. 139. In the classical era, however, a far-reaching decline in the word is possible, its desacralization is completely in the Enlightenment style - about people full of false opinions and class prejudices, one can say that they are “bodies without a mind, just images displayed in the square, decorations of the square" (hai de sarces cai cenai phrenon agalmat" agoras eisin -Eur. El., 387-388); one cannot help but feel a certain aesthetic tendency here.
50 Wed. Buchstaben.
51 Aristotle already has this meaning; it has been developed since the classical era; see: Korte A. Op. cit. S. 76, 79-80. On the development of the rhetorical concept of “character” see: Fischer L. Gebundene Rede: Dichtung und Rhetorik in der literarischen Theorie des Barock in Deutschland. Tiibingen, 1968. S. 106-131.
52 Aeschylus. Tragedies. M., 1971. P. 50.
53 This word goes back to Indo-European. See: Schmitt R. Dichtung und Dichtersprache in indogermanischer Zeit. Wiesbaden, 1967. S. 296-297 (§ 601); Gamkrelidze T. V., Ivanov Vyach. Sun. Indo-European language and Indo-Europeans. Tbilisi, 1984. pp. 705-706, Toporov V.N. Sanskrit and its lessons // Ancient India: language, culture, text. M., 1985. P. 10; Kalygin V.P. The language of ancient Irish poetry. M., 1986. pp. 19-20.
54 Aeschylus. Decree. Op. P. 63.
56 Euripides. Decree. Op. T. 1. P. 359. The translation significantly deviates from the original due to additions (“beautiful”, “glowing”).
56 It is acceptable to think that Euripides, in the speeches of the choir of Theban old men, reproduces the features of senile thinking - one that is prone to repetition (hence the pleonasms) - and at the same time cannot convey the basic logic of reasoning. Indeed, where is the “clarity of character” here, if a noble person - for his nobility to come out - must first die and immediately begin a second life, and a vile person must die for the first and last time?! It is obvious that here, as in Sophocles, the problem of character as revealing the inner is put in connection with time (which will tell everything), but only in an ironic and intricate way. If we put aside the unrealizable and idle dreams of the choir, then the choir itself comes to the conclusion that

nyn d" oydeis horos ec theon
chrestois oyde cacois saphes

There is no clear horos from the gods, neither good nor bad, that is, there is no clear boundary, distinction. And then the chorus only repeats what was said earlier in the tragedy and which belonged to the deep convictions of Euripides: oyden anthropoisin ton theonsaphes - no nothing clear from the gods to people (62). Regarding horos "a U. Wilamowitz writes that instead of it there could be a “character” (Wilamowitz-Moellendorf U. von. Euripides" Herakles. B., 1959. Bd. 3. S. 154).

To the understanding of verse 655: ei de theois en xynesis cat sophia cat "andras - protasis. with which the dreams of the chorus begin, and contrary to the interpretation of W. Wilamowitz and others (see, for example, the translation of D. Ebener), xynesis and sophia should be considered homogeneous members of the sentence and sophia cat "andras should be understood not as “reason among people,” “reason among people,” etc., but approximately like this: the wise dispensation (of the gods!) in relation to people. What is important is not even that wisdom, or reason, or common sense people (as in Vilamowitz) turn out to have nothing to do with further reasoning, but that they expect a sign, clarity from the gods, from their institutions, making sure that there is neither a sign nor clarity. Of the translations, W. Wilamowitz is very descriptive, D. Ebener is a little more accurate, but very accurate (essentially) I. J. K. Donner: Waret iht klug, Gotter, und wogt Menschengeschickmit Weisheit. . . (Euripides von J. J. C. Donner. Heidelberg, 1852. Bd. 3. S. 220). I. Annensky translates accordingly. Very accurately conveyed by Donner and Art. 664-665:Kein gottliches Zeichen granzt ab. . .
Regarding synesis (Eurip. Or., 396), the destroying Orestes, who realized that he had done a terrible thing, see: Stolyarov A. A. Phenomena of conscience in ancient and medieval consciousness // Historical and philosophical yearbook "86. M., 1986. P. . 21-34 (with literature: pp. 34-35. Especially p. 26); Yarho V.N. Did the ancients have a conscience?: (On the depiction of man in the Attic tragedy) // Antiquity and modernity. pp. 251-263 ( Conscience )
67 Compare: Wilamowitz-Moellendorf U. von. Op. cit. Bd. 2. S. 157.
58 Sophocles. Tragedies. M., 1958. P. 153.
59 Ibid. P. 27.
60 Regarding aion. Aion is the life or fate of everyone living, conceptualized as follows: aion is the “age” of a living person, the “age” of a person, and the “age” is a telos that embraces the time of all life (Arist. de caelo, 279a), i.e. life as aion is understood as a wholeness defined by the purpose of the whole. “Aion” is a whole meaning, a whole semantic totality, since the meaning of periechon in Aristotle moves from “about-surrounding”, “framing” to that which embraces, embraces “everything” as a result, a semantic result (here - the whole “ ion" of life); “ayon” - everything that is covered by it, a whole, and, moreover, endowed with a purpose. Consequently, to think that the final meaning of “ayona” can be determined only by living it fully corresponds to the internal direction of the meaning of the word. Although, one must assume, aion is given in advance (and is only unknown to man). Hence aion and term - as embedded inside, given by fate; hence life and fate (of someone). See about aion: Wilamowitz-Moellendorf U. von. Op.cit. Bd. 3. S. 154-155.
Is it not possible to assume that horos, about which the chorus discusses in Euripides’ “Hercules” (see above, note 56), secretly reveals here a connection with time (and in this way differs from “character”): after all, only that one thing follows from the philosophies of the chorus that one can wait for a “sign” or “border” of good and bad in a person only from the life he has lived to the end - and then he would be given a second life. . .When life is lived, then a sign will appear: it would be nice to turn it into something completely obvious, but it doesn’t work that way. In fact, it turns out that the “border” passes through time, and not along the surface of the human body and forehead.
61 Cp.: Trach. 945-946:
. . . oy gar esth" he g" ayrion,
prin ey parei tis ten paroysan hemeran.

See also: Schmitt A. Bemerkungen zu Charakter und Schicksal der tragischenHanptpersonen in der “Antigone” // Antike und Abendland. 1988. Bd. 34. S. 1-16.Bes. Anm. 14. S. 3-4.