On July 9, 1972, an underground nuclear explosion was set off in the densely populated Kharkov region to extinguish a burning gas drilling well.

Today, only a few people know that a nuclear explosion was carried out near Kharkov. Its explosion power was only three times less than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Fortunately, no one died then. And Soviet scientists used a nuclear charge to extinguish a huge gas torch. The attempt ended unsuccessfully. The fire geyser burned for another year, and the radioactive cloud spread across half of Ukraine. All this was hushed up and kept in strictly confidential. To lift the veil over this secret, we went to the village of Pervomaiskoye, Krasnograd district, Kharkov region, a kilometer away from which a nuclear explosion occurred back in 1972.

ACCIDENT

In 1970, geologists discovered the largest gas field in these places. Based on estimates alone, its reserves were estimated at 300 billion cubic meters of gas. A year later there were already 17 drilling wells. And suddenly an emergency happened - at one of the drilling rigs, at a depth of 20 meters, gas condensate caught fire. A moment later, the pillar of fire was already rising several tens of meters. The torch hummed louder than a jet plane or space rocket during launch. The gas spread throughout the surrounding area and began to poison residents of nearby villages. “We were forbidden to use matches, turn on the lights, and were ordered to turn off all electrical appliances. They said there was a gas accident. And if we light a match, everything will explode. My family and I were very scared, we cried. And something was also buzzing terribly, it’s impossible to describe,” Ekaterina Yatsenko, a resident of the village of Pervomaiskoe, recalls those events. According to her, on the outskirts of the village it was as bright as day at night.

SOLUTION

They tried to put out the burning fountain with everything that science was capable of at that time. For example, they threw multi-ton concrete slabs from cranes, but they were blown away like feathers for hundreds of meters. “They tried to inject concrete there under high pressure. But it didn’t help either,” Leonid Chernogor, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences at Kharkov National University, a native of those places, recalls those events. Finally, Moscow decided to use an underground nuclear charge to create a local earthquake. The explosion was supposed to move the soil and create an artificial seal that would block the flow of gas. Moreover, back in 1963, at the Urta-Bulak gas field in Uzbekistan, exactly the same burning fountain was extinguished using the same method. But... there the accident occurred in the desert, the area was uninhabited for hundreds of kilometers. And here is the densely populated Kharkov region. Nearby is the city of Krasnograd with a population of about 50 thousand inhabitants.

ACCORDING TO ALL CALCULATIONS, THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE WAS ONLY 1%

This was supposed to be the 28th nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes in the Soviet Union and the first on Ukrainian territory. Not a drop of radiation should have escaped to the surface - Soviet scientists did everything for the safety of the population. All radiation, according to their calculations, should have remained underground.

“There was no other way to extinguish it and cause less damage to the state. The probability that this torch would have been extinguished is 99%. The probability that it would not have been possible is only 1%. Was it worth the risk? It was worth it,” says Leonid Chernogor, who was an eyewitness to these events. “I remember when the torch was burning, it was very beautiful and scary at the same time. Such an unprecedented natural rocket. My parents lived 12 kilometers from the well. I saw and heard it all,” the scientist recalls. According to him, the gas torch produced acoustic vibrations, in particular infrasound, inaudible to humans, which affects nervous system and the human psyche. “Some become aggressive, others lose their minds. And most importantly, the infrasound from this fire spread over hundreds and thousands of kilometers without weakening! These are some of the damaging factors of this fire,” says Leonid Chernogor and immediately adds that no one seriously studied this problem at that time, and if any research was carried out, it was all classified as “top secret.”

The second time a nuclear charge was used for peaceful purposes in Ukraine was in 1979. On September 16, in the city of Yenakievo, Donetsk region, the secret operation “Cleavage” was successfully implemented at the “Young Communard” mine. The rocks were shaken with a nuclear charge to release methane from the mines, which often exploded and led to the death of people. The second explosion was successful.

EXPLOSION: “THE MANAGEMENT BEGAN TO ESCAPE ON THE VOLGA”

A nuclear charge was delivered from Moscow to the village of Pervomaiskoye. The top leadership of the Soviet Union arrived. The fiery torch was cordoned off: the first row - a kilometer from the accident - were police officers, the second - military, and the third - KGB officers. “We stood in a cordon, one every 20 meters. They didn’t give us weapons, but they told us to stand to death and not let anyone through,” recalls local resident Nikolai Taran, who worked as a policeman in those years. “Near the torch there was a T-34 tank, but instead of a cannon there was a huge fan, with the help of which a gas stream was directed into the right side. Two helicopters stood nearby: Mi-8 white and green Mi-2. There were still many black Volgas. Even then there were rumors that they would use a nuclear charge. We didn’t know anything else,” he adds. Residents of Pervomaisky, about 450 people, were evacuated five kilometers to the neighboring village of Krestishche. “They took us out in organized buses, with about 5 families assigned to each one. We went out ourselves by car,” says Nadezhda Dzyabura, chairman of the village council of Krestishche, who was only 15 years old at the time. People took only documents with them. “All pets were left at home. But the canned food was taken out to the gardens so that the jars would not break. They told us that they would put it out with an explosion, but we didn’t know anything else,” recalls village paramedic Natalya Taran. Local residents remember that day perfectly. “It was Sunday. After the rain it's warm and nice outside. Sunny. Dul light breeze. In a word - a nice summer day. I remember when we were leaving Pervomaisky, the soldiers were clearing the territory - checking every house,” says Nadezhda Dzyabura.

At 10.00 on July 9, 1972, the charge was detonated. “We stood on our toes so that our spine wouldn’t be knocked out. The authorities ordered us to do this. I felt aftershock, and then there was an unnatural silence, as if he had suddenly become deaf. I don’t know how long it lasted - a minute or two, but suddenly there was an explosion: stones, dirt, water flew up. A heavy brown-black figure, similar to a mushroom, formed. The management immediately rushed to run away in helicopters and Volgas,” recalls Nikolai Taran.

For a while the torch went out - everyone applauded. But then the fire geyser appeared again. According to Leonid Chernogor, the radioactive trail stretched through the Kyiv and Chernigov regions. “Of course, the first secretaries in Kyiv got wind of this, and they were already supplied with food not from the Kyiv region, but from the Moscow region. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine was fed with food that was imported from uninfected regions. “The top authorities were so scared, but they didn’t know the facts and figures,” says Leonid Chernogor. According to the scientist, the products of this nuclear explosion decayed in a maximum of two months. “Radiation was more or less distributed throughout Ukraine, and its level was relatively low,” says Leonid Chernogor. “It’s also impossible to say what exactly put the local residents to the grave immediately (or after months, or after ten years.”)

PERVOMAYSKYE: WE CAME BACK LIKE AFTER THE WAR

Residents from tiny Pervomaisky, which was located only a kilometer from the epicenter of the explosion, naturally were not informed that their territory had been contaminated. They learned the truth only after the collapse of the USSR. Then it was only alarming that suddenly all the bees died within a radius of several kilometers. And five hours after the explosion, local residents were already quietly having dinner at home and drinking water from wells. The explosion caused the doors of some houses to be thrown open, some with broken windows and cracked walls. “This is a normal phenomenon, the consequences shock wave, although underground explosion. All the experts foresaw this,” explains Leonid Chernogor. Dilapidated and old buildings have completely collapsed. “The barn collapsed, the wall of the house fell away. It was scary to go into it. It felt like the war was over. The chandelier fell and broke, all the walls were cracked,” recalls Ekaterina Yatsenko, a resident of the village of Pervomaiskoye, with tears in her eyes. “There was some kind of destruction in every house. In our barn the roof burst and the walls were cracked. And those who lived closer to the explosion were well shocked,” echoes Nadezhda Dzyabura, chairman of the village council of neighboring Krestishchi. Construction materials were delivered only to those whose houses were badly damaged, residents of Pervomaisky say.

“My dad wanted to go home immediately after the explosion, because they abandoned the farm. We took a roundabout route - we were not allowed into the village, which was cordoned off during the explosion. After two o'clock in the afternoon they took us back by bus. Only 30 years later we learned for sure that it was a nuclear explosion. Then there were conversations too. Someone heard on the radio American program that it was a nuclear explosion. Then no one paid much attention to it,” Nadezhda Dzyabura continues the story. According to the village’s former paramedic Natalya Taran, out of almost five thousand villagers, a quarter of the population died from cancer in 30 years. “Now about 250 people live in Pervomaisky. Mostly these are old people. A rural school It was closed under Soviet rule,” says the paramedic.

With a shudder in Pervomaisky they remember those months after the explosion when the gas torch burned unextinguished. The height of the flame reached 150 meters. “White nights have arrived in our village. My friends lived on the outskirts then. When I came to visit them, we couldn’t hear each other from one meter away. We had to scream,” recalls local resident Lidiya Pisareva. Some abandoned their homes on the outskirts of the village a few days after the gas fountain was set on fire, while others did not want to leave for months. The chickens, people remember, did not want to lay eggs in the evening because it was as bright as day. The cows did not want to give milk because the noise was loud. “People couldn’t live in their houses on the outskirts of the village for long - they went crazy. They said that for the first weeks they could not sleep - it was a nightmare. I once came to visit them in the evening - the room was light, and the window opened unusual look- a burning fountain reaching to the sky. I will never forget this sight. A month later, they had to leave their house, take their most valuable things, livestock, and move to the neighboring village of Krestishche to live with their relatives,” says Lidiya Pisareva.

The fire was extinguished only in the summer of 1973. We had to dig out this well and seal it with liquid concrete under high pressure. During 21 months of gas combustion, as much energy was released as the entire humanity consumes in a day. It would be enough for Ukraine for 10 years. And the smoke from the burning fountain was released into the atmosphere as much as Ukraine emits as a result of its industrial activity in two years.

Now scientists claim that the area suffered more from the fire than from the released radiation. From this well, within a radius of several hundred kilometers, there was rainfall. acid rain. “In the summer the trees stood without leaves. And in winter there was no snow, green grass grew around the well within a radius of 200 meters,” recalls Nadezhda Dzyabura.

“Not a single responsible English general, admiral or air marshal believes in the possibility of practical implementation of Operation Sledgehammer in 1942. I myself am sure that... Operation Gymnast will undoubtedly give best chance to ease the situation of the Russians on the Eastern Front in 1942."

This is what Churchill wrote in his message to Roosevelt on July 8, 1942. Operation Sledgehammer, which the Americans proposed this year, envisaged the seizure of a coastal bridgehead in Northern France. The goal of Operation Gymnast, proposed by the British, was the landing of allied troops in North Africa.

Nine days after Churchill's message, General Marshall, Admiral King and Harry Hopkins made their second trip to London that year. Having failed to overcome British objections to Operation Sledgehammer, they agreed to a compromise. The US and British governments agreed to make every effort to open a second front in Europe in the first half of 1943 (Operation Round-Up). But if the German offensive in Russia continues successfully until September 1942 and makes this operation impossible, then until December. This year, Operation Gymnast, or, as it is now called, Operation Torch, is to be launched in North Africa. On July 30, 1942, President Roosevelt supported the British proposal to land allied forces in North Africa, and preparations for Operation Torch took on a wide scope. The landing of allied troops in France was postponed indefinitely.

According to the plan of Operation Torch, the landing of allied troops in Africa was planned to be carried out simultaneously at three points: in Casablanca on Atlantic coast, in Oran and Algeria on the Mediterranean coast. The lack of escort ships and landing craft and the likelihood of losing a large number of ships from enemy air attacks excluded the possibility of our troops landing east of Algeria. At the final agreement, it was decided that the funds allocated for the operation would be distributed equally between the two allies. American troops were to land in French Morocco; This operation was directed directly from the United States. The landing of British and American troops was planned in Algeria. The leadership of this landing was entrusted to the British command. It was planned to land American troops in Oran, but they were to be delivered to the coast by the British. navy. During the first stages of the landing operation air support aviation was provided by the British naval forces, then by the American air force.

The start of Operation Torch was scheduled for November 8 - the earliest date by which all preparatory activities were planned to be completed.

The actions of British aviation in this grandiose operation, undoubtedly, should have begun long before the landing of allied troops in Africa. The command of the British Air Force was, firstly, to assist in building up the American air force in the British Isles. This assistance was expressed in air cover for American convoys as they passed through the Atlantic Ocean, providing airfields, premises and necessary equipment, as well as providing air cover for the US 8th Air Force, commanded by Major General Spaatz. As part of this army, the 12th Air Force was formed under the command of Major General Doolittle - a formation specifically designed to participate in Operation Torch. Secondly, it was necessary to expand the British airfield in Gibraltar, which was the main airfield for supporting landing operations in the Mediterranean. Thirdly, with the start of the operation, British aviation, operating first from the airfields of the metropolis, and then from the airfield in Gibraltar, was supposed to cover and escort convoys with troops. Finally, the British Air Force was entrusted with conducting combat operations directly related to the landing operation, including support for the British 1st Army during its rapid advance into Tunisia. To support this army, as well as to cover land and sea communications located east of Cape Tenes, the Eastern Air Command was formed, headed by Air Marshal Welsh. The American Air Force was entrusted with conducting combat operations west of Cape Tenes.

The British Air Force was significantly inferior to its partner in the number of aircraft fleet. Seven weeks after the landings, Welsh expected to have only 450 aircraft at his disposal, and Doolittle - 1,250 aircraft. Since the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Air Forces was not provided, both Welsh and Doolittle were directly subordinate to General Eisenhower.

The first convoy of British troops left the Firth of Forth on October 22, 1942. Thanks to measures taken precautions we managed to mislead the enemy. When preparations were underway for the convoy to leave, the Germans believed that we were preparing to invade Norway; when the convoy entered the Mediterranean, they assumed that it was heading for Malta.

On 2 November, Air Marshal Welsh arrived in Gibraltar to take personal charge of air operations. Three days later, Eisenhower arrived there.

Beginning on November 5, our bombers, based in Gibraltar, began to be used to escort convoys, as well as to fight enemy submarines. At the same time, reconnaissance aircraft, operating from the airfields of the metropolis, Gibraltar and Malta, carried out careful surveillance of the French, Spanish and Italian naval and air forces.

November 7 just a few hours before landing german planes, based in Sardinia, attacked the main Mediterranean convoy heading towards Malta. Despite the attacks of enemy aircraft, the convoy continued to move. As darkness fell, he changed course and split up: one part of the convoy headed towards Oran, the other towards Algiers.

The landing of allied troops in the Algeria region began exactly at one in the morning on November 8. Even before the landing of the allied troops, secret negotiations were held with the head of the Algerian garrison, General Mast, at which he assured us that the French troops would not offer any resistance to the allies. General Mahet kept his word and surrendered Algeria. This circumstance, as well as the continuous patrolling of our naval aircraft, greatly contributed to the successful landing. An important task facing us was the capture of two local airfields - Maison Blanche and Blida, located respectively 18 and 45 kilometers from the port of Algiers. Maison Blanche was captured by a detachment of American troops immediately after the landing; soon after this we captured the Blida airfield. After some time, the 81st and 242nd fighter squadrons arrived at Maison Blanche. French Admiral Darlan, who was in Algeria at that time, called on the French to stop resistance in Algeria. Soon the fighting in scattered pockets of resistance ceased.

The situation in Oran was much more complicated than in Algeria. As a result of the energetic actions of our troops, the small port of Arzeu with its surroundings was in our hands by 07.45 on November 8, but the attack on the port of Orac was unsuccessful. The attempt of American paratroopers to capture the airfields of La Senia and Tafarou was also unsuccessful. However, after a successful raid by British naval aircraft, the Tafarow airfield was soon captured by our ground forces, and in the evening of the same day they began to arrive here from Gibraltar american planes. La Senia airfield was captured only on November 10, after the surrender of Oran.

As expected, the enemy showed the most stubborn resistance in Casablanca. After three days of stubborn fighting, American troops captured the port of Lyautey and approached Casablanca, but captured the city only after Admiral Darlan called on the Casablanca garrison by radio to stop further resistance.

By November 11, the initial objectives of the operation were achieved. True, it was not immediately possible to establish peaceful relations with the French, who could provide us with considerable assistance in combat operations and in protecting important communications for us.

The day after the Allied landing, German fighters, bombers and transport planes carrying troops began to arrive at the airfield near Tunisia. The Petain authorities, who did everything possible to prevent the Allied landings in French Morocco and Algeria, allowed the Germans into Tunisia without any resistance.

On November 10, according to intelligence data, it was established that there were already 115 enemy aircraft at the Tunis airport, and 50 transport aircraft were arriving at the Sidi Ahmed airfield (a suburb of Bizerte) every day. In addition, the Germans continuously delivered reinforcements with troops and supplies by sea.

The arrival of the Germans in Tunisia required the Allies to take immediate and decisive action. On November 10, a convoy with allied troops left Algeria to capture the port of Bouji, located 200 kilometers east of Algeria. One of the ships of the convoy was allocated to capture the Gijelli airfield, located 50 kilometers east of Buzhi, from where our fighters could cover the convoy as it approached the target. Strong surf made landing here impossible, and the ship returned to the convoy. Now one could only count on air support from aircraft from the aircraft carrier accompanying the convoy, which, however, soon returned to its base, and fighters based in Algeria. During the afternoon and evening of November 11, German aircraft attacked the convoy several times and sank two ships. On the morning of November 12, another raid was carried out on our ships and vessels, which by this time were already in the port of Buzhi.

On November 12, as a result of the combined efforts of British naval and airborne landings, our troops captured the port and airfield of Bon - 440 kilometers away east of the port Algeria. By November 14, the 81st Bombardment Squadron and the 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron were based at this airfield. On November 15, our troops captured the port of Tabarka; on the same day, American parachute units captured the Yuk Les Bains airfield, located on the border between Algeria and Central Tunisia, and the village of Gafsa. Simultaneously with the deployment of hostilities in the central part of Tunisia, the offensive of the main group continued successfully English troops on the northern sector of the front. By November 28, the advanced units of our troops fought their way to the village of Djedeida, located 25 kilometers from Tunisia.

In early December, the enemy, whose number by this time had reached 15,000 people, launched a counter-offensive on the northern sector of the front and drove our troops back to Medjez el-Bab. Our troops retreated because they were almost not supported by tactical aviation, which was based too far from their troops. The enemy, in addition to a powerful group of his aviation in Sicily and Sardinia, had about 200 aircraft located at airfields in Tunisia and Bizerte, which could fly to the front line in a few minutes, while the nearest airfield of our aviation was still 100 kilometers away front lines. However, German air raids on Algeria were no longer as effective as in November. This is because in December the Beaufighter night fighters were re-installed with on-board radar sights, which had been removed before being sent to Africa for secrecy reasons.

The reason for the poor effectiveness of allied aviation was the lack of centralized control; This was especially evident when the 12th Air Army began to take an active part in the battles for Tunisia. One part of the fighters of this army was based at the Souk el-Arba airfield, the other, operating from the Yuc-les-Bains airfield, supported the offensive of the 2nd American Corps in the central and southern sections Tunisian Front. American long-range bombers, operating first from Maison Blanche airfield and then from the less busy and safer Tafarou airfield, attacked ports and airfields in Tunisia from the very beginning of the operation.

In January 1943 in fighting The bombers of the British Air Force of the Middle East, which included American units armed with Flying Fortress and Liberator aircraft, turned on. At a time when the fall of Tripoli was beyond doubt, these planes began operating at Tunisian ports. Raids on targets in Sicily and Southern Italy contributed to the success of our armies in Tunisia and Tripolitania. Our reconnaissance aircraft, especially the bombers based in Malta, attacked enemy convoys and made a significant contribution to the successful operations of our armed forces in Tunisia. Long before the 8th Army reached the Mareth Line, it became necessary to combine the efforts of the air forces of the Middle East, Malta, the British Eastern Air Command and the US 12th Air Force. However, first of all it was necessary to create an allied air force in North-West Africa. In early December, Eisenhower appointed General Spaatz to be responsible for coordinating the combat operations of the British Eastern Air Command and the US 12th Air Force.

In mid-January 1943, the Casablanca Conference approved a plan to create a unified command of the Allied air forces in the Mediterranean theater of operations. In accordance with this plan, all allied air forces in the Mediterranean theater of operations were united in February 1943 into one large association - the Mediterranean Air Command. The commander-in-chief of this association, Tedder, reported to Eisenhower in matters of directing the combat operations of allied aviation in Tunisia and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conducting operations in the Middle East. Since the center of hostilities at this time was in Tunisia, Tedder's headquarters had to be located jointly with Eisenhower's headquarters in Algeria, from where Tedder could control the three large aviation associations subordinate to him. Two of these formations - the British Air Force in the Middle East under the command of Air Chief Marshal Douglas and the British Air Force in Malta under the command of Air Vice-Marshal Park - already existed. The third force was the newly formed North West African Air Force under the command of the American General Spaatz. They were created as a result of the merger of the Eastern Air Command of the British Air Force, the 12th Air Force of the United States and the tactical units of the British Air Forces of the Middle East. In its organization, the air force of North-West Africa resembled the successful structure of the British Air Force of the Middle East. This force consisted of the North West African Strategic Air Force under Doolittle, the North West African Tactical Air Force under Conyngham, and the Coastal Air Force under Lloyd. Lloyd was entrusted with the implementation air defense V coastal zone, conducting aerial reconnaissance and combat operations against enemy ships and vessels. At the end of February or a little later, auxiliary commands were created that were part of the air force of North-West Africa: the Maintenance and Support Command, the Training Command and the Airlift Command, which was entrusted with the management of all transport aviation and support. airborne operations. In addition, a photo reconnaissance wing was formed under the command of Colonel Elliott Roosevelt. Generals and officers with the necessary knowledge and experience were placed at the head of aviation associations and formations. Thanks to new organization combat aviation operations in the Mediterranean theater of operations could now be concentrated on any targets and anywhere: in the tactical zone, along enemy land and sea communications, at airfields in the deep rear, ports and bases of Italy. The Anglo-American air force was not divided between the commanders of the ground and naval forces and were not tied to specific geographic areas. Tedder could direct his planes at any time in accordance with a single agreed plan.

The reorganization of the Allied air forces was completed at the most critical moment since the Allied landings in North Africa. In January 1943, Eisenhower sent the US II Corps to central and southern Tunisia with the task of reaching the coast and capturing Sfax, thus cutting off von Arnim's troops in northeastern Tunisia from Rommel's troops in Tripolitania. However, the forces of the 2nd Corps, stretching from the village of Fondouk in Central Tunisia to Sfax in the south, were clearly insufficient to complete this task.

At the end of January, Rommel, retreating from El Alamein, approached the southern border of Tunisia. On February 14, Rommel's troops, supported by 371 aircraft, attacked American troops located in the Faid area, and at the same time a second attack much further south, forcing the Americans out of Gafsa. In conditions of low clouds, which reduced the activity of aviation on both sides, both groups of German troops continued their offensive and on February 17 linked up at Kasserine. The initial goal of the enemy’s offensive was to secure Rommel’s left flank, but with access to Kasserine there was a real danger of the Germans breaking through the mountain ranges of Central Tunisia with subsequent access to the Mediterranean coast and the encirclement of our troops operating in the Tunisian direction.

For four days she stood at the front complete confusion. By February 18, when the reorganization of the Allied air forces was completed, the situation had cleared up somewhat. Conyngham's fighters, carrying out patrol missions, began to strike enemy targets on the battlefield. In carrying out this task, they were greatly assisted by the Spaatz bombers temporarily placed at the disposal of Conyngham. As a result of the joint efforts of ground troops and aviation, the German offensive was suspended. The reorganization of the air force undoubtedly significantly influenced the outcome of the fighting in this sector of the front. On February 22, the enemy began to retreat to the coast. At this time, preparations were underway for a new offensive by the 8th Army. Our bombers from the air forces of the Middle East and Western Desert carried out raids on enemy airfields located in populated areas Maret, Gabes and Hamma, and also acted on enemy communications.

On March 6, Rommel again tried to strike at the troops of the 8th Army in the Medenine area. However, the German offensive quickly fizzled out, as our reconnaissance promptly revealed the enemy’s intentions. Having lost 52 tanks, the German troops retreated to fortified positions on the Mareth Line.

After the defeat at Medenine, Rommel, already ill, soon flew to Germany. Command by German troops von Arnim took over in the north, and the Italian general Messe took over in the south.

From the moment Germany declared war on the United States, the Americans began to prepare for large-scale military operations in Europe. Washington understood that this was the direct path to victory over Hitler . But the British did not share the resolve of the allies. And in the end they persuaded the Americans to try their hand at North Africa first. Thus the operation plan was born "Torch".

When France was defeated by the Germans in just 40 days, Britain was plunged into mourning. She lost not only an ally on whom she really counted, but also most of military equipment abandoned near Dunkirk . The British could only look at what was happening in Europe without much optimism. And even wait for the Nazis to come after them.

Even Hitler’s attack on the USSR did not change the picture much: in 1941 it seemed that the Wehrmacht would easily crush the Red Army. In London they completely lost heart. The British command believed that their soldiers had no chance in confrontation with the Germans. This was confirmed both by what was happening on the Eastern Front and by our own sad combat experience.

Fear has big eyes

In December 1941, two significant events occurred at once. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Hitler declared war on the United States. Nobody expected such a gift as the involvement of the Americans in the war. After all, the President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt Although he believed that it was necessary to act as a united front against Germany, he still could not break the resistance of the Congress.

Meanwhile, the situation seemed very difficult. The Germans, despite the defeat near Moscow, still had a huge advantage over the USSR, and the Japanese were preparing an invasion of California. The British themselves had to fight to preserve their “lifeline” across the Atlantic, turn bomber power into a threat to Germany and preserve their chances of success in Africa.

Soviet Union, naturally, demanded much more than declarative support for the fight against Nazi Germany from England and the United States. Gratefully accepting supplies of military materials and weapons, Moscow insisted on opening a Second Front in Europe to reduce the burden on its troops.

"Germany first"

Cause for concern English Prime Minister Winston Churchill there was a difficult situation in which the United States found itself Pacific Ocean. This could become a serious obstacle to the path of American soldiers to Europe. However, Roosevelt's policies exceeded all expectations. Already on December 31, 1941, at a meeting in Washington, it was decided that Germany’s military power was the primary threat, and therefore the United States agreed to postpone the defeat of Japan until later.

But Churchill was categorically not satisfied with the further course of thoughts of the American leadership. Roosevelt and his military advisers believed that it was necessary to land in Europe as soon as possible, either in France or in the north of the continent. To do this, he was ready to increase the number ground forces The United States has up to eight million people and devotes almost all its forces to the fight against Germany.

But the British had no reason to believe that American soldiers will be able to provide more effective resistance to the Wehrmacht than the French and British. The circumstances of the First World War were too fresh in memory, when the American contingent had to not only be armed and equipped, but also trained to fight. In Washington, they held the exact opposite opinion. Americans have always tended to overestimate their strength.

Another discrepancy has emerged. The Americans took up the task of supplying military equipment to the USSR in the most seriously. And the British were required to strictly fulfill their obligations to provide transport, warships and aircraft to escort convoys, port facilities and so on.

Meanwhile, in London they hoped that promises to Moscow could be fulfilled carelessly, as during the First World War. Then the French and British more than once delayed deliveries, or even completely sent military equipment fully paid for by Russia to their troops. And this time Churchill believed that there was no point in spending valuable materials on a defeated ally. Let Russia hold out as long as it can, wear out the enemy, and in the meantime, the Americans will increase their force in the British Isles, and then...

Inspired high hopes, Churchill, on his way from Washington at the beginning of 1942, in his sketches regarding the prospects of war, considered the option of a possible landing in Europe in next year up to 40 Allied tank divisions: "We could hope to win the war at the end of 1943 or in 1944".

Rehearsal failure

The buildup of American forces in Europe (in Britain) was called Operation "bolero". However, the timing of the formation and transfer of troops was behind schedule. The British never tired of pointing out to the allies: if difficulties arose with the transfer of troops to Britain, then how are we going to storm the English Channel?

We tried to find a compromise - try to land troops on the territory occupied by the Germans. Dieppe was chosen for the operation. A town with good port infrastructure, convenient for defense. If, of course, he can be captured. The British were delirious about seizing a bridgehead, then holding it, and then breaking through deep into the continent.

Nothing came of the clever idea. On August 19, 1942, four landing groups were supposed to secretly approach the shore, land and occupy Dieppe. However, everything went wrong from the very beginning. It was not possible to achieve surprise; not far from the shore, one of the allied groups ran into a German minesweeper, and a firefight ensued.

German units were alerted, and the British-Canadian troops found themselves under murderous fire. Churchill tanks got stuck in the sand, and the few that made it to Dieppe were stuck in the city's narrow streets. Only one group of paratroopers completed the task exactly, and only because they made a mistake with the landing area.

In the end, all the equipment had to be abandoned, and the remaining troops had to be evacuated. The British Air Force and Navy also suffered losses incomparable to those of the Germans and did not complete their tasks. The commander of the defense, Gerd von Runstedt, wrote in his diary: “Officers who were at Dunkirk two years ago note the complete similarity of the landscape”.

There were people in London who were pleased by the failure of this rehearsal. He clearly showed the Americans how strong the Germans were and what difficulties they would have to face. And the fact that it was mainly Canadian soldiers who were put under attack was simply written off under the “losses” column. But now the conclusion suggested itself that if a landing were to be made, it would be in a place where there were no Germans.

Hunting the Desert Fox

It must be said that the British did much more than the Germans to postpone the opening of the Second Front in Europe. They eventually persuaded the Americans to land in French North Africa. Roosevelt was forced to give up and agree to this option in order to “do at least something.”

The Americans themselves insisted on a raid in Northwestern Europe or at least to Italy, which would create a threat to Germany itself or, at least, take its ally, Mussolini, out of the war. But the British were afraid of losing their colonies and control of the Suez Canal. In the summer of 1942, Egypt was threatened by an invasion by the Italo-German corps of Erwin Rommel, nicknamed the Desert Fox.

According to the British command, a landing in Morocco and Algeria would make it possible to strike Rommel to the rear The idea is quite controversial, especially since the Germans and Italians were already in a difficult situation. Their supply across the Mediterranean was seriously undermined. There wasn’t even enough fuel and ammunition, not to mention getting reinforcements. The Americans rightly believed that Rommel would capitulate himself if he landed in Italy and completely cut him off from supplies.

Development of Operation Torch

However, a joint group of British and American generals began developing the operation "Torch". The Allies planned to carry out a simultaneous capture of all key ports and airfields of Morocco and Algeria, attacking Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The American consul in Algeria reported that, according to his observations, the troops of Vichy France would most likely avoid an open clash with the landing force.

In fact, US representatives were wishful thinking. French forces, and considerable ones, were determined to repel the invasion. 60 thousand soldiers, powerful coastal batteries, up to 600 aircraft, submarines and surface ships were kept in full readiness Moreover, Germany made it clear to the Vichy government that if French troops in North Africa or somewhere else capitulated to the Anglo-Americans without resistance, Hitler's troops would occupy the south of France.

But even without that, the allies could not count on an easy walk. Among the French there remained strong anti-British sentiments that arose after the British attempted to send to the bottom or capture the French fleet at Mersel-Kebir and Dakar. In general, London was not shy about anything in relations with his former ally. Once the British suspected that Madagascar would become a base for German submarines how they invaded this French possession.

The Americans tried to pull the British back, but all their efforts were in vain. In the end, Roosevelt accepted that the landings in North Africa, imposed by Churchill, would be carried out mainly by American forces, to which the French were friendly. In this situation, he could only insist that an American general command the invasion.

Eisenhower's difficulties

As the joint Anglo-American planning team began to develop the detailed plan, it became clear that the operation would be fraught with exceptional difficulties. First of all, it required such close cooperation between the two allies that none of the previous wars had known. The usual method, when the national armed forces acted independently, with a liaison mission at each headquarters, and the commander-in-chief only nominally exercising strategic leadership, was completely unsuitable for this operation.

Here precise planning had great importance. The first task was obvious: to establish synchronous interaction between completely different units and branches of troops operating at distances significantly removed from each other.

The second difficulty lay in the peculiarities of the theater of military operations. They had to land on territory occupied by the enemy, in an area where German and French submarines were operating, and even a few miles from hostile fascist Spain.

And finally, it was necessary to decide the most difficult question: Somehow avoid friction between American and British officers. The latter stubbornly did not understand why the French did not like them so much. They did not agree that they simply abandoned an ally at Dunkirk, and then tried to lay their paw on what was left of the French military power. In addition, the British considered their combat experience invaluable, which their allies could not agree with.

Command of the operation was entrusted to Dwight Eisenhower , who was able to solve the problems facing him and even do more than could have been expected. At the end of October 1942, on his instructions, negotiations were held between a representative of the French command in Algeria General Charles Mast and American General Mark Clark , who with a group of officers landed from a submarine on the Algerian coast. Despite the French promises not to oppose the landing, allied forces carefully prepared for battle.

"Ball Game"

October 24, 1942 years, transports with troops left the ports of the United States, and a few days later - from the ports of England, with the expectation of arriving in the areas of the upcoming landing at the same time. On the way, the caravans of ships did not encounter any opposition from the naval or air forces of Germany and Italy. This was explained by the fact that, despite the significant scale of movement, the Allies managed to keep the areas and time of landing secret.

Having received information from the Italians that large naval forces with military equipment and landing craft were moving through Gibraltar to the Mediterranean Sea and further east, the Germans concluded that the Anglo-Americans would probably try to land troops in Sicily or Sardinia. The option of invading North Africa was the last thing they considered.

At the same time the position Rommel in Africa has become critical. Under the blows of the British troops, his corps was defeated (Rommel himself was being treated in Germany at that time) and rolled back 1000 kilometers in just two weeks. The prospect loomed complete victory in North Africa.

On the night of November 8, 1942, Allied transport ships, under the cover of warships, approached the designated points, and the landing of troops and unloading of military equipment began. The landing units were ordered not to fire unless the coastal defense forces opened fire. At the first hostile act on the part of the French troops, it was ordered to transmit a conditioned signal over the radio network: “Play Ball” (“Ball Game”), which meant an order to conduct active operations.

At 10 o'clock in the morning, a statement by US President Roosevelt was broadcast on the radio. He assured the French that Western allies do not seek to seize territories, and called on them to cooperate. Many French generals either attempted to arrest Allied resistance supporters or remained as spectators.

For example, the coup in Algeria was successful, and the Americans entered there without resistance. Casablanca and Oran, on the contrary, resisted until November 10, although there were attempts by the French Resistance to move out there.

In the end, the matter ended in negotiations. Even prominent figures of the Vichy regime generals Henri Giraud And Francois Darlan did not want to offer active resistance. In response, Hitler ordered the occupation of Southern France, but this only pushed the French to create a unified government in exile, ready to cooperate with the anti-Hitler coalition.

In purely military terms, the success of Operation Torch meant the isolation of Rommel's troops in Tunisia. He also inflicted several defeats on the allies, but was unable to change the operational situation. I In May 1943, the Italo-German troops in North Africa capitulated.

Boris Sharov

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Operation Torch(English) Operation Torch listen)) is a British-American invasion of North Africa that began on November 8, 1942, in the North African Campaign of World War II. The Soviet Union demanded that the United States and Great Britain begin military operations in Europe and open a second front to reduce the burden on the armed forces of the USSR on eastern front military operations. In this regard, American military leaders planned to carry out Operation Sledgehammer, which involved landing in occupied Europe as soon as possible. However, their British colleagues believed that such a scenario would lead to catastrophic consequences. Instead, a landing in French North Africa was proposed, with the liberation of North Africa from Axis forces, improved control of the Mediterranean, and the preparation of an invasion of Southern Europe in 1943 as possible outcomes. Despite suspicions American President Franklin Roosevelt that the operation in Africa excluded the landing in Europe in 1943, the United States supported the British plan.

Before the battle

The Allies' plans for anti-Hitler coalition there was an invasion northwest Africa- Algeria and Morocco, that is, on the territory of Vichy France, which had approximately 60,000 soldiers stationed in Morocco, batteries coastal artillery, a small number of tanks and aircraft, as well as about 10 surface ships and 11 submarines. The Allies believed that Vichy French forces would avoid battle, including information received from the American consul in Algeria. However, there was a danger that the Vichy Navy might seek revenge for the 1940 British attack on Mers el-Kebir, making research into the sentiments of French forces in North Africa crucial. Plans were made to secure their cooperation.

The Allies intended to make a rapid breakthrough into Tunisia to the south, followed by an attack on German forces from the rear. General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed to command the operation, with his headquarters located in Gibraltar. Andrew Cunningham was appointed naval commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force; his deputy, Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, was entrusted with the development of the landing.

The American Consul in Algeria succeeded in establishing tentative contacts with French officers, including with the commander-in-chief of the Vichy forces in Algeria, General Charles Emmanuel Mast. They agreed to cooperate with the Allies on the condition of holding secret negotiations with a senior Allied general in Algeria. Negotiations were successfully held on October 21, 1942 (Major General Mark Clark participated on the Allied side).

The Allies also managed to win over the Vichy General Henri Giraud, offering him the position of commander-in-chief of the French armed forces in North Africa after the invasion. Giraud, however, agreed only to the post of commander in chief of all invasion forces, that is, to replace Eisenhower. Having been refused, Giraud decided to remain “as a spectator.”

Battle

Operation Torch Map

The Allies planned to carry out a simultaneous capture of all key ports and airports of Morocco and Algeria, attacking Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.

The Western Task Force (targeting Casablanca) consisted of American units - the 2nd Armored, as well as the 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions (a total of 35,000 soldiers). It was commanded by Major General George Patton, maritime part Rear Admiral Henry Hewitt led the operation.

The central task force aimed at Oran consisted of the 509th Airborne Battalion, the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division (a total of 18,500 soldiers). They were sent from Britain and were under the command of Major General Lloyd Fredendall. The naval part of the operation was led by Commodore Thomas Trowbridge.

The Eastern Task Force (targeting the city of Algiers) was under the command of Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of the British 78th and American 34th Infantry Divisions (20,000 soldiers). By naval forces led by Vice Admiral Harold Barrow.

The air part of the operation was divided into two directions - east and south of Cape Tenez in Algeria, respectively. The first was operated by British aircraft under the command of Marshal William Welsh, and the second by American aircraft under the command of Major General Jimmy Doolittle.

Casablanca

The Western Task Force landed before dawn on November 8, 1942 at three places: Safi, Morocco (Operation Blackstone), Fedal, Morocco (Operation Brushwood) and Mehdiyeh, Morocco (Operation Goulpoast). Artillery preparation was not carried out, since it was assumed that the French would not resist.

The previous night, a coup attempt had been carried out by the French General Betoir. He surrounded the villa of the pro-Vichy General Auguste Nogues, but Nogues managed to evade capture. Betoir's actions alerted Nog to an impending Allied landing, and he put the coastal defense forces on alert.

The invasion of Safi was most successful. There was no artillery preparation here either, however, as soon as the intruders came under fire from Vichy coastal artillery, the ships returned fire. Safi was captured by noon on November 8th. By November 10, the last pockets of resistance in the city were extinguished, after which the main part of the forces under the command of General Harmon headed towards Casablanca.

Casablanca was surrounded by November 10 and surrendered to the Allies an hour before the planned final assault. Patton's troops entered the city unopposed.

In general, resistance by Vichy troops in Morocco was sporadic. An attempt by a Vichy Navy squadron, including the unfinished battleship Jean Bart, to prevent the landing was unsuccessful. As a result, many ships were lost, while the remaining ones joined the Allies.

Oran

The Central Task Force's attack was divided into three sections of the coast west and north of Oran. Due to insufficiently thorough reconnaissance, some of the attacking ships were damaged due to the unexpectedly shallow depth of the sea. This served as a valuable lesson in the planning of Operation Overlord (the Normandy landings).

Coastal artillery was active on both 8 and 9 November. The Vichy troops defended themselves very stubbornly, but were forced to surrender under incessant shelling from British battleships on November 9.

Algeria

British and American troops on the coast near Algiers

According to agreements with the Allies, a group of 400 members of the French Resistance under the command of Henri D'Astir and José Aboulker carried out a military coup in the city of Algiers before landing on the night of November 8. They occupied key targets in the city, including telephone exchange, radio station, governor's house and headquarters of the 19th corps. The defenders spent much of the day regaining control of the positions they had lost during the coup, allowing the Allies to surround the city with little resistance.

The invasion was distributed among three sections of the coast. Not all the landing troops ended up in the areas allocated to them, which, however, was unimportant, because. they encountered virtually no resistance. The coastal artillery batteries were disabled in advance by the rebels. One of French generals openly greeted the Allies.

The only fighting took place in the city of Algiers itself, which was surrendered to the Allies at 18:00.

Consequences

Political consequences

Soon enough it became clear that Henri Giraud did not have sufficient authority to command French troops; Moreover, he decided to wait for the results of the landing while in Gibraltar. Therefore, Eisenhower, with the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, offered Admiral Francois Darlan, who was in Algeria, control of North Africa if he defected to the Allied side, effectively leaving the Vichy regime intact. The response was an angry reaction from both Charles de Gaulle, the French Resistance, and war correspondents. Despite this, this idea was implemented. After the murder of Darlan by a local anti-fascist on December 24, 1942, Giraud was put in his place, who soon arrested the leaders of the uprising on November 8 with the full connivance of the Allies.

Commando [Formation, Training, Outstanding Special Forces Operations] Miller Don

Operation Torch

Operation Torch

Rommel began withdrawing troops to Tunisia on November 4, 1942. On November 8, the Allies launched Operation Torch. It was planned to land air and sea troops on the coast of northern Africa, controlled by the collaborationist French Vichy government, and set a trap for the retreating Germans. The Commandos and Rangers were given a mission similar to the one that failed during the Dieppe operation. This time, however, they were much more successful, with the 1st Ranger Battalion attacking an artillery battery protecting a beach in the town of Arzew in western Algeria (this town is one of the targets of the operation). Meanwhile, 2 commando groups landed in the Gulf of Algiers and destroyed coastal fortifications.

In contrast to the fierce resistance at Dieppe, the French defenses in northern Africa were rather weak and fragmented. Operation Torch is very important task performed by paratroopers; They were to capture French air bases, main communications hubs and assist the Allied forces in the attack on Tunisia, the 509th Parachute Battalion was flown directly to the air force base at Senia, near Oran, using 39 C-47 aircraft. The commander of this risky operation, Lieutenant Colonel Ruff, received information from Allied intelligence that the French would not resist. Therefore, he decided to land directly on the runways. As in the case of locating Rommel's headquarters (during Operation Crusader), intelligence was mistaken, which led to disaster. The French met the attackers with such powerful fire that Raff and his men were forced to commit emergency landing on the nearest salt lake. Therefore, the credit for the capture of Senia belongs to ground forces. Then the situation improved, on November 8th the 3rd battalion of paratroopers landed in Beaune, 250 km west of Tunisia. Three days later, the 509th battalion, having recovered from the " friendly meeting"in Senia, landed at the airfield in Tebes (200 km from Bon), on the border between Tunisia and Libya. Here the Allies were received as liberators.

The 1st battalion of paratroopers, which landed on November 16 at Souk el Arba (120 km west of Tunisia), was much less favorably received. Fortunately, the British officers managed to take control of the situation in time. They convinced the commander of the French garrison (3,000 soldiers) that they were the forward units of two tank divisions located nearby.

On 29 November, the 2nd Parachute Battalion, under the command of John Frost (who had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel since the Bruneville raid), landed near the Oudna air base, 15 km from the city. Although the Germans had already left the base, more than just white minarets could be seen from the nearby mountain ridge. Tunisia and its surroundings were literally filled with mechanized and tank formations of Axis troops. Threatened by the advancing Germans and Italians, the 2nd Parachute Battalion began to retreat on 30 November. The retreat of the British units did not resemble the stampede of a gazelle pursued by a herd of lions. It was the retreat of a wounded lion before a herd of hyenas. Fighting stubbornly, on December 3, the 2nd Parachute Battalion reached the Allied positions. He lost 266 people, but his line of retreat was literally littered with destroyed Axis tanks and hundreds of Italian and German corpses. For the first, but not the last time, the 2nd Parachute Battalion resisted the seemingly inexorable logic of war.

By early December 1942, it became clear that despite the efforts of the paratroopers, the Allies had no chance of capturing Tunisia on the move. The command stated with regret that the war in Africa would not end in the near future. However strategic position it wasn't bad. The Axis forces, squeezed into a small space (430 km from north to south), no longer had a chance to carry out major counteroffensives.

Now the British commandos and paratroopers had to fight on the front line like regular infantry. This situation repeated itself many times over the next two years. On March 7, 1943, the first clash took place between a battalion of German paratroopers under the command of the legendary Major Witzig and the 1st paratrooper battalion. In the beginning german soldiers inflicted losses on the British, but the latter launched a successful counterattack and forced the Germans to retreat.

Allied commandos and paratroopers fought on the front line until April 1943, losing total 1,700 people. The soldiers in red berets showed extraordinary courage and, perhaps, that’s why the enemy called them “red devils.” English paratroopers are still proud of this nickname.

While the British operated on the front line, their American counterparts carried out very dangerous reconnaissance operations and sabotage raids. Each attack could end tragically, since many thousands of Axis soldiers were concentrated in a small area, willingly supported by Tunisian Arabs who were hostile to the Allies.

On December 21, 1942, a platoon of soldiers from the 509th battalion landed in the El Jem area, in southern Tunisia, with the task of blowing up railway bridge. The bridge was blown up, but the return was a nightmare. The soldiers had to cover 170 km of mountainous terrain and desert. Of the 44 soldiers who took part in the raid, only eight survived.

Even the most experienced “desert pirates”, attached to the 8th English Army advancing from the southeast, experienced troubles. Thus, an SAS patrol under the command of David Stirling himself, who went on reconnaissance to the Gabes Gap area in southern Tunisia, was discovered by the Germans and captured. True, Stirling managed to escape, but he was captured 36 hours later.

The LRDG patrols were more fortunate. One of them, consisting of New Zealanders under the command of Captain Nick Wilder, discovered a clear passage between the hills west of the Mareth line. Soon the passage received the name of the captain. On 20 March 1943, Wilder led 27,000 troops and 200 tanks (mostly from the 2nd New Zealand Mechanized Division) through. These formations encircled the Mareth Line from the west, which marked the beginning of the end for Axis forces in Tunisia and throughout North Africa.

Chapter 25 El Alamein and Operation Torch October–November 1942 In October 1942, while Zhukov and Vasilevsky were preparing a large-scale encirclement of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Rommel was in Germany on sick leave. He suffered from the effects of stress, low blood