Operation unthinkable Western allies against the USSR. Churchill's "Unthinkable" Plan

Third World War was supposed to begin on July 1, 1945 with a sudden attack by the combined forces of the Anglo-Saxons on the Soviet troops... Now few people know this, as well as how Stalin managed to thwart the plans of the “probable allies”, why we were forced to hastily take Berlin, against whom In April 1945, English instructors trained the undisbanded German divisions that surrendered to them, why Dresden was destroyed with inhuman cruelty in February 1945, and who exactly the Anglo-Saxons wanted to intimidate with this.

In April 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered the preparation of a plan for war against the USSR. The task was preceded by the conclusions that Churchill presented in his memoirs:
. firstly, Soviet Russia became a mortal threat to the “free world”;
. secondly, to immediately create a new front against its rapid advance;
. thirdly, this front in Europe should go as far east as possible;
. fourthly, the main and true goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin;
. fifthly, the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American troops into Prague is of utmost importance;
. sixth, Vienna, essentially the whole of Austria must be governed by the Western powers, at least on an equal basis with the Russian Soviets;
. seventh, it is necessary to curb the aggressive claims of Marshal Tito towards Italy...

Operation plan

The operation plan was prepared by the War Cabinet's Joint Planning Staff and was provided to it on May 22, 1945, in 29 pages.
According to this plan, the attack on the USSR was to begin following Hitler's principles - with a surprise attack. On July 1, 1945, 47 British and American divisions, without any declaration of war, were supposed to deal a crushing blow to the naive Russians who did not expect such boundless meanness from the allies. The strike was supposed to be supported by 10-12 German divisions, which the “allies” kept unformed in Schleswig-Holstein and southern Denmark, they were trained daily by British instructors: they were preparing for the war against the USSR.

It was then that Churchill gave orders to stockpile captured German weapons with an eye to their possible use against the USSR, placing surrendered Wehrmacht soldiers and officers into divisions in Schleswig-Holstein and Southern Denmark. Then it will become clear general meaning the insidious undertaking hatched by the British leader. The British took German units under their protection, which surrendered without resistance, and sent them to Southern Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. In total, about 15 German divisions were stationed there. Weapons were stockpiled, and personnel were trained for future battles.

Oberleutnant Otto Carius, author of the book “Tigers in the Mud,” writes:
I took the lieutenant back and said goodbye to the commander of the American armored advance detachment. He wanted to offer me a cup of coffee and was very surprised when I refused. He then asked me why we kept fighting at all. In response, I told him: as a soldier and officer, perhaps I do not need to give an explanation on this matter. He advised me to take care of my men, since we would soon need every soldier to carry out joint tasks. This remark again gave me some hope. After all, it could be about a joint campaign against the Russians. Perhaps prudence will prevail over hatred between Western rivals. Perhaps also taking into account the situation between enemy combat units. Unfortunately, the last word it was up to the politicians.

American General Patton- commander tank armies directly stated that he did not plan to stop at the demarcation line along the Elbe, agreed upon in Yalta, but to move on. To Poland, from there to Ukraine and Belarus - and so on until Stalingrad. And end the war where Hitler did not and could not end it. He called us nothing more than “the heirs of Genghis Khan who need to be expelled from Europe.” After the end of the war, Patton was appointed governor of Bavaria, and was soon removed from his post for Nazi sympathies.

Dwight Eisenhower in his memoirs he admits that the Second Front practically did not exist at the end of February 1945: the Germans rolled back to the east without resistance. The German tactics were as follows: to hold, as far as possible, positions along the entire line of Soviet-German confrontation until the virtual Western and real Eastern front will not close, and the American and British troops will, as it were, take over the baton from the Wehrmacht formations in repelling " Soviet threat", hanging over Europe. Churchill at this time in correspondence, telephone conversations with Roosevelt he is trying to convince him to stop the Russians at all costs, not to let them into Central Europe. This explains the significance that the capture of Berlin had acquired by that time.

In theory, a war of the united forces of Western civilization against the USSR was supposed to begin - subsequently other countries were supposed to participate in the “crusade,” for example, Poland, then Hungary... The war was supposed to lead to the complete defeat and surrender of the USSR. Final goal was to end the war approximately in the same place where Hitler planned to end it according to the Barbarossa plan - at the Arkhangelsk-Stalingrad line.

The Anglo-Saxons were preparing to break us with terror - the savage destruction of large Soviet cities: Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Murmansk and others with crushing blows from waves of “flying fortresses”. Several million Russian people were supposed to die in the “fire tornadoes” worked out to the smallest detail. This is how Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo were destroyed... Now they were preparing to do this to us, the allies. The usual thing: the most vile betrayal, extreme meanness and savage cruelty - business card Western Civilization and, especially, the Anglo-Saxons, who exterminated many people.

The naval forces of Great Britain and the USA then had an absolute superiority over the USSR Navy: 19 times in destroyers, 9 times in battleships and large cruisers, 2 times in submarines (http://www.respublika.info/4440 /history/article22384/). Over a hundred aircraft-carrying ships and several thousand carrier-based aircraft against zero from the USSR. The "probable ally" had 4 air armies heavy bombers that could carry out attacks crushing blows. Soviet long-range bomber aviation was incomparably weaker.

In April 1945, the Allies presented our troops as exhausted and exhausted, and military equipment- worn out to the limit. Their military experts were greatly surprised by the power of the Soviet Army, which it demonstrated during the capture of Berlin, which they considered impregnable. There is no doubt that the conclusion of the prominent historian V. Falin is correct - Stalin’s decision to storm Berlin in early May 1945 prevented the third world war. This is confirmed by recently declassified documents. Otherwise, Berlin would have been surrendered to the “allies” without a fight, and the combined forces of all of Europe and North America would fall on the USSR.

Reasons for canceling the operation

However, on June 29, 1945, the day before the planned start of the war, the Red Army unexpectedly changed its deployment for the insidious enemy. This was the decisive weight that moved the scales of history - the order was not given to the Anglo-Saxon troops. Prior to this, the capture of Berlin, which was considered impregnable, showed the power of the Soviet Army and the enemy’s military experts were inclined to cancel the attack on the USSR.

According to Professor of the University of Edinburgh D. Erickson, Churchill’s plan helps explain “why Marshal Zhukov suddenly decided in June 1945 to regroup his forces, received orders from Moscow to strengthen the defenses and study in detail the deployment of the Western Allies. Now the reasons are clear: obviously, Churchill’s plan became known to Moscow in advance and the Stalinist General Staff took appropriate countermeasures.” The plan for Operation Unthinkable was indeed known to Moscow in advance, having been transmitted by the Cambridge Five (the core of the network Soviet agents In Great Britain)
Even after the capture of Berlin, plans for a treacherous strike continued to be developed full swing. The only thing that stopped them was that they realized that their plans had been revealed and the calculations of the strategists showed that it would not be possible to break the USSR without a sudden blow.

The drafters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan came to two main conclusions:
. when starting a war with the Russians, you must be prepared for a long and expensive total war,
. The numerical superiority of the Russians on land makes the possibility of achieving limited and rapid (military) success extremely doubtful.
Therefore, we believe that if war breaks out, it will be beyond our capabilities to achieve rapid limited success and we will find ourselves drawn into a long war against superior forces. Moreover, the superiority of these forces may increase enormously if American fatigue and indifference grow and they are drawn to their side by the magnet of the war in the Pacific.
- from the conclusion of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, sent to W. Churchill

It should also be noted that Churchill indicated in comments on the draft plan presented to him that the plan was a “precautionary measure” for what he hoped would be a “purely hypothetical case.”

There was another important reason why the Americans objected to the British - they needed the USSR to crush Kwantung Army on Far East, without which the US victory over Japan on its own was in question.

Further plans in case of war with the USSR

In mid-July 1945, Churchill, having suffered defeat in the elections, resigned. A Labor government led by Clement Attlee came to power in Great Britain. In 1946, the new British government led by K. Attlee continued to develop plans for war with the USSR, involving the USA and Canada for this. The negotiations were entrusted to the head of the British military mission in Washington, a participant in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Field Marshal H. Wilson, who discussed British military projects with President G. Truman, General D. Eisenhower, at that time the commander-in-chief of the allied forces in Europe, and Canadian Prime Minister M. King. In September, General D. Eisenhower met with British Field Marshal B. Montgomery on a yacht near the US coast. The parties ultimately came to the conclusion that if the Red Army launched an offensive in Europe, the Western allies would not be able to stop it. The plan for Operation Unthinkable, or rather what was left of it, was sent to the archives; subsequent plans for the war against the USSR were developed at the NATO level.

The Second World War had barely died down, and the allies were already hatching plans to start a new large-scale conflict. They, like Germany once did in 1941, intended to launch a surprise attack on Russia.

Polish question

By April 1945 Soviet army completely took control of the territories of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and partly Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the USSR had already managed to create a new communist government in Poland, which seriously worried its Western allies. The US and UK continued to defend the legitimacy of the Polish government in exile.

Back in February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, it would seem that a compromise was reached, which involved the reorganization of the pro-communist leadership of Poland on a “broader democratic basis.” In reality it turned out differently. The term "reorganization" was interpreted differently by the USSR and its allies. The West hoped for the creation of a virtually new government of Poland, while Stalin only wanted a decorative “dilution” of the previous leadership with several non-communist figures.

For Churchill, Poland was the key to Eastern Europe, and he did not want to give it under the full control of the Sotsky Union. In a letter to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister expressed the idea that the “Polish impasse” can only be resolved by refusing to withdraw American troops in Germany to the demarcation line of occupation zones agreed upon in Yalta. At least until the Polish issue is resolved.

Growing threat

Churchill mused: “If Poland were to be completely absorbed, buried deep in Russian-occupied territory, then the whole east of Europe would be under Soviet influence" The British politician was also concerned about the prospects for Soviet control of Turkey and the Straits; he was no less concerned about the character Soviet occupation Germany.

“If these issues are not resolved before the withdrawal of American armies from Europe and before western world will curtail its military machines,” the prime minister reasoned, “it will be impossible to count on a satisfactory resolution of the problems, and the prospects for preventing the Third World War will turn out to be very weak.”

Churchill was extremely concerned that "Soviet Russia had become a mortal threat to the free world." He considered the only way to prevent its rapid advance to be the creation of a new front, which was supposed to go as far to the east as possible. At the same time, Churchill did not rule out the expansion of the scale of confrontation in the event of an alliance between the USSR and Japan.

Adventurous plans

At the very beginning of April, Churchill ordered the chiefs of staff to urgently prepare a plan (offensive and defensive) in the event of a military conflict between Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. On May 22, the operation plan, codenamed “Unthinkable,” was ready.

According to plan military campaign against the USSR at the first stage should have been of a land nature. The best springboard for an attack on Russia was named the north-east of Europe, namely the territories north of the Zwickau-Chemnitz-Dresden-Görlitz line. The other part of the front had to focus on defense. July 1, 1945, according to strategists, is the most suitable date for the start of the operation.

In addition to England and the USA, Churchill intended to use the Armed Forces of Canada and France, as well as the troops of the emigrant government of Poland. What’s most interesting is that the British prime minister’s plans were to attract 15 German divisions assembled from prisoners of war.

However, the Allied General Staff noted that only 47 Anglo-American divisions, including 14 armored ones, would be able to be involved in offensive operations. They also believed that from the USSR they would be opposed by forces comparable to 170 allied divisions, of which 30 divisions were armored.

However, many understood that in the spring and summer of 1945 the situation was not at all favorable for carrying out such an adventurous operation. The Red Army was on the rise and occupied very advantageous positions in Europe. Moreover, Japan was still strong. Finally, no one could guarantee approval of a military conflict with the USSR both in the British Isles and in America.

There was one more important circumstance. The US government was extremely interested in helping the USSR in the war with Japan. Across the ocean, they looked to the East with hope, expecting that Moscow was about to declare war on militaristic Japan. However, this circumstance did not bother the brave warriors. American General George Patton confidently declared that “he and his troops will reach the Volga and Stalingrad.”

From heaven to earth

Churchill sent the plan for Operation Unthinkable to Britain's highest headquarters body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British Prime Minister received the staff verdict on June 8.

The expert report noted that the Anglo-Americans had 103 divisions in Europe against Soviet forces, equivalent to 264 allied divisions. In the air, 8,798 allied aircraft will oppose 11,742 USSR aircraft. Anglo-American troops could only have obvious superiority at sea.

The conclusions of the British headquarters were as follows: when starting a conflict with the Russians, it is necessary to be prepared for a long and expensive all-out war; The numerical superiority of Soviet troops on land makes the possibility of achieving limited and rapid success extremely doubtful.

It was also considered unpromising to attract Germany’s allies to the side: “War fatigue will become dominant factor influencing the position civilian population Germany. The reluctance to cooperate with Western allies may be strengthened by Russian propaganda coming from the Russian occupation zone,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted.

Military experts unanimously agreed that as the military conflict progressed, the superiority of the USSR could increase enormously and this would cast great doubt ultimate success operations.

It should be noted that Churchill seriously considered the defensive version of Operation Unthinkable. “It is necessary to come up with a clear plan for how we can defend our island, taking into account that France and the Netherlands will not be able to withstand Russian superiority at sea,” the prime minister wrote with concern. In his notes in the margins of the plan, Churchill indicated the purely hypothetical possibility that this could happen. He hoped that things would not come to a military conflict.

Nobody canceled the Third World War

The epic of Operation Unthinkable ended in July 1945, when it chief ideologist Winston Churchill, having been defeated in the elections, resigned. However, this did not relieve the tension. The new Labor government led by Clement Attlee continued to develop plans for war with the USSR, involving the USA and Canada for these purposes.

In September 1945, near the US coast, a meeting between American General Dwight Eisenhower and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery took place on a yacht. The parties came to the conclusion that if the Red Army launched an offensive in Europe, the Western allies would not be able to stop it.

According to Edinburgh University professor John Erickson, the Soviet Union was well aware of the alleged military operation. This is the only way the historian explains the order from Moscow to strengthen the defense, regroup its forces and study in detail the deployment of the Western Allies' troops, which was received by Marshal Zhukov in June 1941.

The plan for Operation Unthinkable was sent to the British archives. But later other plans for war against the USSR arose, which were developed at the NATO level. Soviet military strategy took this into account. Thus, the country’s defense plan for 1947 set the task of ensuring the integrity of the borders in the west and east, established by international treaties after the Second World War, and being ready to repel possible enemy aggression. In connection with the increase in the military presence of the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe, a gradual increase in the size of the Soviet Armed Forces began - the countries were steadily drawn into the arms race.

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On July 1, 1945, the Nazi coalition of Great Britain, the United States and Germany was about to start a war against the USSR.

TOP SECRET

War Cabinet

Integrated Planning Headquarters

OPERATION "UNTHOUGHT"

Report of the Joint Planning Headquarters

E) Until July 1, the implementation of plans for the redeployment and demobilization of troops continues, then it stops.
In order to maintain the regime of increased secrecy, consultations with the headquarters of the ministries in charge of the branches of the armed forces were not held.

Target
2. The general political goal (of the operation) is to impose the will of the United States and the British Empire on the Russians. // democratic impose the will of the Anglo-Saxons on the Russians.
Although the “will” of the two countries can be seen as a matter directly affecting only Poland, it does not at all follow that the degree of our involvement (in the conflict) will necessarily be limited. Quick (military) success may or may not prompt the Russians to at least temporarily submit to our will. If they want total war then they will get it. // If they want!? Anglo-Saxons are two-faced Nazis!
3. The only way for us to achieve our goal in a definite and long-term sense is victory in a total war, but taking into account what was said above, in paragraph 2, regarding the possibility of quick (military) success, it seems to us correct to approach the problem with two premises:
a) total war is inevitable, and we have considered the chances of success taking this into account;
b) the political attitude is such that quick (military) success will allow us to achieve our political goals, and subsequent participation (in the conflict) should not worry us.

TOTAL WAR
4. Since the possibility of a revolution in the USSR and the political collapse of the current regime is not considered by us and we are not competent to make judgments on this issue, the Russians can only be taken out of the game as a result of:
A) occupation of such (vast) territory of Russia proper as to reduce the country's military potential to a level at which further (Russian) resistance becomes impossible; // Nazi Hitler has a lot to learn from the democratic Anglo-Saxons.
b) inflicting such a defeat on the Russian troops on the battlefield that would make it impossible to continue Soviet Union wars // They only landed in Normandy, and already they consider themselves capable of fighting a country that defeated Nazi Germany.

Occupation of Russia's living space
5. It is possible that the situation will develop in which the Russians will be able to withdraw their troops and thereby avoid decisive defeat. In this case, they can adopt the tactics they used so successfully against the Germans, as well as in previous wars, and consisted of using huge distances, which the territory has endowed them with. In 1942, the Germans reached the borders of Moscow, the Volga and the Caucasus, but the methods of evacuating factories, combined with the deployment of new resources and the help of the allies, allowed the USSR to continue hostilities.
6. In fact, it is impossible to talk about the limit of the Allies’ advance into Russia, at which further resistance (of the Russians) will become impossible. It is difficult to imagine the very possibility of such a deep and rapid penetration of the Allies, as the Germans managed in 1942, despite the fact that such an advance did not lead to a decisive outcome.

Decisive defeat of Russian troops
7. Details of the available forces and deployment of Russian and Allied troops are given in Appendices II and III and illustrated in Maps A and B. The current balance of power in Central Europe, where the Russians have an advantage of approximately three to one, makes the current situation unlikely complete and decisive victory allies in this territory. Although the Allies are doing better with organization and slightly better equipment (troops), the Russians showed themselves in the war with the Germans formidable opponents. They have competent command, adequate equipment and organization (of troops), // Clearing the minds of analysts
which perhaps does not meet our standards, but has passed the test (of war) // Did the armies of Germany, France and Poland meet the standards?
On the other hand, only about a third of their divisions correspond high level(requirements), others are significantly behind them, and in terms of mobility, all of them, without exception, are significantly inferior to the corresponding allied formations.
8. Inflicting a decisive defeat on Russia in a total war will require, in particular, the mobilization of human resources (allies) in order to counter the current colossal human resources (Russians). This exceptionally long-term project includes:
A) large-scale deployment in Europe of colossal American resources (manpower); // That is, the occupation of Europe. No, the Anglo-Saxons are no worse than Nazi Germany.
b) re-equipment and reorganization of the human resources of Germany and all Western European allies.

Conclusion
9. Our conclusions:
A) if the political goal is to achieve a definite and final result, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of Russia in a total war; // And then democratic happiness will come in Russia.
b) the result of a total war with Russia is unpredictable, one thing can be said with certainty: victory in such a war is a task that will take a very long time.

QUICK SUCCESS
10. However, based on a political assessment (of the situation), it can be concluded that a quick and limited victory will force Russia to accept our terms.
11. Before deciding to initiate hostilities, the following should be considered:
A) If the assessment is wrong and the achievement of any limited goal we set does not force Russia to submit to our terms, we will effectively find ourselves embroiled in an all-out war. // Another clearing up in the brains of Nazi analysts.
b) It is impossible to limit military operations to any one region, and therefore, as they unfold, we will have to reckon with the reality of a global struggle.
c) Even if everything goes according to plan, we will not achieve a final result from a military point of view. Military power Russia will remain unbroken, and the Russians will always be able to resume the conflict at any time appropriate for themselves.
12. Nevertheless, in the event of a willingness, taking into account all the above dangers, to take the risk of limited military action, we have analyzed possible steps to inflict a blow on the Russians that would force them to accept our terms even in a situation where they can avoid a decisive defeat and militarily will still be able to continue the fight.

General strategic situation

13. Of the Russian forces opposing us, the most formidable, of course, is the Red Army. // What smart experts! There is no threat to our bases and ships comparable to the German threat from Russian strategic bombers or submarines, and therefore the main attention should be paid to the strength and deployment of (parts of) the Red Army.
14. Europe. The main forces of the Red Army are concentrated in Central Europe. Although the Russians may occupy Norway as far south as Trondheim and Greece, this will not have a significant impact on the overall strategic situation.
In Europe, the Russians could also occupy Turkey and, using their current dominant position in Southeastern Europe, could blockade the Straits, preventing any possible Allied naval action in the Black Sea. This in itself does not pose an additional threat to us, but Southeastern Europe, including Greece, will immediately be closed to our influence and trade.
15. Middle East. Extremely dangerous situation may occur in Persia and Iraq. It seems quite likely that the Russians will advance into this region in order to seize valuable oil fields and because of the exceptional importance of this region to us. According to our estimates, here against allied forces About 11 Russian divisions can be used as part of three Indian brigade groups. Based on the above, it is difficult to imagine how we will be able to defend these territories, given that the loss of this source of oil supplies could have extremely serious (consequences).
Due to transport difficulties and due to involvement in (the campaign in) Central Europe, it seems unlikely that initial stage(military actions) Russian offensive in the direction of Egypt.
But they will certainly try to provoke unrest in all states of the Middle East // Anglo-Saxons, as they write about themselves.
16. India. Although the Russians will no doubt try to provoke unrest in India // What's the point of this?, the possibility of them carrying out a military action in this region seems doubtful.
17. Far East. In the Far East, any agreement between the Russians and the Japanese will allow the latter to free up forces to strengthen the mother country or to resume the offensive in China. They are unlikely to be able to undertake large-scale operations to regain the territories they have lost. Since, however, decisive operations against Japan, apparently, will have to be postponed; a stalemate may arise in the war with Japan. Russian offensive actions against the allies in the Far East seem unlikely.
18. The above arguments and the current disposition of the main forces lead us to the conclusion that the main theater (of military operations) inevitably becomes Central Europe - with auxiliary (in nature), but extremely important (in terms of consequences) operations in the Persia-Iraq region. // The USSR bombed Berlin already in August 1941, so England and the USA will also become a theater of military operations.
19. In Appendix 1 we analyze the (possibility of conducting a military) campaign in Europe. Key Points of our analysis are summarized below.

Factors influencing our strategy in Eastern Europe
20. First of all, we will have superiority over the Russians in the air and at sea. The latter will allow us to control the Baltic, but this in itself will not play a significant role in achieving rapid success.
21. In the air our advantage will be up to to a certain extent complicated by the fact that our strategic bomber forces will initially have to be based in England - even if intermediate airfields on the continent are used. The grueling workload of the Air Force and long distances that they will have to overcome are unlikely to allow them to be used with the same effectiveness as during the war with Germany.
22. Russian industry is so dispersed that it can hardly be considered a favorable target for air strikes. At the same time, the significant length of Russian communications, apparently, can offer us much more preferable targets (for bombing), especially on. important crossings over water barriers. However, to achieve any effective results, such attacks on communications must be coordinated with the offensive on land.
So, the only means for us to achieve quick (military) success is a land campaign, which allows us to fully use our advantage in the air - both tactical and when striking Russian communications.
2Z. A study of the topographical (map) and general direction of communications indicates that the main efforts of the land offensive should be concentrated in the North (Europe). This provides us with additional advantages, since it allows us to use our naval advantage in the Baltic to cover our left flank and act against the enemy’s right flank.
24. So, the campaign should be carried out in North-East Europe, first of all, by ground forces.

Land campaign in Northeastern Europe
25. Possibility of attracting offensive operations Allied forces will largely be determined by what part of them will be tied up with the need to restore and protect communications in the destroyed areas of Germany.
26. Taking into account this part, as well as the forces necessary to secure the front north to the Dresden-Chemnitz line, we estimate that we have about 47 divisions, including 14 armored divisions, which can be used in offensive operations.
27. The Russians, in response, according to our estimates, will be able to field forces equivalent to 170 Allied divisions, of which 30 divisions are armored. Thus, we will face a power imbalance of approximately two to one in armored forces and four to one - in land.
28. It is difficult to assess the extent to which our advantage in tactical aviation and command and control would help restore the balance (of forces), but given the above-mentioned inequality, launching an offensive would definitely be a risky undertaking. // Anglo-Saxons are so cowardly when the odds are not in their favor
If, in spite of everything, this particular option is chosen, it can be implemented through two main attacks: - northern, along the axis Stettin - Schneidemühl - Bydgoszcz; - southern, along the axis Leipzig - Cottbus - Poznan and Breslau.
29. Basic tank battles most likely to deploy east of the Oder-Neisse line, and the outcome of the campaign may depend on their outcome. If the outcome is favorable, we will probably be able to achieve common line Danzig - Breslau. Any subsequent offensive, however, would mean a stretching of the front line, which must be held during the winter, and an increase in the threat posed by the salient that had taken shape in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bBohemia and Moravia, from which the Russians would not necessarily have to retreat. Consequently, if we fail to win the victory we need west of the Danzig-Breslau line, then it is quite likely that we will actually find ourselves drawn into an all-out war. So, the success of the land campaign will depend on the outcome of the battles west of the above line before the onset of winter cold. Our strategic position is not strong in itself, and in fact, we will be forced to rely on one major battle with an extremely unfavorable balance of forces for us.

CONCLUSIONS
Z1. According to our conclusion:
a) starting a war with the Russians, we must be prepared for a total war, long and expensive at the same time;
b) the numerical superiority of the Russians on land makes the possibility of achieving limited and rapid (military) success extremely doubtful, even if, accordingly political views, this will be consistent with achieving our political goals.

J. Grantham,

J. S. Thompson,

W. A Aowson

Attached:
Appendix I - Evaluation of the Campaign in Europe
Appendix II - Russian forces and their disposition
Appendix III - Allied forces and their disposition
Appendix IV - German Response

Help from the Germans

19. The possibility of German assistance is discussed in Appendix IV; according to calculations, at early stages(military campaign) 10 German divisions can be reorganized and rearmed. However, they should not be counted on by the July 1 deadline. Therefore, although they may be re-formed by the time they participate in hostilities by the fall, we have not included them in our calculations.
20. Reforming a larger German force would be a much more time-consuming undertaking, as it would involve large-scale re-equipment from Allied sources. // So what’s wrong with them being Nazis and killing your citizens?.

History has shown that the cowardice of the Anglo-Saxons allows them to attack only small and defenseless countries - Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, but even there they die like flies and run away. Democratic Anglo-Saxons can only enter into a conspiracy with criminals, who are later removed themselves (Hussein, Bin Laden, Hitler, Gorbachev).