The meaning of the battle for the Caucasus is brief. Operation Edelweiss begins

The Battle of the Caucasus, which lasted 442 days (from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943) and took place simultaneously with the Stalingrad and Kursk battles, played a big role in creating and completing a radical change during the Great Patriotic War. Its defensive stage covers the period from July 25 to December 31, 1942. The Wehrmacht, during fierce battles and suffering heavy losses, managed to reach the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range and the Terek River. However, in general, the German Edelweiss plan was not implemented. German troops were unable to penetrate the Transcaucasus and the Middle East, which should have led to Turkey entering the war on the side of Germany.

Plans of the German command

On June 28, 1942, the Wehrmacht's 4th Panzer Army under the command of Hermann Hoth broke through the Soviet front between Kursk and Kharkov and continued its offensive towards the Don. On July 3, Voronezh was partially captured by German troops, and the troops of S.K. Timoshenko, defending the Rostov direction, were covered from the north. The 4th Tank Army rapidly advanced southward between Donets and Don. On July 23, Rostov-on-Don was captured by the Germans. As a result, the path to the North Caucasus was open.

In the strategic plans of the German military-political leadership, the capture of the Caucasus, where about 90% of Soviet oil was produced before the start of the war, was given a large place. Adolf Hitler understood the limitations of the raw material and energy base of the Third Reich and at a meeting in Poltava in June 1942 he said: “If we fail to capture the oil of Maikop and Grozny, then we will have to stop the war!” In addition, Hitler took into account the importance of the Kuban and the Caucasus as a source of food (grain), and the presence of reserves of strategic raw materials here. In particular, the Tyrnyauz tungsten-molybdenum ore deposit was located here. The plan of the German command on the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1942 provided for delivering the main attack in the Caucasus direction with a simultaneous attack on Stalingrad, an important transport hub and major center military industry. Some researchers believe that this was a strategic miscalculation by Hitler, since the division of limited military forces and resources led to the dispersion of the Wehrmacht, and ultimately to defeat in the Stalingrad and Caucasus directions.

On July 23, 1942, Hitler approved the plan for Operation Edelweiss (German: Operation Edelweiß). It provided for the encirclement and destruction of Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov-on-Don and the capture of the North Caucasus. In the future, one group of troops was supposed to advance bypassing the Main Caucasus Range from the west and capture Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and the second was to advance from the east with the aim of capturing the oil-producing regions of Grozny and Baku. Simultaneously with this roundabout maneuver, the German command planned to break through the Main Caucasus Ridge in its central part in order to reach Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi. With the Wehrmacht's breakthrough South Caucasus, the tasks of destroying the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, establishing complete dominance in the Black Sea, establishing direct contact with the Turkish armed forces and the involvement of Turkey in the war on the side of the Reich, the preconditions were created for an invasion of the Near and Middle East region. In addition, the German command hoped that a number of Caucasian nationalities and Cossacks would support them, which would solve the problem with auxiliary troops. These expectations will be partially met.

To solve such large-scale problems, the German command concentrated a significant strike force in the Caucasian direction. For the attack on the Caucasus, Army Group A was allocated from Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List (Hitler took command on September 10, 1942, and from November 22, 1942 - Colonel General Ewald von Kleist ). It consisted of: 1st Panzer Army - commander Colonel General Ewald von Kleist (until November 21, 1942, then Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen), 4th Panzer Army - Colonel General G. Hoth (first attacked Caucasian direction, then was transferred to Group “B” - to the Stalingrad direction), 17th Field Army - Colonel General Richard Ruoff, 3rd Romanian Army - Lieutenant General Peter Dumitrescu (in September 1942 the army was transferred to Stalingrad direction). Initially, Manstein’s 11th Army was supposed to take part in the attack on the Caucasus, which after the siege of Sevastopol was located in the Crimea, but part of it was transferred to Leningrad, partly divided between Army Group Center and Army Group South. The troops of Army Group A were supported by units of the 4th Air Army of Wolfram von Richthofen (about 1 thousand aircraft in total). In total, by July 25, 1942, the strike force had about 170 thousand soldiers and officers, 15 thousand oil workers, 1,130 tanks (from July 31 - 700 tanks), over 4.5 thousand guns and mortars.

The German troops had high combat effectiveness and had a high morale, which was strengthened by recent high-profile victories. Many Wehrmacht formations took part in the defeat of Red Army units near Kharkov, southwest of Voronezh, in the June battles, when they, moving towards the lower reaches of the Don, immediately gained a foothold on its left bank. In Berlin they were confident of victory; before the battle they even founded oil companies (“Ost-Öl” and “Karpaten-Öl”), which received the exclusive right to 99 years of operation oil fields in the Caucasus. It was prepared a large number of pipes (which later went to the USSR).

Soviet troops

The German troops were opposed by the troops of the Southern Front (Rodion Malinovsky) and part of the forces of the North Caucasus Front (Semyon Budyonny). The Southern Front included the 9th Army - commanded by Major General F. A. Parkhomenko, the 12th Army - Major General A. A. Grechko, the 18th Army - Lieutenant General F. V. Kamkov, the 24th army - Major General D. T. Kozlov, 37th Army - Major General P. M. Kozlov, 51st Army - Major General N. I. Trufanov (on July 28 it was transferred to the Stalingrad Front) and 56- I army - Major General A.I. Ryzhov. Aviation support was provided by the 4th Air Army, Major General of Aviation K. A. Vershinin (since September, Major General of Aviation N. F. Naumenko). At first glance, the composition of the front was impressive, but almost all of these armies, except the 51st, suffered heavy losses in previous battles and were bled dry. The southern front numbered about 112 thousand people; there was a significant lag behind the Germans in technology - 120 tanks, more than 2.2 thousand guns and mortars, 130 aircraft. Thus, the front that received the main attack of the enemy was inferior to the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, in aircraft by almost 8 times, in tanks by more than 9 times, and in guns and mortars by 2 times. To this should be added the lack of a stable system of command and control, which was disrupted during their rapid retreat to the Don. On July 28, 1942, the Southern Front was abolished, its troops entered the North Caucasian Front.

The Red Army was faced with a very difficult task: to stop the enemy’s advance, wear him down in defensive battles and prepare the conditions for launching a counteroffensive. July 10-11, 1942 Headquarters Supreme High Command(SVGK) ordered the Southern and North Caucasian fronts to organize a defensive line along the Don River. However, this order was difficult to carry out, because the troops of the Southern Fleet at that time were fighting heavy battles with the German troops rushing forward in the Rostov direction. The command of the Southern Fleet had neither the time nor significant reserves to prepare defensive positions on the left bank of the Don. By this time, troop control in the Caucasian direction had not been restored. In addition, at this time the SVGK paid closer attention to the Stalingrad direction, the Germans were rushing to the Volga. Under strong enemy pressure, the Southern Front armies retreated to the southern bank of the river by July 25. Don in a strip 330 km long, from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river. They were bleeding, lost a lot of heavy weapons, and some armies had no contact with the front headquarters.

At the same time, it should be noted that there were other troops in the region that also took part in the battle for the Caucasus. The troops of the North Caucasus Front under the command of Marshal Budyonny at this time defended the coasts of the Azov and Black Seas to Lazarevskaya. The SCF included: the 47th Army - under the command of Major General G.P. Kotov, the 1st Rifle and 17th Cavalry Corps. Air support was provided by the 5th Air Army of Aviation Colonel General S.K. Goryunov. Units of the Transcaucasian Front under the command of Ivan Tyulenev defended the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskaya to Batumi, the Soviet-Turkish border and provided communications for the Soviet group in Iran. In addition, units of the Polar Front were located in the Makhachkala region and covered the coast of the Caspian Sea (44th Army). At the beginning of the battle for the Caucasus, the Transcaucasian Front included the 44th Army - Lieutenant General V. A. Khomenko, the 45th Army - Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov, the 46th Army - V. F. Sergatskov (from August K. N. Leselidze) and the 15th Cavalry Corps. The front was reinforced by 14 aviation regiments. At the beginning of August 1942, the 9th, 24th (disbanded on August 28) and 37th armies were transferred to the Polar Fleet, and at the end of August the 58th army was formed. At the beginning of September, several more armies were transferred - the 12th, 18th, 56th. It should be noted that Tyulenev, having received his appointment to the post of commander of the Polar Fleet in February 1942, carried out great job to create defensive lines in case of invasion from Turkey. He insisted on the construction of defensive lines in the area of ​​the Terek River and Grozny, and the defense of the Main Caucasus Range was strengthened in advance. The events of the battle for the Caucasus showed the correctness of the commander’s decision.

After the loss of Sevastopol and Kerch, the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Philip Oktyabrsky was based in the ports of the Caucasian coast, although they were in the zone of operation of the German Air Force. The fleet had the task of interacting with ground forces in protecting coastal areas, ensuring maritime transportation, and also attacking enemy sea communications.

The importance of the Caucasus for the USSR

The Caucasus at that time was of great importance for the country, it was an inexhaustible source of industrial and military-strategic raw materials, and an important food base for the Union. During the years of the Soviet pre-war five-year plans, the industry of the Transcaucasian republics grew significantly, and a powerful industry was created here through the efforts of the people. Hundreds of new heavy and heavy enterprises were built here. light industry. Thus, only in the Baku region for the period from 1934 to 1940. 235 new wells were drilled, and in total, 1,726 new wells were launched in the region by 1940 (about 73.5% of all wells that were commissioned in the USSR during this period of time). The Baku oil-bearing region played a huge role. It provided up to 70% of all-Union oil production. It is clear that only the loss of the Baku region could have a sharply negative impact on the industry of the USSR and its defense capability. Much attention was also paid to the development of oil production in Checheno-Ingushetia and Kuban.

Along with the oil industry, production developed rapidly natural gas. The gas industry of Azerbaijan provided the country with about 2.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 1940, i.e., about 65% of the total gas production of the USSR. The electric power base developed rapidly; before the Great War, new power plants of the all-Union and local significance. Manganese ore, which is of great economic and military-strategic importance, was mined in Georgia. Thus, the Chiatura mines produced 1448.7 thousand tons of manganese ore in 1940, or about 56.5% of the total production of manganese ore in the USSR.

The Caucasus and Kuban were important as one of the food bases of the USSR. The region was one of the richest in the state in the production of wheat, corn, sunflowers and sugar beets. The South Caucasus produced cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, grapes, tea, citrus fruits and essential oil crops. Thanks to the availability of rich feed, livestock farming was developed. On the basis of agricultural products in the pre-war years, the food and light industries were developed. Cotton, silk, weaving, wool, leather and shoe factories, canning factories for processing fruits, vegetables, meat and fish products, wineries and tobacco factories, etc. were erected.

The region was of great importance in terms of communications and foreign trade. Through Caucasus region and its ports on the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea passed big flow goods. In particular, 55% of all exports and 50% of imports of the Soviet Union went through southern, including Caucasian, ports. Communications of the Black and Caspian Seas connected Russia with Persia and Turkey, and through the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea straits with the routes of the World Ocean. It should be noted that during the war, communications that went through the Persian Gulf, Iran and the Caspian Sea took second place in the supply of weapons, equipment, ammunition, food and strategic raw materials from the United States and the territories of its subordinates British Empire. The significance of the Caucasus also lay in its unique geographical position: the Caucasus is located in an important strategic area of ​​the planet, through which trade and strategic routes run, connecting the countries of Europe, Asia, the Near and Middle East into a single hub. We must not forget the mobilization capabilities of the region’s human resources.

North Caucasus strategic defensive operation

On July 23, 1942, the Germans occupied Rostov-on-Don and began an attack on Kuban. The forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies inflicted a strong beat the left flank of the Southern Front, where the defense was held by the 51st and 37th armies. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and retreated. The Germans in the defense zone of the 18th Army broke through to Bataysk. In the defense zone of the 12th Army, things initially were not so good and the Wehrmacht was unable to cross the Don on the first day. On July 26, the 18th and 37th Soviet armies, having received reinforcements, tried to launch a counterattack, but to no avail. As a result, already from the first days of the battle, the situation in the defense zone of the entire Southern Fleet sharply worsened, and there was a threat of German troops entering the Salsk area and cutting Southern Front into two parts and the enemy entering the rear of the Soviet group, which continued to defend south of Rostov. The Soviet command tried to withdraw the troops of the left flank to the line of the southern bank of the Kagalnik River and the Manych Canal. However, units of the Southern Front, in conditions of overwhelming enemy superiority in tank forces, aviation and artillery, were unable to withdraw in an organized manner to the positions indicated by them. The retreat turned into flight. German troops, no longer encountering serious resistance, continued their offensive.

In the critical conditions created, the Supreme Command Headquarters took measures to correct the situation. On July 28, the Southern Front, in order to unite efforts and improve troop control, was disbanded. His armies became part of the North Caucasus fronts under the command of Marshal Budyonny (in fact, the two fronts were united). The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were subordinate to the front command. SCF received the task of stopping the advance of German troops and restoring the position of the front along the left bank of the Don River. But such a task was actually impossible, since the enemy had a strategic initiative and led a well-organized offensive with superior forces and means. It is also necessary to take into account the factor that it was necessary to organize command and control of troops on a strip with a length of over 1 thousand km, and this in the conditions of the collapse of the front and the successful offensive of enemy troops. Therefore, the Headquarters allocated two operational groups within the SCF: 1) the Don group led by Rodion Malinovsky (it included the 37th Army, the 12th Army and the 4th Air Army), it was supposed to cover the Stavropol direction; 2) Primorsky group under the command of Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko (18th Army, 56th Army, 47th Army, 1st Rifle, 17th Cavalry Corps and 5th Air Army, Azov Military Flotilla), one was supposed to defend the Krasnodar direction. In addition, the 9th and 24th armies were withdrawn to the area of ​​Nalchik and Grozny, and the 51st was transferred to the Stalingrad Front. The troops of the Polar Front received the task of occupying and preparing for defense the approaches to the Caucasus Range from the north. The Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front prepared a combat plan, which was approved by the Supreme Command Headquarters on August 4, 1942. Its essence was to stop the advance of German troops at the turn of the Terek and the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. Units of the 44th Army from the Makhachkala and Baku region were transferred to defensive positions on the Terek, Sulak and Samur rivers. It was supposed to defend Grozny, cover the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military roads. At the same time, other parts of the Polar Fleet were transferred from the Soviet-Turkish border and from the Black Sea coast to the Terek and Urukh border. Simultaneously with the transfer of units of the Polar Front to fight German troops, Headquarters replenished the forces of the front from the reserve. Thus, from August 6 to September, the Polar Fleet received 2 guards rifle corps and 11 separate rifle brigades.

At the same time, the German command transferred the 4th Tank Army to the Stalingrad direction as part of Army Group B. Perhaps they thought that the Soviet front in the Caucasus had collapsed and the remaining troops would be sufficient to accomplish the assigned tasks.

The fighting in the Caucasus at the end of July - beginning of August took on an exceptionally fierce and dynamic character. The Germans still had numerical superiority and, possessing the strategic initiative, developed an offensive in the direction of Stavropol, Maikop and Tuapse. On August 2, 1942, the Germans continued their offensive in the Salsk direction, and on August 5 they captured Voroshilovsk (Stavropol). In the Krasnodar direction, the Wehrmacht was unable to immediately break through the defenses of the 18th and 56th armies; Soviet troops tried to counterattack, but soon retreated across the Kuban River. On August 6, the 17th German Army launched a new offensive in the Krasnodar direction. On August 10, the Azov flotilla had to be evacuated from the Azov coast, and Krasnodar fell on August 12.

The German command decided to take advantage of the moment and block Soviet troops south of Kuban. Part of the strike force that captured Stavropol was sent to the west. On August 6, units of the 1st German Tank Army captured Armavir, on August 10 - Maikop and continued to move to Tuapse. Part of the 17th Army, from Krasnodar, also began to advance in the direction of Tuapse. Only by August 15-17 did the Red Army units manage to stop the enemy’s advance and prevent the Wehrmacht from breaking through to Tuapse. As a result, during the first stage of the offensive (July 25 - August 19), the German command was able to partially fulfill the assigned tasks: the Red Army in the Caucasus direction suffered a serious defeat (although there were no large “cauldrons”) and was captured most of Kuban, part of the North Caucasus. Soviet troops were able to stop the enemy only at Tuapse. At the same time, the Soviet command carried out a lot of preparatory work to reorganize the troops, create new defensive lines, transfer troops of the Polar Fleet and the Headquarters reserve, which ultimately led to the failure of the German offensive and victory in the battle for the Caucasus.

Headquarters, in order to restore the combat effectiveness of Soviet troops and ensure the defense of the Caucasus in the northern direction, on August 8 united the 44th and 9th armies into the Northern Group of the Polar Fleet. Lieutenant General Ivan Maslennikov was appointed its commander. On August 11, the 37th Army was included in the Northern Group. In addition, the Headquarters paid great attention to organizing the defense of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. The measures taken already from mid-August 1942 began to have a positive effect on the situation at the front, resistance to the enemy increased sharply.

Despite the measures taken by the Headquarters, the Wehrmacht had sufficient forces to develop a simultaneous offensive both in the direction of Baku and Batumi - by units of the 1st Panzer and 17th field armies, and to capture the passes of the Main Caucasus Range - by units of the 49th Mountain Corps (from the 17th Army). In addition, German troops attacked in the direction of Anapa - Novorossiysk. On August 19, units of the 17th Army went on the offensive in the Novorossiysk direction. The Soviet 47th Army, which held the defense in this direction, was able to repel the first blow. However, on August 28, the Wehrmacht resumed its offensive and captured Anapa on August 31. As a result, the ships of the Azov military flotilla had to break through into the Black Sea.

On August 23, German troops went on the offensive in the Mozdok direction, where the 9th Soviet Army held the defense. On August 25, Mozdok was captured. At the same time, the 23rd Panzer Division attacked Prokhladny and occupied it on August 25. Further attempts to break through along the Prokhladny-Ordzhonikidze line were unsuccessful. Soviet troops, using natural barriers, created a deeply echeloned defensive line. At the beginning of September, German troops began to cross the Terek and occupied a small bridgehead on the southern bank of the river; on September 4, the Germans launched a new offensive with the help of 2 tank and 2 infantry divisions. The Germans had superiority here in artillery by more than 6 times and in tanks by more than 4 times. However great success did not reach, suffering heavy losses due to Soviet air strikes. On September 24th a new beginning began German offensive in this direction. The strike force was reinforced by the 5th SS Viking Panzer Division, which was removed from the Tuapse direction. The Germans advanced in the direction of Ordzhonikidze and along the Prokhladny-Grozny railway along the Sunzha River valley to Grozny. After four days of fierce fighting, German troops captured Terek, Planovskoye, Elkhotovo, Illarionovka, but were unable to get further than Malgobek. The ever-increasing resistance of the Soviet troops and the huge losses suffered in the battles in the area of ​​​​Mozdok, Malgobek and Elkhotovo forced the Wehrmacht to go on the defensive. As a result of the Mozdok-Malgobek defensive operation (September 1-28, 1942), the plans of the German command to capture the Grozny and Baku oil regions were thwarted.

Simultaneously with the fighting in the Grozny direction, a battle broke out in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range. Initially, the battle was clearly not in favor of the Soviet forces - units of the 46th Army of the Polar Fleet, which poorly prepared the defense in the foothills. The Wehrmacht, with the help of units specially trained for combat in mountainous conditions - the 49th Mountain Corps and two Romanian mountain divisions, managed to quickly capture almost all the passes west of Mount Elbrus. On August 16, the Kadar Gorge was captured. On August 21, German climbers hoisted the Nazi flag on Elbrus. This was done by Captain Grot’s detachment from the 1st Mountain Infantry Division “Edelweiss”. Before the war, Grot visited Tyrnyauz and climbed to Elbrus; as a mining engineer, he was able to easily examine the area, providing a detailed report on what he saw. The Edelwes climbers became national heroes in Germany, newspaper headlines shouted: “We are the masters of Europe! The Caucasus has been conquered!..” At the beginning of September, German units occupied the Marukh and Sanchar passes. As a result, there was a threat of German troops reaching Sukhumi and coastal communications.

While German troops stormed the approaches to Grozny, Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz), and the passes of the central part of the Caucasus Range, the battle for Novorossiysk unfolded. The German command planned to capture Novorossiysk and then launch an offensive along the Black Sea coast towards Tuapse - Sukhumi - Batumi. The strike was carried out by a strike force from the forces of the 17th German Army - the 5th Army Corps and the 3rd Romanian Army - a cavalry corps consisting of the 5th, 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions. Already during the operation, the strike force was reinforced by three infantry divisions of the 11th Army, which were transferred across the Kerch Strait.

On August 17, the Soviet command created the Novorossiysk defensive region (NOR) for the defense of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula under the command of Major General G. P. Kotov (since September 8, Major General A. A. Grechko). Commander of the Azov Flotilla, Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, was appointed Kotov’s deputy for naval affairs. The NOR included: the 47th Army, one rifle division from the 56th Army, the Azov military flotilla, Temryuk, Kerch, Novorossiysk naval bases and a combined aviation group (parts of the 237th Air Division and formations of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force) . Measures were taken to create a powerful line of defense, but by the time of the German offensive only a minority of the measures had been implemented. The NOR troops, drained of blood in previous battles, were inferior to the Wehrmacht: in manpower by 4 times, in artillery and mortars by 7 times, in tanks and aviation by 2 times.

On August 19, the Wehrmacht went on the offensive, striking in the direction of the villages of Abinskaya and Krymskaya. Auxiliary strikes were aimed at Temryuk and the Taman Peninsula, where the defense was held by a few Soviet garrisons. After fierce battles, units of the 47th Army and Marines stopped the enemy by August 25, preventing him from capturing Novorossiysk on the move. On August 29, having received reinforcements from the Tuapse direction, the Germans resumed their offensive and, at the cost of heavy losses, captured Anapa on August 31 and reached the coast, cutting off part of the Soviet troops on the Taman Peninsula. On September 3, the surrounded units were evacuated by sea to Gelendzhik. On September 7, Wehrmacht units made their way to Novorossiysk, and fierce street battles broke out. The Germans captured Train Station, elevator and port. By September 11, at the cost of enormous efforts, the enemy was stopped in the southeastern part of the city. The battles for Novorossiysk continued until September 26; in fact, the city was completely destroyed. However, German troops were never able to break through to Tuapse along the coast, and went on the defensive. The plan for an offensive along the Black Sea coast was thwarted.

As a result of the second stage of the German offensive (August 19 - September 29, 1942), German troops won a number of victories, captured the Taman Peninsula, reached the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range, capturing part of its passes. But in general, the Red Army was able to withstand a powerful onslaught and stop the enemy’s advance and prevent him from breaking into the South Caucasus, capturing the regions of Grozny and Baku, and capturing the Black Sea coast from Novorossiysk to Batumi. The balance of forces in the Caucasus gradually began to change in favor of the Red Army. This was facilitated by the transfer of a significant part of the German troops to the Stalingrad direction. The German troops suffered heavy losses in men and equipment, were exhausted by the battles, and partially lost their offensive power.

Headquarters continued to pay great attention to the Caucasus. On August 23, GKO member Lavrentiy Beria arrived from Moscow to Tbilisi. He replaced a number of responsible leaders of the front and army leadership. Measures were taken to improve aviation reconnaissance. A lot of work has been done to equip defensive structures - defense units, strong points, pillboxes, trenches and anti-tank ditches, barriers systems - work to prepare for the collapse of rocks, destruction of roads and their flooding, at the most important passes, on the Ossetian Military and Georgian Military roads . On the main pass routes and roads, commandant's offices were created, which included sappers and radio stations. To counter the enemy's outflanking actions, special detachments were formed, numbering up to a company, reinforced by sappers, who could quickly block a possible enemy breakthrough. Separate mountain rifle detachments were also created, numbering a company - a battalion, with climber instructors; they were sent to the most inaccessible areas; those paths that could not be reliably covered were blown up. On September 1, the Supreme Command Headquarters made an important organizational decision - the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts were united. The united front was called the Transcaucasian Front. The SCF management became the base for the Black Sea Group of the Transcaucasian Front. This significantly increased the stability of the Soviet defense on the coastal sector of the front.

Failure of the German offensive

Tuapse defensive operation (from September 25 to December 20, 1942). The German command, after the failure of operations to break through to the South Caucasus in August - September 1942, decided to use the 17th Army under the command of Colonel General Richard Ruoff (more than 162 thousand people, 2266 guns and mortars, 147 tanks and assault guns and 350 combat aircraft), strike again at Tuapse. The defense here was held by the Black Sea group of Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko (since October, the defense was led by Lieutenant General I. E. Petrov), it included the 18th, 56th and 47th armies, the 5th Air Army ( the strength of the group of troops is 109 thousand people, 1152 guns and mortars, 71 aircraft). In addition, the Tuapse defensive region was created here.

On September 25, after two days of air strikes and artillery bombardment, German troops went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered by the Tuapse group (it included mountain rifle and light infantry units) from Neftegorsk and an auxiliary blow was delivered from Goryachiy Klyuch, the Germans attacked in converging directions towards Shaumyan. The goal of the offensive was to encircle and destroy the 18th Soviet Army, Lieutenant General F.V. Kamkov, blockade the Black Sea Group of Soviet Forces, and deprive the Black Sea Fleet of bases and ports. By September 30, German-Romanian troops were able to penetrate 5-10 km in some areas of the defense of the 18th and 56th armies. There was a threat of the fall of Tuapse. The Soviet command organized a series of counterattacks, and by October 9 the German offensive was stopped. In these battles, the Germans lost more than 10 thousand people.

On October 14, the German Tuapse group resumed its offensive. German troops launched simultaneous attacks on Shaumyan and the village of Sadovoye. On October 17, the Germans captured Shaumyan, the 56th Army was pushed back, and the threat of encirclement of the 18th Army arose. However, the Black Sea group received reinforcements, this changed the balance of forces in this direction, on October 23 the German troops were stopped, and on October 31 they went on the defensive.

The German command brought up reserves and in mid-November the Wehrmacht launched a third offensive in the Tuapse direction, trying to break through to Tuapse through the village of Georgievskoye. The enemy managed to penetrate the defenses of the 18th Army up to 8 km deep. However, this was where the successes of the German-Romanian troops ended. Strong resistance from Soviet troops forced the Germans to stop. Already on November 26, the 18th Army went on the offensive, striking with two strike groups. By December 17, the German-Romanian group in this direction was defeated and thrown back across the Pshish River. Aviation played a major role in these battles - aircraft of the 5th Air Army shot down and destroyed 131 enemy aircraft at airfields, and took an active part in the operation coastal artillery, Black Sea Fleet and Marines. As a result of this operation, the Germans' attempt to break through to Tuapse was thwarted, the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive along the entire front of the Black Sea Group of the Transcaucasian Front.

Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze defensive operation (October 25 - November 12, 1942). By October 25, the German command was able to secretly regroup the 1st Tank Army and concentrate its main forces (two tank and one motorized divisions) in the Nalchik direction. The Germans planned to capture Ordzhonikidze and then develop an offensive in the direction of Grozny - Baku and along the Georgian Military Road to Tbilisi.

Here the defense was held by the Northern Group of Forces of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov: the 9th, 37th, 44th and 58th armies, two separate rifle corps and one cavalry corps. The group was supported from the air by the 4th Air Army. The command of the Northern Group missed the enemy's preparations for the attack, although the reconnaissance of the 9th and 37th armies reported suspicious movements of enemy troops. They believed that the Germans were strengthening their defensive formations. At this time, the Soviet command itself was preparing a counteroffensive in the Malgobek-Mozdok direction (in the sector of the 9th Army), where the main forces and reserves were concentrated. On the Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze line, the defense was held by the 37th Army, weakened by previous battles and lacking tanks. Therefore, the German command was able to create a huge superiority in forces in the 6-kilometer breakthrough section: 3 times in manpower, 10 times in guns and mortars; the Soviet side had no tanks at all.

On the morning of October 25, after powerful air and artillery preparation, German troops went on the offensive. The defense of the 37th Army was broken through: on October 28, the Germans captured Nalchik, and on November 2, they broke through the outer line of the Ordzhonikidze defensive region, capturing Gizel (a suburb of Ordzhonikidze) by the end of the day. To stabilize the situation, the Soviet command transferred some troops from the Grozny region to the Ordzhonikidze direction. On November 3-4, the Germans concentrated up to 150 tanks in the Gisel area and tried to build on their success, but were unsuccessful. On November 5, Soviet troops with their counterattacks forced the Wehrmacht to go on the defensive.

For German troops in the Gisel area, there was a threat of encirclement. The Soviet command took advantage of this moment and launched a counteroffensive on November 6, trying to block the Gisela group. On November 11, Gisel was liberated, the German group was defeated and was thrown back across the Fiagdon River. It was not possible to encircle the German troops, but the last attempt of the Wehrmacht to break through to Grozny, Baku and the South Caucasus was thwarted.

After the completion of the Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze defensive operation, the Soviet command organized a counter-offensive in the Mozdok direction. On November 13, units of the 9th Army went on the offensive. But they failed to break through the defenses of the German troops; Soviet troops were only able to wedge themselves into the German formations for several kilometers, reaching the eastern bank of the Ardon and Fiagdon rivers. At the end of November and beginning of December 1942, the troops of the 9th Army repeated offensive attempts, but they were also unsuccessful. As a result, the offensive in the Mozdok direction was postponed until early January 1943.

Results of the defensive stage of the battle for the Caucasus

During the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus, which took place from July to December 1942, the Wehrmacht achieved great success: the rich agricultural regions of the Don and Kuban, the Taman Peninsula, part of the North Caucasus were captured, they reached the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range, capturing part of the passes. Overall, however, the German Edelweiss plan was a failure. German troops were unable to capture the oil-producing areas of Grozny and Baku, break through into Transcaucasia, or occupy the Black Sea coast right up to the Turkish border, establishing direct contact with Turkish troops. Türkiye never took the side of Germany. The German-Romanian troops suffered heavy losses - about 100 thousand people, the strike force was exsanguinated. Soviet troops completed their main task - they stopped the enemy advance in all directions. German troops were stopped east of Mozdok, on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz), on the passes of the Main Range, in the southeastern part of Novorossiysk. German-Romanian troops were driven back from Tuapse.

One of the main reasons why the German offensive in the Caucasus did not achieve its goals was the dispersal of forces. The German military-political leadership began to pay more attention to the battle for Stalingrad, where the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Romanian Army were transferred. In December, due to the defeat German group near Stalingrad, several more German military formations were withdrawn from the Caucasian direction, which further weakened Army Group A. As a result, by the beginning of 1943, Soviet troops surpassed the Wehrmacht in the Caucasus in numbers, both in personnel and in equipment and weapons.

It is also necessary to take into account the factor of the enormous attention of the Headquarters and the General Staff to the Caucasus; it also played a big role in the failure of the plans of the German command. Much attention was paid to restoring the stability of the command and control system and measures to improve it. In addition, despite the difficult situation in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the VKG Headquarters constantly strengthened the Caucasian direction with fresh troops. From July to October 1942 alone, about 100 thousand marching reinforcements, a significant number of military units, special units, equipment and weapons were transferred to the Caucasian Front.

It should be noted that the battles in the Caucasus took place under specific conditions mountainous terrain, which required the Red Army soldiers to master special forms and ways to fight the enemy. The organization of formations and units was improved, and special mountain detachments were created. The units were reinforced with sapper units, engineering equipment, mining equipment, transport, including pack vehicles, and received more radio stations. During the battles with the enemy, the interaction of ground forces with ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla received great development. The ships covered the ground forces from the flanks, supported defenses and attacks with naval and coastal artillery fire, and carried out anti-landing measures. The crews formed marine units that covered themselves with immortal glory in the battles for the Caucasus. In addition, the Black Sea Fleet, Azov, Volga and Caspian military flotillas played a large role in the delivery of reinforcements, military cargo, evacuation of the wounded, civilians and material assets. Thus, in the second half of 1942, ships and vessels transported more than 200 thousand people and 250 thousand tons of various cargo. Soviet sailors sank 51 enemy ships with a total displacement of 120 thousand tons.

In November 1942, the offensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht in the Caucasus were significantly depleted, and the activity of the Red Army, on the contrary, increased. A turning point came during the battle for the Caucasus. The strategic initiative in the Caucasian sector of the Soviet-German front began to pass into the hands of the Soviet command.

VO, Samsonov Alexander

Significant forces were devoted to the construction of defensive lines in the main directions of the upcoming enemy attacks: on the Transcaucasian front, the number of engineering troops increased by 6-7 times compared to the beginning of August, in addition, the local population was mobilized for the construction of fortifications. Significant forces were also allocated from the General Headquarters reserve. By mid-August 1942, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front regrouped their forces and organized the defense of the Caucasus from the north. A second line of defense was created along the Terek and Urukh rivers, on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. Special attention was given to covering the Baku direction and the approaches to Grozny.

At this stage of the operation, according to the Edelweiss plan, the fascist German command intended to seize Transcaucasia, bypassing the Main Caucasian ridge from the west and east and at the same time overcoming it from the north through the passes, and thus reaching the border with Turkey and Iran. Although these countries were not formally on the side of the Hitler coalition, in 1942 there was a real threat that Turkish troops would invade the Caucasus if German units successfully advanced. And in Iran, the Reich, as best it could, supported and intensified anti-Soviet sentiments. Additionally, the Germans made a lot of efforts to sow discord among the Caucasian peoples in the region and play on separatist sentiments.

The enemy launched an attack on the Caucasus in three directions at once:

1) to Novorossiysk;
2) along the Black Sea coast in the direction of Anapa - Poti - Batumi;
2) through the Main Caucasus Range to Sukhumi, Kutaisi, Grozny and Baku. Thus, the fighting moved from the plains of the Don and Kuban to the foothills of the Caucasus.

In the first half of August, German troops advanced into the Caucasian Mineral Waters region. On August 11, the enemy occupied Cherkessk and established control over the bridge across the Kuban River located there. Without encountering strong resistance, the enemy rushed to the passes of the central part of the Main Caucasus Range and soon the advanced German detachments were already at the foot of the mountains. The path to the passes from Sancharo to Elbrus was open.

On August 14, the advanced units of the German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps of the Edelweiss Mountain Division entered into battle with small units of the 46th Army covering the passes in the central and western parts of the Main Caucasus Range. Germanic alpine arrows were recruited from the best climbers and skiers, had special mountain equipment and weapons, warm uniforms, and pack transport - mules. They could move quickly in the mountains, climb glaciers and snowy passes, while our fighters did not always have necessary equipment and weapons, in addition, many of them were in the mountains for the first time. Defending the passes proved to be a difficult task. Not all officers knew the peculiarities of combat operations in the mountains.

By August 15, separate German units had already captured passes and bases near Elbrus, their further goal was the Baksan Gorge, along which our units were retreating, and through which it was possible to reach the Soviet rear.

West of Elbrus, due to poorly organized defense, on August 17 the Germans occupied the Klukhor Pass, which became known to the headquarters of the 46th Army only on the third day. At the end of August 1942, L.P. Beria arrived from Moscow to Tbilisi to organize the defense of the passes After assessing the situation and removing the officers who had erred, he created an operational group of NKVD troops, the leadership of which he entrusted to General Petrov. On the main directions of the enemy's advance were placed rifle divisions internal troops of the NKVD. To staff army units with fighters capable of navigating difficult mountain environments, climbers and skiers began to be sent from all over the country to the Transcaucasian Front. However, the troops still experienced great difficulties in transporting ammunition, food and equipment. It took time to achieve any results.

On the night of August 17, a detachment of German military climbers set off from the Hotyu-tau pass to the slopes of Elbrus to the “Shelter of the Eleven” and to the meteorological station. From there, on August 21, a group of German alpine riflemen under the command of Captain Grot climbed to Elbrus and hoisted the division flag on both its peaks. However, instead of gratitude, the German climbers received a penalty. The fact is that Hitler wanted to see a flag with a swastika on the highest peak in Europe. They had no choice but to rise again to a height of 5,642 meters and plant the desired flag.

A little to the west, other units of the German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps were already fighting with Soviet troops on the southern slopes of the Klukhor Pass. By the end of the month, the enemy reached the northern slopes of the Marukh Pass and captured the Umporg Pass. Heavy bloody battles were fought at the Sancharsky Pass. On September 5, 1942, the Nazis captured the Marukh Pass with a surprise attack from three sides.

Only by the end of September 1942, having pulled up significant forces to the passes, the command of the Transcaucasian Front managed to stabilize the situation. Positional mountain battles began, which with varying success continued until the end of December 1942. Our troops never managed to knock down the German mountain riflemen and rangers from the passes. In turn, the commander of the 49th German Corps, General Conrad, no longer had the strength to continue the offensive and break through to Transcaucasia.

On August 23, German troops launched an offensive on Mozdok with the goal of breaking through to the oil-bearing regions of Grozny and Makhachkala. This area was to be defended by the 1st Tank, 4th Air, 37th and 9th armies. The soldiers and commanders showed unparalleled tenacity, heroism and courage.

Defense of the Caucasus (Battle for the Caucasus) is a major defensive-offensive operation of Soviet troops during the second period of the Great Patriotic War in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.

The operation took place in two stages: from July 25 to December 31, 1942, an offensive was carried out by the German army, which managed to capture part of the territories; from December 31 to October 9, 1943, Soviet troops, launching a counteroffensive, forced the Nazis to retreat and recaptured the territories captured by the enemy.

By the beginning of autumn, the enemy had conquered most of Kuban and the North Caucasus, but after the Battle of Stalingrad, the Nazis retreated because they suffered significant losses. They were afraid that they would be surrounded. But, unfortunately, the operation planned by the Soviet High Command, as a result of which the enemy was to be surrounded and defeated on the territory of the Kuban, failed, and the Nazis were evacuated to the Crimea.

The situation on the eve of the battle

The German command, seeing that Soviet troops, after unsuccessful battles near Kharkov, could not provide a worthy rebuff, decided to attack the Caucasus. The capture of the Caucasus, as well as Ukraine, was very important for the enemy, since the Caucasus and Kuban contained large reserves of oil and grain, which could provide the enemy with significant support for further military operations on the territory of the Soviet Union. It should also be noted that Hitler hoped that having reached the sea, he would be able to turn to Turkey for help.

After Rostov-on-Don was captured by the enemy, our Headquarters could communicate with the Caucasus only by sea or by railway, which passed through Stalingrad. However, the Germans suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, so later they were never able to conquer the Caucasus, since they suffered significant losses on the Volga.

From battle to battle

During the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus, Hitler's army captured cities such as Stavropol, Armavir, Maikop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok. Part of Novorossiysk was also captured. However, in September 1942, in the Malgobek area, the enemy met resistance from Soviet troops and was stopped by them. During the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus, the enemy managed to approach the foothills of the Caucasus Range and the Terek River. However, the Soviet army was able to stop this offensive in time; the Nazis suffered significant losses here; in fact, most of the German army was destroyed. Hitler's hopes for help from Turkey were also not realized.

The second part of the battle for the Caucasus was a counter-offensive by Soviet troops. They not only recaptured territories previously captured by the enemy, but also completely liberated North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Rostov Region, Stavropol Territory and other areas. Oil and grain reserves were again ours, and this gave a huge advantage during military operations.

But still, despite the serious successes of our troops, the main goal that Stalin set for the Soviet army - to capture and destroy the Germans in the Kuban - was not achieved. The Germans relocated to Crimea, but the Caucasus became ours again.

The meaning and results of the battle for the Caucasus

The significance and results of the battle for the Caucasus are great. The Soviet army not only began to return occupied territories and captured people, but also very noticeably strengthened its power. Now she could engage in battles with the enemy on equal terms. The liberation of such an important strategic region as the Caucasus is one of the greatest victories of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. The further victorious march of our army, now to the West, began precisely with the victory at Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus.

1942, Defense of the Caucasus
The situation in the Caucasus in July 1942 and measures to strengthen the defense of the Caucasus

The Caucasus is an important economic region. On the eve of the war, a large fuel and energy base was created here. The North Caucasus and Transcaucasia accounted for 86.5 percent of all-Union oil production, 65 percent of natural gas, and 56.5 percent of manganese ore. The Baku region provided almost three-quarters of all oil produced in the USSR. The Caucasus is a rich agricultural region.

The geographical location of the Caucasus determines its strategic importance. In the pre-war period, significant foreign trade turnover of the Soviet Union was carried out through the Caucasus and ports on the Black and Caspian Seas. During the war, trade routes passing through the Persian Gulf, Iran, and the Caspian Sea occupied second place after the Northern Sea Route in the supply of weapons and strategic raw materials from the United States and the countries of the British Empire.

By the summer of 1942, with the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other areas, the economic base of the Soviet Union had narrowed sharply: steel production had decreased by more than 10 million tons per year; grain harvest - more than three times; mobilization resources decreased due to the enemy occupation of the unit Soviet territory. In the current conditions, the defense of the Caucasus acquired for Soviet state vital. The Soviet Supreme High Command entrusted it to the troops of the Southern, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts.

During the period of deterioration of the situation on the Don, Headquarters demanded that the troops, and above all the command of the Southern Front, prevent the enemy from crossing to the left bank of the river. By a directive dated July 22, 1942, the commander of the Southern Front was tasked with immediately occupying the southern bank of the Don from Konstantinovsky to Bataysk. All units of the North Caucasus Front defending in this sector were transferred to the subordination of the commander of the Southern Front, under his leadership the aviation of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts was united, which was entrusted with the task of destroying enemy crossings from Konstantinovsky to the mouth of the Don. The line of defense along the banks of the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Konstantinovsky was (exclusively) occupied by troops of the 51st Army of the North Caucasus Front, which from July 25 were transferred to the Southern Front. The actions of the troops of this army were supported from the air by aviation of the 8th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front.

Thus, from July 25, the troops of the Southern Front under the command of General R. Ya. Malinovsky occupied defense along the left bank of the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Azov. The front included seven combined arms armies. All of them were small in number and totaled about 112 thousand people, 121 tanks, 2,160 guns and mortars. In the first echelon of the front, the width of which was about 320 km, there were the 51st, 37th, 12th and 18th armies. After the battles for Rostov, the 56th Army was withdrawn to the second echelon. The front reserve consisted of rifle and cavalry divisions located in the 37th Army zone in the area west of the Vesely village, as well as the remnants of the 9th and 24th armies, weakened in the battles for Donbass, which were concentrated in the Salsk region. The front troops were supported by the 4th Air Army under the command of General K. A. Vershinin, which had 130 aircraft.

The southern front was tasked with destroying the enemy who had broken through to the left bank of the Don, and, having restored the situation, firmly occupying the defense from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Azov. Subsequent events showed that such a task was beyond the capabilities of the Southern Front: the armies of the left wing numbered only 17-20 thousand people. Only the 51st Army, whose defense front reached 170 km, had 40 thousand people. All this did not allow us to achieve the necessary density of forces and means in defense. The armies were stretched along the front and did not have the opportunity to create strong second echelons and reserves. There was also not enough artillery. There was not a single gun left in the artillery units of the 37th Army; there was a shortage of ammunition. The army's artillery had from 0.3 to 3 rounds of ammunition for anti-tank guns, up to 3 rounds of ammunition for guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, and up to 1 round of ammunition for mortars. There were not enough hand grenades and rifle cartridges. Due to a lack of fuel, the aviation of the 4th Air Army was forced to sharply reduce the number of combat sorties.

The armies of the first echelon of the front went over to the defensive hastily, under continuous attacks superior forces the enemy and occupied lines that were not fully prepared in engineering terms. Only in the zone of the 51st Army was it possible to prepare the defensive line by 50-60 percent. Engineering structures on the front from Tsimlyanskaya to the Sea of ​​Azov, previously built by the forces of the North Caucasus Military District, were flooded during the spring floods, and many of them could not be used by the retreating troops.

A difficult situation has arisen regarding logistics. The planned supply was disrupted. The troops received food mainly from local resources. During the withdrawal, control of formations and units was disrupted, communications were often interrupted: there was no wired communication, and the radio was not always used skillfully.

The responsible task was assigned to the troops of the North Caucasus Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. The front included the 47th Army, the 1st Separate Rifle Division and the 17th Cavalry Corps. They defended the northeastern and eastern coasts of the Azov and Black Seas from Azov to Lazarevsky. The 5th Air Army of the front, commanded by General S.K. Goryunov, had only about 100 aircraft. The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were promptly subordinate to the front.

The Transcaucasian Front, commanded by General I.V. Tyulenev, defended the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskoye to Batumi and the border with Turkey. Part of his troops were stationed in Northern Iran and covered the Iranian-Turkish border. The front included the 45th and 46th armies and the 15th cavalry corps. In the Makhachkala region, the newly formed 44th Army covered the Baku direction from the north. Front aviation consisted of 14 regiments with 164 serviceable combat aircraft. In addition, 3 reserve aviation regiments and 8 aviation schools, which had only 232 serviceable combat aircraft.

By the beginning of the battle for the Caucasus, the formations of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts were not fully staffed. There were also no necessary reserves. The commander of the Transcaucasian Front had in his reserve an infantry division, a tank brigade and four artillery and mortar regiments. Therefore, in the directive of July 8, 1942, the Headquarters demanded that the commanders of the troops of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts “...use all opportunities to create reserves using internal resources..., having them on prepared defensive lines or in anti-tank areas and in advance aiming for a counterattack in the directions where the enemy is most likely to appear.”

The Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, despite the losses suffered in the first year of the war, maintained superiority in ships. However, with the loss of Sevastopol - the main naval base on the Black Sea - and the Crimean Peninsula, the situation for the Black Sea Fleet became significantly more complicated. The fleet began to be based at the Caucasian ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Poti, which had a small ship repair base, while many ships needed urgent repairs. The relocation of German aviation to Crimea allowed it to attack ships and naval bases of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the Black Sea Fleet aviation was forced to use poorly equipped Caucasian airfields and even unpaved sites, which limited its use, especially in rainy weather. There was an acute shortage of fighter aircraft to provide reliable cover for ships operating at sea. The Azov military flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, together with the ground forces, carried out the task of defending the eastern coast of the Sea of ​​Azov.

By July 25, 1942, fascist troops advancing in the Caucasian direction reached the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river. The enemy managed to capture bridgeheads in the areas of Tsimlyanskaya, Nikolaevskaya, Razdorskaya and Bataysk. Capturing the bridgeheads and the presence of a strong group, much superior to the Soviet troops in the Lower Don, allowed the German command to launch an offensive operation to capture the Caucasus virtually without pause. The plan for the operation called “Edelweiss” was contained in OKB Directive No. 45 of July 23, 1942.

The implementation of the plan was entrusted to Army Group A, whose troops were commanded by Field Marshal General V. List. It consisted of the 1st Tank Army (eleven divisions), the 4th Tank Army (three tank divisions), the 17th Army (fifteen divisions, infantry and cavalry brigades), the 3rd Romanian Army (seven divisions) and the in Crimea the 11th Army (fifteen divisions).

The 17th Army, 1st and 4th Tank Armies operated in the first echelon against the Southern Front from Verkhne-Kurmoyarsk to the mouth of the Don. The enemy group consisted of 167 thousand people, 1130 tanks, 4540 guns and mortars, up to 1 thousand combat aircraft of the 4th air fleet. The enemy achieved significant superiority over the troops of the Southern Front: in personnel - 1.5 times; guns and mortars - 2.1; tanks - 9.3; on airplanes - 7.7 times.

The enemy's main strike group, consisting of three tank corps (40, 3 and 57), acted against the troops of the center of the Southern Front in the Salsk direction.

The immediate task of Army Group A was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov and Novocherkassk. It was planned to launch two strikes in converging directions on Tikhoretsk: the main one - with large forces of tank and mechanized formations of the 1st and 4th Tank Armies from bridgeheads in the Konstantinovsky and Tsimlyanskaya areas, auxiliary - with the forces of the 17th Army after crossing the Don near Rostov and from the bridgehead in the Bataysk region.

After the capture of the North Caucasus, the enemy planned to develop an offensive on Tuapse and Batumi in order to enter Transcaucasia and deprive the Black Sea Fleet of its bases. The Nazi offensive in this direction was facilitated by the 42nd Army Corps of the 11th Army, which was supposed to strike through the Kerch Strait to Krasnodar and Novorossiysk.

Mountain and ranger divisions were given the task of crossing the Kuban River, capturing the areas of Maykop, Armavir, the mountain passes of the western part of the Main Caucasus Range and advancing into Transcaucasia.

The 1st and 4th tank armies with the main forces were supposed to advance through the Stavropol region to Grozny, Makhachkala and capture the Baku oil region. Part of the forces was planned to take passes through the Main Caucasian ridge on the Ossetian Military and Georgian Military roads with subsequent access to Transcaucasia.

Thus, at the first stage of the operation according to the Edelweiss plan, the fascist German command intended to capture the North Caucasus, and at the second - Transcaucasia, bypassing the Main Caucasian ridge from the west and east and at the same time overcoming it from the north through the passes. The Wehrmacht command hoped to force Turkey to enter the war with the Soviet Union by leaving its troops in Transcaucasia. At the same time, the fascists pinned great hopes on the fact that they would be able to quarrel the peoples of the Caucasus, destroy their friendship with the Russians and other fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union, and use this to strengthen their dominance in the Caucasus.

Ensuring the offensive of the troops of the left wing of Army Group “A” was entrusted to Army Group “B”, which was striking at Stalingrad. After capturing the city, part of its tank and motorized troops was supposed to advance along the Volga with the task of reaching Astrakhan and paralyzing movement along the river. The right wing of the troops of Army Group A was supported by naval forces located on the Black Sea. Their task was to provide ground forces with passage through the Kerch Strait and deprive the Soviet fleet of the opportunity to strike at German troops advancing along the coast in the south. east direction. General Staff naval forces Germany was also tasked with preparing light ships for transfer to the Caspian Sea to disrupt sea communications.

The existing superiority in tanks and artillery allowed the German command to create large attack groups in certain directions, primarily tank ones, and, in the event of a breakthrough in the defense, to conduct an offensive at a high tempo, especially in the North Caucasus. Big advantage The enemy in the conduct of combat operations both on land and at sea was superiority in aviation. Due to the small number of fighter aircraft in the air armies of the Southern and North Caucasus fronts and weak air defense, enemy aircraft often acted with impunity.

The unfavorable balance of forces for the Soviet troops was aggravated by the difficulties of logistical support for the formations operating in the Caucasian direction. In the summer of 1942, the country's industry could not yet fully satisfy the needs of the Soviet army. It has just completed its transition to military production. The lack of fuel, food, and technical equipment made it impossible to quickly make up for losses. In addition, a large amount of military equipment, weapons and ammunition was required for the armies operating in the Stalingrad direction, which was turning into the center of the struggle on the Soviet-German front.

The rear units and institutions of the Southern Front suffered heavy losses in vehicles when withdrawing from Donbass and crossing the Don. Supplying troops from the rear of the country became more difficult. Railways, connecting the Caucasus with the center of the country, were cut by the enemy. The railway communications of the Stalingrad direction carried out the supply of reserves to the Stalingrad area and the evacuation of material assets from the North Caucasus. The ports on the Caspian Sea were not suitable for loading and unloading military equipment. All this slowed down transportation from Astrakhan, Guryev, Krasnovodsk to the ports of the western coast of the Caspian Sea by more than 1.5-2 times.

The delivery of the necessary funds to the front was made difficult by the accumulation of a huge number of people on highways and railways, bridges and ferries, at railway stations of the North Caucasus, as well as industrial equipment, agricultural products and livestock evacuated deep into the Caucasus from the regions of the Don, Kuban and Stavropol. Road and horse-drawn transport mobilized from the national economy was not used effectively enough for the transportation of goods.

Preparation of the territory of the Caucasus as a theater of military operations began before the Great Patriotic War and continued throughout 1941.

The Supreme High Command's directive of October 2, 1941 demanded that the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District immediately begin organizing the defense of the Caucasus from the north, building fortified field lines on the Taman Peninsula and strengthening the defense of the Black Sea bases and ports from land. On October 9, she indicated specific defense lines that should be built by November 25. On November 22, Headquarters once again drew the attention of the district command to accelerating the construction of defensive lines, primarily on the Taman Peninsula and in the areas of fleet bases and ports on the Black Sea coast. She demanded “defensive work in the port areas... to be carried out not only from the sea, but also from land, having coordinated the defense system with representatives of the Navy.”

Back in November - December 1941, the construction of field fortified lines began on the Lower Don from Nizhnechirskaya to Azov, along the Kuma and Manych rivers. However, there were shortcomings in the preparation of defensive lines in the North Caucasus before the spring of 1942: engineering work unfolded slowly; the main positions of the defensive lines were chosen in the floodplains of the Lower Don and Kuban rivers; in the spring they were flooded with water, as a result of which some of the structures collapsed and their restoration was delayed until mid-summer; the work was carried out on a wide 700-kilometer front, which scattered the already insignificant forces and resources of the district; not enough attention was paid to creating a deeply layered defense in the most important operational areas.

In the spring and especially early summer of 1942, when the Nazi troops were getting closer to Rostov and there was an immediate threat of an enemy attack on the Caucasus from the north, Headquarters and the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District (from May 19, 1942 - North-Caucasus Military District) Caucasian Front) took more decisive measures to strengthen the defense of the North Caucasus.

On April 3, the territory of the North Caucasus was divided into eleven combat areas. The defense of each of them was entrusted to the formations, units and military institutions stationed within the boundaries of these areas. IN regional centers and militarily important settlements in the district, 138 fighter battalions were formed, mainly from those liable for military service who received a deferment from conscription. The main task of the battalions was to, in cooperation with units and units of the NKVD troops and police, eliminate possible enemy airborne assaults and sabotage groups.

In order to create a deeply layered defense from the north, in May the construction of defensive lines began between the Don and Kuban, along the Terek and on the external defensive contours around Tikhoretsk, Voroshilovsk (Stavropol), Grozny, Mineralnye Vody and Krasnodar. On June 16, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front decided to equip 580 battalion defense areas on these lines. However, by the beginning of hostilities in the North Caucasus, there were less than one third of the planned number. Significant disadvantages of the defensive lines were their poor anti-tank preparation and insufficient camouflage.

On July 19, the General Staff pointed out to the headquarters of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts the shortcomings in the organization of defense, the lack of proper management of engineering work and low quality prepared lines. The directive noted that the troops are slowly restoring flooded structures on the Lower Don; units and formations do not have close contacts with local authorities, which also slows down the conduct of defensive work.

In order to organize defense in the Stavropol direction, the commander of the Southern Front troops on July 23 set the task of the 8th Engineer Army, consisting of 8 engineer brigades and 19 construction battalions, to build a line along the banks of the Sal, Susat, and Podpolnaya rivers by July 28. The 25th Defense Construction Directorate was supposed to prepare a line along the southern bank of the Manych Canal, along the Manych and Nizhny Don rivers. To protect large administrative and industrial centers, it was planned to create special defensive regions: Makhachkala, Grozny, Ordzhonikidze. The bulk of the troops in these areas were NKVD divisions. Improvement of the borders on the coast of the Taman Peninsula continued.

At the same time, the defense of the Main Caucasus Range and the Baku direction was strengthened: formations and units of the 46th and 44th armies built fortifications on the roads and passes; The main forces of the 44th Army prepared lines in the Baku direction along the Terek and Sulak rivers, equipped Derbent and Samur positions and built two intermediate lines.

Despite the measures taken, the defensive lines in the North Caucasus and the Main Caucasus Ridge were not ready for the start of the battle due to lack of time. Engineering and construction work had to be carried out during the battle under the continuous influence of aviation and strong tank and mechanized enemy groups.

To strengthen the defense of the Caucasus, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command carried out other measures. New formations and units were formed in the Transcaucasian Military District, which on May 1, 1942 was again renamed the Transcaucasian Front. Air defense strengthened the most important objects and industrial regions of the Caucasus. Based on the resolution of the State Defense Committee, adopted on November 9, 1941, the Rostov, Krasnodar and Grozny divisional air defense regions were formed. In April 1942, due to the increased threat of air raids, the Baku Air Defense Corps was transformed into the Baku Air Defense Army under the command of General P. M. Beskrovnov. However, the cover of these objects by fighter aircraft was insufficient. On August 1, there was only one fighter aviation regiment to solve the air defense problems of Grozny and Krasnodar. The Baku Air Defense Army consisted of 5 fighter aviation regiments.

With the arrival of fascist troops on the Don, the question arose about the evacuation of material assets from the North Caucasus. In a short period of time, with the active participation of the population, a huge amount of national economic property, industrial equipment and food were removed. Equipment from oil fields and oil refineries was evacuated first. It was sent to the Volga region, Bashkiria and Central Asia to expand oil production and refining in these areas. Crude oil from Maykop was transported to Grozny oil refineries, and from there the finished products went directly to the front.

The oil workers of Baku found themselves in the most difficult conditions. Oil export became possible only through the Caspian Sea. But there were not enough tankers, and the Caspian Shipping Company could not cope with such a task. There were also not enough oil storage tanks. Despite this, its extraction continued, and the mountain hollows were turned into unique storage facilities.

Agricultural workers worked selflessly to harvest a rich harvest in a timely manner. Work in the fields did not stop until the enemy approached. The grain was sent in trains to the rear of the country, transferred to the troops of the Soviet army and partly to workers and collective farmers. Bread reserves were created for partisan detachments. Tractors and combines, free from harvesting, were driven under their own power into the depths of the Caucasus. The cattle were taken to the foothills; The horse train was sent mainly to staff the cavalry, artillery and rear units of the Soviet army.

The evacuation of material assets was carried out by the Caspian Merchant Shipping Company and ships of the Caspian Military Flotilla. The bulk of cargo was sent through the Makhachkala, Baku, and Astrakhan ports to Guryev and Krasnovodsk. However, due to the lack of transport, the constant impact of enemy aircraft, as well as his rapid advance, it was not possible to remove everything. The remaining material assets were destroyed: the engines of tractors and combines were disabled, grain was burned in the fields and barns, industrial equipment was destroyed, oil wells, oil pumping compressors, railway depots and other structures were rendered unusable.

The approaching danger rallied the Soviet people and made everyone want to give all their strength to defeat the enemy. Under the leadership of the Ordzhonikidze regional party committee, whose first secretary was M. A. Suslov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and the Krasnodar regional party committee, headed by the first secretary P. I. Seleznev, local party and Soviet bodies prepared the underground and formed partisan detachments. As a result of their continuous painstaking work together with the command and political bodies fronts, the combat unity of the front and rear was created. Through the heroic efforts of fighters, commanders and workers, all measures were taken to bleed, stop, and then defeat the hordes Nazi invaders.

The beginning of the battle for the Caucasus. North Caucasus defensive operation

The defensive battle in the North Caucasus began on July 25, 1942 at the turn of the Don River in the zone from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth. Nazi troops, with the support of aviation and artillery, began to implement the Edelweiss plan. Fighting between the Don and the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range continued until August 17.

Fierce fighting broke out in the center of the Southern Front, where the troops of the left flank of the 51st and 37th armies defended. Tank and mechanized units of the enemy’s 4th and 1st tank armies were advancing here.

The 51st Army, under the command of General T.K. Kolomiets, bravely met the enemy and successfully repelled attacks during the day.

A very difficult situation was created in the defense zone of the 37th Army, commanded by General P. M. Kozlov. When it retreated to the left bank of the Don, many units and subunits, as well as the civilian population, accumulated at the crossings. Due to the insufficient number of anti-aircraft artillery and aviation, the crossings were not reliably covered. Therefore, enemy aircraft acted with impunity. Nazi troops managed to break through to the area of ​​Nizhny and Verkhny Solenye.

In the area of ​​the village of Aksayskaya, the enemy tried to cross the Don and advance on Olginskaya. Here, two motorized, one tank divisions and two tank regiments operated against the small units of the 12th Army, commanded by General A. A. Grechko. However, all attempts by the Nazis to cross the Don were thwarted.

In the zone of the 18th Army of General F.V. Kamkov, the enemy managed to break through to Bataysk.

Despite the steadfastness and courage of soldiers and officers, the troops of the Southern Front were unable to detain further promotion superior enemy forces. The 1st Tank Army of General E. Kleist continued to develop an offensive in the direction of the Vesely farm, and the 17th Army of General R. Ruoff along the railway to Yegorlykskaya. In the defense zone of the 51st Army, separate enemy mobile groups broke through to the Sal River.

As a result, already on the first day of fighting, the situation in the entire zone of operations of the Southern Front sharply deteriorated. There was a real threat of an enemy breakthrough into the Salsk region. With its successful development, the enemy had the opportunity to cut the Southern Front into two parts and open the way for his tank group to reach the rear of the main forces of the Soviet troops, who continued to hold positions south of Rostov.

Hitler's command took all measures to encircle Soviet formations south of Rostov. July 27 Chief of Operations Department General Staff ground forces, General A. Heusinger conveyed the following to the chief of staff of Army Group A, General G. Greiffenberg: “... from the Rostov bridgehead, do not press too hard to the south, so as not to force the enemy to retreat before he is surrounded by the advancing left flank of the army group."

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the Southern Front foresaw such actions of the enemy. Therefore, in order to improve the operational situation, it was decided to withdraw the formations of the left wing of the front on the night of July 28 to a line running along the southern bank of the Kagalnik River and the Manych Canal.

Meanwhile, the enemy, under the cover of large aviation forces, transported formations of seven corps to the left bank of the Don and created overwhelming superiority there, especially in tanks and artillery. By the end of the day on July 28, large gaps had formed between the armies of the Southern Front. The defense front was broken. The troops could no longer hold back the enemy's onslaught and continued to retreat south. With the entry of enemy tank and motorized formations into the Zadonsk and Salsk steppes and into the open spaces Krasnodar region there was an immediate threat of his breakthrough into the depths of the Caucasus.

The situation required emergency measures. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to combine the efforts of all troops located in the North Caucasus. According to the directive of July 28, the Southern and North Caucasian fronts were united into one North Caucasian Front. Marshal S. M. Budyonny was appointed front commander, and General A. I. Antonov was appointed chief of staff. The Military Council included: S. M. Budyonny, L. M. Kaganovich, L. R. Korniets, I. S. Isakov and P. I. Seleznev. The Stavka directive stated: “The main task of the North Caucasus Front, Stavka sets a stubborn struggle not only to stop the enemy’s further advance to the south on the occupied lines, but at all costs active actions return Bataysk and restore the situation along the southern bank of the river. Don". At the same time, the Headquarters demanded that part of the front forces be allocated to occupy the line along the southern bank of the Kuban River, the Krasnodar bypass to Temizhbek (30 km east of Kropotkin).

Following the instructions of Headquarters, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, in order to improve command and control of troops, by his directive of July 28, divided the front troops into two operational groups - Don and Primorsky. The Don operational group under the command of General R. Ya. Malinovsky included the 51st, 37th and 12th armies. She covered the Stavropol direction. Aviation support for the group was assigned to the 4th Air Army. The Primorsky operational group under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko united the 18th, 56th and 47th armies, the 1st separate rifle and 17th cavalry corps. The group was supported by the Azov military flotilla, the Kerch naval base of the Black Sea Fleet and the 5th Air Army. Its task included the defense of the Krasnodar direction and the Taman Peninsula. The departments of the 9th and 24th armies were ordered to be stationed in Nalchik and Grozny, respectively.

The soldiers of the North Caucasus Front continued to offer stubborn resistance to the enemy, and he failed to encircle the Soviet troops south of Rostov. But the situation in the North Caucasus remained tense.

On July 30, the front troops were read the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 227 dated July 28, 1942. “In explanation of the order of the People’s Commissar,” wrote former boss of the political department of the 47th Army, General M. Kh. Kalashnik, - all commanders participated. They spoke at service meetings, party and Komsomol meetings, held conversations with fighters, and made passionate, mobilizing speeches at rallies before battles. The main burden of responsibility for bringing the demands of the order to every defender of the Motherland lay with the party-political apparatus of the troops.” To strengthen the party layer in the units operating on the front line and to clarify the requirements of the order, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front sent 1,400 communists from the rear units and 200 political workers. More than 6 thousand communists were sent from party organizations in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia to strengthen the political apparatus in the troops. Four special shock detachments of 500 communists and Komsomol members each were created to strengthen the most dangerous areas. The formation of detachments was entrusted to General V.F. Vorobyov, Brigade Commissar L.I. Brezhnev, Colonels V.I. Rozhkov and S.I. Svintsov.

Activities carried out by Headquarters, the Military Council of the Front, and regional party organizations to strengthen morale Soviet soldiers, played an important role during the defense of the Caucasus.

However, a turning point in the fight against the enemy was not achieved immediately. Possessing overwhelming superiority in tanks, aircraft and artillery, the enemy continued to push back Soviet troops along the entire front. He stubbornly strived for Salsk, where strong formations of the 48th Tank Corps were sent. The defense of the troops of the Don Group was poorly organized and almost completely unprepared in engineering terms. The rear units lost contact with the active troops. Therefore, during the intense period of fighting, the group’s formations had almost no ammunition. By the end of July, the situation on the Don Group front became especially complicated. The 51st Army found itself cut off from the main forces of the front, and communication between the army headquarters and the headquarters of the group and the front was disrupted. Therefore, on July 31, Headquarters transferred the 51st Army to the Stalingrad Front. As a result, a new demarcation line was established between the Stalingrad and North Caucasus fronts, which passed through Nikolaevskaya, Remontnoye, and Astrakhan.

The failure of the attempt to capture Stalingrad on the move forced the Nazi command on July 31 to turn the 4th Tank Army (except for the 40th Tank Corps, transferred to the 1st Tank Army) from the Caucasus direction to Stalingrad and transfer it to Army Group B. This weakened the enemy troops operating in the North Caucasus. However, the enemy still had enough strength to continue the offensive. Wedged in at 40 tank corps in the gaps between the 51st and 37th armies, and the 57th Tank Corps - between the 12th and 37th armies, it created a threat of enveloping the right flank of the Primorye Group. To avoid encirclement, the troops of the Primorsky group left their positions on the Kagalnik River and retreated to the line of the Eya and Kugoey rivers.

On August 2, large forces of fascist German troops, supported by almost 200 tanks, resumed the offensive on Salsk and by the end of the day captured the settlements of Krasnaya Polyana, Zhukovka, and Rassypnoye.

In connection with the current situation, on August 3, the Military Council of the front decided to withdraw the Don group beyond the Kuban River. Acting with shock tank groups, the enemy overcame the resistance of the rearguard units of the 37th Army and captured Voroshilovsk on August 5. Then he slowed down the advance in the southeast direction, covering himself with the 40th Tank Corps from the east in order to regroup the troops. The 37th Army managed to break away from the enemy and by the end of August 5th had retreated beyond the Kalaus and Yankul rivers. On the same day, the 12th Army was included in the Primorsky Group. This ended the defensive operation of the Don Group in the Stavropol direction.

The situation was also difficult on the left wing of the North Caucasus Front, where the Primorye Group of Forces was defending. The main blow of the enemy's 17th army on July 28 was taken by the 18th and 56th armies. The enemy, having reached the Kagalnik River, was unable to immediately break through the defense front of the Soviet troops on the left bank of this river and was forced to bring the 44th Army Corps into battle.

In order to finally stop the advance of the Nazi troops, the commander of the North Caucasus Front ordered the 18th Army on July 30 to launch a counterattack in the direction of Olginskaya (30 km east of Bataysk) and in cooperation with the 12th Army and the 17th Cavalry Corps, which was supposed to strike at Bataysk, restore the situation on the Don. The 56th Army was withdrawn to the line along the southern bank of the Kuban River and to the Krasnodar defensive contour.

The measures taken by Headquarters and the Front Military Council significantly improved the position of the Primorsky Group. Nevertheless, the superiority in forces and means on its right wing remained on the enemy’s side: in personnel - 1.4 times, in tanks - absolute, in guns and mortars - 3 times. Enemy aircraft dominated the air. The defense front of the Soviet troops was also disrupted. During the retreat, a gap formed between the Don and Primorsk groups, into which the enemy introduced the 13th Panzer Division and the SS Viking Motorized Division and struck in the direction of Armavir. There was a threat of envelopment by the troops of the right wing of the Primorsky group. Therefore, on August 3, the front commander ordered them to be taken to the left bank of the Kuban.

On August 5, the Headquarters ordered the front commander to firmly cover the Maikop area and the Maikop-Tuapse road in order to prevent the enemy from reaching the Black Sea coast and isolating the Primorye Group of Forces.

On August 6, the enemy's 17th Army rushed towards Krasnodar. For several days, small formations of the 56th Army of General A.I. Ryzhov and soldiers of the Krasnodar detachment people's militia courageously repelled the onslaught of the infantry and motorized divisions of the 5th Army Corps.

Particularly fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Pashkovo crossing, where the 30th Irkutsk Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Colonel B. N. Arshintsev fought selflessly. Being semi-surrounded and experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition, the division repelled all enemy attacks. And only on August 12, by order of the command, she left Krasnodar, blowing up the Pashkovskaya crossing and retreating to the left bank of the Kuban.

The Azov coast was defended by the Azov military flotilla until August 10. She held Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, her main base, until the arrival of the forces defending Yeisk. On August 10, after blowing up military facilities, the flotilla was evacuated. Ships and vessels delivered more than

4 thousand soldiers, 30 coastal defense guns and other equipment, as well as 1,670 tons of various cargo.

The fascist German command decided to encircle Soviet troops south of Kuban. To this end, the 1st Tank Army struck through Armavir to Maykop in order to break through to Tuapse. On August 6, with powerful air support, the enemy captured Armavir in battle and continued the attack on Maykop. For four days there were fierce battles along the lines of the Kuban, Laba, and Belaya rivers. By the end of August 9, the mobile units of the 1st Tank Army broke into Maykop. The Nazis hoped to capture fuel and oil, but all supplies were removed in advance, the drilling wells were plugged, and the equipment was partially evacuated and partially buried in the ground.

Having captured Maykop, the enemy launched fierce attacks in the Tuapse direction, trying to reach the Black Sea coast. On August 10, the Headquarters indicated to the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front: “In connection with the current situation, the most important and dangerous for the North Caucasus Front and the Black Sea coast is this moment is the direction from Maykop to Tuapse. With the enemy’s entry into the Tuapse area, the 47th Army and all front troops located in the Krasnodar area will be cut off and taken prisoner.”

The commander of the forces of the North Caucasus Front made a decision: the 17th Cavalry Corps should concentrate southeast of Krasnodar, the 12th Army would gain a foothold on the left bank of the Laba River, the 32nd Guards Rifle Division would cross on ships of the Black Sea Fleet to the area north of Tuapse and, together with 236 1st rifle division to take up defense in several lines in depth to cover the road from Maikop to Tuapse.

On August 12, the enemy managed to capture Belorechenskaya, and on August 13, Tverskaya. His further advance was stopped.

During three weeks of fighting (from July 25 to August 17), the enemy forced the troops of the North Caucasus Front to retreat from the Don to the foothills of the northwestern part of the Main Caucasus Range. This stage of the fighting was extremely difficult. Soviet troops were unable to comply with the Headquarters directive to restore the situation on the Don.

The commander of the North Caucasus Front did not have sufficient reserves with which to reinforce the first echelon of troops in the most dangerous areas. There were no large mobile formations, while the Nazis had tank and motorized divisions that made up more than 40 percent. Often this allowed them to get ahead of Soviet troops when occupying defense lines. The small number of its aviation had a negative impact on the actions of the North Caucasus Front. By maintaining air superiority, the enemy had a fairly effective impact on the defending armies, especially in open areas. The command and headquarters of the front and armies often lost control of the troops. Formations and units were in dire need of ammunition, fuel, and food.

And yet, despite this, the Nazis were unable to encircle the Soviet group between the Don and Kuban. The heroic defenders of the Caucasus defended Tuapse and blocked the enemy’s path to the Black Sea. Retreating, the troops of the North Caucasus Front exhausted the enemy in fierce battles and destroyed their manpower and equipment. According to the headquarters of Army Group A, the Nazi losses during this period amounted to about 54 thousand soldiers and officers.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command promptly revealed the enemy's plans, accurately determined the directions of his possible attacks and provided assistance to the troops. It took urgent measures to strengthen the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts using its reserves with weapons, tanks and anti-aircraft guns, communications equipment, fighter and bomber aircraft.

The commanders of the fronts, armies and their headquarters began to more quickly carry out the instructions of Headquarters and take energetic measures to delay the advance of the Nazi troops.

During this most crucial period of the battle for the Caucasus, the party organizations of the autonomous and union republics, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, carried out a great deal of work to mobilize internal resources for the needs of the front. Many enterprises began producing ammunition, weapons and equipment (mainly for the troops of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts).

Military councils of fronts and armies, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of units and formations carried out great educational work in the troops aimed at maintaining a high political and moral state of personnel, at raising morale troops and ensuring reliable protection of the defensive lines covering the Caucasus. A huge army of propagandists and agitators daily explained to the soldiers the internal and foreign policy The Communist Party and the Soviet government, the fair nature of the Great Patriotic War, the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system, the requirements of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 of July 28, 1942, promoted labor successes Soviet people in the rear and feats of arms at the fronts, educated personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship of the peoples of the USSR and proletarian internationalism.

The main motto of all party-political work in the troops was the party’s call: “Fight to the death, not a step back without the order of the commander!” As a result, it was possible to strengthen the political and moral state of the troops, discipline in units, and increase the stability of defense. Operating in difficult conditions, experiencing interruptions in the supply of ammunition and food, without sleep and rest, the heroic defenders of the Caucasus, in the forefront of which were communists and Komsomol members, showed steadfastness, courage and bravery in the fight against the enemy, striving at all costs to avoid allow the enemy to advance deep into the Caucasus. The troops of the North Caucasus Front, having detained the enemy, made it possible for the Transcaucasian Front to timely take up defense along the Terek and Bak-san rivers in the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range and cover Transcaucasia from the north.

Having regrouped his forces, the enemy tried to achieve success in the areas of Novorossiysk, Malgobek and on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. The intense defensive battles of the Soviet troops that unfolded here continued until September 28.

Due to the deterioration of the situation in the Caucasus, the Party Central Committee, the State Defense Committee and Headquarters took urgent measures to strengthen its defense. The Headquarters directive to the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front dated August 20 indicated that the enemy, seeking to invade the Transcaucasus, would not limit himself to the actions of large forces in the main directions. “The enemy, having specially trained mountain units, will use every road and trail through the Caucasus Range to penetrate into Transcaucasia, acting both in large forces and in separate groups of thugs and saboteurs. Those commanders are deeply mistaken, the directive emphasized, who think that the Caucasus Range itself is an impassable barrier for the enemy. Everyone must firmly remember that only the line that is skillfully prepared for defense and stubbornly defended is impassable...”

The headquarters demanded, along with the creation of strong defenses in the main operational directions, to strengthen the defense of the Main Caucasus Ridge, and especially the Georgian Military, Ossetian Military and Sukhumi Military roads, in order to exclude any possibility of enemy penetration in these directions. The directive also indicated specific urgent measures to strengthen the defense of the Caucasus.

The number of engineering troops on the Transcaucasian Front increased. By the beginning of September, it already had 146 engineer and sapper battalions, that is, six times more than by August 1, 1942. In these units there were 63,686 people - seven times more than on August 1. The number of engineering units increased due to the manning of the withdrawing engineering troops of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts.

In addition to troops, local residents were also involved in the construction of defensive lines. 16 of September State Committee Defense made a special decision to mobilize 90 thousand people local population for the construction of Makhachkala, Derbent and Baku defensive lines. Intense work was in full swing on the thousand-kilometer front. Under heavy bombardment, fortifications were erected, stone barriers were built on the roads and paths of high mountain passes, sappers prepared rubble in the wooded foothills, and dug trenches on the banks of Urukh and Terek.

The commander of the Transcaucasian Front, in a directive dated August 3, assigned the following tasks to the troops. The 44th Army under the command of General I.E. Petrov was ordered to create a deeply echeloned defense on the approaches to Grozny and Baku from the north and northwest and, in cooperation with the Caspian Military Flotilla, to prevent the enemy from crossing the Terek in the area from the mouth to Chervlennaya. The army group of General V.N. Kurdyumov, consisting of four rifle divisions and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, takes up defense along the Terek and Urukh rivers. Particular attention was paid to covering the approaches to Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military roads. The 46th Army was entrusted with the defense of the passes through the western part of the Main Caucasus Range and the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskoye to the mouth of the Sarp River, as well as covering the border with Turkey to Mount Uch-Tepelyar. The 45th Army and the 15th Cavalry Corps were supposed to stop any attempt to violate the state border with Turkey and Iran.

The front reserve included five reserve rifle brigades, military schools and several artillery and mortar units. Their task was to eliminate possible airborne assaults enemy in the rear of the Transcaucasian Front.

Front aviation was given the task of covering the troops and preventing the landing of sea and airborne assault forces.

To strengthen the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, significant forces were allocated from the Headquarters reserve. From August 6 to September, the Transcaucasian Front received 2 guards rifle corps and 11 separate rifle brigades. Transportation of units was carried out from Astrakhan and Krasnovodsk along the Caspian Sea to Makhachkala. The headquarters allocated 840 vehicles to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, which to some extent facilitated the transfer of reserves.

The concentration of large forces for defense along the Terek and Urukh rivers and the great distance of the front headquarters from this line required the creation of a separate control body. On August 8, by order of the Headquarters, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was created in the 44th and 9th armies, the 11th Guards Rifle Corps. General I. I. Maslennikov was appointed commander of the Northern Group of Forces. On August 11, the 37th Army of the North Caucasus Front was included in it, and the Don Group of Forces was disbanded.

Thus, by mid-August 1942, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front regrouped their forces and organized the defense of the Caucasus from the north. A second line of defense was created along the Terek and Urukh rivers, on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. Particular attention was paid to covering the Baku direction and the approaches to Grozny.

With the advance of the fascist German troops to the foothills of the western part of the Main Caucasus Range, the command of Army Group A informed Hitler's headquarters that the Soviet troops were no longer able to offer stubborn resistance. “The army group command is of the opinion that this resistance [in the Novorossiysk area] can be broken with a strong onslaught. Also, strong enemy units in the bend of the Terek can only provide temporary resistance to the massive offensive of German formations.” And further: “It seems that the enemy along the entire front has placed all the forces at his disposal on the front line and that after breaking through this line, the enemy’s resistance will be broken.”

In the current situation, the main command of the ground forces decided to regroup the forces of Army Group A, and then continue the attack on the Caucasus simultaneously in three directions: by the 17th Army along the Black Sea coast from Anapa to Poti and then to Batumi; 49th Mountain Rifle Corps - through the Main Caucasus Range to Sukhumi and Kutaisi; 1st Tank Army - from the areas of Pyatigorsk and Prokhladny to Ordzhonikidze, Grozny, Makhachkala, Baku.

On August 23, the enemy began to implement a plan to complete the capture of the Caucasus. On this day, two tank and infantry divisions of Army Group A went on the offensive directly towards Mozdok. For three days, the combined detachment of Major Korneev and cadets of the Rostov Artillery School, together with units of the 26th reserve rifle brigade, fought fierce battles, but under pressure from superior enemy forces they were forced to leave Mozdok and retreat to the right bank of the Terek. In the future, the enemy intended to seize crossings across the Terek with strong detachments and secure a starting point for an attack on Ordzhonikidze.

Simultaneously with the attack on Mozdok, the 23rd German Panzer Division launched an attack from the north and east on Prokhladny. Having captured it, the enemy began an offensive on August 25 south along the Prokhladny - Ordzhonikidze railway. However, all his attempts to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops were unsuccessful. The Nazis were forced to stop the offensive in the Prokhladny area and begin preparing an attack on Malgobek. A serious threat was created of a breakthrough of enemy tank and mechanized forces to the Grozny and Baku oil regions.

To prevent this threat, a new 58th Army was formed in the Makhachkala region, consisting of four rifle divisions, a rifle brigade and two artillery regiments under the command of General V. A. Khomenko. This made it possible to significantly strengthen the position of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front. By the end of August it included the 9th, 37th, 44th and the 58th Army, which was in the second echelon. As a result, the Soviet command managed to create a general superiority in forces and means, except for tanks and aircraft, along the entire front of the Northern Group of Forces. But these forces and means were distributed evenly along the entire front. Of the 2,356 guns and mortars available in the direction of the enemy’s main attack, in the Malgobek area, at the beginning of the fighting there were only 237 guns and mortars. The Nazis outnumbered the Soviet troops here in tanks by 4.2 times, in artillery by 6.5 times.

On the morning of September 2, the enemy began crossing the Terek in the Mozdok area. Having captured a small bridgehead on the southern bank of the river, fascist German troops struck a strong blow on the night of September 4 and advanced 10 km south of Mozdok. Soviet soldiers put up stubborn resistance, repeatedly launching counterattacks in order to restore their positions.

Soldiers of the 4th Air Army under the command of General K. A. Vershinin fought in close cooperation with the ground forces. On September 6 alone, they carried out 460 sorties in the areas of Predmostny and Kizlyar, where the enemy had captured a small bridgehead. Thanks to good interaction between aviation and ground troops The enemy tank attack was repulsed. At the foot of the ridge there were up to 30 damaged and burned tanks, half of which were destroyed by aircraft.

The Mozdok area became a “valley of death” for the Nazis. By the end of September, the enemy had lost more than 6 thousand soldiers and officers and a large amount of equipment. Stubborn resistance and counterattacks by Soviet troops sharply weakened the advancing enemy units.

Hitler's headquarters expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of Army Group A. Field Marshal W. List was removed from his post as commander of the group. Some commanders of tank divisions who failed to encircle Soviet troops between the Don and Kuban were also displaced. All this testified to the impending crisis of Hitler’s strategy to conquer the Caucasus. However, the fascist leadership did not lose hope of success. It still hoped to capture the Grozny oil region. Hitler demanded that the 1st Tank Army quickly capture Grozny. Indeed, back on September 1, the command of this army, outlining the plan for the attack on Baku, informed the commander of Army Group A that “advance from Grozny is possible from September 6, and from Makhachkala - on September 16.” September was ending, and the 1st Tank Army had only advanced slightly south of Mozdok.

Hitler's command began to look for new ways and means to capture Grozny. The SS motorized division "Viking" was transferred from the Tuapse direction to strengthen the Mozdok group. The enemy now decided to advance through the Elkhotov Gate (along the valley along the Terek) in the direction of Ordzhonikidze and along the Prokhladny - Grozny railway along the Sunzha River valley to Grozny. On September 24, his tank and motorized formations resumed their attacks. After four days of stubborn fighting, they managed to capture Elkhotovo, but they were unable to break through to Grozny and were forced to abandon further attacks.

During the period of fierce fighting from September 1 to 28, the enemy suffered heavy losses. Having thrown large forces of infantry and up to 300 tanks on the offensive, General Kleist, an ardent supporter of the tank ramming, was confident that the divisions of his 1st Tank Army would break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and easily break through to Grozny. However, the 1st Tank Army was defeated in the Mozdok direction. The plan of the Nazi command to seize the Grozny and Baku oil regions was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the defenders of the Caucasus.

Simultaneously with the fierce battles of the Northern Group of Forces in the Mozdok direction, Soviet troops fought defensive battles in the Novorossiysk area. Here the enemy decided to take revenge for the failure of his first attempt to break through the defenses in the Tuapse direction. At first, he intended to capture Novorossiysk, then develop an offensive on Tuapse and Sukhumi along the Black Sea coast. Having regrouped the troops, the fascist German command concentrated two infantry and three cavalry divisions for the attack on Novorossiysk, and five infantry and two motorized divisions in the Tuapse direction.

The approaches to Novorossiysk from the north and northeast were defended by the 47th Army of General G.P. Kotov. It was also supposed to defend the Taman Peninsula. A gap of about 40 km opened between the 47th Army and the troops of the 56th Army, which had retreated to the south. Fearing for this direction, on August 10, the Headquarters ordered the command of the North Caucasus Front to organize a strong defense of Novorossiysk, removing the 77th Infantry Division from the Taman Peninsula.

In order to unite the efforts of the troops and navy defending Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front decided on August 17 to create the Novorossiysk defensive region, which included troops of the 47th Army, the 216th Infantry Division of the 56th Army, the Azov military flotilla, Temryuk, Kerch, Novorossiysk naval bases and a combined aviation group (237th Air Division and units of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force). The command of the Novorossiysk defensive region (NOR) was entrusted to the commander of the 47th Army, General G.P. Kotov. The commander of the Azov military flotilla, Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, was appointed his deputy for naval affairs. On the evening of August 18, this decision was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region were faced with the task of preventing the Nazis from breaking through to Novorossiysk both from land and from the sea. The defense of Novorossiysk from the sea was entrusted to coastal artillery, ships of the naval base and fleet aviation. To solve this problem, 87 guns, 2 gunboats, 26 water area security ships, 17 torpedo boats and other watercraft, and 112 naval air group aircraft were involved. The air defense of Novorossiysk was carried out by a fighter aviation regiment, 84 anti-aircraft guns and about 50 anti-aircraft machine guns.

In total, by August 18, the Novorossiysk defensive region numbered about 15 thousand soldiers. In the direction of the main enemy attack there were 2,200 people, 36 guns, 30 mortars and 36 tanks. The enemy forces numbered 27 thousand people, 260 guns, 172 mortars, 64 tanks and assault guns. In the ports of Kerch and Feodosia, the enemy had 15 torpedo boats, 30 self-propelled barges and other vessels. 150 aircraft (60 fighters and 90 bombers) were based at the Kerch and Marfovka airfields; There were 12 seaplanes in the Feodosia Gulf.

On August 19, Nazi troops went on the offensive. Despite the enormous numerical superiority, they were only able to capture the city of Temryuk by the end of August 24, and Anapa on August 31. Marine units defending the Taman Peninsula found themselves cut off from the main forces of the 47th Army, and the ships of the Azov military flotilla were forced to break through into the Black Sea.

For the convenience of controlling the troops operating in the Caucasus and improving their supply, the Headquarters, by directive of September 1, transformed the North Caucasus Front into the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. The group included troops of the 12th, 18th, 47th, 56th armies and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps, which continued to carry out their previous combat missions. From the air, the Black Sea Group was supported by the 5th Air Army and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet began to be operationally subordinate to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front.

On September 3, enemy troops began crossing from Crimea to the Taman Peninsula. The position of the defending marine units became even more difficult, and two days later they were evacuated to Gelendzhik.

The evacuation of Soviet troops from the Taman Peninsula and the concentration of enemy forces on it created real threat capture of Novorossiysk from the west. The directive of the Transcaucasian Front dated September 6 stated: “The ongoing battles in the Novorossiysk direction are becoming more intense every hour. It is clear from everything that the enemy is suffering heavy losses, but is sending fresh forces to this section of the front, with the goal of capturing this large and convenient seaport, advantageous for further actions along the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea.

Units of the NOR defending the approaches to Novorossiysk must, without sparing strength and life, defend their positions, destroying the enemy by all means and means.

Novorossiysk and its region cannot be abandoned by us, and the enemy must not appear on the shores of the Tsemes Bay.

This is the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief comrade. Stalin.

In this task, the 47th Army and all the troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region should be assisted in every possible way by the command of the Black Sea Group. Everything is for the defense of Novorossiysk...”

To stop the enemy’s advance towards Novorossiysk, the Front Military Council ordered the urgent transfer of the 16th Separate Rifle Brigade and two battalions of the 81st Separate Marine Rifle Brigade from the 12th Army to the city to reinforce the 47th Army. rifle regiment 318th Infantry Division from Gelendzhik and a Marine Regiment from Poti, as well as provide army troops with ammunition. On September 8, General A. A. Grechko was appointed commander of the 47th Army and the troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region instead of General G.P. Kotov.

On the evening of September 7, the Headquarters approved the front's measures to strengthen the defense of Novorossiysk. However, in the morning of the same day, the Nazis broke through to the northern outskirts of the city. Fierce fighting raged for three days. But the forces were unequal, and on September 9, the 47th Army was forced to abandon most of Novorossiysk.

Nevertheless, the measures taken by the Front Military Council yielded positive results. The new commander of the army, General A. A. Grechko, as well as the newly appointed member of the Military Council, regimental commissar E. E. Maltsev and chief of staff, General A. G. Ermolaev, during these tense days, put a lot of effort into stopping the enemy in the area of ​​the cement plant. October" on the south-eastern outskirts of the city. The 305th, 14th Marine Battalions and units of the 83rd Separate Marine Rifle Brigade stubbornly defended here and stopped the enemy. The enemy's attempt to develop an offensive on Tuapse along the coast was unsuccessful.

However, the fascist German command did not abandon its intentions to break through along the Black Sea coast on Tuapse in order to connect with the 57th Tank and 44th Army Corps, which were advancing on Tuapse from the north. In the Abinskaya area, the enemy concentrated the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division. On September 19, after strong air preparation, it went on the offensive and in three days of bloody battles, at the cost of heavy losses, captured several heights and wedged itself into the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of 6 km.

The NOR command decided to deliver two converging strikes on the flanks of the wedged enemy group, encircle it and destroy it. For this purpose, an infantry division and two combined marine brigades were involved. In the hot battles that erupted from September 22 to 26, the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division was almost completely destroyed. She lost up to 8 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded and captured.

In the Novorossiysk direction, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive and no longer attempted to attack here with large forces. He was unable to use the Novorossiysk port as his naval base, since the eastern shore of Tsemes Bay was occupied by Soviet troops, who constantly bombarded the bay with machine gun, mortar and artillery fire.

The heroic defenders of Novorossiysk stopped the enemy’s advance along the Black Sea coast in Transcaucasia. Their feat is immortalized in the memory of the people. Near the highway on the southeastern outskirts of Novorossiysk, a railway carriage riddled with bullets and shell fragments stands on a pedestal - a relic of the Great Patriotic War. It says: “Here, on September 11, 1942, the valiant warriors of units of the Soviet Army and the Black Sea Fleet blocked the enemy’s path to the Caucasus, and 360 days later, in cooperation with the amphibious assault and units from Malaya Zemlya, they began the assault on Novorossiysk and on September 16, 1943, defeating the fascist troops , liberated the city."

In recognition of the services of the defenders of the Caucasus, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated September 15, 1973, Novorossiysk was awarded the honorary title “Hero City” with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. On the same day Secretary General The Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev in his address to the workers of Novorossiysk wrote: “This truly historic act expresses the gratitude and gratitude of the Soviet people, the party and the government, given high mark feats of arms of all those who, not sparing their lives, showed unparalleled courage, fortitude and heroism at the city walls, blocking the enemy’s path to the pearl of the Soviet south - the North Caucasus.”

Back at the end of August, the command of Army Group A believed that after breaking through the defenses of the Soviet Army troops near Novorossiysk, their resistance would be broken. However, its hopes were not justified, and after capturing most of Novorossiysk, it received “an order in principle from the Fuhrer for a defensive battle.”

Simultaneously with the battles in the Grozny and Novorossiysk directions, in mid-August fierce battles began between units of the 46th Army of the Transcaucasian Front on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. The German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps operated here, consisting of two mountain rifle and two light infantry divisions. In addition, the command of Army Group A targeted two Romanian mountain rifle divisions for operations in the mountain passes. By the time the Nazis reached the Main Caucasus Ridge, not only the northern slopes, but also many passes were not occupied by Soviet units, and on those occupied there were almost no defensive structures. This was explained by the fact that the army’s troops were scattered along a large front and some commanders did not attach due importance to preparing the passes for defense, considering the Main Caucasus Range an insurmountable barrier for the enemy.

In connection with the looming threat of a Nazi breakthrough through the Main Caucasus Ridge to the Black Sea coast, the command of the Transcaucasian Front, in accordance with the Headquarters directive of August 20, hastily began to move troops to the passes and organize their defense. The belated advance, poor logistics, and poor organization of intelligence and communications made the situation on the mountain passes extremely difficult. The population, party and Soviet bodies came to the aid of the soldiers. The help and experience of local residents was widely used to transport food and ammunition to the passes. They delivered to the passes more than 60 thousand various things from military warehouses, about a million rifle cartridges, 4 thousand hand grenades, 2 thousand cartridges for anti-tank rifles and a large number of mines and shells. Mountain rifle detachments, led by mountaineering instructors, were sent to the most inaccessible areas. In order to strengthen the defense of the passes, responsible employees of the Council of People's Commissars, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia were assigned to each direction. All these measures significantly improved the supply of troops at the passes and their defense.

By mid-August, units of the 1st German mountain rifle division "Edelweiss" approached the Klukhorsky pass. The fighting here continued until the onset of winter, and only in January 1943 was the enemy driven back.

On August 18, the Nazis reached the southern slopes of Elbrus, captured the Khotyu-tau and Chiper-azau passes and the Krugozor and Shelter of Eleven tourist bases. The Nazi mountain riflemen decided to plant two flags on the top of Elbrus. They had been preparing for this operation for a long time and carefully. The ascent was carried out by several Alpine companies. In the second half of August, they managed to reach the goal, “but this significant achievement of mountaineering,” according to the former Nazi general Tippelskirch, “had neither tactical nor even more strategic significance.” Fascist flags did not have to fly for long on the highest mountain in the Caucasus. In mid-February 1943, Soviet soldiers under the leadership of lieutenants N.A. Gusak, N.P. Morenz, military engineer 3rd rank A.M. Gusev and senior political instructor A.A. Tettov hoisted the Soviet Red Flag over Elbrus.

Taking advantage of significant superiority in firepower, on September 7 the enemy captured the Marukh Pass. Units of the 46th Army of General K. N. Leselidze made repeated attempts to return the pass, but to no avail. The Nazis continued to hold it until the Soviet troops went on the offensive in January 1943.

In the Sanchar direction, the enemy, having concentrated more than a regiment of the 4th Mountain Rifle Division in the Laba River valley, went on the offensive on August 24 and, having captured the Sancharo Pass, began to move south. To restore the situation, the Military Council of the 46th Army created the Sanchar group of troops consisting of the 307th regiment of the 61st rifle division, two battalions of the 155th and 51st rifle brigades, the 25th border regiment of the NKVD, the consolidated regiment of the NKVD and detachment 1 -th Tbilisi Infantry School. She stopped the Nazis and then threw them back to the northern bank of the Bzyb River. On October 16, units of the Sanchar group went on the offensive and by October 20 captured the Sanchar group of passes. The remnants of the Nazi troops retreated to the northern slopes of the Main Caucasus Range. The enemy's attempts to overcome the Main Caucasus Range through the Umpyrsky and Belorechensky passes were repelled.

The fascist occupiers, planning to penetrate Transcaucasia through the Main Caucasus Ridge, had high hopes that they would be able to deceive, bribe the local residents and win them over to their side. But the peoples of the Caucasus, like all Soviet people, without sparing their strength and life itself, fought in the name of victory over the enemy. The mountaineers, especially the Svans, excellent climbers, led Soviet soldiers along unknown paths, showing them ways to bypass the enemy’s flanks in order to strike from the rear.

In the deep autumn of 1942, thanks to the heroic resistance of Soviet troops and the holding of important events by the military councils of the front and the 46th Army, as well as local party and Soviet authorities By strengthening the defense of the passes, the Nazi offensive was stopped. The threat of the enemy entering Transcaucasia in this direction was eliminated.

Tuapse and Nalchik defensive operations

By the end of September 1942, the situation in the North Caucasus had stabilized somewhat. Soviet troops inflicted great damage on the enemy and stopped their advance in the Caucasus direction. Hitler's plan for a breakthrough in Transcaucasia was thwarted. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gained time to accumulate reserves and strengthen the Transcaucasian Front with them.

Exhausted enemy troops were no longer able to advance wide front. The Nazi command could not transfer reserves to the Caucasus from Stalingrad. Drawn into heavy fighting on the banks of the Volga, the 6th and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies themselves needed reinforcements. “From mid-August it became clear,” writes former Nazi general G. Doerr in his book “The March on Stalingrad,” that operations in the south of Russia were not going according to plan; The army, instead of a “victorious march,” moved forward with difficulty. In such a situation, it is customary to throw reserves into battle or change the plan of operation.” But the Nazi command had no reserves.

Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht command did not intend to abandon plans to seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Army Group A had 29 divisions. It was decided to launch successive attacks with the 17th Army on Tuapse, and then with the 1st Tank Army on Ordzhonikidze. In the Tuapse direction, the enemy hoped to reach the Black Sea coast in the Tuapse area, cut off the Black Sea Group of Forces from the main forces of the Transcaucasian Front, deprive the Black Sea Fleet of bases and ports and free up part of its forces for transfer to other sectors of the front. The 1st Tank Army was supposed to break through to the Grozny oil region. The fascist German command attached great importance to the implementation of such a plan. In a conversation with Keitel on September 18, 1942, Hitler, analyzing the situation in the Caucasus, emphasized: “The decisive thing is the breakthrough on Tuapse, and then the blocking of the Georgian Military Road and the breakthrough to the Caspian Sea.”

Thus, Soviet troops had to carry out two defensive operations in these directions: Tuapse and Nalchik. They were carried out in close operational connection, in difficult conditions of mountainous and wooded terrain and ended in the defeat of the strike forces of the 17th and 1st Panzer armies of the German armies.

The Tuapse defensive operation began on September 25 and lasted until December 20. Even during the fighting in the Novorossiysk area, the Supreme High Command Headquarters demanded that the front command not weaken the defense in the Tuapse direction. On her instructions, the defense of the Black Sea Group of Forces was strengthened from the north and along the Black Sea coast from Novorossiysk to Sochi. The Tuapse defensive region was created, and two rifle divisions and two rifle brigades were transferred from the reserve of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front to strengthen the Black Sea Group. The defense of the eastern shore of Tsemes Bay, passes and mountain passes through the Main Caucasus Range was strengthened.

The Black Sea Group of Forces, whose defense front was about 250 km, included the 18th, 56th, and 47th armies (the 12th Army was disbanded, and its personnel were transferred to replenish the first three armies). In total these armies had 109,134 men, 515 guns and 637 mortars. The troops of the Black Sea Group were supported by the aviation of the 5th Air Army (71 aircraft) and partially by the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet.

The command of the German 17th Army planned an offensive through the Main Caucasus Range from the Khadyzhenskaya area in the direction of Tuapse. The essence of the plan was to launch two strikes in converging directions with the goal of encircling the main forces of the 18th Army northeast of Shaumyan. The main attack was planned from the Neftegorsk area towards Shaumyan and a secondary attack - from the Goryachiy Klyuch area towards Shaumyan. To deliver the main blow, the Tuapse group was created, mainly from mountain rifle and light infantry divisions, specially equipped and undergoing extensive training in combat operations in the mountains. In total, the 17th Army had 162,396 men, 147 tanks and assault guns, 1,316 guns and 950 mortars. Its troops were supported by the 4th Aviation Corps of the 4th Air Fleet, which had 350 aircraft. The balance of forces, therefore, was in favor of the enemy, who outnumbered the troops of the Black Sea group: in personnel - 1.5 times, in guns - 2.6 times, in mortars - 1.5 times, in tanks - absolutely, in aircraft - 5 times.

On September 25, after air strikes carried out for two days on communications and battle formations of the 18th Army, the enemy went on the offensive.

Having failed to achieve success during the first two days, the fascist German command threw the divisional group of General X. Lanz into battle against the formations of the center of the 18th Army. By the end of September 30, its units managed to penetrate the defenses of the 18th Army to a depth of 5-10 km.

The fighting took place simultaneously on several directions. Particularly fierce battles took place over communications, which were extremely important for operations in mountainous conditions. On the right flank of the 56th Army of the Transcaucasian Front, the enemy advanced to a depth of 8 km. His further offensive was stopped by the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops.

In order to eliminate the threat hanging over Tuapse, on October 4, the Headquarters set the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front with the specific task of restoring the situation in the breakthrough areas. She demanded to immediately destroy the enemy in the Sosnovka area, firmly cover the Perevalny, Shaumyan direction and restore the situation in the Kotlovina area. Subsequently, the Black Sea group was supposed to strike from the Rozhet, Maratuk area in the direction of the Red Cemetery and from the Belaya Glina area to Pervomaisky, Khadyzhenskaya. The headquarters indicated what additional forces needed to be deployed to solve the task.

Fulfilling the requirements of the Headquarters, the front command regrouped the troops, strengthening them in the enemy’s offensive directions and creating appropriate groups to carry out counterattacks.

By the end of October 9, the 18th Army had stopped the Nazi advance in all directions with counterattacks. Their attempt to break through to Tuapse failed. The enemy lost more than 10 thousand soldiers and officers.

On October 14, the enemy resumed an offensive simultaneously from the east to Shaumyan, Sadovoe and from the area east of Fanagoriysky to Sadovoe with the goal of encircling the main group of troops of the 18th Army and breaking through to Tuapse. By the end of October 15, its units were forced to retreat to the southern outskirts of Shaumyan and railway bridge at Ostrovskaya Shchel. The troops of the right flank of the 56th Army were also somewhat pushed back - here the fascists tried to reach the Sadovoye area. The Nazis' attempts to go on the offensive in other sectors of the front were unsuccessful.

In connection with the intensification of enemy actions in the Tuapse direction, the Headquarters, in a directive dated October 15, ordered the commander of the Transcaucasian Front to focus on the Black Sea Group. She demanded that the 18th Army be reinforced with three guards rifle brigades from the reserve of the Northern Group, and that the reserve be created by transferring three rifle brigades from Baku. At the direction of Headquarters, a cavalry division was transferred from the 46th Army to the Tuapse direction, and the mountain rifle division that had arrived at the front was concentrated in the Tuapse area. Four anti-tank fighters were placed at the disposal of the front. artillery regiment, two air defense regiments and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion of 85 mm guns. Six rifle divisions were being completed. Three of them were ordered to be deployed on the Black Sea coast in the Novomikhailovsky, Tuapse, Lazarevskoye areas. These events turned out to be timely. On October 16 and 17, the Nazis, continuing the offensive, captured the Shaumyan area and started fighting for the Elisavetpolsky pass. At the junction of the 56th and 18th armies, they advanced deep into the defense of the Soviet troops and tried to capture Mount Kochkanova.

On October 17, the commander of the Black Sea group, General I.E. Petrov, and the chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front, General P.I. Bodin, went to the troops and resolved a number of issues on the spot regarding the organization of sustainable defense and control of the 18th and 56th armies. The measures taken contributed to the creation of conditions for launching powerful counterattacks against the enemy group that had broken through to the Shaumyan area.

The command and headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Group of Forces strengthened military order in formations and units and improved control of combat operations. They paid special attention to the 18th Army defending in the Tuapse direction, the commander of which was General A. A. Grechko from October 19.

Much attention was paid to party-political work, which was carried out under the leadership of the front commander, General I.V. Tyulenev, member of the Military Council, brigade commissar P.I. Efimov, and head of the political department, regimental commissar A.F. Khromov. The main efforts of party bodies were directed towards ensuring that soldiers carried out combat missions. The mobilization of communists and Komsomol members of Tuapse was carried out. Political workers were sent to the party organizations of the units to explain the need to detain the enemy at any cost and prevent him from approaching the city.

The measures taken made it possible to stop the enemy offensive by the end of October 23. He failed to capture Mount Oplepen and Maratuk.

He did not achieve success in the areas of Sarai Gora and Kochkanova Mountain. However, the advanced units of the Nazis were in the valley of the Tuapsinka River, from which little more than 30 km remained to Tuapse.

Soviet troops were completing preparations for launching counterattacks on the flanks of the enemy group that had broken through. On October 24, the 383rd and 353rd rifle divisions struck and began to slowly advance in the northern and northeastern directions. On October 27, the troops of the right flank of the 56th Army launched a counterattack on the enemy. As a result of stubborn fighting in mountainous and forested areas, the Nazis were thrown back across the Pshish River. By the end of October, with the arrival of new formations in the Black Sea Group, the balance of forces and means began to change in favor of the Soviet troops.

From October 31, fascist German troops were forced to stop offensive operations and go on the defensive. The German 17th Army had used up all its reserves. The commander of Army Group A also did not have reserves. In addition, during this period in the Ordzhonikidze area, the 1st Tank Army also suffered heavy losses.

And yet, in mid-November, the enemy made one more, last attempt to reach Tuapse through Georgievskoye. By November 23, he had penetrated the defenses in the center of the 18th Army to a depth of 8 km and along the front up to 10 km. His further advance in this direction was stopped by the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops.

The commander of the Black Sea Group of Forces decided to intercept communications with a counterattack on the flanks of the broken through enemy and, encircling, destroy him. In accordance with the decision made, two strike groups were created. Each included a rifle division and a rifle brigade.

On November 26, the troops of both groups went on the offensive. They operated in difficult conditions of mountainous and forested terrain. Due to heavy fog, visibility sometimes did not exceed twenty meters. But, despite all the difficulties, by December 17, the enemy group was eliminated, and its remnants were thrown back across the Pshish River. Thus, the last threat of a breakthrough of fascist German troops to Tuapse was eliminated.

During the Tuapse defensive operation, intense battles were fought by the 5th Air Army. The enemy had a three- to five-fold numerical superiority in the air. And yet, in October - December, more than 11,300 sorties were flown, 175 air battles were carried out, 99 fascist aircraft were shot down and 32 were destroyed at airfields.

The marines, coastal artillery, aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet took an active part in the Tuapse defensive operation. Following the instructions of the Headquarters and the Military Council of the front, warships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet in September - November transferred three rifle brigades, cavalry and mountain rifle divisions, artillery and other units to the Tuapse defensive region. In total they delivered 52,844 people and 57,796 tons of cargo and evacuated more than 2,500 wounded to Poti.

The Tuapse defensive operation of the Black Sea Group ended, and preparations for the offensive began. The enemy, who tried three times to break through to Tuapse, suffered heavy losses and was forced to go on the defensive along the entire front of the Black Sea group.

A month after the start of the Tuapse defensive operation, on October 25, fascist German troops launched a new offensive in the Nalchik direction. The Nalchik defensive operation began - the last defensive operation of the Transcaucasian Front, which lasted until November 12.

The northern group of forces of this front occupied defense in a strip about 350 km wide, consisting of the 9th, 37th, 44th and 58th armies, two separate rifle and cavalry corps, two cavalry divisions and the 4th air army.

The main grouping of Soviet troops was in the Grozny and Ordzhonikidze directions, while in the Nalchik direction the 37th Army, weakened by battles, was defending itself, against which the enemy planned to attack main blow. Here, on a six-kilometer breakthrough section, he created a three-fold superiority in men, eleven-fold in guns, ten-fold in mortars and absolute in tanks.

The command of the Transcaucasian Front did not expect an offensive in the Nalchik direction. Therefore, a weak group of Soviet troops was located here. Larger forces were concentrated in the zone of the 9th Army of General K. A. Koroteev, where an offensive operation was being prepared. The military councils of the 37th Army and the Northern Group of Forces were unable to unravel the enemy’s plan, despite intelligence reports from the 9th and 37th Armies about the regrouping they were making. It was seen as a measure to strengthen defense.

The offensive of the Northern Group troops in the Malgobek-Mozdok direction was scheduled to begin on November 3. However, on October 25, early in the morning, about 70 enemy aircraft carried out a powerful raid on the troops and headquarters of the 37th Army, located in Dolinskoye. Communication between the Northern Group and army headquarters was interrupted. At 10 o'clock the 2nd Romanian Mountain Division, reinforced by German units, went on the offensive after a short but strong fire attack. During the day, the enemy managed to advance up to 8 km in some areas. On the morning of October 26, he resumed the offensive and approached Nalchik in the afternoon. The Nazis believed that Soviet troops would no longer be able to stop them. On the same day, the headquarters of Army Group A reported to Hitler’s headquarters: “In the area of ​​the 1st Panzer Army, the attack on Nalchik apparently took the enemy by surprise. Tank divisions already advanced to Psygansu on the first day, some of their units turned north and created the preconditions for encircling approximately four enemy divisions. The destruction of this group should be completed in a few days. The enemy is pushed into the mountains. It seems that the advance of tank forces in the southern and then eastern direction to Vladikavkaz [Ordzhonikidze] will open up broad prospects...”

The enemy continued to push the 37th Army to the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. A gap formed between its parts in the area from Urukh to Chikola. The road to Ordzhonikidze was opened for the Nazis. The command of the Northern Group, trying to stop their advance, moved a tank brigade, reinforced with anti-tank artillery, to the Digora area on the night of October 30, and a rifle division from the 58th Army to the area of ​​the mouth of the Ardon River, Suadag. This made it possible to slow down the enemy's advance. However, the situation remained tense.

Overcoming the resistance of Soviet troops, on November 1 the Germans occupied Alagir and crossed the Ardon River. Their aircraft subjected Ordzhonikidze to heavy bombardment. Fierce fighting broke out in the air, in which 18 enemy aircraft were shot down and 12 damaged.

Five regiments of anti-tank artillery and three regiments of anti-tank artillery were transferred to the Ordzhonikidze area from the 9th Army and the reserve of the commander of the Northern Group of Forces rocket artillery. Rifle formations were also strengthened.

On the morning of November 2, the enemy, with the support of almost 100 tanks, broke through the outer contour of the Ordzhonikidze defensive area in the Fiagdon sector (20 km west of Ordzhonikidze), Dzuarikau and reached the suburb of Ordzhonikidze. By the end of the day he had captured Gisel.

Soviet troops could not hold back the onslaught of a strong tank group, and yet they did everything to stop the enemy’s advance. In the Fiagdon area, units of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps under the command of General I.P. Rosly, knocking out 30 German tanks, did not move away from the city walls.

During these difficult autumn days, a heavy burden fell on the pilots of the 4th Air Army. Despite bad weather, they made about 2,200 sorties in the Nalchik direction and over the course of 12 days conducted about 100 air battles, during which they shot down 60 enemy aircraft.

The Nazis continued to rush towards Ordzhonikidze. Having captured Gisel and concentrated up to 150 tanks in this area, on November 3 and 4 they tried to expand the breakthrough, but were thrown back everywhere with heavy losses for them. On November 4, the headquarters of the 1st German Tank Army informed the headquarters of Army Group A that “it will be necessary to suspend the attack on Vladikavkaz until the area south of the Terek River is cleared of the enemy and this eliminates the danger of an attack on the flank and rear of tank divisions." However, tactical considerations were not the reason why the Nazis suspended their attack on Ordzhonikidze. They were forced to do this by the stubborn resistance of Soviet soldiers and militia units, as well as heavy losses.

On November 5, the enemy was stopped. Now the fascist German command was not thinking about pursuing Soviet troops, but about saving their own. On that day, the headquarters of the 1st Tank Army received an order that said: “... on everything Eastern Front on the Russian revolutionary holiday of November 7, large offensive operations; The Fuhrer expresses the hope that the troops will defend every inch of land to the last man.”

The narrow bag in which the enemy troops found themselves at Ordzhonikidze was being tightened more and more tightly by units arriving from the reserve of the Northern Group of Forces. Created real opportunity complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy in the Giselle area. The commander of the Northern Group of Forces decided to launch a counterattack with three rifle and four tank brigades. The main forces of the group received defensive tasks. This decision reflected the caution of the command and fears for the Grozny direction, the desire to cover it with deeply echeloned defense.

On the morning of November 6, the 11th Guards Rifle Corps launched an attack along the eastern bank of the Fiagdon River on Dzuarikau with two rifle and two tank brigades. At noon, the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, with one rifle and two tank brigades, launched an attack on Gisel. Thanks to the successful advance of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, the main forces of the 23rd tank division The Nazis were almost completely surrounded. They only had a narrow corridor in the Mayramadag region, no more than 3 km wide. The enemy made desperate attempts to break out of the bag and save his group.

Fierce fighting broke out in the Suar Gorge beyond Mayramadag (12 km west of Ordzhonikidze), where the 34th separate rifle brigade of Colonel A.V. Vorozhishchev, formed from cadets, was defending naval schools. For more than ten days, the sailors heroically defended the line. They did not allow the enemy to capture Mayramadag and penetrate the Suar Gorge. He was also unable to provide assistance to his group, surrounded in Giselle.

On the morning of November 11, the troops of the left flank of the 9th Army broke the resistance of the Nazi rearguards, captured Gisel, and in the afternoon occupied New Saniba. The next day, the 9th Army reached the line of the Mayramadag and Fiagdon rivers. Its further advance was stopped by stubborn resistance from the enemy, who organized defense along the western bank of the Fiagdon River.

The Nalchik defensive operation of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front ended with the defeat of the Gisel fascist German group. 140 tanks, 70 guns of various calibers and other trophies were captured. On the battlefield, the enemy left over 5 thousand soldiers and officers killed.

Underestimation of the strength and capabilities of the Transcaucasian Front and the resilience of Soviet soldiers led to the failure of the plans of the command of the German 1st Tank Army. Its formations were unable to overcome the entire depth of the Soviet defenses and develop tactical success into operational success. With the defeat of the enemy on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, his last attempt to break through to the Grozny and Baku oil regions, as well as in Transcaucasia, failed.

The Nalchik defensive operation took place during the period of fierce battles near Stalingrad. The unprecedented resilience of Soviet soldiers did not allow the enemy to capture the city on the Volga. The fascist German command was looking for new reserves to strengthen its Stalingrad group. It intended to take these reserves from the Caucasian direction.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front the task of actively pinning down the German 1st Tank Army and preventing the fascist German command from transferring troops from Army Group “A” to Stalingrad.

Following the instructions of Headquarters, the Northern Group of Forces launched several counterattacks in the Mozdok and Nalchik directions in the second half of November and December 1942. However, due to a lack of forces and means, these counterattacks did not bring the expected success.

On December 11, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command indicated to the commander of the Northern Group of Forces: “The enemy has already transferred part of his forces from the area of ​​your troops to the north and thereby weakened himself. Judging by the course of the operation at Stalingrad, the enemy will continue to transfer part of its forces to the north. The enemy's unauthorized withdrawal on the northern bank of the Terek cannot be considered an accident. Thus, a favorable situation has been created for the offensive of all your troops. Your task is to seize the moment and act boldly.”

But the command of the Northern Group of Forces hesitated. The enemy managed to withdraw the tank and motorized divisions from the battle and throw them into the Kotelnikovsky area to help the encircled 6th Army. And yet, as a result of counterattacks, the Northern Group significantly improved its positions by the end of December and created conditions for an attack on the flank and rear of the main forces of the 1st German Tank Army.

Results of the defensive period of the Battle for the Caucasus

The defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus lasted five months. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to reach the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range and the Terek River. Inferior to the enemy in the number of aircraft, tanks and artillery, Soviet troops withstood the enemy's attack and did not give him the opportunity to break through to Baku, Transcaucasia and the Black Sea coast. The plans of the fascist German command, designed to seize the Grozny and Baku oil regions and to enslave the peoples of the Caucasus, were thwarted. The plans of the leadership failed fascist Germany by breaking through in Transcaucasia, draw Turkey into the war against the Soviet Union, unite with its troops operating in North Africa, and then continue aggression in order to enslave the countries of the Near and Middle East. Thus, Hitler's Edelweiss plan failed.

The defense of the Caucasus was carried out in close connection with the actions of Soviet troops at Stalingrad, which had an exceptional influence on the course of the struggle in the Caucasus. In turn, the battles that took place here influenced the situation in the Battle of Stalingrad. The firm leadership of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the clear assignment of tasks to the troops operating in the Caucasus, the implementation of a number of important measures by the party and the Soviet government to strengthen the fronts and mobilize the local population were the most important factors that contributed to the build-up of resistance to the enemy.

At the beginning of the battle for the Caucasus, the main burden of the fight against the enemy fell on the North Caucasus Front, which included the formations and associations of the Southern Front weakened in the battles. The command of the North Caucasus Front took the necessary measures and managed to strengthen discipline among the troops, increase their combat effectiveness and organize stubborn resistance to the Nazi invaders. The armored and motorized formations of the German Army Group A were forced to slow down the pace of the offensive already in mid-August. Thus, conditions were created for the troops of the Transcaucasian Front to prepare a deeply echeloned defense.

In September, the enemy's onslaught in the Caucasian direction began to weaken. He could no longer continue the offensive along the entire front, but was forced to try to break through the defenses of the Caucasus defenders in certain directions. But these attempts were unsuccessful.

During the period of defensive battles in the Caucasus, Army Group A lost more than 100 thousand people. Everywhere her troops were eventually forced to go on the defensive. Stubborn defensive battles and then a counteroffensive by Soviet troops near Stalingrad not only prevented the German command from strengthening its Caucasian group, but also forced it to withdraw some formations from the Caucasian direction and transfer them to Stalingrad to the rescue of the encircled 6th and partially 4th tank armies .

During the defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus, battles unfolded along a front from 320 to 1000 km and to a depth of 400 to 800 km. Significant forces and resources of the parties were involved in them.

During the defense of the Caucasus, Soviet troops gained extensive experience in conducting combat operations in mountainous and forested areas.

Fighting in the mountains was fought mainly over valleys, roads and mountain passes; Large gaps often formed between the defending units and subunits. The rifle division's defense line reached 20-25 km, and in high mountain areas - up to 90 km. Such wide stripes forced divisions to form battle formations in one echelon. The defense of the passes required holding not only the passes themselves, but also the roads leading to them, as well as the dominant heights, which helped prevent the enemy from penetrating the rear of the defending units.

The forward detachments played a big role. With their active actions, they delayed the enemy and thereby created conditions for the main forces to organize defense.

In the main directions of the enemy's offensive in the Caucasus, the Grozny, Makhachkala, Ordzhonikidze, Sukhumi and Tbilisi rifle divisions of the NKVD internal troops fought bravely.

Units also made their contribution to the defense of the Caucasus border troops(23, 24, 25, 26, 32 and 95th border regiments). Together with units of the internal troops of the NKVD and troops of the Soviet Army, they participated in the defense of the cities of Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, Novorossiysk and others, in the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasus Range (Azishsky, Belorechensky, Klukhorsky and others). As on other fronts, they carried military service as part of the rear security forces of the active army.

Party political work was of great importance in the successful outcome of the defensive battles in the Caucasus for the Soviet troops. All the activities of communists and Komsomol members in that period were aimed at increasing the combat effectiveness of units and formations, strengthening the moral and political state of personnel, and instilling in them perseverance, discipline and organization.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics and local party bodies showed constant concern for strengthening the troops, supplying them with everything necessary, and actively influenced the activities of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations.

The Soviet army preserved the Caucasus with its large economic resources and important communications connecting the USSR with the countries of the Middle East and, through them, with its allies.

The Nazis were not destined to achieve their economic goals. They never managed to get the oil from Maikop and Grozny.

The fascists’ hopes for the “disloyalty” of the Caucasian peoples to Soviet power. Representatives of more than 60 nationalities of the Caucasus, finding themselves in the occupied territory, rose up to fight the enemy. Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, Armenians, Ossetians, and representatives of many other peoples of the USSR fought in partisan detachments, in underground organizations and groups.

The increased tenacity of the Soviet troops in defense, the heroism of the Soviet people in the rear and the expansion of the struggle in the occupied territory of the Caucasus were the main factors that contributed to the subsequent transition of the Soviet army to the offensive and the eventual expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the North Caucasus.

Defense of the Caucasus (Battle for the Caucasus) is a major defensive-offensive operation of Soviet troops during the second period of the Great Patriotic War in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.

• From July 25 to December 31, 1942, an offensive was carried out by the Germans, who managed to capture part of the territories;
• From December 31 to October 9, 1943, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, recaptured territory and forced German troops to retreat.

By the beginning of autumn 1942, German troops were able to conquer most of the Kuban and North Caucasus, but after the defeat at Stalingrad they were forced to retreat again, as they suffered serious losses and feared that Soviet troops would encircle them. In 1943, the Soviet army planned an operation, as a result of which German troops were to be surrounded in the Kuban territory and defeated, but the operation failed - the Germans were evacuated to Crimea.

Background and balance of power

By June 1942, the Soviet army was in a weakened state after the failure at Kharkov. The German command, seeing that the Soviet troops could not provide worthy resistance, decided to launch an offensive in the Caucasus, taking advantage of the situation. After a series of battles, German troops were able to conquer several cities, including Rostov-on-Don, which opened the way for Hitler to the Caucasus.

The Caucasus, like Ukraine, was a very important strategic point that German troops sought to capture as early as possible. The Caucasus and Kuban contained large reserves of Soviet oil, grain and other crops, which could provide serious support for the German army to conduct further battles on the territory of the USSR. In addition, Hitler hoped that by reaching the sea he would be able to turn to Turkey for help. Moreover, the German command also counted on the help of the residents themselves, since they were aware that part of the local population did not accept Soviet power.

After the fall of Rostov-on-Don, communication Soviet command with the Caucasus could only be carried out by sea or by rail passing through Stalingrad. That is why Stalingrad became an important point that the Germans needed to capture. Despite the fact that Hitler threw enormous forces into the fight at Stalingrad, he was never able to take the city. The Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad. They suffered significant losses and, largely thanks to this, later they never managed to conquer the Caucasus.

Progress in the defense of the Caucasus

The battle took place in two stages. During the first stage, the German army, not without difficulty, managed to take a number of cities: Stavropol, Armavir, Maykop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok and part of Novorossiysk. In September 1942, the German army approached the Malgobek area, where it was stopped by Soviet troops.

The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus took place from July to December 1942. The German army was able to approach the foothills of the Caucasus Range and the Terek River, but this victory was not easy - Hitler’s troops suffered colossal losses. The original plan to capture Transcaucasia was never completed, despite the fact that the Germans were still leading in this operation - Soviet troops were able to stop the German offensive in time and force the army to stop fighting, since most of the army was simply destroyed. Türkiye also failed, because it never decided to enter the war and come to the aid of Hitler.

The German offensive failed largely due to the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad. Hitler, who had too high hopes for the capture of this city, simply did not foresee the possibility that the Soviet army could defend Stalingrad and, therefore, one of the routes to the Caucasus.

As a result of numerous losses, by the beginning of 1943 the German army was numerically inferior to the Soviet army several times.

The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus can be considered a counter-offensive of Soviet troops, which became extremely successful for the Soviet Union. Territories previously captured by the Germans were recaptured, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Rostov region, Stavropol Territory and other areas Oil fields and grain crops were again returned to the control of the Soviet Union, which gave a colossal advantage in the war.

Despite the fact that the Soviet army was able to achieve serious successes, it cannot be considered that the victory definitely belonged to the Soviet Union, since the main goal that Stalin set for his army - to capture and destroy the Germans in Kuban - was never achieved. The German army fled to Crimea, however, despite this, the Caucasus returned again to the command of the USSR.

The meaning and results of the battle for the Caucasus

The successes of the Soviet Union in the battle for the Caucasus can be considered one of the most important parts of the general counter-offensive of the USSR in the second period of the war. At this time, the Soviet army not only began to recapture its territories and return captured people, but also greatly increased its combat power and could engage in battles with the German army on equal terms. The return to the control of the USSR of such an important strategic point as the Caucasus can be considered one of the greatest victories of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, the battle for the Caucasus also had negative consequences. Part of the population was accused of assisting the enemy and many of the local residents were later exiled to Siberia.

With the victory at Stalingrad and the battle in the Caucasus, the victorious march of the Soviet Union in the Second World War began.