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✪ Military drummers "Solo on drums" orchestra of the 58th Army. Vladikavkaz, Ossetia Alania
✪ Grand parade of troops and military equipment of the 58th Army. Anniversary best army Russia. Vladikavkaz, Ossetia
✪ Units of the 58th Army were presented with the St. George Banner
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According to the directive Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation dated March 17, 1995 No. 314/2/0198 and headquarters directive SKVO dated April 4, 1995 No. 14/0155 from June 1, 1995 management of the 42nd army corps with security and service units, reorganized into the command of the 58th Army. Thus, the 58th Army of the Russian Armed Forces was recreated in the Caucasus.
Military exercises (2006)
Exercises Caucasus-2012
On September 17-23, 2012, at the Raevsky, Asheluk, Daryal, Tarskoye, Sernovodskoye training grounds, formations and military units of the 58th army received direct participation in the strategic command and staff exercises of the Southern Military District " Caucasus-2012" - which took place at the end summer period training in Armed Forces. The topic of the exercise is improving practical skills command staff and headquarters in the planning and use of troops in the conditions of flat-steppe terrain using promising automated systems control and use of high-precision weapons and new types of weapons.
Vladimir Putin visited the strategic exercises taking place at the Raevsky training ground " Caucasus-2012" and gave them an excellent rating. The President noted that main task Such exercises are a demonstration of the military personnel’s readiness to protect the national interests of Russians and eliminate threats national security Russia.
Operations
Beslan (September 1-3, 2004)
Divisions 58th Army participated in liberation of hostages in Beslan September 1-3 2004. Not far from the school where they were held hostages, an operational headquarters was deployed 58th Army, field hospital to provide assistance to those leaving the building. Parts army participated in assault school, demining the premises and rescuing the remaining hostages in the building.
War in South Ossetia (2008)
August 8, 2008
18:24 - two tank columns of the 19th motor vehicle rifle division 58th Army and walked around Tskhinvali along the Zar road and Trans-Caucasian Highway and began shelling the positions of the Georgian military. Georgian troops had to leave Tskhinvali.
19:37 - parts 58th Army suppressed Georgian firing points that were shelling the city and the positions of Russian peacekeepers.
August 9, 2008
11:56 - According to the statement Commander-in-Chief Ground forces Vladimir Boldyrev parts 58th Army completely cleared Tskhinvali from the Georgian military. Previously, the warring parties have repeatedly reported that Tskhinvali is under their control
The 58th Combined Arms Army was first formed in the Siberian Military District on November 10, 1941 on the basis of a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) dated November 2, 1941. It was directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters and, after its formation, was redeployed to the territory of the Arkhangelsk Military District to begin work on equipment defensive line on the banks of the Mariinsky Canal from Lake Onega to Lake Beloye. At the end of May 1942, the formation was transformed into the 3rd Tank Army.
In June 1942, the 58th Combined Arms Army was re-formed and became part of Kalinin Front. Since June 20, the army was in front-line reserve in the area of the city of Ostashkov. At the beginning of August 1942, field control, formations and military units of the 58th Army were turned to the formation of the 39th Army.
On August 30, 1942, the 58th Combined Arms Army was formed for the third time based on the directive VGK rates dated August 23, 1942 as part of the Transcaucasian Front of the 2nd formation. Its field administration was formed on the basis of the field administration of the 24th Army.
To the beginning of Malgobekskaya defensive operation The 58th Army was part of Northern group troops of the Transcaucasian Front, constituted the second echelon of the group and carried out the task of equipping a defensive line in the Makhachkala region.
At the end of November 1942, the main forces of the army were regrouped on the Terek River in the Malgobek area, where during December they fought defensive battles at the turn of Mozdok, Verkhniy Kurp. At the same time, the forces of the rifle division continued to defend Makhachkala.
In January 1943, the 58th Army, as part of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, took part in offensive operation in the Stavropol direction with the aim of defeating German group armies "A" and liberation North Caucasus. Going on the offensive on January 1, formations and military units of the army crossed the Terek River and on January 3 liberated the cities of Mozdok and Malgobek. Then they crossed the Terek River and, in cooperation with the 44th Army, began pursuing the enemy along the entire 320-kilometer front.
By January 24, 1943, the army reached the area north of Novoaleksandrovskaya (70 kilometers northwest of the city of Armavir), where it was reassigned North Caucasus Front. During the further offensive, formations and military units of the army reached the coast in early February Sea of Azov. Then, as part of the main strike force front took part in the Krasnodar operation.
On September 10, 1943, the 58th Army was transferred to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters and disbanded on November 15, 1943. Its field management is aimed at replenishing the administration of the Volga Military District.
June 1, 1995, in accordance with the directive of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation dated March 17, 1995, on the basis of the 42nd Directorate army corps The North Caucasus Military District was formed by the 58th Directorate combined arms army with headquarters in the city of Vladikavkaz.
In November-December 1992, the personnel of the 58th Army took part in resolving the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.
In 1995-1996, soldiers of the 58th Army fought against gangs in Chechnya, and in August 1999 they repelled the invasion of Dagestan. Having driven the militants out of the republic, they continued the counter-terrorist operation, called the second Chechen campaign, as part of a joint group of troops.
Its units took an active part in August 2008.
The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources
Vladislav SHURYGIN, editor-in-chief"Soldier of Russia":
- Anatoly Nikolaevich, this year the “War of 08/08/08” will be 4 years old, as it was called modern historians war with Georgia in August 2008.
It is unique in that it was the first modern history Russia is a war waged by Russia against another state. And this war became victorious for us. Georgia was destroyed. But many secrets of this war remain in the shadows to this day, and there are many more questions about it than answers.
You were the commander of the 58th Army, which decided the outcome of the war. Your formations and units defeated the Georgian army in South Ossetia, You have unblocked Tskhinvali.
But somehow it happened that after those days you went into the shadows. They did not meet with journalists, did not give interviews. Completely different people decorated their uniforms with high awards.
I thank you for agreeing to give an interview to the magazine “Soldiers of Russia”. And, of course, the first question I want to ask you is how did this war begin?
Anatoly KHRULEV:
For me, the war began at my workplace. On August 7, the district commander, Colonel General Sergei Afanasyevich Makarov, arrived at the army headquarters, and with him a group of district headquarters officers.
Literally two days before, on August 5, he approved the decision of the commander of the 58th Army to strengthen the Russian military contingent as part of the Mixed Peacekeeping Forces in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone. This plan was developed in case of a threat of military action.
During the day, the commander and I worked in the Vladikavkaz garrison and in the evening we returned to army headquarters. At about 10 p.m., the commander went home to rest, and I remained in the office to work with documents.
The situation was alarming.
The situation was heating up every day. Shelling from both sides, movement of equipment and troops from Georgian side, harsh statements, evacuation of women and children by Ossetians. A week before, the Georgian army exercises, which took place jointly with American advisers and with their active participation. Our exercises also took place and ended in early August, and we have just returned our troops to their permanent deployment points.
I already knew that at 16:00 Saakashvili announced: Georgia unilaterally ceases fire. But his demonstrative peacemaking, after several weeks of escalating the situation, alarmed me. I knew the saying that if an enemy hands you bread, watch his other hand, it might have a dagger in it. In general, it was alarming. And at 00:00 the bell rang. The telephone operator reported: “Comrade Commander, Kulakhmetov is here urgently.”
A moment later I heard Marat Minyurovich, commander of the Mixed Forces, on the phone: “Anatoly Nikolayevich, General Kurashvili, Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff of Georgia, just came to me, he informed me that Georgia was starting a military operation to restore its territorial integrity.” Massive artillery shelling began. Fire is being fired at the positions of the peacekeepers. This is the beginning of the war.
I ask: “Are you sure about this?”
He told me: - Yes, I’m officially reporting. This is war!
I say: - Got it.
At the same time, the operational duty officer of the army received a report from the duty officer of the peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia about the start of hostilities by the Georgian side.
I immediately give the command to the operational duty officer: - Open the package, begin to carry out actions on the signal for the peacekeeping forces, bring the signal to formations and units, carry out a notification. Report to the operational North Caucasus Military District.
This was at 00:03 minutes.
At 00:07 on August 8, a confirmation signal came from the district headquarters. I sat in my office, comprehending everything that had happened. I remember my feelings at that moment well. There was anger that this fool Saakashvili nevertheless started a war, and now so much blood would be shed, so many people would die, but everything could have been resolved peacefully...
And then all the feelings went away. Combat work began. At the headquarters of the 58th Army, constant combat duty of an operational group of officers was organized. Upon receiving the signal, they immediately went to the Central Bureau of Operations and began preparing combat documents and collecting information.
At 00:15 I arrived at the CBU, the senior operational group reported that they were ready for work. I clarified to him the task of collecting situational data from the peacekeepers and starting actions based on a signal from our forces and means. Subsequently, after gathering the entire operational staff of the army, work began to clarify the plan and subsequently make decisions according to the developing situation. Basically, these were issues of putting on combat readiness, marching along their routes to concentration areas, as well as issues of interaction and comprehensive support.
At 00:15, the district commander, Colonel General Sergei Afanasyevich Makarov, arrived at the Central Bureau of Investigation, I reported to him the situation and received permission to continue combat work. This is how this war began...
Why did the Georgians choose August 8th to attack South Ossetia? Why not earlier and not later? Was there any logic to this or was it just an arbitrarily chosen date?
I have no doubt at all that in the plan for the attack on South Ossetia, when choosing the date, the Georgian command and their advisers took everything into account, and the date of the attack was chosen very carefully. It was a well-worked plan in which all the nuances were taken into account. Even those who seemed to be able to know only those who had served long enough Russian army People.
Well, for example, as I already said, under the guise of exercises, the Georgians worked out the issues of concentrating a powerful strike force on the borders of South Ossetia. At the same time, they deliberately moved the date of the exercises so that their exercises ended 2-3 days earlier than ours. And the war began precisely when the formations and units of my army returned to their permanent deployment points, the equipment was put into boxes and needed maintenance, the weapons were handed over to weapons storage rooms. After the exercises, it usually takes 2-3 days for all organizational matters - the personnel are washed, changed clothes, the officers go home to rest, that is, the troops after the exercises are traditionally at the lowest level of combat readiness.
It was also taken into account where it was located military-political leadership, the state of the forces and means of command and control of the Armed Forces, personnel changes. All this was taken into account by the advisers and their “sub-adviser” Georgians. In addition, the Olympics were beginning. All attention was focused on her. The moment was chosen very precisely.
And I am sure that he was not chosen by Georgians. Remember what organized information campaign was launched around the world immediately after the start of the war? Was Georgia able to organize this? I knew their military leadership - they had their own level of thinking, but here there was a completely different way of thinking, a different school. Today the advisers are denying it: they say they didn’t know anything, but defeat is always an orphan.
It is clear that no one is eager to become the author of a lost war.
While preparing this war, taking everything into account, the Georgian generals and their advisers did not take into account the main thing - we were constantly closely monitoring the situation. Despite " general condition at the hospital,” this was the responsibility of the 58th Army. And we outplayed the Georgians and their American instructors and advisers.
Having completed the exercises and knowing that the Georgians are continuing incomprehensible maneuvers with forces and means, that the situation is ambiguous and alarming, not all formations and units of the army returned to the barracks.
In the mountains on the approach to the Roki tunnel, there were two battalion tactical groups (BTG) from two motorized rifle regiments with their regiment commanders and control groups, with a total number of just over 700 people. Both BTGs were well dispersed, camouflaged and fully equipped with people, equipment, ammunition and fuel. It was these BTGs that decided the outcome of the operation... - Is it possible to explain in more detail what a battalion tactical group is and what it included?
To ensure the counter-terrorist fight in the 58th Army, battalion tactical groups were formed in each regiment, which were 100% staffed with both equipment and personnel. These groups were created based on the experience of the first and second “Chechen” campaigns, each included a motorized rifle battalion with attached reconnaissance, tank, artillery, air defense, engineering, communications, NBC protection units, as well as units maintenance and logistics support with the necessary supplies.
For 6 months they were in 2-hour combat readiness to carry out assigned tasks, then their personnel changed.
These BTGs were ready to perform any task.
And they were the ones who played decisive role in the defeat of the Georgians. In addition, to support the actions of the BTG, artillery units, as well as logistics and technical support units, additionally remained in the mountains.
Therefore, the boss’s statement is completely incomprehensible General Staff Nikolai Makarov, that since the beginning of the war, the North Caucasus Military District fought with some unorganized and understaffed units and that officers were collected from all districts to lead the operation. This statement is simply untrue and casts a shadow on the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army, who honorably fulfilled their duty to the Motherland.
- What happened after the alarm was announced?
Around 1:30, all the headquarters officers were already at their combat positions, I introduced them to the situation, conveyed to them the preliminary elements of the operation plan, and determined the calculations. And the work began. A huge combat mechanism has come into action - the 58th Army!
You need to imagine this scale! Formations and units were located on the territory of 9 subjects Russian Federation, the farthest brigade of the army, the 136th - 380 kilometers away, in Dagestan. And all this began to move.
The presence of the district commander, Colonel General Sergei Afanasyevich Makarov, greatly helped the matter - this is operational and quick solution all issues related to decision-making, as well as organizing interaction with units and formations of the district. Thus, the 42nd Division was operationally subordinate to me, but had Chechnya as its main direction. And the district commander, without hesitation, gave the go-ahead for planning it too. There were many such questions, and in these tense hours Sergei Afanasyevich demonstrated his most best qualities leader and organizer.
- I can’t help but ask about intelligence. You talk about the beginning of the war as if you had no advance information.
As if the plans of the Georgians were unknown to us. How it worked military intelligence? Have Georgia's preparations for war been revealed?
Of course, the war did not suddenly start. Now someone in the General Staff suddenly declares that from now on wars will begin “without a threatened period,” just like that suddenly and out of the blue. Let's leave this nonsense without comment. Every war has its threatened period.
Our situation has been slowly and inevitably heating up over the past 2 years. It was clear that things were heading towards war. Of course, we wanted to avoid it, there were hopes that the diplomats would somehow be able to come to an agreement and not allow a violent scenario, but we based our work not on hopes, but on reality, and it was disappointing. Therefore, about what fighting there will be, we assumed. But, unfortunately, our intelligence did not work.
We had very little specific information about the enemy, about his movements, about his plans. Some scattered messages and telegrams of an indicative nature arrived. Where am I going more information received from his intelligence officers who “trawled” the air, talked with people whose relatives were in Georgia, or with those who had been there themselves. It was much more accurate information than what came from above. We learned more information from radio conversations between Georgian taxi drivers, who discussed among themselves which roads were blocked today due to the passage of troops or where they were taking clients in uniform.
We could have had an order of magnitude more information if we had received permission to work on the territory of South Ossetia, but I testify, and this is true, that before the start of the war we were strictly forbidden to conduct reconnaissance beyond the Caucasus ridge. This foreign territory! You can't go there! It was only possible to conduct radio interception.
Of course, some things were reported by the peacekeepers, who, as part of their duty, monitored the peacekeeping zone and were required to monitor any movements of armed persons and equipment in this zone. But they also did not go beyond their powers. We understood that the Georgians were monitoring our behavior very carefully, and the area was full of their stations.
Therefore, we must say honestly: our intelligence is initial stage the war failed to cope with the task. The Georgian group was practically undetected.
Neither the movement of artillery into position nor the movement of mechanized units was revealed.
We must give the enemy credit - he disguised his preparations for the start of the war well and was able to achieve tactical surprise.
- How did you manage to capture the strategic Guftinsky Bridge?
Before the start of the advance, BTGrya set the commanders a task: to break through to Tskhinvali as quickly as possible, preventing the Georgians from blocking the road and gaining a foothold in positions. Knock down all outposts and checkpoints and, most importantly, capture the strategic Guftinsky bridge, throwing the Georgians as far away from it as possible, after which one BTG will go towards Tamarasheni, and the second along the Dzara road, to the peacekeepers for unblocking and reinforcement.
And so that you understand the level of training of people, I am reporting to you: already at 1:40 the first BTG passed the Roki tunnel and went down in an accelerated march with the deployment of a combat reconnaissance patrol, and the second BTG at that time was entering the tunnel!
They reached the Guftinsky Bridge at 4:40, just at the moment when the Georgians approached him from the other side of the bridge. And the Georgians simply weren’t waiting for us here.
They could not even imagine that 4 hours after the declaration of war, Russian troops would be almost near Tamarasheni. The Georgians came to the bridge and began to block it. The regiment commander, Colonel Andrei Kazachenko, reported that he had gone to the bridge and was observing Georgians on it. I set him a task - to immediately capture the bridge with a tank platoon, shoot down the Georgians and throw them away from the bridge. And the commander completed the task. He literally swept away the Georgians with fire from the bridge and forced them to begin retreating. In this battle we lost an infantry fighting vehicle, which was on forward patrol. She stalled on the bridge, blocking the road, and had to be pushed off the bridge.
- What was happening behind your back at that time? How was the entry of troops into South Ossetia organized?
By morning, troops were already continuously marching along the Transkam.
In the vanguard are three battalion tactical groups and immediately behind them is the artillery regiment of the 19th division and missile units. The BTGs went first to cover the artillery.
The main thing was to get artillery through the “hole” as we called the Roki tunnel as quickly as possible. Beyond the pass, it could be quickly deployed to positions in the mountains and support the warring battalions and columns advancing along the Transkam with fire.
At 10:30 minutes on August 8, the district commander, who worked at the Central Bureau of Investigation with officers, set me the task: “Fly to South Ossetia, no one will figure it out except you. Everything is already debugged here.
The troops have begun moving, the tasks have been defined, and now you must be there to understand the situation on the spot. What is really happening there now, where are the peacekeepers, where are the Georgians? Tasks: first - to prevent the destruction of the peacekeepers, to release them.
Second - civilians. Prevent the destruction of residential areas and villages. The third is to prevent the Georgians, if they capture the city, from preparing it for defense. I know that there are not enough forces and means, but with these forces and means you must complete the specified tasks until the troops arrive.”
It was absolutely the right decision. It is impossible to control troops in such a difficult situation through the Caucasian ridge. And I immediately went to the helipad. By this time we already knew that Georgian aviation was operating in the air. They also knew that the Georgian radars were not destroyed and were functioning and that we could be detected. But I had to fly. The helicopter pilots were aces, we walked along the very bottom of the gorges, literally above the very tops of the trees, and broke through undetected.
At 11:45 on August 8 I was in Java, we flew almost under Georgian bombs. Just a couple of minutes before landing, Georgian attack aircraft bombed Java, and the dust had not yet settled when we landed. With me was a group of staff officers: an artilleryman, a reconnaissance officer, an engineer, and a cameraman. The board sat down, we jumped out, and the board left. I immediately determined on the spot where the battalion groups were located and clarified their tasks - to break through to the city along the Dzarskaya road.
That’s exactly why I had to be there, to react on the spot to changes in the situation and make decisions.
By 22:40, the BTGs concentrated on the Galuan Heights, then dispersed and camouflaged.
The commanders were given a clarified task - to prepare for the morning hostilities, to conduct reconnaissance, and I myself returned along the road to the Roki tunnel. An army task force led by Chief of Staff Major General Zhuravlev worked there, organizing the passage of columns through the Roki tunnel. And at that moment the commander of the district arrived there, we met with him at one in the morning from the 8th to the 9th at the tunnel.
In general, the conduct of troops along the Transkam was a daunting task and an excellent operation.
The tension was enormous. Firstly, this is driving along a mountain serpentine, where experience and caution are required from driver mechanics, since any mistake can end tragically - and in calm times, cars fell into the abyss, people died, but here there are hundreds of units of multi-ton military equipment, heavy traffic , maximum speed, and many drivers by this time already had hundreds of kilometers of march behind them.
The columns stretched upward in a continuous line towards the Roki Pass; at the pass, the road stretched first into a concrete gallery, and behind it into a long, narrow tunnel.
When I approached the tunnel, the columns were literally flying through it. The traffic density was such that due to the gas pollution, the outlines of the car in front were not visible, only its side lights.
There was no time to ventilate, and at the entrance to the tunnel all drivers were given wet gauze bandages to make it easier for them to breathe. But, thanks to the excellent organization and coordination of the task force, we did not lose a single person! Cars broke down, yes, it happened. The technology was not new at all.
Two “Chechen” wars have passed. But collection points for faulty equipment were set up along the highway; tractors were on duty, which immediately evacuated the faulty equipment and towed it to the site, where repairmen dealt with it.
Here it must be said that after the exercises the integrated technical and logistics support center was not closed. We waited for all Georgian units in the adjacent territory to return to their permanent deployment points. I understood that if it thundered behind the ridge, then we would not have time to deploy our rear. And when it starts, in addition to us, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and doctors will go to the mountains to meet and treat big flow refugees. And everyone will be looking convenient sites closer to the Roki tunnel. And the cat made them cry. These are mountains - you can’t turn around there. Therefore, during the exercises, comprehensive technical and logistics support points were deployed in the most suitable places, which did not interfere with the work of other departments.
It was led by Deputy for Logistics General Yuri Rukovishnikov. He had his own security and his own communications, the posts that were located along the routes were determined in advance, means of evacuation were allocated, a rescue battalion was deployed, warehouses with food and fuel and lubricants - and all this was well camouflaged.
The Georgians never took into account or appreciated the unmasking signs.
- So how did you manage to break into Tskhinvali?
I have already said that at the first stage there were only two battalion tactical groups, two batteries of self-propelled guns with 5 guns each and a battery of MLRS - against the entire Georgian group. I understood that if the Georgians figured it out and realized how many of us there were, they would simply crush us and destroy us. They had complete superiority on their side. And not only numerically.
They had the latest technology, excellent communication, excellent organization. These were trained and well-prepared units, and those who call the Georgian army an operetta are talking nonsense today. This was a very serious and dangerous opponent. And I'm not exaggerating at all.
Yes, we had military operations behind us in Chechnya, but this cannot be compared. There were, albeit organized, gangs that could strike from an ambush, but could not conduct full-fledged military operations against regular army. But here the enemy was smart, stubborn, trying to impose his own scheme of military operations, having the most modern weapons and well-trained soldiers.
Before my eyes, Georgian tankers from an ambush destroyed those moving on small open areas on high speed passenger cars. Real snipers!
Our artillery was not in one position for more than 10 minutes, because the Georgians had excellent reconnaissance means and counter-battery warfare was practiced. Within 15 minutes after opening fire, Georgian shells rained down on the place from which our artillery was firing.
Only once did the artillerymen make a mistake - and immediately suffered losses. One battery commander was killed.
There was a battle going on, the infantry asked for fire support, and he fired on the second task from the same place. Immediately after that he began to leave, but he didn’t have time and came under fire, 4 cars left, but he didn’t have time to get out on the fifth one...
And it was possible to fight such an enemy only by breaking all patterns, imposing your initiative, not allowing him to come to his senses, and striking him with small units in several directions. Keeping constant military intelligence, look for gaps in combat formations, since there cannot be a continuous line of combat operations. All this was inherent in actions in the mountains a long time ago; it has only reached some people now.
Therefore, having knocked the Georgians off the bridge, throwing them back to Tamarasheni, I decided to divide the BTG into separate company groups, and sometimes platoon ones. These groups “pull apart” the Georgians as much as possible, pin them down with combat, daring and lightning-fast actions: strike - leave, strike - leave, and also force them to go on the defensive by inflicting fire damage. Instill in them that there are many of us, that we are coming from all sides. Don't let them come to their senses and disrupt their control.
Maintain constant impact with units and fire.
To do this, it was necessary to have well-trained personnel and well-prepared commanders. And I can say with pride that the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army coped with this task.
An important role here was played by patriotism, moral and psychological spirit, loyalty to the oath and ideals of the country, confidence in one’s rightness and readiness for heroism.
In turn, despite the surprise achieved, the widespread participation of advisers and instructors, highly trained troops and good weapons, the Georgian army was defeated. And this is not a miracle, as some people are trying to imagine today. Behind the victory was a huge, long-term work of many people, whom I would like to mention.
The success of the 58th Army's actions is a huge credit to the former commander of the Hero of Russia district, Army General Alexander Ivanovich Baranov.
A brilliant military leader, highly erudite, competent, intelligent, over the years of his command he did a tremendous amount of work, increasing the combat readiness of units and formations of the district, training and educating us, his subordinates. Alexander Ivanovich put a lot of effort and health into our training, helping both with advice and deeds practically, not theoretically. All exercises took place only on standard equipment, as part of regular units. From interacting structures - only people who had the right to make decisions and give instructions to subordinates, and not observers and advisers. His demands on the state of equipment and weapons also played a role, which, despite two campaigns, were serviceable, equipped, combat-ready, the personnel were trained to operate with weapons, and the officers had experience and skills in managing combat operations.
The commander-in-chief took upon himself the entire burden of management, decision-making and organization of interaction of forces and means of branches and branches of the Armed Forces during the war in the South Ossetian direction ground forces General of the Army Boldyrev Vladimir Anatolyevich with his arrival at the Central Budgetary Institution at the headquarters of the 58th Army. Such efficiency is inherent only to highly internally organized, competent and combat-experienced military leaders.
But reality is the fulfillment of the state task by personnel, from general to soldier. Not begging for rewards, but actions that as soon as possible and with least losses were fulfilled.
It's a pity that no deep analysis questions initial period military operations, as well as the experience of forcing Georgia to peace. There is a personal vision of individual military leaders, which they transfer to a new look and present it as conclusions. However, the enemy also made the main conclusion: as of 08/08/08, the Russian Armed Forces are combat-ready, and everything must be done to prevent them from being so.
...And we broke into Tskhinvali from the direction of Khetagurov. Before this, we carried out two diversionary strikes, pretending reinforcements were approaching us, and where we decided to break into the city, on the contrary, we defiantly turned around and dusted, showing that we were leaving from a height. We left it, but only to a small lowland along which a gas pipeline stretched into the mountains. Our reconnaissance had already passed this lowland, and we, along this gas pipe, hiding behind it, climbed to a hollow overgrown with bushes on a hillside. Along this hollow, through the bushes, we reached the outskirts of Tskhinvali, to the area of households, and through private sector The battalion group of the 135th regiment of Colonel Gostev burst into the city.
One company from the BTG went to relieve the peacekeeping battalion, another company provided protection from an attack on the flank from Zemo-Nikozi, the third company remained in reserve and simultaneously covered the artillery and rear. Cooperation was organized with the South Ossetian militia units led by Eduard Kokoity, they struck the city center, knowing its location.
Military Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee for Rocket Forces strategic purpose Based on the results of the pre-investigation check, a criminal case was opened against the commander of the 58th Army of the Southern Military District, Major General Andrei Gurulev. He is suspected of complicity in abuse of power.
As the RG correspondent was told by the Main Military Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Russia, this criminal case is combined in one proceeding with a previously initiated criminal case against another high-ranking military man - the chief of staff - first deputy commander of the troops of the Southern Military District, Lieutenant General Nikolai Pereslegin.
According to the investigation, in 2005, Major General Pereslegin became a student at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Before leaving for study, he agreed with Colonel Gurulev, who at that time was the chief of staff - deputy commander of a military unit, to illegally second two servicemen to his disposal: a private and a warrant officer.
As investigators managed to establish, in total The “conscript” was illegally absent from the military unit for about 28 months. This did not stop him from "growing" into military rank to sergeant and at the same time conclude a contract with the Ministry of Defense. The senior warrant officer did not appear in his unit for almost 26 months. According to military investigators, by hiding their absence from service, even then Colonel Gurulev organized the issuance of untrue orders about their departure on leave, business trips, as well as assigning them regular military ranks.
Meanwhile, at this time both of them were engaged in repairing and assembling furniture in Pereslegin’s service apartment in Moscow. In addition, one of the servicemen carried out personal assignments for the general, and the other guarded the private house Pereslegin in the Tver region, monitoring its condition and cleaning the territory. With Pereslegin's permission, both servicemen were illegally employed in a company headed by his daughter and son-in-law, and even received salaries there.
During preliminary investigation In this case, Lieutenant General Nikolai Pereslegin was charged with exceeding official authority and using a deliberately forged document, the Main Inspectorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia reported.
By the way, investigators discovered other facts, to put it mildly, of Pereslegin’s illegal activities. So, from 2006 to 2008, Pereslegin kept with him six military personnel who worked as bathhouse attendants and also guarded his dacha in the Tver region. In addition, the soldiers repaired and assembled furniture in the general's Moscow apartment. Pereslegin admitted these episodes, but due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, they were not included in the criminal case.
As for General Gurulev, holding him investigative actions scheduled immediately after his return from vacation.
