Non-combat aircraft losses in WWII. Non-combat losses

This article examines Israeli and Syrian air force losses during the 1982 Lebanon War. Chronologically, the review is limited to the period from June 11, 1982, which accounted for the bulk of the fighting between the armed forces of the two countries. All statistics relate to losses of combat aircraft (that is, helicopter losses are not specifically considered).

War Review

Operation Peace of Galilee (also known as the First Lebanon War or the Israeli invasion of Lebanon), which took place from June to August 1982, was not a “classic” Arab-Israeli military conflict. Unlike all previous middle east wars, the main opponent of the Israeli army in 1982 was not regular Arab armed forces, but paramilitary militias, primarily the armed wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Although the Palestinian forces were organized into three "divisions" equipped with heavy weapons (including tanks), they were inferior in combat capabilities to regular units.

The initially declared goal of the Israeli operation in Lebanon was to create a 40-kilometer security zone in the south of the country in order to stop rocket attacks northern regions Israel (Galilee). The invasion began on June 6 and took place in three directions. The Israeli leadership intended to avoid armed clashes with the Syrian peacekeeping forces stationed in Lebanon since 1976; The Syrians also initially took measures to prevent possible military contacts with the Israelis. However, very soon Israeli units encountered resistance from the Syrians in the Central and then in the Western directions. In view of this, it was decided to strike a large Syrian group in the Bekaa Valley, which posed a threat to the right flank of Israeli forces. On June 9, the Israeli army attacked the Syrian positions and achieved significant (though not complete) success within two days. These battles took place from active use both sides have armored vehicles and combat aircraft.

At noon on June 11, a truce came into force in the Eastern and Central directions, but West direction the fighting continued (without the use of large ground forces and aircraft by Syria). A few days later, Israeli troops reached the southern approaches to Beirut. In fact, now the talk was about eliminating the presence of the PLO in Lebanon, which contradicted the initial statements of the Israeli leadership and was perceived very ambiguously in Israel itself. The siege of Beirut lasted two months (until the end of August). Under military pressure from Israel, the PLO was forced to agree to the evacuation of its forces from Lebanon, which marked the end of Operation Peace to Galilee. Further events(the murder of Bashir Gemayel, the tragedy of Sabra and Shatila, the entry of international forces into Lebanon, the signing of the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty) significantly complicated the situation; The Israeli army was drawn into the fight against partisan movement in the occupied areas of Lebanon. IN politically The Lebanon campaign was the most unpopular war in Israeli history up to that time and significantly damaged the country's international prestige. In -1985, the bulk of the Israeli forces were withdrawn from the country; later (from June 1985 to May 2000), a “security strip” remained under the control of the IDF - 850 km² in the south of the country (8% of the territory of Lebanon).

Brief historiography

Israeli air losses

Israeli aviation losses according to Israeli data

With reference to official Israeli data, Oleg Granovsky writes that during the period under review, the country’s air force lost 1 aircraft. It was an A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, shot down on the morning of June 6 by Palestinian militants using MANPADS. Its pilot ejected and was captured, where he spent two and a half months. In addition, during the battles with Syrian aviation, two F-15 fighters were damaged (one was shot down by an R-60 missile that hit the nozzle of one of the engines, the second was damaged by a close explosion of the MiG-21 it shot down), but both of them returned safely to base. Granovsky notes that information about damaged aircraft may be incomplete.

After June 11, two more aircraft were lost. The Kfir fighter-bomber was damaged by a Syrian anti-aircraft missile on June 13 and crashed during landing (the pilot successfully ejected). An F-4 Phantom II reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by two anti-aircraft missiles on July 24, killing one crew member and capturing another.

The victories of Syrian aviation over Israeli aircraft are listed in sufficient detail in the works of V. Ilyin (“MiG-23 in the Middle East” and “Multi-role fighters foreign countries» ):

• June 7- two planes were shot down (both F-16s)
• June 8- three aircraft were shot down (one F-16, two A-4)
• June 9- six aircraft were shot down (two F-15s, two F-16s, one F-4, one Kfir)
• June 10- ten aircraft were shot down (including at least three F-15s and one F-16; the types of other aircraft were not disclosed)
• June 11- three planes were shot down (all three were F-4s)

According to Ilyin, the Syrian Air Force shot down 24 Israeli aircraft, including five F-15s, six F-16s, four F-4s, two A-4s, one Kfir and six aircraft whose types have not been established (in any case, they are not named by V. Ilyin). At the same time, according to G. Yashkin, at a meeting between Hafez Assad and the leadership of the General Staff, it was reported that in four days of fighting, Syrian aviation shot down 23 enemy aircraft. The reason for the discrepancies remains unclear, but in any case we can say that according to Soviet (and possibly Syrian) data from the Syrian Air Force in air battles shot down 23 or 24 Israeli planes.

However, V. Ilyin, summing up the work of Syrian fighter aircraft, reports that it shot down 42 Israeli aircraft during the period under review. Thus, he contradicts both his own list of Syrian victories, given in two sources, and the data of the main military adviser in Syria. Moreover, this figure is given in most of his publications (see, for example, sections on the F-15 and F-16 aircraft in the illustrated reference book “ Combat aviation foreign countries"). Only in your own early work“Fighters” (1996), written together with M. Levin, he twice (in articles about the MiG-23 and F-16) talks about 23 Israeli losses in air battles. This figure is also present in the article “MiG-23 in the Middle East,” but here, three paragraphs later, it talks about 42 shot down. One way or another, the figure of 42 planes shot down by Syrian aircraft is not confirmed by anything, contradicts known factual information and can hardly be considered plausible and reflective of the data of Soviet military advisers in Syria.

Syrian air losses

The most complete data on Syrian aviation losses in specified period are given in Ilyin’s book “Fighters of Foreign Countries” and are confirmed by a number of other publications:

• MiG-21 - 37 aircraft lost (including 26 MiG-21bis and 11 MiG-21MF)
• MiG-23 - 24 aircraft lost (including 6 MiG-23MS, 4 MiG-23MF and 14 MiG-23BN)
• Su-22M - 7 aircraft lost

It should be noted that according to the chief military adviser in Syria, G. Yashkin, in just one day, June 10, the Syrian Air Force lost 4 MiG-23MF and 8 MiG-23MS (that is, more than according to Ilyin for the entire period of fighting).

Thus, the Syrian Air Force lost 68 aircraft in total. V. Ilyin claims that all these losses were suffered in air battles, and even attributes all the downed MiG-23BN and Su-22 to the account of Israeli F-16s, but this statement is erroneous. As O. Granovsky points out, in his other book (“MiG-29, Mirage-2000, F-16. Stars of the fourth generation”), Ilyin speaks only about nine MiG-23BNs shot down by F-16s. The article by V. Markovsky “Hot June 1982” provides information about the circumstances of the loss of all fourteen MiG-23BN. For most aircraft, the reason for the loss is indicated rather unclearly (probably in some cases it was not established by the Syrians themselves), the loss of several aircraft is attributed to the actions of Israeli air defense systems, and only for one MiG-23BN the cause of loss is clearly indicated as a defeat by a missile fired by an F- fighter 16. The article by O. Granovsky describes the case of the Israeli air defense shooting down one MiG-21. Of the seven Su-22s lost by the Syrians, three aircraft, according to A. Yavorsky’s article “Sukhoi are on fire,” were damaged by fragments of bombs dropped from the leading aircraft, after which the pilots of all three aircraft ejected; It is interesting that all three aircraft are officially listed as lost from enemy anti-aircraft fire. Another Su-22 crashed due to lack of fuel while returning to the airfield. In addition, Yavorsky reports that 12 Syrian aircraft from among total losses were shot down by their own air defense (V. Markovsky, with reference to Soviet military advisers, gives a less categorical estimate - 10-12 aircraft).

Due to these ambiguities, it is impossible to determine how many Syrian aircraft were shot down by enemy fighters and how many were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, although such an attempt was made. Ilyin and Levin’s book “Fighters” (1996) states that Syria lost 67 aircraft(this should include the inclusion of helicopters in the figure), including 47 in air battles and 20 from Israeli air defense systems. Most likely, this assessment is based on earlier article G. Yashkina. The following remarks can be made here. Firstly, there is a discrepancy with modern sources in the total number of losses (67 aircraft compared to 68 aircraft, and it is known that Syria actually lost several helicopters - according to Yavorsky, 18 Gazelles). Secondly, the number of losses from enemy air defense systems is clearly overestimated (see Israeli statistics below) - losses from its own air defense could have been included in it. Thirdly, it is indicated above that, for example, for the MiG-23BN attack aircraft, the reasons for the loss may not be named in all cases. Due to these circumstances, G. Yashkin’s data on losses of Syrian aviation in air battles and from fire from the ground may be questionable.

Syrian aviation losses according to Israeli estimates

The number of air victories of the Israeli Air Force in battles with Syrian aircraft in June 1982 is usually stated as "more than 80". Those sources that try to provide an exact number often contradict each other. According to the most plausible data given by Granovsky, in total, in the period 6-11.6.1982, Israeli aircraft shot down 82 aircraft, including 80 enemy aircraft and 2 helicopters:

• F-15s shot down 36 planes and 1 helicopter
• F-16s shot down 43 planes and 1 helicopter
• F-4s shot down 1 plane

By day it looks like this:

• June 7- 1 plane shot down
• June 8- 3 planes shot down
• June 9- 29 aircraft shot down
• June 10- 29 planes and 1 helicopter shot down
• June 11- 18 planes and 1 helicopter shot down

By the end of June, Israeli aircraft shot down two more Syrian aircraft(total 84 aircraft for June), and for the entire summer - 87 aircraft. Some publications talk about 102 air victories of the Israeli Air Force during the Lebanon War. In fact, it is known that between June 27, 1979 (the first air battle over Lebanon) and June 11, 1982 (the cessation of active air war), Israeli pilots were officially credited with 103 victories over enemy aircraft.

It is not possible to determine how many aircraft of which types were shot down by the F-15 and F-16. Some English-language sources allow you to collect such statistics, but their reliability and accuracy will be unsatisfactory.

Regarding other losses of Syrian aviation, Granovsky, with reference to the book “Fighters over Israel,” reports that for the entire June 1982 ground forces and Israeli air defense counted 7 enemy aircraft shot down, including helicopters, and another 3 enemy aircraft were lost unknown reasons(double counting is possible here). In total, Israeli statistics report the loss of approximately 90 aircraft by the Syrians in June.

Overall loss estimate

As can be seen from the above statistics, during the period from June 6 to June 11, 1982, the Israeli Air Force admitted the loss of 1 combat aircraft, while the Syrian side announced the destruction of 50-51 aircraft (23-24 in air battles and 27 by air defense fire). During the same period, the Syrian Air Force admitted the loss of 68 combat aircraft, but the Israeli side reported the destruction of 80 aircraft in air battles and up to 7 aircraft by air defense fire (there is no data confirming that all 7 aircraft, including helicopters, were shot down in period under review).

Information about your own losses, as a rule, is quite accurate, unless we are talking about cases military propaganda. Information about air victories won is much less accurate; this is often associated not only with propaganda, but also with completely objective circumstances that make it difficult to determine the fate of an attacked or damaged enemy aircraft. For example, in the study by Igor Seydov “Red Devils in the Sky of Korea” (M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007), dedicated to Korean War, there are many cases in which both American and Soviet pilots confidently chalked up an enemy plane that actually returned safely to its airfield. There were also opposite cases when the pilot did not even suspect that the plane he had shot down crashed as a result of the damage received or was written off.

V. Ilyin describes the balance of capabilities of the parties during air battles over Lebanon as follows:

Some advantage in air battles in favor of Israel can be explained, in addition to the difference in the combat capabilities of aircraft, by the wider use of AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft, and better developed tactics combat use fighter aircraft, as well as higher flight and tactical training of Israeli fighter pilots.

From this it follows:

To this we can add that Israeli aviation had a significant numerical superiority. The most modern Syrian fighters were 24 MiG-23MF, which the Israeli Air Force countered with about 40 F-15s and about 70 F-16s. All these factors explain why, even according to Soviet data, the results of the air war were in favor of the Israelis. As stated above, the Syrian pilots were credited with destroying five F-15s, six F-16s, and six more unspecified aircraft. It is unlikely that all six unidentified aircraft were F-15 and F-16 fighters, but even if this possibility is accepted, it turns out that Israel lost from 11 to 17 fighter-class aircraft (Kfirs and Skyhawks were used exclusively in the role attack aircraft, and “Phantoms” were involved in air battles only sporadically). If we take into account that the losses of Syrian fighter aircraft amounted to 47 aircraft (six MiG-23MF, four MiG-23MS, thirty-seven MiG-21, of which one was shot down by Israeli anti-aircraft units and, possibly, several more by their own air defense), it turns out that that the ratio of fighter losses ranged from 1:2.5 to 1:4 in favor of the Israeli Air Force. Of course, even such statistics contradict official Israeli figures.

The official assessment of the air victories of the Israeli Air Force is generally confirmed by modern data from Russian military experts (Colonel Pyotr Moiseenko, Candidate of Military Sciences; Major General Valentin Tarasov, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor), who report that in the first week of fighting, 86 Syrian aircraft were shot down. However, it is difficult to establish performance for the F-15 and F-16 fighters. Israeli data suggests approximately equal numbers of victories for both types (36 and 43, respectively, excluding helicopters), despite the fact that the F-16 was twice as large as the F-15. This cannot be traced from Soviet data due to their incompleteness (in particular, it is impossible to establish what type of aircraft were used to shoot down the MiG-23MF pilots Nazakh, Said and Zofie on June 9, and it is also doubtful who shot down the pilot Dib). There are also obvious errors in Soviet statistics: for example, the MiG-23MF, lost on June 8, is considered to be shot down by an F-16, but O. Granovsky reports that all three victories that day were won by F-15s.

According to independent researcher Tom Cooper, Syrian MiG-21 fighters claim 2 confirmed air victories (1 Kfir and 1 Phantom). According to researcher Efim Gordon, the Syrians also claim 2 air victories. .

David Nicol's book "Arab MiG-19s and MiG-21s in Combat" contains a photograph of the wreckage of a Phantom shot down by a MiG-21 on June 10.

According to researchers Steve Davis and Doug Dildy, Syria lost 88 aircraft. Israeli losses are estimated at 1 F-16, 1 F-4, 1 Kfir, 2 A-4 and several helicopters.

Victory, of course, has absolutely important in war, but the face of the victorious state depends on the price that was paid for it. IN in this case the price of victory in the air can be determined primarily by the number of lost crews and aircraft during the period of hostilities. The price of victory in the air is the most important criterion for the level of combat skill and military art of command personnel and aircrews, which determines the winner as having achieved victory with much less losses than the enemy.

Unfortunately, we have to reckon with the fact that the price for the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was paid very, very high. Victory in the air did not become a completely separate indicator in this regard. Judge for yourself.

If on the part of the Red Army Air Force on the Soviet-German front 129,400 aircraft took part in combat operations, which carried out 3.8 million sorties (29 on average per aircraft), then on the part of the German Air Force - 48,450, which carried out 1. 8 million sorties (37 average per aircraft).

During the war years on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of aircraft losses was 1 to 1.15. If the combat losses of the Space Forces Air Force amounted to 46,100, and non-combat losses - 60,300, then the German Air Force on the Soviet-German front lost 52,850 aircraft, and in total since 1941 - 85,650 aircraft on the Eastern and Western fronts.

According to Germany itself, losses in German Air Force aircraft, taking into account damage from 10% to the complete destruction of the aircraft, for the entire Second World War world war, from 01.09.39, amount to 71965.

Moreover, if the USSR aircraft industry produced only 122,100 aircraft from 1941 to 1945, then the German aircraft industry produced 100,749. According to other data, 113,514. Therefore, we can talk about more, aircraft produced and fewer combat losses by the Soviet Union.

However, we must not forget that Germany fought on two fronts: from 1939 - 64 months, and its non-combat losses were several times less losses Air Force spacecraft, which can speak generally about high level aircraft equipment and an equally high level of training for Luftwaffe flight personnel.

If the irretrievable losses of the air force crew of the spacecraft from 1941 to 1945 amounted to 48,158, including 28,193 pilots, then Germany lost more than 66 thousand flight personnel in the same period killed and missing on two fronts. According to other sources, the Luftwaffe from 1939 to 1945 lost only about 24 thousand killed and 27 thousand missing.

Even based on these figures, one can imagine the cost of victory in the air for the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

The results of the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force in the initial period of the war were negatively affected, first of all, by the predominance of obsolete types of aircraft in their composition, the crowded deployment of aviation units and formations, and the cumbersome and sluggish organizational structure front-line aviation. In addition, the level of training of the flight personnel did not meet the requirements imposed by the war.

The acceleration of the growth in the number of aviation personnel occurred to the detriment of the quality of their training, which, in turn, resulted in a decrease in the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of air units and air formations. On the eve of the war, the Air Force command staff found itself unsure of itself. The flight personnel were slowly retrained for new combat equipment and were poorly prepared for flights in adverse weather conditions, at night, and for the combat use of complex types of maneuver. The acquired combat experience in military conflicts of the interwar period was little suited to the conditions modern warfare, and in addition, when generalized, it led to incorrect conclusions, primarily in the tactics of the aviation branches.

All this led to high losses of Soviet aviation in the first two years of the war, increasing the “price of victory” for the Red Army Air Force.

Despite the fact that the size of the Air Force spacecraft fleet was constantly increasing due to the growth in the volume of aircraft received from the aircraft industry and under Lend-Lease, the composition of the German Air Force group on the Soviet-German front was actually consistently decreasing. As a result, this led to a twofold or more numerical superiority of the Soviet Air Force air group starting in 1943 in all strategic operations. By the end of the war, the number of new types of aircraft had increased to almost 97%.

During the war years, a number of modern aircraft entered service with the Air Force, which were not inferior to similar aircraft in Germany. The Soviet aviation industry managed to significantly improve fighting qualities aircraft without increasing their weight.

Besides, soviet planes, born just before the war, had reserves for modification, while German aircraft, created much earlier, had actually exhausted such capabilities already at the beginning of the war. At the same time, shortcomings in combat use, organization of interaction and control of aviation in individual operations contributed to an increase in unjustified losses of spacecraft aviation and certainly affected the cost of victory.

One of the reasons for the high losses can also be called the lack of centralized leadership of the Soviet Air Force. The division of aviation, before the creation of air armies, into army and front-line aviation prevented the massing of front-line aviation in the main directions.

A huge role in the Air Force personnel training system was played by the formation of reserve and training air regiments, the continuous pilot training system and the reduction of training time in aviation schools and colleges. In essence, on the one hand, these measures were justified under those conditions. On the other hand, they can also be considered a factor in increasing losses.

Researchers of Air Force spacecraft losses point out that many of them resulted from significant shortcomings in the theory and practice of combat use of the Air Force. The lack of initiative in the spacecraft air force in the initial period of the war led to its huge losses. In addition to errors in the theory of the construction and use of the Air Force, one can also pay attention to the neglect of the experience of the war taking place in the West. This is especially true for air supremacy and the practice of distributing the main Luftwaffe efforts among tasks.

The most important is the fact that the fight against enemy aviation was carried out, as a rule, by fighter aviation, covering the most important groupings of troops on the fronts and providing support for other types of aviation.

However, for a number of reasons such active actions, like hunting, blocking airfields, imposing air battles, unlike the enemy, were carried out extremely rarely. It can be said that radar sights and electronic warfare equipment were almost completely absent in Soviet aviation, which, in turn, imposed significant restrictions on the use of the air force both at night and in difficult weather conditions. And this also led to unjustified losses...

Thus, it can be argued that the spacecraft air force suffered significant combat losses and even more significant non-combat losses.

N. Bodrikhin considers the amazing results of the Luftwaffe aces to be untenable. He writes: “After all, the results of the combat work of more than 40 thousand fighter pilots who fought on the side of Germany during the Second World War are described by law normal distribution, and if we assume that the best of them actually achieved the stated number of victories (352 - E. Hartman, 301 - G. Barnhorn, 13 more pilots - over 200,88 - more than 100, etc.), then total quantity the number of aircraft shot down in air battles will exceed the actual number by several times.” He claims “that the losses of Allied aircraft in World War II, according to American data, consisted of non-combat losses (40-50%), losses from anti-aircraft artillery fire (15-20%), the number of those shot down in air battles (20-30%) and lost at airfields. (7-12%).

In this case, the loss of aircraft of countries anti-Hitler coalition in air battles European theater should not exceed 30-35 thousand vehicles, and the estimated number of those shot down by Luftwaffe pilots exceeds 60-80 thousand.”

Of course, patriotism is a good and necessary thing. Today it is just not enough. But as far as the historical past is concerned, in this regard it is still truth is more valuable. Studies show that Germany, by the nature of Air Force losses, lost 57%, or 30,125 aircraft in air battles on the Soviet-German front, 17% were aircraft losses at airfields (8984) and 26% from anti-aircraft artillery fire.

Consequently, in this case, American data are not suitable for assessing the criterion for losses of both the German Air Force and the Space Force.

It should be noted that greatest distribution During the war, he received a method of destroying enemy aircraft in the air. This method accounts for 96% of all sorties carried out by Soviet aviation in the struggle for air supremacy. In this case, Luftwaffe pilots during the Second World War could well have won about 70 thousand victories, including 25 thousand on the Western Front and 45 thousand on the Eastern Front. However, some researchers argue that real numbers victories of Luftwaffe pilots amount to 19 thousand on the Western Front, and about 32 thousand on the Eastern Front. In total, about 5,000 German pilots had five or more victories to their credit.

The list Soviet aces has more than 2,000 names, of which about 800 pilots achieved 15 or more victories, another 400 - from 10 to 15, and about 200 pilots shot down 20 or more enemy aircraft.

In no case should we forget that after the First World War in the young Republic of Soviets, and then in the Soviet Union, there was no continuity of generations in the field of fighter aviation. There was no school... We started from scratch. In Germany, on the contrary, great attention devoted to the training of fighter pilots. They perfectly understood their value in a future war, which means they valued them. And the question of continuity as such did not arise at all. It is not surprising that in this case the German ace was first and foremost an individualist and, if you like, a “hunter.” He was not afraid to improvise tactics in the name of aerial victory.

The spacecraft air force carried out the smallest number of combat missions for “hunting.” For example, in the 28th IAP, in which I had the opportunity to serve as a lieutenant after college, only 86 sorties were carried out for this task (in 1944 - 48, in 1945 - 38). Of 14,045 combat missions, this is only 6%.

According to the authoritative opinion of Hero of the Soviet Union, General G.A. Baevsky, “the Luftwaffe was not only a group of outstanding pilots, they, and leading German aces A. Galland and E. Hartmann agreed with this, also had “thousands of young, unknown German pilots who died without winning a single victory.” battle!

This once again shows how difficult the profession of a fighter pilot is.” French fighter pilot Pierre Yuesterman shares this opinion in principle: “There seemed to be no “middle” in the Luftwaffe, and German pilots could be divided into two very clear categories.

Aces, components from total number 15-20% of pilots were indeed superior to the average Allied pilots. And the rest didn't deserve it special attention. Brave, but unable to get the most out of their aircraft. The reason for this was primarily a hasty selection due to heavy losses in the Battle of Britain and in the Russian campaign. Their training was very short and not very well balanced; paramount importance was given to the cultivation of morale, devotion to the great German idea and adherence to military theories, while underestimating technical instruction. From the end; In 1943, these mistakes were compounded by an acute shortage of fuel. So it existed, gradually carrying huge losses in difficult trials in the skies of Europe, a heroic detachment of “experienced people” of the Luftwaffe, real veterans with three or four thousand hours of flight behind them. These pilots, who went through the Spanish school civil war, who survived successful Luftwaffe campaigns since 1940, knew their job thoroughly, in all its intricacies - careful and self-confident flying masters, they were very dangerous.

On the other hand, there were young fanatics with a high fighting spirit and bound by iron discipline, who could be sent into battle with relative ease in many difficult circumstances.

Overall, in late 1944 and early 1945 the average standard of German fighter pilots was much higher than at any other time since 1940. This can be explained - apart from the importance of battle morale and a sense of patriotism - by the fact that the elite fighter pilot units had unsurpassed authority and primacy in everything - until the distribution of fuel and lubricants.”

During the war, the 28th IAP destroyed only 511 aircraft and lost 56 pilots.

During the war, the 5th Guards IAP scored 539 confirmed victories and lost 89 pilots (36 in air battles, 23 did not return from a combat mission, 7 died from anti-aircraft artillery fire, 7 during bombing, attack and shelling, 16 - in disasters).

The 32nd IAP destroyed 518 enemy aircraft during the war and lost 61 pilots.

The 9th IAP shot down 558 enemy aircraft in total.

The most effective regiment in the Red Army Air Force was the 402nd Red Banner Sevastopol IAP, which destroyed 810 enemy aircraft in battle.

So why couldn’t the most successful Luftwaffe fighter squadron (52nd) destroy 10,000 aircraft during the war? After all, it is necessary to divide into three groups, in our opinion - into three regiments. And it will turn out to be more than three thousand per group, per regiment. Moreover, only one squadron in the Luftwaffe was so effective, and not all. Why not agree... For example, in another elite fighter squadron (“Green Heart” - 54th) from June 22, 1941 to 1945, 416 pilots did not return from combat missions. In 1942, 93 pilots were lost there, in 1943 - 112, and in 1944 - 109. And during the very first month of the war in Russia, from June 22 to July 22, 1941, 37 pilots of this squadron (out of 112 those on the list) were killed or went missing. That is, in each regiment or group there is an average of more than ten per unit.

For example, in 1943, Major Hans Hann (108 victories) was captured from this squadron on February 21, Oberleutnant Hans Beisswenger (152 victories) was shot down and died on March 17, Major Reinhard Seiler (109 victories) was also shot down on July 5 , and Lieutenant Max Stots (189 victories) bailed out and was captured on August 19. We still believe that if a German pilot with so many victories was shot down, then he could not have had so many.

In the Soviet Union, only 2,332 pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 810 (35%) are in fighter aviation. Total twice - 61. Of these, 22 (36%) in fighter aviation. A total of three times - 2, and all in IA.

In Germany, 1,730 pilots became holders of the Knight's Cross. Of these, 568 (33%) are in fighter aviation.

192 pilots were awarded the Oak Branch. Of these, 120 (63%) are in fighter aviation; “swords” - 41, including 25 (61%) in fighter aviation; “diamonds” - 12, including 9 (75%) in fighter aviation.

And here, in the awarding of ace pilots of both sides, we see similar restraint. They didn’t hang them here or there high awards just anyone. This means that Goebbels’s propaganda was not completed, since in the Third Reich Knight’s Crosses should have been poured out several times more. At two or three! But no. In the two countries, awards were awarded, as a rule, for a certain number of victories, and each victory, as is known, had a high price.

While looking through the electronic library I came across quite interesting material about how the Germans and ours considered their victories in air battles during the Second World War, the author cited quite interesting facts indicating that not all was well with the count of downed aircraft for both the Lutwaffe aces and the Red Army aviators, below I present to your attention an excerpt from this material.

When, in a small article in the newspaper "Arguments and Facts" in 1990, data on the personal accounts of German fighter pilots were first published in the domestic press, for many the three-digit figures came as a shock. It turned out that blond 23-year-old Major Erich Hartmann laid claim to 352 downed aircraft, including 348 Soviet and four American.
His colleagues in the 52nd Luftwaffe Fighter Squadron, Gerhard Barkhorn and Günther Rall, claimed 301 and 275 kills, respectively.
These figures contrasted sharply with the results of the best Soviet fighter pilots, 62 victories of I.N. Kozhedub and 59 - A.I. Pokryshkina.


Erich Hartmann in the cockpit of his Bf.109G-6.

Heated discussions immediately broke out about the method of counting those shot down, confirmation of the successes of fighter pilots by ground services, machine guns, etc. The main thesis, intended to relieve tetanus from three-digit numbers, was: “These were the wrong bees, and they made the wrong honey.” That is, the Luftwaffe aces all lied about their successes, and in reality they shot down no more planes than Pokryshkin and Kozhedub.

However, few people have thought about the expediency and validity of a head-to-head comparison of the results of the combat activities of pilots who fought in different conditions, with different intensity of combat work.

No one has tried to analyze the value of such an indicator as " greatest number shot down", from the point of view of the body of the air force of that particular country as a whole. What is hundreds of shot down, the girth of a bicep or the body temperature of a patient with a fever?

Attempts to explain the difference in the number of people shot down by a flawed counting technique do not stand up to criticism. Serious failures in confirming the results of fighter pilots are found on both sides of the conflict.

An enemy plane was considered shot down, which, for example, according to a report from a fighter pilot who claimed to destroy it, “fell randomly down and disappeared into the clouds.”

Often, it was the change in the flight parameters of the enemy aircraft observed by witnesses of the battle, a sharp decline, or a spin that began to be considered a sign sufficient to qualify for victory. It is not difficult to guess that after a “disorderly fall” the plane could have been leveled by the pilot and returned safely to the airfield.

In this regard, the fantastic accounts of the air gunners of the “Flying Fortresses” are indicative, chalking up “Messerschmitts” every time they left the attack, leaving a trail of smoke behind them. This trace was a consequence of the peculiarities of the Me.109 engine, which produced a smoky exhaust in afterburner and in an inverted position.

Naturally, when conclusions about the results of the attack were made on the basis of general words, problems arose even with recording the results of air battles conducted over one’s territory. Let's take the most typical example, the air defense of Moscow, the pilots of the well-trained 34th Fighter Aviation Regiment. Here are lines from a report presented at the end of July 1941 by the regiment commander, Major L.G. Rybkin to the air corps commander:

"... During the second flight on July 22 at 2.40 in the Alabino - Naro-Fominsk area at an altitude of 2500 m, Captain M.G. Trunov caught up with the Ju88 and attacked from the rear hemisphere. The enemy dropped to low level. Captain Trunov jumped forward and lost the enemy. It is possible believe the plane was shot down."

"...During the second takeoff on July 22 at 23.40 in the Vnukovo area, junior lieutenant A.G. Lukyanov was attacked by a Ju88 or Do215. In the Borovsk area (10-15 km north of the airfield), three long bursts were fired at the bomber. With The hits were clearly visible on the ground. The enemy returned fire, and then sharply descended. It can be assumed that the plane was shot down."

“...Junior Lieutenant N.G. Shcherbina on July 22 at 2.30 in the Naro-Fominsk area, from a distance of 50 m, fired two bursts at a twin-engine bomber. At this time, anti-aircraft artillery opened fire on the MiG-3, and the enemy plane was lost. We can assume the plane was shot down."

However, reports of this kind were typical for the Soviet Air Force initial period war. And although in each case the air division commander notes that “there is no confirmation” (there is no information about the crash of enemy aircraft), in all these episodes victories were credited to the pilots and the regiment.

The result of this was a very significant discrepancy between the number of downed Luftwaffe bombers declared by Moscow air defense pilots and their real losses.

In July 1941, the Moscow air defense carried out 89 battles during 9 raids by German bombers, in August - 81 battles during 16 raids. 59 vultures were reported shot down in July and 30 in August.

Enemy documents confirm 20-22 aircraft in July and 10-12 in August. The number of victories of air defense pilots turned out to be overestimated by about three times.

Opponents of our pilots on the other side of the front and allies spoke in the same spirit. In the first week of the war, June 30, 1941, a grandiose air battle took place over Dvinsk (Daugavpils) between the DB-3, DB-3F, SB and Ar-2 bombers of three air force regiments Baltic Fleet and two groups of the 54th Fighter Squadron of the 1st Air Fleet of the Germans.

In total, 99 Soviet bombers took part in the raid on the bridges near Daugavpils. German fighter pilots alone claimed to have shot down 65 Soviet aircraft. Erich von Manstein writes in “Lost Victories”: “In one day our fighters and flak 64 planes were shot down."

The actual losses of the Baltic Fleet Air Force amounted to 34 aircraft shot down, and another 18 were damaged, but landed safely at their own or the nearest Soviet airfield.

It appears that the victories declared by the pilots of the 54th Fighter Squadron exceed the actual losses by no less than twofold. Soviet side. A fighter pilot recording an enemy aircraft that reached his airfield safely was a common occurrence.

The battles between the “Flying Fortresses”, “Mustangs”, “Thunderbolts” of the USA and the Reich air defense fighters gave rise to a completely identical picture.

In a fairly typical Western Front air battle, which unfolded during the raid on Berlin on March 6, 1944, fighter escort pilots reported 82 destroyed, 8 presumed destroyed and 33 damaged German fighters.

Bomber gunners reported 97 German air defense fighters destroyed, 28 presumed destroyed, and 60 damaged.

If you add these requests together, it turns out that the Americans destroyed or damaged 83% of the German fighters that took part in repelling the raid! The number declared as destroyed (that is, the Americans were confident of their destruction) - 179 vehicles - was more than double real number shot down, 66 Me.109, FV-190 and Me.110 fighters.

In turn, the Germans immediately after the battle reported the destruction of 108 bombers and 20 escort fighters. Another 12 bombers and fighters were among those believed to have been shot down.

In fact, the US Air Force lost 69 bombers and 11 fighters during this raid. Note that in the spring of 1944 both sides had photo machine guns.

Sometimes attempts are made to explain the high scores of German aces by some kind of system in which a twin-engine aircraft was counted for two “victories”, a four-engine aircraft - as many as four.

This is not true. The system for counting victories of fighter pilots and points for the quality of those shot down existed in parallel. After the downing of the Flying Fortress, the Reich air defense pilot painted one, and I emphasize, one stripe on the fin.

But at the same time he was awarded points, which were subsequently taken into account when rewarding and assigning subsequent titles.

In the same way, in the Red Army Air Force, parallel to the system of recording victories of aces, there was a system cash bonuses for downed enemy aircraft depending on their value for the air war.

These pathetic attempts to “explain” the difference between 352 and 62 only indicate linguistic illiteracy. Coming to us from English-language literature about German aces the term “victory” is a product of double translation.

If Hartmann scored 352 “victories”, this does not mean that he laid claim to 150-180 single- and twin-engine aircraft. The original German term is abschuss, which the 1945 German-Russian Military Dictionary interprets as “shot down.”

The British and Americans translated it as victory, which later migrated into our literature about the war. Accordingly, the marks on the keel of an aircraft in the form of vertical stripes were called “abschussbalken” by the Germans.

Serious errors in identifying their own downed victims were experienced by the pilots themselves, who saw enemy aircraft if not from tens, then from hundreds of meters. What then can we say about the Red Army soldiers VNOS, where they recruited soldiers unsuitable for combat service. Often they simply wished for reality and identified an unknown type of aircraft falling into the forest as an enemy one.

A researcher of the air war in the North, Yuri Rybin, gives this example. After the battle that took place near Murmansk on April 19, 1943, observers at VNOS posts reported the crash of four enemy aircraft. Four victories were confirmed to the pilots by the notorious “ground services.” In addition, all participants in the battle stated that Guard Captain Sorokin shot down the fifth Messerschmitt. Although he was not confirmed by VNOS posts, he was also recorded in the combat account of the Soviet fighter pilot.

The groups that went in search of the downed fighters after some time found instead of four downed enemy fighters... one Messerschmitt, one Airacobra and two Hurricanes. That is, VNOS posts phlegmatically confirmed the fall of four planes, including those shot down by both sides.

All of the above applies to both sides of the conflict. Despite a theoretically more advanced system for recording downed victims, Luftwaffe aces often reported something unimaginable.

Let's take two days as an example, May 13 and 14, 1942, the height of the Battle of Kharkov. On May 13, the Luftwaffe announced 65 downed Soviet aircraft, 42 of which were attributed to the III Group of the 52nd Fighter Squadron.

The next day the pilots Group III The 52nd Fighter Squadron reports 47 Soviet aircraft shot down during the day. The commander of the 9th squadron of the group, Hermann Graf, declared six victories, his wingman Alfred Grislavski chalked up two MiG-3s, Lieutenant Adolf Dickfeld declared nine (!) victories for that day.

The real losses of the Red Army Air Force on May 14 were threefold smaller number, 14 aircraft (5 Yak-1, 4 LaGG-3, 3 Il-2, 1 Su-2 and 1 R-5). MiG-3 is simply not on this list.

They didn't remain in debt either" Stalin's falcons". On May 19, 1942, twelve Yak-1 fighters of the 429th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which had just arrived at the front, got involved in a battle with large group"Messerschmitts" and after a half-hour air battle they declare the destruction of five "He-115" and one "Me.109". The “Xe-115” should be understood as a modification of the “Bf.109F”, which was very different in its sleek fuselage with a smooth transition between the propeller spinner and the engine cowling from the angular “Bf.109E”, which is more familiar to our pilots.

However, enemy data confirms the loss of only one Xe-115, that is, Bf.109F-4/R1 from the 7th Squadron of the 77th Fighter Squadron. The pilot of this fighter, Karl Stefanik, went missing.

The 429th Regiment's own losses amounted to four Yak-1s, three pilots successfully landed by parachute, one was killed.

Everything is as always, the enemy’s losses were stated to be slightly greater than their own losses. This was often one of the ways to justify the high losses of their aircraft in the face of the command.

For unjustified losses, they could be put on trial, but if these losses were justified by equally high losses of the enemy, an equivalent exchange, so to speak, then repressive measures could be safely avoided.

Once again I received a comparative number of Air Force losses in World War II. I perfectly understand the desire to feel a sense of pride in one’s ancestors, but lying has never contributed to this. The numbers below appeared out of nowhere several years ago and are floating around the Internet, surrounded by guesses and fiction. I will provide “invigorating” figures at the end, as well as a table of US Air Force losses.

But for starters - it doesn't exist reliable facts about Air Force losses Hitler's Germany. There are no primary data for 1944 at all. And the existing documents of different departments of the Reich differ from each other significantly.
Attack by an Il-2 attack aircraft on a German airfield

Here are some examples:

On the eve of the October holidays, the Lenfront command received intelligence data about the alleged German raid on Leningrad on November 7. It was decided to forestall the enemy by first striking the Siverskaya airfield.

At 11.25 on November 6, seven Pe-2s from the 125th BAP (leading regiment commander, Major V.A. Sandalov), accompanied by ten MiG-3 fighters from the 7th IAP, attacked German aircraft parking lots. The “pawns” dropped 28 ZAB-100, 210 8-kilogram fragmentation bombs and 280 2.5-kilogram bombs (fragmentation and incendiary) onto the airfield.

The Germans clearly missed the raid. According to a report from our pilots, anti-aircraft artillery fire was opened late and was conducted in a disorganized manner. At 10.40, nine I-153s from the 7th IAP stormed firing points on the outskirts of the airfield. During the retreat, our pilots fought with the Messerschmitts. Lieutenant Timoshenko and junior lieutenant Stoletov did not return from the battle, the first died, and the second was captured.

Pe-2 dive bomber of the Northern Fleet aviation at the airfield

From 10.50 to 10.55, six Il-2s accompanied by eight fighters launched a second strike. Ten ZAB-100s, ten high-explosive "fifty-fifties" and 30 rockets fell on the German parking lots. The “silts” of captain Anisimov and junior lieutenant Panfilov were shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

At 2:17 p.m., seven “loopbacks” repeated the raid. Again, 28 ZAB-100, 112 AO-15 and 140 ZAB-2.5 were expended. On the way back, Captain Rezvykh's Pe-2 crashed. The crew remained unharmed.

The GKL (Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe) reports paint the following picture of the results of our air raids. Two Junkers-88s were destroyed (100% loss) (serial number 2543 from III./KG77 and 1256 from KGr806), another one was damaged (60%) and had to be written off (serial number 3542 from III./KG77). Three aircraft from the 806th group were damaged (40%), but could be restored (production numbers 1081, 2501 and 4547). Thus, in the most favorable scenario, three enemy bombers were destroyed and three were seriously damaged. In addition, two pilots from the 77th squadron, one military construction worker and one anti-aircraft gunner** were injured.

And here is how the events of November 6 in Siverskaya are reflected in the “Journal of Combat Operations of the 18th Army”***.
“November 6, 1941, 15 hours 20 minutes.

The Luftwaffe liaison officer reports the results of today's raid on the Siverskaya airfield. At 10.15 nine enemy fighters flew over the airfield. At 10.30, at an altitude of 200 meters above the airfield, seven bombers passed under the cover of fighters and immediately behind this were seven attack aircraft. The planes dropped thirty bombs at low level. Six aircraft were destroyed, four were seriously damaged, and eight were slightly damaged. Personnel losses: two killed and two wounded. 20 thousand liters of gasoline burned.

Two fighters on duty took off on alert and shot down two enemy aircraft in pursuit.
It was later determined that the irretrievable losses amounted to five vehicles.

21 hours 35 minutes.
The Luftwaffe liaison officer informed the head of the army's operations department that in the afternoon the enemy carried out a second raid on the Siverskaya airfield. One aircraft was destroyed, one aircraft was seriously damaged and one aircraft was slightly damaged. The fiziler-shtorkh was also damaged.

Thus, according to the “Journal of Combat Operations of the 18th Army” German losses in two raids, six aircraft were destroyed, five were seriously damaged, and ten aircraft were lightly damaged (see table)!

German Ju-88A bombers from the "Lion" squadron KG30 in flight over the Banak airfield

Now fast forward to 1942. Far North, a very successful raid by Il-4 bombers on the Banak airbase in Northern Norway as part of the operation to escort the infamous convoy PQ-17.

On June 30, five “Ilyushins” from the recently arrived Northern Fleet The 35th Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment dropped thirty high-explosive "hundreds" of aircraft onto the parking lots of a German airbase. According to the crews' reports, the entire airfield was covered with explosions. The Severomorsk suffered no losses, and upon their return they reported destruction as a result bomb strike two enemy aircraft, which were identified as Messerschmitt Bf-109s. However, this is a rare case when their undoubted successes were underestimated in their reports “to the top.”

GKL reports, on the contrary, report the destruction of four “Junkers” (serial number 0051, 3717, 2125, 1500, all 100%) from the 30th “Eagle” bomber squadron*. One more bomber from KG30 was seriously damaged (70%) and had to be written off (serial number 1753) and one (serial number 2060) could be repaired on site (30%)**. If the number of burned planes in different documents coincides, then the situation differs with the number of damaged cars and the difference is very noticeable.

Here's what you can glean about this from the Kriegsmarine documents:
“June 30, 9 hours 1 minute/9 hours 3 minutes.

Air raid on Banak airfield. Five aircraft dropped 15 bombs from an altitude of 5800 meters. Four aircraft were destroyed and 17 damaged. Two seriously and two slightly wounded.” ***

The enemy learned from the events of June 30, so the next raid on Banak on July 2 was not so successful. On this day, two groups of Il-4s took off to bomb the airfield. The first five returned from the Varde area due to engine failure on the lead plane. Of the four Ilyushins of the second group, one aircraft took off in cloud cover and also returned to the airfield. The remaining three DB-3fs continued their flight to the target, dropping thirty FAB-100s onto the airfield from an altitude of 5500 meters. At the moment our bombers departed from the target, a pair of Messerschmitts appeared in the air. Within a few minutes, they successively shot down the DB-3f of the commander of the 35th MTAP, Major A.A., who had just arrived in the North. Krylov and flight commander of the 2nd Guards Regiment, Captain P.D. Zubkova. The third crew, despite numerous holes in their Ilyushin, managed to escape.

Now let's fast forward to 1943, to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. This is what was reported to the 6th headquarters field army Wehrmacht, about the results of a Soviet air raid on the Kuteinikovo airfield, in a report on the air situation of the 15th Luftwaffe anti-aircraft artillery division dated July 14, 1943*****:
“Preliminary loss report.
Nine vehicles were slightly damaged: four Focke-Wulf 189s, one Me-110, one W34, one Klemm and two Fisiler-Storchs.
Two vehicles were seriously damaged: Me-110 and Fw-189.
One "physicaler-shtorch" was destroyed.
One soldier was killed, two were seriously wounded, two buildings were destroyed.”

What, in turn, can you learn about this by looking at the reports of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe? The GKL report, dated the fifteenth, indicates that as a result of the bombing of the Kuteinikovo airfield, one Fw-189A-2 (serial number 0125, 15%) and one “physician” (serial number 5074, 40%) were damaged** ****.

As you can see, the overlap between these two documents is minimal. The Fw-189A-2 from the GKL report can only be classified as a lightly damaged vehicle, and the “stork” is not at all clear which category to put in. On the one hand, it was damaged quite seriously and required factory repair. On the other hand, he was not listed in the army report as seriously injured. As the only possible justification for the German staff officers, it can be assumed that information about the raid on Kuteinikovo eventually migrated to reports for 1944, which were later lost. But this is just a guess.

And here is the figure floating around the network:

In first place is Japan: 60,750 killed pilots (well, that’s understandable, “kamikaze”, traditions of honor, etc.)
In second place is Germany: 57,137 killed pilots.
In third place is England: 56,821 pilots killed.
In fourth place is the United States: 40,061 pilots killed.
And in FIFTH and last place is the USSR: 34,500 killed pilots.

Losses are even less than those of the USA! Why?

Maybe Soviet military leaders hesitantly used aviation, “save” it? No! The USSR used aviation THREE times more intensively than Germany: during the war years Eastern Front German aviation made 1,373,952 combat sorties, and USSR aviation - 3,808,136 sorties!

This fact alone shatters the legends about the “bast shoe Vanka”, who, they say, is stupid, stupid and narrow-minded to fight on an equal footing with the “civilized Aryans” - for military aviation- this is always, then and now, the technical elite of the army. And a combat pilot is a unique fighter, combining the knowledge and intelligence of an engineer with the skills and reflexes of a professional Olympic-level athlete. Therefore, the main thing is to save the pilot, because compared to the cost of his training, the plane itself is pennies...

However, the USSR is also not in first place in terms of “material losses”:

During the Second World War, the aviation of the warring countries lost:

And some other statistics:

For the losses of Red Army Air Force pilots. During the war years, 44,093 pilots were trained. 27,600 died in battle: 11,874 fighter pilots, 7,837 attack pilots, 6,613 bomber crew members, 587 reconnaissance pilots and 689 auxiliary aviation pilots (V.I. Alekseenko. Soviet Air Forces on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War).

Various historians have a lot of very different data. Mukhin also has a table of losses by military branch as of January 1, 1945. True, not the pilots, but the entire Luftwaffe, without allies. I won’t cite them simply so as not to force a discussion on the party.

But any more or less reliable figures prove two facts

1 - the victory was very expensive for the USSR;
2 - we are not corpses Nazi Europe didn't throw it.

* - The documented maximum time interval between the event and the moment it was recorded is about a year
** - Military archive of Germany VA-MA RL 2 III/1179 S. 321, 327, 329
*** - National Archives USA NARA T-312 roll 782 frame 8433368, 8433374
More examples - https://topwar.ru/29659-chudesa-nemeckoy-statistiki.html

Original: Brophy, A. The Air Force: A Panorama of the Nation's Youngest Service. - New York: Gilbert Press, 1956.

Last edition 12/12/2011 17:06

The material was read by 25,156 people

Since the summer of 1944, the Third Reich and its allies went into “blind defense.” The catastrophe in Belarus, the transfer of hostilities on the eastern front beyond the borders of the USSR, the opening of a second front, massive bombing of German territory: everything suggested the inevitable and imminent collapse of the “eternal” Reich. Some local successes of the German armed forces simply prolonged the agony. Germany and its allies were forced to wage a war on two fronts: from the east, the Red Army, whose military power was growing every day, was approaching the original German territories; from the west, Anglo-American troops were advancing, which had a “big grudge” against the Nazis and a huge technical advantage.

In the context of the conduct of hostilities between June 1944 and May 1945, several rather interesting questions arise. How great were the Reich's losses in the personnel of the armed forces and in the main types of military equipment during this period? How were they distributed across theaters of war? Which direction (Western or Eastern) was a priority for the Reich leadership? For those who live in the territory of the former USSR, it would seem that the answer is obvious. But is he true? After all, for those who live in the West and the USA today, the correct answer seems completely different.

On the one hand, there is a “canonized” opinion, the source of which lies in the Soviet interpretation of the events of the Second World War: the main efforts of the Reich Armed Forces and the German allies were concentrated against the Red Army, and western front was considered by them as secondary. On the other hand, there is an opposite opinion, especially in English-language “pop” historiography, which regards the eastern front as “secondary”.
Let's try to abstract from personal biases, preferences and patriotism, and analyze the distribution of resources in the Reich across theaters of war and their losses during last year World War II in Europe. Based on these statistics, we will see which front was considered a higher priority by the German leadership. Simply put, who was Hitler “more afraid of?” Let's start with military equipment.

AVIATION

Combat aviation played a huge role in World War II. Air superiority allowed to the warring parties inflict significant losses on the enemy, in turn greatly reducing your own. Moreover, the aircraft industry was a kind of “litmus test” for each of the warring countries, showing how industrial and intellectual potential country, and the ability to implement it in practice.
We need to start with statistics on the production of aircraft during the Second World War:

According to German data, the German aircraft industry and the industry of the countries occupied by Germany from September 1, 1939 until the end of the war produced 113,515 aircraft of all types, of which 18,235 bombers, 53,729 fighters, 12,359 attack aircraft, 11,546 training aircraft, 1,190 naval aircraft , 3145 transport-landing gliders.

During Soviet times, it was claimed that the Germans lost 77,000 aircraft on the eastern front. In the classic work " Soviet aviation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. in numbers" gives more modest figures for the losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4200 aircraft, 1942 - 11,550, 1943 - 15,200, 1944 - 17,500, 1945 - 4,400. In total: 52,850 aircraft.

In the monograph “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” a team of authors led by G.F. Krivosheeva contains other data on the losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4,000 aircraft, 1942 - 11,500 aircraft, 1943 - 19,000, 1944 - 17,500, 1945 - 7,500. Total: 59,500 aircraft of all types. This is, so to speak, official Russian point view at this moment.

There is a point of view that differs from our official one. For the first time, the figures for irrecoverable/total losses of the German Luftwaffe were made public famous historian aviation O. Groiler(Gröller) in the 3rd issue of the magazine “Militaergechichte” back in 1972, based on daily reports of the 6th Department of the Quartermaster General of the Reich Air Force. To say that these data differ from those circulating in Soviet historiography means to say nothing. So, according to these data, aircraft losses for 1941 on the eastern front amount to 2213 irretrievably damaged aircraft and 1435 severely damaged ones. During the period from January to August 1942, 4,561 were destroyed and 3,740 were damaged.

But the fact is that the documents of the 6th department were not completely preserved, since the Luftwaffe archive was mostly destroyed by the Germans themselves. More or less complete data was preserved until December 1943, partially until December 1944, and fragmentarily for 1945. The remaining part of the documents was mostly exported to the USA, and only in the 1970s was returned to the military archive of Germany.

Thus, there is no reliable data on the losses of the German Air Force during the last year of fighting in Europe. However, irretrievable losses on the eastern front suffered precisely during combat missions were known quite accurately. According to Groiler, in 1944 they amounted to: 839 fighters, 1342 bombers and attack aircraft, 376 reconnaissance aircraft. Some domestic “historians” happily clung to these figures and, based on the known losses of the Soviet Air Force, derived a loss ratio of 6:1 in favor of the Germans, and some even managed to get 8:1. However, these “historians” forgot to take into account that all belligerents suffered significant non-combat aviation losses throughout the Second World War. The figure for non-combat losses ranges from 40% in the German Air Force to 50-55% in the Soviet Air Force. In addition, Groyler wrote his work back in 1972, since then several more very detailed studies have been published on the issue of losses of the German Air Force in the period from 1940 to 1945.

On at the moment the most complete and reliable information on Luftwaffe losses and the breakdown of these losses in the theater of operations is contained in the works of the professor Murray and aviation historian Michael Holm.

According to these data, Luftwaffe losses are: on the Eastern Front for the period February - December 1942, 2,955 aircraft destroyed directly in battle, 2,308 aircraft lost “outside enemy influence” and 1,806 aircraft damaged. The total losses of the Luftwaffe on the Soviet-German front amounted to 5,263 aircraft destroyed plus 1,806 damaged, for a total of 7,069 combat vehicles, which is 58% of all Luftwaffe losses in 1942 in relation to all theaters of operations. On all other fronts, 3,806 aircraft were lost permanently and 1,102 damaged, or 4,908 combat vehicles. Data on educational units for 1942 are missing.