Fascist retreat. The mood of retreating German soldiers - Yaroslav Ognev

Continuation, beginning of posts under the tag “1941 through the eyes of the Germans”

When I started quoting Kershaw’s book, it was still winter, and the first posts were about June 22nd. True, it’s today, but it’s already 1941. And there is probably something symbolic that today - June 22 - the cycle has just come to the beginning of the end of the German invasion of big country our ancestors

So I continue to put a selection of quotes from a very interesting, in my opinion, book by the British historian Robert Kershaw “1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of Iron”, in which the author collected and analyzed a lot of documentary evidence of participants in the events on both sides of the Eastern Front

As I already said, in my opinion, the book is especially interesting because it is also a look at the events of 1941 in the east from the outside

Headings in bold and selection of illustrations are mine, everything else is quotes from Kershaw's book

Beginning of the End

“On November 29, at 2:15 a.m., the 7th Panzer Division received an order to leave the bridgehead at Yakhroma. It was not easy for the Germans to regain the bridgehead they had won with such difficulty, as the division commander, General Baron von Funk himself, testified. Everyone understood that in fact such a decision only complicated the conditions for a further attack on the Soviet capital. Von Funk compared this order to “a fatal lightning strike and a turning point in the war with Russia...”
<…>
Forty years later, former artillery private Pyotr Yakovlevich Dobin, looking thoughtfully at the bridge over the canal, will remember those heavy battles:

“We tried with all our might not to let the Germans cross the canal. They, however, managed to cross it, but not for long - only for a day. Then, on November 28 and 29, 1941, there were terrible battles here, the snow turned red with blood. We managed to push them back to the west bank. And I myself don’t believe that I survived then.”

Many Germans remember that bridge blowing up early morning November 29 during the withdrawal of their troops. “Back then we could not find non-commissioned officer Leopold,” says one of the eyewitnesses.

“It turns out that he had not yet woken up properly when he returned, winding along the ice of the canal. The roar of the explosion finally woke him up. He was literally the last one to return “from there.”

Dmitrovsky Bridge after the explosion, December 1941

<…>
Corporal Bruch's unit took part in battles near the 7th Panzer Division's sector. It operated 7 kilometers from the canal as part of the 4th Infantry Regiment, which was part of the 6th Tank Division. The squad defending the support battery spotter "soon found itself out of ammunition." The Russians literally shot the company in an open field. The losses were terrible.

On December 3, the Germans managed to capture the village of Yazykovo, but at noon they were attacked by 10-15 Russian tanks that suddenly appeared from the forest. Von Bruch describes the horrors of this attack.

“We were taken by surprise and all we could do was flee. Many fled just to survive. All the weapons, in a word, everything fell into the hands of the Russians. 20-30 people 500 from the battalion were then declared missing, including the battalion commander and two company commanders ... "

Soviet troops advancing near Moscow, December 1941

<…>
The “Der Fuhrer” regiment of the SS division “Das Reich” advanced along the Istra-Moscow road and reached the western suburbs of Lenino, 17 kilometers from Moscow. He was opposed by detachments of the Moscow people's militia. “Moscow was two steps away,” recalls Otto Weidinger, one of the commanders.

“There were only a few days left before the capture of Moscow. On clear, cold days, city buildings were visible to the naked eye. The forward battery of 100mm guns was intensively shelling the city.”
<…>
One SS officer from the Deutschland regiment wrote home: “Step by step we are approaching our ultimate goal- Moscow." But he immediately added about problems with supplies, about a lack of ammunition, about machine guns and guns that were out of order due to cold weather. “The day is not far off,” he continued, “when not only platoons and squads, but entire companies will finally lose their combat effectiveness due to losses, wounds and frostbite.”
<…>
“These soldiers, half-dead from the cold, had to fight and die in the terrible frost, at times reaching minus 45. And they were wearing thin overcoats, and ordinary summer boots on their feet...”

German soldiers freezing near Moscow, December 1941

<…>
Non-commissioned officer Gustav Schrodeck from the 15th Panzer Regiment, sent to the site of the SS Division Das Reich, noted in his diary: “The capital Moscow is the goal of our offensive. Will we get there?
<…>
“I saw a road sign: “Moscow is 18.5 kilometers away,” says Gustav Schrodek. But when a 76-mm shell from a Russian T-34 tank standing in the shelter whistled past the tower, the driver immediately turned the car around sharply.

“To our right, as a result of a direct hit by a Russian shell on the turret, another vehicle from our platoon was hit. While turning the turret to return fire, I saw for a moment how the commander and the driver were trying to get out. Later I learned that the tank commander lost both legs, and the driver lost his hand, which was frozen to the tank’s track. Our ranks are thinning. We were losing our comrades every day.”
<…>
“Using hand grenades, we tore out small graves, not graves, but rather just holes,” Schrodek continues the story.
<…>
General Konstantin Rokossovsky, whose 16th Army was defending west of Moscow, soon had a very unpleasant telephone conversation with Stalin.

“Comrade Stalin called at night. The situation was quite serious, and in some places our units had to retreat. We understood that we could not expect words of gratitude for this from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. And I picked up the direct line with a feeling of some confusion. Stalin asked one single question: “Do you know, Comrade Rokossovsky, that the enemy has occupied Krasnaya Polyana, and do you understand that if Krasnaya Polyana is in the hands of the enemy, this means that all of Moscow will be under German fire?”

Soviet tanker Veniamin Ivanteev spoke about the losses of the Red Army as follows: “If you remember about everyone who died, there is nothing left but to be ashamed.”
<…>
Artillery fire spotter Pavel Osipov talks about how preparations for the counteroffensive were carried out.

“We received orders to dig trenches and trenches in thirty-degree frost in soil frozen to 30-40 cm. We were given crowbars, crowbars and sapper blades. There was nothing else. The work was carried out mainly in the dark for reasons of secrecy. In two days we dug in. On December 1, an order was received to take up firing positions.

A couple of days later we were delivered warm clothes - sheepskin coats, padded jackets, mittens, felt boots. After that it became much easier - after all, we had to sleep in the cold right next to the guns on boxes with shells. It’s inconvenient, of course, but we didn’t freeze, and that’s why we were able to fight.”

Soviet artillerymen prepare to fire from a captured 50-mm German PaK 38 gun, December 5, 1941, near Moscow

<…>
Lev Kopelev, a junior officer in 1941, believed that “many have now forgotten that we went to the front as volunteers, many went as volunteers, millions of people, and we dreamed of a counteroffensive.”
<…>
Lieutenant Heinrich Haape, fulfilling the instructions of the commander, arrived at the location of the 106th Infantry Division. Haape became convinced that there was much more optimism in the rear than on the front line. “We were told that in a few days the decisive assault on Moscow would begin,” Haape said. — Morale in the rear is at its peak, everyone is convinced that the capital of the Bolsheviks will fall again until the end of the year."
<…>
“They say in the troops,” says Haape, “that since they were not stopped by the impassability, nor the rain, nor the snow, nor the frosts, since they approached Moscow, now it has no choice but to fall at their feet.”<…>“It was breathtaking to think that in just a quarter of an hour you could be in Moscow, on Red Square near the Kremlin.”
<…>
The combat diary of the 87th Infantry Division told of the 173rd Infantry Regiment, which on December 3, in 30-degree frost, took up positions near the forest near Maslovo, at the confluence of the Istra and Moscow Rivers. The regiment was "no more than 20 kilometers from the suburbs of Moscow, the towers of which were clearly visible."

The one who made the recording reports that he is “proud that he happened to be among those who came closest to the Soviet capital of the Russian Empire.”
<…>
When Lieutenant Haape reached the 106th Infantry Division's forward positions, the temperature had dropped to double digits below zero. There was a tram stop nearby. God! Moscow was nearby, here it is! And its fall meant the end of the war. There were only 16 kilometers left to the center!

“As we entered the tram, we began to look at these wooden seats, on which thousands of Muscovites had sat before us. We noticed a small wooden box against the wall. Opening it, we found a pile of used tickets. We were able to read only one word written in Slavic letters: “Moscow”.

Field Marshal von Bock looks at Moscow through binoculars

On December 1, Field Marshal von Bock admitted that “the hope that the enemy “will be broken”, judging by the battles of the last two weeks, turned out to be illusory.”
<…>
And this is what he writes that same day in his diary:

“I emphasized in the conversation that we are also concerned about the increased consumption of forces. However, you need to try to defeat the enemy, throwing all your strength into battle to the last. If it finally turns out that it is still impossible to defeat the enemy, then another decision will need to be made.”
<…>
The cold increasingly reduced the combat effectiveness of the troops. This is how spotter Lothar Fromm describes combat operations in these near-Arctic conditions.

“The weapon no longer obeyed us... Minus thirty is the maximum temperature that the lubricant could withstand. She froze in this frost. The crews tried again and again to activate the guns, but in vain. The barrel jammed, the return mechanism did not work. This just made me lose heart.”

Richter, on the contrary, cursed the Soviet artillery, which “crushed everything near our positions, it is not clear what caliber these Russians have.” And, as a result, “factory buildings are on fire.” Nerves to the limit. “Fear has gripped literally everyone - even the cooks refuse to crawl out of their dugouts and prepare food. They sit in them and tremble at every rupture,” Richter concluded doomedly on December 3 in his diary. According to Richter, “there is no point in holding on to these Katyushkas or Gorki.”

Heavy Soviet artillery in position near Moscow, December 1941

<…>
It is precisely the lack of sufficient forces that Field Marshal von Bock warns about in his diary entry of December 3, 1941: “If we are forced to stop the offensive, it will be very difficult to go on the defensive.” The fall of Moscow was the last hope of the Germans. And this is confirmed by the words of von Bock: “It is precisely the transition to the defense of our few forces and possible consequences This step is the reason why I still continue to cling to this offensive.”

Two days later, the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Group reported that “... that the offensive power of the group has been exhausted and that it will be able to hold its position only if the forces of the 23rd [Infantry] Division are reassigned to it...” The commander of the 4th Army, von Kluge, informed von Side that the planned offensive of the 4th Panzer Group of Hoepner “does not seem possible.”

On the same day, Colonel General Guderian asked permission to postpone the start of the offensive for his 2nd Army. On December 4, he spoke much more clearly: “There could be no talk of the division going on the offensive on the same day. The temperature dropped to minus 35 degrees.” German tanks, unlike Russian ones, could not withstand such cold weather.

Lieutenant Colonel Grampe from the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Division reported on the same day that his tanks were unready due to low temperatures (minus 35 degrees). “Even the towers are jammed,” said Lieutenant Colonel Grampe, “ optical instruments are covered with frost, and machine guns are only capable of firing single cartridges..."
<…>
A report dated December 6 from the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 114th Infantry Regiment (6th Tank Division), stationed in the village of Stepanovo, stated:

“As the morning approached, there were signs of a certain revival among the civilian population. Explanation - Stepanovo is about to be occupied by the Russians, and the Germans will leave from there - the German soldiers did not take it seriously. However, radio reconnaissance confirmed the rumors. Soon retreating units of the 7th Tank Division appeared on the Stepanovo-Zhukovo road.”

Stepanovo, December 1941

Photo source: http://uspenie.pravorg.ru/p973/

<…>
On December 6, artilleryman Private Pavel Osipov supported the advancing Soviet troops with the fire of his gun. As soon as the infantrymen went on the offensive, their complete unpreparedness was revealed. “The young people in particular rushed forward, and everyone immediately fell dead into the snow in thirty-degree frost,” says Osipov.

Pyotr Veselinokov (as in the text - Translator's note) was also horrified by his “first battle”. He dubbed it a massacre. “The worst thing,” he recalls, “was to see steam rising from the bodies of those who had just died. There was an unbearable smell of blood and meat in the air.”
<…>
Staff officer Mikhail Milshtein recalls how “a sense of confidence gradually came to them, the first counterattacks brought successful results.” However, success came at a very difficult price.

This is what private artilleryman Pavel Osipov says:

“There were many wounded, especially among the machine gunners. After all, everyone needed to move forward, and no one could help with this. We sent one of our people to tell who it was that the motorized unit following us should pick up the wounded.”

“In the end,” continues Milstein, “it gradually became clear to everyone that the invincible Nazis could also be beaten.”

Advancing Soviet troops near Moscow, December 1941

<…>
Pavel Osipov notes with concern that “there were many casualties among the civilian population, the elderly, and children. The Soviet counter-offensive also took them by surprise, and they did not have time to leave the combat areas due to these terrible cold weather.”

On December 5, 1941, German military doctor Anton Grunder was on duty until 6 a.m. This happened in the sector of the 9th Army.

“I was just sitting down to breakfast when all this hell broke out. Everyone rushed to run - tank crews, artillerymen with their guns, soldiers - alone or in groups. Nobody could understand what was going on. No orders were received; everyone tried to get away. Most of the equipment was out of order due to the frost, but we still managed to take with us most of the medical equipment and medicines. We tried to stick together with the remnants of the company, and those who strayed disappeared without a trace.”

A German sergeant-major frozen to death, holding an antique vase, probably from a museum near Moscow, winter 1941

Caring for the wounded in conditions of general retreat is hard work. “We witnessed terrible scenes,” admits Gründer. “We had to change bandages that were a week or more old.”

“One soldier was wounded through the arm. The limb turned black, pus flowed even down the legs. The arm had to be taken away down to the joint. And during the operation, I ordered three soldiers to continuously smoke cigars in order to somehow kill this terrible stench.”
<…>
Lieutenant Haape was on his way to leave when the train was suddenly delayed. “Everyone was ordered to report to their units and report their arrival to the command,” he says. The vacationers tried to protest, but they were immediately informed of the sudden advance of the Russians, who managed to break through to Kalinin. “Everyone fell into silence,” Haape testifies, “no one even cursed, it was all too serious.”

“Where are the Russians?” - asked Haape, arriving at his division. “Yes, everywhere,” came the answer, “nobody seems to know that.”
<…>
“On the second or third day of our counteroffensive, we felt that success was on our side, the morale of the soldiers, sergeants and officers had increased. And since then we have driven the Germans to prevent them from burning our cities and villages to the ground. And they, retreating, burned everything.”

Yes, the Russians were winning, and they gradually began to understand this. The commander of the infantry platoon, Anatoly Chernyaev, having seen with his own eyes the state of the Germans, realized that “they were completely unprepared for a war with Russia.” Here is his statement:

“During these months of war, the image of a German has changed a lot. In the summer and autumn, when we were forced to retreat, they seemed to us invincible and incredibly strong. And now, when we saw them near Moscow, half-naked, dirty and hungry, we realized that such an army was already being defeated.”

German prisoners near Moscow, 1941

Robert Kershaw 1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of Iron crosses
http://detectivebooks.ru/book/20480016/?page=1

To be continued

The breakthrough of Soviet units on the flanks of Army Group Center for the first time in this campaign put German divisions in front of a real threat of destruction. Lieutenant Georg Richter, whose unit left Puchki located 30 kilometers from Moscow on December 6, two days later wrote the following lines in his military diary: “... until now the retreat has proceeded according to plan.” This greatly facilitated the retreat of the motorized units. The temperature in those days ranged from minus 6 to minus 12 degrees with snow. Due to constant shortages of fuel, we had to make frequent stops. On December 13, their unit came across the remains of a German column that had been defeated shortly before - the roadsides were dotted with the charred remains of trucks and armored vehicles. Suddenly, Richter's ears heard shouts of "Hurray!"

“Brownish figures appeared from the forest, and soldiers, drivers, car crews running in panic rushed straight towards me... At first I didn’t even know what to do. Try to stop this unstoppable flow? It makes no sense - many of them even forgot that they were armed. Most likely, there were Russian tanks nearby. And that’s right - soon I saw them, heavily swaying from side to side, crossing the highway.”

Richter still managed to assemble a group of 10 people, from those who were younger and bolder. But the armored personnel carriers accompanying the convoy “did not perform at their best.” The group was forced to retreat to a nearby village. None of the equipment could be saved...

The position of the Germans was aggravated by the fact that they did not know how to fight in retreat. We had to rely mainly on the intelligence of the commanders and each soldier individually. Horst Orloff, the commander of a tank company, who quite recently had the good fortune to see the “sunlit towers of the Soviet capital,” in one of the post-war conversations recalled how their unit was retreating:

“I can only say that within the limits of my command authority the retreat was carried out in an orderly manner. Naturally, there were losses of equipment and personnel, but it was not a disorderly flight.”

The notorious inability to retreat was explained, first of all, by victorious previous campaigns. But in December, the troops of the Eastern Front on the move had to master by no means simple science departure. And far from everywhere he had an “orderly” character, as Horst Orloff put it. The scenes witnessed by Lieutenant Richter, who was retreating with units of the 4th Panzer Group, also occurred during the retreat of the 3rd Panzer Group. “Discipline is falling,” said December reports from her headquarters.

“More and more soldiers, separated from their units, continue to move westward without weapons, they drag cows behind them on ropes or carry nets full of potatoes in both hands. Russians killed as a result of air attacks or shelling are no longer buried. Not accustomed to retreating... the troops were seized by real panic. Most of the units were left without the necessary supplies... and are suffering the most from the cold. Among them there are many wounded, whom there is no way to send to rear areas. There is no control over the movement of troops. The most difficult period in the entire history of its existence begins for the tank group..."

The highest command authorities were simply unable to evaluate and make decisions, reading every day a heap of similar reports, which reported on the mass of Russian troops who had come from nowhere. The OKW headquarters, in an attempt to stabilize the situation, sent out threatening orders in parts, the essence of which was to “not give in to panic.”

Not only the retreating German units experienced colossal problems, but also those remaining in the rearguard, such as the remnants of the 18th Infantry Regiment, where Lieutenant Haape served. Security posts were set up around the villages, and attempts were made to put weapons in order. The soldier, trained by the cold of the Russian winter, already realized that if a machine gun or machine gun was warmed up and then cleaned of grease, then it would not misfire in battle. And therefore, they preferred not to carry weapons around in the cold, but to keep them in warm huts near the stoves, disassembling them if necessary. “And yet,” Lieutenant Haape concluded bitterly, “how difficult it is to repel the attacks of the advancing enemy in these snow-covered fields.”

Such tactics yielded, albeit modest, results. Russian losses grew. Soviet officers and sergeants, compared to German ones, were poorly trained in tactics. Higher-ranking commanders tended to attack wide front, allocating, for example, 9-14 kilometers per rifle division, which led to the dispersion of available forces. Tanks were used primarily as infantry support rather than being deployed to carry out concentrated attacks in relatively narrow areas.

The Russians understood perfectly well that German soldiers were poorly equipped and practically unsuited for conducting operations in harsh conditions. climatic conditions. They spent almost all their time in warm dugouts, because they preferred “to die in the warmth rather than die in the cold.” The Russian artillery did not spare shells, smashing to pieces these frail shelters, hastily dug in the frozen ground. However, the massive concentration of huge infantry forces characteristic of the Russians to attack one, often unimportant target, testified to the inexperience of the command. The Germans quite successfully repulsed the frontal attacks of the Russians, who tried to take them with numbers, but not with skill. General Zhukov was forced on the third day of the offensive to issue an order by all means to avoid frontal attacks fraught with colossal losses.

Primitive attempts to encircle German units also failed. Almost no breakthrough attempts were made due to fears Soviet commanders get hit in the flank. A well-thought-out system of security posts, the use of various light weapons in cooperation with a few tanks and artillery pieces significantly increased the combat effectiveness of German units.

In addition, the Germans, while retreating, everywhere used “scorched earth tactics.” “As soon as it gets dark, here and there you can see the fire pits of blazing village huts,” Werner Polt, a 19-year-old native of Hamburg and a former student, wrote in a letter home. “Entire villages are burning to the ground.”

Wilhelm Goebel of the 78th Infantry Division experienced plenty of similar sights. “At night, a terrible sight presented itself to our eyes,” he recalled, “the sky to the very horizon was colored with a crimson glow from burning villages.”

Army Group Center was retreating...

Meanwhile, heated debates broke out between the OKH (Supreme High Command of the Army) and the OKW (Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht) on how to resolve the crisis. Deep penetrations of Soviet troops on the flanks of Army Group Center threatened to encircle the entire central sector of the Eastern Front. The question was extremely simple: fight or retreat. Actually, the retreat was already in full swing, and, to the great relief of the front command, it was a question of an organized withdrawal of troops to a reasonably defined line - Kursk - Orel - Gzhatsk. The risk was that rapid and deep penetrations of German defenses in certain areas could cause a sharp drop in the morale of German troops. In addition, I had to give up a large number of ammunition and equipment.

Holding the front, in the opinion of the front command, would be a suicidal act. The condition of the troops on the Eastern Front completely excluded such a possibility. However, Hitler put an end to the hesitation of his commanders. On December 18, he transmitted his order to the headquarters of Army Group Center:

“Commanders at all levels bear direct responsibility for inspiring soldiers to fanatical resistance, regardless of any enemy breakthroughs from the flanks or rear.”

In other words, it was an order “not to retreat a single step.” Two days earlier, Hitler had a telephone conversation with Field Marshal von Bock. Hitler forbade the commander of Army Group Center from any withdrawal of forces. "No step back!" - the Fuhrer summed up.

In mid-December, the chief of staff of the 4th Army, General Günter Blumentritt, was summoned to a meeting of the highest command staff. The gap between Kluge's 4th Army and Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army continued to widen. There were no reserves to neutralize the threat to the southern flank. One motorized division was on the march, heading west towards Yukhnov. When Blumentritt was called by telephone by his longtime friend and colleague at the headquarters of Army Group Center, Chief of Staff of Army Group General von Greifenberg, the issue of the possibility of withdrawing the forces of the 4th Army south of the Moscow-Smolensk highway was being discussed. “You somehow get out of your situation there. Hitler has just received a new order - the 4th Army will not retreat an inch." Blumentritt was stunned:

“According to all forecasts, this could only mean one thing - the defeat and death of the 4th Army. But an order is an order. The units that had already begun moving west were urgently stopped and returned to the front. The 4th Army was preparing to give its last Stand, and only a miracle could save her from defeat.”

Adolf Hitler decided to assume supreme command of all the armed forces of the Reich. So the forces of the Eastern Front had to fight without retreating a single step, or, if necessary, die.

Chapter 17

"Frozen Meat Medal"

“Forward, comrades, we are ordered to retreat!”

Humor German infantry

“Not a step back” - this is the order of the Fuhrer

“This order plunged me into complete apathy,” recalls one officer from the 198th Infantry Division. “I didn’t even want to think about anything.” From now on, survival required much more prudence and the ability to anticipate events.”

Responsibility for the implementation of Hitler's mentioned directive fell entirely on commanders of all levels.

The Fuehrer's order, communicated to the personnel of the battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Infantry Division of the 4th Army, read:

“...Positions on Lama must be maintained at all costs. Defend them until the last soldier!»

Adolf Hitler went against the opinions of his generals. Watching with irritation how the front was falling apart, he decided to free the front-line generals from the difficult burden of decision-making. The Fuhrer of the “German nation”, and now the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of its armed forces, has always boasted of his unsurpassed instincts and ability to get out of crisis situations. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch followed the commander of Army Group South, Rutzstedt, into retirement. It was decided to make Brauchitsch a scapegoat for the failure of Operation Barbarossa, as well as for the winter crisis. Then it was the turn of another field marshal, von Bock, who predicted the defeat of the troops of the army group entrusted to his command if it was not allowed to withdraw its forces. On December 20, von Bock received the right to the long-awaited “sick leave.” And off we go. On December 26, 1941, Colonel General Guderian, one of the most ardent opponents of the notorious Fuhrer directive “not a step back,” was relieved of his post. General Hoepner, the aggressive commander of the 4th Panzer Group, fell into disgrace for daring to disobey Hitler in January 1942 by retreating west to avoid encirclement. Deprived of military rank and awards, he had no right to wear military uniform after being retired. A week later, they also got rid of the commander of the 9th Army, Strauss, and on January 17, the commander of Army Group North, von Leeb, was removed from his post. During the winter of 1941/42, over 30 generals, commanders of corps and divisions, were removed from their positions. It was to them that the troops of the Eastern Front owed their triumphant successes in the first weeks of the campaign in Russia until the tragic days of December 1941 at the gates of Moscow. Now they have retired. By sending these commanders into retirement, Hitler completed the process of degeneration of the troops of the Eastern Front, which began in June 1941. The vestiges of the Weimar Republic and the former General Staff have disappeared. The troops of the Eastern Front and the entire Wehrmacht turned into an obedient tool of the Nazi Reich.

Naturally, the almost simultaneous departure from the scene of so many experienced command personnel at the height of the crisis at the front could not but affect the conduct and outcome of operations. Hitler, instinctively understanding this, sought to minimize Negative consequences personnel changes. The instincts of a participant in the First World War told him that a soldier during retreats and crises was much more predictable and controllable if he was ordered to fight to the death. This immediately eliminated all ambiguities and omissions. After all, the soldier in moments of crisis More than ever, the German soldier needs clarity and certainty. Lieutenant tank troops Friedrich-Wilhelm Christians subsequently explained:

“Please don’t even ask me if we complained or had an opinion on this matter. What was left for us? There was and could not be any talk of any freedom of action! Such questions were not even raised. We were given tasks and orders, and we took them seriously.”

Another reason for the command changes was Hitler’s desire to nullify any manifestations of initiative at the fronts. The troops of the Eastern Front had to do the unthinkable, and it was impossible to do without sacrifices. Therefore, Hitler required not thinking, but executing commanders. In this case, strategic initiative and control over operations automatically became the prerogative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and even a semblance of collegiality faded into oblivion. And in this cartoonish method of conducting military operations, centralization uncontrollably prevailed, although Germany’s opponents little by little began to understand all the advantages of decentralization - it was the Wehrmacht, and not anyone else, who clearly demonstrated with the example of the Blitzkrieg that military victories directly depend on the initiative of commanders of all levels .

Although the first phase of the Soviet offensive pushed the Germans back from Moscow, the state of agony into which the troops of Army Group Center were plunged exceeded everything, even Stalin’s wildest expectations. Having conceived, planned in detail and successfully carried out, in general, a rather ordinary counter-offensive operation, the Russians did not have the opportunity to give it a wider scale without bringing additional forces into battle and without adequate support for them. The pace of the Soviet offensive slowed down in direct proportion to the distance of the forward units from the military supply bases. And then Hitler gives Army Group Center the order to stand to the death. The ordeal that befell the army group was recognized with a special medal. "In Osten 1941-42"(Eastern Front 1941–1942), which was awarded to participants in the hostilities near Moscow during the specified period. German soldiers, with their characteristic dark humor, immediately dubbed the award the “Order of Frozen Flesh.”

For the already familiar sergeant major Gottfried Becker from the 9th Infantry Regiment, this meant frostbite on both hands. On the second day of Christmas, December 26, 1941, forgetfulness turned tragically for him - Becker, forced to leave a warm shelter in one of the villages under Soviet artillery fire, forgot his mittens. The sergeant major’s hands were miraculously not amputated; the treatment lasted several months, starting in hospitals in Vyazma and Smolensk, where he was given first aid, and ending in Germany.

Throughout the second half of December, both the Germans and Russians feverishly reinforced their troops. Hitler ordered the deployment of 17 additional divisions from occupied Europe to Moscow, which took time. Inspired by the success, Stalin developed much more ambitious plans for new counterattacks. The second phase of the Soviet offensive in the first half of January 1942 was marked by another attempt to break through the encirclement around Leningrad. At the same time, operations began on the southern and southwestern fronts. Soviet forces landed in Crimea. In the central sector of the front, attempts were made to encircle the Germans with attacks from Rzhev in the north and from Sukhinichi in the south along directions converging at Vyazma. All this forced Hitler to withdraw his troops to where the Germans launched Operation Typhoon in October. During the retreat, many German units were surrounded, but the front line was reduced, which made it possible to seal the most dangerous gaps in it. Soon the Russians launched another offensive from the north, the goal of which was to liberate Smolensk. Despite the fact that the German defenses were broken through, it soon became clear that the Russians had overestimated their forces and, moreover, scattered them, trying to achieve several goals at once. This not only saved the Germans from encirclement, but also gave them the opportunity to deal with individual groups of Soviet troops that had broken through to the rear.

Meanwhile, a campaign to collect warm clothing for soldiers on the Eastern Front took place in the Reich with great fanfare. However, the event planned by the Ministry of Propaganda also sowed uncertainty among the masses. Skeptics quickly realized what was going on. SS reports on the situation in the Reich constantly mention a glaring contradiction: soldiers of the Eastern Front in warm winter uniforms on newsreels, on the one hand, and the collection of warm clothes for the front, on the other. This was confirmed after the war in his memoirs by former Minister of Armaments Albert Speer:

“We all rejoiced at the success of our army in Russia, but the first doubts arose when Goebbels suddenly organized an all-German “action” to collect warm clothes for soldiers of the Eastern Front. That’s when we realized that something unexpected had happened.”

The “unforeseen” was that for the first time during this war the German soldier lost confidence in future victories. For the first time, the future was painted in a gloomy light. However, we are not just talking about soldiers. Here is what Guderian's staff officer Bernd Freytag von Loringhofen writes:

“The defeat at the gates of Moscow had a very depressing effect on us. On the one hand, the war seemed to be lost, no, it was actually lost, and victory could now only be achieved at the cost of incredible efforts. On the other hand, the ease with which Hitler dismissed so many qualified commanders caused deep grief and misunderstanding.”

Postscript to Plan Barbarossa

“The world will hold its breath,” Hitler declared on June 22, 1941, when nearly three million German soldiers suddenly invaded the territory of the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa was the largest military operation in the history of the German nation. This campaign, nourished by previous victories in Western Europe, had every chance of success, but just four months later the combat effectiveness of the Eastern Front troops fell catastrophically. The last attack on Moscow was more of an improvisation, a game of chance, rather than a thoroughly planned, operationally and tactically thought-out operation. A number of factors contributed to this, which should be considered individually.

The main and fundamental factor in the initial period of the campaign in Russia was the factor of surprise. The outbreak of war with the Soviet Union took not only the Red Army by surprise, it also came as a surprise to many Wehrmacht soldiers and officers.

The Soviet General Staff, rushing between Scylla and Charybdis of offensive and defensive configurations in the border areas, fell into a stupor as a result of the rapid, almost “lightning-fast” defeat of its main forces. And this defeat was crushing, it was marked by encirclements unprecedented in military history and the capture of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. The attack on Moscow began in late autumn, despite the approaching winter. The German General Staff did not appreciate the power Soviet Russia, mistaking her for a “colossus with feet of clay.” The initial strength of the Red Army at 200 divisions soon had to be revised and estimated at as many as 360.

Hastily dubbed a “paradise for subhumans,” the Soviet Union was able to provide its army with tanks invulnerable to German cannon shells, high-speed and maneuverable fighters, and Katyusha rocket-propelled mortars. All this somehow did not fit into the theories of racial inferiority that were carefully driven into the heads of burghers in the Reich and soldiers on the Eastern Front.

The vast expanses of the country called Russia also gave this war a special specificity. The German soldier was not ready to act in conditions when the rear came under the control of quickly and secretly formed partisan detachments, in conditions when the front line was inexorably and terribly stretched, when the supply of troops was likened to an expedition into the unknown.

Operation Barbarossa was the longest campaign since 1939. Until June 1941, the theory, strategy and tactics of the “blitzkrieg” worked. In the sixth week of the war with the Soviet Union, the troops of the Eastern Front were still trampling around Smolensk, bogged down in battles to defeat the encircled Red Army units. It was this period of the campaign that was characterized by a rapid increase in German losses. The next surprise was the first defeat of this war. Zhukov’s counterattack near Moscow, in fact, the most primitive operation both in concept and in the method of execution, brought the troops of the Eastern Front to their knees. And this defeat of the Wehrmacht may seem unexpected only at first glance. He was greatly facilitated by a series of Pyrrhic victories - defeats of encircled enemy groups, which consumed both time and masses of troops.

The fact is that the Germans have not yet had to face the problem of physically destroying enemy troops caught in the encirclement. How did they not have to face resistance similar to that which the defenders of the Brest Fortress gave them? As a result, the Germans lost more during the border battles alone than during the entire campaign in France. The battles of Minsk and Smolensk diverted up to 50% of all forces of Army Group Center. Enemy groups in France, Poland and other countries, cut into fragments, surrendered peacefully. The Russians preferred to fight to the end. So in Russia it was impossible to achieve decisive victories by encircling the enemy alone. It also needed to be crushed, physically destroyed. This took up precious time. The tankers could not rely solely on their own strength for this; they needed the support of the infantry. And the infantry, as a rule, could not keep up with the fast tanks, and had to wait for it, fighting off the harassing attacks of scattered enemy groups hiding in the forests. And it is no coincidence that in letters from the front in the first months of the war there were no less references to purely defensive and annoying local battles with the Russians than there were boasts about victorious and rapid advances forward.

Operation Barbarossa differed from previous campaigns in that in the Soviet Union the Wehrmacht had to wage war not only against regular units The Red Army, but also against the civilian population, since this war had a clearly expressed ideological overtones. In other words, the war in Russia served as a clear example of a “war of annihilation.”

Among the important reasons for the collapse of the Barbarossa plan, mention should be made of the inability of the German General Staff to timely take into account and assess the level of losses of the Eastern Front troops by September 1941. Both in numbers and personnel structure, the troops this month were very different from those that crossed the borders of the Soviet Union. The losses of officers and non-commissioned officers had a serious impact on the combat effectiveness of the troops.

The general unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht for war was also evident in terms of military equipment and heavy weapons. Tanks and motorized units, this steel fist of the blitzkrieg, already after the first months needed replenishment, both in personnel and material.

The combat power of troops can be crushed in three ways: outmaneuver it conceptually, destroy it physically and break its morale. Conceptual victory means using a more advanced strategy and tactics.

All three methods, all three components of combat power were under threat - German troops won, but were forced to win at the cost of self-destruction.

Below we publish the memoirs of a German officer dedicated to the “Caucasian Operation” of 1942-1943. The book contains episodes dedicated to the liberation of Georgievsk. We decided to publish this chapter in as expanded a text as possible for one purpose - to make clear the logic of the events immediately preceding the liberation of the city.

The book is dedicated to the events that immediately preceded the collapse of Nazi Germany. During 1944, German troops suffered defeat after defeat on all fronts, but the largest retreat took place in the east. The author talks about how, during the East Prussian operation, Soviet troops, having liberated their country from invaders, entered enemy territory. About the position of Hitler, who did not want to believe real military reports and, with his ridiculous orders and reluctance to start negotiations on surrender, deprived the army of the opportunity to surrender and the civilian population to escape. The Soviet army marched towards Berlin, towards final victory, sparing no one on its way. Having destroyed countless people during the war years, Hitler ultimately destroyed his country, dooming his people to irreparable losses...

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The given introductory fragment of the book Defeat in the east. Defeat of Nazi Germany. 1944-1945 (Jurgen Thorwald) provided by our book partner - the company liters.

“The front remains where it is!”

On the night of January 8, 1945, the train of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army rolled west from Zossen, a town south of Berlin, towards the city of Giessen in Hesse. Formations of heavy British bombers were reported over the Ruhr and central Germany. Lighter planes dropped bombs on Berlin. The train, which stopped and made detours several times, was late. But this has long ceased to be unusual.

General Heinz Guderian was sleeping. The night light cast a dim light on his large head, emphasizing the irregular features of his face. He was again on his way to a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters. This meeting decided the fate of the Eastern Front, the fate of the entire East Germany. Guderian wanted to save his strength as much as possible, but did not find peace in his soul. He was horrified by the Russian general offensive on the Eastern Front scheduled for January 12.

Guderian knew what enormous forces the Russians had amassed for the impending attack - his intelligence chief in the east, General Gehlen, was a qualified and thorough man. And the situation seemed more alarming because the Soviet armies now separated from German territory only tiny sections of the vast areas they had conquered three or four years earlier. In East Prussia, Russian troops were already stationed on German soil. And the population of the East Prussian cities of Nemmersdorf and Goldap, caught by the unexpected Russian offensive, experienced great fear of the future.

General Guderian became chief of staff almost by accident. Of course, he was a member of the General Staff for a long time. He was the main creator of the German armored forces and until 1941 he commanded a tank army in the thick of battle. But during the Moscow campaign in the winter of 1941/42, Hitler suddenly removed him. Guderian remained out of action until 1943, when he again became needed to breathe new life into the German tank forces, which were almost exhausted. He was made chief inspector of armored forces. Then came July 20, 1944, with the attempt on Hitler's life. Guderian became the new chief of staff because the man intended for the job became ill.

The few survivors of the July 20 uprising blamed Guderian for accepting his post at a time when generals, officials, and brothers in arms were being arrested and quickly and mercilessly executed. They did not forgive him the order that he issued while in office regarding the share of guilt of the General Staff in the conspiracy of the officers. Some even suspected that Guderian had accepted the post out of old grudges against General Beck, who had once been Chief of Staff but was now a traitor, and who in earlier days had shown little sympathy for Guderian's revolutionary ideas about the use of armored forces. But this suspicion was not justified.

This straightforward man was convinced: rebellion, betrayal and tyrannicide are inappropriate when there is a threat of unconditional submission and destruction. And he believed that such moments require unity and unification of forces against the enemy.

Like most generals, Guderian was not a politician. He thought that a soldier's job was to fight, and that work politicians- end the war when there is no other way out. And since the declarations of Roosevelt and Churchill in Casablanca, he had become convinced that he, a soldier, had no alternative but to face the enemy and fight him, regardless of the crimes committed by Hitler. Then, during the ill-fated December Bulge Offensive, an enemy document regarding the Allied Eclipse plan was captured. Eclipse was a faithful reflection of the line of thought regarding the treatment of Germany after the Allied victory, represented by the American Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. Guderian saw in this document a blueprint for the complete destruction of the German nation.

From time to time, Guderian wondered whether he would accept the post again, if the crushing burden of it was known in advance. But there was no use wondering. He accepted this post. He threw himself into his new duties with all his considerable energy and without much thought.

Up to that time he had little experience of dealing with the Führer's headquarters or with Hitler directly. He was sure that only his, Guderian's, stubborn persistence and courage would put an end to Hitler's awkward strategy. And also – frankness. Perhaps he overestimated himself.

Guderian has learned a lot since then. He recognized the Fuhrer's headquarters. He recognized the swamp of self-deception and delusions of grandeur, lack of insight and terrible incompetence, slavish devotion and extreme resignation, personal anger and intrigue - this swamp fed by Hitler's refusal to recognize own mistakes, his corrosive distrust of others, hatred and leaden fear of the end, which Hitler tried to hide behind extravagant promises of final victory.

Guderian had the tenacity of a bulldog. He was almost insistently frank. And his stubbornness had indeed wrested many concessions from Hitler since the summer of 1944. But when he looked back at the total number of dividends, it seemed quite small. In most cases, the viscosity of the swamp won out.

During 1944, German troops experienced the horror of difficult retreats.

In the west, English and American troops The invasion made landings on the Normandy coast. After weeks bloody struggle They broke through German lines, swept through France and Belgium, bypassed Dutch territory and reached the German border.

In Italy, the Allied front was steadily moving north. In the north, the devastated Finns concluded a truce with the Soviet Union. The German Alpine Army retreated into Northern Norway, working its way south through slow overland marches.

And yet all these defeats, retreats, disasters were incomparable with the retreats in the east.

At the beginning of June 1944, the Eastern Front stood at Soviet land far beyond German borders. But just a few weeks later, the entire structure began to shake.

This process began in the sector of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Bush, whose front lines, deeply protruding, stretched more than 700 kilometers from Kovel through Pinsk, Zhlobin, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk to a point northeast of Polotsk. Along this front, the German 2nd, 4th and 9th Armies and the 3rd Panzer Army, with only forty divisions and only two divisions in reserve, found themselves facing one hundred and fifty infantry divisions and seventy-five armored divisions of the Russians.

In vain did the commanders of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Kluge, and later his successor, Field Marshal Busch, point out again and again that this convex front was strategically weak and literally “invited” an attack on it. In vain both military leaders demanded permission to eliminate the bulge, straighten the front line and thus obtain reserves. But Hitler, horrified by the ever-increasing number of defeats, knew only one kind of “strategy”: to strike in all directions. He categorically refused. He did not intend to retreat from the conquered land.

On June 22, 1944, after hours of artillery bombardment, Soviet troops began their summer offensive. Russian armored columns crashed into German lines at Zhlobin, Rogachev, north and south of Vitebsk. They hit the left flank of the 4th Army in the rear. They reached the Berezina, captured crossings and cut off the German retreat. Most of the 4th Army and about half of the 3rd Panzer Army—nearly three hundred thousand men—met their deaths in the deep, dark forests east of Minsk. All six divisions were surrounded near Bobruisk, Orsha and Vitebsk. Most of the captured German soldiers and officers were destroyed.

Field Marshal Busch was hastily replaced by Field Marshal Model, a man sympathetic to Hitler, capable of impatient gambling in his excessive sense of self-esteem, ambitious and, therefore, a good executor of Hitler's orders. The divisions began to roll north from the Romanian Front, which at that time stood in misleading silence. Most of them came too late. On July 5, the Russians took Molodechno, and on July 8, Baranovichi. They then paused to regroup their ranks, and Field Marshal Model succeeded in forming a short, shaky front along the Kovel-Pinsk-Lida-Vilno line.

Even Model now saw no other choice but to withdraw Army Group North to get fresh troops. After the collapse of Army Group Center, North formed a vast bridgehead in Baltic countries– Latvia and Estonia. Army Group North's southern flank had to be expanded to maintain contact with the retreating remnants of Army Group Center. Many divisions could have been released if Army Group North had been withdrawn south of the Dvina River. Hitler refused to do this, continuing to hold on to every meter of conquered land. A new Russian offensive began on July 14. The Germans, with desperate efforts, succeeded only in holding Warsaw. But further north, the Russians made their first attack, crossing the Neman River and sweeping forward to the borders of East Prussia.

Guderian fell asleep again, but this only brought back to him the disturbing dance of tormenting dreams that had haunted him for so long. He heard his own voice repeatedly repeating the quick, excited words: “The Russians are at the gates of East Prussia. Any day they can reach the sea. They can cut off Army Group North. Then Army Group North will be scattered in vain. We need thirty of its divisions in East Prussia. We need them on the Narew. We need them on the Vistula. We need them to protect our land!" Then Hitler's face appeared, deathly pale behind green glasses, and his mouth repeating: “No, that's out of the question! Army Group North fights where it is. A German soldier does not give up even a meter of land. No, this is impossible! Army Group North fights where it is..."

Guderian's dreams swirled, endlessly repeating...

July–August 1944: Russians in East Prussia. The thin German front line still holds. Army Group North in Latvia and Estonia has been retained for now. A desperate fight against Hitler to bring three hundred thousand men south to defend East Germany. Hitler's answer: "No!" The first Russian breakthrough to the Baltic Sea will cut off Army Group North. Contact has been re-established.

September 18-27: Army Group North, driven out of Estonia, retreats to Latvia. New proposal to redeploy it to East Prussia. Hitler's answer: "No!"

October 9: Russians break through to the Baltic Sea: north and south of Memel. Army Group North is completely cut off. Request: Allow Army Group North to prepare a breakthrough into East Prussia while the Russians in Memel are still weak. Hitler's answer: "No!"

October 16: massive Russian attack on East Prussia. General Hossbach resists with the semi-reorganized remnants of the 4th Army, most of which was crushed near Vitebsk. Four shaky German army corps face off against five Soviet armies. New request: allow Army Group North, still intact, to break through to East Prussia. Hitler's answer: "No!"

the 25th of October: The 4th Army stops the Russians in a desperate struggle. A new Russian breakthrough from the north threatens the loss of East Prussia. Request: withdraw Army Group North. Hitler: “No! Army Group North fights where it is..."

November 11, 18, 20 and 23: requests to return Army Group North. All efforts to drive the Russians out of East Prussia fail.

November 26 and 28, December 5: new requests to withdraw Army Group North. Hitler’s answer: “No, that’s out of the question, a German soldier doesn’t give up even a meter of land, no, that’s out of the question...”

And these were not the only events that brought Guderian, even in his dreams, back into the whirlpool of crises, dangers and disasters that constituted his waking hours. There were other events, even more extensive, even more chaotic, a real drama that unfolded between Warsaw and the Balkans...

August 5, 1944: conference with Romanian Prime Minister Antonescu. Guderian acts as translator. Antonescu aside to Guderian: “I just don’t understand how the officers took part in the assassination attempt on Hitler. You can rest assured that I can trust my generals blindly!”

August 6: General Friessner, commander of Army Group South, sends a message to Hitler: “The internal situation in Romania is uncertain. The king is probably the originator of the idea of ​​getting out of the war. They hope that the Western powers will not abandon Romania to the communists. The entire front of Army Group South, from the Black Sea through the Dniester to the Carpathians, is threatened by the impending Russian offensive. The front is weakened by the loss of divisions transferred to Army Group Center. The Romanian 4th Army and Dimitrescu's Army Group are unreliable. The front will be reliable only if Romania remains loyal, if no more German troops are transferred and if all scattered German troops in Romania are - air Force, Marines, district command troops and police are located under the control of the army group. If these conditions are not met, then an immediate retreat to the west of the Prut River is inevitable.”

August 7: Hitler: “The front remains where it is!” August 13: Instead of withdrawing Army Group North, Hitler orders all reserve divisions and all but one panzer division of Army Group South to be transferred north to the Vistula, Narev and East Prussia.

August 20: The Russians begin a large-scale offensive in the south. The Romanians throw down their weapons, flee or join the Russians. The Russians break through the German front and reach the Prut River.

August 22: The German 6th Army is cut off. Hitler allowed Army Group South to retreat. Too late. The 6th Army is surrounded. Units of the 8th Army flee to the foothills of the Eastern Carpathians.

August 23: German Ambassador von Killinger was arrested in Bucharest. Romanian Prime Minister Antonescu is imprisoned. King Michael leads the movement to break with Germany. Hitler orders the traitor clique to be arrested. Form a national government. Bomb Bucharest! Too late. Romania declares war on Germany. Soviet armies march through Romania without resistance. Torture, robbery, arrests, violence, expulsion of Germans caught up in the Russian advance, and also of countless Romanians. Russian troops behind the German front in the Balkans.

September 1: retreat. There are serious concerns about what will happen to the German settlement in Transylvania. Hitler: “I order that German subjects in Transylvania organize resistance!” Factual Events: The Russians invade Transylvania. All Germans who did not escape at the last moment were killed or robbed, forced out, expelled. Refugees in vans move through Hungary to Austria.

September 14: Russians on the borders of Banat. New tragedies for German settlers. Hitler: “The Banat will be held!” Factual Events: The Russians reach Temesvar, the capital of the Banat. A terrible outrage. Mass flight of Banat Germans to the south. The Danube crossings are insufficient to transport crowds. American and British planes throw mines into the river and attack ferries. Weisskirchen, 70 kilometers south of Temesvar, fell. Thousands of Germans - old people, women, children - were killed.

October 1944: Russian breakthrough into the German settlement in Sirmia. Tito's partisans. Those who did not escape the partisans were killed, driven out, or driven into camps by the hundreds of thousands.

October 15: The German-appointed governor of Hungary, von Horvath, is trying to achieve a truce. Arrested by the German secret police.

November 1944: constant Russian advances in Hungary. Arbitrariness against the Germans, as well as the Hungarians. The Russians are preparing an offensive to cross the Danube.

December 23: The Russians captured Stuhlweissenburg, 56 kilometers southwest of Budapest.

At about nine o'clock on the morning of January 9, General Guderian was awakened by a sudden jolt from the train. He stood up and walked down the aisles to the conference car. His aide-de-camp, Freytag-Loringhoven, deduced from Guderian's expression that this day would see another clash with Hitler - and probably a violent one.

Guderian sat down at the table and stared into the gray winter morning. He thought about the endless deserts of snow that he had crossed three days ago, on January 6, when he went to meet the commander of Army Group A. This army group was the first to sense the new Russian offensive.

He bent over the map. The German front in the east was finally stabilized along a line that began near the city of Tilsit in East Prussia. This line then followed the East Prussian border, cut through East Prussian territory near the town of Gołdap, and ran southwest along the Narew River down to its confluence with the Vistula at Modlin. South of Modlin it followed the left bank of the Vistula, covering most of Warsaw west of the river. It curved around the large Russian bridgehead at Puława and then rejoined the river below in the Zwolen area, where it encircled another Russian bridgehead. Beyond Zwolen it again followed the western bank of the Vistula to Baranow and here it met the largest and most dangerous Russian bridgehead. This line then crossed the Vistula and headed south to Kassa, approximately 208 kilometers northeast of Budapest, where it joined Army Group South.

While in Latvia an almost untouched army group occupied a small pocket aimlessly, the 800 kilometers of front from Tilsit down to Kassa was manned by two German army groups, both of which had endured the heat of the Russian summer offensive.

Army Group Center between Tilsit and Modlin was to be rebuilt as far as German resources still allowed. The commander of the group was General Reinhardt. Its northern flank was held by the 3rd Panzer Army, which no longer lived up to its name, under the command of General Routh, a grey-haired Austrian. To the south was the 4th Army under the command of General Hossbach. She had just recovered from the brutal defensive operation of October. The 4th Army formed a dangerous bulge in front of Army Group Center. South-west of the Narev there was a weak 2nd Army under the command of General Weiss.

Army Group A held the line from Modlin to Kassa. It was commanded by General Harpe, a youthful man who spent long years in battles on the Eastern Front. Harpe's 9th Army, composed of several unequally equipped divisions, was stationed along the Vistula north and south of Warsaw. The 4th Panzer Army, under the command of General Graeser, arrived from the south, bypassing the large Russian bridgehead at Baranova. Then came the 17th Army, under the command of General Schultz, between the Vistula and the Beskydy mountains. Finally, the 1st Panzer Army under the command of General Henrici arrived, straddling the Beskid Mountains and linking up with Army Group South near Kassa.

In November 1944, German intelligence reported the concentration of four new Soviet army groups. The army groups of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky advanced towards East Prussia. Army groups of Zhukov and Konev appeared on the Vistula south of Modlin. The main forces of the two southern groups concentrated on the bridgeheads in Pulawa and Baranow. An attack from Baranow would endanger the German regions of Silesia and Saxony. From Pulawy, Russian troops threatened the Warta area and beyond to Berlin.

The information that German intelligence gathered regarding the enormous strength of the Russians did not at first seem very plausible even to Guderian. But it was so well documented that it could not be questioned.

Guderian began preparations for the coming assault. Gradually he moved units away from the shaky front lines and restored them to armored divisions, with seventy to eighty tanks each, again reaching at least one-third their former strength. He assembled fourteen reserve divisions and resumed his constant, fruitless struggle with Hitler over the thirty divisions of the army group in Courland.

But in September 1944, Hitler put forward the daring idea of ​​once again taking the initiative on the Western Front. He prepared to attack the Allied lines in the Ardennes, which were manned very sparingly by Western commanders who thought Germany was too weak to attack. Hitler believed that he could return Antwerp and inflict a blow on the Americans that would delay their advance for many months. General Jodl, this one a strange man, was insightful enough to foresee the coming disaster, but for a long time he did not dare to resist the will of Hitler and supported this plan. Thus, the last reserves rolled back to the Western Front, where they were formed in the 5th tank army and the 6th SS Panzer Army. But Hitler promised that he would send these troops back to the east as soon as victory was won in the Ardennes or when it became clear that success would not be achieved there.

Finally, Guderian issued an order that set hundreds of thousands of people in motion. In East Prussia, West Prussia, Pomerania, in the “General Government”, in the Warta region and further south - from the Baltic Sea down to Silesia - Germans, Poles and prisoners of war began to dig tank traps, shorten trenches and create a belt of fortifications around each city. This order challenged Hitler's command, which prohibited the construction of defensive structures behind the lines because it undermined the morale of the troops. But Guderian signed: “Adolf Hitler – through Guderian.”

This was the only time he resorted to such a trick. And probably the only reason he had was that Erich Koch, the district leader of East Prussia, was already expecting Guderian's measures, since Koch launched extensive earthworks in his area as soon as the Russians began the summer offensive of 1944. And with From then on, in Hitler's eyes, Koch was the very embodiment of a ruthless desire to resist, his action paving the way for Guderian's grand attempt to create a deep network of field fortifications behind the entire Eastern Front.

Soon after Guderian began preparing these defensive structures, Hitler decided to promote the district leaders in the east - in Königsberg, Danzig, Posen, Stettin and Breslau - to "Reich Defense Commissioners". This move made them the true owners of the eastern zone. And they wanted a lot thanks to this new government– especially Koch.

The first field fortifications were built according to Koch's whim. He refused the demand of General Reinhardt, commander of Army Group Center, to build positions far enough away, because this would be a sign of “defeatism.” He refused to remove the civilian population, except within an 8-kilometer zone immediately behind the front lines, or to make preparations for evacuation in case of disaster, because “no true German would even allow himself to think that East Prussia might fall into Russian hands.” Instead he turned to civilian population asking them to arm themselves. He called himself "Führer of the People's Army of East Prussia." He refused to entrust the training of his people's army to the military or to place it under military control. And he even got Hitler’s permission to have his own functionaries manage army personnel and track down the “cowards.” As part of his remit as Reich Commissioner for Defense, he dealt with the war industry of East Prussia, created his own arsenals and kept them inviolable from the regular army.

Despite the intervention of district leaders in the east, fortified lines finally ran from East Prussia down to the borders of Silesia. By the end of August, Guderian had succeeded in raising one hundred battalions of limited service personnel and providing them with two thousand field weapons from captured supplies to defend key positions.

However, a single order from Hitler deprived Guderian of all his men and most of his weapons. They rolled west when the front in France collapsed and fragments of the western German armies poured back across the German borders. All Guderian's protests, all his warnings about eastern threat were ignored.

But even then Guderian did not give up. He suggested that in areas under threat, Hitler should staff the defense lines with local militia. He was unaware that in Hitler's mind this plan was combined with Koch's experiments until, three days later, Hitler announced that Guderian's idea of ​​a people's army would be carried out not only in the east, but throughout Germany. And the implementation of the plan was placed in the hands of Martin Bormann, head of the Nazi Party office.

That was the end. Bormann - a stupid, primitive, dangerous shadow of Hitler, incapable of assessing political or military affairs, constantly busy spreading his own power and the power of the party - turned people's army into a party propaganda tool.

And now, in January 1945, the defensive lines in the east, countless trenches, tank traps, slots for riflemen and weapons, on which tens and hundreds of thousands of people worked, are empty, covered with snow.

On December 16, 1944, Hitler's offensive in the Ardennes began. By December 22, his failure became obvious. Guderian went to the Führer's headquarters on Christmas night to demand the immediate redeployment to the east of the divisions that were no longer needed in the west.

But Hitler's mind was still fixed on Antwerp. He maintained that the initiative was still in his hands. He categorically stated that Guderian's information about the strength of the Russians was a clear fabrication.

Guderian returned to his headquarters with empty handed. At this time he received news that Budapest had been captured by the Russians. On arrival, he found another report waiting for him: by order from the Fuehrer's headquarters, Gille's Panzer Corps, held in reserve behind the Vistula front, was sent to Hungary to recapture the foreign capital. This was the final mistake: the reserves that he had so painfully accumulated were transferred to another front.

Guderian, containing his rage and despair, returned to the Fuehrer's headquarters on New Year's Eve. But Hitler, just as at Christmas, denied the threat from the east. He did not want to admit that his enemy, Stalin, who hated him, had such enormous forces. Hitler repeated his frequent assertion that all Stalin could muster was "purified Russian scum" and "rejected trash collected along the way." He shouted that Gehlen, with all his reports, belonged in a madhouse. Hitler did not notice Guderian’s objection that he, Guderian, apparently belonged in the same madhouse, since he shared Gehlen’s views.

Once again Guderian demanded the Courland division. He showed calculations from his transportation experts proving that transfers, including heavy equipment, were entirely possible. Hitler refused.

Guderian then resumed the struggle for the forces that had become available in the west. But Hitler still did not believe in his failure in the Ardennes. He stated that in the east he still had lands to lose - but not in the west. No arguments helped. There were no supplies for the east.

After the meeting, while Guderian, still trembling with rage, was eating breakfast, Himmler said to him:

– Do you really think that the Russians will attack? This would be the biggest bluff since Genghis Khan!

General Guderian's thoughts were interrupted by the appearance of General Gehlen. The intelligence chief arrived for a final report on the upcoming meeting with Hitler.

Gehlen began:

– I have prepared another special report based on latest information, concerning the forces in the Baraniv bridgehead sector. According to my information, the enemy has concentrated five infantry armies, six tank corps, two separate tank corps and five tank brigades on a front of eighty kilometers. At present, the balance of forces is in favor of the enemy as follows: infantry - eleven to one; tanks - seven to one; artillery - twenty to one. In some sectors the Russian artillery numbers three hundred and eighty guns per kilometer. My testimony is irrefutable. It should convince even the Fuhrer: if something is not done, we will get a disaster at the bridgehead in Baranova.

Guderian got up and walked around the office.

- Gelen, today is ours last chance, - he said. “If the tank divisions from the west are sent to the east no later than tonight, they will be able to get there in time...” Guderian stopped. - Gelen, when you report, stay calm, no matter what happens. Stay calm, even if the Fuhrer allows himself to get carried away and abuses the General Staff or you personally.

Helen nodded. He laid out his cards and papers on the table.

Guderian continued:

– Summary of the points to be discussed. First, immediate withdrawal from Courland. Secondly, the transfer of motorized troops from west to east, this evening. Thirdly, in case of refusal, at least the withdrawal of the protruding front of the 4th Army in East Prussia, which will give us several divisions for reserves. Fourth, the approval of Operation Sleigh Ride for Army Group A. This means: the withdrawal of our salient front between the bridgeheads in Pulawa and Baranow shortly before the Russian attack, which will save four divisions for reserves. Aggressive defense on the bridgehead in Pulawa, delaying defense from the bridgehead in Baranow to the border of Silesia...

For a thorough study of General Jodl, a sufficient room was provided at the Fuehrer's headquarters, designed for approximately twenty people, who met on the evening of January 9 to confer with Hitler.

The tall, heavy figure of Field Marshal Keitel towered over the meeting. Jodl himself was pale, his face seemed like a mask. The plump Goering stood between his dapper liaison officer, General Christian, and his naval adjutant von Puttkamer. The intelligent, intelligent face of General Winter, Chief of Staff of Task Force South, contrasted pleasantly with the pale features of Heinrich Himmler. Standing at the table with the map was the stocky, bow-legged General Burgdorf, head of the OKH personnel department, known as “the gravedigger of the German officer corps.”

Hitler entered. He walked carefully, like an old man dragging his left leg. His left hand trembled, his shoulders sagged, his head drooped. The face was flabby and pale. Gray strands showed through his dark hair. A double-breasted gray suit with gold buttons hung shapelessly on him.

Hitler shook hands with everyone. He approached the table. The adjutant pulled out a chair for him, and Hitler sat down heavily on it.

And then there came that strange, rustling, crackling sound that had accompanied these meetings for months - an irritating, paralyzing background that reminded listeners that the imaginary colossus was disintegrating: the sound of Hitler's left hand trembling on the cards.

But it was still dangerous to judge Hitler's internal resources by their external decline. His imagination, needless to say, left him. All he had left was a strange rigidity - he seemed incapable of thinking, reasoning or planning, unlike the days at the height of his power. But behind this rigidity there was still a manic force. Hitler still possessed his desperate desire to live, his cruel rejection of harsh facts and his unreasonable faith in fate, which, having once raised him so high, would now not allow him to fall.

Reason was powerless against fate.

Guderian, with a face that conveyed tension, positioned himself to Hitler's left to make his report. This has become a tradition since a bomb explosion on July 20 destroyed Hitler's right eardrum.

“My Fuhrer,” Guderian began, “I have come once again to confer with you personally. We have information that inspires confidence that the Russian winter offensive, aimed at Berlin, will begin three days later, on January 12. I want to inform you once again, as I did on December 24 and December 31, about the real situation on the Eastern Front. I have brought General Gehlen to show you any document you wish to see. On 6 January I personally visited Army Group A in Krakow to obtain information regarding the situation in this sector. This is the last moment for action. I hope that our report will encourage you to send the reinforcements that are needed there to the Eastern Front - and you will do so tonight.

In the early morning hours of 10 January, General Harpe, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A, was driving south along the Kielce Highway towards his headquarters in Krakow. The plains on both sides of the straight, unforested road were covered with snow. They stretched endlessly in all directions - empty, white and flat, without a single obstacle for the Russian armored forces.

The general was returning from a trip to the front, located on the bridgehead in Baranova. He discussed with General Graeser Guderian's visit to the headquarters of Army Group A. They spoke of Guderian's promise to forcefully demand reinforcements from the west or, failing that, approval of Operation Sleigh Ride, a plan devised by Harpe and his assistant, General von Xylander. Harpe knew only too well that this plan could, at best, do no more than prevent the Russians from invading Silesia. But at least it was an operation that gave a little hope...

A piercing wind rolled across the plains. General Harpe hid his face in the fur of his collar. He was a man who still believed in Hitler's destiny. He even still believed in Hitler's intelligence and paid little attention to Guderian's warning that Operation Sleigh Ride was being interpreted by Hitler as an expression of Harpe's lack of fighting spirit. Harpe hoped—hoped confidently—that at the last moment Hitler would realize how desperate the situation was.

The general's car rolled into Krakow and stopped in front of the school building where his headquarters was located. General von Xylander was waiting on the steps.

“The Army High Command has just sent the results of General Guderian’s conference at the Fuehrer’s headquarters,” said von Xylander. - The Fuhrer refused everything. From the Courland troops from the west, “Sleigh Ride” - from everything. The front remains where it is. And the situation remains as it is. The Fuhrer does not believe that there will be a Russian offensive...

Over the next week, against fierce resistance and repelling numerous counterattacks, troops on all three fronts continued to advance. The reserves abandoned by the Germans allowed us to somewhat slow down the pace of advance of our shock armies, but they could not turn the tide of events.

Many fighters in those battles showed exceptional tenacity and ingenuity. Thus, machine gunner Karl Cheishvili, surrounded by the Germans, held out for 24 hours and repelled all attacks without losing his line to the enemy.

Lieutenant Rantman's tank rushed far ahead, destroying many enemy soldiers and equipment with its tracks and fire. The crew, carried away by the battle, did not notice that they were in an anti-tank area. The enemy opened heavy artillery fire on the vehicle. Ammunition was running out, and the commander understood that it was impossible to survive under such hurricane fire. Then he decided to use a trick. By order of the tank commander, turret gunner Neuspokoev lit smoke grenades and thick smoke poured out of the tank. The Germans decided that the car was set on fire and ceased fire. Four tank crews sat in the tank for 15 hours, watching the enemy. In the evening the Germans headed towards the tank. In their hands they carried a tol prepared for exploding the car. When the Nazis were already a few meters away, Rantman and Neuspokoev threw grenades at them. The driver-mechanic Sergeev started the engine and all four full speed ahead went to their positions, delivering valuable information about the enemy to the unit.

Oryol sector of the front, July 20 (Special correspondent TASS). At exactly four o'clock in the morning, engines began to rumble and tank battalions rushed to attack enemy positions. Heavy vehicles crushed wire barriers and subtle obstacles, smashed bunkers and firing points along the way, paving the way for the Guards infantry.
Lieutenant Rantman's guard tank jumped far ahead and met heavy enemy artillery fire. It was too late to go back. But the tank commander quickly found a way out. At his signal, the tower gunner Neuspokoev lit smoke grenades. Thick smoke poured out of the tank, which had frozen in place. The Germans apparently decided that the car was set on fire by their shells and ceased fire. The tank showed no signs of life. Four Soviet tank driver Rantman, Sergeev, Neuspokoev and Sershenko sat like that for fifteen hours, watching the enemy. At dusk we headed towards the tank German officer and four soldiers. They carried in their hands a tol prepared for blowing up the car. When the Nazis were already a few meters away, Rantman and Neuspokoev threw grenades at them. The mechanic-driver Sergeev started the engine with lightning speed and the tank turned around and rushed to his unit. The information provided by the tankers about the enemy’s advance and their firepower turned out to be very valuable.

The successes of the Red Army had serious influence international situation. There was a real threat of a coup in Italy and the withdrawal of the main German ally from the war. Hitler was forced to withdraw some troops from the Kursk direction for transfer to the Western Front. And without that difficult situation the German army was becoming critical. Further retention of the Oryol bridgehead was not possible.

On July 26, 1943, the German command decided to leave the Oryol bridgehead and begin withdrawing to defensive line"Hagen", which by that time existed mainly only on paper.

On July 29, our troops liberated an important German defense center - Bolkhov, Fierce fighting ensued on the approaches to Orel.

Advance of infantry and tanks near Orel.

ACh 22/YII-43 Latest news from RFI
Bolkhov is ours!

Oryol direction, July 22. / special correspondent TASS/. The city of Bolkhov was the most important point of resistance in a heavily fortified area of ​​Nazi troops north of Orel.
For a long time, the Nazis created lines of their fortifications on the distant and near approaches to this resistance center. The entire area is covered with a network of trenches, firing points have been installed, and rubble surrounded by barbed wire has been built in the forests. The city was surrounded by large and small strongholds with a unified control system.
Breaking through enemy defense, Soviet soldiers quickly moved forward and reached the near approaches of the city. The fighting was stubborn. Our units broke the fierce resistance of the enemy.
In an effort to delay the advance of the Red Army at any cost, the Germans pulled a large number of tanks and infantry from other sectors of the front into the city area. The Nazis launched numerous counterattacks, throwing 100-120 tanks and self-propelled guns at them. From the air, German ground units were covered by large groups of aircraft. Junkers, Heinkels, Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts continuously appeared above our battle formations.

/to be continued/

22/YII-43 Latest news from RFI
Bolkhov is ours!

/continuation/
Soviet infantrymen, tank crews, artillerymen and pilots repelled enemy counterattacks and, breaking his resistance, moved forward. The ensuing battles were replete with examples of heroism and military skill of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. The crew of Captain Ilyasov's tank in one tank battle destroyed 9/nine/ German vehicles. During the day, armor-piercing units burned and knocked out several dozen German tanks. All types firearms infantry were also directed against enemy aircraft. During this time, 12 /twelve/ fascist planes were shot down by infantry fire alone.
Our guards infantry fought skillfully and steadfastly. All the Nazi counterattacks were defeated by her resilience. One of our guards units occupied a position in a small grove. The Germans rained down a large amount of artillery and mortar fire on the grove. With a decisive rush, the guards came out from under fire and rushed to attack the Germans, who had settled on a nearby height. The blow was sudden and stunning. The Nazis retreated under the blows of Soviet soldiers. The guards occupied the trenches that had just been left by the enemy and immediately entrenched themselves in them. All fascist counterattacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Having exhausted the enemy's forces, Soviet soldiers went on the offensive and achieved new successes.
Strong battles broke out for every strong point. Soviet units carried out flank attacks on the enemy, encircled and destroyed individual German garrisons. After persistent and bloody battles on the outskirts of the city of Bolkhov, our troops, having suppressed enemy resistance, broke into the outskirts of the city, and then completely captured Bolkhov. With the occupation of this important node in the enemy defense system, Soviet troops completed the liquidation of the heavily fortified German area north of Orel.