The peasants interpreted the new king’s favorable appeal to them in their own way. They refused to pay “taxes and sales,” taxes and dues, and moved to lands convenient for them, not paying attention to the fact that a good half of the lands in the state remained reserved. The reaction of the peasants was so violent that when the decree of 1602 was re-issued, the words about granting an exemption “from taxes and sales” were excluded from it.
As for the landowners, they resisted with all their might any concessions in favor of the serfs, even limited and temporary ones. The resistance of the nobles reached such proportions that the authorities included clauses in the text of the decree of 1602 designed to protect peasants from landlord violence and robbery. “It would be very difficult for the children of boyar peasants. “They didn’t keep it to themselves,” the law said, “and they didn’t make any sales to them, and whoever robs the peasants and doesn’t let them out because of himself, will be in great disgrace from us.” Verbal threats of disgrace could not frighten the nobles, as long as income was involved. Without peasants, the small landowner faced a beggarly sum. For its part, the serfdom state did not think about any serious sanctions against the masses of the nobility, which constituted its social support. Attempts to alleviate the situation of the starving village apparently failed.
In 1603 the law on St. George's Day has not been confirmed. Boris Godunov admitted his failure peasant policy. The nobility appreciated the king’s measures, which fully met her interests. But among the minor nobility, the popularity of the Godunov dynasty began to quickly fall. This circumstance greatly contributed to the success of the impostor, whose invasion unleashed a civil war in the country.
A. S. Pushkin put into the mouth of Boris Godunov bitter complaints about the ingratitude of the people:
... I thought my people
In contentment, in glory to calm.
To win his love with generosity
- But he put aside empty concerns:
Living power is hateful to the mob,
She only knows how to love the dead...
In life, Boris really failed to win people's sympathy, despite all his charity.
The famine hardened the population to the extreme. IN different ends armed gangs appeared in the country. On big roads There was no passage or passage from them.
The largest armed detachment, led by a certain Khlopok, operated almost at the very walls of Moscow. A. A. Zimin suggested that the performances of the lower classes in 1602-1603 marked the beginning of the peasant war, which immediately engulfed many districts of the state.
Documents from the Razryadny Prikaz, the main military department of Russia, at first glance confirmed his assumption. Over the course of a year - from September 1602 to September 1603 - the authorities sent at least two dozen nobles to cities such as Vladimir, Ryazan, Vyazma, Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk, Kolomna, Rzhev, entrusting them with the fight against the robbers operating there. The idea arose that the performances of “robberies” in different districts were part of general movement, the climax of which was the actions of Khlopok in the vicinity of the capital. After the name of the leader, the movement was called the “Cotton Rebellion.”
A critical analysis of sources completely destroys this picture. The truth was discovered thanks to a simple technique - checking the official appointments of the nobles who fought the robbers. It turned out that the nobles traveled to different cities for short time and immediately returned to Moscow. Their travels began in September 1602 and had nothing to do with Cotton's rebellion in the fall of 1603.
It was during this period that the country experienced famine. By 1602-1603, the disaster had reached unprecedented proportions. Hoping for help from the treasury, many starving peasants from the Moscow region and a dozen other districts poured into Moscow, but starvation awaited them there. The government made desperate efforts to establish supplies for the capital. Officials sent to the provinces tried to collect bread in crumbs wherever possible. But their efforts did not lead to the desired results. The country's grain reserves were almost completely exhausted, and what could be procured in the districts could not be delivered to Moscow. Numerous gangs of “robberies” appeared on the roads, repulsing and robbing food convoys heading to the capital. The actions of the “robberies” aggravated the people’s misfortunes and doomed thousands of refugee peasants to death.
The critical situation determined the nature of government measures. To ensure unhindered delivery of goods to Moscow, the authorities sent nobles to main roads- Vladimir, Smolensk, Ryazan, connecting the city with various counties. The “robberies” operated not only in the provinces, but also in the capital. On May 14, 1603, Boris Godunov instructed the most prominent members of the Boyar Duma to maintain order in Moscow. Moscow was divided into 11 districts. The Kremlin has become central district, two districts were formed in Kitai-gorod, eight districts in the White and Wooden “cities”. The district was headed by the boyars Prince N.R. Trubetskoy, Prince V.V. Golitsyn, M.G. Saltykov, okolnichy P.N. Sheremetov, V.P. Morozov, M.M. Saltykov, I.F. Basmanov and three Godunov. The boyars, together with their assistants - noble heads - regularly made detours in the quarters assigned to them.
The measures described were emergency. They were a direct consequence of critical situation, which took shape in Moscow by 1603. Possibilities for famine relief were exhausted, and the distribution of money to the poor was completely stopped. The refugees, who were almost more numerous than the native residents of Moscow, found themselves in the worst situation. Refugees filled squares and vacant lots - “hollow places”, fires, ravines and meadows. They were forced to live under open air or in hastily put together booths and huts. Deprived of help, they were doomed to painful death. Every morning, carts drove through the streets of Moscow, carrying away the corpses of people who had died overnight.
The threat of starvation pushed desperate people into robbery and robbery. The chroniclers very accurately described the situation at the height of the famine, when
“There was great violence, many rich houses were robbed, and broken, and set on fire, and everywhere there was great fear and increasing injustice.” The poor attacked the mansions of the rich, set fires to make it easier to rob, and attacked the carts as soon as they appeared on the streets of the capital. Markets stopped functioning. As soon as the merchant appeared on the street, he was instantly surrounded by a crowd, and he had to think about only one thing: how to escape from the crush. The starving people took the bread and ate it right away.
During the years of famine, many landowners went so far as to let their peasants go so that they would not have to support them. No less nobles acted quite vilely, driving people away with the expectation that after the end of the famine he would simply find them and return them to himself. As a result, traveling on the roads has become, to put it mildly, unsafe. Crowds of starving slaves were engaged in robbery and robberies on the roads. Many rushed to Moscow after learning that the tsar was generously distributing money from the treasury.
Meanwhile in Moscow things were no better. According to Abraham Palitsyn from the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, at least 127 thousand people died from hunger or problems related to it in the capital. These problems are obvious. In addition to the increase in crimes, the number of patients increased, and a cholera epidemic began. Cases of cannibalism were observed. Those who were not ready to feed on their own kind sometimes ate dung.
How the sovereign fought hunger. Contemporary assessments
Contemporaries had different assessments of how the authorities helped the starving. The well-known Isaac Massa believed that the distribution of alms only intensified the hunger in Moscow, because needy people from all over the area flocked to the capital. Moreover, the money given out was simply stolen by officials.
Russian chroniclers assessed Godunov’s measures differently. One contemporary described the state of affairs in Moscow this way: “And in Moscow and within its borders they ate horse meat, and dogs, and cats, and people, but the poor still held on to the royal alms...” Helping the starving poor was indeed invaluable.
According to the chronicles, to provide work to the poor population, Godunov started large-scale construction work, including the construction itself tall building in Russia
Isaac Massa, however, notes that the sovereign could have done more. For example, as if the king could, but did not strictly order noble gentlemen, monks and other rich people who had barns full of grain to sell their grain. The patriarch himself, having a large supply of food, allegedly announced that he did not want to sell grain, for which over time he could earn more more money. In the literature one can find multiple references to the quoted words of Mass: “... the reserves of bread in the country were greater than all the inhabitants could eat in four years... noble gentlemen, as well as all monasteries and many rich people had barns full of bread, part of it was already rotten from lying for many years, and they did not want to sell it; and by will king of god was so blinded, despite the fact that he could order everything he wanted, he did not command in the strictest way that everyone sell their own grain.”
The reliability of this evidence, however, is questionable. The “patriarchal speech” “transmitted” by Massa is imbued with a merchant spirit, characteristic of the Dutch merchant, but not of the patriarch Job. Boris's closest assistant could not act as an open supporter of grain speculation when the authorities were taking all measures to curb it.
Cathedral Square during the time of Godunov
We can say that the Dutchman's assessments are quite one-sided. Probably due to the fact that he observed this from the position of a contemporary. Now we can evaluate that time more objectively. For example, we know that monasteries were the largest holders of grain reserves. On the eve of the famine, the grain reserves of, for example, the Vologda Spaso-Prilutsky Monastery amounted to 2834 quarters of rye and oats. A year later, they dropped to a minimum of 942 quarters; the monks were forced to start purchasing grain.
Causes of hunger
Speculation in bread by monks, rich nobles and merchants was one of the reasons aggravating the misfortunes of the population, but still they were not main reason the emergence of famine in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. The harsh climate, scarcity of soil, and feudal farming system made it impossible to create such grain reserves that could provide the country with food in conditions of a three-year crop failure.
In our time, according to meteorologists, due to a volcanic eruption in Spanish Peru, a small ice age. This is what destroyed the harvest of 1601, and then 1602, and 1603. Historians and economists blame this on the general crisis of the feudal system throughout Europe, caused by overpopulation. The old order simply could not feed the crowds of people. The turmoil was gaining momentum.
People left their native lands in search of not happiness, but at least bread. Until the end of the century Russian kingdom will still experience what happened in Time of Troubles, the terrible part of which was hunger. Uprisings of Cossacks and peasants on the Volga, Don and Yaik, city riots will give their name XVII century- “rebellious age”.
The reign of Fyodor Ioannovich, Time of Troubles. Social movements in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. Fight against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden
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The reign of Fyodor Ioannovich
1) in 1589 g., with the blessing of the Patriarch of Constantinople Jeremiah II, who was in Moscow, the patriarchate was established in Russia and the first patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Boris Godunov's direct protégé and assistant, the current Moscow Metropolitan, was elected Job (1589-1605);
2) B 1591 in Uglich at quite mysterious circumstances died last representative Rurik dynasty youngest son Ivan the Terrible's nine-year-old Tsarevich Dmitry. Historical tradition, coming from N.M. Karamzin, linked his death with the name of Boris Godunov, but this version is still considered unproven and rejected by many historians (R. Skrynnikov, V. Kobrin, V. Kozlyakov). Although, of course, the death of Tsarevich Dmitry was beneficial to Boris Godunov and opened it to him direct path to the throne.
3) Russo-Swedish War 1590-1595 There was a return of cities lost during Livonian War: Ivangorod, Yam, Koporye, Oreshek, (Korela)po Tyavzin Peace Treaty 1595. Construction White City– a powerful defensive stone line and stone Smolensk.
The reign of Boris Fedorovich Godunov (1598-1605)
After death Fedor Ivanovich, the last king from the grand ducal branch of the dynasty Rurikovich, between the most influential members of the Boyar Duma - B.F. Godunov And F.N. Romanov(future Patriarch Philaret) began an intense struggle for power, which was won by the brother-in-law of the deceased tsar.
IN February 1598 on Zemsky Sobor V Moscow on the initiative Patriarch Job and after three times exhortations Boris Godunov was elected new Russian Tsar and Sovereign of All Rus'.
Most historians believe that Godunov was very gifted and experienced person and large statesman, which in other historical conditions could bring a lot of benefits to the country.
Boris Godunov seriously shook up all composition of the Boyar Duma and first of all he dealt with his longtime opponent Fedor Nikitich Romanov. In 1600, together with his wife Ksenia Ivanovna Shestova, he was forcibly tonsured a monk and, under the monastic name Filaret, taken to Kholmogory and imprisoned in the distant Anthony-Siysky Monastery. Head of the Ambassadorial Prikaz, Duma clerk Vasily Yakovlevich Shchelkalov was also exiled.
IN 1601-1603 years, in the country three years in a row because of terrible weather conditions: first drought, and then heavy rains and early frosts, there was severe crop failure, which caused a massive, unprecedented in its scale hunger. Government of Boris Godunov made every effort to somehow alleviate social tension in the country: it organized public works in different cities and massive free distribution of bread to the hungry from state storage facilities. Besides, by a special royal decree, the right of peasants to move on St. George’s Day (1601/1602) was restored). However, all the measures taken had a very small effect and the situation in the country continued to deteriorate rapidly. The culmination of the socio-economic crisis and “hunger riots” throughout the country was movement of serfs-robbers under the leadership of Ataman Cotton Kosolap (1603), which was suppressed by government troops with great difficulty and a lot of blood.
At the beginning of the 17th century. Russia experienced a three-year famine. The disaster had a significant impact on the development of the crisis in Russian society. The problem of the “great famine” was reflected in historiography 1 . V.I. Koretsky subjected this problem to special research 2 . However, some issues require further consideration.
A study of secular climate fluctuations shows that the most significant cooling in Europe (over the last thousand years) falls at the beginning of the 17th century. 3 In countries with more favorable soil and climatic conditions and a high level of agriculture for their time, the noted fluctuations did not lead to serious economic consequences. However, in a number of countries in the North and Eastern Europe The cold snap caused a genuine agricultural catastrophe. The summer of 1601 was cold and damp. Over a vast area from Pskov to Nizhny Novgorod, the rains did not stop for 10-12 weeks 4 . The grain in the fields was not ripe. Due to need and hunger, the peasants began harvesting unripe grain - “living on bread,” but they did not have time to reap the rye. “On Semyon Day” - September 1, 1601 - frosts began. In some places, frosts were observed even earlier - at the end of July and mid-August 5 . With the onset of cold weather, the rains gave way to heavy snowfalls. Peasant fields and vegetable gardens were covered with deep snowdrifts. Since October, frosts and snowstorms have intensified. The Dnieper froze in the middle reaches and upper reaches, “and we drove along it like it was the middle of winter.” In the cold, farmers lit fires in the fields, raked snowdrifts and tried to save the remains of the crop 6 .
After a harsh winter, the warm spring of 1602 came. Winter grain was harvested where the fields were sown with old seeds, gave abundant shoots. But in the middle of spring, as a chronicler from Southern Belarus wrote, a “great, terrible frost” struck and killed the grain and other plantings “in bloom.” The same chronicler recorded a rumor, “allegedly in the middle of summer there was great snow and frost in Moscow, so many weeks we went on sleigh rides in the summer” 7 .
The rumors were exaggerated. But in Great Russia, spring and summer frosts brought even worse disasters to the peasants than in Southern Belarus. Having lost their winter crops, the villagers tried to replant their fields using “frozen rye” rescued from under the snow. However, new crops did not sprout - instead of rye, “the old crops were born: someone sowed a hundred measures of grain, and he gathered one measure...” 8.
In the spring of 1603, the greenery in the fields did not die. The summer turned out to be dry and hot. The year was favorable for agricultural work. But the peasants had long ago exhausted their grain reserves. They had no seeds, they had nothing to eat.
After the first crop failure, bread prices rose to 1-2 rubles. per quarter, by the end of the famine - up to 3-4 rubles. According to the Chronograph edition of 1617, before the Troubles, rye was sold for 3-4 kopecks. for a quarter. Taking these data as initial ones, V.I. Koretsky concluded that during the famine, prices “increased 80-120 times!” However, it must be borne in mind that the Chronograph data is random. As A.G. Mankov showed, a steady increase in grain prices occurred already in the second half of the 16th century. During 1594-1597. Novgorod authorities sold confiscated rye at a price equal to 15 kopecks, or 30 money, per quarter. Compared to the mentioned average price, rye rose in price 20 times during the famine years, and even more compared to cheap prices. Interesting information about prices was reported by foreign servicemen Yakov Marzharet and Konrad Bussov, who owned estates in the central districts and were knowledgeable about the grain trade. According to Marzharet, a measure of rye, which previously cost 15 soles (6 kopecks, or 12 money), during the years of famine was sold for almost 20 livres, or 3 rubles. Grain prices, Bussov wrote, remained at high level until 1604, when rye alum was sold at 25 times more expensive than in normal times 9. Thus, both Margaret and Bussov equally believed that bread had risen in price by about 25 times.
Beginning in the spring of 1602, the population began to die of hunger. People ate cats and dogs, chaff and hay, roots and grass. There were cases of cannibalism. In the cities they didn’t have time to pick up dead bodies. On rural roads, corpses became prey for predatory animals and birds 10.
Some contemporaries tried to determine total number victims of the “great famine” in Russia. No later than the second half of 1602, a resident of Vazh land wrote in the margins of a liturgical book Chetyi Menaia for October: “And people died of hunger in the city, and the suburb, and in the volost, two shares, and a third remained” 11. To a resident of the devastated northern places, it seemed that two-thirds of the inhabitants had died out throughout the country.
It was easier to live in the south, and here the chroniclers estimated the number of deaths at one third. An unknown resident of Pochep wrote: “Summer 7110 7111 (1601 - 1603 - R.S.) There was famine throughout the entire land and throughout the entire kingdom of Moscow under the blessed Tsar Boris Fedorovich of all Rus' and under the Holy Archbishop Iev, and a third of the kingdom of Moscow died out by starvation" 12. The above records do not contain accurate information. They captured only the feeling of horror of eyewitnesses, amazed at the scale of the disaster.
Even the government did not have accurate data on the number of deaths throughout the country. The “counting” of the dead was systematically carried out only within the capital. Specially assigned teams daily picked up corpses from the streets and buried them in huge mass graves. Tsar Boris ordered the dead to be dressed in government shrouds, and, apparently, the clerks kept count of the linen released from the treasury 13 . “And in two summers and four months,” wrote Abraham Palitsyn, “who, by order of the Tsarev, counted the cellars in three poor women as 127,000, only in one Moscow.” A similar figure - 120 thousand - is reported by Yakov Marzharet 14.
At the beginning of the 17th century. the population of Moscow did not exceed 50 thousand people. It follows that the bulk of the dead were refugees. Eyewitnesses testified to the fact that starving people from many towns and villages near Moscow sought salvation in the capital 15 .
On the eve of the famine, Godunov organized a system of public charity, establishing almshouses in Moscow. To provide income to those in need, the king ordered the expansion of construction work in the capital 20.
During the Great Famine, the doctrine of the common welfare was truly tested. The authorities spared no expense to help the starving. Faced with unheard-of high prices, the Moscow population lived in hopes of selling cheap bread from the royal granaries. Muscovite D. Yakovlev, in a letter dated March 18, 1602, informed his relatives: “...the rye in Moscow is expensive, but they say that the sovereign’s rye will be for dry bread at half a half...” The treasury supplied cheap bread to the market, it was distributed to the hungry for free breads. Distributions in 1601 -1602. was in charge of the Grand Parish Order. On behalf of the authorities, the son of the boyar S.I. Yazykov “weighed bread and rolls on Tverskaya and Nikitskaya and at lazy markets.” He handed over the distribution sheets to the order. In addition to supplies, starving people could receive small cash benefits. Every day at four large areas In the capital, officials distributed half a ruble to the poor on a weekday, and half a coin on Sunday, i.e., double. As eyewitnesses noted, the treasury spent 300-400 rubles on the poor. and more on day 21. In other words, up to 60-80 thousand starving people received assistance every day.
Similar measures were taken in Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov and other cities. “I know,” wrote Margaret, “that he (Boris. - R.S.) sent 20,000 rubles to Smolensk with one of my friends.” Such was the scale of government expenditures for the needs of the “nationwide multitude.” However, it must be borne in mind that the authorities provided assistance mainly to the urban population. The benefits provided to the villages could not be compared with the charity in the cities 22 . Peasant taxes were so important for state budget, that the authorities did not consider it possible to abandon them, as was done during the coronation of Boris. Lacking sufficient funds, the treasury did not try to feed millions of starving peasants.
Contemporaries assessed the significance of famine relief measures differently. Issac Massa, who openly denigrated the affairs of Boris Godunov, believed that the distribution of alms only intensified the hunger in Moscow, because needy people from all over the area flocked to the capital. Moreover, the charitable money fell into the wrong hands: it was stolen by clerks, etc. Russian chroniclers, who avoided prejudice, gave a completely different assessment of Godunov’s measures. One contemporary described the state of affairs in Moscow in the following terms: “And in Moscow and within its borders they ate horse meat, and dogs, and cats, and people, but the poor were still holding on to the royal alms...” 23 Help for the starving poor actually had invaluable.
In an effort to prevent the rise in high prices in cities, Godunov’s government made the first attempt in Russian history to state price regulation. In the fall of 1601, the townspeople of Sol-Vychegodsk turned to Moscow with a complaint that local merchants had raised the price of bread to a quarter ruble or more. On November 3, 1601, Tsar Boris ordered the introduction of a single price for bread in Sol-Vychegodsk, obligatory for everyone. The state price was half the market price. To put an end to speculation, the decree introduced rationed sales of bread. It was forbidden to sell more than 2-4 quarters of bread per person. The Posad "mir" received the right to take away grain surpluses from traders and immediately put them into retail sale. Traders who refused to sell grain at the sovereign price were subject to imprisonment and a 5-ruble fine.
The government did not want to resort to extreme measures in relation to wealthy merchants who had large grain reserves. The punishment did not deprive the violators of trading profits.
Even those people who were subject to imprisonment were supposed to receive all the money received from the sale of the bread confiscated from them.
Looking after the interests of the merchant elite, the authorities showed much less leniency towards small speculators. They were threatened with “trade execution,” that is, punishment with a whip 24.
Some contemporaries expressed the idea that in a country as abundant in grain as Russia, people could avoid the unheard-of disasters of famine. According to Isaac Massa, there were more grain reserves than were required to feed the entire people during four years of famine. The stocks were rotting from being left for many years and were not used by the owners even for sale to the hungry 25 .
A question arises. Can testimony of this kind be trusted? To answer this question, let us turn to the monastery documentation. The monasteries were the largest holders of grain reserves. Based on monastic books late XVI- beginning of the 17th century N.A. Gorskaya established that the Joseph-Volokolamsk Monastery had the largest grain surplus. The monastery received the overwhelming majority of its grain from its own plowing, and the monks sold some of it. In lean years, the Joseph-Volokolamsk Monastery either had minimal surpluses or purchased the missing grain. After the crop shortage of 1590, the cellarer of the monastery calculated that 12 thousand quarters of rye would be needed for the next year for “everyday living” for the monks, loans to peasants, etc., while there were only 1982 quarters in the bins. With an average harvest in 1599, the monks allocated 7,362 quarters of rye to cover the annual needs, after which they were left with 7,792 quarters of rye from old stocks and the new harvest, milked and non-daired, in storage in the fields. Oats and other spring crops were consumed in a similar way. Of the 23,718 quarters, 13,594 quarters were allocated for seeds and monastic use. The remainder remained a smaller part of the “new and old life.” In the fields, oats from the harvest of 1596/97 were stored in stacks, but in general stock its share was small 26 .
The Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery was one of the largest feudal landowners in Russia. Its lands were not distinguished by fertility, and the monastery received the necessary bread mainly from its peasants. In 1601, the available reserves of rye and oats in the monastery did not exceed 30 thousand quarters. Due to a bad harvest, the share of newly harvested grain accounted for less than 12 thousand quarters. The annual consumption of the monastery, taking into account N.A. Gorskaya’s amendment, amounted to more than 10 thousand quarters of rye and oats. Thus, the monks had as much grain in surplus as they needed to satisfy their own needs for only two or three years 27 .
On the eve of the famine, the grain reserves of the Vologda Spaso-Prilutsky Monastery amounted to 2834 quarters of rye and oats. A year later they had dropped to a low of 942 quarters. The monks were forced to start purchasing grain 28.
Contemporaries had every reason to reproach the monks, rich laymen and merchants for speculating in grain and enriching themselves at the expense of the starving people. Speculation aggravated the distress of the population. But they were not the main cause of the disastrous famine in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. The harsh climate, poor soil, and feudal farming system made it impossible to create such grain reserves that could provide the country with food in conditions of a three-year crop failure.
Godunov's ill-wisher Isaac Massa argued that the tsar could, but did not strictly order noble gentlemen, monks and other rich people who had barns full of grain to sell their grain. The patriarch himself, having a large supply of food, allegedly announced that he did not want to sell grain, which could earn even more money over time 29. In the literature one can find multiple references to the given words of Massa. However, their reliability is questionable. The “patriarchal speech” composed by Massa is imbued with a merchant spirit, characteristic of a Dutch merchant, but not of Job. Boris's closest assistant could not act as an open supporter of grain speculation when the authorities were taking all measures to curb it.
According to Peter Petrey, Boris issued a strict order addressed to landowners to sell bread at half price. As Konrad Bussov wrote, Tsar Boris appealed to “princes, boyars and monasteries to take the people’s disaster to heart, put up their grain reserves and sell them somewhat cheaper than they were asking then...”. The royal messengers went to all corners of the country to write back to the treasury the old grain that was stored in stacks in the fields. Confiscated bread was sent to state granaries. To prevent the mass death of the poor, Godunov ordered “the opening of royal granaries in all cities and selling thousands of cades every day at half price” 30 . (Obviously, fixed government prices were half the market prices.)
The government understood that it was impossible to put an end to high prices by decrees alone, and tried to use economic means. Trade in cheap government grain could stabilize the grain market if the rise in prices were short-lived. But the famine turned out to be much longer than expected. Towards the end, the disasters reached such monstrous proportions that the authorities were forced to admit their powerlessness and stopped selling cheap bread and distributing money to the poor, so as not to attract new crowds of refugees to the city.
So, at the beginning of the 17th century. For the first time in Russian history, the government tried to implement a broad program of assistance to the starving people. Boris tried to justify new measures with the help of new ideas. As stated in the decree on the introduction of fixed prices in Sol-Vychegodsk, Tsar Boris “protects the peasant (Orthodox. - R.S.) the people in everything,” regrets the entire “Orthodox peasantry”, seeks “for all of you - the whole people of the people - something useful, so that ... there will be an abundance of grain in all our lands, a calm life and unharmed peace for everyone” 31.
Recognition that not only the top, but also the bottom of society - the “popular multitude” - have equal right(“everyone has the same amount”) for grain abundance, prosperity and peace, was one of the important principles of Boris Godunov’s “zemstvo policy.”
New ideas to some extent reflected that crisis situation, which developed in the state at the beginning of the 17th century. The country was on the verge of major social upheaval. The most far-sighted politicians sensed the approaching disaster and tried to prevent it.
1 See: Karamzin N. M. History of the Russian State. T. XI. St. Petersburg, 1843. P. 65-68; Solovyov S. M. History of Russia since ancient times. Book IV. pp. 399-400; Platonov S.F. Moscow famine of 1601 -1603. // Artel business. 1921. No. 9-16; Smirnov I. I. Bolotnikov’s Rebellion. pp. 63-11.
2 See: Koretsky V.I. Formation of serfdom and the first Peasants' War in Russia. pp. 117-148.
3 See: Le Roy Ladurie E. History of climate since 1000. L., 1971. P. 172, 212.
4 Legend of Abraham Palitsyn. P. 105; PSRL. T. 32. M., 1975. P. 187.
5 See: Koretsky V.I. Formation of serfdom... P. 118-121.
6 PSRL. T. 32. P. 188.
7 Ibid. The chronicler, recording weather data from year to year, only once noted the death of the crop “in bloom” - in the late spring of 1602.
8 Quoted. from: Koretsky V.I. Formation of serfdom... P. 126.
9 Ibid. P. 128; Mankov A. G. Prices and their movement in Moscow state XVI V. M.; L., 1951. P. 30; Agrarian history of North-West Russia: Novgorod Pyatiny. P. 23; Margaret Ya. Notes. P. 188; Bussov K. Moscow Chronicle. P. 97.
10 Legend of Abraham Palitsyn. P. 106; Bussov K. Moscow Chronicle. P. 97; Margaret Ya. Notes. pp. 188-189; Massa I. Brief news about Muscovy at the beginning of the 17th century. P. 62.
11 Quoted. from: Koretsky V.I. Formation of serfdom... P. 127.
12 Ibid. pp. 131 - 132.
13 As it appears in the “History” of A. Palitsyn according to the Solovetsky list, Boris, “grieving about the dead, ordered the bailiff to wash everyone and give them shrouds and conscripts and ports from the royal treasury, and take them to bury them from his royal treasury” (GPB, OR, collection of the Solovetsky Mon., No. 43/1502, l. 154 vol. For more information about the Solovetsky list, see: Solodkin Y. G. Solovetsky edition of the history of Abraham Palitsyn // Literature Ancient Rus'. Vol. 4. M., 1913. P. 88).
14 Legend of Abraham Palitsyn. P. 106; PSRL. T. 14. P. 55; Margaret Ya. Notes. P. 188.
15 Notes of S. Nemoevsky // Titov A. A. Slavic and Russian manuscripts belonging to I. A. Vakhromeev. Vol. 6. M., 1907. P. 37; Mass I. Brief news... P. 61; The story of Abraham Palitsyn. P. 105.
16 AAE. T. II. St. Petersburg, 1836. P. 14; Ancient Russian vivliophics. 2nd ed. Part VII. M., 1788. P. 50.
17 Legend of Abraham Palitsyn. P. 104.
18 Bussov K. Moscow Chronicle. P. 90; cf.: Report of M. Schil, 1598 // CHOIDR. 1875. Book. 2. P. 17; Materials on the Time of Troubles, collected by V. N. Aleksandrenko // Antiquity and novelty. 1911. Book. 15. P. 188.
19 TsGADA, f. 198, op. 2, Miller's portfolios, No. 478, part 1, l. 12; No. 479, l. 3; f. 98, op. 1, 1598, No. 1, l. 201.
20 PSRL. T. 14. P. 55; T. 34. P. 202.
21 Morozov B. N. Private letter of the early 17th century. // History of the Russian language. Monuments of the XI-XVIII centuries. M., 1982. P. 290; Local directory of the 17th century. / Ed. Yu. V. Tatishchev. Vilna, 1910. P. 6; PSRL. T. 34. P. 203; Mass I. Brief news... P. 61; Bussov K. Moscow Chronicle. P. 97.
22 Margaret Y. Notes. P. 189; Anpilogov G. N. New documents about Russia at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. P. 432.
23 Massa I. Brief news... P. 61; BAN, OR, collection. Sreznevsky, No. 119. l. 21 rev.
24 Decree of Boris Godunov of November 3, 1601 // Semevsky M.I. Historical and legal acts of the 16th and 17th centuries. // Chronicle of the activities of the Archaeographic Commission. Vol. IX. St. Petersburg, 1893. pp. 55-57.
25 Massa I. Brief news... P. 61; Wed: The Legend of Abraham Palitsyn. P. 106; Bussov K. Moscow Chronicle. P. 98.
26 Gorskaya N.A. Marketability of grain farming in the farms of monastic estates of the center of the Russian state by the end of the 16th century - early XVII V. // Yearbook agrarian history Eastern Europe. 1962. Minsk, 1964. P. 134-136; Patrimonial household books of the 16th century. Vol. III. M.; L., 1976. S. 455, 473, 481, 487, 511-514.
27 See: Nikolsky N. Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery and its structure until the second quarter of the 17th century. T. I. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1910. App. pp. I-XIV; see also: Prokofieva L. S. Patrimonial farming in the 17th century. M.; L., 1959. P. 9-10; Gorskaya N.A. Decree. op. pp. 124-125.
28 Archives of the Leningrad Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, f. 271, op. 2, No. 21, l. 1-2 volumes, 8 volumes, 12, 20, 32. In the documents of the Staritsky Assumption Monastery of 1607, it is noted that the stock of “standing” and milked bread accumulated by the monastery after the fruitful years (1598-1599) was “spent in famine years" (Tverskaya antiquity. 1911. No. 12. P. 20). This fact was first noted by Ya. G. Solodkin.
29 Massa I. Brief news... P. 60-61.
30 Petrey P. History of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. M., 1867. P. 193; Bussov K. Moscow Chronicle. P. 98.
31 Semevsky M.I. Historical and legal acts of the 16th and 17th centuries. P. 57.
The beginning of Boris's reign seemed unusually prosperous. But that was only an appearance. Attempts to impose a serfdom regime on the people met with deaf ears. mass resistance, intensifying from year to year. Signs of discontent could be seen everywhere - in rural areas and in cities.
Tax oppression and bondage drove peasants from the old feudal centers to the outskirts. In the depths " wild field", far beyond the defensive line, Cossack communities were formed, constantly replenished with peasants. Reflecting frequent attacks from the steppe nomads, the Don Cossacks advanced to the mouth Seversky Donets and they founded their capital there, Discord. Success Cossack freemen caused deep concern in the Moscow elite: for now quiet Don served as a refuge for runaway peasants, the serfdom in the Center could not triumph completely. Boris understood this very well, and his policy towards the outskirts was distinguished by decisiveness and ruthlessness.
Step by step, government troops, moving after the Cossacks, built new towns and fortifications in the middle of the “wild field”. The steppe governors conscripted the colonists into service and obliged them to plow the sovereign's arable land. On next year After the coronation, Boris, as we remember, sent large military forces deep into the Cossack lands to found the city of Tsarev-Borisov. The new fortress was already hundreds of miles away from the old Russian borders. But from it they opened shortest paths to Discord. Confrontation between a fortress with a royal name and a Cossack]! capital had a certain symbolic meaning. The name of the fortress showed that relations with the Cossacks became for Boris not only a subject constant worry, but also a matter of prestige.
Cossack army could not exist without the supply of ammunition and food from Russia. In an effort to subjugate the Cossack freemen, Godunov banned the sale of gunpowder and food to the Don and began to persecute those who violated the strict decree. Tsar Boris was aware of the danger fraught with the seething outskirts. But his attempts to restrict Cossack freedom turned against him. The open uprising of the Cossacks accelerated the civil war.
Urban movements, having experienced a boom in the 1980s, then began to decline. Boris spared no expense to win over the top of the townsfolk community to his side. On the occasion of the coronation, he provided the capital's posad with all sorts of benefits. Merchants who controlled trade with the East through Astrakhan were exempted from trade duties for two years. Taxes were collected from the capital's residents. Money, clothing and supplies were distributed to needy widows and orphans. The second largest settlement, Veliky Novgorod, received similar favors. Tsar Boris temporarily abandoned his “fatherland - a great state” Veliky Novgorod", abolished monetary collections from townspeople's yards, small trades and trades. Novgorod trading people received the right to “travel freely” to trade in Moscow and Livonian cities. The authorities freed the estate from the state wine trade and closed the royal taverns in the city. Godunov promised the people to make sure that “all the Posadtsky people would live in peace, and in silence, and in a prosperous life, and there would be no crowding, and no losses, and no sales from anyone.”
The policy towards cities was determined by the fact that during the years of devastation the settlements fell into disrepair and became depopulated. To revive city life, the authorities had to resort to emergency measures called<.<посадского строения».
The “posad structure” was not reflected in the legislative material, like many other Godunov innovations. This makes it difficult to evaluate. Fragmentary data about different cities help to reveal only the general direction of Godunov’s policy. In Volkhov, Korel and Rostov, the authorities made attempts to return to the settlement the old tax-payers who had gone to the land of the landowners and moved to the city courtyards of the feudal lords, or, as they said then, “mortgaged” for the nobles. In Kazan and Zaraysk, the administration confiscated and assigned to taxation several monastic settlements, in Vladimir it filled the settlement with peasants from the patriarchal settlement, in Kaluga it “collected” quitrent peasants from monastic and palace estates for settlement.
The revival of a solvent tax community in the cities met the interests of the treasury and at the same time the requirements of the influential merchant elite. The authorities did not forget about the Moscow unrest during the first years of Fedor's reign and, with the help of concessions, tried to prevent their recurrence. “Cherny Posad” suffered considerable losses due to competition from the “White Slobodchik”, who lived on the urban lands of feudal lords and had tax benefits. Therefore, the tax posad sought recognition of his exclusive right to engage in trades and trades. The government from time to time listened to the voice of the townspeople. In Rostov, it “sieged” trading people into the towns tax “because of the metropolitans and because of the monasteries and all sorts of ranks” and thus decisively put an end to the competition of the “White Slobodchiks”.
Godunov’s policy served to a certain extent as a model for the “townsman structure” of the mid-17th century. It was as if she anticipated the future. Cities were centers of progress. Their revival met the deepest economic interests of the state. Boris's policy favored the development of the class of townspeople, but it lacked consistency. It was not sanctioned by law and, apparently, was carried out only in certain areas. Moscow remained the largest settlement in the country, where a significant part of the urban population of Russia lived and numerous settlements of feudal lords were located. The need for a “village structure” was felt most acutely here. But in Moscow, the tsar did not want to quarrel with the influential metropolitan nobility and clergy for the sake of the interests of the posad. Therefore, the reform did not receive any noticeable implementation in the capital.
Godunov's urban reform was complex. The state tried to revive the cities at the cost of attaching members of the townsfolk community to taxation. By patronizing the cities, the monarchy directed their development in a feudal direction. Carrying out the “townsman structure”, the authorities strictly distinguished between nobles (they were called service people “by fatherland”, or origin) and other military people (they were called people “by device” and were recruited from among the townspeople). Those who did not belong to the feudal class were subject to taxes along with the townspeople. It is known that Boris’s “construction workers” “put” city gunners and other service people “on duty” in Pereyaslavl and Zaraysk under taxation. Class differences split urban society ever deeper. The small serving class, included in the tax-paying class, fully experienced the oppression of the feudal state. “Posad construction”, where it was carried out, exacerbated social contradictions.
City dwellers made up a small part of the country's population, no more than 2%. Other people lived in tiny villages scattered across the vast expanse of the East European Plain. Godunov's policy towards the peasantry was clearly serf-like in nature. The abolition of St. George's Day and the implementation of the decree on the search for fugitive peasants immeasurably expanded the power of feudal landowners over the rural population. The nobles increasingly introduced corvée on their estates and increased dues. The peasants had difficulty adapting to the new order of things. They put up with the temporary cancellation of St. George’s Day while they were promised the upcoming “sovereign weekend of summer.” But the years passed, and the population became increasingly convinced that they had been cruelly deceived. The peasants protested against the strengthening of serfdom as best they could. Most often they fled from their landowners. More serious symptoms also appeared. Rumors about the increasing number of murders of landowners agitated the country. The authorities, willy-nilly, had to think about means to calm the village.
Upon ascending the throne, Boris promised prosperity to both nobles and peasants. The new tsar, the leaders of the Ambassadorial Prikaz claimed, gave “the all-Russian land relief” and “set the whole Russian land in mowing, and in silence, and in a prosperous life.” The official explanations made a deep impression on foreigners. One of them, the Austrian messenger Mikhail Schil, while in Moscow, wrote that Russian peasants were in complete slavery to the nobles, but Boris intended to strictly determine the volume of duties and payments coming from each peasant household. Such a measure could delay the increase in quitrents and the expansion of duties. But nothing is known about its practical implementation.
In connection with the coronation of Boris, the authorities announced tax breaks. The serving foreigner Konrad Bussov wrote that the king freed all his land from taxes for a period of a year. However, Bussov wrote from hearsay - his story can hardly be trusted. In reality, the government pursued a differentiated policy in relation to various groups of the tax-paying population. The large rural population was able to take advantage of tax benefits to a much lesser extent than the small urban population. Areas that desperately needed them received advantage. Thus, the Korelsky district, which was devastated to the ground, and shortly before returned by Sweden to Russia, was exempt from taxes for 10 years. In response to many years of requests from the Siberian Voguls,1 Boris ordered to pay them yasak for a year, and in the future to equalize taxation, “as anyone can henceforth be paid without a husband, so that henceforth they will be wealthy and durable without need.” Among the Siberian Tatars and Ostyaks2 only the old and “thin” yasak people received relief.
The benefits provided to individual localities quickly exhausted themselves. The peasants groaned under the weight of the sovereign's taxes. Tax oppression ruined the village.
At the beginning of the 17th century, agriculture declined due to natural disasters. In agrarian Russia, agricultural production was extremely unstable and highly dependent on weather conditions. The study of climate change has led scientists to the conclusion that over the last millennium, the largest cooling occurred in the second half of the 16th - early 17th centuries.
The deterioration of climatic conditions coincided in a number of countries with disruption of weather cycles. For each ten-year period there were usually about one or two bad years and one extremely unfavorable year in terms of climate. As a rule, bad years alternated with good ones, and peasants compensated for losses from the next harvest. But when disasters destroyed the harvest for two years in a row, small peasant production collapsed.
At the beginning of the 17th century, Russia experienced the consequences of a general cooling and disruption of the weather cycle. Long rains prevented the ripening of grain during the cold summer of 1601. Early frosts completed the disaster. The peasants used unripe, “cold” seeds,
to sow winter crops. As a result, in the winter fields there is either bread
did not germinate at all, or sprouted poorly. Crops for
those farmers pinned all their hopes on
destroyed by frost in 1602. In 1603 the village was not
what was needed to sow the fields. A terrible famine set in. .
As usual, prices rose in the spring. It is not surprising that already in the spring of 1601 “bread was expensive.” | A year later, rye began to be sold at 6 times more expensive. Then this price tripled. Not only the poor, but also the middle strata of the population could not buy such bread.
Having exhausted food supplies, the starving people began to eat cats and dogs, and then began to eat grass, linden bark, and human corpses. Starvation decimated the population throughout the country. Corpses littered the roads. In the cities they barely had time to take them out to the fields, where they were buried in large holes. In Moscow alone, during the famine, the authorities buried 120,000 dead in three large “skudelnitsa” (brotherly cemeteries). This figure is cited in their notes by both foreigners (I-Marzharet) and Russian writers (A. Palitsyn). Contemporaries believed that during the famine years “a third of the kingdom of Moscow” died out.
To the credit of the Godunov administration, it should be noted that from the first days it assessed the danger and tried by all means to prevent mass starvation. The subject of its concern was, first of all, the settlements. In Solvychegodsk, the authorities, by a special decree, tried to introduce uniform fixed prices for bread, half as low as compared to with the market ones. The Posad community received permission to requisition grain reserves, paying the owners at fixed prices. Bread buyers were ordered to be whipped, and for the resumption of speculation they were imprisoned. Mer: against grain speculation in city markets, apparently, was of a nationwide nature. They began to be introduced in November 1601. At that time, the population still had some supplies of bread.
Why were the authorities in such a hurry? It is not difficult to explain -/go. Godunov's generation survived a two-year famine during the oprichnina years. The country did not overcome the consequences of the great devastation until the end of the 16th century.
In his manifestos, the new king resorted to a language that none of the previous rulers used to speak to the people. The townspeople were convinced that Boris rules the land fairly, “to all people for silence, and peace, and privilege,” that he, out of his mercy, protects them in everything, “searching” “for all the people, useful,” so that it would be
Lacking real reserves to feed the village, the government tried to use social levers. For many years, enslaved peasants lived in hopes of the “sovereign's summer weekend.” With his decree on the search for fugitives, Boris dealt a mortal blow to these hopes. But three years later he showed greater flexibility, temporarily retreating from the accepted course. On November 28, 1601, the country learned of the restoration of the peasant exit on St. George's Day for a period of one year.
One should not think that famine itself could lead to such a sharp social turn. By the autumn of 1601, the consequences of the first crop failure had not fully manifested themselves. The population has not yet exhausted old reserves. A three-year famine lay ahead, and no one could foresee its scale. Godunov was not afraid of hunger, but of social upheaval, long predicted by sober observers. The peasantry remained a mute witness to the change of dynasty. No one thought to ask his opinion in the matter of electing the king. No matter how insignificant Tsar Fedor looked, the people believed him. The administration of all ranks from top to bottom ruled in his name. All her orders came from the legitimate sovereign. Boris was not a born king. How could he lay claim to the place of “earthly god”? The leisurely peasant mind was not immediately able to find an answer to such a difficult question. Boris tried to win the affection of the rural population with one blow. His decree perfectly suited this goal. In the name of Fyodor, the freedom of the peasants was taken away. Now Boris restored St. George's Day and took on the role of liberator. His decree in clear words explained to the peasants how merciful the “great sovereign” was to them, who “granted a waiver of taxes and sales throughout (!) his state, and ordered the peasants to be given a way out.”
The restoration of St. George's Day came into conflict with the interests of the petty nobility. In fact, the laws of 1601 - 1602 temporarily restored peasant transitions only on the lands of the provincial nobility, lower officers and minor clerks. The decrees categorically confirmed the serfdom of the peasants,
“In all lands there is an abundance of grain, a calm life and undamaged peace for everyone.”
The government spared no expense in fighting hunger. Godunov immediately sent 20,000 rubles to Smolensk to distribute to the people. In the capital, he ordered even larger sums of money to be distributed to those in need, and in addition, he organized public works to feed the population. But the cash distributions did not reach the goal. Money was losing value day by day; the government penny could no longer feed a family or even one person. Meanwhile, rumors about the royal alms spread throughout the country, and people poured into the capital in droves, causing hunger there to intensify. Boris conducted a search for grain reserves throughout the state and ordered grain from the royal granaries to be sold to the people. But the reserves were depleted quite quickly. A lot of bread, sold at fixed prices, nevertheless fell into the hands of grain buyers. The new tsar, trying to fight grain profiteering, even ordered the execution of several metropolitan bakers who cheated in baking bread. But all this didn't help much.
Government measures might have been successful in the event of a short-term famine. Repeated harvest failure brought to naught all his efforts. The monasteries and boyars, who had accumulated some grain reserves, remained deaf to the calls of the authorities. In anticipation of worse times, rich peasants buried their grain in the ground. The government tried in some places to requisition grain, but it lacked firmness and consistency. Boris did not dare to enter into a serious conflict with the richest of his subjects. Attempts to curb the frantic speculation of traders also failed.
Godunov patronized the posads in order to maintain the main source of cash receipts for the treasury. The multimillion-dollar peasantry was left to its own fate. Even in the palace volosts, the de facto patrimony of the Godunovs, business was limited to the sale of “old” grain to peasants on credit against enslaving receipts. The palace clerks of the village of Kushalina reported to Moscow that many needy peasants came there and “stood along the streets with their wives and children, dying of hunger and chills.” On their report, the order imposed the following resolution: “Tell them to warm the poor and lend some bread to whomever they can trust.”
Godunov avoided steps that could irritate the nobility, and at the same time was not afraid of irritating the petty nobility - the most numerous stratum of the ruling class. Contrary to the opinion of S. F. Platonov, Boris cannot be considered a noble tsar who completely linked his fate with the interests of the leading” service class.
By making temporary concessions to the peasantry, the authorities tried, as far as possible, to smooth out the unfavorable impression made on small landowners. One could have expected that with the restoration of St. George's Day, peasants would pour into the lands of privileged landowners who had the opportunity to provide loans and benefits to newcomers. The government averted this threat by prohibiting wealthy landowners from inviting peasants to join them. As for the provincial nobles, they received the right to export no more than one or two peasants from one estate at a time. Such an order contained a certain economic meaning.
Under Boris Godunov, Russia for the first time experienced a general famine in conditions of enslavement of the peasants, which created special difficulties for small-peasant production. For a century, St. George's Day played the role of a kind of economic regulator. When the harvest failed, the peasants immediately left the landowners who refused to help them and went to the landowners who were ready to lend them seeds and food. Under conditions of enslavement, poor estates turned into a kind of trap: the peasant received neither help nor had the right to leave. Godunov’s laws opened the doors of traps for the peasants. At the same time, they prevented enterprising nobles from bringing to themselves many peasants from a neighboring estate, for whom they did not have the means to help.
The government allowed transfers within medium and small estates, guided primarily by financial considerations. Only a way out and help would save the peasants of the distressed estates and prevent the desolation of the tax that provided government income. Since small landowners made up the majority of the feudal class, it should be recognized that a significant part of the peasant population received chances to take advantage of the decree of Tsar Boris. Under certain conditions, the restoration of St. George's Day would help small-peasant production survive lean years and would defuse the discontent of the enslaved peasantry. But did this really happen? There was a gap between the publication of the law and its implementation.
The peasants interpreted the new king’s favorable appeal to them in their own way. They refused to pay “taxes and sales,” taxes and dues, and moved to lands convenient for them, not paying attention to the fact that a good half of the lands in the state remained reserved. The reaction of the peasants was so violent that when the decree of 1602 was re-issued, the words about granting an exemption “from taxes and sales” were excluded from it.
As for the landowners, they resisted with all their might any concessions in favor of the serfs, even limited and temporary ones. The resistance of the nobles reached such proportions that the authorities included clauses in the text of the decree of 1602 designed to protect peasants from landlord violence and robbery. “It would be very difficult for the children of boyar peasants. “They didn’t keep it to themselves,” the law said, “and they didn’t make any sales to them, and whoever robs the peasants and doesn’t let them out because of himself, will be in great disgrace from us.” Verbal threats of disgrace could not frighten the nobles, as long as income was involved. Without peasants, the small landowner faced a beggarly sum. For its part, the serfdom state did not think about any serious sanctions against the noble masses, which constituted its social support. Attempts to alleviate the situation of the starving village apparently failed.
In 1603, the law on St. George's Day was not confirmed. Boris Godunov admitted the failure of his peasant policy. The nobility appreciated the king’s measures, which fully met her interests. But among the minor nobility, the popularity of the Godunov dynasty began to quickly fall. This circumstance greatly contributed to the success of the impostor, whose invasion unleashed a civil war in the country.
A. S. Pushkin put into the mouth of Boris Godunov bitter complaints about the ingratitude of the people:
I thought my people
In contentment, in glory to calm.
To win his love with generosity
But he put aside empty concerns:
Living power is hateful to the mob,
She only knows how to love the dead...
In life, Boris really failed to win people's sympathy, despite all his charity.
The famine hardened the population to the extreme. Armed gangs appeared in different parts of the country. On the big roads there was no passage or passage from them.
The largest armed detachment, led by a certain Khlopok, operated almost at the very walls of Moscow. A. A. Zimin suggested that the performances of the lower classes in 1602-1603 marked the beginning of the peasant war, which immediately engulfed many districts of the state.
Documents from the Razryadny Prikaz, the main military department of Russia, at first glance confirmed his assumption. Over the course of a year - from September 1602 to September 1603 - the authorities sent at least two dozen nobles to cities such as Vladimir, Ryazan, Vyazma, Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk, Kolomna, Rzhev, entrusting them with the fight against the robbers operating there. The idea arose that the performances of “robberies” in different districts were part of a general movement, the apogee of which was the actions of Khlopok in the vicinity of the capital. After the name of the leader, the movement was called the “Cotton Rebellion.”
A critical analysis of sources completely destroys this picture. The truth was discovered thanks to a simple technique - checking the official appointments of the nobles who fought the robbers. It turned out that the nobles traveled to different cities for a short time and immediately returned to Moscow. Their travels began in September 1602 and had nothing to do with Cotton's rebellion in the fall of 1603.
It was during this period that the country experienced famine. By 1602-1603, the disaster had reached unprecedented proportions. Hoping for help from the treasury, many starving peasants from the Moscow region and a dozen other districts poured into Moscow, but starvation awaited them there. The government made desperate efforts to establish supplies for the capital. Officials sent to the provinces tried to collect bread in crumbs wherever possible. But their efforts did not lead to the desired results. The country's grain reserves were almost completely exhausted, and what could be procured in the districts could not be delivered to Moscow. Numerous gangs of “robberies” appeared on the roads, repulsing and robbing food convoys heading to the capital. The actions of the “robberies” aggravated the people’s misfortunes and doomed thousands of refugee peasants to death.
The critical situation determined the nature of government measures. To ensure unimpeded delivery of goods to Moscow, the authorities sent nobles to the main roads - Vladimir, Smolensk, Ryazan, which connected the city with various districts. The “robberies” operated not only in the provinces, but also in the capital. On May 14, 1603, Boris Godunov instructed the most prominent members of the Boyar Duma to maintain order in Moscow. Moscow was divided into 11 districts. The Kremlin became the central district, two districts were formed in Kitay-Gorod, eight districts in the White and Wooden “cities”. The district was headed by the boyars Prince N.R. Trubetskoy, Prince V.V. Golitsyn, M.G. Saltykov, okolnichy P.N. Sheremetov, V.P. Morozov, M.M. Saltykov, I.F. Basmanov and three Godunov. The boyars, together with their assistants - noble heads - regularly made rounds in the quarters assigned to them.
The measures described were of an emergency nature. They were a direct consequence of the critical situation that had developed in Moscow by 1603. Possibilities for famine relief were exhausted, and the distribution of money to the poor was completely stopped. The refugees, who were almost more numerous than the native residents of Moscow, found themselves in the worst situation. Refugees filled squares and vacant lots - “hollow places”, fires, ravines and meadows. They were forced to live in the open air or in hastily put together booths and huts. Deprived of help, they were doomed to a painful death. Every morning, carts drove through the streets of Moscow, carrying away the corpses of people who had died overnight.
The threat of starvation pushed desperate people into robbery and robbery. The chroniclers very accurately described the situation at the height of the famine, when
“There was great violence, many rich houses were robbed, and broken, and set on fire, and everywhere there was great fear and increasing injustice.” The poor attacked the mansions of the rich, set fires to make it easier to rob, and attacked the carts as soon as they appeared on the streets of the capital. Markets stopped functioning. As soon as the merchant appeared on the street, he was instantly surrounded by a crowd, and he had to think about only one thing: how to escape from the crush. The starving people took the bread and ate it right away.
The scale of the robberies and assaults in Moscow apparently exceeded everything that happened in the district towns and on the roads. This is what prompted Boris to assign responsibility for maintaining order in the capital to the highest state body - the Boyar Duma. The boyars were ordered to use any military and police measures so that “in Moscow, in all the streets and alleys and hollow places and near the cities, battles and robberies, and murders, and thefts and fires, and all kinds of theft would not happen to some.” While small gangs of “robberies” were operating in the vicinity of the capital, the government was much more afraid of an uprising in the city than an attack by gangs from outside. But the situation changed when the “robberies” united into a large detachment. Its leader was Khlopko. According to contemporaries, runaway boyar slaves predominated among the “robberies.” The ataman's nickname indicates that he was also a slave. In September 1603, Khlopko acted on the Smolensk and Tver roads. At that time in Moscow, order in the western quarters “along Tverskaya Street” was guarded by governor Ivan Basmanov. Relying on his own strength, he left the city gates and tried to capture Cotton. Five hundred rebels took the fight. Basmanov was killed. Only after receiving reinforcements from Moscow did government troops defeat the rebels. Cotton and other prisoners were brought to the capital and hanged there.
In the speeches of 1602-1603, it is difficult to draw a distinction between banditry robberies and food riots of the poor. The social nature of the movement was manifested primarily in the fact that the violence generated by hunger was directed against the rich. At the height of the Cotton uprising, on August 16, 1603, Tsar Boris issued a decree on the immediate release of all slaves illegally deprived of food by their masters. The Tsar's decree confirms the words of his contemporaries that it was primarily the boyar slaves who went for robbery.
Among the dependent population, combat slaves were the only group that had weapons and combat experience. The events of 1603 showed that, under certain conditions, military slaves could become the core of the insurgent movement. This circumstance forced the authorities to make concessions to the slaves to the detriment of the interests of the nobles.
After the defeat of Khlopok, many rebels fled to the outskirts - to the Chernigov-Seversk land and the Lower Volga region. A direct continuation of the “robberies” in the Center was the robbery of the Cossacks on the lower Volga in 1604. All these events were harbingers of the impending civil war.
