Events on the Khalkhin Gol River. Fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River

“When we got into the car, a thought occurred to me, which I immediately expressed to Stavsky, that it would be nice, when the conflict ends, instead of all the usual monuments to be erected in the steppe on high place one of the tanks that died here, battered by shell fragments, torn apart, but victorious.”

Konstantin Simonov

From May 11 to September 16, 1939, in Mongolia, near the previously unknown Khalkhin Gol River, there were clashes between Soviet and Japanese troops - starting with small border skirmishes, they ended in full-scale battles using hundreds of tanks, guns and aircraft.

Back in 1937, China began new stage war with Japan. The Soviet Union actively supported China. Soviet instructors trained Chinese crews of T-26 tanks sold to China by the USSR, Soviet pilots fought in the skies of China, preventing Japan from reaching final victory. Naturally, the Japanese did not like this. In the summer of 1938, “reconnaissance in force” on Khasan, according to the Japanese, confirmed the low qualities of the Red Army, but the desired effect was not achieved - Soviet aid continued to flow into China.

The next place to test our strength was Mongolia. The Japanese, developing the territory of Manchuria they controlled, pulled the railway to the side Soviet border- to Chita. About fifteen kilometers from the border between Mongolia and Manchuria, the first spurs of the Khingan Range began, and in the Khalkhin-Gol section, the Mongolian border formed a large protrusion towards Manchuria. Thus, the Japanese had to either build a railway through the mountains or run it close to the border within gunshot. Capturing the right bank of the Khalkhin Gol River would put the USSR “in its place”, test its determination to further aggravate relations with Japan and ensure the safety of the road. Nearest railway station on the USSR side, Borzya was approximately 700 km from the site of the alleged battles; there were no railways at all in Mongolia, and on the Japanese side, the Hailar station was only 100 km away. To the nearest settlement, Tamtsak-Bulak, there were 130 km of desert steppe. Thus, Soviet troops would be cut off from supply bases, and the Mongolian army would not pose a serious threat to the Japanese.

From the beginning of 1939, the Japanese shelled Mongol outposts and in small groups crossed the border, and in May, with the support of aviation, several sections of Mongolia were occupied. The USSR transferred its units to the Khalkhin Gol River area (in March an order was given to move the operational group of the 11th Tank Brigade to Tamtsak-Bulak). On May 28-29, a group of Japanese soldiers in a truck, encountering a Soviet T-37 tank, threw a couple of cans of gasoline out of the back. When the tank ran over one of the canisters, it was engulfed in flames. Perhaps this incident served as an impetus for the use of gasoline bottles against tanks. On May 29, the debut of 5 HT-26 flamethrower tanks took place, defeating a Japanese reconnaissance detachment. However, in general, as a result of the May battles, Soviet troops retreated to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. On June 12, G.K. became commander of the 57th Special Corps in Mongolia. Zhukov.

Meanwhile, General Michitar Kamatsubara, considered an expert on the USSR, decided to cross Khalkhin Gol, capture the Bain-Tsagan mountain dominating the area, cut off and destroy the Soviet units on the right bank, located 5-6 km east of the river. By the morning of July 3, two infantry regiment with sappers and artillery, at the same time an offensive towards the Soviet crossing developed along the coast. On the right bank, two Japanese tank regiments (86 tanks, of which 26 Otsu and 34 Ha-Go) also advanced towards the crossing, losing about 10 tanks in the night battle on July 2-3.

The Soviet command decided to fend off the threat of encirclement by tanks. The 11th Tank Brigade, the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment moved to the Bayin-Tsagan area. Their task was to destroy the enemy on the eastern bank, so retargeting troops that had already crossed over took place at the last moment. The 1st battalion of the brigade (44 BT-5) at a speed of 45-50 km/h encountered the Japanese front line and destroyed the enemy with fire and tracks. The attack was not supported by infantry and artillery, and the tankers withdrew, leaving 20 damaged tanks on the battlefield, which were then burned with gasoline bottles. The 3rd battalion, consistently attacking Japanese units, lost 20 out of 50 armored vehicles burned out and 11 knocked out. The battalion of armored cars was shot at point-blank range by anti-tank guns, losing 20 burned out and 13 damaged out of 50 armored vehicles.

Although Soviet tankers, attacking without reconnaissance and interaction with each other, suffered huge losses, the Japanese were shocked by the number of Soviet armored vehicles, reporting an attack by as many as 1000 tanks!!! In the evening, Kamatsubara gave the order to withdraw to the eastern bank.

On the same day, a battle took place on the eastern bank between Soviet BT-5s, armored cars and Japanese tanks that had crossed at night. Advancing Japanese tanks were shot from shelters from a distance of 800-1000 m. According to various sources, the Japanese lost 41-44 of the 77 tanks originally available. On July 5, the Japanese tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle and did not participate in any more battles. The plan to defeat the Soviet troops was thwarted.

Although the July Soviet attacks were also unsuccessful, by August 20, 438 tanks and 385 armored vehicles were concentrated in the Khalkhin Gol area. The units were preparing for battle, it was collected large number ammunition and fuel.

On August 20 at 6:15 am it started Soviet offensive, and by the evening of August 23, Japanese troops were surrounded. In hot pursuit, the “stubborn struggle for each dune” and the “high resistance of the surrounded individual centers of defense” were noted. By the morning of August 31, the remaining Japanese units in the cauldron were completely destroyed.

Soviet soldiers examine an abandoned Japanese technology. In the foreground is a Type 95 "Ha-Go" light tank, armed with a 37 mm Type 94 gun, the exhaust system of a 120 hp Mitsubishi NVD 6120 diesel engine is visible. On the left, a soldier inspects the 75 mm gun, the "improved Type 38", the main field weapon Kwantung Army in the battles at Khalkhin Gol

The reports compiled following the battles testified:

“...the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks showed themselves very well in battle. T-26 - showed exceptionally good performance, walked perfectly on the dunes, the tank had very high survivability. There was a case in the 82nd Rifle Division when a T-26 received five hits from a 37-mm gun, the armor was destroyed, but the tank did not catch fire and after the battle it went to SPAM under its own power. Artillery tanks have proven to be an indispensable weapon in the fight against anti-tank guns. The SU-12 artillery mounts have not justified themselves, since they cannot support tanks in an attack. T-37, T-38 proved to be unsuitable for attack and defense. Slow moving, caterpillars fly off".

Flamethrower T-26s boasted:

“The introduction of only one chemical tank, which fired a stream of fire at the center of resistance, caused panic in the enemy’s ranks, the Japanese from the front line of trenches fled deep into the pit and our infantry arrived in time, occupying the crest of the pit, this detachment was completely destroyed.”.

The tanks and armored cars suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank artillery and “bottle shooters” - in total about 80-90% of all losses:

“Tanks and armored cars burn from throwing bottles, and from being hit by anti-tank shells, almost all tanks and armored cars also burn and cannot be restored. The cars become completely unusable, and a fire breaks out within 15-30 seconds. The crew always jumps out with their clothes on fire. The fire produces strong flames and black smoke (burns like a wooden house), observed from a distance of 5-6 km. After 15 minutes, the ammunition begins to explode, after which the tank can only be used as scrap metal.”

Japanese soldiers pose with trophies captured in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. One of the Japanese is holding a Soviet 7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system, model 1929, DT-29. Trophies could have been captured from both Soviet troops and the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic

In the August battles, tanks went into battle in two echelons - the second echelon shot the Japanese who appeared with bottles and mines.

Based on the results of the entire operation, among the main reasons for unnecessary losses were “inattention to reconnaissance and the inability to organize and directly conduct it, especially in night conditions... Our commanders and political workers, unfortunately, forget that the loss of an organizer and leader of a battle weakens the troops, and inappropriate, reckless courage increases casualties and harms the cause.”(it is worth noting that the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, Yakovlev, died while raising lying infantry), “... our infantry is poorly trained joint action with artillery and tanks".

At least a third of all Red Army prisoners of war were captured by the Japanese wounded, burned, shell-shocked, and sometimes unconscious. Both Soviet and Japanese documents note that the Soviet crews of damaged and burned tanks and armored vehicles desperately resisted to the last and were extremely rarely captured. Those captured were often killed soon after, especially in surrounded Japanese units. So, on August 22, several tanks of the 130th separate tank battalion of the 11th tank brigade in the Japanese rear jumped out to artillery positions and were shot at point-blank range by 75-mm cannons. At least six of their crews were captured and killed.

Thus, it can be stated that, despite the use of tanks not always in the “correct” way, especially at Bayin Tsagan on July 3, tanks made a decisive contribution to the victory. Without tank attacks, the Japanese attempt to encircle Soviet troops could well have been successful, and this was on the eve of the outbreak of World War II in Europe, in which the USSR managed to avoid fighting on two fronts.

References:

• Battles at Khalkhin Gol. Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army.– M.:Military Publishing House, 1940.
• Kolomiets M. Fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River. – M.: KM Strategy, 2002.
• Simonov K.M. Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol notes. – M.: Fiction, 1985.
• Svoisky Yu.M. Prisoners of war of Khalkhin Gol. – M.: Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science, 2014

Background

In July 1927, Japan adopted and published the so-called " Political program regarding China." This document declared that Mongolia and Manchuria were a subject of special interest to the Land of the Rising Sun. Just a few days later, General Tanaka Chiichi presented the Japanese Emperor with a memorandum, which, without any diplomatic equivocation, said: “In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China."

Japan considered the military defeat of the USSR to be an inevitable and extremely important stage in the implementation of its warlike plans. However, at the end of the 1920s, the country was not ready for such a global conflict. Therefore, the Japanese decided at this stage to limit themselves to the conquest of Manchuria.

At this time, the so-called “young officers” arose in the Japanese army, which consisted of people from the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. These people were very aggressive and considered Japanese government policy to be insufficiently decisive. But they themselves were determined. Since 1930, the “young officers” have carried out a number of coup attempts and political assassinations. Terror and active propaganda led to increased war sentiment in Japan. In September 1931, the invasion of Manchuria began.

By March 1, 1932, the occupation of Manchuria was over. The state of Manchukuo was created on its territory, formally headed by Emperor Pu Yi. The emperor had no real power, the country entirely followed the political course of Japan. The Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo, commander of the Kwantung Army, had the right to veto any decision of the “puppet” emperor.

Soon after the occupation of Manchuria, Japan made claims to the Soviet Union on the territory near Lake Khasan and the Tumannaya River. From 1934 to 1938, there were 231 border violations by the Japanese, of which about 35 resulted in serious combat. Ultimately, the Japanese twice - on July 9 and 20 - handed the Soviet government a note demanding that they immediately leave the disputed territories. The note was rejected, and on July 29 the Japanese attacked the Soviet troops. During the conflict, which lasted until August 11, 1938, the Red Army, although it made a number of unfortunate mistakes, nevertheless inflicted a decisive defeat on the Japanese.

The defeat in the battles at Lake Khasan shook the authority of the Japanese army. The military, in whose hands the power in the country actually lay, could not allow such a development of events. The echo of the last shots of the Khasan clash had not yet died down in the Manchurian hills, and Tokyo was already preparing plans for a new attack on the USSR, much larger than the conflict that had just ended.

Japan needed a victorious campaign not only to heal its wounded pride. Back in 1936, the Soviet Union signed a mutual assistance pact with the Mongolian People's Republic. In accordance with this pact, the 57th Special Corps of the Red Army was based on the territory of Mongolia - a large group of Soviet troops, consisting of more than 30 thousand people, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles, 107 aircraft, as well as a large number of auxiliary equipment and artillery pieces. The Japanese were building a branch line near the border with Mongolia railway, and such a neighborhood did not please them at all. In addition, the USSR provided military assistance to the Republic of China, which Japan really wanted to conquer.

The conflict begins

Japan managed to develop two versions of a plan to attack the Soviet Union. But the Kwantung Army never had a chance to use them. The fighting began not in the early 40s, as the military leaders of the Land of the Rising Sun had hoped, but in May 1939.

At the initial stage, the conflict at Khalkhin Gol was like two peas in a pod similar to the skirmish at Lake Khasan. Only this time Japan made territorial claims against Mongolia, and not the USSR. More precisely, the claims were made by the Manchu authorities. But, as stated earlier, Manchukuo did not have the right to an independent policy. So, in fact, it was Tokyo that demanded from the Mongolian People's Republic move the border between it and Manchuria to the Khalkhin Gol River, although according to all documents the border line ran 20-25 kilometers to the east. Japan ignored the objections of the Mongolian side, as well as the documents presented confirming the correct location of the border. Armed provocations began, as in Hassan. Only their scale was much more impressive. If in 1938 the Japanese violated the borders of the USSR in small groups, then units of up to a battalion burst into Mongolia. In fact, the conflict has already begun, although war has not been officially declared.

May 11, 1939 is considered the date of the beginning of the first stage of the confrontation at Khalkhin Gol. On this day, a detachment of Japanese-Manchu cavalry numbering about 300 people, supported by 7 armored vehicles, attacked the Mongolian border detachment near Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. Having destroyed about 20 border guards, the attackers reached the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.

On May 14th we turned around active actions Japanese combat aviation. Border outposts and military airfields were subject to air attacks. Commanded air force In Japan, in the conflict zone, the famous ace pilot Morimoto. While aviation was operating, the Kwantung Army hastily transferred additional forces to the battlefield. The prudent Japanese were well prepared: on the territory of Manchuria, barracks were built in advance for soldiers, and warehouses were built for ammunition and equipment.

Developments

Having received information about the concentration of enemy troops, the headquarters of the 57th Corps of the Red Army ordered to strengthen the security of the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic. By the end of the day on May 29, the advanced units of the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade approached the battle area. At the same time, the equipment covered about 700 km under its own power, which was a very impressive indicator for those times. The 149th Infantry Regiment also moved to the border. But, despite this, Japanese troops had a superiority over the combined Mongolian and Soviet units by 2.5 times in manpower and up to 6 times in armored vehicles. In tanks, the advantage was on the side of the USSR: 186 versus 130.

Early on the morning of May 28, the Japanese launched an offensive large forces. Their goal was to encircle and destroy the Soviet-Mongolian units on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The attack was supported by about 40 aircraft, which bombed crossings, the rear and the location of Soviet and Mongolian units. Stubborn fighting continued all day. The Japanese managed to squeeze out the Mongolian cavalry from their positions, as well as the combined detachment of Senior Lieutenant Bykov, who defended with it. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated into the hills near the mouth of the Khaylastyn-Gol River (a tributary of Khalkhin-Gol). The Japanese failed to encircle them. When trying to cross, the fire from the Soviet artillery battery of Lieutenant Bakhtin caused serious damage to the Japanese. The Kwantung Army's attack failed. They managed to capture the Japanese headquarters map, which showed the location of Japanese troops. Also, the map directly indicated that the fighting was taking place precisely on Mongolian territory, therefore, the Japanese attack should be considered as aggression, and not an attempt to restore justice.

On May 29, the intensity of the fighting did not decrease. Red Army forces and Mongol army launched a counteroffensive, supported by two artillery divisions. By evening, the Japanese were driven back 2 kilometers from the river. The Japanese army lost more than 400 soldiers and officers in killed alone, and many trophies were captured.

The first serious battles showed that there were not enough forces concentrated at Khalkhin Gol to repel Japanese aggression. The concentration of reinforcements began. A Soviet tank brigade, 3 motorized armored brigades, a motorized rifle division, a heavy artillery division, a Mongolian cavalry division and more than 100 fighters arrived. A military guard was set up along the state border line of the Mongolian People's Republic.

After this, there were no ground battles throughout June. But a major air battle unfolded. While the Soviet and Japanese pilots fought for the skies of Mongolia, the commander of the 57th Special Corps was replaced. In place of N.F. Feklenko, whose actions were considered insufficiently decisive, G.K. Zhukov was appointed, in the future - the legendary Soviet commander.

Final round

By July, the Japanese command had developed a plan for further action, called the “Second Stage of the Nomonhan Incident.” It provided for a strong attack by the right flank of Japanese forces with the aim of encircling and destroying the Soviet-Mongolian troops. Commander Japanese group Lieutenant General Kamatsubara wrote in the order that the enemy’s morale was low and the time had come to strike a decisive blow.

On July 2, the Japanese offensive began. After artillery preparation, the infantry and tank units of the right flank under the command of General Yasuoka went into battle first. The Japanese immediately brought about 80 tanks into battle, pushing back the Soviet guard units in the southwest.

On the night of July 2–3, the second attacking group, commanded by General Kobayashi, crossed Khalkhin Gol and, after fierce fighting, occupied Mount Bayin-Tsagan. Having knocked out the enemy, the Japanese immediately began to fortify themselves, build dugouts and dig trenches. Japanese infantrymen carried anti-tank and divisional guns up the mountain by hand.

The capture of the dominant heights made it possible for the Japanese to strike in the rear of the defending Soviet-Mongolian troops. Realizing that the situation was critical, Zhukov threw into battle a mobile reserve that had been created in advance. Without reconnaissance or infantry escort, the 11th Tank Brigade went on the attack straight from the march. It was supported by armored vehicles of the Mongolian troops, as well as aviation units.

Hit Soviet tank crews, accompanied by fire from all available artillery and air attacks, shocked the Japanese. They had not yet managed to deploy an organized defense, but still held out with all their might. Intensifying artillery fire, they managed to knock out 15 Soviet tanks. In general, without infantry support it was very difficult for the tank brigade. Only in the middle of the day did the 24th Infantry Regiment strike from the west. Tanks and infantry, despite fierce resistance, stubbornly moved forward. The Japanese found themselves locked in a semicircle and pushed back almost to the very top of the mountain. All Japanese troops who had crossed to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol were trapped here. On both sides, about 400 tanks, more than 800 artillery pieces, and several hundred aircraft took part in the battle.

At 15:00 on July 5, the Japanese could not withstand the onslaught and began to retreat randomly across the river. Due to the premature explosion of the pontoon bridge by Japanese sappers, many soldiers and officers drowned while trying to escape by swimming. Only the two-meter depth of Khalkhin Gol and the swampy shores prevented our tank units pursue the enemy.

Zhukov's decision to attack the Japanese on the move initially caused many objections and complaints. However, in the end it was recognized that in the current situation it was the only possible one. After the defeat at Bain-Tsagan, the Japanese no longer risked crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.

Zhukov began preparing an offensive. The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army Group under the command of G. M. Stern. New troops began to arrive - infantry divisions and tank brigades. As a result, by the beginning of the Red Army offensive, Zhukov’s group had about 57 thousand people, more than 500 guns and mortars, 498 tanks and 516 aircraft.

The Japanese were also gathering forces, expecting to attack on August 24. Simultaneously with the concentration of manpower and equipment, work was carried out on the construction of defensive structures.

On August 20, Soviet troops went on the offensive, 4 days ahead of the Japanese. The attack was so unexpected that during the first hour not a single artillery shot was fired in response. The command of the Japanese army was unable to immediately determine the direction of the main attack: it was assumed that the Soviet-Mongolian troops were advancing evenly along the entire front. In fact, the main blow was delivered by the southern group of troops. The mistake of the Japanese command led to the fact that, with a strong defense of the center, the Japanese were unable to properly protect the flanks. As a result, on August 26, 1939, Soviet troops completely surrounded the Japanese 6th Army. Attempts to release the encircled group failed.

On August 28, the suppression of Japanese resistance began in the area of ​​Remizov Heights, the last node of defense. By that time, the Japanese artillery was almost completely disabled, they only had mortars and machine guns. About 400 Japanese soldiers, who tried to break out of the encirclement at night, were completely destroyed in a fierce battle that reached hand-to-hand combat.

By the morning of August 31, the territory of Mongolia was completely cleared of Japanese troops. After this, ground battles died down again, but air battles resumed. But here, too, Japan did not achieve success, losing about 70 aircraft and 14 Soviet ones shot down. Realizing their defeat, the Japanese asked for an armistice, which was signed on September 15, 1939.

One of the most important results Soviet victory What should be considered at Khalkhin Gol is that the Japanese never attacked the USSR during World War II. Even Hitler's demands did not add to their resolve. The defeat led to a government crisis in Japan.

From negative consequences For the USSR, it should be noted that the victory of the Soviet troops forced the military to be overly optimistic about the level of readiness of the Red Army for war. In 1941 they had to pay for it high price. Still a triumph Soviet weapons on Khalkhin Gol, without a doubt, deserves the respect and pride of descendants.

1939)
G. K. Zhukov (after June 6, 1939)
Khorlogin Choibalsan

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area.

May 1939 First battles

On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo heights were occupied.

On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special rifle corps Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border.

During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, Japanese troops, possessing numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed, largely due to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin.

The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.

June. The fight for air supremacy

Although not a single collision occurred on the ground in June, a air war. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. Thus, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.

The Soviet command had to take radical measures: on May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union, and also had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

At the beginning of June, N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov. Soon after G.K. Zhukov arrived in the area of ​​military conflict in June 1939, he proposed his plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G. K. Zhukov. They began to flock to the conflict area necessary forces. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops on Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, Army Commander G.M. Stern arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with new strength on the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were transferred here. So, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan, the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy.

At the same time, on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol.

July. Japanese attack

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuoka did not complete its task.

The group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a general retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. More than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost.

The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of the commander - corps commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev and chief of staff of the brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District to the Trans-Baikal Military District, partial mobilization was carried out and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.

On July 8, the Japanese side again began active fighting. At night they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th rifle regiment and a battalion of a rifle and machine gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned.

Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, they were the result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.

From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took energetic measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required for the implementation of the planned by G.K. Zhukov offensive operation against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.

On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20.

Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards under the command of Major A. Bulyga was transferred from the Transbaikal Military District. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were identified.

During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from the territory of Mongolia to Manchu territory However, these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership.

As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, it consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, a Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiment and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China.

General Rippo and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping attack was planned on the right flank Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During G.K. Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. To mislead the enemy into early period In preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created.

During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between state border th MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. Main blow was carried out by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M.I. Potapov, an auxiliary strike by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I.P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6:15 a.m., a powerful artillery barrage and air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the attack began ground forces. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, led stubborn defensive battles, therefore G.K. Zhukov had to introduce the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Worked well at this time and Soviet aviation. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and made no attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces united and completed complete environment Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, until last person. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the river Khaylastyn-Gol. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, the undeclared war of Japan against the USSR and its ally Mongolia). So, on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were driven back beyond the state border by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce.

On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

Results

The USSR victory at Khalkhin Gol played a role decisive role in Japan's non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States.

In the fall of 1941, the leadership of the USSR received a message from intelligence officer Sorge that Japan was not going to attack the USSR. This information made it possible, during the most critical days of the defense of Moscow in late October - early November 1941, to transfer from the Far East up to twenty fresh, fully staffed and well-equipped rifle divisions and several tank formations, which played a key role in the defense of Moscow, and also allowed in the future Soviet troops launch a counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941.

Literature

• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. Chapter seven. Undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.

• Shishov A.V. Russia and Japan. History of military conflicts. - M.: Veche, 2001.
• Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.
• Novikov M.V. Victory at Khalkhin Gol. - M.: Politizdat, 1971.
• Kondratyev V. Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air. - M.: Techniki - Youth, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M.: Aviation Promotion Foundation "Russian Knights", 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the 20th Century). - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7

Cinema

The Soviet-Mongolian document is dedicated to the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River feature film“Listen on the other side” directed by Boris Ermolaev and Badrakhyn Sumkha (1971).

The television film “On the Roads of the Fathers” by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina (2004) is dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.

Notes

Footnotes

1. incl. 6,472 killed and died during the sanitary evacuation stages, 1,152 died from wounds in hospitals, 8 died from illnesses, 43 died in disasters and as a result of accidents
2. data is incomplete
3. In “Western” historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local “Incident at Nomon Khan”. "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of ​​the Manchu-Mongolian border.
4. Translated into Russian “Khalkin-Gol” - Khalkha River
5. The troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed marching order
6. During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured.
7. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.
8. : On June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
9. : Zhukov, without waiting for the accompanying rifle regiment to approach, threw the 11th, which was in reserve, into battle directly from the march tank brigade brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, who was supported by a Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In fairness, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Along the line special department Corps, a report was sent to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.
10. : The division was formed hastily in the Urals; many soldiers of this division had never held a weapon in their hands, so it was necessary to urgently organize on-site training for its personnel.

The battles at Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian Khalkhin golyn bailaan or Mongol Khalkhin golyn dain, Japanese ノモンハン事件 Nomon-khan jiken) - an undeclared local armed conflict that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia near borders with Manchukuo between the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic on the one hand and the Japanese Empire and Manchukuo on the other. The final battle took place in last days August and ended with the complete defeat of the 6th Separate Army of Japan. An armistice between the USSR and Japan was concluded on September 16, 1939.

In Soviet historiography, these events are usually called a “military conflict.” At the same time, many Japanese historians admit that this was a real local war, with some authors calling it the “Second Russian-Japanese war"- by analogy with the war of 1904-1905.

In Japanese historiography, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the “Nomon Khan Incident”, after the name of one of the heights in this area of ​​​​the Manchurian-Mongolian border.

Background to the conflict

In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. A puppet state of Manchukuo was created on the occupied territory, which was planned to be used as a springboard for further aggression against China, Mongolia and the USSR.

According to the Soviet side, the conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway, which was being built by the Japanese in this area bypassing the Greater Khingan to the USSR border in the area of ​​Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. According to the Soviet historian M.V. Novikov, to substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the Khalkhin-Gol border and “issued a special order to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, on the maps of which the correct border in the Khalkhin River area was given.” Gol", but the Russian historian K.E. Cherevko points out that the administrative border along the Khalkhin-Gol channel was indicated on a map published on the basis of Russian topographic surveys of 1906 and on physical map Outer Mongolia General Staff Republic of China 1918.

In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end.

On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia in the form of the 57th Special Corps, which was successively commanded by division commanders I. S. Konev and N. V. Feklenko. By May 1939, the strength of the corps was 5,544 people, including 523 commanders and 996 junior commanders.

In the summer of 1938, a two-week conflict occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR.

In 1939, following the change of Japanese government in January, border tensions increased. The slogan of expansion began to be put forward Japanese Empire"all the way to Lake Baikal." Attacks by Japanese troops on Mongolian border guards became more frequent. At the same time, Japan accused Mongolia of deliberately violating the borders of Manchuria.

Hostilities

Border provocations

On January 16, 1939, in the area of ​​the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo height, a group of 5 Japanese soldiers fired at a detachment of four MPR border guards from a distance of about 500 meters.

On January 17, at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, 13 Japanese soldiers attacked a detachment of three MPR border guards, capturing the head of the outpost and wounding another soldier. On January 29 and 30, Japanese and Bargut cavalrymen made new attempts to capture the guard detachments of the MPR border guards. And in February and March, the Japanese and Barguts carried out about 30 attacks on the MPR border guards.

On the night of May 8, a group of Japanese up to a platoon with a light machine gun tried to secretly occupy an island belonging to the MPR in the middle of the Khalkhin Gol River, but after a short firefight with the border guards of the MPR, they retreated, losing 3 soldiers killed and one captured (Takazaki Ichiro from the reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division) .

On May 11, a detachment of Japanese cavalry (up to 300 people with several machine guns) advanced 15 km deep into the territory of the MPR and attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. As reinforcements approached the border, the Japanese were pushed back to their original line.

On May 14, a reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Japanese Infantry Division (300 horsemen supported by a flight of five light dive bombers) attacked the 7th border outpost of the MPR and occupied the heights of Dungur-Obo. On May 15, the Japanese transported up to 30 trucks with two infantry companies, 7 armored vehicles and 1 tank to the occupied heights.

On the morning of May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko, sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a sapper company and an artillery battery of the Red Army. At the same time, a division of MPR armored vehicles was sent there. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border.

During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces under the command of Colonel Yamagata consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6-8 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, Japanese troops, possessing numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed largely due to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Yu. B. Vakhtin.

The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.

Although there was not a single collision on the ground in June, an air war has developed in the skies since May 22. The first clashes showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Ya. V. Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes Soviet Union, many had combat experience of the war in Spain and China. They began training pilots and reorganized and strengthened the air surveillance, warning and communications system.

To strengthen air defense Two divisions of the 191st anti-aircraft artillery regiment were sent to the Trans-Baikal Military District.

At the beginning of June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff M.V. Zakharov. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Soon after arriving in June in the area of ​​​​military conflict, the chief of staff Soviet command a new combat plan was proposed: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to gather in the area of ​​​​combat operations: the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aviation managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft (the Japanese lost 2 bombers and 3 fighters).

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here, which for the first time in the world used combat unguided air-to-air missiles, later used to create multiple launch rocket systems. Thus, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan (in this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize dominance in the air. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.

At the same time, on June 26, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol. The words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.

By the end of June, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” IN general outline it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the Red Army’s defenses on the operational sector of the front.

On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, the troops of Major General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and subsequently destroy them.

Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. From difficult situation The defending Soviet troops were rescued by a mobile reserve created in advance by Zhukov, which was promptly put into action. Zhukov, without waiting for the approach of the infantry cover, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve (up to 150 tanks T-37A, BT-5, BT-7 and OT-26) and 8 1st Mongolian armored division, equipped with BA-6 armored vehicles with 45 mm cannons. Soon they were supported by the 7th motorized armored brigade (154 armored vehicles BA-6, BA-10, FAI). It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander Stern. To be fair, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of troops, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense in a telegram dated July 15 reprimanded Kulik and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete its task.

A group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a general retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians More than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8,632 people. killed. The Japanese side lost almost all their tanks and most of their artillery. These events became known as the “Bayan-Tsagan Massacre.”

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

July - August

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of: commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, chief of staff brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, aviation commander corps commander Y. V. Smushkevich, corps commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.

On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned.

Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.

From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required to carry out the offensive operation planned by the chief of staff Bogdanov against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.

On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place. From July 21 to July 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20.

Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard the crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards was transferred from the Trans-Baikal Military District under the command of the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment, Major A. Bulyga. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were identified.

During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter:

"You want to untie big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.”

As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree the Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ryuhei Ogisu (Japanese), consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments of the Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should be noted that most of the soldiers in the Japanese group had combat experience of the war in China.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the starting areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground command staff were carried out only on trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese are conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening telephone conversations, in order to misinform the enemy, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, Zhukov, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol for the first time in the world military practice tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main impact force flank groups performing a maneuver to encircle.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, an auxiliary blow by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne, 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the offensive

the total number of Soviet and Mongolian troops was 35 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 216 field and 286 anti-tank guns, 40 mortars, 2255 heavy and light machine guns, 498 tanks, 346 armored vehicles, 581 aircraft;

The total number of Japanese troops was 25 infantry battalions, 17 cavalry squadrons, 135 field and 142 anti-tank guns, 60 mortars and bomb throwers, 1238 heavy and light machine guns, 120 tanks and armored vehicles, 450 aircraft.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 6:15 a.m., powerful artillery preparation and air raids on enemy positions began. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters were launched into the air. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing the tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese planes in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, he took a considerable risk, since the commander’s closest reserve - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to release its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 heavy and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million rounds of ammunition, and much other military equipment as trophies.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

On the morning of September 4, two battalions of Japanese infantry tried to occupy the heights of Eris-Ulyn-Obo, but were thrown back beyond the state border, losing up to 350 soldiers and officers. On the night of September 8, in the same area, Japanese troops made a new attempt to penetrate into Mongolia with up to four infantry companies, but were again repulsed by big losses. In total, in these attacks the enemy lost up to 500 troops killed, 18 machine guns and more than 150 rifles were captured.

After September 8, the Japanese command did not take action with ground troops, but air battles continued. In the first half of September, 7 air battles. The largest one - 120 Japanese planes against 207 Soviet ones - took place on September 15, the day the armistice was signed. On September 16, hostilities on the border ceased.

In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207 aircraft, Japan - 162.

During the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River, Soviet troops actively used artillery: according to incomplete data (the results of the shelling of a number of objects in the adjacent territory were not established), 133 were destroyed by artillery fire artillery pieces(six 105-mm guns, 55 pcs. 75-mm guns, 69 small-caliber and three anti-aircraft guns), 49 mortars, 117 machine guns, 47 artillery, 21 mortar and 30 machine-gun batteries suppressed, 40 tanks and 29 armored vehicles destroyed, 21 observation stations destroyed point, 55 dugouts, 2 fuel depots and 2 ammunition depots.

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to stop hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

The conflict ended in May 1942 with the signing of a final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese, based on the old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats in Soviet-German front, then it worked out enough difficult situation. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Japanese. But it only lasted until 1945, before Japan's surrender in World War II.

The victory of the USSR and the MPR at Khalkhin Gol was one of the reasons for the refusal of Japan to attack the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the Japanese General Staff, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler’s demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2 it was decided final decision wait until Germany wins for sure.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous (August 23) signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 it signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation Japanese army and the fleet was defeated by the “maritime party”, which defended the idea of ​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The German military leadership, having studied the experience Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan’s military capabilities very low and did not recommend Hitler to bind himself to an alliance with it.

The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and British Ambassador in Tokyo by Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended for six months the plan denounced on January 26 trade agreement with Japan, and then completely restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and petroleum products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow into Japan until the outbreak of war with the United States.

The events at Khalkhin Gol also became important element propaganda in the USSR. Its essence boiled down to the idea of ​​​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants tragic events The summer of 1941 many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of a major war.

The impact of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

On August 1, 1939, at the height of hostilities, an additional insignia was established to the highest degree of distinction of the USSR, the title “Hero of the Soviet Union” - the “Hero of the Soviet Union” medal, renamed in October of the same year into the “Gold Star” medal. The title was established in 1934, but no special insignia were provided.

The fate of the winners

70 servicemen were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 83 were awarded the Order of Lenin, 595 - the Order of the Red Banner, 134 - the Order of the Red Star, 33 - the medal "For Courage", 58 - the medal "For Military Merit". The commissar of the 8th motorized brigade, Alexander Nikolaevich Moskovsky, was forever included in the lists of personnel of the military unit; on August 28, 1939, he led a night counterattack of a rifle company against a Japanese battalion and died in battle (as a result of a successful counterattack, the Japanese battalion was thrown back, losing over 170 soldiers killed and failed to break through the encirclement).

The government of the Mongolian People's Republic established badge“Participant in the battles of Khalkhin Gol,” which was awarded to distinguished Soviet and Mongolian military personnel.

Khalkhin Gol became the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown corps commander, after the victory over the Japanese, headed the country's largest Kiev Military District, and then became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The aviation commander of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and Army Commander G. M. Stern were awarded Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force; Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the USSR Government, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission for Resolution controversial issues on the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation on the Japanese side, Bogdanov made a “gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. March 1, 1940 by the Military Collegium Supreme Court USSR he was convicted under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years of labor camp. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR. He ended the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and with the rank of major general.

Combat losses of the parties

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops during the battles from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured (of which about 20 thousand were Japanese losses). The Soviet-Mongolian troops lost 9831 Soviet (together with the wounded - more than 17 thousand) and 895 Mongolian soldiers.

Reflection in literature and art

The events at Khalkhin Gol were reflected in Soviet and world literature and art. Novels, poems and songs were written about them, and articles were published in newspapers.

K. M. Simonov - novel “Comrades in Arms”, poem “Far in the East”, poem “Tank”.

F. Bokarev - poem “Memory of Khalkhin Gol”

H. Murakami - novel “The Chronicles of the Wind-Up Bird” (a long story by Lieutenant Mamiya).

In cinema

“Khalkin Gol” (1940) - documentary film, TsSDF.

“Listen, on the other side” (1971) - Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.

“I, Shapovalov T. P.” (1973, directed by E. E. Karelov) - the first part of the “High Rank” duology, an episode in the film.

“On the Roads of the Fathers” (2004) - a television film by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.

"Khalkin-Gol. The Unknown War" (2008) - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large amount of chronicles, as well as comments from veteran participants in those events and historians.

“Historical Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze” 1939

Volunteers

My Way (film, 2011) (Korean: 마이웨이) is a Korean film directed by Kang Jaegyu, released in 2011. The film is based on the story of Korean Yang Kyungjong and Japanese Tatsuo Hasegawa, captured by the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol.

Not everyone remembers that in 1939 the USSR won the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, which took place from May 11 to September 16. In this collision...

Not everyone remembers that in 1939 the USSR won the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, which took place from May 11 to September 16. During this collision he managed to show himself with the best side Georgy Zhukov. The fights took place in Mongolia, near the border of the country of Manchukuo, which was created by the Japanese rulers, in the area where the Khalkhin Gol River flows.

Where it all started

From the very beginning of 1939, the Japanese carried out regular attacks on the Mongolian border guards.

In early May, the Japanese became especially active, and on the 11th, a Japanese cavalry detachment advanced fifteen kilometers into Mongolia. Then ground troops supported by aviation.

The USSR and Mongolia concluded a “Protocol on Mutual Assistance”, so already on May 17, Soviet troops arrived to help “ younger brother" Soon, even larger armed forces began to arrive, armored vehicles and aircraft arrived.

At first there was an active air war, which advanced from with varying success, then a large-scale battle began on the ground.

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol.

Fight on the ground

At first, Zhukov was sent to Mongolia only to inspect the military situation there. Some believe that Budyonny advocated for him. At the end of May, Zhukov reported that the corps commander N.V. Feklenko did not have sufficient military skills to lead this section of the front. As a result, Feklenko was recalled, and Zhukov was appointed in his place. This is how Stalin always acted - he gave those who criticized the opportunity to show themselves in action. This was a good moment for Zhukov.

The newly formed headquarters under the leadership of Zhukov decided to act according to the following scheme: to firmly defend the territory beyond the Khalkhin Gol River and prepare a counterattack against the Japanese. They were able to carry out this plan in full, since during these days there was a battle in the air, and there was a lull on the ground.

The Japanese, meanwhile, were making their plans. By the end of June 1939, they decided to encircle and kill the Red Army troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, cross the river and break the front line. In early July, Japanese troops went on the offensive, crossed Khalkhin Gol, fortified themselves on Mount Bayan-Tsagan forty kilometers from the border, and the Soviet troops had a hard time. Japanese troops increasingly strengthened their conquests. Georgy Zhukov, taking responsibility to correct

situation, sent a Soviet tank brigade with a division of Mongolian armored vehicles into the fight, although motorized rifles did not protect them. This group of troops justified the hopes of Georgy Konstantinovich. True, half of the armored division was lost, but the situation leveled out. Help arrived and the Japanese began to retreat. To prevent this, Japanese military leaders ordered to blow up the last bridge over Khalkhin Gol, but a general flight of Japanese soldiers began. The Japanese side lost thousands of people killed, almost all armored vehicles and artillery.

Yakovlev, Mikhail Pavlovich (November 18, 1903 - July 12, 1939), Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

Broken Soviet armored car BA-10.

On east coast Khalkhin Gol, Soviet forces rolled back, reducing the occupied territory, but were not broken. For complete victory above the Japanese, it was necessary to clear the eastern bank of them and redefine the border. Zhukov was planning an attack. The Japanese thought the same, but they were already afraid to cross the river. They simply wanted to defeat the Russians by removing them from the eastern bank.

The Soviet side attracted additional troops - rifle division, tankers, combat-ready men were mobilized in Transbaikalia, organizing two more divisions, and a border battalion was invited from there, which was able to catch many scouts from the Japanese side.

Russian troops numbered 57,000 fighters, they were equipped with more than 500 guns, more than 500 tanks, more than 300 armored vehicles and more than 500 aircraft. On the Japanese side they were opposed by an army of 75,000 soldiers, about 500 guns, and almost 200 tanks.

For four days in early July, the battle for the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol continued, the Red Army soldiers did not budge. There were no battles for ten days, during which time the Russians strengthened their positions, and more motorized riflemen and machine gunners arrived to help. On July 23 and 24, the Japanese went on the offensive, but could not do anything.

M. A. Bogdanov.

Komkor Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan.

Long-awaited victory

The Red Army troops prepared for the main attack in secret, moving equipment only at night, radio conversations were conducted only about defense, and at night, radio stations transmitted recordings of the sounds of moving equipment and aircraft, so that the Japanese’s perception was dulled.

As a result, the Soviet attack at the end of August came as a big surprise to the Japanese, who themselves wanted to attack only 4 days later. A military operation according to the canons of the classics, where tanks and armored personnel carriers struck from the flanks to encircle and defeat the enemy in the territory between the river and the official border of Mongolia. This is how our Red Army, led by Zhukov, acted, even before the same well-known attacks of the Nazis in Poland and France. 3 groups attacked: Southern - the main attack, Northern - auxiliary attack, Central group - the main battle.

At the beginning of seven in the morning the artillery and aviation moved out, at 9 o'clock the infantry and tanks moved in. The hottest battle took place in the Central Department of the Front, where the enemy was very powerfully fortified. In the next two days, Zhukov involved reserves - a motorized armored group, then in the Central sector - airborne troops and border guards. Aviation helped very effectively. The Japanese were unable to coordinate their actions in time and defend well on the flanks. By August 26, 1939, the Red Army had trapped Japanese troops in a pocket.

The Japanese fighters also fought very bravely, literally stood to the death, did not go into captivity, but still could not escape the encirclement.

In early September, Japanese troops again tried to seize lands beyond the border of Mongolia, but were brutally defeated.

As a result, on September 15, 1939, the USSR, Mongolia and Japan entered into an agreement to end the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River. The final agreement was reached in 1942, it contained many concessions to Japan, since the USSR was at a disadvantage. But in 1945, all the lands given to Japan again passed to Mongolia.

Results:

Memorial "Zaisan", Ulaanbaatar.

• The fact that the USSR showed its strength during the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River caused Japan to abandon clashes with the Red Army and they began to expand their empire to the south. This is before the Great Patriotic War was very useful for the Soviet Union, since its friendly Mongolia was in the rear.
• The battles at Khalkhin Gol contributed to the start of a dizzying military career Georgy Zhukov.