Separate barrage detachment of the 60th Army, 1943. Barrage detachments

Markus Johannes Wolf (German: Markus Johannes Wolf; January 19, 1923, Hechingen - November 9, 2006, Berlin) - leader foreign intelligence GDR in 1958-86, Colonel General state security.
Markus Wolf was born in the city of Hechingen (Württemberg) in the family of a Jewish doctor, writer and communist Friedrich Wolf. In 1934, after the NSDAP came to power, together with his parents and younger brother Conrad, who later became a famous film director, he emigrated to Switzerland and then to the USSR.
In Moscow, Marcus studied first at the German school named after Karl Liebknecht, then at the Russian school named after Fridtjof Nansen. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Wolf family was evacuated to Kazakhstan, from where Markus Wolf was sent to the Comintern school, which trained agents to be deployed behind enemy lines. Due to a number of failures of agents, it was decided to retain the main personnel from among young German emigrants to work in post-war Germany. Markus Wolf entered to study at Moscow aviation institute. Marcus failed to graduate from college: in 1945, he was sent to work in Germany along with the “Ulbricht group,” which was supposed to prepare for the communists to come to power.
Initially, his cover was to work as a correspondent for the radio station Berliner Rundfunk (GDR Radio), where he, in particular, covered the Nuremberg trials.
In 1949, Markus Wolf was appointed assistant to the GDR ambassador to the USSR.
In 1951, he was recalled to Germany to work at the Institute for Scientific and Economic Research. This institute was in fact a cover for the nascent foreign intelligence service of the GDR. In December 1952, Markus Wolf was appointed head of foreign intelligence. At first, the number of intelligence officers and agents was small. According to Wolf himself, at the end of 1953, 12 infiltrated agents were working abroad and another 30-40 people were preparing for infiltration. A particular difficulty in intelligence work was that many foreign countries they refused to recognize the GDR and had to use only illegal intelligence methods (there were no embassies in which legal agents could work).
In the 1960s, it was the foreign intelligence of the GDR, in close cooperation with the KGB, that carried out the “export” revolutionary movement to the countries of Asia and Africa.
By 1986, about 1,500 embedded agents worked for the foreign intelligence of the GDR, not counting legal agents at embassies and auxiliary agents.
Many agents borrowed enough high position, in particular, agent Gunter Guillaume worked as an assistant to German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
In 1986, Markus Wolf retired. With the fall Berlin Wall emigrated to the USSR, after the August putsch requested political asylum in Austria, but ultimately in September 1991 decided to return to Germany, where he was arrested and spent 11 days in solitary confinement, after which he was released on bail. In 1993 he was sentenced to 6 years in prison. In 1995, the sentence was overturned by the German Federal Constitutional Court, but in 1997, a court in Düsseldorf sentenced him to another three years of probation. In 1995, the German Federal Constitutional Court released a decision that freed East German intelligence officers from prosecution on charges of treason and espionage. According to Markus Wolf himself, during interrogations he did not betray any of the GDR foreign intelligence agents known to him.
I worked until my death literary activity: wrote memoirs and prose. A number of books were published in other languages ​​of the world, including in Russia.

Markus Wolf, the “man without a face” as he is called in the West, is one of the most talented organizers of the intelligence services.

The GDR intelligence service he headed was the most effective and energetic for more than thirty years, and it was not her fault that the state, whose interests she represented and defended, suddenly ceased to exist.

The eldest son of Elsa (German, Protestant) and Friedrich (Jew) Wolf, Marcus was born in 1923 in the small town of Hechingen. My father was a doctor, he was interested in homeopathy, vegetarianism and bodybuilding, but in addition to this he became famous writer and a playwright. A film based on his play "Professor Mamlok", which talks about anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany, was very popular in our country, and the play itself was performed in theaters all over the world. As a Jew and a communist, Friedrich Wolf was forced to flee abroad after Hitler came to power and, after a year of wandering, he and his family ended up in Moscow.

Marcus, whom his Moscow friends called Misha, together with his brother Konrad, entered a Moscow school, and after graduation, entered the aviation institute. Russian became his native language. Marcus grew up as a staunch anti-fascist and firmly believed in the triumph of socialism.

In 1943, he was preparing to be deployed as an illegal intelligence officer to the rear. fascist army. But the assignment was canceled, and until the end of the war, Marcus worked as an announcer and commentator at a radio station that broadcast anti-fascist broadcasts. He took up the same work when he arrived in Berlin in May 1945. Then he spent a year and a half on diplomatic work in Moscow. To do this, he had to change his Soviet citizenship to GDR citizenship.

In the summer of 1951, Markus Wolf was recalled to Berlin and offered, or rather ordered, along the party line, to join the apparatus of the newly created intelligence service. By this time in West Germany For several years now there has been an intelligence service - the Gehlen Organization. In response to this, the Institute of Economic Research was created on August 16, 1951. The foreign policy intelligence (VPR) of the GDR received such a harmless name for camouflage. The official day of its founding was September 1, 1951, when eight Germans and four advisers from the USSR at a joint meeting formed its tasks: conducting political, economic and scientific-technical intelligence in Germany, West Berlin and NATO countries, as well as penetration into Western intelligence services. Last task was entrusted to the department, which Wolf soon began to lead.

The difficulty was not only that neither Wolf himself, nor his employees, nor Soviet advisers They knew nothing about these special services, except that they were led by a certain General Gehlen (and even this became known from an article in the London Daily Express newspaper), but that Wolf’s department found itself in confrontation with the Ministry of State Security of the GDR , which has operated in the same area since 1950.

At first it was planned to use the already established intelligence apparatus of the KKE party intelligence, but it soon became clear that it was impossible to rely on it: it was all riddled with enemy agents. They decided to abandon the use of CNG once and for all.

It was necessary to create our own intelligence apparatus, but the solution to this problem seemed vague to Wolf.

In December 1952, he was unexpectedly summoned by Walter Ulbricht, the head of the party (SED) and the de facto head of state. He announced to Markus Wolf his appointment as head of intelligence. Marcus was not yet thirty years old; his intelligence experience was almost equal to zero. But he came from the family of a famous communist writer, had reliable connections in Moscow, and was recommended former boss intelligence Ackerman, who resigned “for health reasons.”

Wolf received his new appointment shortly before the death of Stalin, the events of June 17, 1953 and the collapse of Beria, which largely affected future fate intelligence. It was included in the system of the Ministry of State Security, which was headed by Wollweber and then Mielke.

After the events of June 17, a massive outflow of population from the GDR began. Until 1957, almost half a million people left it. It was possible to “launch” into this number specially selected men and women, intelligence agents who had completed a simple training course: basic rules conspiracy and problems that will have to be solved. Some of them had to start life in the West from scratch, engage in manual labor and build a career on their own. Places in important places were found for students and researchers in a roundabout way. scientific centers. Some found themselves in positions of secrecy, some reached major positions in the economic hierarchy.

Difficulties were encountered when introducing settlers into political and military circles. They were exposed too complex verification and they didn’t always stand it. There were also objective obstacles: Germany had enough candidates for these positions.

The first agent to achieve success was “Felix”. According to legend, a representative of a company supplying equipment for hairdressing salons, he often visited Bonn, where the office of the Federal Chancellor was located. The scouts never dreamed of getting there. Felix made up his mind. In the crowd at a bus stop, he met a woman who later became the first source in the department. Over time, they became lovers, and “Norma” (as she was called) gave birth to a son with him. She was not an agent, but what she said allowed intelligence to act more actively and systematically.

Later, the department for the protection of the constitution (counterintelligence of the Federal Republic of Germany) became interested in “Felix”. He had to be recalled, and “Norma” remained in the West, because, according to Felix, “she could not imagine life in the GDR.” This is how the first “Romeo case” ended. Then there were many similar cases. This whole epic was called “espionage for love.”

Markus Wolf in his memoirs “Playing on a Foreign Field” writes on this occasion that love, personal affection for an intelligence officer is only one of the motivations for those who acted in favor of his service, along with political convictions, idealism, financial reasons and dissatisfaction. ambition. He writes: “The widespread claim in the media that my General Directorate of Intelligence had unleashed real “Romeo spies” on innocent West German citizens quickly took hold. own life. Nothing could be done about it, and since then they have attached themselves to my service dubious words“Heart hackers” who in this way find out the secrets of the Bonn government...” They wrote that there is a special department for the preparation of “Romeo”. “...Such a department,” Wolf further says, “belongs to the same category of fantasy as the imaginary department in the British MI5, where the latest technologies are invented and tested.” aids for agent 007."

Marcus further notes that the emergence of the “Romeo stereotype” became possible because most of the intelligence officers sent to the West were bachelor men - it was easier for them to create legends and conditions for adaptation.

Here are some examples of “spying for love.”

The above-mentioned “Felix”, having returned to the GDR, reported on a certain Gudrun, a lonely secretary in the office of State Secretary Globka, who could be influenced by the right man. For this purpose, Herbert S. (pseudonym “Astor”), an athlete pilot, was chosen former member NSDAP. This last one appeared good reason for his “escape” from the GDR. He went to Bonn, where he made good acquaintances, including Gudrun. She, even without being recruited, began to provide information about people and events in Adenauer’s inner circle, Gehlen’s contacts with the Chancellor and with Globke. "Astor" recruited Gudrun, posing as... a Soviet intelligence officer. Attention to her representative person great power appealed to her, and she began to spy diligently. Unfortunately, Astor's illness forced him to be recalled and communication ceased.

The director of a famous theater from Saxony, Roland G., went to Bonn to meet a woman named Margaret, a devout, well-bred Catholic who worked as a translator at NATO headquarters. He posed as Danish journalist Kai Petersen and spoke with a slight Danish accent. Having become close to Margarita, he “admitted” that he was an officer of the Danish military intelligence. “Denmark is a small country, and NATO is offending it by not sharing information with it. You must help us." She agreed, but admitted that she was tormented by remorse, aggravated by the sinfulness of their relationship. To calm her down, they performed a whole combination. One of the intelligence officers quickly learned Danish(to the required extent) and went to Denmark. I found a suitable church and found out its operating hours. Roland G. and Margarita also went there. One fine day, when the church was empty, the “priest” took Margarita’s confession, calmed her soul and blessed her for further help to her friend and “our little country.”

Later, when Roland G. had to be recalled for fear of failure, Margarita agreed to provide information to another “Dane”, but soon her interest disappeared: she worked only for the sake of one man.

In the early 1960s, intelligence officer Herbert Z., working under the pseudonym “Krantz,” met nineteen-year-old Gerda O. in Paris. She served in the Telco department of the Foreign Ministry, where telegrams from all West German embassies were deciphered and forwarded. “Krantz” opened up to Gerda, they got married, and she began working for her husband under the pseudonym “Rita.” Being brave and risky, she calmly filled her huge bag with meters of ticker tape and brought them to Kranz. For three months she worked as a codebreaker in Washington, and thanks to her, intelligence was aware of American-German relations.

In the early 1970s, “Rita” was transferred to work at the embassy in Warsaw. According to legend, “Krantz” was supposed to remain in Germany. “Rita” fell in love with a West German journalist, a BND agent, and confessed everything to him, but she had the decency to warn “Krantz” by phone. He managed to escape to the GDR.

At Wolf's request, Polish intelligence officers at the airport before sending "Rita" to Bonn offered to grant her political asylum in Poland. She hesitated for a moment, but entered the plane. In Bonn, she willingly gave information about her work for GDR intelligence and about Kranz.

But the scout turned out to be “unsinkable.” He found another woman who received the pseudonym "Inga". She knew everything about him, especially since in an illustrated magazine she came across an article about the trial against “Rita” and a photograph of “Krantz”. Despite this, she began to work actively, quite quickly found a place in Bonn, in the department of the Federal Chancellor, and for a number of years supplied intelligence with first-class information.

“Inga” dreamed of officially marrying “Krantz”, but in Germany this was impossible. We decided to do it in the GDR. “Inga” was given documents in her maiden name and the spouses’ relationship was formalized in one of the registry offices. True, the page with the record of the registration of their marriage was confiscated and destroyed, which the spouses did not find out about at that time.

In 1979, West German counterintelligence dealt heavy blows to the intelligence of the GDR. Sixteen agents were arrested. Many, including “married couples,” had to flee to the GDR. Some of them maintained their marriages and lived a normal life. family life. However, intelligence work continued successfully both using classical methods and “espionage for love.” (By “classical” methods, the author means ordinary male agents.)

In the 1950s, the Kornbrenner group operated, led by former employee SD - National Socialist Security Service. This, by the way, was the only case when GDR intelligence used a former active Nazi.

One of the lucky scouts was Adolf Kanter (pseudonym “Fichtel”). He was introduced into the circle of a young politician, the future Chancellor Helmut Kohl. True, his rise in the ranks of Kohl’s supporters was brought to an end by a ridiculous charge of misuse of donations, of which he was acquitted. However, with Kolya's entourage, he retained good relations. In 1974, he became deputy head of the Bonn bureau of the Flick concern and not only conveyed information about the connection between big business and politics, but also influenced the distribution of fairly large “donations.”

When a major scandal arose in Bonn over these “donations” in 1981, GDR intelligence, shielding its source, overcame the temptation to hand over the materials to the West German media, although it knew a lot. After the scandal, the Bonn bureau was liquidated, but Kanter retained all his connections in the party and government apparatus and continued to inform intelligence. He was arrested only in 1994 and given a suspended two-year prison sentence. Apparently, it worked that during the trial he kept silent about much of what he knew about the life of the Bonn political community.

“A source of inestimable importance,” Markus Wolf called his agent “Freddy” (he never revealed his real name) surrounded by Willy Brandt. He had a successful career, but died in the late 1960s after a heart attack.

One of the most important sources of GDR intelligence information was Günther Guillaume, whose name went down in history (see essay about him). Therefore, we will not talk about it in detail here. Let us only note that it is difficult to say whether Guillaume’s case brought more benefit or harm to the development of the general political situation in Europe?

Finally, Gabriela Gast was an outstanding intelligence officer - the only woman in West German intelligence, reaching a senior position as chief intelligence analyst Soviet Union And Eastern Europe. It was she who compiled summary reports for the chancellor from all the information received. Second copies of these reports ended up on Markus Wolf's desk. In 1987, she was appointed deputy head of the Eastern Bloc section of West German intelligence. She was arrested in 1990 and released in 1994.

Often, Markus Wolf's mission was broader than simple reconnaissance. He participated in secret negotiations with some official and high-ranking figures of the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, with the Minister of Justice Fritz Schaeffer, who outlined his ideas for the reunification of the two Germanys. Or (through intermediaries) with the Minister for All-German Affairs in the Adenauer cabinet, Ernst Lemmer. Trusted political contacts were maintained with the Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn and with the chairman of the SPD faction in the Bonn parliament Fritz Erler. His analysis of the processes taking place within NATO, or reports on the plans of Washington “hawks” were very useful.

To make friends in higher spheres Bonna Markus Wolf used the most different ways. For example, to establish contact with a prominent figure in the Bundestag, who then went by the pseudonym “Julius,” Wolf organized his trip along the Volga, and then a visit to a fisherman’s house near Volgograd, where, in the most relaxed atmosphere, with Russian button accordion, dumplings, vodka, caviar and stories of a fisherman who lost two sons at the front and was found with him mutual language.

The number of contacts is high and top level Markus Wolff himself and his people were very large, and just listing them would take several pages and tire the reader. But both the agents and these contacts gave so much to intelligence that if their information could be and would have been implemented, it would have played a big role in further development GDR-FRG and European relations. But, unfortunately, both subjectively and objective reasons Intelligence information is far from the only factor determining events.

Markus Wolf received the nickname “The Man Without a Face” in the West, since during the twenty years of his tenure at the head of GDR intelligence in the West, they were never able to get his photograph. This was only possible after intelligence officer Senior Lieutenant Stiller betrayed and fled to the West. It so happened that while in Sweden, Wolf was photographed as an "unknown suspicious person." This photograph was kept among many others and was among them presented to Stiller, who immediately identified his boss. The consequence of this was the arrest of a certain Kremer, a man with whom Wolf met in Sweden. He was considered a very important agent, since the head of the intelligence service himself met with him. By the way, he was not an agent, but only a “bridge” to access the right person. But this did not help Kremer, and he was convicted.

For many years, the duel between Markus Wolf and the head of the BND, “gray general” Gehlen, continued. The fight was with with varying success. Gehlen sent, or rather, recruited his agents in many vital important sites GDR, starting with party and government institutions. Wolf's agents penetrated into the most secret places of the BND and NATO. Both suffered from defectors and traitors. Both believed that they were serving the interests of the German people.

Gehlen was fired from his post in 1968 and passed away in 1979.

Wolf voluntarily resigned in 1983 at the age of sixty. He was not fired immediately; the transfer of affairs to the new intelligence chief, Werner Grossman, practically lasted about three years. May 30, 1986 was his last working day, but his official dismissal took place on November 27, 1986.

Wolf found himself out of work. First of all, he fulfilled the dream of his deceased brother - he completed his film “Troika” about the destinies of the people of their Moscow youth. In the spring of 1989, the film was released simultaneously in the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany and attracted the attention of viewers. In it, the author critically interpreted the dark sides of socialism, demanded openness, democratic exchange of opinions, and tolerance towards dissent.

In the middle of the same year, an amazing event occurred: attorney general Germany Rebman obtained an arrest warrant for Wolf Marcus, a citizen of the GDR. It was a senseless and stupid action that only caused irritation.

On October 18, 1989, Honecker and some of his associates retired from political life. On November 4, Wolf addressed a rally of five hundred thousand people at Alexanderplatz, calling for perestroika and true democracy. But when he mentioned that he was a state security general, there were whistles and shouts of “Down!”

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Markus Wolf went to his sister Lena in Moscow to study creative work. But upon returning to Germany, he found himself in a “hysterical atmosphere of massacre.” The thirst for revenge among many was concentrated on the state security agencies and its famous representatives- Mielke and Wolf.

In the summer of 1990, a law on amnesty for GDR intelligence officers, prepared together with the unification agreement, which protected them from persecution, was failed. From the day of unification, that is, from October 3, 1990, Wolf was threatened with arrest. He wrote a letter to the German Foreign Minister, as well as Willy Brandt, stating that he was not going to go into exile and was ready to consider all the charges brought against him on fair terms. “But fair terms were not given in that German autumn of 1990,” recalls Wolf.

He and his wife went to Austria. From there, on October 22, 1990, he wrote a letter to Gorbachev. It said, in particular:

“Dear Mikhail Sergeevich...

...The GDR intelligence officers did a lot for the security of the USSR and its intelligence, and the agents, who are now being persecuted and publicly persecuted, provided a constant flow of reliable and valuable information. I have been called a “symbol” or “synonym” for successful intelligence work. Apparently, our former opponents want to punish me for my successes, crucify me on the cross, as they already wrote..."

The letter ended with the words:

“You, Mikhail Sergeevich, will understand that I stand up not only for myself, but for many for whom my heart aches, for whom I still feel responsible...”

But “dear Mikhail Sergeevich” not only did not take any measures, but also did not respond to the letter.

From Austria, Wolf and his wife moved to Moscow. But there he felt that in the Kremlin there were different opinions regarding his stay in the USSR. On the one hand, his past obliged him to provide asylum, on the other hand, they did not want to spoil relations with Germany.

After the failure of the “operetta” putsch of August 1991, Wolf decided to return to Germany and share the burden of responsibility placed on his successor and comrades in service.

On September 24, 1991, he crossed the Austro-German border, where the prosecutor general was already waiting for him. On the same day, he found himself in a solitary confinement cell with double bars in the Karlsruhe prison. Eleven days later he was released on a huge bail raised by his friends.

A long and grueling investigation procedure began, and then trial over Markus Wolf. He, like all sensible people, was first of all outraged by the very fact of bringing to trial people who acted in the interests of their legally existing state, a member of the UN.

Even Wolf's former opponents expressed bewilderment.

Former BND leader H. Hellenbroit said: “I consider the trial against Wolf to be unconstitutional. Wolf was engaged in reconnaissance on behalf of the then state..."

Justice Minister Kinkel: “There are neither winners nor losers in the German unification.”

The Berlin Trial Chamber convincingly substantiated its doubts about the compliance of the charges against intelligence officers with international law.

Nevertheless, the process took place.

On December 6, 1993, Markus Wolf was sentenced to six years in prison, but was released on bail.

In the summer of 1995, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in the case of Werner Grossmann that GDR intelligence officers were not subject to prosecution in Germany for treason and espionage. On this basis, the Federal Court of Justice also overturned the verdict of the Düsseldorf court against Markus Wolf.

The former head of East German intelligence continued to fight for the rehabilitation of those still being persecuted for working for the GDR.

It is interesting that Markus Wolf, the “man without a face,” became the hero of a spy novel during his lifetime. In 1960, his exploits inspired a young Intelligence Service employee, David Cornwell. Under the pseudonym of John Le Carré, he created the famous image of Karl, the Communist intelligence chief, an educated and captivating man, dressed in a tweed suit and smoking Navy Cat cigarettes...

March 2015

There is no need to introduce him to professionals, but the rest of the population, that is, you and me, mentions his name much less often than the names of Mata Hari, Admiral Canaris or Abel.
This, in general, is not surprising. After all, even his photograph appeared in the West only 27 years after he headed the political intelligence of the GDR. Wolf's merits in this field even today cannot be strictly assessed. Although it is generally accepted that the damage he inflicted on a potential enemy was colossal.
Thousands of his agents literally entangled the entire political life of Germany and Europe. They penetrated the most closed structures. Wolf's man, for example, was the secretary of Federal Chancellor Brandt. Many people held responsible positions in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO, the Common Market, and in large concerns. The informants were leading politicians, businessmen and cultural figures. His people listened to the private conversations of Helmut Kohl and other famous leaders of the country. The efficiency of the service aroused admiration even in Moscow, especially since they eagerly enjoyed the fruits of these successes. Many still consider him the best intelligence officer of the century.
After the reunification of Germany, they tried to put him in prison. It was revenge on the part of those who could not resist him on the battlefields" cold war" The Constitutional Court of Germany declared Wolf's activities beyond jurisdiction. And he remained true to his ideals. And this is already a lot in our time, when ideals are crumbling. He died at 83. He fell asleep and didn’t wake up.

Our conversation took place long before the premiere of the film about Wolf on Channel One took place in Russia, we spoke in his favorite cafe opposite the Berlin Red Town Hall. There, during the GDR times, it was as if every table was equipped with a listening device. In the same quarter, the quarter of St. Nicholas, he lived. The text of this conversation has been waiting in the wings for quite some time.
SPECIAL DISTRICT OF MOSCOW
– For many in the world, you are an almost legendary person. How was the legend born? How did you become who you are? What motivated you when making major life decisions?
– I was born in the same year when all money in Germany was devalued. A little symbolic. Born into the family of a military doctor, who after the war became first a convinced pacifist and then a socialist. He was a famous writer and playwright, and you can read about him, Friedrich Wolf, in many encyclopedias, including the Soviet or Literary. And the play “Professor Mamlok”, written in 1934 and already on next year translated into Russian, became world famous. You can also read about my younger brother Konrad, a film director and organizer of the GDR film industry. You can’t read about me there yet...
After the Nazis came to power, it was mortally dangerous for us to remain in Germany: my father was a Jew and a member of the KKE.
We were almost immediately deprived of German citizenship, fled first to Austria and Switzerland, and then, after unsuccessful attempts to obtain the right to reside in France, with the help of friends we received asylum in Moscow in 1934. Vsevolod Vishnevsky then helped us get two-room apartment in the writer's superstructure in a house in Nizhny Kislovsky Lane on Arbat. There I learned Russian, although at first I made thirty mistakes in dictations.
IN in a certain sense I am one of the children of Arbat. We lived in Moscow until the end of the war. I first studied at the German school named after. Karl Liebknecht on Kropotkinskaya, and from 1937, from the eighth grade - at the famous 110th school on Merzlyakovsky Lane, where the teachers were still from the gymnasium. In general, I lived in a special area of ​​​​Moscow. And this, of course, affected my whole life. Many of my classmates were the children of famous writers, actors, musicians, major military men, and party leaders. We have created an amazing intellectual atmosphere. The parents of many of my comrades were repressed. By the way, at our school we did not isolate the children of those arrested. This is the merit of director Ivan Kuzmich Novikov. For example, Bukharin’s daughter studied a couple of grades lower.
Our family was not affected by the repressions. Like some other political emigrants, we were not handed over to the Gestapo. Randomness generally prevails here. We did not understand the reasons for that wave of madness. And although his father’s name was known abroad, if someone really needed it, his fame and dedication to the idea, of course, would not have stopped anyone. Father, however, traveled abroad to various conferences, participated in civil war in Spain as a doctor.
I wanted to build airplanes, I completed two courses at the Moscow Aviation Institute, but then, as they said then, “by the will of the party” I ended up at the Comintern school. I was really looking forward to this, since all my classmates had already been drafted into the army, and I, the only guy, remained with the girls in Alma-Ata, where the institute was evacuated after the start of the war. The Comintern school trained underground workers. Although, of course, during the war the difference between an underground fighter and an intelligence officer is very arbitrary. There were young communists at the school from 12 countries, mostly occupied ones. When it became clear that almost all the messengers dropped by parachute were killed, and there was practically no contact with the Resistance, the emphasis in our training was on work after the war. Mainly for political work.
After the dissolution of the Comintern, I ended up as an announcer at the former Comintern radio center in Rostokino, near the Agricultural Exhibition, which became the “Voice of National Resistance.” There I learned my first journalistic skills. Therefore, there was some logic (although I did not like this logic) in the fact that already in May 1945 I was sent as an editor and commentator to Berlin Radio. I didn’t really hold on to this job, although I quickly became one of the radio managers. Participated in the coverage of the Nuremberg trials.
When the GDR arose in 1949, I was offered to go to Moscow to create a diplomatic mission. We were given Morozov's mansion in Leontyevsky Lane, and at first I was simultaneously a diplomat, a supply manager, a secretary, and a driver, in charge of protocol, and delivering mail.
However, it so happened that the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anton Ackerman (he was a candidate member of the Politburo, was responsible for work on the radio and knew me well) turned out to be the first head of foreign intelligence. We did not know then about the existence of the Soviet Information Committee, but our service was apparently created in the image and likeness of Moscow, when political intelligence was subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the head of the Information Committee was Molotov. Soon Ackerman was recalled, and he proposed me for this post. I was 29 years old at the time, and I was a convinced communist. I did not receive any special training. We, in fact, learned to walk when we should have run. Soviet advisers, of course, explained to us in detail how to write plans, how to prepare for appearances, etc. However, unlike other socialist countries, we did not send our leaders to Moscow “for school.”
Did I have an inclination for this work? Apparently yes. But, rather, it is education. I knew how to overcome myself and completely devoted myself to the task that was entrusted to me. Editorial work, for example, was disgusting to me at first. But then my former radio boss called me the most talented commentator. When I headed the intelligence service, I did not know that this work would last 34 years. Thus, one might say, I became the doyen of all intelligence chiefs.

DOYEN OF INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS
– How did it happen that East German intelligence became one of the most effective intelligence services in the world? What is her strength? What methods did you use to achieve your goals? And what role did you personally play in developing the operations? What did you see as the weakness of your opponents? Are you satisfied with what you did?
– There is a whole range of reasons here. From the very beginning, my strategy was to concentrate all our efforts on West Germany and West Berlin as an outpost of the West-East confrontation. Working conditions, in general, were very favorable: common language, common traditions, common mentality, numerous family ties. It was not as difficult for our young intelligence officers, whom we sent to the West with new documents, as, say, for the Russians, to find a common language with a potential agent. But, oddly enough, the main thing in our work was political convictions and political position.
There are stereotypes in the West that in order to force agents to work, we widely used bribery, blackmail, and coercion. This is wrong. We, of course, were not alien to all intelligence methods since biblical times, but the main thing was still ideological conviction. That was the time then. Not communist, not Marxist, but, if you like, universal. One more important point was that we immediately concentrated on key areas. We were mainly interested in weapons systems, and in politically– NATO and all structures associated with it. We started working in these directions when, in fact, NATO was not fully formed.
As for the methodology, one of the qualities that distinguished us was patience. We began working with promising young people a long time ago, being confident that sooner or later, perhaps years later, they would become the political elite, get into the structures we needed, or acquire the connections we needed. And this method, judging by the results, gave the greatest return. We worked not only with the left, but also with conservative circles, appealing to one degree or another to their national feelings. German conservatives, for example, were dissatisfied with the too pro-American policy of their government, and indeed with the US policy in Europe, especially in relation to Germany. Leftist youth actively condemned the war in Vietnam, and after 1968, anti-American sentiment among young Europeans generally became dominant. And it was easier for us Germans to work with such young people than, say, for Russians or Poles.

The idea of ​​“compensation for the evil that the Germans caused to the Soviet Union” was very productive. West Germany's weakness was that it was too closely tied to American politics. This helped us gain allies within the country.
Many associate intelligence work with the sense of power it supposedly gives. This side has never been the main one for me. I was interested in people. And I, apparently, tried harder than many of my fellow bosses to meet with them. I often traveled abroad, including to capital countries. And once I did get burned when I was photographed in Sweden.
The photograph was later published in Der Spiegel in 1979. This was, of course, my big defeat. Before this, no one in the West knew what the head of GDR intelligence looked like. Working at a desk with the awareness of my power never attracted me, but people were attracted who were ready, for completely different reasons, to go to great lengths. big risk. Of course, I couldn’t meet everyone – there were too many people working for us! (It is now known that there were more than 4,000 of them, only permanent agents. - A.S.). There were, of course, individual agents with whom I contacted personally, but very often in the presence of an employee or even several employees. Most of my subordinates were my like-minded people, I selected them myself.
When, after the reunification of Germany, a criminal case was opened against me, I understood that I could go to prison for a long time. However, I was in Moscow at that time and could well have stayed there. However, I believed that I should share the fate of my former subordinates. And my first trial ended, as you know, with a six-year sentence. The Constitutional Court, by a vote of 5:4, overturned the verdict. What if it were the other way around? I would sit. I still have a big moral burden on me, as the persecution of our former intelligence officers, agents, spies - whatever you want to call it. The Americans, who got their hands on our intelligence files in 1990, periodically throw in new information. (Now photocopies of these documents have been transferred to the German side. - A.S.) There were arrests, although the security of a united Germany does not suffer in any way from what and how happened during the confrontation.
And finally, regarding the costs of our service. Many people believe that with very plight In the economy of the GDR, our service required too much money. Moreover, the difference in living standards was constantly increasing in favor of Germany. I can object: the results of scientific and technical exploration alone paid for the costs of maintaining our office many times over. The trouble, however, was that economic system made it impossible to use our data effectively. But that is another topic.

THE SPY WHO CAME FROM THE COLD
– You voluntarily left your post several years before the unification of Germany. What was it? Foresight? What should be the relationship between intelligence and big politics? What do you believe and disbelieve today? How do you feel about the new realities in the world and Russia? Your attitude towards former colleague Putin?
– The first time I asked to retire was back in 1983. The process dragged on until 1986. There were several reasons, but I would say the main one was “loss of hope.” The hope that through my work at the head of intelligence I could fundamentally change our lives for the better. In addition, I believed that we, like air, need democratization, tolerance towards other ideas, a kind of ideological balance. And that our “agitation and propaganda” (and I still considered myself a journalist) only spoil everything.
My desire to leave was abnormal in every way. And that’s how it was perceived. Although technically I was retiring. But everyone understood that this was not so. For almost a year, management refrained from publishing this information. Then there were many comments in the East and West. After leaving, I understood perfectly well that my apartment would be bugged, my correspondence would be looked through, and I would no longer be allowed into the West, although there were many invitations. My minister Erich Mielke openly told me about this. But I was relieved because I could get creative and I could say—at least for myself—what I wanted. By the way, I didn’t think that my book “Troika” would be published quickly.
And from experience, I considered the “related difficulties” to be inevitable, and this did not bother me as a professional.
In general, I believe that intelligence should be separated from political power, and intelligence officers themselves should not hold public positions. With the possible exception of the manager. I fully imagined Primakov as prime minister. However, in different countries- differently. In the GDR, the post of chief of intelligence was not a political post. Fortunately for me, I have never been a member of the Central Committee. As for Russia, I didn’t even know that so many former intelligence officers came to power. But this is probably natural for your country.
As for worldview, you will be surprised, but I still consider myself a communist. In the sense that my parents were. For me it's the idea of ​​faith. Beliefs in freedom, equality, brotherhood. These ideals were not realized either in the Soviet Union or in those countries that unfairly called themselves socialist.
I have always been confused by the contradiction between a noble idea and its implementation. But there was hope that things could still change, that there could be real big reforms. One hope appeared after the 20th Congress. Then there were Hungary, Czechoslovakia... But the Cold War was going on, and it was impossible to sit between the trenches.
After I read Khrushchev’s report at the 20th Congress, I took down a photograph of Stalin from the wall, where he was so kind and pleasant, lighting a pipe... For me, it was over with Stalin. I wouldn't say he was an idol for me. Idol - it contradicts my family education. But he was an endless authority for me.
However, even then I did not believe that communism could be realized throughout the world. Moreover, by force. A real communist, in my opinion, is distinguished by non-violence. In our country, on the contrary, there has always been a cult of strength, or rather power. Retention of power. After all, her loss was sometimes tantamount to the loss of life or, in any case, freedom.
I have always believed that maintaining power at any cost cannot and should not be an end in itself. For this, the same Mielke called me a hopeless intellectual, and he treated them with contempt. Communist ideals can only make their way through conviction and belief. History, however, is not very encouraging in this sense. But, apparently, historical optimism still lives in me. Maybe at least my negative experience will somehow be useful.
What happened in last years in Russia, it’s very sad, and I just feel sorry for many of my friends. Although I can’t judge the essence of the reforms: I don’t understand them. By the way, it was precisely the helpless transformations and the rotten system that led, in my opinion, to the collapse of the USSR. But there is hardly any need to build analogies here. In general, the collapse of the Union is a huge loss for Russia and almost all other republics.
People often ask me about Putin. When Putin became the leading presidential candidate, the phones began to ring. But I can’t say anything new about him. We were, as you understand, absolutely on different levels. Once, however, one of my good friends from a large German magazine called and said that he had information that Putin in Dresden worked with so many agents - citizens of the GDR. I replied that it was his job and he had to get promoted. An acquaintance answers: we have an order to award Putin a bronze medal People's Army GDR "For Merit". Lord, I say, many people received this medal from us! There was, as you know, a corresponding limit. In Karlshorst (KGB base) they compiled lists - Putin got in. Nothing special. Fine.
I also said then: I hope that his views on the national dignity of Russia will not always be combined with bathhouse gatherings. Requested: no publication. Published with a link. It's a pity.

…AND FOUND WARMTH
– How do you feel about your fame and evaluate your actions? – I am sometimes compared to Karl from John Le Carré’s book “The Spy Who Came in from the Cold.” Although I prefer the spy themes from Graham Greene. If only because it is literary better. By the way, I haven’t read Le Carré’s novel for a long time and didn’t know what it was about we're talking about. That’s why I never claimed that I was the prototype of one of the main characters. But I think that, unlike other authors, Le Carré is still an expert in our profession. And like a writer he has rich fantasy. For example, in the novel “Russian House”. By the way, I can say: if we had written together, it probably would have turned out better, because Le Carré knows the mentality of the English intelligence officers well, but, in my opinion, I know the Russian security officers better. It would be more truthful and colorful.
Many of my friends are now asking themselves the question: have we lived our lives in vain? This is important for me too. I often give lectures abroad. And the interest that many countries show in me—you can call it fame—tells me that much of my life was indeed not in vain.
One of my current advantages is that I can travel a lot (I'm only not allowed in the USA). I have already written six books. The last one is a book of memoirs “Friends Don’t Die” (it has been translated into Russian - A.S.). One of the heroes there is mine school friend, whom I haven't seen in 55 years. Now you'll meet me.
And now I have a big family. Eleven grandchildren, five children, great-grandchildren, third wife. By the way, in the leadership of the GDR, divorce was considered a serious offense...

Markus Wolf is rightfully considered one of the most effective and successful intelligence officers of his time. For quite a long time, Western intelligence agencies simply called him “a man without a face.” And only after another intelligence officer, Werner Stiller, fled to Germany, Wolf’s nickname became irrelevant.

Germans in the USSR

Markus Wolf was a native of Germany. He was born in 1923. His mother was German and his father was Jewish. Wolf Sr. held leftist views and openly opposed fascism. That is why, after Hitler came to power, the Wolfs decided it was time to leave. First they went to Switzerland, then to France. However, they failed to settle down neither here nor there. In 1934, the couple arrived in the USSR.

A German family settled in Moscow. There Marcus, whom his classmates simply called Misha, graduated high school. When the Great Patriotic War began, Volfov, along with many others Soviet citizens, sent for evacuation to Kazakhstan. Surprisingly, being Germans, they were not subjected to any persecution by the authorities. On the contrary, the authorities decided that Marcus could be useful to them and sent him to study at special school, where agents were trained to carry out sabotage and reconnaissance work.

Stasi

Immediately after the victory in 1945, Markus Wolff went to the German capital Berlin. There he, along with other agents, had to prepare an appropriate springboard for communist power. Wolf got a job as a journalist on a local radio, which by that time had been reclassified as anti-fascist, and even covered the famous Nuremberg trials.

In 1949, the new state of the GDR appeared on German territory. His education was not recognized by many countries except the Soviet Union. A year later, the German Ministry of State Security was created Democratic Republic- Stasi. It was there that Markus Wolf was transferred. In 1952, he was already the head of the country's foreign intelligence service.

Without a face

The period when Wolf led reconnaissance is even today recognized by many experts as the real heyday of this activity. For example, the GDR spy Günter Guillaume was able to get a job in the administration of the German Chancellor himself, and Gabriela Gast managed to become an intelligence agent for the Federal Republic of Germany. The work of some successful intelligence officers was personally supervised by Markus Wolf.

For quite a long time, Western intelligence agencies were unable to identify Wolf himself. They couldn't even imagine what he looked like. Until 1979, they did not have a single photograph of Wolf. That's why he was dubbed "the man without a face." Although, perhaps, it would be more logical to call Marcus the king of conspiracy. Because he traveled a lot all his life and never hid. Perhaps the appearance of the head of the GDR intelligence service would have remained a mystery for a long time if not for one agent. Werner Stiller fled from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany. One day he accidentally saw his boss on one of the photographs and reported this to the right people.

When the Berlin Wall fell, Wolff left again for the Soviet Union. However, he did not stay there long. The August putsch forced him to return to Germany again. Of course, he was immediately arrested at home. But the intelligence officer was lucky again: he was given only 3 years of probation, and then all charges against him were completely dropped.

He died in 2006 in the German capital. His ashes also rest there to this day.

MARCUS WOLF (1923–2006)

Markus Wolf, the “man without a face” as he is called in the West, is one of the most talented organizers of the intelligence services.

The GDR intelligence service he headed was the most effective and energetic for more than thirty years, and it was not her fault that the state, whose interests she represented and defended, suddenly ceased to exist.

The eldest son of Elsa (German, Protestant) and Friedrich (Jew) Wolf, Marcus was born in 1923 in the small town of Hechingen. His father was a doctor, was interested in homeopathy, vegetarianism and bodybuilding, but in addition he became a famous writer and playwright. The film based on his play “Professor Mamlock,” which tells about anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany, was very popular in our country, and the play itself was shown in theaters all over the world. As a Jew and a communist, Friedrich Wolf was forced to flee abroad after Hitler came to power and, after a year of wandering, he and his family ended up in Moscow.

Marcus, whom his Moscow friends called Misha, together with his brother Konrad, entered a Moscow school, and after graduation, entered the aviation institute. Russian became his native language. Marcus grew up as a staunch anti-fascist and firmly believed in the triumph of socialism. In 1943, he was preparing to be deployed as an illegal intelligence officer to the rear of the fascist army. But the assignment was canceled, and until the end of the war, Marcus worked as an announcer and commentator at a radio station that broadcast anti-fascist broadcasts. He took up the same work when he arrived in Berlin in May 1945. Then he spent a year and a half on diplomatic work in Moscow. To do this, he had to change his Soviet citizenship to GDR citizenship.

In the summer of 1951, Markus Wolf was recalled to Berlin and offered, or rather ordered, along the party line, to join the apparatus of the newly created intelligence service. By this time, an intelligence service, the Gehlen Organization, had already existed in West Germany for several years. In response to this, the Institute of Economic Research was created on August 16, 1951. The foreign policy intelligence (VPR) of the GDR received such a harmless name for camouflage. The official day of its founding was September 1, 1951, when eight Germans and four advisers from the USSR at a joint meeting formed its tasks: conducting political, economic and scientific and technical intelligence in Germany, West Berlin and NATO countries, as well as penetrating Western intelligence services. The last task was entrusted to the department, which Wolf soon came to lead.

The difficulty was not only that neither Wolf himself, nor his employees, nor the Soviet advisers knew anything about these special services, except that they were led by a certain General Gehlen (and even this became known from an article in the London newspaper "Daily express"), but that Wolf's department found itself in confrontation with the GDR Ministry of State Security, which had been operating in the same area since 1950.

At first it was planned to use the already established intelligence apparatus of the KKE party intelligence, but it soon became clear that it was impossible to rely on it: it was all riddled with enemy agents. They decided to abandon the use of CNG once and for all.

It was necessary to create our own intelligence apparatus, but the solution to this problem seemed vague to Wolf.

In December 1952, he was unexpectedly summoned by Walter Ulbricht, the head of the party (SED) and the de facto head of state. He announced to Markus Wolf his appointment as head of intelligence. Marcus was not yet thirty years old, his intelligence experience was almost zero. But he came from the family of a famous communist writer, had reliable connections in Moscow, and was recommended by former intelligence chief Ackerman, who resigned “for health reasons.”

Wolf received his new appointment shortly before the death of Stalin, the events of June 17, 1953 and the collapse of Beria, which largely affected the future fate of intelligence. It was included in the system of the Ministry of State Security, which was headed by Wollweber and then Mielke.

After the events of June 17, a massive outflow of population from the GDR began. Until 1957, almost half a million people left it. It was possible to “launch” into this number specially selected men and women, intelligence agents who had completed a simple training course: basic rules of conspiracy and tasks that would have to be solved. Some of them had to start life in the West from scratch, engage in manual labor and build a career on their own. Places were found in important scientific centers for students and researchers in a roundabout way. Some found themselves in positions of secrecy, some reached major positions in the economic hierarchy.

Difficulties were encountered when introducing settlers into political and military circles. They were subjected to too difficult a test and did not always pass it. There were also objective obstacles: Germany had enough candidates for these positions.

The first agent to achieve success was “Felix”. According to legend, a representative of a company supplying equipment for hairdressing salons, he often visited Bonn, where the office of the Federal Chancellor was located. The scouts never dreamed of getting there. Felix made up his mind. In the crowd at a bus stop, he met a woman who later became the first source in the department. Over time, they became lovers, and “Norma” (as she was called) gave birth to a son with him. She was not an agent, but what she said allowed intelligence to act more actively and systematically.

Later, the department for the protection of the constitution (counterintelligence of the Federal Republic of Germany) became interested in “Felix”. He had to be recalled, and “Norma” remained in the West, because, according to Felix, “she could not imagine life in the GDR.” This is how the first “Romeo case” ended. Then there were many similar cases. This whole epic was called “espionage for love.”

Markus Wolf in his memoirs “Playing on a Foreign Field” writes on this occasion that love, personal affection for an intelligence officer is only one of the motivations for those who acted in favor of his service, along with political convictions, idealism, financial reasons and dissatisfaction. ambition. He writes: “The widespread claim in the media that my General Directorate of Intelligence had unleashed real “Romeo spies” on innocent West German citizens quickly took on a life of its own. Nothing could be done about this, and since then the dubious words of “heart burglars” have been attached to my service, who in this way find out the secrets of the Bonn government...” They wrote that there was a special department for the preparation of “Romeo”. “...Such a department,” Wolf further says, “belongs to the same category of fantasy as the imaginary unit in the British MI5, where the latest aids for agent 007 are invented and tested.”

Marcus further notes that the emergence of the “Romeo stereotype” became possible because most of the intelligence officers sent to the West were bachelor men - it was easier for them to create legends and conditions for adaptation.

Here are some examples of “spying for love.”

The above-mentioned “Felix”, having returned to the GDR, reported on a certain Gudrun, a lonely secretary in the office of State Secretary Globka, who could be influenced by the right man. For this purpose, Herbert S. (pseudonym “Astor”), an athlete pilot and former member of the NSDAP, was chosen. This latter was a good reason for his “escape” from the GDR. He went to Bonn, where he made good acquaintances, including Gudrun. She, even without being recruited, began to provide information about people and events in Adenauer’s inner circle, Gehlen’s contacts with the Chancellor and with Globke. "Astor" recruited Gudrun, posing as... a Soviet intelligence officer. The attention paid to her as a representative of a great power impressed her, and she began to diligently spy. Unfortunately, Astor's illness forced him to be recalled and communication ceased.

The director of a famous theater from Saxony, Roland G., went to Bonn to meet a woman named Margaret, a devout, well-bred Catholic who worked as a translator at NATO headquarters. He posed as Danish journalist Kai Petersen and spoke with a slight Danish accent. Having become close to Margarita, he “admitted” that he was an officer of Danish military intelligence. “Denmark is a small country, and NATO is offending it by not sharing information with it. You must help us." She agreed, but admitted that she was tormented by remorse, aggravated by the sinfulness of their relationship. To calm her down, they performed a whole combination. One of the intelligence officers quickly learned the Danish language (to the required extent) and went to Denmark. I found a suitable church and found out its operating hours. Roland G. and Margarita also went there. One fine day, when the church was empty, the “priest” took Margarita’s confession, calmed her soul and blessed her for further help to her friend and “our little country.”

Later, when Roland G. had to be recalled for fear of failure, Margarita agreed to provide information to another “Dane”, but soon her interest disappeared: she worked only for the sake of one man.

In the early 1960s, intelligence officer Herbert Z., working under the pseudonym “Krantz,” met nineteen-year-old Gerda O. in Paris. She served in the Telco department of the Foreign Ministry, where telegrams from all West German embassies were deciphered and forwarded. “Krantz” opened up to Gerda, they got married, and she began working for her husband under the pseudonym “Rita.” Being brave and risky, she calmly filled her huge bag with meters of ticker tape and brought them to Kranz. For three months she worked as a codebreaker in Washington, and thanks to her, intelligence was aware of American-German relations.

In the early 1970s, “Rita” was transferred to work at the embassy in Warsaw. According to legend, “Krantz” was supposed to remain in Germany. “Rita” fell in love with a West German journalist, a BND agent, and confessed everything to him, but she had the decency to warn “Krantz” by phone. He managed to escape to the GDR.

At Wolf's request, Polish intelligence officers at the airport before sending "Rita" to Bonn offered to grant her political asylum in Poland. She hesitated for a moment, but entered the plane. In Bonn, she willingly gave information about her work for GDR intelligence and about Kranz.

But the scout turned out to be “unsinkable.” He found another woman who received the pseudonym "Inga". She knew everything about him, especially since in an illustrated magazine she came across an article about the trial against “Rita” and a photograph of “Krantz”. Despite this, she began to work actively, quite quickly found a place in Bonn, in the department of the Federal Chancellor, and for a number of years supplied intelligence with first-class information.

“Inga” dreamed of officially marrying “Krantz”, but in Germany this was impossible. We decided to do it in the GDR. “Inga” was given documents in her maiden name and the spouses’ relationship was formalized in one of the registry offices. True, the page with the record of the registration of their marriage was confiscated and destroyed, which the spouses did not find out about at that time.

In 1979, West German counterintelligence dealt heavy blows to the intelligence of the GDR. Sixteen agents were arrested. Many, including “married couples,” had to flee to the GDR. Some of them maintained their marriages and lived a normal family life. However, intelligence work continued successfully both using classical methods and “espionage for love.” (By “classical” methods, the author means ordinary male agents.)

In the 1950s, the Kornbrenner group operated, headed by a former SD employee - the National Socialist security service. This, by the way, was the only case when GDR intelligence used a former active Nazi.

One of the lucky scouts was Adolf Kanter (pseudonym “Fichtel”). He was introduced into the circle of a young politician, the future Chancellor Helmut Kohl. True, his rise in the ranks of Kohl’s supporters was brought to an end by a ridiculous charge of misuse of donations, of which he was acquitted. However, he maintained good relations with Kohl’s entourage. In 1974, he became deputy head of the Bonn bureau of the Flick concern and not only conveyed information about the connection between big business and politics, but also influenced the distribution of fairly large “donations.”

When a major scandal arose in Bonn over these “donations” in 1981, GDR intelligence, shielding its source, overcame the temptation to hand over the materials to the West German media, although it knew a lot. After the scandal, the Bonn bureau was liquidated, but Kanter retained all his connections in the party and government apparatus and continued to inform intelligence. He was arrested only in 1994 and given a suspended two-year prison sentence. Apparently, it worked that during the trial he kept silent about much of what he knew about the life of the Bonn political community.

“A source of inestimable importance,” Markus Wolf called his agent “Freddy” (he never revealed his real name) surrounded by Willy Brandt. He had a successful career, but died in the late 1960s after a heart attack.

One of the most important sources of GDR intelligence information was Günther Guillaume, whose name went down in history (see essay about him). Therefore, we will not talk about it in detail here. Let us only note that it is difficult to say whether Guillaume’s case brought more benefit or harm to the development of the general political situation in Europe?

Finally, an outstanding intelligence officer was Gabriela Gast, the only woman in West German intelligence to reach a senior position as chief analyst on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was she who compiled summary reports for the chancellor from all the information received. Second copies of these reports ended up on Markus Wolf's desk. In 1987, she was appointed deputy head of the Eastern Bloc section of West German intelligence. She was arrested in 1990 and released in 1994.

Often, Markus Wolf's mission was broader than simple reconnaissance. He participated in secret negotiations with some official and high-ranking figures of the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, with the Minister of Justice Fritz Schaeffer, who outlined his ideas for the reunification of the two Germanys. Or (through intermediaries) with the Minister for All-German Affairs in the Adenauer cabinet, Ernst Lemmer. Trusted political contacts were maintained with the Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn and with the chairman of the SPD faction in the Bonn parliament Fritz Erler. His analysis of the processes taking place within NATO, or reports on the plans of Washington “hawks” were very useful.

Markus Wolf used a variety of methods to make friends in the highest circles of Bonn. For example, to establish contact with a prominent figure in the Bundestag, who then went by the pseudonym “Julius,” Wolf organized his trip along the Volga, and then a visit to a fisherman’s house near Volgograd, where, in the most relaxed atmosphere, with Russian button accordion, dumplings, vodka, caviar and the stories of a fisherman who lost two sons at the front found a common language with him.

The number of high-level contacts between Markus Wolf himself and his people was very large, and listing them alone would take several pages and tire the reader. But both the agents and these contacts gave so much to intelligence that if their information could and would have been implemented, it would have played a big role in the further development of the GDR-FRG and European relations. But, unfortunately, for both subjective and objective reasons, intelligence information is far from the only factor determining events.

Markus Wolf received the nickname “The Man Without a Face” in the West, since during the twenty years of his tenure at the head of GDR intelligence in the West, they were never able to get his photograph. This was only possible after intelligence officer Senior Lieutenant Stiller betrayed and fled to the West. It so happened that while in Sweden, Wolf was photographed as an "unknown suspicious person." This photograph was kept among many others and was among them presented to Stiller, who immediately identified his boss. The consequence of this was the arrest of a certain Kremer, a man with whom Wolf met in Sweden. He was considered a very important agent, since the head of the intelligence service himself met with him. By the way, he was not an agent, but only a “bridge” to reach the right person. But this did not help Kremer, and he was convicted.

For many years, the duel between Markus Wolf and the head of the BND, “gray general” Gehlen, continued. The fight went on with varying degrees of success. Gehlen sent, or rather, recruited his agents in many vital objects of the GDR, starting with party and government institutions. Wolf's agents penetrated into the most secret places of the BND and NATO. Both suffered from defectors and traitors. Both believed that they were serving the interests of the German people.

Gehlen was fired from his post in 1968 and passed away in 1979.

Wolf voluntarily resigned in 1983 at the age of sixty. He was not fired immediately; the transfer of affairs to the new intelligence chief, Werner Grossman, practically lasted about three years. May 30, 1986 was his last working day, but his official dismissal took place on November 27, 1986.

Wolf found himself out of work. First of all, he fulfilled the dream of his deceased brother - he completed his film “Troika” about the destinies of the people of their Moscow youth. In the spring of 1989, the film was released simultaneously in the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany and attracted the attention of viewers. In it, the author critically interpreted the dark sides of socialism, demanded openness, democratic exchange of opinions, and tolerance towards dissent.

In the middle of the same year, an amazing event occurred: the Prosecutor General of the Federal Republic of Germany, Rebman, obtained an arrest warrant for Wolf Marcus, a citizen of the GDR. It was a senseless and stupid action that only caused irritation.

On October 18, 1989, Honecker and some of his associates retired from political life. On November 4, Wolf addressed a rally of five hundred thousand people at Alexanderplatz, calling for perestroika and true democracy. But when he mentioned that he was a state security general, there were whistles and shouts of “Down!”

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Markus Wolf went to his sister Lena in Moscow to engage in creative work. But upon returning to Germany, he found himself in a “hysterical atmosphere of massacre.” The thirst for revenge among many was concentrated on the state security agencies and its famous representatives - Milke and Wolf.

In the summer of 1990, a law on amnesty for GDR intelligence officers, prepared together with the unification agreement, which protected them from persecution, was failed. From the day of unification, that is, from October 3, 1990, Wolf was threatened with arrest. He wrote a letter to the German Foreign Minister, as well as Willy Brandt, stating that he was not going to go into exile and was ready to consider all the charges brought against him on fair terms. “But fair terms were not given in that German autumn of 1990,” recalls Wolf.

He and his wife went to Austria. From there, on October 22, 1990, he wrote a letter to Gorbachev. It said, in particular:

“Dear Mikhail Sergeevich...

...The GDR intelligence officers did a lot for the security of the USSR and its intelligence, and the agents, who are now being persecuted and publicly persecuted, provided a constant flow of reliable and valuable information. I have been called a “symbol” or “synonym” for successful intelligence work. Apparently, our former opponents want to punish me for my successes, crucify me on the cross, as they already wrote..."

The letter ended with the words:

“You, Mikhail Sergeevich, will understand that I stand up not only for myself, but for many for whom my heart aches, for whom I still feel responsible...”

But “dear Mikhail Sergeevich” not only did not take any measures, but also did not respond to the letter.

From Austria, Wolf and his wife moved to Moscow. But there he felt that there were different opinions in the Kremlin regarding his stay in the USSR. On the one hand, his past obliged him to provide asylum, on the other hand, they did not want to spoil relations with Germany.

After the failure of the “operetta” putsch of August 1991, Wolf decided to return to Germany and share the burden of responsibility placed on his successor and comrades in service.

On September 24, 1991, he crossed the Austro-German border, where the prosecutor general was already waiting for him. On the same day, he found himself in a solitary confinement cell with double bars in the Karlsruhe prison. Eleven days later he was released on a huge bail raised by his friends.

The long and grueling investigation and then trial of Markus Wolf began. He, like all sensible people, was first of all outraged by the very fact of bringing to trial people who acted in the interests of their legally existing state, a member of the UN.

Even Wolf's former opponents expressed bewilderment.

Former BND leader H. Hellenbroit said: “I consider the trial against Wolf to be unconstitutional. Wolf was engaged in reconnaissance on behalf of the then state..."

Justice Minister Kinkel: “There are neither winners nor losers in the German unification.”

The Berlin Trial Chamber convincingly substantiated its doubts about the compliance of the charges against intelligence officers with international law.

Nevertheless, the process took place.

On December 6, 1993, Markus Wolf was sentenced to six years in prison, but was released on bail.

In the summer of 1995, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in the case of Werner Grossmann that GDR intelligence officers were not subject to prosecution in Germany for treason and espionage. On this basis, the Federal Court of Justice also overturned the verdict of the Düsseldorf court against Markus Wolf.

The former head of East German intelligence continued to fight for the rehabilitation of those still being persecuted for working for the GDR.

It is interesting that Markus Wolf, the “man without a face,” became the hero of a spy novel during his lifetime. In 1960, his exploits inspired a young Intelligence Service employee, David Cornwell. Under the pseudonym of John Le Carré, he created the famous image of Karl, the Communist intelligence chief, an educated and captivating man, dressed in a tweed suit and smoking Navy Cat cigarettes...