Where did Brusilov participate? Brusilov the Red General

Bartolomeu Dias (c. 1450 - 1500) - Portuguese navigator. He was the first to circumnavigate the southern tip of Africa and discover the Cape of Good Hope. In 1487, an expedition was sent along the coast of Africa under the leadership of one of the best sailors in Europe, Bartolomeu Dias (Diash). There is no direct evidence that the main purpose of this small flotilla, consisting of two small ships that were so unstable that it was impossible even to mount heavy guns on them, was to reach India. Probably their main task was to collect intelligence data. In 1488, their ships reached the southern tip of Africa, called the Cape of Storms by Bartolomeo Diaz, but renamed the Cape by the Portuguese king Joan II Good Hope. This voyage strengthened the hope that it was possible to get from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean by circumnavigating Africa from the south.

Dias's discovery had great importance. In addition to opening the way to the Indian Ocean for Portuguese and later other European ships, his journey dealt a crushing blow to Ptolemy’s theory of an uninhabited hot zone. Perhaps it also played a role in organizing Columbus's expedition, since the latter's brother, Bartolomeu, who accompanied Dias during the voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, a year after its completion, went to England to King Henry VII asking for help for his brother's expedition. In addition, during Dias's report to the king, Christopher Columbus himself was at court, on whom Bartolomeu's journey made a strong impression.

Henry the Navigator, “who himself never sailed the sea,” as evil tongues said about him, nevertheless did more to explore the planet than many travelers. He was the initiator of systematic research expeditions, main goal which was the discovery sea ​​route to India. In the year of the death of Henry the Navigator (1460), Vasco da Gama was born, who subsequently made this journey. When preparations began for a new expedition to India, Dias was appointed head of ship construction. Naturally, he had to be the candidate to lead the expedition. But Vasco da Gama was appointed head of the expedition. The first expedition, which decided to set off along a new route from Portugal to India, left the harbor of Lisbon in the summer of 1497. A small flotilla of 4 ships was led by Vasco da Gama. After the Portuguese ships passed Mozambique, they found themselves on the busy trade route between Africa and India. In the spring of 1498, sailors reached the western tip of India, landing in the city of Calicut, as the Europeans then called it (in the Middle Ages, the city became famous for the production of calico, or calico, which is where the name of the city came from). The Portuguese were perceived in Calcutta as trading competitors. And they hardly got the opportunity to trade in another Indian city - Cannanore. More than two years later, having lost half of his team from difficulties and hardships, Vasco da Gama returned to Portugal with a cargo of gold and spices

The golden idol alone, intended as a gift to the king, weighed about 30 kg, had emerald eyes, and on its chest were rubies the size of walnuts. The opening of the route to India was of such great importance that the Portuguese king Manuel I adopted the nickname “Happy” and the title “Lord of the conquest, navigation and trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India” on this occasion.

Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov(August 19, Tiflis - March 17, Moscow) - Russian and Soviet military leader and military educator, cavalry general (from December 6, 1912), adjutant general (from April 10, 1915), chief inspector of the Red Army cavalry (1923).

Biography

Comes from noble family Brusilov. Born in Tiflis in the family of Russian general Alexei Nikolaevich Brusilov (1787-1859). Mother - Maria-Louise Antonovna, was Polish and came from the family of the collegiate assessor A. Nestoemsky.

On June 27 (July 9), 1867, he entered the Corps of Pages. He graduated from it on July 17 (29), 1872, and was released into the 15th Tver Dragoon Regiment. In 1873-1878 - regiment adjutant. Participant in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 in the Caucasus. Distinguished himself while taking Turkish fortresses Ardahan and Kars, for which he received the Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd and 2nd degrees, and the Order of St. Anne, 3rd class. In 1879-1881 he was a squadron commander and head of the regimental training team.

In 1881 he arrived for service in St. Petersburg. In 1883 he graduated from the science course of the department of squadron and hundred commanders with the category of “excellent”. From 1883 he served in the Cavalry Officer School: adjutant; from 1890 - assistant head of the riding and dressage department; from 1891 - head of the department of squadron and hundred commanders; from 1893 - head of the dragoon department. From November 10, 1898 - assistant head, from February 10, 1902 - head of the school. Brusilov became known not only in Russia, but also abroad as an outstanding expert in cavalry riding and sports. K. Mannerheim, who served in the school under his command before the Russo-Japanese War, recalled:

He was attentive, strict, demanding subordinate manager and gave very good knowledge. His military games and exercises on the ground were exemplary and extremely interesting in their development and execution.

Having no previous experience of commanding either a regiment or a brigade, only thanks to the patronage of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who had exceptional influence on the appointment of senior cavalry commanders before the war, he was appointed on April 19, 1906, head of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. Since January 5, 1909 - commander of the 14th Army Corps. From May 15, 1912 - assistant to the commander of the Warsaw Military District. Since August 15, 1913 - commander of the 12th Army Corps.

First World War

General A. A. Brusilov - Commander-in-Chief of the troops South Western Front (1916)

On the day Germany declared war on Russia, July 19 (August 1), 1914, A. A. Brusilov was appointed commander of the 8th Army, which a few days later took part in the Battle of Galicia. On August 15-16, 1914, during the Rohatyn battles, it defeated the 2nd Austro-Hungarian Army, capturing 20 thousand people and 70 guns. On August 20, Galich was captured. The 8th Army takes an active part in the battles at Rava-Russkaya and in the Battle of Gorodok. In September 1914, he commanded a group of troops from the 8th and 3rd armies. From September 28 to October 11, his army withstood a counterattack by the 2nd and 3rd Austro-Hungarian armies in battles on the San River and near the city of Stryi. During the successfully completed battles, 15 thousand enemy soldiers were captured, and at the end of October 1914, his army entered the foothills of the Carpathians.

At the beginning of November 1914, having pushed back the troops of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army from positions on the Beskid ridge of the Carpathians, it occupied the strategic Lupkovsky Pass. In the Krosno and Limanov battles he defeated the 3rd and 4th Austro-Hungarian armies. In these battles, his troops captured 48 thousand prisoners, 17 guns and 119 machine guns.

In February 1915, in the battle of Boligrod-Liski, he thwarted the enemy’s attempts to release his troops besieged in the Przemysl fortress, taking 130 thousand people prisoner. In March, he captured the main Beskydy ridge of the Carpathian Mountains and by March 30 completed the operation to cross the Carpathians. German troops pinned down his troops in difficult battles near Kazyuvka and thereby prevented the advance of Russian troops into Hungary.

When disaster struck in the spring of 1915 - the Gorlitsky breakthrough and the heavy defeat of the Russian troops - Brusilov began an organized retreat of the army under constant enemy pressure and led the army to the San River. During the battles of Radymno, in the Gorodok positions, he confronted the enemy who had an absolute advantage in artillery, especially heavy artillery. On June 9, 1915, Lviv was abandoned. Brusilov's army retreated to Volyn, successfully defending itself in the Battle of Sokal from the troops of the 1st and 2nd Austro-Hungarian armies and in the battle on the Goryn River in August 1915.

Autograph of Brusilov (1916)

At the beginning of September 1915, in the battle of Vishnevets and Dubno, he defeated the 1st and 2nd Austro-Hungarian armies opposing him. On September 10, his troops took Lutsk, and on October 5, Czartorysk.

In the summer and autumn of 1915, at his personal request, repeated attempts were made to expand geographically and numerically the scale of deportations of local German population west of Sarn, Rivne, Ostrog, Izyaslav. Since October 23, 1915, the deportation of such categories of German colonists as old people over 60 years old, widows and mothers of those killed at the front, disabled people, blind people, and cripples, who had still remained in their places by decision of the Special Meeting, was carried out. According to Brusilov, they “undoubtedly damage telegraph and telephone wires.” 20 thousand people were expelled within 3 days.

Since March 17, 1916 - Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front.

In June 1916, he carried out a successful offensive of the Southwestern Front, using a previously unknown form of breaking through the positional front, which consisted of simultaneous the advance of all armies. The main attack was planned on the sector of one of the four armies that were part of the front, but preparations were carried out in all four armies and, moreover, along the entire front of each of them. The main idea of ​​​​deception is to force the enemy to expect an attack along the entire length of the front and thereby deprive him of the opportunity to guess the location of the actual attack and take timely measures to repel it. Along the entire front, stretching for several hundred kilometers, they dug trenches, communication passages, machine-gun nests, built shelters and warehouses, paved roads, and constructed artillery positions. Only the army commanders knew about the location of the actual strike. The troops brought in for reinforcement were not brought to the front lines until the very last days. To get acquainted with the terrain and the location of the enemy, newly arriving units were only allowed to send forward small quantity Commanding officers and intelligence officers, soldiers and officers continued to be sent on leave, so that even in this way they would not detect the proximity of the day of the offensive. Vacations were stopped only a week before the attack, without announcing this in the order. The main blow, in accordance with the plan developed by Brusilov, was delivered by the 8th Army under the command of General A. M. Kaledin in the direction of the city of Lutsk. Having broken through the front on the 16-kilometer Nosovichi-Koryto section, the Russian army occupied Lutsk on May 25 (June 7), and by June 2 (15) it defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and advanced 65 km.

This operation went down in history under the name Brusilovsky breakthrough (also found under original name Lutsky breakthrough). For the successful implementation of this offensive, A. A. Brusilov, by a majority vote of the St. George Duma at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was nominated for awarding the Order of St. George, 2nd degree. However, Emperor Nicholas II did not approve the presentation, and A. A. Brusilov, along with General A. I. Denikin, was awarded the St. George weapon with diamonds.

Revolutionary years

To raise the revolutionary offensive spirit of the army, it is necessary to form special shock revolutionary battalions, recruited from volunteers in the center of Russia, in order to instill in the army the belief that the entire Russian people are following it in the name of speedy peace and brotherhood of peoples, so that during the offensive, the revolutionary battalions , placed in the most important combat areas, their impulse could carry away those who are hesitant.

On May 22, 1917, he was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief by the Provisional Government instead of General Alekseev. After the failure of the June offensive, Brusilov was removed from his post as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and replaced by General Kornilov. After retirement, he lived in Moscow. During the October battles between the Red Guards and cadets, he was accidentally wounded by a shell fragment that hit his house. According to his own recollections, only this prevented him from going to the Don.

In the Red Army

“Brusilov’s Appeal” came out against the backdrop of a Bolshevik campaign aimed at physical extermination royal officers and civil servants, and many of them perceived it as a betrayal: “Brusilov betrayed Russia, betrayed the people! - so how many weak and hesitant will follow him? Just as much as this appeal made a terrible and overwhelming impression on the irreconcilables, it had the same opposite effect on the wavering masses.”

Since 1921, Alexey Alekseevich has been the chairman of the commission for organizing pre-conscription cavalry training. In 1923-1924 - inspector of the Red Army cavalry. Since 1924, he was attached to the Revolutionary Military Council for particularly important assignments.

A. A. Brusilov died on March 17, 1926 in Moscow from pneumonia at the age of 72 years. He was buried with full military honors near the walls of the Smolensk Cathedral of the Novodevichy Convent. The grave is located next to the grave of A. M. Zayonchkovsky.

Brusilov and the “Brusilovsky breakthrough” from Brusilov’s point of view

Events immediately preceding the attack

At the end of August 1915, it was officially announced that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was removed from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Emperor Nicholas II assumed the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander. In his memoirs, A. A. Brusilov wrote that the impression among the troops from this replacement was the most negative. “The entire army, and indeed all of Russia, certainly believed Nikolai Nikolaevich”. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich undoubtedly possessed the gift of leadership. This replacement was little understood: “It never occurred to anyone that the tsar would take on the responsibilities of supreme commander-in-chief in this difficult situation at the front. It was common knowledge that Nicholas II understood absolutely nothing about military affairs and that the title he has assumed will be only nominal". Lack of a true commander-in-chief “it had a big impact during the hostilities of 1916, when we, due to the fault supreme command, did not achieve the results that could easily lead to the end of a completely victorious war and to the strengthening of the monarch himself on the wavering throne".

I absolutely did not ask for anything, I did not seek any promotions, I never left my army anywhere, I never visited Headquarters and did not talk about myself with any special persons, then for me personally, in essence, it was absolutely all the same, whether to accept a new position or stay in the old one.

Nevertheless, Brusilov resolved the conflict that had arisen: he asked Diterikhs to tell Ivanov that he had not surrendered the position of commander-in-chief and was "my direct boss", So what “I will not go to Berdichev without his order and I warn you that, without legally accepting the position, I will not go to Kamenets-Podolsk to review the 9th Army either”. Brusilov’s statement plunged Ivanov into “great confusion,” and he reported to the headquarters of the 8th Army that he had been waiting for Brusilov for a long time.

In Kamenets-Podolsk, Brusilov met the Tsar, who, after bypassing the guard of honor, invited Brusilov to an audience. Nicholas II asked “what kind of clash I had with Ivanov and what disagreements emerged in the orders of General Alekseev and Count Fredericks regarding the replacement of General Ivanov”. Brusilov replied that there were no “clashes or misunderstandings” with Ivanov and I don’t know about what “disagreement between the orders of General Alekseev and Count Fredericks”. Brusilov told Nicholas II that the opinion about the impossibility of advancing in present moment armies of the Southwestern Front erroneously: “the armies entrusted to me after several months of rest and preparatory work are in excellent condition in all respects, have high morale and will be ready to attack by May 1st.”. Moreover, Brusilov asked the Supreme Commander to provide the initiative for actions coordinated with the actions of neighboring fronts. Brusilov especially noted that if his opinion was rejected, he would resign as commander.

The Emperor shuddered somewhat, probably as a result of my such a sharp and categorical statement, while by the nature of his character he was more prone to indecisive and uncertain situations. He never liked to dot the i's and especially did not like to be presented with statements of this nature. Nevertheless, he did not express any displeasure, but only suggested repeating my statement at the military council, which was supposed to take place on April 1, and said that he had nothing either for or against and that at the council I should come to an agreement with his chief of staff and other commanders in chief.

At the military council on April 1, 1916 in Mogilev, it was necessary to develop the order of military operations for 1916. General Alekseev reported that the armies of the Western Front, together with the armies Northwestern Front must apply main blow in the direction of Vilna. It was decided to transfer most of heavy artillery and general reserve troops, at the disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, at the disposal of the Western and Northwestern Fronts. Regarding the Southwestern Front, Alekseev stated that the front troops should remain in their positions. An offensive is possible only when both of its northern neighbors firmly indicate their success and advance sufficiently to the west. General Kuropatkin said that it was difficult to count on the success of the North-Western Front. Break through a perfectly fortified German front impossible. Evert said that he fully subscribed to Kuropatkin’s opinion, did not believe in the success of the offensive and believed that it was better to stick to a defensive course of action. Brusilov stated that he was firmly convinced of the success of the offensive. He does not undertake to evaluate others. However, the troops of the Southwestern Front can and must advance. Brusilov turned to Alekseev with a request:

allow my front to act offensively simultaneously with my neighbors; even if, as expected, I had not even had any success, then at least I would not only have delayed the enemy’s troops, but also attracted part of his reserves to myself and in this way would have significantly facilitated the task of Evert and Kuropatkin.

Alekseev replied that in principle he had no objections. However, he considers it his duty to warn that Brusilov in this case will not receive anything in addition to the troops he has: "no artillery, no more shells". Brusilov replied:

I don’t ask for anything, I don’t promise any special victories, I will be content with what I have, but the troops of the Southwestern Front will know with me that we are working for the common good and making the work of our comrades easier, giving them the opportunity to break enemy.

After Brusilov’s answer, Kuropatkin and Evert slightly modified their statements and said that “they can attack, but with the caveat that one cannot guarantee success”.

Preparing for the offensive

Immediately after the military council in Mogilev, Brusilov spoke at a meeting of the commanders of the armies of the Southwestern Front with the decision to “definitely go on the offensive in May.” However, the commander of the 7th Army, Shcherbachev, reported that at present offensive actions were very risky and undesirable. Brusilov replied that he “gathered the commanders of the armies not in order to decide the question of an active or passive course of action,” but in order to give the order to prepare for the attack. Brusilov then outlined an order of attack that was at odds with the one considered exclusively suitable for breaking through the front in trench warfare. Brusilov’s idea was to prepare one strike area in not just one, but in all armies of the Southwestern Front, including corps. In all these areas, urgently begin excavation work to get closer to the enemy. Thanks to this, the enemy will see earthworks in 20-30 places and will be deprived of the opportunity to know where the main blow will be delivered. It was decided to deliver the main blow by the 8th Army in the direction of Lutsk. The remaining armies of the front were to inflict “albeit minor, but strong blows”. Each army corps also “concentrated the greatest possible part of its artillery and reserves in some part of its combat sector” in order to “to strongly attract the attention of the troops opposing him and attach them to his sector of the front”.

Brusilov in his memoirs outlined in detail the work done by the front armies in preparation for the offensive. Thus, through reconnaissance, including aerial reconnaissance, reliable data was obtained about the enemy’s location and the construction of fortifications. It was possible to establish exactly which enemy units were in front of the troops of the Southwestern Front. Based on the totality of the collected data, it became known that the Austro-Germans were in front of the front with a force of 450 thousand rifles and 30 thousand sabers. Aerial reconnaissance photographed enemy fortified positions from airplanes:

The photographs were turned into a plan using a projection lamp and placed on the map; These maps were easily brought to the desired scale photographically. I ordered all armies to have plans of 250 fathoms per inch with all enemy positions accurately marked on them. All officers and commanders from the lower ranks were supplied with similar plans for their area.

The enemy positions consisted of three fortified strips, spaced from 3 to 5 versts from each other. Each strip consisted of at least three lines trenches spaced from each other at a distance of 150 to 300 steps. As a rule, the trenches were full profile, taller than a person, and in “heavy dugouts, shelters, fox holes, nests for machine guns, loopholes, canopies and a whole system of numerous communication passages for communication with the rear were built in abundance”. Each fortified strip was thoroughly braided with barbed wire: “a wire network stretched in front of the front, consisting of 19-21 rows of stakes. In some places there were several such stripes, at a distance of 20-50 steps from one another.”. Some areas were mined, or wires were passed through them. electric current. As Brusilov noted, the work of “the Austro-Germans to create fortifications was thorough and was carried out by the continuous labor of troops for more than nine months.” However, Brusilov was confident that the armies of the Southwestern Front had the opportunity to successfully break through the enemy’s “heavy” front using the element of “surprise”:

Based on general reconnaissance, based on the totality of all collected data, each army outlined areas for a breakthrough and presented its thoughts on the attack to my approval. When these areas were finally approved by me and the locations of the first strikes were quite accurately established, intense work began on the most thorough preparation for the attack: troops were secretly attracted to these areas, intended to break through the enemy front. However, so that the enemy could not guess our intentions in advance, the troops were located in the rear behind the battle line, but their commanders of different degrees, having plans of 250 fathoms per inch with detailed location enemy, were always in front and carefully studied the areas where they were to operate, personally became acquainted with the first line of enemy fortifications, studied the approaches to them, chose artillery positions, set up observation posts, etc.

In selected areas, infantry units carried out trench work, which allowed them to get closer to the positions of the Austro-Germans by only 200-300 steps. For the convenience of attack and the secret location of reserves, parallel rows of trenches were built, connected by communication passages.

Only a few days before the start of the offensive, the troops intended for the initial attack were quietly introduced into the battle line at night, and artillery, well camouflaged, was placed in selected positions, from which it carried out a thorough shooting at the intended targets. It was addressed great attention on the close and continuous connection of the infantry with the artillery.

Brusilov noted in his memoirs that the work of preparing for the offensive was “extremely difficult and painstaking.” The front commander, as well as the front chief of staff, General Klembovsky and other officers of the General Staff and Front Headquarters personally inspected the work being carried out, visiting positions. By May 10, 1916, the preparation of the front troops for the attack was "V general outline finished".

While the front command made every effort to prepare the troops with special care for an offensive of “grand scale,” the tsar arrived in Odessa on April 30 with his entire family to review the “Serbian division.” Brusilov was forced to leave the front headquarters and meet the emperor. With these actions the king once again confirmed the fact complete absence desire to fulfill the duties of supreme commander. He only received the report of the chief of staff and the quartermaster general on the situation at the front every day at 11 o’clock in the morning, and “this was the end of his fictitious command of troops”. The people of his retinue - “had nothing to do with the war”. According to Brusilov, the tsar was bored at Headquarters and he, “just to kill time,” tried all the time “to travel to Tsarskoe Selo, then to the front, then to different places in Russia, without any specific purpose.” And this time, as those close to him explained, “he took this trip to Odessa and Sevastopol mainly to entertain his family, who were tired of sitting in one place, in Tsarskoe Selo.” As Brusilov recalls, for several days he invariably had breakfast at the royal table in the absence of the queen. The queen did not come to the table. On the second day of his stay in Odessa, Brusilov was invited to her carriage. Alexandra Feodorovna greeted Brusilov coldly and asked if the troops were ready to go on the offensive.

I replied that it’s not quite yet, but I expect that we will defeat the enemy this year. She didn’t answer anything to this, but asked when I thought I’d go on the offensive. I reported that I did not know this yet, that it depended on the situation, which was changing rapidly, and that such information was so secret that I myself did not remember it.

She said goodbye to Brusilov dryly. Alexey Alekseevich saw her for the last time.

Offensive

On May 11, 1916, Brusilov received a telegram from the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Alekseev, which reported that the Italian troops had been defeated and were unable to hold the front. The command of the Italian troops asks the Russian armies to go on the offensive in order to pull back some of the forces. Considering the current situation, by order of the sovereign, Alekseev asked Brusilov to report on the readiness of the armies of the Southwestern Front for an offensive. Brusilov immediately replied that the front armies were ready to go on the offensive on May 19, but “On one condition, on which I especially insist, that the Western Front also move forward at the same time in order to pin down the troops positioned against him (Brusilov)”. Alekseev told Brusilov by phone that he was asking to launch the attack not on May 19, but on May 22, since Evert could launch the offensive only on June 1. Brusilov replied that he could “put up with this” provided that there were no more delays. Alekseev replied that he “guarantees.” On the evening of May 21, Alekseev told Brusilov by phone that he doubted the success “enemy attacks simultaneously in many places instead of one strike with all the assembled forces and all the artillery that I have distributed among the armies”. Alekseev conveyed the king’s desire: to change « unusual way attacks", postpone the offensive for several days in order to arrange one strike sector, as has already been developed in practice real war. Brusilov flatly refused:

I do not find it possible to postpone the day and hour of the offensive a second time, because all the troops are in the starting position for the attack, and until my orders to cancel reach the front, artillery preparation will begin. With frequent cancellations of orders, troops inevitably lose confidence in their leaders, and therefore I urgently ask you to replace me.

Alekseev replied that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had already gone to bed and it would be inconvenient to wake him up. He asked Brusilov to think. Brusilov writes in his memoirs that he was very angry at this and sharply replied: “The Supreme’s dream does not concern me, and I have nothing more to think about. I ask for an answer now." In response, Alekseev said: “Well, God be with you, do as you know, and I will report to the Emperor tomorrow about our conversation.” .

At dawn on May 22, 1916, heavy artillery fire began in selected areas of the breakthrough along the entire Southwestern Front: light artillery fire made numerous passages in the wire barriers. Heavy artillery and howitzers were tasked with destroying the trenches of the first line and suppressing enemy artillery fire. Part of the artillery, which completed its task, was supposed to transfer its fire to other targets and thereby help the infantry move forward, preventing the approach of enemy reserves with its barrage fire. Brusilov highlighted special role chief of artillery in organizing artillery fire: “like a conductor in an orchestra, he must conduct this fire” subject to the obligatory condition of uninterrupted operation telephone communication between artillery groups. Our artillery attack, Brusilov wrote, was a complete success:

In most cases, passages were made in sufficient quantity and thoroughly, and the first fortified line was completely swept away and, together with its defenders, turned into a pile of rubble and torn bodies.

However, many shelters were not destroyed. The garrison units that had taken refuge there had to surrender, since “as soon as one grenadier with a bomb in his hands stood at the exit, there was no longer any salvation, because if they refused to surrender, a grenade would be thrown inside the shelter”.

By noon on May 24, we had captured 900 officers, over 40,000 lower ranks, 77 guns, 134 machine guns and 49 bomb launchers; by May 27, we had already captured 1,240 officers, over 71,000 lower ranks and captured 94 guns, 179 machine guns, 53 bombs and mortars and a huge amount of all other military booty.

On May 24, Alekseev again conveyed to Brusilov that, due to bad weather, Evert could not attack on June 1, but would postpone his attack to June 5. Brusilov was extremely dissatisfied with Evert’s actions and asked Alekseev to confirm the transition on June 5 to the offensive by the armies of the Western Front. Alekseev replied that “there can be no doubt” about this. However, on June 5, Alekseev again told Brusilov by telephone that, according to Evert’s data, “enormous enemy forces and numerous heavy artillery have been assembled against his strike area” and an attack on the chosen location cannot be successful. Alekseev also reported that Evert received permission from the sovereign to move the attack to Baranovichi.

what I was afraid of happened, that is, that I would be abandoned without the support of my neighbors and that, thus, my successes would be limited only to a tactical victory and some advancement, which would not have any influence on the fate of the war. Inevitably, the enemy will withdraw his troops from all sides and throw them against me, and, obviously, in the end I will be forced to stop. I believe that it is impossible to fight like this and that even if the attacks of Evert and Kuropatkin were not crowned with success, the very fact of their offensive with significant forces for a more or less long time pinned the enemy’s troops against them and would not allow the sending of reserves from their fronts against my troops.

To create a new strike group with the aim of successful attack the enemy’s fortified zone, as Brusilov noted, will take at least six weeks. During this time, the armies of the Southwestern Front will suffer significant losses and may be defeated. Brusilov asked Alekseev to report to the sovereign about the need to immediately attack the enemy with Evert’s armies. Alekseev objected: “It is no longer possible to change the decisions of the Emperor”- Evert was ordered to attack the enemy at Baranovichi no later than June 20. At the same time, Alekseev assured that he would send two reinforcement corps. Brusilov replied that two corps would not be able to replace the missed attacks of Evert and Kuropatkin, and their delayed arrival would disrupt the supply of food and ammunition and allow the enemy to use a developed network railways, “bring up as many as ten corps against me, not two”. Brusilov ended the conversation with a statement that Evert’s belated attack would not help me, and “The Western Front would again fail due to lack of time to prepare an attack, and that if I had known in advance that this would be the case, I would have flatly refused to attack alone.” Brusilov understood that “The king has nothing to do with it, since in military affairs he can be considered a baby”. Alekseev perfectly understood the state of affairs and the criminality of the actions of Evert and Kuropatkin, however, as “their former subordinate during Japanese war, tried in every possible way to cover up their inaction.”

In June, when the successful actions of the South-Western Front became obvious, the Headquarters, in order to develop the offensive and seeing the passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin, began to transfer troops first from the North-Western and then from the Western Fronts. At the same time, the Headquarters persistently demanded that the Southwestern Front take Kovel, which indicated a desire to “push the Western Front, that is, Evert.” As Brusilov wrote: “The matter came down, in essence, to the destruction of the enemy’s manpower, and I hoped that I would defeat them at Kovel, and then my hands would be untied, and wherever I wanted, I would go there.”. However, I made miscalculations and mistakes:

I should not have agreed to Kaledin’s appointment as commander of the 8th Army, but insisted on my choice of Klembovsky, and I should have immediately replaced Gillenschmidt from the post of commander of the cavalry corps. Eat high probability that with such a change Kovel would have been taken immediately, at the beginning of the Kovel operation.

Brusilov noted that Kaledin’s desire “to always do everything himself, completely not trusting any of his assistants, led to the fact that he did not have time to be at all places on his large front at the same time and therefore missed a lot.”

By June 10, the troops of the Southwestern Front captured 4,013 officers and about 200 thousand soldiers. The following were captured: 219 guns, 644 machine guns, 196 bombers and mortars, 46 charging boxes, 38 searchlights, about 150 thousand rifles. On June 11, the 3rd Army of General Lesh became part of the armies of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov set the task of capturing the “Gorodok-Manevichi” area with the forces of the 3rd and 8th armies. The 7th and 9th armies of the left flank of the front continue the attack on Galich and Stanislavov. The Central 11th Army maintains its position. Taking advantage of the passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin, the Germans and Austrians brought up reserves and stopped the advance of the armies of the Southwestern Front in the Kovel and Vladimir-Volyn directions. In the Manevichi area there was a threat of an enemy attack on the right flank of the 8th Army. It was necessary decisive action reduce the enemy's Kovel-Mnevichev flank position to zero. To this end, on June 21, Lesh’s 3rd Army and Kaledin’s 8th Army moved into decisive offensive and by July 1 they gained a foothold on the Stokhod River: in many places the vanguards crossed Stokhod and gained a foothold on the left bank of the river. With this operation, the front troops strengthened their positions in Volyn and neutralized a possible threat. At this time, units of the 11th Army of General Sakharov had a very difficult time:

He was subjected to several persistent attacks by the Austro-Germans, but he repelled them all and retained the positions he occupied. I really appreciated this success, since, naturally, I directed all my reserves to the shock sectors, while Sakharov, with the defensive task given to him, had to act with a relatively small number of troops.

By July 1, the 3rd Army and the right flank of the 8th Army were strengthened on the Stokhod River. The 7th Army advanced west of the Ezerzhany-Porkhov line. The 9th Army occupied the Delatyn area. Otherwise, Brusilov wrote, the position of our armies remained unchanged. From July 1 to July 15, the 3rd and 8th armies regrouped and prepared for a further offensive in the direction of Kovel and Vladimir-Volynsky. At the same time, a guards detachment arrived, consisting of two guards corps and one guards cavalry corps. Brusilov added two army corps to the arriving units. The formation was called the “Special Army”, which entered the battle line between the 3rd and 8th armies in the direction of Kovel. At the same time, General Sakharov's 11th Army delivered three strong, short blows to the enemy. As a result of the attack, Sakharov advanced with his right flank and center to the west, occupying the line Koshev - Zvenyach - Merva - Liszniow. 34 thousand Austro-Germans, 45 guns and 71 machine guns were captured. Army actions with relatively "modest" the composition was excellent. The enemy realized that it was dangerous to withdraw his troops from the front of this army. At this time, the troops of the 7th and 9th armies regrouped to deliver a strong blow along the Dniester in the direction of Galich. On July 10, both armies were supposed to go on the offensive, but due to heavy rains that fell continuously for several days, they were forced to postpone the offensive until July 15. This pause in the actions of the armies led to the breakdown of the element of “surprise”. The enemy managed to pull his reserves into the threatened areas.

In his memoirs, Brusilov described in detail the offensive actions of the troops of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 and the coordinated interaction of Shcherbachev, Lechitsky (commander of the 9th Army), Sakharov, Lesh and Kaledin, as well as the excellent use of artillery with “transfer of fire” and coordination of its work With offensive actions infantry, subject to the obligatory condition of stable functioning of telephone communication lines. Brusilov especially noted the role of sanitary trains and mobile baths, sapper troops and personally the actions of the military engineer General Velichko in the construction of engineering fortifications of the front line and crossings. However, all this turned out to be insufficient for final victory over the enemy. The “treacherous” passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin took its toll. In his memoirs, Brusilov cites the memories of the commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front, General Ragoza. The 4th Army was entrusted with the task of attacking the enemy’s fortified position at Molodechno. The preparation for the attack was excellent, and Ragosa was convinced of victory. He and the troops were shocked by the cancellation of the long-prepared offensive. Ragoza went to front headquarters for clarification. Evert said that this was the will of the Emperor. Brusilov writes that gossip subsequently reached him that Evert allegedly once said: “Why on earth would I work for the glory of Brusilov?” .

If there had been another Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Evert would have been immediately removed and replaced accordingly for such indecisiveness, but Kuropatkin would not have been under any circumstances. active army I wouldn't get any position. But under the regime that existed at that time, there was complete impunity in the army, and both continued to be the favorite military leaders of Headquarters.

Results of the offensive

The Austrians stopped their attack on Italy and went on the defensive. Italy was freed from enemy invasion. The pressure on Verdun decreased, as the Germans were forced to withdraw some of their divisions for transfer to the Southwestern Front. By July 30, 1916, the operation of the armies of the Southwestern Front “to capture a winter, extremely strongly fortified enemy position, considered by our enemies to be absolutely impregnable,” ended. Part of Eastern Galicia and all of Bukovina were re-conquered. The immediate result of these successful actions was Romania's exit from neutrality and its accession to the Entente countries. Brusilov wrote in his memoirs:

It must be admitted that the preparation for this operation was exemplary, which required the full effort of commanders of all levels. Everything was thought out and everything was done in a timely manner. This operation also proves that the opinion, which for some reason spread in Russia, that after the failures of 1915 the Russian army had already collapsed is wrong: in 1916 it was still strong and, of course, combat-ready, because it defeated a much stronger enemy and achieved such successes , which no army had had before that time.

By the end of October 1916, hostilities ended. From the offensive of May 20 to November 1, 1916, the troops of the Southwestern Front captured more than 450 thousand officers and soldiers, “that is, as many as at the beginning of the offensive, according to all the fairly accurate information we had, there were enemy troops in front of me”. During the same time, the enemy lost over 1.5 million killed and wounded. By November 1916, over a million Austro-Germans and Turks stood before the Southwestern Front. Brusilov concludes: “Consequently, in addition to the 450,000 people who were initially in front of me, over 2,500,000 fighters were transferred from other fronts against me” and further:

From this it is clearly clear that if other fronts were moving and did not allow the possibility of transferring troops against the armies entrusted to me, I would have every opportunity to move far to the west and powerfully influence both strategically and tactically on the enemy facing our Western Front. With a friendly influence on the enemy, our three fronts were full opportunity- even with those insufficient technical means, which we possessed in comparison with the Austro-Germans, to throw all their armies far to the west. But everyone understands that the troops that have begun to retreat lose heart, their discipline is upset, and it is difficult to say where and how these troops will stop and in what order they will be. There was every reason to believe that a decisive turn in the campaign along our entire front would be made in our favor, that we would emerge victorious, and there was a possibility that the end of our war would be significantly accelerated with fewer casualties.

Family

General Brusilov owned the Moscow region noble estate Glebovo-Brusilovo.

Memoirs

Brusilov left behind a memoir entitled “My Memoirs,” dedicated primarily to his service in Tsarist and Soviet Russia. The second volume of Brusilov's memoirs was transferred to the Russian emigrant archive in 1932 by his widow N.V. Brusilova-Zhelikhovskaya, who went abroad after the death of her husband. It touches on the description of his life after the October Revolution and is strongly anti-Bolshevik in nature. This part of the memories was dictated by Brusilov to his wife during treatment in Karlovy Vary in 1925 and left for storage in Prague. According to the will, it was subject to publication only after the death of the author.

After 1945, the manuscript of the second volume was transferred to the USSR. Its authenticity is indicated by the actions of the USSR leadership to consign the name of A. A. Brusilov to oblivion. The sharply negative assessment of the Bolshevik regime in the second volume led to the fact that in 1948 the publication of the collection “A. A. Brusilov" and his name was removed from the guidebook of the Central State Military Archive:

The manuscript of “Memoirs,” which we received in the archive, written by the hand of Brusilov’s wife (N. Brusilova) and signed by A. Brusilov himself during his and his wife’s stay in Carlsbad in 1925, contains sharp attacks against the Bolshevik party, personally against V. I. Lenin and other party leaders (Dzerzhinsky), against Soviet power and Soviet people, leaving no doubt about the double-dealing of General Brusilov and his counter-revolutionary views, which did not leave him until his death.

Soviet editions of “Memoirs” (1929; Voenizdat: 1941, 1943, 1946, 1963, 1983) do not include the 2nd volume, the authorship of which, according to a number of Soviet scientists, belonged to Brusilov’s widow Brusilova-Zhelikhovskaya, who thus tried to justify her husband before white emigration, and the 1st volume was censored in places where Brusilov touched upon ideological issues. Currently, a complete edition of the memoirs of A. A. Brusilov has been published.

Military ranks

• Lieutenant - April 2, 1874
• Staff Captain - October 29, 1877
• Captain - December 15, 1881, renamed captain - August 18, 1882
• Lieutenant Colonel - February 9, 1890
• Colonel - August 30, 1892
• Major General - May 6, 1900, birthday of Nicholas II
• Lieutenant General - December 6, 1906, the name day of Nicholas II
• General of the Cavalry - December 6, 1912, the name day of Nicholas II

Retinue rank

• Adjutant General - April 10, 1915

Awards

Russian:

• Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd class with swords and bow (01/01/1878)
• Order of St. Anne, 3rd class with swords and bow (03/16/1878)
• Order of St. Stanislaus, 2nd class with swords (09/03/1878)
• Order of St. Anne, 2nd degree (03.10.1883) - “awarded outside the rules for distinguished service”
• Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree (12/06/1895, name day of Nicholas II)
• Bukhara Order of Noble Bukhara, 2nd degree (1896)
• Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd degree (12/06/1898, name day of Nicholas II)
• Order of St. Stanislaus, 1st degree (12/06/1903, name day of Nicholas II)
• Order of St. Anne, 1st degree (12/06/1909, name day of Nicholas II)
• Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd degree (03/16/1913)
• Order of St. George, 4th degree (08/23/1914) - “for battles with the Austrians, the result of which was the capture of the city of Galich on August 21st”
• Order of St. George, 3rd degree (09/18/1914) - “for repelling attacks on the Gorodok position from the 24th to the 30th of last August”
• Order of the White Eagle with Swords (01/10/1915)
• St. George's weapon (Vys. Ave. 10/27/1915)

Brusilov Alexey Alekseevich was a hereditary military man. Born August 19 (31), 1853 in the family of a Russian general. Father - Alexey Nikolaevich, mother - Maria-Louise Antonovna, Polish by origin. At the age of 6, Brusilov was left an orphan, and received his first education in his uncle’s house.

At the age of 14, Alexey Alekseevich entered the third grade of the Corps of Pages. In the Corps of Pages it was fundamental quality education, here a number of generally accepted disciplines were studied in depth. The teachers of the Corps of Pages were true professionals in their field.

Five years later, in 1872, Alexey was released from the Corps of Pages. He began his service in the Tver Dragoon Regiment, which was located near Kutaisi. He arrived in the regiment with the rank of warrant officer and was appointed junior platoon officer of one of the squadrons. He soon became a lieutenant, and two years later he was appointed adjutant of the regiment.

In September 1876, the Tver Dragoon Regiment was ordered to move to the Russian army camp on the Russian-Turkish border. Brusilov had to work hard; by the nature of his service, he was preparing four squadrons, a non-combatant company and a regimental convoy for the campaign.

For bravery during the next Russian-Turkish war he was awarded the order St. Stanislaus of the 3rd degree, as well as. In addition, he received a new rank of staff captain.

When Alexey Alekseevich returned to his regiment, he was asked to undergo officer training cavalry school. The purpose of the study was to improve the officer's qualifications. In 1881 he arrived in St. Petersburg and soon began his studies. IN new school Brusilov was almost the youngest student.

In July 1914, the Allied armies were ready for large-scale military operations. Opponents of the Entente aimed their main forces at striking France and Belgium. Against Russia, the German leadership fielded only one army in East Prussia and one building in Silesia. But Austro - Hungarian Army, almost entirely stood at the borders of the Russian Empire.

The General Staff of the Russian Army planned an immediate offensive of the Russian armies against Prussia and Galicia. On July 18, Brusilov returned from vacation to Vinnitsa, where mobilization had already been announced. The next day, Germany declared war on Russia.

The start was unsuccessful for Russia. The Russians carried huge losses. After an unsuccessful operation in the North - Eastern Front, the Russian army had to switch to positional warfare, for which the army was completely unprepared. In 1915, the situation changed little; the Germans, albeit slowly, moved forward. IN next year The army system was completely reformed. Reinforcements arrived at the front, and supply disruptions stopped.

A large-scale offensive by the Russian army was scheduled for 1916. On March 17, General Brusilov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian troops on the Southwestern Front. He reported to Nicholas II that the Russian army was rested and ready to move on to decisive military action. The general's offensive on the Southwestern Front went down in history as "". During the three days of the offensive, which began in May, the front was broken through 25-30 versts, and the length of the breakthrough was 70-80 kilometers.

Soon mass unrest began in St. Petersburg. Belatedly, news of numerous spontaneous rallies, strikes and other outrages reached headquarters. Brusilov turned to Nicholas II with a proposal to abdicate the throne. Having lost, I will support Alexei Alekseevich, popular in the army and the people, from the throne. After some time, a provisional government came to power, to which Brusilov swore allegiance. Discord began in the army, soldiers left their positions, fled home, and demanded peace with Germany.

After the events of October, Alexey Brusilov held a good position in the Red Army, which actively recruited former tsarist officers into the service. He was the chairman of the Special Meeting under the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the Republic, Kamenev. The life of Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov was cut short at the age of 73 of his most interesting earthly path. He caught a cold and died on March 17, 1926..

The future hero of the First World War was born in the city of Tiflis on August 19, 1853 in the family of Russian Army General Alexei Nikolaevich Brusilov. His father, in his youth, with the rank of major, as commander of a squadron of a cuirassier regiment, participated in the war with Napoleon. At the time of the birth of his eldest son Alexei, he was 66 years old. As a hereditary nobleman Alexey Brusilov, having received good home education, easily entered the senior courses of the Corps of Pages, which he graduated in 1872 with the rank of ensign. In 1877-1878, Brusilov, as part of the 16th Tver Dragoon Regiment, took part in hostilities in the Caucasus during the Russian-Turkish War. For the courage shown during the capture of Ardahan and Kars, he received the Order of St. Stanislav, 2nd and 3rd degrees, and the Order of St. Anne, 3rd degree. In 1881 he entered the St. Petersburg Officers' Cavalry School, which he graduated from in 1883 and was enrolled as an adjutant. Over the next 25 years he made a career in it and in 1902 became head of the school, holding the rank of major general. He was widely known as one of the best experts in cavalry riding, and the school he led became a recognized center for training senior officers for the cavalry. In 1906, Brusilov returned to combat service, becoming commander of the 2nd Guards cavalry division. Such a fast career became possible thanks to proximity to the highest circles of society from the king’s entourage. But he was burdened by service in the capital, left the guard and in 1909 was transferred to the Warsaw district as commander of the 14th army corps.

In 1912, Brusilov was appointed assistant to the commander of the Warsaw District troops, but due to a conflict with the Governor-General and his entourage, he did not stay in this position for long.

General Brusilov during the First World War.

In 1913, Brusilov was transferred to the Kiev Military District as commander of the 12th Army Corps with promotion to cavalry general. In this position he met the beginning of the World War. During the mobilization, General Brusilov is appointed to the post of commander of the 8th Army, which, as part of the Southwestern Front, is sent to the theater of military operations in Galicia. The Battle of Galicia began there - the largest and most successful strategic operation Russian troops, in which the 8th Army played decisive role. For two months in several battles Austrian army was defeated, losing about 400 thousand people. Almost all of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina were captured, including the cities of Lviv and Galich. During the Battle of Galicia, Brusilov showed himself as a master of maneuver warfare and for the successful leadership of the actions of the 8th Army he was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th and 3rd degrees, and at the beginning of 1915 he was included in the imperial retinue with the rank of general. adjutant.

In March 1916, Brusilov was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front, whose troops began offensive operation, known as " Brusilovsky breakthrough" This was the last one successful operation Russian troops. For its implementation, he was awarded the golden Arms of St. George with diamonds. During February Revolution, supported the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne and became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, but a little later, disappointed, he resigned and until 1920 lived as a private citizen in Moscow. His son voluntarily joined the Red Army and died in 1919 on the Denikin front. In 1920, Brusilov himself joined the Red Army and published an appeal “To all former officers"with a call to go over to the side Soviet power. From 1922 until his death in 1926, Brusilov served as the chief cavalry inspector of the Red Army. Was the most authoritative tsarist general who went over to the side of Soviet power.

Brusilov Alexey Alekseevich (1853-1926), Russian military leader, cavalry general (1912).

Born on August 31, 1853 in Tiflis (now Tbilisi) into a noble family. He graduated from the Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg and in 1872 was accepted into service as an ensign in the 15th Tver Dragoon Regiment. As a cavalryman he participated in Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 on the Caucasian front.

In 1881-1906. served in the officer cavalry school, where he successively held positions from riding instructor to head of the school. In 1906-1912. commanded various military units. At the beginning of the First World War, he was appointed commander of the 8th Army, in March 1916 he took the post of commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front and became one of the best commanders.

The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front in 1916, which brought the Russian army the greatest success in the war, went down in history as the Brusilov breakthrough, but this brilliant maneuver was not received strategic development. After the February Revolution of 1917, Brusilov, as a supporter of continuing the war to a victorious end, was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but due to the failure of the June offensive and the order to suppress calls for non-execution of military orders, he was replaced by L. G. Kornilov.

In August 1917, when Kornilov moved part of his troops to Petrograd with the aim of introducing a military dictatorship, Brusilov refused to support him. During the fighting in Moscow, Brusilov was wounded in the leg by a shell fragment and was ill for a long time.

Despite his arrest by the Cheka in 1918, he refused to join White movement and from 1920 he began to serve in the Red Army. Headed a Special Meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces RSFSR, which developed recommendations for strengthening the Red Army. From 1921 he was chairman of the commission for organizing pre-conscription cavalry training, and from 1923 he was attached to the Revolutionary Military Council to carry out particularly important assignments.