In October 1939, secret negotiations took place between Stalin and Hitler, the sole masters of the two strongest countries in Europe, whose borders began to rapidly expand. Less than a month had passed since the defeat of Poland and it was necessary to find out the ally’s reaction to the immediate plans and get the maximum possible support or even help. Hitler was in a more difficult foreign policy situation; moreover, he was at war with two Great Powers. Therefore, the initiative to hold the meeting came from him.
Only a month has passed, during which Poland was defeated, and Ribbentrop again asks Molotov for an audience; the pretext is vague - working out the question of Poland.
On the evening of September 27, 1939, Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow, was immediately received by Molotov and talked with him from 10 pm to 3.30 am. Stalin was present at this conversation for two hours. On the morning of September 28, negotiations, the contents of which were kept strictly secret, continued. Returning to Berlin on September 29, Ribbentrop immediately went to see Hitler and had a long conversation with him in private.

Europe in 1940.

The mystery of Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow is only now becoming clearer. It appears that the Reich Minister was discussing with the Soviet leadership the final details of Stalin's personal meeting with Hitler. Many sources indicate that such a meeting was supposed to take place, and various dates for this meeting were also named. Today it is possible to give precise answers to these questions: correspondence between Stalin and the German Ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, has been found.

Ref. No. 960 of September 3, 1939 .

I agree in principle to meet with Mr. Adolf Hitler. I will always be glad to see this meeting. I entrusted the organization of the meeting to my People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade. Beria.

Sincerely, I. Stalin.

Schulenburg notified Hitler of Stalin's agreement to meet. There is a note about this on the copy of the letter: “At 17:10. Moscow time time on September 9, 1939, the 2nd Secretary of the German Embassy in the USSR called and asked to convey Comrade. Molotov that Mr. Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler’s message to Comrade. I got Stalin.” Then another letter followed.

To the German Ambassador to the USSR Count Werner von der Schulenburg
Ref. No. 1001 of September 20, 1939

Inform the Reich Chancellor of Germany Adolf Hitler that I will be ready to meet him personally 17, 18 and 19 November 1939 in Lvov. I would have expected to arrive on a special train and hold the meeting in my carriage.

Sincerely, I. Stalin.

Stalin's carriage in the museum of the city of Gori.

In the margins of the surviving copy is a note from an NKVD employee who, apparently, was in touch with the German Embassy in the USSR and wrote down the response of the German ambassador: “Not November, better October, because Mr. Adolf Hitler may have a free week in October, but the numbers can be left the same. Please convey to Comrade Molotov, September 26, 1939.” The date says that Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow the next day was apparently connected with the details of the upcoming meeting and the timing. Stalin's third letter followed.

To the German Ambassador to the USSR Count Werner von der Schulenburg
Ref. No. 1037 of October 11, 1939

I ask you to finally consider the time of the meeting 17, 18 and 19 October 1939, not 17-19 November, as previously planned. My train will arrive at the meeting point at 15 hours 30 minutes October 17, 1939 The NKVD authorities have taken all measures to ensure the safety of the planned event.

Sincerely, I. Stalin.

Below is a confirmation received from the German Embassy in the USSR: “For Molotov. The information has not changed. Everything remains unchanged.” There were no obstacles to the meeting of the leaders of the two great powers of Europe...

But establishing the fact and date of the meeting, alas, does not shed any light on the content of the negotiations that took place. One can only guess about it by the nature of previous and subsequent events. The month that passed after the surrender of Poland required important decisions from Hitler. Although England and France, which declared war on Germany immediately after its attack on Poland, did not conduct active hostilities, Hitler was worried that these countries were at war with him. On October 6, 1939, speaking in the Reichstag, he made it clear to the world that he was ready to make peace with them. But Daladier and Chamberlain rejected his peace proposals on October 7 and 12, respectively. Anticipating a refusal, Hitler on October 10 familiarized the generals with Directive No. 6 to continue the war in the West.

Office in Stalin's carriage.

At the same time, he was bluffing: he did not have the resources necessary to wage such a war. And he could only get them from Russia, which was ready to supply them in exchange for German technology, specialized equipment and samples of the latest weapons. The fact that an agreement was reached with Stalin is evidenced by a curious coincidence. On October 27, 1939, Hitler ordered his generals to be ready to begin fighting in the West on November 12. And on the same day, October 27, I. Tevosyan’s economic mission, consisting of specialists from the defense commissariats, arrived in Berlin. After inspecting German factories, shipyards and new models of military equipment, two new agreements were concluded between the USSR and Germany on February 11, 1940 and January 10, 1941, according to which the Soviet Union, among other things, received drawings and samples of the latest German combat aircraft, artillery pieces, tanks, tractors and even the entire heavy cruiser “Lutzow”! Although the Chief of the General Staff Ground Forces Germany F. Halder wrote in his diary that the cruiser "Lutzow" has significant design flaws. In the Soviet Union it was renamed first to Petropavlovsk and then, in 1944, to Tallinn.

It was not for nothing that there were rumors then that Ribbentrop, who had arranged a meeting between the two leaders, Soviet side was awarded the Order of Lenin! (German Nazarov “But the meeting still took place!”)

American intelligence agencies, as it turned out, were also not asleep. Look at this report sent in hot pursuit: "July 19, 1940. Personally and confidentially to the respected Adolf Berl Jr., Assistant Secretary of State... According to just received information from a confidential source of information, after the German and Russian invasion of Poland and its partition Hitler and Stalin met secretly in Lvov on October 17, 1939. In these secret negotiations, Hitler and Stalin signed a contract. military agreement to replace the exhausted pact... Sincerely yours, J. Edgar Hoover."
The document was signed by the famous long-time FBI chief.

And here is what Edward Radzinsky wrote in his famous book “Stalin”. Chapter 20. " Great dream".
In 1972, in Lvov, an old railway worker told me about the train that arrived in the city in October 1939, about the guards who did not let anyone into the station square, about the stopped movement of trains. He even remembered the date - October 16th.

Lvovsky railway station.

“I understood that it was unlikely that it would be possible to verify this - undoubtedly, all documents, all traces of this meeting should be carefully destroyed by Stalin. And I decided to turn to an unexpected source - Stalin’s Visitor Register, its pages for October 1939...
No, on October 16, Stalin was in his office in Moscow. And on October 17th he has - long list visitors. I was about to leave my job, but I still looked at October 18... There was no reception on that day! Stalin did not appear in the Kremlin! And it was not a day off, a regular working day is Thursday.
So, on October 18 he is not in the Kremlin! He was absent all day on October 19 and only late in the evening at 20:25 he returned to his office and began to receive visitors.
I knew the style of his tireless, hard-drinking work. He was a typical workaholic, and this absence in the middle of the working week (Saturday was also a working day then) could only happen in two cases: either he was very ill, or... absent in Moscow.
The list of his visitors on the eve of this mysterious absence is also interesting. Together with the members of the Politburo come Voroshilov, Zhukov, Kulik, Kuznetsov, Isakov - all the leaders of the army and navy. But the longest-serving person in his office that day was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov.
No, the Master was not sick. Most likely, something very important happened during his absence, because, according to the Journal, on October 19, when he reappears in the Kremlin, there is a face-to-face meeting with the second man in the state, Molotov, until midnight. At the same time, during their conversation, the same Zhukov and functionary number three - Kaganovich - are called into the office...
Did this meeting really happen? Secret meeting of the century! How can you write it! They sat opposite each other - Leaders, earthly gods, so similar and so different. They swore eternal friendship, shared the world, and each thought how he would deceive the other..."

The pact that changed the course of history Najafov Vladimir Guseinovich

Chapter 14. Secret meeting of Stalin and Hitler in Lvov on October 17, 1939? In the footsteps of an archival document from the US FBI

In the footsteps of an archival document from the US FBI

Stalin was the greatest conspirator.

V.M. Molotov

One more reason in order to try to understand everything current topic motives and goals foreign policy Stalin's Soviet Union in World War II, became identified by me in National Archives US document about allegedly took place in October 1939 secret meeting between Stalin and Hitler This is a “personal and confidential” letter sent by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover to US Assistant Secretary of State A. Berle on July 19, 1940.

Here is this short document:

“Dear Mr. Berle, According to information just received from a confidential source, after the German and Russian invasion and partition of Poland, Hitler and Stalin met secretly in Lvov, Poland on October 17, 1939. It is believed that other governments are still in the dark about the meeting. At these secret negotiations, Hitler and Stalin reportedly signed a military agreement to replace the defunct non-aggression pact. It is also reported that on October 28, 1939, Stalin made a report to members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, informing seven members of the said bureau about the details of his negotiations with Hitler. I thought , that this information is of interest to you” (829).

There are two stamps on the document: the Assistant Secretary of State with the date July 23, 1940 and the European Division of the US State Department dated July 25, 1940. There are marks relating both to the time of origin of the document and to a later time - in the latter case mark indicating its declassification in December 1979 - January 1980. The word “seven” (members of the Politburo) is underlined in ink, and on the side, in the margin, is written in hand: “According to our information, at that time there were 9 members and 2 candidates in the Politburo as a member" and signed: "E. Page" (3rd Secretary of the US Embassy in the USSR in 1935, 1937–1938, employee of the European Department of the State Department in 1938–1942).

The addressee of the FBI letter is Harvard graduate, Columbia University law professor A. Berle Jr., who was part of F. Roosevelt’s “brains trust” during the 1932 presidential campaign and was appointed by him in early 1938 as Assistant Secretary of State of the United States.

Having provided the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper with a photocopy of this document with my comments in November 1990 (830), I, of course, understood the low likelihood of such a meeting. It was believed that the discovered document could well be from a series of “disinformation material” well known in the historiography of the Second World War strategic purpose" But he could not help but take into account the fact that he left the department of E. Hoover, the highly experienced head of the FBI, who at that time was also endowed with intelligence functions. (Before the war, the United States did not yet have the current extensive intelligence service carried out by the CIA). He concluded his comments on the publication with the conclusion that the document needs confirmation using materials from the most secret Soviet archives. There has never been such documentary evidence. Although in 1999 an article by G.A. Nazarov under the loud title “But the meeting still took place!” with links to archival documents of dubious nature, but more on them later.

In my comments on the publication of the FBI document by the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, I drew the attention of readers to the speech at the session of the Supreme Council of the USSR on October 31, 1939 by the head of the Soviet government V.M. Molotov, which stood out for its harsh anti-Western and openly pro-German tone. On one occasion, he spoke about relations between the USSR and Germany that “enmity ... was replaced by rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations” between the two countries. In another, about the onset of “the last decisive turn in political relations” between them. Another one says that “a sharp turn in the relations between Soviet Union and Germany...could not but affect the entire international situation.”

Anticipating and, as it were, preparing Stalin’s definition of the new Soviet-German relations as “friendship sealed by blood” (from Stalin’s response telegram to I. Ribbentrop on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet leader (831)),

V.M. Molotov extolled the common victory of Germany and the USSR over Poland, for which, as he put it, “a short blow to Poland from the side was sufficient.” German army, and then - the Red Army, so that nothing remains of this ugly brainchild of the Treaty of Versailles...”

Shielding Nazi Germany, which unleashed general war in Europe, V.M. Molotov said: “Now... Germany is in the position of a state striving for a speedy end to the war and for peace, while England and France, which only yesterday stood up against aggression, stand for the continuation of the war and against the conclusion of peace.”

And finally, to Western countries: “... it is not only senseless, but also criminal to wage a war for the “destruction of Hitlerism”, hiding behind the false flag of the struggle for democracy” (832).

I also referred, among other things, to the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, who had the opportunity (as Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army) to closely observe Stalin in the days leading up to Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. In his “Memoirs and Reflections,” Zhukov wrote about his firm conviction: Stalin was confident that he it will be possible to avoid a war with Hitler (833). If this is so, what gave Stalin such confidence? According to the logic of things, it was said in my comments to the publication in the newspaper, Stalin could have been given confidence by something not known to the world, but only he knows is a secret agreement with Hitler. This is the agreement that was mentioned in the American archival document. In this case, the persistence with which, after the start of the Soviet-German war, he repeated again and again with undisguised resentment towards his ex-partner that Germany "flagrantly violated the non-aggression pact" and carried out a "surprise", treacherous attack. Estimates made by Stalin personally while he was editing his “ Brief biography"in 1947 (834) It also seemed strange to me that after the capture of Berlin he wanted to hide from the world the fact of the death and burial of Hitler’s corpse.

An important argument for me in favor of publishing the FBI document, no matter how suspicious it may seem, was the secrecy that accompanied Soviet-German relations both before and at the beginning of World War II. “Stalin and Molotov,” wrote A.N. Yakovlev in an analytical note to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - shrouded in impenetrable secrecy the contacts, and then the negotiations that were conducted with Germany" (835).

It is worth recalling how both the Soviet and German sides carried through the entire Second World War the secret of the secret additional protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939. During the war with the USSR, I. Ribbentrop, Hitler’s foreign minister, who signed together with V.M. Molotov's non-aggression pact, ordered the destruction of the secret protocol and its copies; miraculously the protocol in German was preserved in a photocopy. At the Nuremberg trial of German war criminals, the Stalinist leadership took all measures to ensure that no issues related to bilateral Soviet-German relations at the first stage of the world war (1939–1941) surfaced there, when these relations were characterized only by “ friendly." And what does the fact indicate that for the first time in our country, recognition of the signing of the secret protocol to the 1939 non-aggression pact occurred only half a century later, in 1989, in connection with the work of the Congress people's deputies USSR? And what about the Soviet tradition of concealing the political background of the Soviet-German Pact, which continues to this day? And what about the information that appears again and again about the correspondence between Stalin and Hitler before the Soviet-German war? I mean, for example, the publication of one of these letters by an official body - “ Russian newspaper" Federal issue No. 4688 of June 20, 2008. The list of remaining “blank spots” in the history of relations between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany does not end there.

What is the most dubious thing about the FBI document? In particular, the reference to the Politburo meeting on October 28, 1939 with Stalin’s speech to its members appears controversial. Firstly, Stalin occupied such a position in the country's leadership that it is difficult to imagine him reporting to the Politburo, with which he no longer had much regard. Secondly, the very fact of holding a Politburo meeting on this day is in question. As for the mention in the Politburo protocols of its decisions for this date (paragraphs 160–169), it has now been established quite definitely that such decisions were formalized retroactively, without formally convening meetings. And, of course, in these paragraphs there is no mention of a secret meeting (836). Let us add that according to Protocol No. 8 of Politburo decisions, between October 10 and October 29 they were adopted daily (837).

My attempt to add information about E. Hoover’s letter from the FBI archives failed. While in Washington (March 1995), he asked the FBI Information Department about materials related to the discovered document (source of receipt, etc.). An official response came that appropriate searches were underway in the FBI Central Catalog. A repeated response, received already in Moscow, stated that the search had yielded nothing, but stipulated my right (limited to 30 days that had elapsed by the time the response was received) to an additional request. There was no opportunity to continue the search, covering the papers of A. Berle (the addressee of the document), stored in the F. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York).

Now about publications that contain indirect confirmation of the FBI document.

In E. Radzinsky's book about Stalin, the FBI document is supplemented by the testimony of an old railway worker about a mysterious train that arrived in Lvov on October 16, 1939, to which the guards did not allow anyone to approach, and about the stopped movement of trains. It seems appropriate, too, for the author’s discussion of the entries in Stalin’s Visitor Register relating to several days in mid-October (838).

In light of the identified FBI document, some evidence that is not clearly interpreted deserves attention. For example, in “One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov,” the writer F. Chuev asked the latter whether Stalin had met Hitler. Molotov's answer: “No, I was the only one who had such pleasure.” And again: “Only I dealt with him” (recordings 1984–1985) (839). But could such a question arise out of the blue? As for Molotov’s refutation, he even more resolutely denied the fact that he had signed the secret protocol to the 1939 pact (840), as well as repeated rumors that there was a war between Stalin and Hitler secret correspondence {841} .

But it was carried out! The publication of one of the letters by an official government body (“Rossiyskaya Gazeta”) has already been mentioned above. This correspondence was mentioned by Marshal G.M. Zhukov (842), and D.A. Volkogonov, the author of a biography of Stalin, spoke confidently of “a whole series of letters exchanged between Stalin and Hitler” (843). It is believed that in total from October 1940 to May 1941, Hitler sent 6 personal letters to Stalin. We managed to find two. The remaining letters have not yet been discovered. Stalin's answers have not yet been discovered, although where they are stored is known (844). Relatively recently, M. Zakharov, a long-term theater director Lenkom, who has repeatedly demonstrated his awareness of the intricacies of our modern socio-political life, wondered when the secrecy stamp would be removed from the letters exchanged between Stalin and Hitler (845). Apparently not soon, given the pro-Stalinist sentiments in the country.

The authors of a number of publications on historical topics write about the correspondence between Stalin and Hitler. One of them is the American author D. Murphy, a former professional intelligence officer. In the appendix to his book entitled “What Stalin Knew. The riddle of “Barbarossa” (846) contains two letters from Hitler to Stalin (now known on the Internet). In one of them, in a letter dated May 14, 1941, that is, shortly before Germany attacked the USSR, Hitler swears “on the honor of the head of state” that all his thoughts are directed against England, while simultaneously calling for “consolidation of the union socialist countries" (847) . As is known, the common interests of two states, the USSR and Germany, as opponents of Versailles, in the struggle against the countries of the democratic West were reflected in the line of Soviet-German treaties in Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926). The second treaty, the Berlin Treaty, was extended under Hitler in 1933. Both treaties were considered indefinite.

It appears, write K. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, co-authors of a book on the history of the KGB, that the secret negotiations that paved the way for the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 “were channeled through the NKVD rather than through diplomacy” (848). And not through channels foreign intelligence, as can be judged from the memoirs of P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German direction since March 1939 Soviet intelligence. He writes that he was “surprised” to learn about I. Ribbentrop’s arrival in Moscow to sign the pact just a few hours before this event (just as he knew nothing about the secret protocol) (849). Apparently, even the ubiquitous Soviet intelligence was not aware of Stalin’s secrets. In a personal conversation with me

A.N. Yakovlev said that after my publication appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda in November 1990, he, as a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, made a request (without specifying where) about the reality of the secret Stalin-Hitler meeting, to which a negative answer was received.

One cannot ignore the article by G.A. Nazarova "A the meeting did take place!”, which cites Stalin’s “correspondence” with German Ambassador F.-V. Schulenburg about preparing a meeting with Hitler. In the same place and on the same date as in the FBI document.

This is the “correspondence”:

I I agree in principle to meet with Mr. Adolf Hitler. I will always be glad to see this meeting. I entrusted the organization of the meeting to my People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade. Beria.

Sincerely.

I. Stalin.

The fact that the German ambassador notified Berlin of Stalin's agreement to meet with Hitler is allegedly evidenced by a note on a copy of the letter: at 17:10 According to wash time, on September 9, 1939, the 2nd Secretary of the German Embassy in the USSR called and asked to convey Comrade. Molotov that Mr. Adolf Hitler’s message to Comrade. I received Stalin.

Then a new letter allegedly followed:

To the German Ambassador to the USSR, Count Werner von der Schulenburg.

Inform the German Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler that I will be ready to meet with him personally on November 17, 18 and 19, 1939 in Lvov. I would have expected to arrive on a special train and hold the meeting in my carriage.

Sincerely.

I. Stalin.

It is as if a copy of the document preserved a note from an NKVD officer who kept in touch with the German Embassy and recorded the ambassador’s response: not November , better October , because Mister Adolf Hitler may have a free week in October, the dates can be left the same. Please convey to Comrade Molotov. September 26, 1939

The author of the article associates this date of Ambassador Schulenburg’s response with the arrival in Moscow the next day of I. Ribbentrop, with whom the Treaty of Friendship and Border between Germany and the USSR was signed on September 28.

There was allegedly a third letter from Stalin to the German ambassador:

To the German Ambassador to the USSR Count Werner von der Schulenburg

I ask you to finally consider the meeting time to be October 17, 18 and 19, 1939, and not November 17–19, as previously planned. My train will arrive at the meeting point at 15:30. October 17, 1939 The NKVD authorities took all measures to ensure the safety of the planned event.

WITH respect.

Clearly, I could not ignore G.A.’s article. Nazarova. The editor of the entertainment magazine “Miracles and Adventures,” in which his article was published, responded to my telephone request that the magazine’s editors do not check the accuracy of the information of its authors. Gave little and lasted telephone conversation with Nazarov himself. According to him, he discovered Stalin’s correspondence with the German Ambassador F. Schulenburg (in a copy) quite by accident, while working in the Presidential Archive on a different topic. He could not answer my question satisfactorily about the output of the case where he discovered the correspondence. So we were unable to find out anything additional or convincing.

Then I contacted the Presidential Archives, providing a photocopy of G.A.’s article. Nazarov with a request to confirm or refute the information given in it. An official response was received stating that there were no materials in the archive about Stalin’s correspondence with F. Schulenburg (as well as confirmation of the agreement between the NKVD and the Gestapo cited in Nazarov’s article). In a conversation with me, the employee of the Presidential Archive, responsible for its work, said that Nazarov did not work in their archive at all.

Now let's turn to that part of the FBI document where it says that at a secret meeting Stalin and Hitler signed a military agreement to replace the exhausted non-aggression pact.

Yes, if you consider Soviet-German pact about non-aggression at the angle of its nearest and immediate goal, specified in the additional secret protocol - “on the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe” (850), then in a purely practical sense it has exhausted itself. The intention of the parties to finally decide the fate of Poland “in the manner of friendly mutual consent” was realized by the Treaty “On Friendship and Borders”, signed on September 28, 1939 (851) Two Soviet-German treaties from August-September 1939, concluded with an interval of one month, had a common pragmatic goal - the settlement of bilateral relations through territorial demarcation in Eastern Europe.

Remained, however, no less unresolved important question- about the attitude towards the ongoing war in Western Europe, a question that went beyond the scope of both treaties. The parties tried to solve this problem during I. Ribbentrop’s visit to Moscow by adopting a joint statement dated September 28, 1939, in which they called on England and France to come to terms with the fact that the USSR and Germany had “finally settled” issues related to Poland and agree to conclusion of peace. If the war continued, they decided to consult each other “about the necessary measures” (852). I. Ribbentrop, before leaving Moscow (after the signing of the second Soviet-German treaty), clarified that if England and France refused to end the war, “Germany and the USSR will know how to respond to this” (853). Doesn't this mean some kind of, albeit preliminary, agreement between the parties on the nature of their response?

The statement issued in Moscow was perceived by contemporaries as a request for further rapprochement between the USSR and Germany as opposed to England and France. On the day the joint Soviet-German statement was published, the American correspondent in Berlin, W. Shirer, wrote in his diary that this “may mean that Russia is entering the war on the side of Germany” (854). Almost immediately, the newspaper Pravda, reporting on the responses of the foreign press to the results of the Moscow negotiations, highlighted the opinion of the leading German newspaper Völkischer Beobachter, which wrote: let the people of France and England now decide whether they want peace or war (855). However, England and France immediately rejected the Soviet-German peace terms dictated to them. What kind of reaction could be expected from Moscow and Berlin? Could it be in the form of another Soviet-German agreement, this time, which would be quite in the spirit of the emerging situation, already of a military nature? What did Stalin mean when he told I. Ribbentrop at the negotiations in the Kremlin that if “Germany finds itself in a difficult situation, then it can be sure that Soviet people will come to Germany’s aid and will not allow Germany to be strangled... for Germany to be thrown to the ground”? (856)

True, the example of the war with Poland showed all the benefits for the Stalinist leadership of the unadvertised overly military-strategic cooperation with Nazi Germany.

But this same example showed that it was the victories of German weapons that provided the conditions for the beginning of the “Stalinist onslaught on the West” (857). In the fall of 1939, recalled the director of the famous dance ensemble I.A. Moiseev, at a reception after the concert in the Kremlin, Stalin joked that he still couldn’t stage the “new” dance that “we need.” “What do you need, Joseph Vissarionovich?” - “Well, you won’t stage the defeat of England and France? - and he smiled.” When asked again by the newspaper correspondent who interviewed Moiseev whether he accurately remembered Stalin’s phrase, Moiseev replied: “Absolutely! He turned to me... How can I not remember this!” Retelling this episode in the book of memoirs, Moiseev adds that those who heard the conversation froze in amazement and fear: “No one imagined that we needed the defeat of England and France” (858).

Stalin's anti-Western and therefore pro-German policy is explained, of course, by Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe. When England and France rejected Hitler’s “peace proposals” made by him on October 6 in a speech in the Reichstag, the Agitprop Central Committee, led by A. A. Zhdanov, prepared two analytical notes on the position of Western countries. One of them said that to put forward, as the West does, the restoration of Poland’s independence as a condition of peace “means to fight not only with Germany, but also to declare war on the Soviet Union” (859). The more the USSR's relations with countries outside the Axis bloc deteriorate, he reported American Ambassador in Moscow L. Steingardt to the State Department in connection with Soviet-Finnish war, the more he is forced to rely on friendship with Germany (860).

Rumors of a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Germany became widespread. At the beginning of 1940, Plenipotentiary Representative in London I.M. Maisky reported to the NKID that many representatives of the British ruling elite are “deeply convinced” that there is a secret military alliance between the two countries, regardless of whether it is registered or not. Hence the tendency to expand the war through the involvement of the USSR in it (861).

But the loudest accusation against the Soviet Union came from the lips of US President F. Roosevelt. On February 10, 1940, at the forum of the American Youth Congress, he stated that his early hopes associated with communism were either destroyed or put aside until better times. The Soviet Union, a country of “absolute dictatorship,” he continued, "allied with another dictatorship" and invaded the territory of an infinitesimal neighbor [Finland], in no way capable of causing him any harm (862).

The statement caused a slow reaction from the Kremlin. The next day, the head of TASS, Ya. Khavinson, asked for the opinion of V.M. Molotov, whether information about F. Roosevelt’s speech should be given to the press (863). February 12 “Pravda” on the fifth page under the heading “In last hour“briefly reported, with reference to American correspondents and the United Press agency, that “about 4,000 youth congress delegates coldly greeted Roosevelt’s speech, especially in the part in which he made attacks against the Soviet Union.” No mention of either the dictatorship in the USSR or the military alliance with Germany.

In February, V.M. Molotov considered it necessary to convey a special message to the government of England through the embassy in London, calling “ridiculous and offensive... even the simple assumption that the USSR allegedly entered into a military alliance with Germany,” understanding “all the complexity and all the risk of such an alliance.” Just as the USSR was neutral, it remains neutral, “unless, of course, England and France attack the USSR and force them to take up arms” (864). During the period of the Soviet-Finnish " winter war» 1939-1940 real threat wars with England and France forced the Stalinist leadership to enter into peace negotiations with Finland.

When examining the issue of a possible secret meeting between Stalin and Hitler, one cannot help but touch upon the topic of their commonality as dictators - one of the popular ones in world historiography. The authors of such works emphasize the moment of their mutual attraction, in a certain sense, the predetermination of rapprochement and cooperation between them. Thus, domestic historian V.I. Dashichev, commenting on the undocumented version of the meeting between Stalin and Hitler in the fall of 1931 on board a port longboat near Poti (865), wrote: “If we consider historical background 30s, then a lot really speaks in favor of the fact that they could strive to get closer to each other and to search common language" (866) . Hitler, speaking on August 22, 1939 to the highest military officials in Germany, said: “In a few weeks I will extend my hand to Stalin on the common Soviet-German border and together with him I will redraw the map of the world” (867).

With exacerbation international situation Stalin, this, according to Molotov’s description, “the greatest conspirator” (868), kept his intentions in the sphere of international politics. Here and there we find indirect confirmation of secret Soviet-German contacts at the Stalin-Hitler level. A.M. Nekrich, who worked a lot on Soviet-German relations in connection with the Second World War (it is enough to recall his book “1941. June 22” with criticism of Stalin’s leadership, for which he was expelled from the CPSU and forced to emigrate), wrote about the enduring Stalinist orientation towards Germany, which he pursued “not directly, but gradually” (869). A.S. Chernyaev, when he was an assistant to M.S. Gorbachev, in one of the memos about the pact, mentions references from the foreign press “to some documents about Stalin’s flirting with Hitler long before 1939" (870). In particular, Stalin acted through his confidant- Soviet trade representative in Berlin D. Kandelaki, who repeatedly conveyed signals to J. Schacht, G. Goering and other high-ranking Germans about the Kremlin’s readiness to enter into negotiations on improving mutual relations (871). No wonder V.M. Molotov spoke at the ratification of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty Supreme Council USSR on August 31, 1939, that the Soviet government “before” wanted to improve political relations with Germany (872). All this is confirmed in the memoirs of a Soviet intelligence resident in Western Europe V. Krivitsky “I was an agent of Stalin” (873). The reader will find a lot of interesting information about the channels of political connections between Moscow and Berlin in the book by corresponding member Russian Academy Sciences R.Sh. Ganelin about the relationship between Stalin and Hitler. By the way, in his multifaceted study, the author devoted a number of pages to E. Hoover’s letter to the US State Department and various responses to my publication of the FBI document, supplementing them with thoughtful considerations, naturally avoiding a final conclusion (874).

So archival document The FBI, no matter how truthful, raises questions about the mystery surrounding Soviet-German relations before and since World War II. In conclusion, I will again refer to V. Dashichev: “To find out the truth, you need to look closely at any, even the most incredible, facts and listen to any, even the most incredible, opinions” (875).

author Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich

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From the book Alfred Jodl. A soldier without fear or reproach. The combat path of the head of the German OKW. 1933-1945 by Just Gunter

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From the book Conspiracy of Dictators or Peaceful Respite? author Martirosyan Arsen Benikovich

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Appendix No. 3 From the document: “Draft resolution on the report of the Central Committee. (according to the reports of Comrades Stalin and Molotov)"3 The main political orientation of the congress: "Taking into account these circumstances, the Congress instructs the Central Committee to be guided in its policy by the following basic provisions: a) strengthen

Hypothesis about the likelihood of Hitler's secret visit to Moscow with the Ribbentrop delegation in 1939 ("EFE", Spain)

A Russian historian said yesterday, June 22, that Adolf Hitler may have been in Moscow in August 1939, meeting with Stalin and attending the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

The hypothesis of Alexander Osokin, the author of books about the Second World War, is based on recently discovered Soviet archives lists of the German delegation that accompanied the Foreign Minister in August and September 1939 Nazi Germany, Joachim von Ribbentrop, during his visits to Moscow.

The historian has established that at least eight members of Ribbentrop's delegation were from Hitler's inner circle: a pilot, a photographer, an aide-de-camp, an orderly officer, a doctor and a stenographer.

Only two women were found on the list of the delegation: “Fräulein Edith Kruger” (without mention of position) and “Secretary Gilda von Seef.” Osokin suggested that it could be Eva Braun, Hitler's wife, and Ilse Braun, Eva's older sister.

According to the historian, in the photographs and newsreels found in the archives, there are two characters similar to Hitler’s main advisers - politician Karl Haushofer, one of the ideologists of Nazism, and Marshal Wilhelm Keitel - whose arrival in Moscow as part of the Ribbentrop delegation was never mentioned mentioned in the press.

"Most probable cause the inclusion of such a significant part of Hitler's retinue in Ribbentrop's delegation turns out to be nothing more than secret participation the Fuhrer himself is in it,” the author of the article concludes.

However, other historians refute Osokin's version.

“In my opinion, this is nonsense. Why did Hitler go to Moscow? To meet Stalin? But such facts are not hidden, especially for 70 years,” he told Interfax. famous historian Arseny Roginsky.

By signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin and Hitler divided the countries Eastern Europe on the spheres of German and Soviet interests. This agreement was the decisive impetus for the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939 and the outbreak of World War II.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact includes two documents (the non-aggression treaty and the friendship and border treaty between the USSR and Germany), which were signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany, Ribbentrop, and the People's Commissar for foreign affairs USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, in the presence of Stalin in Moscow on August 23 and September 28, 1939.

http://inosmi.ru/history/20100623/160799392.html

FOR:

Edward Radzinsky. "Stalin". Chapter 20. "The Great Dream."
“There were many rumors about a secret meeting between Stalin and Hitler, which took place somewhere in the territory taken from defeated Poland.
In 1972, in Lvov, an old railway worker told me about the train that arrived in the city in October 1939, about the guards who did not let anyone into the station square, about the stopped movement of trains. He even remembered the date - October 16... I remembered this date with amazement when I saw in Komsomolskaya Pravda a photocopy of a sensational document found in the US National Archives.
"July 19, 1940. Personally and confidentially to the respected Adolf Berl, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State... According to information just received from a confidential source of information, after the German and Russian invasion of Poland and its partition, Hitler and Stalin met secretly in Lvov on October 17 1939. At these secret negotiations, Hitler and Stalin signed a military agreement to replace the exhausted pact... Sincerely yours, J. Edgar Hoover."
The document was signed by the famous long-time FBI chief.
The document bears marks indicating declassification in December 1979. Even having believed in its authenticity, I naturally continued to doubt the truth of the information. After all, the message sent to Hoover may have been false. But the publication still made me re-read the railway worker’s story written in my diary - and it was October there too!
I understood that it was unlikely that it would be possible to verify this - undoubtedly, all documents, all traces of this meeting should be carefully destroyed by Stalin. And I decided to turn to an unexpected source - Stalin’s Visitor Register, its pages for October 1939...
No, on October 16, Stalin was in his office in Moscow. And on October 17 he has a long list of visitors. I was about to leave my job, but I still looked at October 18... There was no reception on that day! Stalin did not appear in the Kremlin! And it was not a day off, a regular working day is Thursday.
So, on October 18 he is not in the Kremlin! He was absent all day on October 19 and only late in the evening at 20:25 he returned to his office and began to receive visitors.
I knew the style of his tireless, hard-drinking work. He was a typical workaholic, and this absence in the middle of the working week (Saturday was also a working day then) could only happen in two cases: either he was very ill, or... absent in Moscow.
The list of his visitors on the eve of this mysterious absence is also interesting. Together with the members of the Politburo come Voroshilov, Zhukov, Kulik, Kuznetsov, Isakov - all the leaders of the army and navy. But the longest-serving person in his office that day was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov.
No, the Master was not sick. Most likely, something very important happened during his absence, because, according to the Journal, on October 19, when he reappears in the Kremlin, there is a face-to-face meeting with the second man in the state, Molotov, until midnight. At the same time, during their conversation, the same Zhukov and functionary number three - Kaganovich - are called into the office...
Did this meeting really happen? Secret meeting of the century! How can you write it! They sat opposite each other - Leaders, earthly gods, so similar and so different. They swore eternal friendship, shared the world, and each thought how he would deceive the other..."

AGAINST:
Bezymensky L.A. "Operation "Myth", or How many times Hitler was buried" - M.: International Relations, 1995. Chapter "Meeting in Berlin."
“Stalin and Hitler never met, although legends about this go around the world. The first of them dates back to 1913, when both actually lived in the same city - Vienna.
The second legend dates back to a later time. It was put into use by none other than the notorious FBI chief Edgar Hoover, who in 1940 reported to Roosevelt that, according to his reliable information, Stalin and Hitler definitely met in Lvov on October 17, 1939, supposedly to conclude a secret military agreement. Hoover's information was pure fiction. Stalin was in Moscow that day (this is confirmed by the records of secretaries who carefully recorded the Secretary General’s visitors), Hitler was in Berlin.”
"Could Stalin have met with Hitler? What was revealed in the reception logs in the main Kremlin office."
“On October 17, 1939, Stalin did not leave Moscow, and therefore, his meeting with Hitler is excluded. Stalin began his reception at 19:35. Molotov, Mikoyan, Andreev, Zhdanov, Voroshilov visited his office... A total of 10 people. The last visitors left at 22:30."

http://labazov.livejournal.com/21682.html

Despite many indirect facts that speak in favor of a possible meeting between Hitler and Stalin in Lvov, there is one “but”. By by and large there was no reason for them to meet. The autumn of 1939 is the time of maximum friendship between the USSR and Germany. Both countries successfully partitioned Poland and agreed on non-aggression. On the other hand, perhaps the opponents wanted to look each other in the eye in person to decide how to proceed. It is noteworthy that immediately after appearing in the Kremlin after a two-day absence, I.V. Stalin gathered the entire leadership of the state and told them something important. It is likely that at the meeting, if it actually happened, Hitler managed to convince Stalin that an attack on the USSR was not part of his plans. In this case, it is clear why I.V. Stalin, until the very last moment, did not believe in the German attack on the USSR, and when this happened, he was incredibly angry and confused.

Declassified correspondence between the offices of the leaders of the USSR and Germany also confirms the possibility of a meeting between the leaders of the two countries. In it, the parties agree on the possibility of a meeting between the leaders of the two countries on exactly the dates that were indicated in the document declassified by the FBI. Moreover, at first they planned to see each other in September and only then the meeting was postponed to October. Whether it actually took place or not is not known for certain, but all indirect facts speak in its favor.

The head of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, was ready to give the Baltic states and Ukraine to Hitler to establish peace with Nazi Germany, and his dogmatism and adherence to far-fetched foreign policy schemes led to the tragedy of 1941. This is reported by " Novaya Gazeta", referring to archival materials.

The article says that Stalin conveyed to the German government a peace proposal based on huge territorial concessions, and to find out the conditions under which Adolf Hitler would agree to end the war was the “secretary of the General Commissar of State Security Lavrentiy Beria”, the head of the special group of the NKVD Pavel Sudoplatov.

Sudoplatov received questions and proposals for transfer to Berlin from Beria, but their list and meaning leave no doubt about their authorship, the article notes.

“A completely recognizable Stalinist style with a double repetition: “What would suit Germany, on what conditions does Germany agree to end the war, what is needed to end the war,” writes Novaya Gazeta.

Stalin believed that it was not too late to stop the war by turning it into a limited incident on the border, “a kind of visual demonstration of German strength to reinforce territorial demands.” And myself Soviet leader agreed to shameful world necessary to save the country.

At the same time, on the basis of Sudoplatov’s directives, later Beria was accused of treason, although he insisted that he was carrying out the direct instructions of the leader.

The study says that Stalin believed that Hitler would leave him alone after receiving compensation. On the eve of the war, the USSR recruited an agent under the pseudonym Lyceumist, whom the Kremlin believed. On the eve of the German invasion, he announced Hitler’s plans “ German plan war with the Soviet Union is developed in the most detailed way. The maximum period of war is six weeks. During this time, Germany would have captured almost all of European part USSR, but would not touch the government in Sverdlovsk. If Stalin after this managed to save the socialist system in the rest of the USSR, then Hitler would not interfere with this.” However, after the war it turned out that the Lyceist (Latvian correspondent in Berlin Orests Berlinks) who had extensive connections at the top of the Reich was double agent, carrying out direct instructions from the German leadership.

His reports were accepted by Stalin as at face value, since his previous messages, for example about the upcoming seizure of Yugoslavia by Germany, came true, since “Hitler spoke to Stalin through the mouth of a Lyceum student.”

The Lyceum Student's reports were transmitted to Hitler and the head of the German Foreign Ministry, Joachim Ribbentrop, and German disinformation transmitted Soviet state security, reviewed and approved by Hitler. At the same time, Berlinx’s reports were sent personally to Stalin and the head of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Vyacheslav Molotov.

“The Kremlin trusted Berlinks completely. Especially clear to Stalin were his signals that the Wehrmacht’s military preparations were Soviet border- just a way of putting pressure in order to achieve certain concessions. And on this score a German ultimatum is coming soon. Stalin was waiting for him,” writes Novaya Gazeta.

However, instead of issuing an ultimatum, Hitler struck first at the USSR.

“To say that Stalin was confused is to say nothing. He was crushed and morally broken. I couldn’t speak to the population on the first day, so I entrusted it to Molotov. Hence the rhetoric of the offended - “they were treacherously attacked.” So what to do? Give in and maintain your power in at least part of the country! Moreover, the sooner you give in, the closer you go. Maybe you won’t have to go to Sverdlovsk, but by sacrificing the western regions and the Baltic states, you will be able to stay in Moscow. Hitler suggested that Stalin get out of the Urals, and Stalin was ready to sacrifice mainly his territorial acquisitions of 1939–1940,” the article says.

Under these conditions, a few days after the start of the war, in June 1941, Sudoplatov met with the Bulgarian envoy in Moscow, Ivan Stamenov, to whom he handed over a list of questions for the German leadership.

In 1953 Sudoplatov wrote explanatory note to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in which he outlined the essence of those events:

"A few days after treacherous attack fascist Germany in the USSR, around June 25–27, 1941, I was summoned to the office of the then people's commissar Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.

Beria told me that there is a decision of the Soviet government, according to which it is necessary to find out informally on what conditions Germany will agree to end the war against the USSR and will suspend the offensive Nazi troops. Beria explained to me that this decision of the Soviet government was intended to create conditions that would allow the Soviet government to maneuver and gain time to gather forces. In this regard, Beria ordered me to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR Stamenov, who, according to the NKVD of the USSR, had connections with the Germans and was well known to them...

Beria ordered me to pose four questions in a conversation with Stamenov. Beria listed these questions, looking into his notebook, and they boiled down to this:

1. Why Germany, violating the non-aggression pact, started a war against the USSR;

2. What would suit Germany, on what conditions does Germany agree to end the war, what is needed to end the war;

3. Will the Germans be satisfied with the transfer to Germany of such Soviet lands as the Baltic states, Ukraine, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Karelian Isthmus;

4. If not, what territories does Germany additionally claim?”

At the same time, Sudoplatov did not conduct a conversation with Stamenov on behalf of the Soviet government, but voiced questions during the conversation on the topic of the current military and political situation.

“Beria said that the point of my conversation with Stamenov was for Stamenov to remember these four questions well. Beria at the same time expressed confidence that Stamenov himself would bring these issues to the attention of Germany...” wrote Sudoplatov.

It is unknown whether Stamenov transmitted information to Berlin. However, there was no answer to the questions posed, since Hitler believed in the power German troops and did not need Stalin’s concessions. He believed that Stalin’s place was not in Moscow, but beyond the Urals.

Stalin's resolution testifying to the friendly relations of the USSR with Hitler's Germany at the end of 1939

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