After the enthronement of his wife Catherine I after the death of Peter I, power was concentrated in the hands of Prince A.D. Menshikov. The latter tried in every possible way to reduce the role of the Senate, and on the other hand, was forced to reach an agreement with the other “chicks of Petrov’s nest.”

By decree of Catherine I of February 8, 1726, the Supreme privy council, which actually took over the functions of the Senate, which, according to Peter I, exercised the supreme leadership of the country during his absence. Members of the Council were formally supposed to give the Empress “secret advice on political and other important State affairs.” The Senate, which was now called not the Governing, but the High, as well as the collegiums, were placed in a subordinate position to the Council, in which all the main levers of power in the empire were now concentrated. All decrees were sealed not only with the signature of the Empress, but also with the members of the Council.

Menshikov got Catherine I to add a clause to her will before her death that during Peter II’s minority, the Council would receive the same power as the reigning monarch (in fact, a collective regency was established), while the Council was prohibited from making any changes in the order of succession to the throne. .

In the field of domestic policy, the Council’s activities were focused on solving, first of all, financial, economic and social problems, associated with the crisis in which Russia was in the last years of the reign of Peter I. The Council considered it a consequence of Peter’s reforms, and therefore intended to adjust them in a more traditional way for Russia (for example, the country’s capital was returned to Moscow). In current practice, the Council tried to streamline the system of accounting and control over public finances, as well as reduce costs and find additional ways replenishing the state budget, including reducing spending on the army, reducing the officer corps, etc. At the same time, the series established by Peter was eliminated, and the number of officials was reduced. At the same time, to attract foreign merchants, a number of restrictions on trade were lifted, incl. the protective customs tariff of 1724 was revised.

Composition of the Council

The Empress assumed the chairmanship of the Council, and the following were appointed as its members:

Field Marshal His Serene Highness Prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov,

Admiral General Count Fedor Matveevich Apraksin,

State Chancellor Count Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin,

Actual Privy Councilor Count Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy,

Acting Privy Councilor Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn

Vice-Chancellor Baron Andrei Ivanovich Osterman.

The composition of the Council changed: in March 1726, Duke Karl Friedrich of Holstein-Gottorp, married to the daughter of the Empress, Princess Anna Petrovna, was added to its composition.

The most serious changes in the composition of the Council occurred in connection with the death of Catherine I. Due to disagreements over her heir, Count Tolstoy was sentenced to death in May 1727. death penalty(with the replacement of a link), and after the accession to the throne of Peter II, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp withdrew from participation in the Council.

In 1727, Princes Alexey Grigorievich and Vasily Lukich Dolgorukov, who enjoyed the support of Peter II, were introduced into the Council, along with Field Marshal General and President of the Military Collegium, Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn; in 1828, Field Marshal General Prince Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgorukov. Thanks to the intrigues of the Dolgorukovs and Osterman, Menshikov was sent into exile on September 7, 1727, and Peter II announced that all instructions from now on would come only from him. In November 1828, Count Apraksin died.

Enthronement of Anna Ioanovna

After the death of Emperor Peter II in January 1730, a crisis of succession to the throne arose in Russia, where power was completely controlled by the “sovereigns.” Seven members of the Council took part in resolving issues of succession to the throne, as well as the favorite of Peter II, Prince Ivan Alekseevich Dolgorukov (son of Council member Alexei Grigorievich).

On January 18 (29), meetings of the Council began to determine the heir. The candidacy of the eldest daughter of Tsar John Alekseevich Catherine, who was married to the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. A compromise candidate was her younger sister Anna Ioanovna, the Dowager Duchess of Courland, who did not have strong support at court, or even in Courland. By 8 o'clock in the morning on January 19 (30), the decision was made, only Prince A.G. Dolgorukov opposed her election. Simultaneously with the proposal, Duchess Anna was elected, Prince D.M. Golitsyn proposed limiting her power to a number of conditions written down in the “Condition”. In accordance with them, the empress, upon ascending the throne, had to undertake to preserve the Supreme Privy Council, which consisted of 8 people, and in the future without its consent: not to start a war; do not make peace; do not introduce new taxes; not to appoint to ranks (court, civil and military) older than the colonel, but to transfer the guard and army under the control of the Council; do not favor estates and estates. In addition, the Council had to approve all sentences depriving nobles of life, property or dignity, and also received complete control over government revenues and expenditures. Later Prince D.M. Golitsyn wrote a draft constitution, according to which the rule of the highest aristocracy was established in Russia with limited power of the monarch, which provided for the creation, incl. representative institutions. This plan, however, was not approved by the Council; without reaching agreement, the “higher-ups” decided to submit the issue to the consideration of the nobility gathered in Moscow (the future Legislative Commission). Various groups came up with their own projects (all implying restrictions on the monarchy), but none of them were supported by the Council.

Prince V.V. spoke out against the “Conditions”. Dolgorukov, Baron A.I. Osterman and Count G.I. Golovkin. However, their opinion was not taken into account and Prince V.L. Dolgorukov with “Conditions” left for Mitava on January 20 (31) to visit Duchess Anna. On January 28 (February 8), Anna Ioanovna signed the “Conditions”, after which she left for Moscow.

She arrived in the capital on February 15 (26), where she took the oath of office and troops in the Assumption Cathedral. swore allegiance to the empress. The struggle between the groups moved into a new stage: the “supreme” tried to achieve official confirmation (“Conditions” were only a preliminary document, an “agreement of intent”), and the group opposing them (A. I. Osterman, P. I. Yaguzhinsky, etc. ), who enjoyed the support of the ordinary nobility, advocated a return to an autocratic monarchy.

On February 25 (March 7), a large group of nobles submitted a petition to Anna Ioannovna with a request to reconsider - together with the nobility - the future structure of the country. Anna Ioanovna signed the petition, after which, after a 4-hour meeting, the nobility submitted a new one, in which they advocated the restoration of autocracy. The “Supreme”, who did not expect such a turn of events, were forced to agree, and Anna Ioanovna publicly tore up the “Conditions” and her letter, in which she had previously agreed to their acceptance.

Liquidation of the Council

By the manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, the Council was abolished, and the Senate was restored to its former rights. Representatives of the Dolgorukov family, as those who most actively participated in the conspiracy, were arrested: I.A. and A.G. The Dolgorukovs were sent into exile, V.L. Dolgorukov was executed. The remaining members of the Council were not formally injured, Prince V.V. Dolgorukov was arrested only in 1731, Prince D.M. Golitsyn - in 1736; Prince M.M. Golitsyn died in December 1730. G.I. Golovkin and A.I. Osterman not only retained their posts, but began to enjoy the favor of the new empress.

Federal Agency for Education

Stavropol State University

Department of Russian History

Thesis on the topic:

Creation and functioning of the Supreme Privy Council

4th year students of the Faculty of History

Group "B"

Durdyeva Guzel

Scientific adviser:

Belikova T.V. KIN, associate professor

Stavropol2007

Content.

Chapter 1.

The struggle for power after the death of Peter I in 1725.

Reasons for the emergence and composition of the Supreme Privy Council.

Chapter 2. Policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

Adjustment of Peter's reforms.

The struggle for power in the Supreme Privy Council.

An attempt to limit autocracy.

Introduction .

Relevance of the problem:

The period of palace coups has not been sufficiently studied in national historiography. There are very few special studies on the work of the state apparatus during this period, in particular various state institutions, including the Supreme Privy Council. In addition, there are diametrically opposed assessments, directions of the essence of the policy of this supreme body power during the reign of Catherine 1 and Peter 2. The debatability of various aspects of the topic, the poor degree of study of the problem of the functioning of state institutions during the period of palace coups dictate the need for further comprehensive research our topic.

Goal of the work: study the activities of the Supreme Privy Council

Tasks determined by the goal:

Find out the circumstances of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council;

Analyze its composition;

To identify the main focus of specific activities in the Supreme Privy Council, their relationship with Peter’s reforms;

Consider the course of the struggle for power in the Supreme Privy Council, determining the causes and results;

Analyze the attempts of the Supreme Privy Council to limit autocracy, while clarifying the circumstances of the fall of the Supreme Privy Council.

An object – history of state institutions of Russia.

Item - policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

Degree of knowledge:

I analyzed the degree of knowledge of the problem according to the problem-chronological principle, that is, I proposed the most important problems that were in the center of attention of pre-revolutionary, Soviet and modern researchers of the topic and traced how they tried to solve them in historiography. These are the following problems:

1. Reasons for the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council;

2.Assessment of the “invention of the supreme leaders” associated with the development of “Conditions”;

3. The relationship between Peter’s reforms and the policy of the Supreme Privy Council, its effectiveness and necessity for the further progressive development of Russia.

In the studies of pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians, based on the study of official legislative acts, the history of the creation and functioning of the Supreme Privy Council has been studied with sufficient completeness.

In Eroshkin’s opinion, Peter 1, and after him Catherine, were inclined to think about reorganizing the higher administration by forming a body narrower than the Senate. Apparently, it is no coincidence that Lefort’s report dated May 11, 1725 reports plans being developed at the Russian court “to establish a privy council,” which included the Empress, Duke Karl Friedrich, A.D. Menshikov, P.P. Shafirov and A.V. Makarov.

On May 3, this message was repeated almost verbatim in Compredon’s report. The origins of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council should be sought not only in the “helplessness” of Catherine. The message of August 12, 1724 also casts doubt on the common thesis about the emergence of the council as some kind of compromise with the “tribal nobility” personified by D.M. Golitsyn. Anisimov's point of view can be considered a kind of attempt at compromise. However, his position is very contradictory. Researchers such as Golikova N.B., Kislyagina L.G. They believe that over the course of a number of years, since the time of Peter 1, “the lack of efficiency of the Senate began to be felt more strongly, and this could not but lead to the creation of a more flexible permanent body. This became the Supreme Privy Council, which arose on the basis of meetings of advisers systematically assembled by Catherine 1.” The above thesis most adequately reflects the reasons for changes in top management in 1726 and is confirmed in specific material.

Gradovsky A.D. believed that “the establishment of the council belongs to the category of the most unexpected and sudden coups d’etat.” The activities of the Supreme Privy Council led to the fact that “soon the entire system created by Peter collapsed so much that it was already difficult to find the starting point of the administration,” and “peering into historical meaning Supreme Council, one cannot help but notice in it a strong attempt to give dominance to the old personal principle.

Klyuchevsky wrote that by creating the Supreme Privy Council “they wanted to calm the offended feeling old nobility, removed from supreme control by low-born upstarts.” At the same time, it was not the form, but the essence of government, the nature of the supreme power that changed: while maintaining its titles, it turned from a personal will into a state institution.

Filippov A.N. in the book “History of the Senate during the reign of the Supreme Privy Council and Cabinet”, he expressed the opinion that the main flaw of the system of government created by Peter was the impossibility of combining the collegial principle of their structure with the nature of the executive power. Filippov believed that the Supreme Privy Council was founded as an executive body “standing in direct relation to the supreme power.”

Thus, the emergence of the council is not so much the result of the struggle of political interests as a necessity associated with filling a significant gap in the Petrine system of supreme government bodies. The results of the council’s activities were insignificant, because it “had to act directly after that tense, active era, when reform followed reform, when all spheres of national and state life were dominated by strong excitement. The Council had to be an institution of the era of reaction... The Council had to sort out complex tasks Peter's reform, which remained for subsequent eras far from being resolved. Such activity...showed clearly what in Peter's reform stood the test of time and what had to be set aside. Most consistently, Filippov believed, the council adhered to Peter’s line in its policy towards industry, but in general “the general tendency of the Council’s activities is to reconcile the interests of the people with the interests of ... the army, without conducting extensive military enterprises, without asking for any reforms in relation to the “army.” " At the same time, just like Klyuchevsky, he believed that “the council in its activities responds mainly to the needs of the moment and deals with those matters that require an immediate solution.

In 1909, B.L. Vyazemsky’s book was published. "Supreme Privy Council". Like many of his predecessors, the author was interested not so much in the policies pursued by the council as in its history as a public institution. However, we cannot agree with the opinion of Anisimov E.V. that the author’s conclusions and observations were not original and were a repetition of the ideas of Filippov and Miliukov. In fact, many of Vyazemsky’s judgments were original, if only because his assessment of the council’s activities was almost unconditionally positive. Considering the reasons for the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council, Vyazemsky, as if synthesizing the ideas of Gradovsky and Filippov, came to the conclusion that the council played a kind of prosecutor general, adapting the system of Peter’s institutions to the autocracy.

Researcher V.M. Stroev in the Supreme Privy Council he saw a kind of “coalition government” that “proved to be at the height of its calling.”

In 1975, Anisimov E.V. defended his Ph.D. thesis on the topic “Internal Policy of the Supreme Privy Council (1726 - 1730).” The creation of the Supreme Privy Council is considered in the work as “the initial stage of restructuring the management system, which pursued the goal of adapting the state apparatus to the new tasks that faced the autocracy in the first post-Petrine years.”

A group of historians led by Eroshkin believed that assessing the work of government institutions during the period of palace coups depends on assessing the personality of the monarch. Discussions about the “insignificance” of Peter’s successors as opposed to the significance and scale of Peter’s own political transformations are very common.

Another group of researchers, led by Golikova, argue that the Supreme Privy Council is a direct heir to the secret councils of Peter in the 20s of the 18th century, bodies with a more or less permanent composition, information about which was clearly reflected in the diplomatic correspondence of that time.

The fall of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 could be seen as proof that the emergence of bodies like it was something of a specter of Russian absolutism. This is how many historians of the 18th and 19th centuries perceived this organ, starting with Tatishchev V.N. and ending with Pavlov - Silvansky N.P., and echoes of understanding appeared in Soviet historiography.

The stereotypical ideas about the post-Petrine era that have developed in the public consciousness are reflected in the “note about ancient and new Russia» Karamzin, who condemned attempts to limit autocracy by members of the Supreme Privy Council and all the policies pursued by them. Karamzin believed that Anna Ivanovna “wanted to govern in accordance with the thoughts of Peter the Great and was in a hurry to correct many omissions made since his time,” but her “unhappy attachment” to Biron did not allow her to complete her task. Essentially the same point of view was reproduced in some works of legal historians, including A.D. Gradovsky, that appeared in the second half of the 19th century.

The first who set himself the task of impartially covering the history of post-Petrine Russia was Solovyov S.M., in volumes 18–20 of his “History of Russia since Ancient Times,” who gave a detailed outline of the events of this time. Considering government policy during the reign of Catherine 1, Soloviev did not generally deny the necessity of the measures taken by the Supreme Privy Council, but his general conclusion was that “the reformer’s program seemed too extensive, and “the people left to Russia by Peter did not have his faith in the abilities of the Russian people, into the opportunity for them to go through a difficult school; They were frightened by this difficulty and retreated back.” The activities of the Supreme Council represent a reaction against both the financial administration and the tax system of Peter the Great's time.

The financial policy of the council, according to Vyazemsky, was dictated by a concern for reducing state expenses. The reorganization of local government carried out by the council, which was interpreted by all of Vyazemsky’s predecessors as the complete destruction of Peter’s system, was, as he believed, caused by the fact that Peter “did not dare to finally get rid of the pre-reform institutions, as a result of which the reorganization of local government turned out to be imperfect and the new order had to adapt to the old soil to which it was transferred” Vyazemsky’s desire to justify the actions of the council was manifested in the interpretation of judicial reform. He argued that in fact, there was no real separation of powers even under Peter, and the measures of the Supreme Privy Council were hardly more accessible and effective, since the governor could immediately carry out his decisions himself.

Speaking about the historiography of the post-Petrine era, it is necessary to mention the article by N.A. Pavlov-Silvansky “Opinions of the Supreme Leaders on the Reforms of Peter the Great”, published in 1910. He considered Menshikov to be the main opponents of Peter’s reforms. The researcher categorically refuted Miliukov’s judgment about the unity of the methods of Peter and the supreme leaders, arguing that the questions remained, but the methods for solving them had changed, since, in contrast to Peter, the supreme leaders always shied away from the complex and difficult; They often used in their events the technique of accurately reproducing pre-Petrine orders.

In 1949 E.S. Parhom was protected PhD thesis on the trade and industrial policy of the Supreme Privy Council, which particularly emphasized foreign influence on it and, accordingly, many events were assessed sharply negatively. History of the development of customs tariffs in 1727 - 1731The study was devoted to F.I. Kozintseva, industrial policy was reflected in the monograph by N.I. Pavlenko on the history of metallurgy. Financial, including fiscal policy, was subjected to a detailed analysis in the monograph by S.M. Troitsky.

According to Anisimov, under PeterIIThe council turned into a “collective regent,” and Menshikov’s resignation cleared “the path to power for the high-born opposition,” and under these conditions, the council “became an instrument in its hands.” The administrative reform carried out bore the features of centralization and concentration of management and pursued the goals of increasing efficiency, mobility of management, adapting the activities of the state apparatus to the specifics of the internal situation and within political problems post-Petrine period. He paid special attention to attempts to revise the tax reform. It was in it, in his opinion, that the leaders saw the reasons for the deplorable financial state of the country and the ruin of the peasantry.

In his work “Russia without Peter,” the author also criticized the policies of the Supreme Privy Council.

Among the latest works on the issues that interest us, I would like to mention Ya.A. Gordin "Between slavery and freedom." He believes that the Supreme Privy Council in the first year of its existence fulfilled the main tactical task - the mad gallop that Peter led the exhausted RussiaI, was suspended, the position of the merchants and peasants was exposed. Reign of PeterIIproved the incompetence of the state system half-built by PeterI. The defeat of the constitutional “venture” of the supreme leaders led to the fact that from the very first months of the new reign a backward movement towards vulgarized Petrine guidelines began.

A brief review of the historiography of post-Petrine Russia shows quite clearly that for a century and a half there was a constant struggle between two mutually exclusive tendencies. On the one hand, there is the desire to portray the entire post-Petrine era as “a dark page in Russian history, and, accordingly, to present domestic politics as an attempt at counter-reform.” On the other hand, there is the desire to prove that the policy of the Supreme Privy Council was dictated by the specific conditions of the country devastated by Peter’s reform and therefore was completely reasonable and justified.

Source base: When carrying out the work, they relied on the study of various sources, which made it possible to reveal various aspects of the emergence and functioning of the Supreme Privy Council. Sources on my topic can be divided into several groups.

Group 1 - legislative acts (February 8, 1726 - decree on the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council; “Opinion is not a decree”, February 25, 1730 - “Conditions”, March 4, 1730 - decree on the abolition of the Supreme Privy Council), allowing us to consider the process the emergence of this supreme body, reveal the content of specific measures. They give official facts about the need for certain measures.

Group 2 – works by contemporaries. These include: “A short story about the death of Peter the Great” by F. Prokopovich “Manstein’s Notes on Russia 1727 – 1744”.

Group 3 – memoir literature. Among them: notes from Minich.

Group 4 – diplomatic correspondence. Dispatches from foreign ambassadors.

Structure. The work consists of an introduction, 2 chapters, a conclusion and a list of sources and literature.

Chapter 1 – Circumstances of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council.

Chapter 2 – Policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

Chapter I. Historical circumstances of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council.

1.1. The struggle of court factions for power after the death of Peter I

On January 16, 1725, Peter fell ill and never got up again. The king's strength left him. A few hours before his death, when he was already speechless, Peter’s weakening handWithsang to write only two words: “give everything.” But to whom he bequeathed his business, to whom he transferred the Russian throne, remains unknown .

The case of Tsarevich Alexei and the early death of Peter's sons from his second wife Catherine forced Peter to establish new order succession to the throne, according to which the sovereign could appoint a successor at his own discretion. The new law (“Charter on the inheritance of the throne”), set out and interpreted by Feofan Prokopovich in “The Truth of the Will of the Monarchs in Determining the Heirhis power,” was promulgated on February 5, 1722.

The law on succession to the throne assumed the existence of a will and transfer of the throne at the will of the monarch, but Peter did not have time to draw it up during his lifetime.

On January 28, 1725, Peter died. And from this moment on, the Russian throne becomes the object of struggle between various groups.atdressing of the courtiers, in which the Russian guard plays a huge role. The time of palace coups begins.

What was that period of palace coups that marked the history of the Russian Empire from 1725 to 1762 and even later (the murder of Paul)?

In the works of V.I. Lenin has assessments of the evolution of autocracy in Russia. He emphasized that “the Russian autocracyXVIIcenturies since Boyar Duma and the boyar aristocracy does not look like autocracyXVIIIcentury with its bureaucracy, service classes, with separate periods“enlightened absolutism”, that “a monarchy with a boyar duma is not like a bureaucratic-noble monarchyXVIII century." 1.

IN AND. Lenin defines Russian autocracyXVIIIcenturies as a bureaucratic-noble monarchy with a bureaucracy and service classes. The creation of this monarchy, the formation of absolutism, the origins of which go back to the second halfXVIIcentury, is a consequence of the transformations in the reign of PeterI. The period of “enlightened absolutism” in Russia falls during the time of CatherineII, although elements of “enlightened absolutism” are also characteristic of PeterI. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about the era of palace coups as something fundamentally different from the previous and subsequent stages in the history of the autocratic system in Russia. However, new concepts and approaches have given reason to rethink many assessments and conclusions that have already become postulates.

Of course, almost four decades separating the death of PeterIfrom the accession to the throne of "Peter's successor". CatherineII, represent a special period in the history of the Russian Empire, a period filled with political events great importance. DuringXVIIIV. there was a further (compared to Peter’s absolutism) evolution of autocracy: the times of the Supreme Privy Council especially stand out as an attempt to significantly diminish the autocracy in favor of the feudal oligarchy, the “plot of the supreme leaders” in early 1730, which pursued the goal of putting the feudal aristocracy in power and through “conditions” limit the monarch. .

Throughout this entire period, there was a struggle for power between separate groups of the “gentry”, “sovereigns” and “gentry”, nobles and ordinary nobility, and between various groups of the court nobility. But since during the palace coups the noble nature of the autocracy did not change, then “the coups were ridiculously easy, as long as it was a matter of taking away power from one group of nobles or feudal lords and giving it to another.”

Before the Russian emperor had time to close his eyelids, the question of who would inherit his throne became the subject of heated debate. Long ago, two groups formed at court ruling nobility. One consisted of nobles, although titled, but for the most part unborn and not of noble origin. They owe their titles and ranks, their wealth and influence, their place in society to Peter. Among these nobles (Alexander Danilovich Menshikov and Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin and Fyodor Matveevich Apraksin, Pavel Ivanovich Yaguzhinsky and Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin.

The second group of nobility, represented by the Golitsyns, led by Dmitry Mikhailovich, Dolgoruky, Nikita Ivanovich Repnin and others, consisted of nobles whose fathers and grandfathers constituted the same boyar aristocracy that sat in the boyar duma during the reign of Peter’s grandfather and fatherI, Mikhail Fedorovich and “The Quietest” Alexei Mikhailovich and ruled the Russian land according to the usual rule: “The Tsar indicated, and the boyars sentenced,” they were far from being like the Khovanskys and Sokovnins, the same representatives of the boyar nobility of Moscow Rus'XVIIcenturies, like their fathers and grandfathers, cling to Old Testament antiquity; they understood that it would not be possible to turn back the wheel of history, and there was no need to. Therefore, trained by Peter to live “in the German manner”, dressed in a new dress of European cut, with shaved beards and wigs, they were not only not alien to Peter’s innovations, but also carried them out themselves .

If the nobles who made up the first group of the court nobility were clearly aware that they owed their titles of “most serene prince” or “count”, “their real estate”, their careers to Peter, to Peter’s order, which was based on the spirit of the “table of ranks”, then the nobility, who were part of the second group, considered their right to rule Russia as a hereditary right, bequeathed by the fathers along with the estates, a right based on the “breed” and the experience of the sovereign’s service passed on from generation to generation.

The first were the product of the reforms they carried out, the second (even without Peter’s reforms, if everything had remained in the same position as in the time of the “Quiet One”), would have ruled the Russian land. 1. If for the former the basis of their position in ruling circles was the personality of the autocrat, then the latter considered themselves entitled to occupy their posts and own their wealth by virtue of origin alone. This feudal aristocracy looked with contempt at people like Menshikov, who made a career from the tsar's orderly to his serene prince, St. Petersburg governor and president of the military college.

The death of Peter caused a clash and struggle between these two factions of the ruling elite. A dispute flared up over Peter's heir. In the chambers of the palace, where the creator of the law on succession to the throne was dying, an intense discussion began on the spirit and letter of this law. Comparing it with the decree on single inheritance, they talked about the possible inheritance of this throne by daughters. IN in this case Peter's eldest daughter Anna became the heir to the throne. But back in 1724, for herself, her husband, and her offspring, she renounced her claims to the Russian throne. Consequently, the throne had to pass to Peter's second daughter Elizabeth. Peter's widow, Catherine, had the least rights to the throne both according to old Russian customs and according to the decree on single inheritance, which could be considered an analogue of the decree on succession to the throne. But her candidacy was nominated and stubbornly defended by unborn nobles: Menshikov, Tolstoy, Apraksin and others. For them, she was one of their own, having gone through a difficult path from Pastor Gluck’s servant to the empress, a path that in many ways resembled their own, being a symbol of the Peter the Great breed that made their nobles.

Supporters of Catherine's accession to the throne, and first of all Peter Tolstoy, proved her rights, citing the fact that with the coronation of Catherine in 1724, Peter, as it were, designated her as his successor . But the opponents of Catherine and her friends were no less active. Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn and other noble nobles nominated Alexei Petrovich’s young son Peter to the throne. They hoped to turn the helpless boy into a puppet, to rule as they wanted, removing Menshikov, Tolstoy and other low-born nobles from control.

When Peter's imminent death became apparentI, Catherine instructed Menshikov and Tolstoy to act in her, and, consequently, in their interests. The St. Petersburg garrison and other regiments, which had not received pay for almost a year and a half, finally received money, other cash payments were promised, troops returned from work to rest, etc.

Guards officers begin to penetrate one after another into the palace hall, where senators, generals and clergy from the synod have gathered. They listen attentively to Tolstoy, who proves Catherine’s rights to the throne, and when supporters of Peter Alekseevich speak, threats are heard from their ranks against the “boyars,” whose heads they threaten to “break” if they even lay a finger on Catherine. After some time, the commander of the Semenovsky regiment N.I. Buturlin led both guards regiments to the palace, lined up at gunpoint with the beating of drums. When Field Marshal N.I. Repin asked by whose order the regiments were brought, Buturin impressively replied that they came here on the orders of the Empress, to whom everyone must obey, “not excluding you.” .

The demonstration of the guards did its job. At first, Repnin agreed to recognize Catherine as the legal ruler, followed by other nobles, when they finally found out from the Secretary of State, Makarov, that Peter had not left any will.

1.2.Creation of the Supreme Privy Council.

Having ascended the throne, Catherine continued to shower the guards with “favors.” Behind Catherine stood the nobles, who at first actually ruled for her, and then legally secured power in the country.

There was no unity among the main nobles. Everyone wanted power, everyone strived for enrichment, fame, honor. Everyone was afraid of the “blessed one” . They were afraid that this “all-powerful Goliath,” as Menshikov was called, using his influence on the empress, would become the helm of government, and would relegate other nobles, more knowledgeable and nobler than him, to the background. Not only nobles, but also the nobility and gentry feared the “almighty Goliath.” The coffin of Peter was still standing in the Peter and Paul Cathedral, and Yaguzhinsky already addressed the ashes of the emperor, loudly so that they could hear, complaining about “insults” on the part of Menshikov. The influential Golitsyns rallied, one of whom, Mikhail Mikhailovich, who commanded the troops located in Ukraine, seemed especially dangerous to Catherine and Menshikov. Menshikov openly bullied the Senate, and in response, the senators refused to meet. In such an environment, the intelligent and energetic Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy acted, obtaining the consent of Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn and Catherine (whose role in this matter was practically reduced to zero) to establish the Supreme Privy Council. On February 8, 1726, Catherine signed a decree establishing it. The decree stated that “for the sake of good, we have decided and commanded from now on at our court, both for external and internal important state affairs, to establish a Privy Council...”. By decree of February 8, Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, Fyodor Matveevich Apraksin, Gavrila Ivanovich Golovkin, Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn and Andrey were introduced into the Supreme Privy Council

Ivanovich Osterman .

After some time, members of the Supreme Privy Council submitted to Catherine “an opinion not on the decree on the new established Privy Council,” which established the rights and functions of this new highest government body. “Opinion not in the decree” assumed that all the most important decisions are made only by the Supreme Privy Council, any imperial decree ends with the expressive phrase “given in the Privy Council”, papers going to the name of the Empress are also provided with the expressive inscription “for filing in the Privy Council”, foreign policy, army and navy are under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council, equally as well as the boards that head them. The Senate, naturally, loses not only its former significance as the highest body in the complex and cumbersome bureaucratic machine of the Russian Empire, but also the title of “governor”. “Opinion is not a decree” became a decree for Catherine: she agreed with everything, only stipulating something. Created “at the side of the empress,” the Supreme Privy Council only mercifully considered her. So, in fact, all power was concentrated in the hands of the “supreme leaders,” and the governing Senate, the stronghold of senatorial opposition to Menshikov and his entourage, having become simply “high,” lost its importance for a long time, without ceasing to be the focus of opposition to the “supreme leaders.” .

The composition of the Supreme Privy Council is noteworthy; it fully reflects the balance of forces that has developed in government circles. Most of the members of the Supreme Privy Council, namely four out of six (Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin and Tolstoy), belonged to that unborn nobility or adjoined it, like Golovkin, who came to the fore under Peter and thanks to him took leading positions in government , became rich, noble, influential. The noble nobility was represented by one Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn. And, finally, standing apart is Heinrich Ioganovich Osterman, a German from Westphalia, who became Andrei Ivanovich in Russia, an intriguer, an unprincipled careerist, ready to serve anyone and in any way. an energetic and active bureaucrat, a submissive executor of the royal commands under Peter and the ruler of the Russian Empire under Anna Ivanovna, a “crafty courtier” who successfully survived more than one palace coup. His appearance as a member of the Supreme Privy Council foreshadows the time when, after the death of Peter, whom “. overseas "adventurers, who looked at Russia as a feeding trough, although they were not invited to distant Muscovy by him, were afraid and did not dare to act openly; his incompetent successors ended up on the Russian throne, and the "German attack" unfolded in full, penetrating all the pores of the Russian state. Thus, the composition of the Supreme Privy Council under CatherineIin February 1726 reflected the victory of Peter’s pets and their support in January 1725 (the guards. But they were going to rule Russia in a completely different way from Peter. The Supreme Privy Council was a bunch of aristocrats (and the rulers were indeed a feudal aristocracy, all without exception, regardless from who their fathers and grandfathers were in the Muscovite state), who together, as a small but powerful and influential group, sought to rule the Russian Empire in their personal interests.

Of course, the inclusion of Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn in the Supreme Privy Council did not at all mean his reconciliation with the idea that he, Gediminovich, has the same right and grounds to rule the country as the tsar’s orderly Menshikov, the “artistic” Apraksin, and others. The time will come, and contradictions between the “higher-ups”, i.e. the same contradictions between the high-born and unborn nobility that resulted in the events at the tomb of Peter will be reflected in the activities of the Supreme Privy Council itself .

Even in a report dated October 30, 1725, the French envoy F. Campredon reports on a “secret meeting with the queen,” in connection with which he mentions the names of A. D. Menshikov, P. I. Yaguzhinsky and Karl Friedrich. A week later, he reports on “two important meetings” held with Menshikov. One of his reports also mentions the name of Count P. A. Tolstoy.

Almost at the same time, the Danish envoy G. Mardefeld reports in reports about the persons included in the councils “assembled on internal and external affairs”: these are A. D. Menshikov, G. I. Golovkin, P. A, Tolstoy and A . I. Osterman.

When analyzing this news, the following circumstances should be noted. Firstly, we are talking about the most important and “secret” state affairs. Secondly, the circle of advisers is narrow, more or less constant and includes people holding key government positions and relatives of the tsar (Karl Friedrich - Anna Petrovna’s husband). Next: Meetings can happenat Catherine'sIand with her participation. Finallyts, most of the persons named by Campridon and Mardefeld then became members of the Supreme Privy Council. Tolstoy came up with a plan to curb Menshikov’s willfulness: he convinced the empress to create a new institution - the Supreme Privy Council. The empress was to preside over its meetings, and its members were given equal votes. If not with her mind, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, Catherine understood that the unbridled temper of his Serene Highness, his disdainful attitude towards other nobles sitting in the Senate, his desire to command everyone and everything, could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the noble nobility, but also among those who placed her on the throne. Intrigues and rivalries, of course, did not strengthen the empress’s position. But on the other hand, Catherine’s consent to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council was an indirect recognition of her inability to rule the country herself, like her husband.

Was the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council a break with Peter's principles of governance? To resolve this issue, you need to contact recent years Peter and the practice of resolving the most important issues by the Senate. Here the following is striking. The Senate may not meet in full; The emperor himself is often present at meetings that discuss important issues. Particularly significant was the meeting on August 12, 1724, which discussed the progress of construction of the Ladoga Canal and the main items of state revenue. It was attended by: PeterI, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn. It is noteworthy that all of Peter’s advisers are future members of the Supreme Privy Council. This suggests that PeterI, and then Catherine, were inclined to think about reorganizing the top administration by forming a body narrower than the Senate. Apparently, it is no coincidence that Lefort’s report dated May 1, 1725 reports plans being developed at the Russian court “to establish a secret council,” including the Empress, Duke Karl Friedrich, Menshikov, Shafirov, Makarov.

On May 3, this message was repeated almost verbatim in Campridon’s report.

So, the origins of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council should be sought not only in the “helplessness” of Ekater other I. The message about the meeting on August 12, 1724 also casts doubt on the common thesis about the emergence of the Council as some kind of compromise with the “patrimonial nobility” personified by Golitsyn.

The decree of February 8, 1726, which officially formalized the Supreme Privy Council under the person of the empress, is interesting precisely not because of the traces of the struggle of individuals and groups (they can be discerned there only with great difficulty): this state act is nothing more than a legislative establishment, in in principle, boiling down to the legalization of an existing council.

Let us turn to the text of the decree: “We have already seen that secret actual advisors and besides the Senate government there is a lot of work in the following matters: 1) that they often have, in their positions, like first ministers, secret councils on political and other state affairs, 2) some of them sit in the first collegiums, which is why in the first and very in the necessary work, in the Privy Council, and also in the Senate, business stops and continues because they, being busy, cannot soon carry out resolutions and the aforementioned state affairs. For his benefit, we have judged and commanded from now on at our court to establish a Supreme Privy Council for both external and internal important state affairs, at which we ourselves will sit.”St. Petersburg__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

The decree of February 8, 1726 is difficult to suspect of some kind of “understatement” masking some kind of struggle between parties, groups, etc.: the fact that the center of gravity legislative decree lies in a completely different plane, namely in the area of ​​​​functioning tasks of the state machine.

Not long ago, the opinion was clearly formulated that for a number of years, since the time of PeterI“The lack of efficiency of the Senate began to be felt more strongly, and this could not but lead to the creation of a more flexible permanent body. This became the Supreme Privy Council, which arose on the basis of meetings of advisers systematically assembled by CatherineI" The above thesis most adequately reflects the reasons for changes in top management in 1726 and is confirmed in specific material.

Already on March 16, 1726, the French envoy Campredon relied on assessments that came from among the Council itself. In the so-called “Opinion is not a decree” we find, in particular, the following commentary of the decree of February 8, 1726: “and as now Her Imperial Majesty ... for the best success in the disposition of the state, she deigned to divide the government in two, and of which in one important, in the other other state affairs, then as everyone can see there is, that with God’s help things have become much better than before...” The Supreme Privy Council, like the secret councils of the times of PeterI, is a purely absolutist organ. Indeed, there is no document regulating the activities of the Council. “Opinion is not a decree” rather formulates the general principles of independence and sovereignty, rather than somehow limiting them. In charge of external and internal politics, The Council is imperial, since the Empress “rules the first presidency” in it, “this council is only less than a special collegium or otherwise respected, perhaps, since it only serves Her Majesty to relieve Her Majesty of the heavy burden of Her government.”

So, the first link: the Supreme Privy Council is the direct heir to the secret advice of PeterI in the 20s XVIIIcentury, bodies with more or less permanent composition, information about which was quite clearly reflected in the diplomatic correspondence of that time.

The fall of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 could be seen as proof that the emergence of bodies like it was something of a ghost of the past, standing in the way of the newly born Russian absolutism. This is how many historians perceived this organXVIII – XIXcenturies, starting with V.N. Tatishchev and ending with N.P. Pavlov-Selvansky, and echoes of such an understanding appeared in Soviet historiography. Meanwhile, neither the events of 1730 nor their consequences provide grounds for such a conclusion. It must be taken into account that by this time the Council had largely lost the quality of the unofficial real government of the country: if in 1726 there were 125 meetings of the Council, and in 1727 - 165, then, for example, from October 1729 after the death of PeterIIin January 1730 the Council did not meet at all and things were largely neglected. In addition, the documents published in 1730, and documents of programmatic, without exaggeration, significance, cannot be reduced to the famous “Conditions”. The so-called “Oath Promise of the Members of the Supreme Privy Council” deserves no less attention. It is considered as a document drawn up by members of the Council after familiarizing themselves with the position of the capital's nobility in relation to the supreme power. It says: “The integrity and well-being of each state depends on good advice... The Supreme Privy Council does not consist of any assembly of power of its own, but rather for the betterment of state creep and administration, to the aid of their imperial majesties.” It is apparently impossible to perceive this declaration, given the official nature of the document, as a demegogic device: its orientation is diametrically opposed to the provisions of the “Conditions”. Most likely, this is evidence of a change in the initial position of the Supreme Privy Council, taking into account the wishes expressed in the noble projects and the sentiments of the nobility itself. It is no coincidence software requirement“Oath promise”: “See to it that in such a first meeting of one surname no more than two persons are multiplied, so that no one can take the power from above for the village.” This is quite a visible confirmation that, on the one hand, traditions “ monarchies with a boyar duma and a boyar aristocracy” were still in memory, and on the other hand, that the political thinking of the top of the ruling class during this period directly rejected them.

This adjustment in the position of the Supreme Privy Council was the reason that it did not experience any severe repressions in March 1730. The decree of March 4, 1730, which abolished the Council, was carried out in a very calm form. Moreover, a significant part of the Council members were included in the restored Senate and only then, under various pretexts, were removed from government affairs. Members of the Supreme Privy Council A.I. Osterman and G.I. Golovkin on November 18, 1731 were introduced into the newly established Cabinet of Ministers. Such trust on the part of the new empress in people who were, without a doubt, aware of the well-known “venture” of limiting the powers of the empress, deserves to be noted. There is still a lot that is unclear in the history of the events of 1730. Even Gradovsky A.D. drew attention to an interesting detail of the first steps of Anna Ioannovna’s policy: when restoring the Senate, the empress did not restore the position of prosecutor general. As one of the options for explaining this phenomenon, the historian did not exclude the possibility that “her advisers had in mind to place some new institution between the Senate and the supreme power...”

Period 20-60s. XVIIIV. - not at all a return orthe torture of returning to the old days. This is the period of “youthRussian maximalism", which was experiencing strengthening Russian absolutism at that time, interfering in everything and everyone and at the same time,apparently having no real support in the Senate at this time in the central institutions, which were often a “harmonious system” only on paper.

In contrast to the entrenched bourgeoisie among manyAccording to the opinion of many researchers, which has not been completely eradicated in the works of Soviet historians, it was the “supra-Senate” imperial councilsyou were the conductors of a new, absolutist line in management.

Let's turn to specific material. Here are just a few quite bright and typical examples. The emergence of the Supremethe Privy Council caused quite characteristic reaction from the sideus of the Senate, which we can judge by personal order Catherine I: “Announce in the Senate. So that now, according to the decrees, sentmembers of the Supreme Privy Council were carried out as determinedbut they don’t defend themselves about places. For they have not yet entered into business, but they beganthey are defending themselves about places" .

It was the Supreme Privy Council that created the specialnal Commission on taxes headed by D. M. Golitsyn, which was supposed to solve one of the most painful issues - the statestate finances and." at the same time - distresstax-paying population of Russia . But the Commission failed even toto break the “information barrier” - due to the negative attitude of lower authorities. In his report to the Council on September 17September 1727 D. M. Golitsyn reported that the commission was ambassadorswe sent a decree to the Senate and the Military Collegium “and, moreover, the points on which it is required to send appropriate information to this commissionstay, and then a statement was sent from the High Senate about oneKyiv province, and not at all points. And about the Smolensk governorit was announced that reports had been submitted to the Senate, and about other governorsno statements were sent. And the language of the Military Collegium Gazettesent, although not to all points...", etc. The council was forced den, by his protocol of September 20, 1727, threaten the collegyams and offices with a fine if the statements continuewill be delayed, but as far as one can assume, this has had no effect. The council was able to return to workmission only on January 22, 1730, when its don was again listened todecision, but the Commission was unable to complete its work.

Many similar incidents apparently brought membersSupreme Council to conclusions on the need to reducestaff of various authorities. So, G.I. Golovkin categoricallystated: “The staff will look into it very much, because not only are there superfluous people, who can be demonized, but entire officesnewly made, for which there is no need.”

Position of the Senate regarding a number of requests from the Supreme Councilwas more than evasive. So, to the corresponding request aboutthe following report was received at the fiscal offices: “And how manyand where and is everyone against it the specified number have fiscal taxes, orwhere they don’t have it, and for what purpose, there is no news about that in the Senate.”. Inog Yes, the Senate proposed too slow and archaicsolving pressing issues. These include the proposalSenate at the height of the peasant uprisings of the 20s. “Restore special orders for the investigation of robbery and murderaffairs." In contrast to this, the Council took up peasant protestsniyami himself. When in 1728 a fire broke out in the Penza provincefreely large movement, the Council, by special decree, orderedmilitary units to “ruin to the ground” “thieves and robberyno one’s camps,” and the commanders appointed by M. M. Golitsyn had to report directly on the progress of the punitive expedition specifically to the Council.

To summarize, we note that the analysis of the activities of the highest government institutions in Russia in the 20-60s.XVIIIV. clearly illustrates their one-dimensionality as necessary elements of the political system of an absolute monarchy. Theircontinuity not only in general direction politics, but alsotheir very competence, positions, principles of formation,For current work and other issues up to registrationdocumentation, etc.

In my opinion, all this allows us to supplement to some extentgeneral idea existing in Soviet historiographyregarding the political system of RussiaXVIII V. Apparently, next allows us to more clearly understand the depth and versatility ofV. I. Lenin’s well-known description of the “old serfdom”society" in which coups were "ridiculously easy" as long as it was a matter of transferring power from one group to the feogave or two. Sometimes this characteristic gets simplifiedinterpretation, and the emphasis continues to be placed only on the fact that all those who succeeded each other inXVIIIV. governments carried outfasting policy.

History of higher institutions of the 20-60s.XVIII V. visibly by It also shows that absolutism as a system in these years was steadilystrengthened and acquired greater maturity compared to beforemarching period. Meanwhile, still very commonare discussions about the “insignificance” of Peter’s successorsI V counterbalance to the significance and scale of political changesthe callings of Peter himself. It seems that such a transfer of the center is more difficultity with a really important factor - the functioning of the faithhoaxes of absolutist governments - on the personal qualities of that- or another monarch at this stage of development of historiographyis simply archaic. It is especially important to realize this whenwriting textbooks and teaching aids, as well as publications, racesread to a wide readership.

Obviously, a certain adjustment of the establishedterms for a more correct definition of key problems Russian history XVIIIcentury, as well as the most promising putheir decisions. The more facts accumulate about highergovernment bodies, the functioning of which actually reflected the state of absolutism - the political superstructure at the stage of late feudalism , the clearer it becomes: invariably usedThe term “era of palace coups”, which has been around since the time of Klyuchevsky, does not at all reflect the basic essence of the period of the 20-60s.XVIIIcenturies. Considering the controversial nature of the statements madein this article of provisions, it is hardly worth proposing a specificprecise wording to define this period: it waswould be premature given the current state of sample developmentlems. However, we can already say unequivocally: such a formulation and a specific term should reflect the main tenetstrends in the socio-economic and political development of the countryus, and therefore include the definition of what was givennew time for the evolution of absolutism and the degree of its maturity.

Turning to the question of further ways of developing the problem, we emphasize: to this day it remains relevant for a long timethe thesis expressed by S.M. Troitsky on the need for a “monograph”carefully develop the history of the ruling class of feudal lords.”At the same time, the famous Soviet researcher believed that “I should followdoes not pay special attention to the study of specific contradictionswho is within the ruling class of feudal lords and those forms thatry took place in the struggle between individual layers of feudal lordsat one time or another" . Appeal to the history of supreme sovereignsnational institutions of RussiaXVIIIV. allows you to complement and conto concretize the general thesis of S. M. Troitsky. Apparently no lessproblems of “social stratification” in the environment are also importantstate class, factors that influenced the formation of hellministerial elite, which had real influence on the internalthe country's early and foreign policy. A special issue is undoubtedlyworthy of attention is the question of politicalthinking of this period, the study of socio-politicalviews of government officials of the 20-60s, finding outHow did the “programmatic” political guidelines of this time.

Chapter 2. Policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

2.1. Adjustment of Peter's reforms.

The Supreme Privy Council was created by a personal decree of February 8, 1726, consisting of A.D. Menshikova, F.M. Apraksina, G.I. Golovkina, A.I. Osterman, P.A. Tolstoy and D.M. Golitsyn'. The fact that it included the presidents of the Military, Admiralty and Foreign Collegiums meant that they were removed from the subordination of the Senate and their leadership was accountable directly to the Empress. Thus, the country's top leadership made it clear exactly which policy areas it recognized as priorities, and ensured that they were adopted

operational decisions, eliminating the very possibility of paralysis of executive power due to conflicts, such as the one that took place at the end of 1725. Minutes of council meetings indicate that it initially discussed the issue of division into departments, i.e., the distribution of spheres competence between its members, but this idea was not implemented. Meanwhile, in fact, such a division due to job responsibilities supreme leaders as presidents of the collegiums took place. But decisions in the council were made collectively, and therefore responsibility for them was collective.

The very first decisions of the council indicate that their members were clearly aware that its creation meant a radical restructuring of the entire system of central government bodies, and they sought, if possible, to give its existence a legitimate character. It is no coincidence that their first meeting was devoted to resolving issues about the functions, competence and powers of the council, and its relationships with other institutions. As a result, the well-known “opinion not in decree” appeared, which determined the position of the Senate subordinate to the council, and the three most important collegiums were actually equalized with it. since they were instructed to communicate with each other through promemories . Throughout February and the first half of March 1726, the supreme leaders (soon in this work they were joined by Duke Karl Friedrich, who was included in the council at the insistence of the EmpressHolstein) again and again returned to regulating the activities of the new body. The fruit of their efforts was a personal decree of March 7 “on the position of the Senate”, a week later a decree renaming the Senate from “government” to “high” (on June 14 of the same year the Synod was renamed from “government” to “holy”), and on 28 March another decree on the form of relations with the Senate).

In historical literature, the question of whether the leaders initially had oligarchic intentions and whether the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council actually meant a limitation of autocracy was actively discussed. In this case, Anisimov’s point of view seems most convincing to me. “According to its place in the system of power and competence,” he writes, “the Supreme Privy Council became the highest government authority in the form of a narrow,controlled by the autocrat body consisting of trusted representatives. His range of affairs was not limited - he was the highest legislative, and the highest judicial, and the highest administrative authority.” But the council “did not replace the Senate”; it “had jurisdiction primarily over matters that did not fall under existing legislative norms.” “It was extremely important,” notes Anisimov, “that the most acute issues were discussed in the Council in a narrow circle government problems, without becoming the subject of attention of the general public and thereby without damaging the prestige of the autocratic government" 1 .

As for the Empress, later, in a decree of January 1, 1727, she quite clearly explained: “We have established this Council as supreme and at our side for nothing else, so that in this heavy burden of the government in all state affairs the faithful with your advice and impartial announcements of your opinions, help and relief for uscommitted" . Anisimov quite convincingly shows that with a whole series of orders that outlined the range of issues that were to be reported to her personally, bypassing the council, Catherine ensured her independence from it. This is also indicated by many other examples, such as the history of the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the council, the empress’s editing of some council decisions, etc. But how should the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council be interpreted (and its appearance, undoubtedly, was an important transformation in the sphere of governance ) from the point of view of the history of reforms in RussiaXVIII centuries?

As will be seen from the following review of the council’s activities, its creation really contributed to increasing the level of management efficiency and essentially meant improving the system of authorities created by PeterI. The close attention of the leaders from the first days of the council’s existence to the regulation of its activities indicates that they acted strictly within the framework of the bureaucratic rules set by Peter and, albeit unconsciously, did not strive to destroy, but rather to complement his system. It is also worth noting that the council was created as a collegial body that acted in accordance with the General Regulations. In other words, the very creation of the council, in my opinion, meant the continuation of Peter’s reform. Let us now consider the specific activities of the Supreme Privy Council in critical issues domestic policy.

Already by decree of February 17, the first measure was implemented aimed at streamlining the collection of provisions for the army: the General Provision Master was subordinate to the Military Collegium with the right to report to the Supreme Privy Council about the incorrect actions of the college. On February 28, the Senate ordered the purchase of fodder and provisions from the population at the seller’s price, without causing any oppression to them.

A month later, on March 18, on behalf of the Military Collegium, instructions were issued to officers and soldiers sent to collect the poll tax, which, apparently, according to legislators, should have helped reduce abuses in this most painful issue for the state. In May, the Senate implemented last year's proposal of its Attorney General and sent Senator A.A. Matveev with an audit to the Moscow province. Meanwhile, the Supreme Privy Council was concerned primarily with financial issues. The leaders tried to solve it in two directions: on the one hand, by streamlining the system of accounting and control over the collection and expenditure of funds, and on the other, by saving money.

The first result of the work of the supreme leaders to streamline the financial sphere was the subordination of the State Office to the Chamber Board and the simultaneous abolition of the position of county rentmasters, announced by decree of July 15. The decree noted that with the introduction of the poll tax, the functions of rentmasters and chamberlains in the localities began to be duplicated, and ordered that only chamberlains be left. It was also considered advisable to concentrate the accounting of the income and expenditure of all financial resources in one place. On the same day, by another decree, the State Office was prohibited from independently issuing funds for any emergency expenses without the permission of the Empress or the Supreme Privy Council.

July 15 became a turning point in the fate of not only the States Office. On the same day, on the grounds that Moscow has its own magistrate, the office of the Chief Magistrate was abolished there, which was the first step in transforming city government, and this measure itself was one of the ways, as the leaders believed, to save money 1 . The first step was taken on the path to judicial reform: a personal decree was issued on the appointment of a governor in the city to correct judicial and investigative matters. Moreover, the argument was that district residents suffer great inconvenience from having to travel to provincial cities for legal matters. At the same time, court courts are overloaded with cases, which entails increased judicial red tape. However, complaints against the governor were allowed to the same court courts.

It is clear, however, that the restoration of the position of district governors was related not only to legal proceedings, but also to the local government system in general. “And before that,” the leaders believed, “before this, there were only governors in all cities and all sorts of affairs, both sovereign and petitioners, also, according to the decree sent from all the orders, they were sent alone and were without salary, and then the best rule came from one, and the people were happy" . This was a principled position, a very definite attitude towards the system of local government created by Peter. However, it is hardly fair to see in it nostalgia for the old. Neither Menshikov, nor Osterman, nor especially the Duke of Holstein could experience such nostalgia simply due to their origin and life experience. Rather, behind this reasoning there was a sober calculation, a real assessment of the current situation.

As further showed, the decrees of July 15 were only a prelude to the adoption of much more drastic decisions. The leaders understood perfectly well that the liquidation of the Moscow office of the Chief Magistrate alone could not solve the financial problem. They saw the main evil in an excessively large number of institutions different levels and overly inflated states. At the same time, as is clear from the above statement, they recalled that in pre-Petrine times, a significant part of the administrative apparatus did not receive a salary at all, but was fed “from business.” Back in April, Duke Karl Friedrich submitted an “opinion” in which he argued that “the civil staff is not burdened with anything so much as with a multitude of ministers, of which, according to reasoning, a great part can be dismissed.” And further, the Duke of Holstein noted that “there are many servants who, as before, here in the empire, according to the former custom, from ordered income, without burdening the staff, they could live contentedly.” The Duke was supported by Menshikov, who proposed to refuse to pay salaries to minor employees of the Patrimony and Justice Collegium, as well as local institutions. Such a measure, His Serene Highness believed, would not only save public funds, but also “cases can be resolved more efficiently and without continuation, since everyone will work tirelessly for an accident” . By the end of May, they decided “not to give salaries to ordered people, but to give them the allowance from business, according to the previous custom, from petitioners who give what of their own free will.” . It should be borne in mind that clerks were understood to mean minor employees who did not have class ranks.

However, it is significant that in the matter of staff reductions, the leaders first of all paid attention to the boards, i.e.

central rather than local institutions. Already in June 1726, they noted that from their bloated staff “there is a needless loss in salaries, and there is no success in business” . On July 13, members of the council submitted a report to the empress, in which, in particular, they wrote: “In such a plurality in management, there cannot be better success, for they are all considered to be one ear in hearing cases, and not only that there is a better way, but Because of many disagreements in business, business stops and continues, and in salary there is a needless loss.” .

Apparently, the ground for the report was prepared in advance, because already on July 16, on its basis, a personal decree appeared, almost verbatim repeating the arguments of the supreme leaders: “With such a large number of members in the management of affairs, there is no better success, but even more so in disagreements in affairs, stopping and madness is happening." The decree ordered that in each board there should be only a president, a vice-president, two advisers and two assessors, and even those were ordered to be present in the board not all at the same time, but only half of them, changing annually. Accordingly, salaries were supposed to be paid only to those currently in service. Thus, in relation to officials, a measure previously proposed for the army was implemented.

In connection with this reform, A.N. Filippov wrote that “the Council stood very close to the conditions of reality at that time and was keenly interested in all aspects of management... in this case, it noted... what it had to constantly come across in the activities of the boards.” However, the historian considered the decision to be a half-measure that “could not have a future.” The leaders, he believed, did not bother to study the causes of the vice they observed, and reduced the number of collegiate members, “not daring either to directly abandon collegiality or to defend Peter’s reform as a whole.” Filippov is certainly right that the excessive number of collegiate members was not an invention of the leaders and that it actually had a negative impact on the efficiency of decision-making, but his assessment of the reform seems too harsh. Firstly, the fact that the leaders did not encroach on the principle of collegiality indicates, on the one hand, that they did not aim at Peter’s reform of the central government as such, and on the other hand, it is quite clear that the rejection of this principle meant would have been a much more radical break, which in the specific historical conditions of that time could have had unpredictable consequences. Secondly, I note that the actual argumentation related to the ineffectiveness of the work of the boards both in the report of the council and then in the decree was essentially just a cover, while the goal was purely financial in nature. And finally, we must not forget that, at the very least, the boards existed in Russia for many more decades after that, generally coping with their functions.

At the end of 1726, the supreme leaders got rid of another structure that was unnecessary, in their opinion: by decree of December 30, the Waldmeister offices and the positions of the Waldmeisters themselves were destroyed, and the supervision of the forests was entrusted to the governor. The decree noted that “the people have a great burden from the Waldmeisters and forest wardens,” and explained that the Waldmeisters live off fines levied on the population, which naturally entails significant abuses. It is clear that the decision made was supposed to help ease social tension and, apparently, as the leaders believed, increase the solvency of the population. Meanwhile, the discussion was about softening Peter’s legislation on protected forests, which in turn was related to issues of maintaining and building a fleet. This was another pressing problem where Peter’s legacy directly collided with real life. The construction of the fleet required large financial investments and the involvement of significant human resources. Both were extremely difficult in the conditions of post-Petrine Russia. It has already been said above that in the first year after Peter’s death, the construction of the fleet, despite everything, continued. In February 1726, a personal decree was issued to continue the construction of ships in Bryansk . However, subsequently, already in 1728, the council, after much debate, was forced to come to a decision not to build new ships, but only to maintain existing ones. This happened already under PeterII, which is often associated with the young emperor’s lack of interest in maritime affairs. Accordingly, the leaders are accused of neglecting the favorite brainchild of Peter the Great. However, documents show that this measure, like others like it, was forced and dictated by the real economic conditions of the time, when, by the way, Russia did not wage any wars.

However, in 1726, as in the previous year, a number of laws were adopted aimed at maintaining Peter’s rule.

heritage. Of greatest importance, in particular, was the act of April 21, which confirmed Peter the Great’s decree of 1722 on the order of succession to the throne and gave the force of the law to the “Truth of the Will of the Monarchs.” On May 31, a personal decree confirmed the obligation to wear German dress and shave beards for retirees, and on August 4 - for the “philistines” of St. Petersburg.

Meanwhile, the discussion in the Supreme Privy Council on the question of how to reconcile the interests of the army and the people continued. The search for palliative solutions for a year and a half did not lead to any serious results: the treasury was practically not replenished, arrears grew, social tension, expressed primarily in peasant escapes, which threatened not only the well-being of the state, but also the well-being of the nobility, did not subside. It became clear to the leaders that it was necessary to take more radical comprehensive measures. A reflection of these sentiments was a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, submitted in November 1726. It was on its basis that a draft decree was prepared and presented to the Supreme Privy Council on January 9, 1727, which, after discussion in the council, was already implemented in February by several issued decrees .

The decree of January 9 openly stated the critical state of government affairs. “Based on the current state of our empire,” it said, “it shows that almost all those matters, both spiritual and secular, are in poor order and require speedy correction... not only the peasantry, which is responsible for maintaining the army, it is found in great poverty, and from great taxes and incessant executions and other disorders comes to extreme and complete ruin, but other matters, such as commerce, justice and mints, are found in a very ruined state.” Meanwhile, “the army is so needed that it is impossible for the state to stand without it... for this reason, it is necessary to take care of the peasants, because the soldier is connected to the peasant like the soul is to the body, and when the peasant is gone, then there will be no soldier.” The decree ordered the leaders to “have diligent consideration of both the land army and the navy, so that they are maintained without great burden to the people,” for which it was proposed to create special commissions on taxes and the army. It was also proposed, before a final decision on the size of the capitation, to defer its payment for 1727 until September, to pay part of the tax in kind, to shift the collection of taxes and recruits to the civil authorities, to transfer the regiments

from rural areas to cities, send some officers and soldiers from the nobility on long-term leave to save money, reduce the number of institutions, streamline the management of affairs in the Patrimonial Collegium, establish the Milking Office and the Revision Collegium, consider the issue of correcting the coinage, increase the amount of duties for the sale of villages, the liquidation of the Manufacturer Collegium, and the manufacturers meeting once a year in Moscow to discuss minor issues, with more important ones to be decided in the Kommerz Collegium .

As we see, the leaders (based on their own opinion) were offered a whole program of anti-crisis actions, which soon began to be implemented. Already on February 9, a decree was issued to defer payment for the May third of 1727 and return the officers sent to collect the poll tax to the regiments. At the same time, it was reported about the establishment of a commission on the army and navy, “so that they would be maintained without great burden to the people.”. On February 24, Yaguzhinsky’s long-standing proposal, repeated in a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, was implemented: “two parts of officers, and constables, and privates, who are from the nobility, should be allowed into their homes so that they can inspect their villages and put them in proper order.” At the same time, it was stipulated that this norm did not apply to officers from the non-ranking nobles.

On the same day, February 24, a comprehensive decree appeared, containing a number of important measures and almost verbatim repeating the decree of January 9: “Before everyone knows, with what vigilant diligence the blessed and eternal worthy of memory His Imperial Majesty, our dear husband and sovereign, worked in establishing good order in all matters, both spiritual and secular, and in composing decent regulations in the hope that a very proper order would be followed in all this for the benefit of the people; but by reasoning about the current state of Our Empire, it is shown that not only the peasants, on whom the maintenance of the army is entrusted, are in great poverty and from great taxes and incessant executions and other disorders come to extreme ruin, but also other matters, such as commerce, justice and The mints are in very poor condition and all require urgent correction.” The decree ordered the collection of the poll tax not directly from the peasants, but from landowners, elders and managers, thus establishing for the serf village the same order that had previously been

established for palace villages. Responsibility for the collection of the poll tax and its implementation was to be entrusted to the governor, who was given one staff officer to help. And so that there would be no disagreements between them due to seniority in ranks, it was decided to give the voivodes the rank of colonel for the duration of their duties.

The decree of February 24 again repeated the norm about sending part of the military on leave, and also ordered the transfer of regiments to cities. Moreover, the arguments that were heard during the discussion of this issue in 1725 were repeated almost verbatim: in urban conditions it is easier for officers to monitor their subordinates, keep them from escapes and other crimes, and can be collected much faster if necessary; when the regiment sets out on a campaign, it will be possible to concentrate the remaining patients and property in one place, which will not require unnecessary costs for numerous guards; the placement of regiments in cities will lead to a revival of trade, and the state will also be able to receive duties on goods brought here, but “most of all, this will be a great relief for the peasantry, and there will be no burden for citizenship.” .

The same decree carried out a number of measures to reorganize both central and local government bodies. “The multiplication of rulers and offices throughout the state,” noted the leaders, “not only serves to greatly burden the state, but also to the great burden of the people, and instead of what previously was addressed to one ruler in all matters, now to ten and, maybe more. And all those different stewards have their own special offices and office servants and their own special court, and each drags the poor people along in their own affairs. And all those managers and clerical servants want their own food, keeping silent about other disorders that occur every day from unscrupulous people, to the great burden of the people.” The decree of February 24 subordinated city magistrates to governors and destroyed the offices and offices of zemstvo commissars, which became unnecessary when the duties of collecting taxes were assigned to the governor. At the same time, judicial reform was carried out: court courts were liquidated, whose functions were transferred to the governors. The supreme leaders realized that the reform entailed strengthening the role of the College of Justice, and took measures to strengthen it. Under the Supreme Privy Council itself, a Milking Office was established, which structurally and organizationally had a collegiate structure. The same decree created the Revision Collegium, and the Patrimonial Collegium was transferred to Moscow, which was supposed to make it more accessible to landowners. The decree stated about the Manufactory Board that “since it cannot pass any important resolution without the Senate and our Cabinet, it receives its salary in vain.” The Collegium was liquidated, and its affairs were transferred to the Commerce Collegium. However, a month later, on March 28, it was recognized that it was “indecent” for the affairs of the Manufacturer Collegium to be in the Commerce Collegium, and therefore the Manufacture Office was established under the Senate. The decree of February 24 also contained measures to streamline the collection of fees for issuing documents from various institutions.

The reorganization of management continued in the next month: on March 7, the Racketeer Office was liquidated, and its functions were assigned to the Chief Prosecutor of the Senate, “so that there would be no wasted salaries.” In a personal decree of March 20, the “multiplying of staff” and the associated increase in salary costs were again criticized. The decree ordered the restoration of the pre-Petrine system of payment of salaries - “as it was before 1700”: to pay only those who were paid then, and “where they were content with business”, to also be satisfied with this. Where previously in the cities the governors did not have clerks, secretaries cannot be appointed there now. It was this decree (repeated on July 22 of the same year) that was a kind of apotheosis of the leaders’ criticism of Peter’s reforms. It is significant that he differed from others in the harshness of his tone and the absence of the usual detailed argumentation. The decree seemed to indicate the fatigue and irritation that had accumulated among the leaders, and their feeling of powerlessness to change anything radically.

In parallel with the work on reorganizing management and taxation, the leaders paid a lot of attention to trade issues, rightly believing that its activation could quickly bring income to the state. Back in the fall of 1726, the Russian ambassador to Holland B.I. Kurakin proposed opening the Arkhangelsk port for trade and the Empress ordered the Supreme Privy Council to make inquiries on this matter and report its opinion. In December, the council heard a Senate report on free trade and decided to create a Commerce Commission, headed by Osterman, which began its activities by calling on merchants to submit proposals for the “correction of commerce.” The question of Arkhangelsk was resolved at the beginning next year, when by decree of January 9 the port was opened and it was ordered that “everyone should be allowed to trade without restrictions.” Later, the Commerce Commission transferred to free trade a number of goods that had previously been farmed out, abolished a number of restrictive duties and contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for foreign merchants. But its most important task was the revision of Peter’s protectionist tariff of 1724, which, as Anisimov put it, was speculative, divorced from Russian reality, and brought more harm than good.

In accordance with the February decree and the opinion of the supreme leaders, expressed by them in numerous notes, the government decided to take urgent measures in the field of monetary circulation. The nature of the planned measures was similar to those taken under Peter: to mint a lightweight copper coin worth 2 million rubles. As A.I. Yukht noted, the government “was aware that this measure would have a negative impact on the general economic situation of the country,” but “it did not see any other way out of the financial crisis.” Sent to Moscow to organize what A.Ya. Volkov discovered that the mints looked “as if they had been destroyed by an enemy or a fire,” but he set to work energetically and over the next few years, about3 million rubles of lightweight five-kopeck coins.

The council's consideration of the issue of the poll tax and the maintenance of the army did not proceed smoothly. So, back in November 1726 P.A. Tolstoy proposed, instead of auditing arrears, which Menshikov, loyal to the interests of his department, insisted on, to audit funds in the Military, Admiralty and Kamerkollegii. Tolstoy was surprised that Peaceful time, with many officers on leave, the army was short of men, horses and supplies, and apparently rightly suspected possible abuses. Back in June of the same year, a decree was issued according to which the army regiments were ordered to submit receipts and expenditure books and account statements in good condition to the Revision Board, which was again strictly confirmed at the end of December. The Military Collegium proposed collecting taxes in kind from the population, but on Tolstoy’s initiative it was decided to give payers the opportunity to choose the form of payment themselves.

It is significant that despite all the difficulties and insoluble problems that the Supreme Privy Council faced, its activities were highly appreciated by foreign observers. Now the finances of this state are no longer undermined by unnecessary constructions of harbors and houses, poorly developed manufactories and factories, too extensive and inconvenient undertakings or feasts and pomp, and they are no longer forced by force, the Russians, to such luxury and festivities, to build houses and resettlement here their serfs,” wrote the Prussian envoy A. Mardefeld. - In the Supreme Privy Council, affairs are executed and dispatched quickly and after mature discussion, instead of, as before, while the late sovereign was busy building his ships and following his other inclinations, they lay dormant for a whole six months, not to mention countless other laudable changes » .

In May 1727 active work The Supreme Privy Council was interrupted by the death of CatherineIand the accession to the throne of PeterII. Menshikov's subsequent disgrace in September, as many researchers believe, changed her character and led to the triumph of the counter-reformist spirit, symbolized primarily by the move of the court, Senate and collegiums to Moscow. To verify these statements, let us again turn to the legislation.

Already on June 19, 1727, the order to transfer the Patrimonial Collegium to Moscow was confirmed, and in August the Chief Magistrate was liquidated, which became unnecessary after the liquidation of the city magistrates. At the same time, a burgomaster and two burgomasters were appointed to the St. Petersburg Town Hall for the merchant court. A year later, instead of city magistrates, cities were ordered to have town halls. In early autumn, the council considered the advisability of maintaining trade consulates in foreign countries, in particular in France and Spain. The Senate, in turn, relying on the opinion of the Commerce Collegium, believed that this “has no state benefit and it is hopeless to keep them profitable in the future, because the government and merchant goods sent there were sold, many at a premium.” As a result, it was decided to liquidate the consulate. It is unlikely that Anisimov was right in seeing here yet another evidence of the top leaders’ rejection of Peter’s policies, who cared about the penetration of Russian goods into remote corners of the planet, including America, even if it was unprofitable. About three years have already passed since the death of the great transformer - a period sufficient to be convinced of the hopelessness of this undertaking. The measure adopted by the leaders was purely pragmatic in nature. They looked at things soberly and considered it necessary to encourage Russian trade where there were opportunities and prospects for development, for which they took quite serious measures. Thus, in May 1728, a decree was issued on the establishment of special capital in Holland for external expenses, in order to thus support the exchange rate and increase the volume of Russian exports abroad).

By the fall of 1727, it became clear that the removal of the army from collecting the poll tax jeopardized the treasury receiving any money at all, and in September 1727, the military was again sent to the districts, although now subordinate to governors and voivodes; in January 1728 this measure was confirmed by a new decree. In the same January, a stone building was allowed in Moscow, and in April it was clarified that it required obtaining some special police permission. On February 3 of the following year, 1729, stone construction was allowed in other cities. On February 24, on the occasion of the coronation celebrations, the emperor announced a request for fines and easing of punishments, as well as forgiveness of the poll tax for the May third of the current year. Close attention was still paid to the control of income and expenses: a decree of April 11, 1728 required the immediate submission of accounts by the colleges to the Revision Board, and on December 9 it was announced that the salaries of officials guilty of such delays would be withheld. On May 1, the Senate recalled the need to regularly send statements from central government institutions to the Academy of Sciences for their publication. In July, the Milking Office was removed from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council and reassigned to the Senate with the proviso that it was still obliged to submit monthly information about its activities to the council. However, while relieving itself of some responsibilities, the council accepted others: ‘in April 1729 it was abolished Preobrazhenskaya Chancellery and cases “on the first two points” were ordered to be considered in the Supreme Privy Council.

The Order to governors and governors, issued on September 12, 1728, which regulated their activities in some detail, was important for streamlining management. Some researchers drew attention to the fact that the Order reproduced certain procedures of pre-Petrine times, in particular, the passing of state

sort of “according to a list”. However, the document itself was written in the tradition of Peter’s regulations and contained a direct reference to the General Regulations of 1720. There were many such references to the authority of his grandfather in other legislative acts of Peter’s timeII.

In the legislation of this period one can also find regulations that directly continue the policies of Peter the Great. Thus, on January 8, 1728, a decree was issued confirming that the main trading port of the country was still St. Petersburg, and on February 7, a decree was issued to complete the construction of the Peter and Paul Fortress there. In June, the tradesman Protopopov was sent to the Kursk province “to find ores,” and in August the Senate distributed surveyors among the provinces, instructing them to draw up land maps. On June 14, it was ordered from each province to send five people from officers and nobles to participate in the work of the Statutory Commission, but since the prospect of legislative activity apparently did not arouse enthusiasm, this order had to be repeated in November under the threat of confiscation of estates. However, six months later, in June 1729, the assembled nobles were sent home and new ones were ordered to be recruited in their place. In January 1729, a decree was issued ordering the continuation of the construction of the Ladoga Canal to Shlisselburg, and a year later they remembered the fine for not going to confession and communion, which had been canceled by Catherine, and decided to replenish the state treasury in this way.

The statement often found in literature about complete oblivion during the reign of Peter is also not entirely true.IIarmy and navy. Thus, on June 3, 1728, upon the recommendation of the Military Collegium, the Engineering Corps and the mining company were established, and their staffs were approved. In December 1729, the office of the Life Guards of the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments was created, and the decree on the annual dismissal of one third of the officers and privates from the nobility was confirmed. Measures were taken to strengthen the cities and forts of the Ufa and Solikamsk provinces as a “precaution against the Bashkirs.”

changes in the management and judicial system, financial and tax spheres, trade. It is equally obvious that the council did not have any specific political program, a plan of transformation, and especially one that would have some kind of ideological basis. All the activities of the leaders were a reaction to specific social, political and economic circumstances that developed in the country as a result of the radical reforms of Peter the Great. But this does not mean that the decisions of the new rulers of the country were made rashly and were unsystematic. Even though the situation was truly critical, all the measures implemented by the leaders went through long stage comprehensive discussions and the first serious steps were taken almost a year and a half after the death of Peter and six months after the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council. Moreover, in accordance with the bureaucratic procedure already established at the previous stage, almost every decision made by the council went through a stage expert assessment in the relevant department. It should also be taken into account that the people who found themselves in power were not random people. These were experienced, well-informed administrators who had gone through Peter's school. But unlike their teacher, who, for all his strict rationalism, was also partly a romantic, who had certain ideals and dreamed of achieving them at least in the distant future, the leaders showed themselves to be outright pragmatists. However, as the events of 1730 showed, at least some of them were not devoid of the ability to think big and look far ahead.

However, several questions arise. Firstly, what was real situation in the country and weren’t the leaders, as Anisimov believes, trying to exaggerate the story? Secondly, were the transformations carried out by the leaders really counter-reformative in nature and, thus, aimed at destroying what Peter had created? And even if so, does this mean a reversal of the modernization process?

As for the situation in the country, to characterize it it is worth turning to the monograph by P.N. Milyukov “State economy of Russia in the first quarter”XVIIIcenturies and the reform of Peter the Great." Even though many of his data were subsequently disputed by later researchers, on the whole the picture he painted of the economic crisis, I think, is correct. Meanwhile, such a detailed, numerically based

in Miliukov’s book, the picture was not known to the leaders, who based their judgments mainly on reports from the field and information about the amount of arrears. Therefore, for example, it is advisable to refer to a document such as the reports of A.A. Matveev about his revision of the Moscow province, where, as one might assume, the situation was not the worst. “In Alexandrova Sloboda,” wrote Matveev, “all the villages and villages, the peasants of all the villages were taxed and burdened with palace taxes beyond their limits, much imprudently from the main rulers of that settlement; a multitude of fugitives and emptiness have already appeared; and in the settlement, not only in villages and hamlets, not peasants, but direct beggars have their own yards; moreover, not without attacking burdens for one’s own, and not for the palace’s profit.” From Pereslavl-Zalessky, the senator reported: “I found incomprehensible thefts and thefts of not only state, but also capitation taxes from the chamberlain, commissars and clerks here, in which, according to the decrees, they had no decent receipts and expenditure books here at all, except for those lying around their rotten and dishonest notes in scraps; According to their search for more than 4,000, that stolen money has already been found from me.” In Suzdal, Matveev executed the copyist of the Cameroon office for the theft of more than 1000 rubles and, having punished many other officials, reported to St. Petersburg: “In this city there is a great increase in poverty from day to day among the peasants, 200 people or more, and from everywhere they, peasants, in The lower towns are undergoing numerous escapes due to their extreme poverty; there is nothing to pay the capitation fee with. The peasants of the synodal team submit petitions for grievances and excessive fees in excess of the per capita allowance salary." “Easiness in the payment of capitation money, withdrawal of military commands,” wrote S.M., commenting on these documents. Solovyov, - that’s all that the government could do for the peasants at the time described. But it could not eradicate the main evil - the desire of every superior to feed at the expense of the inferior and at the expense of the treasury; for this it was necessary to improve society, and this still had to wait.” 1 ^.

In the activities of Catherine's governmentsI and Petra II, main goal which, as already mentioned, was the search for funds to maintain the viability of the state, the following interrelated areas can be identified: 1) improvement of taxation, 2) transformation of the administrative system,3) measures in the field of trade and industry. Let's consider each of them separately.

As is clear from the materials of the discussion of issues related to the poll tax in the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council, members of the first post-Petrine governments saw the main flaw of Peter’s tax reform not in the principle of poll taxation itself, but in the imperfect mechanism for collecting taxes, firstly, not giving the ability to quickly take into account changes in the composition of payers, which led to impoverishment of the population and an increase in arrears, and secondly, in the use of military commands, which caused protest from the population and reduced the combat effectiveness of the army. The placement of regiments in rural areas with the entrustment of local residents duties to build regimental yards, which also made their duties unbearable. The constant growth of arrears raised serious doubts about the ability of the population to pay taxes in the amount established by Peter in principle, although this point of view was not shared by all the leaders. So, Menshikov, as N.I. writes. Pavlenko, believed that the amount of tax was not burdensome and “this idea was firmly entrenched in the prince’s head six years ago, when Peter’s governmentIdiscussed the amount of tax." Menshikov “remained true to the conviction that it is enough to reduce the number of clerks and messengers of all kinds, to eliminate the regimental yards in the districts that collected a poll tax, and to place soldiers in the barracks of the cities, and prosperity will come among the villagers.” Since Menshikov was the most authoritative of the council members, his opinion ultimately prevailed.

At the same time, it is worth noting that since the first experience of collecting the poll tax was carried out only in 1724 and its results could not be known to the main inspirer of the tax reform, the leaders had every reason to judge it based on the first results. And as people who took responsibility for governing the country, they, moreover, were obliged to take decisive measures to correct the situation. Anisimov believes that in reality the ruin of the country was not caused by the excessive amount of the poll tax, but was a consequence of the overstrain of economic forces during the many years of the Northern War, the increase in the number and size of indirect taxes and duties. In this he is undoubtedly right. However, the introduction of a poll tax, at first glance, of a very moderate size, in such conditions could turn out to be the straw after which the development of the situation crossed a critical line, and the measures that the leaders began to take were really the only

but possible to save the situation. Moreover, I note that they never agreed to a radical reduction in the size of the per capita tax, rightly believing that it would jeopardize the existence of the army. In general, the measures taken by the leaders should be considered quite reasonable: the withdrawal of military units from rural areas, the release of residents from the obligation to build regimental yards, a reduction in the size of the poll tax, forgiveness of arrears, variation in the collection of taxes in money and products with the introduction of virtually free prices for them, shifting the collection of taxes from peasants to landowners and managers, the concentration of collections in one hand - all this was supposed to help reduce social tension and give hope for replenishing the treasury. And the Tax Commission, which, by the way, was headed by D.M. Golitsyn, that is, a representative of the old aristocracy, which, according to some authors, was in opposition to Peter’s reforms, after working for several years, was unable to offer anything in return for the poll tax. Thus, no matter how one evaluates the leaders’ criticism of the tax reform, their real actions were aimed only at improving it, adjusting it, and adapting it to real living conditions.

The transformations were much more radical,

carried out by the leaders in the system of government of the country, and some of them can indeed be considered as counter-reform in relation to Petrine institutions. First of all, this relates to the liquidation of court courts, the creation of which was, as it were, the first step towards the implementation of the principle of separation of powers. However, this kind of theoretical reasoning was, of course, alien and unfamiliar to the leaders. For them, the court was just one of the many institutions that appeared locally during Peter's reforms. Moreover, in the absence of professional legal education in the country, and therefore of professional lawyers, given that law itself has not yet emerged as a sphere of independent social activity, the existence of court courts could in no way ensure a real separation of powers. Looking ahead, I will note that later, when judicial institutions were made independent during the provincial reform of 1775, a true separation of powers still did not work out, because the country and society were simply not ready for it.

As for the organization of local government, when assessing the activities of the leaders, we must remember that the system of institutions that existed locally at that time was created by Peter over a long period of time, and if its core was created in parallel with the collegiate reform, then at the same time many different institutions remained, that arose earlier, often spontaneously and unsystematically! The completion of the tax reform and the beginning of the functioning of the new taxation system is inevitable, even if economic situation in the country was more favorable, should have led to changes in the structure of local authorities, and these changes, of course, should have been aimed at simplifying the system as a whole and increasing its efficiency. This is exactly what was accomplished in 1726-1729. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the meaning of the measures taken was reduced to further centralization of management, to the creation of a clear vertical chain of executive power and, therefore, did not in any way contradict the spirit of Peter’s reform.

One cannot but recognize as reasonable the desire of the top leaders to reduce the cost of the apparatus by reducing it. It’s another matter that the voivodeship administration created, or rather recreated locally, was more archaic in form compared to Peter’s institutions, but it now functioned differently than in pre-Petrine Russia, if only because the voivode was subordinate not to the order in Moscow, but to the governor , which, in turn, was accountable to central authorities, whose organization was fundamentally different. One should not neglect the reasoning of the leaders that it was easier for the population to deal with one boss than with many. Of course, the new governors, like their predecessors,XVIIc., they did not disdain anything in order to fill their pockets, but to correct this evil, indeed, as Soloviev wrote, it was necessary, first of all, to correct morals, which was beyond the power of the leaders.

As for central institutions, as we have seen, all the efforts of the top leaders were aimed at reducing their cost, on the one hand, and increasing their efficiency by eliminating duplication of functions, on the other. And even if we agree with those historians who see in the reasoning of the supreme leaders their rejection of the very principle of collegiality, there is no real action They did not take any action to destroy it. Supremes

destroyed a number of previously existing institutions and created others, and new institutions were created on the same principles of collegiality, and their functioning was based on Peter's General Regulations and the Table of Ranks. The Supreme Privy Council itself, as already mentioned, was a collegial body. All of the above does not contradict the reduction in the number of collegiate members, which did not fundamentally change the order of decision-making in institutions. The decision of the top leaders to refuse to pay some officials’ salaries and to transfer them to feeding “out of business” looks somewhat different. Here one can indeed discern a significant deviation from Peter’s principles of organizing the administrative apparatus, which laid the foundations of the Russian bureaucracy. Of course, those who accuse the leaders of not understanding the essence of Peter’s reform are right, but they acted not on the basis of any ideological principles, but in subordination to circumstances. In their justification, however, it must be said that in reality, officials both at that time and later received their salaries extremely irregularly, with great delays and not always in full; payment of wages in food was practiced. So, to a certain extent, the rulers gave the force of law to what existeddefacto. The vast state needed a ramified and well-functioning administrative apparatus, but did not have the resources to maintain it.

The very fact of not only the liquidation by the leaders of some of Peter’s institutions, but also the creation of new ones by them testifies, in my opinion, to the fact that these actions of theirs were of a completely meaningful nature. Moreover, their reaction to the changing situation was quite quick. Thus, according to the decree of February 24, 1727, all responsibilities related to the collection of taxes in cities were assigned to city magistrates with personal responsibility their members for arrears. As a result, new abuses appeared and a stream of complaints from townspeople against them , which was one of the factors that predetermined their liquidation. Essentially, this was a resolution of the contradiction between the form of Peter the Great’s city institutions, dating back to foreign models, and the virtually enslaved state of the population of Russian cities,

in which even insignificant elements of self-government turned out to be ineffective.

In my opinion, the trade and industrial policy of the Supreme Privy Council can be characterized as quite reasonable and justified. The vzrkhovniki generally proceeded from the economically correct idea that trade could most likely bring much needed funds to the state. The protectionist tariff of 1724 caused significant damage to trade and caused many protests from both Russian and foreign merchants. The consequences of the closure of the Arkhangelsk port even earlier were also negative, which led to the destruction of the trade infrastructure that had developed over centuries and the ruin of many merchants. Therefore, the measures taken by the leaders were reasonable and timely. It is significant that they were in no hurry in these matters, and the Commission on Commerce they created completed work on the new tariff only by 1731. It was based, on the one hand, on the Dutch tariff (which once again proves that the clergy were true “chicks of Petrov’s nest”), and on the other, the opinions of merchants and trade management authorities. A positive role was played by the new bill of exchange charter, the abolition of a number of trade monopolies, permission to export goods from the Narva and Revel ports, the elimination of restrictions associated with the construction of merchant ships, and the introduction of deferments for arrears of customs duties. Experiencing an acute shortage of funds, the leaders, however, considered it possible to provide targeted support for individual industrial enterprises by providing tax breaks and government subsidies. In general, their trade and industrial policy was relatively more liberal and was in line with modernization processes.

So, in the first five years after the death of Peter the Great, the process of transformation in the country did not stop and was not reversed, although its pace, of course, slowed down sharply. The content of the new transformations was associated primarily with the adjustment of those Petrine reforms that did not withstand the clash with real life. However, in general, the policy of the new rulers of the country was characterized by continuity. Everything fundamental in Peter’s reforms - the social structure of society, the principles of organizing public service and power, the regular army and navy, the tax system, the administrative-territorial division of the country, established property relations, the secular nature of government and society, the country’s focus on an active foreign policy - remained unchanged . It is, apparently, right to draw another conclusion: the first years of the history of post-Petrine Russia proved that Peter’s reforms were basically irreversible, and irreversible precisely because they generally corresponded to the natural direction of the country’s development.

2.3. An attempt to limit autocracy

The idea of ​​creating a council was first formulated in approximate form during Peter’s lifetime by Heinrich Fick. He was a like-minded person of Prince D.M. Golitsyn. There is information that the formal project for the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council was drawn up by two major diplomats: the former Peter the Great's vice-chancellor Shafirov and the Holsteiner Bassevich. Each of them pursued his own interest - Shafirov hoped to become a member of the council as chancellor - minister of foreign affairs - and regain lost influence, and Bassevich hoped that his sovereign - as a member of the Russian august family - would lead the council.

They both miscalculated. The idea was intercepted by Menshikov, against whom it was originally directed.

Catherine was happy with the emergence of this strong and authoritative body, since it was supposed to harmonize the interests of the majority of individuals and groups and stabilize the situation at the top.

The powers that the Council received amazed both Russian and foreign diplomats. They saw in what was happening a decisive step towards changing the form of government - towards limiting autocracy. For the third point of the decree - after two formal ones - stated: “No decrees should be issued before, until they have completely taken place in the Privy Council, the protocols are not fixed and will not be read to Her Majesty for the most merciful approbation.”

We cannot agree with this characterization on only one point: by opposition, Miliukov understands the aristocratic grouping, without differentiating it in any way. Meanwhile, the creation of the Supreme Privy Council was not just an objective victory of the forces opposing Menshikov and Tolstoy at that moment (although it was they who most of all sought the creation of the Council), but forces of a very specific kind. The impetus for the emergence of the Council, for the activation of all groups and persons, was a rumor about a possible campaign by Prince M.M. Golitsyn to St. Petersburg at the head of the army stationed in Ukraine. The rumor was false, but very symptomatic. Everyone knew that the famous general, alien to political intrigues, could take such a step only at the request of his older brother, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich. Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich already at this time discussed with the aforementioned Heinrich Fick projects for the constitutional structure of Russia. And an important part of the rumors about the conspiracy was the intention of the hypothetical conspirators, by placing the young Peter 2 on the throne, to limit autocratic power.

As Klyuchevsky absolutely accurately wrote about Golitsyn, “based on the idea, subjectively or genealogically formed in him, that only the noble nobility is capable of maintaining lawful order in the country, he settled on the Swedish aristocracy and decided to make the Supreme Privy Council the stronghold of his plan.” But despite all the undoubted orientation of Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich towards the noble nobility as the guarantor and executor of constitutional reform, the goal of this reform was for him by no means class-based - selfish. Many opponents of precisely this development of the state structure were not yet able to understand what Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich understood and what they themselves vaguely felt in the last decade of Peter’s reign.

It is quite possible that the rumor that horrified Catherine’s circle was started with a clear goal - to shift the situation, to force Catherine and the all-powerful Menshikov at that moment to agree to a fundamental compromise, opening up the possibility of restructuring the system.

The fact that Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich became one of the six highest dignitaries in the empire was a huge victory for precisely that part of the opposition that was focused on a fundamental reform of the system. European reform, but not anti-Petrine reform.

Historians who believe that the creation of the Supreme Privy Council predetermined the possibility of the constitutional impulse of 1730, in my opinion, are absolutely right.

But at the moment of its emergence, the Supreme Privy Council faced, first of all, an extremely specific task- prevent the final ruin of the country. And all the signs of an imminent collapse were evident.

Conclusion

As a result of the research I came to the following conclusions:

— analysis of sources and literature allows us to consider the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council as an urgent need for the creation of a supreme body of power to resolve the most “important matters” of the state. In this capacity, the Supreme Privy Council became the heir to the “Unspoken Councils” of Peter 1;

- the composition of the Supreme Privy Council in the officially established alignment of political forces in society, during the struggle for power, was of a compromise nature, uniting representatives of two warring court factions: supporters of Catherine - the new nobility and supporters of Peter 2 - the court aristocracy;

- the compromise nature of the Supreme Privy Council predetermined the presence of constant confrontation between various groups of the nobility within its composition, complicated by Menshikov’s attempts to concentrate power in the Supreme Privy Council in his own hands;

- one can agree with Anisimov’s opinion that the policy of the Supreme Privy Council bore the features of centralization and concentration of management and pursued the goals of increasing efficiency, mobility of management, adapting the activities of the state apparatus to the specifics of the internal situation, internal political problems of the post-Petrine period;

- the attempt of the supreme leaders to limit autocracy by drawing up “Conditions” for the monarch may indicate the presence of plans for change in the “inventive of the supreme leaders” political structure in society, elements of constitutionalism.

List of used sources and literature.

Sources.

Legislative acts:

1. “The opinion is not in the decree on the newly established Supreme Privy Council”

2. Decree on the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council

3. Decree of the Supreme Privy Council, which granted the newly founded Academy of Sciences a monopoly right in the field of civil book printing in the country

4. Decree on the form of relations of the Supreme Privy Council with the Senate and collegiums

5. “Oath promise of members of the Supreme Privy Council”

6. "Conditions"

Works by contemporaries:

1. “A short story about the death of Peter the Great” by F. Prokopovich

2. “Manstein’s Notes on Russia 1727 – 1744.”

Diplomatic correspondence:

1. Dispatch English Ambassador Rondo.

Memoirs:

1. Notes from Minich.

Literature.

Andreev E.V. Representatives of the authorities after Peter I. Minsk, 1990.

Anisimov E.V. Materials of the commission D.M. Golitsyn about taxes. T. 91. M., 1973.

Anisimov E.V. The time of Peter's reforms. M., 1991.

Anisimov E.V. Travelers who have gone before us // Timelessness and temporary workers. L., 1991.

Anisimov E.V. Death in the office // Motherland. 1993. No. 1.

Belyavsky V.S. Cinderella on the throne of Russia // On Russian throne. M., 1993.

Boytsov M.A. “The Pleasure of the Supreme Lords” // With a sword and a torch: 1725 – 1825. M., 1991.

Boytsov M.A. “...Klia’s terrible voice” // With a sword and a torch. Palace coups in Russia: 1725 – 1825. M., 1991.

Vyazemsky B.L. Supreme Privy Council - St. Petersburg, 1998.

Golikova N.B., Kislyagina L.G. System of public administration // Essays on Russian culture of the 18th century. Part 2. M., 1987.

Gradovsky A.D. The highest administration of Russia in the 18th century and general prosecutors. St. Petersburg, 1966.

Gelbig G. von. Russian chosen ones. M.: Voenizdat, 1999.

Gordin Y. Between slavery and freedom. M., 1997.

Demidova N.F. Bureaucratization of the state apparatus of absolutism in the 17th centuryXVIIIcenturies // Absolutism in Russia. M., 1964.

Eroshkin. History of state institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia. M., 1989.

Ivanov I.I. Mysteries of Russian history of the 18th century. M., 2000.

Kamensky A.B. Russian nobility in 1767. // History of the USSR. 1990. No. 1.

Kamensky A.B. Russian empire in the 18th century: traditions and modernization. M., 1999.

Karamzin N.M. Note on ancient and new Russia. St. Petersburg, 1914.

Kostomarov N.I. Sovereigns and rebels: the reign of the House of Romanov before the accession of Catherine II to the throne. M., 1996.

Kostomarov N.I. Window to Europe: the reign of the House of Romanov before the accession of Catherine II to the throne. M., 1996.

Kostomarov N.I. Russian history in the biographies of its main figures. M., 1990.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history course. M., 1989.

Kurukin I.V. Shadow of Peter the Great // On the Russian throne. M., 1989.

Mavrodin V.V. The birth of a new Russia. L., 1988.

Miliukov P.N. Essays on the history of Russian culture.

Pavlenko N.I. Alexander Danilovich Menshikov. M., 1981.

Pavlenko N.I. Semi-powerful ruler: Historical chronicle. M., 1991.

Pavlenko N.I. Petrov's nest chicks. M., 1988. 2 Ibid. P.287. 1 Eroshkin. History of state institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia. P.247.

2 Gordin Y. Between slavery and freedom. P.101.

The Supreme Privy Council was created after the death of Peter the Great. Catherine's accession to the throne necessitated its organization in order to clarify the state of affairs: the empress was not capable of directing the activities of the Russian government.

Prerequisites

The establishment of the Supreme Privy Council, as many believed, was supposed to “calm down the offended feelings” of the old nobility, removed from governing by unborn figures. At the same time, it was not the form that had to change, but precisely the character and essence of the supreme power, because, having retained its titles, it turned into a state institution.

Many historians express the opinion that the main flaw in the system of government created by the Great Peter was the impossibility of combining the nature of executive power with the collegial principle, which is why the Supreme Privy Council was founded.

It turned out that the emergence of this highest advisory body was not so much the result of confrontation of political interests, but rather a necessity associated with filling the gap in the defective Petrine system at the level of senior management. The results of the short-lived activities of the Council were not very significant, since it had to act immediately after a tense and active era, when one reform replaced another, and great excitement was felt in all spheres of state life.

Reason for creation

The creation of the Supreme Privy Council was intended to understand the complex problems of Peter's reforms that remained unresolved. His activities clearly showed what was inherited by Catherine withstood the test of time, and what needed to be reorganized. Most consistently, the Supreme Council adhered to the line chosen by Peter in his policy regarding industry, although in general the general trend of its activities can be characterized as reconciling the interests of the people with the interests of the army, abandoning extensive military campaigns and not accepting any reforms in relation to the Russian army. At the same time, this institution responded in its activities to those needs and matters that required immediate solutions.

The date of establishment of this highest deliberative state institution was February 1726. General Field Marshal Menshikov, State Chancellor Golovkin, General Apraksin, Count Tolstoy, Baron Osterman and Prince Golitsyn were appointed its members. A month later, the Duke of Holstein, Catherine’s son-in-law and the Empress’s most trusted person, was also included in its composition. From the very beginning, the members of this highest body were exclusively followers of Peter, but soon Menshikov, who was in exile under Peter the Second, ousted Tolstoy. Some time later, Apraksin died, and the Duke of Holstein stopped attending meetings altogether. Of the originally appointed members of the Supreme Privy Council, only three representatives remained in its ranks - Osterman, Golitsyn and Golovkin. The composition of this deliberative supreme body has changed greatly. Gradually, power passed into the hands of powerful princely families - the Golitsyns and Dolgorukys.

Activity

By order of the Empress, the Senate was also subordinated to the Privy Council, which was initially demoted to the point that they decided to send it decrees from the Synod, which was previously equal to it. Under Menshikov, the newly created body tried to consolidate the power of the government. Ministers, as its members were called, together with senators swore allegiance to the empress. It was strictly forbidden to carry out decrees that were not signed by the empress and her brainchild, which was the Supreme Privy Council.

According to the testament of Catherine the First, it was this body that, during the childhood of Peter II, was granted power equivalent to the power of the sovereign. However, the Privy Council did not have the right to make changes only in the order of succession to the throne.

Changing the form of government

From the first moment of the establishment of this organization, many abroad predicted the possibility of attempts to change the form of government in Rus'. And they turned out to be right. When he died, which happened on the night of January 19, 1730, despite Catherine’s will, her descendants were removed from the throne. The pretext was the youth and frivolity of Elizabeth, the youngest heir of Peter, and the early childhood of their grandson, the son of Anna Petrovna. The issue of electing a Russian monarch was decided by the influential voice of Prince Golitsyn, who stated that attention should be paid to the senior line of the Petrine family, and therefore proposed the candidacy of Anna Ioannovna. The daughter of Ivan Alekseevich, who had been living in Courland for nineteen years, suited everyone, since she had no favorites in Russia. She seemed manageable and obedient, without despotism. In addition, such a decision was due to Golitsyn’s non-acceptance of Peter’s reforms. This narrowly individual tendency was also joined by the long-standing plan of the “sovereigns” to change the form of government, which, naturally, was easier to do under the reign of childless Anna.

"Conditions"

Taking advantage of the situation, the “rulers”, deciding to limit the somewhat autocratic power, demanded that Anna sign certain conditions, the so-called “Conditions”. According to them, it was the Supreme Privy Council that should have real power, and the role of the sovereign was reduced only to representative functions. This form of governance was new for Russia.

At the end of January 1730, the newly-minted empress signed the “Conditions” presented to her. From now on she is without approval Supreme Council could not start wars, conclude peace treaties, introduce new taxes or impose taxes. It was not within her competence to spend the treasury at her own discretion, to promote to ranks above the rank of colonel, to pay estates, to deprive nobles of life or property without trial, and most importantly, to appoint an heir to the throne.

The struggle to revise the “Conditions”

Anna Ioannovna, having entered the Mother See, went to the Assumption Cathedral, where the highest government officials and troops swore allegiance to the empress. The new form of the oath was deprived of some previous expressions that meant autocracy; it did not mention the rights vested in the Supreme Secret Body. Meanwhile, the struggle between the two parties - the “supreme leaders” and supporters of the autocracy - intensified. In the ranks of the latter, P. Yaguzhinsky, Feofan Prokopovich and A. Osterman played an active role. They were supported by broad sections of the nobility who wanted a revision of the “Conditions”. The discontent was primarily due to the strengthening of a narrow circle of members of the Privy Council. In addition, the majority of the representatives of the gentry, as the nobility was called at that time, saw the intention to establish an oligarchy in Russia and the desire to assign two families - the Dolgorukys and the Golitsyns - the right to elect a monarch and change the form of government.

Cancellation of "Conditions"

In February 1730, a large group of representatives of the nobility, numbering, according to some sources, up to eight hundred people, came to the palace to submit a petition to Anna Ioannovna. Among them there were quite a lot of guards officers. In the petition, the empress expressed herself together with the nobility to once again revise the form of government in order to make it acceptable to the entire Russian people. Anna, due to her character, was somewhat hesitant, but her older sister finally forced her to sign the petition. In it, the nobles asked to accept complete autocracy and destroy the points of the “Conditions”.

Anna, under new conditions, secured the approval of the confused “higher-ups”: they had no choice but to nod their heads in agreement. According to a contemporary, they had no other choice, since at the slightest opposition or disapproval, the guards would attack them. Anna happily publicly tore up not only the “Conditions”, but also her own letter accepting their points.

On March 1, 1730, under the conditions of full-fledged autocracy, the people once again took the oath to the empress. And just three days later, the Manifesto of March 4 abolished the Supreme Privy Council.

The fates of its former members turned out differently. was dismissed, and some time later he died. His brother, as well as three of the four Dolgorukovs, were executed during Anna's reign. The repressions spared only one of them - Vasily Vladimirovich, who was acquitted, returned from exile and, moreover, appointed head of the military board.

Osterman held the most important government post during the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna. Moreover, in 1740-1741 he briefly became the de facto ruler of the country, but as a result of another defeat he was exiled to Berezov.

The Supreme Privy Council was established - the highest advisory body under the Empress, which was in charge of the main state internal and external affairs of Russia.

After the death of Emperor Peter I in 1725, his wife Ekaterina Alekseevna ascended the throne, creating from among the associates of the late emperor the Supreme Privy Council, which was supposed to advise the empress on what to do when making government decisions. Collegiums were subordinated to the Council, and the role of the Senate was reduced, which was reflected, in particular, in its renaming from the “Governing Senate” to the “High Senate”.

The first composition of the Privy Council included seven people: A. D. Menshikov, F. M. Apraksin, G. I. Golovkin, P. A. Tolstoy, A. I. Osterman, D. M. Golitsyn and the Empress’s son-in-law Duke Karl of Holstein .

Members of the Supreme Privy Council developed for Catherine I “an opinion not in the decree on the new established Privy Council,” which established the rights and functions of this body. It was assumed that all major decisions were to be made only by the Supreme Privy Council, and any imperial decree was to end with the phrase “given in the Privy Council.” Issues of foreign policy, the army and navy, the appointment of senior officials (including senators), control over the activities of the collegiums, financial management, control, investigative and supervisory functions were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Council.

The “top leaders” tried to resolve financial issues that were at the center of the council’s activities in two directions: by streamlining the system of accounting and control over government revenues and expenses and by saving money. The collection of poll taxes and recruits was transferred from the army to the civil authorities, military units were withdrawn from rural areas to cities, and some noble officers were sent on long vacations without payment of salary. In order to save money, the members of the Council decided to liquidate a number of local institutions (court courts, offices of zemstvo commissars, Waldmaster offices) and reduce the number of local employees. Some minor officials who did not have a class rank were deprived of their salaries.

The Supreme Privy Council lifted restrictions on trade in certain goods, abolished many restrictive duties and created favorable conditions for foreign merchants, in particular, previously prohibited trade through the Arkhangelsk port was allowed. In 1726, an alliance treaty was concluded with Austria, which for several decades determined the nature of Russia’s policy in the international arena.

If under Catherine I the Council was an advisory body with broad powers, then under Peter II it concentrated all power in its hands. At first, Menshikov was in charge of the Council, but in September 1727 he was arrested and exiled to Siberia. After the death of Peter II in January 1730, the Supreme Privy Council invited Anna Ioannovna, the Dowager Duchess of Courland, to the throne. At the same time, on the initiative of Golitsyn, it was decided to carry out a reform of the political system of Russia through the actual elimination of the autocracy and the introduction of a limited monarchy. To this end, Council members proposed future empress sign special conditions- “Conditions”, according to which she was deprived of the opportunity to independently make political decisions: make peace and declare war, appoint to government posts, change the taxation system.

The lack of unity among supporters of the Supreme Privy Council, who were trying to limit the power of the Empress, allowed Anna Ioannovna, who arrived in Moscow, to publicly tear apart the “Conditions,” relying on the support of the middle and petty nobility and the guard.

By the Manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, the Supreme Privy Council was abolished, and most of its members were sent into exile.

Lit.: Anisimov E.V. Russia without Peter: 1725-1740. St. Petersburg, 1994; Vyazemsky B. L. Supreme Privy Council. St. Petersburg, 1909; Ostrovsky V. Power in secret. How Russia was left without the House of Lords // St. Petersburg Diary. 2006. July 31 (No. 29 (88));Minutes of the Supreme Privy Council, 1726-1730. M., 1858;Filippov A. N. History of the Senate during the reign of the Supreme Privy Council and the Cabinet. Yuryev, 1895; Filippov A. N. The Cabinet of Ministers and its comparison with the Supreme Privy Council: Speech delivered at the ceremonial meeting of the Imperial Yuryev University, December 12, 1897 Yuryev, 1898.

Creation of the Council

The decree on the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council was issued in February 1726. Field Marshal General His Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, Admiral General Count Apraksin, State Chancellor Count Golovkin, Count Tolstoy, Prince Dimitry Golitsyn and Baron Osterman were appointed as its members. A month later, the empress’s son-in-law, the Duke of Holstein, was included in the number of members of the Supreme Privy Council, on whose zeal, as the empress officially declared, we can fully rely.

The Supreme Privy Council, in which Alexander Danilovich Menshikov took the leading role, immediately subjugated the Senate and collegiums. The ruling Senate was humiliated to such an extent that decrees were sent there not only from the Council, but also from the Synod, which was previously equal to it. Then the title “governor” was taken away from the Senate, replacing it with “highly trusted”, and then simply “high”. Even under Menshikov, the Supreme Privy Council tried to strengthen government power for itself; ministers, as members of the Supreme Privy Council were called, and senators swore allegiance to the empress or to the regulations of the Supreme Privy Council. It was forbidden to execute decrees that were not signed by the Empress and the Council.

Strengthening power, Catherine's testament

According to the testament (testament) of Catherine I, the Supreme Privy Council during the minority of Peter II was granted power equal to the power of the sovereign, only in the matter of the order of succession to the throne, the Council could not make changes. But no one looked at the last point of the testament when the leaders, that is, members of the Supreme Privy Council, elected Anna Ioannovna to the throne.

Alexander Danilovich Menshikov

When created, the Supreme Privy Council included almost exclusively “chicks of Petrov’s nest,” but even under Catherine I, Count Tolstoy was ousted by Menshikov; then, under Peter II, Menshikov himself fell into disgrace and went into exile; Count Apraksin died; the Duke of Holstein has long ceased to be in the Council; Of the original members of the Supreme Privy Council, three remained - Golitsyn, Golovkin and Osterman. Under the influence of the Dolgorukys, the composition of the Supreme Privy Council changed: dominance passed into the hands of the princely families of the Dolgorukys and Golitsyns.

Conditions

In 1730, after the death of Peter II, half of the 8 members of the Council were the Dolgorukovs (princes Vasily Lukich, Ivan Alekseevich, Vasily Vladimirovich and Alexey Grigorievich), who were supported by the Golitsyn brothers (Dmitry and Mikhail Mikhailovich). Dmitry Golitsyn drew up a draft constitution. However, part of the Russian nobility, as well as Council members Osterman and Golovkin, opposed the Dolgorukovs’ plans. However, part of the Russian nobility, as well as Osterman and Golovkin, opposed the Dolgorukovs’ plans.

Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn

The rulers chose the Tsar's youngest daughter, Anna Ioannovna, as the next empress. She lived in Courland for 19 years and had no favorites or parties in Russia. This suited everyone. They also found it quite manageable. Taking advantage of the situation, the leaders decided to limit autocratic power by demanding that Anna sign certain conditions, the so-called “Conditions”. According to the “Conditions,” real power in Russia passed to the Supreme Privy Council, and the role of the monarch for the first time was reduced to representative functions.

Conditions

On January 28 (February 8), 1730, Anna signed the “Conditions”, according to which, without the Supreme Privy Council, she could not declare war or make peace, introduce new taxes and taxes, spend the treasury at her own discretion, promote to ranks higher than colonel, grant estates, without trial, deprive a nobleman of life and property, enter into marriage, and appoint an heir to the throne.

Portrait of Anna Ioannovna on silk,1732

The struggle of two parties in relation to the new state structure continued. The leaders sought to convince Anna to confirm their new powers. Supporters of autocracy (A. I. Osterman, Feofan Prokopovich, P. I. Yaguzhinsky, A. D. Kantemir) and wide circles The nobility wanted a revision of the “Conditions” signed in Mitau. The ferment arose primarily from dissatisfaction with the strengthening of a narrow group of Council members.

Anna Ioannovna tears up the Conditions. Abolition of the Council

On February 25 (March 7), 1730, a large group of nobility (according to various sources from 150 to 800), including many guards officers, came to the palace and submitted a petition to Anna Ioannovna. The petition expressed a request to the empress, together with the nobility, to reconsider a form of government that would be pleasing to all the people. Anna hesitated, but her sister Ekaterina Ioannovna decisively forced the Empress to sign the petition. Representatives of the nobility deliberated briefly and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon submitted a new petition, in which they asked the empress to accept full autocracy and destroy the clauses of the “Conditions”. When Anna asked the confused leaders for approval for the new conditions, they only nodded their heads in agreement. As a contemporary notes: “It was their luck that they did not move then; if they had shown even the slightest disapproval of the nobility’s verdict, the guards would have thrown them out the window.”

Anna Ioannovna breaks the Conditions

Relying on the support of the guard, as well as the middle and minor nobility, Anna publicly tore up the “Conditions” and her letter of acceptance. On March 1 (12), 1730, the people took the oath for the second time to Empress Anna Ioannovna on the terms of complete autocracy. By the Manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, the Supreme Privy Council was abolished.