The 1917 revolution was caused by. But it did not proceed according to a pre-written script, where everything was predetermined and roles were assigned. This is confirmed by the testimony of participants and eyewitnesses.
On the morning of February 23, or March 8 Gregorian calendar, workers of the Vyborg side with slogans “Bread!” and "Down with war!" took to the streets to express their long-simmering discontent on International Women's Day. They were joined by workers from neighboring enterprises, and then unrest began in other areas of the city.
The workers' protests surprised no one. The artist Alexandre Benois wrote in his diary: "On Vyborg side There were big riots due to grain difficulties (one must only be surprised that they have not happened yet!)"
Eyewitnesses did not discern the dawn of the revolution in the events of the day. Socialist-Revolutionary Vladimir Zenzinov recalled that although “everywhere in the city they were talking about the strike movement that had begun in the St. Petersburg factories, it never occurred to anyone to consider this the beginning of the revolution.”
The very next day the process acquired an avalanche-like character. Historian Alexander Shubin writes that although the commander of the Petrograd Military District, Lieutenant General Sergei Khabalov, “urgently allocated bread to the population from military reserves, but now this did not stop the unrest... They had already come to the conclusion that the System was to blame for their troubles. The demonstrators carried slogans "Down with autocracy!"
Members of opposition parties became more active. On February 24, Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze said: “Ignoring the street is a characteristic of both the government and many of us. But the street has already spoken, gentlemen, and this street now cannot be ignored.”
Subsequent events confirmed the correctness of Chkheidze’s words. The reports from the Security Department said that in the evening near Gostiny Dvor, “a mixed detachment of the 9th Reserve Cavalry Regiment and a platoon of the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment opened fire on the crowd of demonstrators.” During the dispersal of the rally on Znamenskaya Square, several dozen people were killed and wounded. The demonstrators were shot at Sadovaya Street, Liteiny and Vladimirsky prospects.
Summarized the events of three days. He reported to Mogilev to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, where Nicholas II was:
“Rumours that suddenly spread in Petrograd about the upcoming supposed limitation of the daily supply of baked bread... caused increased purchases of bread by the public... On this basis, on February 23, a strike broke out in the capital, accompanied by street riots. On the first day, about 90 thousand workers went on strike, on the second - up to 160 thousand, today - about 200 thousand."
Nicholas II demanded from Khabalov “to stop the riots in the capital tomorrow, which are unacceptable in hard times wars with Germany and Austria."
Uprising of the Petrograd garrison
On Sunday morning, February 26, citizens discovered that the bridges, streets and alleys leading from the working-class neighborhoods to the center were occupied by reinforced police and military units. Signs signed by Khabalov hung on the walls:
“In recent days, there have been riots in Petrograd, accompanied by violence and encroachments on the lives of military and police officials. I prohibit any gatherings on the streets. I warn the population of Petrograd that I have confirmed to the troops to use weapons, stopping at nothing to restore order in the capital.”
But not everyone was ready to shoot at the people. On the contrary, the 4th company of the reserve battalion of the Life Guards Regiment, refusing to open fire on the demonstrators, fired at the mounted police. With the help of the Preobrazhensky soldiers, the company was disarmed, and 19 instigators were sent to the Peter and Paul Fortress.
Late in the evening, during a meeting of the Russian government in the Prime Minister's apartment, the majority of ministers, tired of criticism of the Duma Zlatoust, spoke out in favor of dissolution. Golitsyn, with the consent of Nicholas II, announced the end of the session on February 26, setting a date for the resumption of the Duma in April.
This decision was very strange - the riots began not through the fault of the Duma. Apparently, the government did not understand what to do in the current situation.
The order to shoot at demonstrators caused discontent in parts of the capital's garrison. On the morning of February 27, the training team of the reserve battalion of the Volyn Life Guards Regiment rebelled.
Senior non-commissioned officer Timofey Kirpichnikov, nicknamed “Fighter,” led the Volyn residents out into the street. Soldiers from other units and demonstrators began to join them. Alexander Kerensky recalled that “on the morning of February 27, the two hundred thousand Petrograd garrison, completely confused by the events that had taken place, found itself without officers. The Council had not yet been proclaimed, and chaos reigned in the city.”
In the afternoon, Minister of War Mikhail Belyaev informed Headquarters that the unrest that had begun in some units was “firmly and energetically suppressed by the companies and battalions that remained faithful to their duty.”
Belyaev was wishful thinking, misinforming the emperor. The rioting crowd reached the Kresty prison and freed the prisoners. Among them were members of the working group of the Central Military-Industrial Committee, who were arrested by the police on the night of January 27. They all headed towards the Tauride Palace.
Loose and anxious
The deputies were already there. After hearing the decree of dissolution, they gathered for a meeting. Various proposals were made, including not to disperse and to declare the Duma a Constituent Assembly. But the majority of deputies were against it.
Vasily Shulgin recalled: “The question was this: not to obey the decree of the sovereign emperor, that is, to continue the meetings of the Duma, means to take the revolutionary path... Having disobeyed the monarch, the State Duma would thereby raise the banner of the uprising and would have to become the head of this uprising with all its consequences... Neither the overwhelming majority of us, right down to the cadets, were completely incapable of this... Alarmed, excited, somehow spiritually clung to each other... Even people who had been at enmity for many years suddenly felt that there was something that everyone is equally dangerous, menacing, disgusting... This something was a street... a street crowd..."
Excited deputies acted cunningly by electing the Temporary Committee State Duma for “establishing order in the city of Petrograd and for communication with institutions and individuals.”
Leon Trotsky noted: “Not a word about what kind of order these gentlemen are thinking of restoring, nor about what institutions they are going to deal with.” The deputies hoped to win in any development of events...
Meanwhile, Social Democrat Nikolai Sukhanov testified that “soldiers were breaking through in ever greater numbers and more. They huddled in heaps, spread through the halls like sheep without a shepherd, and filled the palace. There were no shepherds."
At the same time, people "flocked to the palace large number Petersburg public figures of various classes, ranks, calibers and specialties,” among which there were plenty of candidates for the role of “shepherds.”
© Public domain
© Public domain
Soon the initiative group led by announced the creation of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The committee appealed to the workers to immediately elect deputies to the Petrograd Soviet. At the suggestion of the Bolshevik Vyacheslav Molotov, they also approached the garrison units with a proposal to send their representatives to the Council. At 9 pm, Social Democrat Nikolai Sokolov opened the first meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, at which the executive committee of the Soviet, headed by Chkheidze, was elected.
The agony of royal power
On the evening of February 27, when two authorities arose in the Tauride Palace, Nicholas II for the first time commented in his diary on the events taking place in the capital: “Unrest began in Petrograd a few days ago. Unfortunately, troops began to take part in them. It’s a disgusting feeling to be so far away and receive fragmentary bad news!
The emperor could still suppress the revolution that had begun.
Arriving at the Tauride Palace, Sukhanov asked questions: “... what was done? And what should have been done? Are the stations occupied in case of troops moving from the front and from the provinces against St. Petersburg? Are the treasury, the state bank, and the telegraph office occupied and protected? What measures are taken? taken to arrest the tsarist government and where is it? What is being done to bring the remaining, neutral, and perhaps even “loyal” part of the garrison to the side of the revolution? Have measures been taken to destroy the police centers of tsarism - the police department and the secret police? their archives? What is the situation with the security of the city and food warehouses? What measures have been taken to combat pogroms, Black Hundred provocations, and police attacks from around the corner? Are any of them protected? real power the center of the revolution is the Tauride Palace, where a meeting of the Council of Workers' Deputies is scheduled to open in two hours? And have any bodies been created that are capable of serving all these tasks in one way or another?..”
Sukhanov later admitted: “Then I did not know and would not have been able to answer these questions. But now I know well: nothing was done...”
Neither the emperor nor his supporters took advantage of the weakness of the new inhabitants of the Tauride Palace. As Lieutenant General Dmitry Filatiev, a professor at the Nikolaev Military Academy, later claimed, it was “easily possible to suppress the “rebellion” of the capital’s garrison with the help of one cavalry division.” However, there was no general capable of this.
Moreover, the generals led by Mikhail Alekseev and the deputies led by Mikhail Rodzianko did not allow the emperor to return to the capital.
Already on February 28, Belyaev, having reported to Headquarters that the “military mutiny” he had with “the few units remaining faithful to duty has not yet been able to be extinguished,” asked for the urgent sending of “really reliable units, and in sufficient numbers, for simultaneous actions in various parts of the city ".
By this time, the insurgent people had captured the Admiralty, the Arsenal, the Peter and Paul Fortress, the Mariinsky and Winter Palaces, destroyed and set fire to the buildings of the District Court, the Gendarmerie Department, the House of Pre-trial Detention, and several police stations.
The revolution of the year was an epochal event in world history. As a result of this revolution, power changed in Russia and a civil war followed, then collectivization and industrialization. The revolutionary storm set in motion political parties and organizations, councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies. The attitude of society towards the revolution was ambiguous. And in our article we would like to draw attention to the content of personal documents of witnesses of those events.
According to the memoirs of priest Sergei Sidorov: “Moscow was gripped by the alarming fever of the revolutionary days.” After the October Revolution, the priest calls Rus' dying and notes that the revolution destroyed his familiar world, where he was happy in his own way. From the notes of Father Sergius: “It was the autumn of 1918. The hetman was still reigning in Kyiv, but in the depths of Ukraine the imminence of a rebellion was already felt, destroying the last remnants of the estates. In the evenings fires blazed, here and there murders were heard.
The landowners hurried to the cities where the Germans were stationed, where they had the opportunity not to wait for death every day.” In February 1917, food riots occurred in Moscow, and a little later pogroms began throughout almost the entire country. So, for example, the author writes: “And all around the estates were already burning, and the turn of destruction was approaching Nikolaevka.” In 1918, Sergei Alekseevich entered the Kyiv Theological Academy, he completed two courses, and at the same time got a job at Polira, which was the name of the Department for the liquidation of religious utensils at the Kiev Gubernia Social Security Service. The apogee of revolutionary events in relation to this family was the execution of the father of the family, Alexei Mikhailovich. The execution of his father did not affect the official position of Sergei’s brother, Alexei, since he worked at the university and was a recognized specialist. At the same time, he could never forgive the revolution for the death of his father2. The French attaché J. Sadoul in his “Notes” talks about the events of the revolution and civil war, of which he was an eyewitness and participant
myself. The meetings are described and apt characteristics of prominent figures of the party and the Soviet state of that period are given. In the summer of 1917, Jacques Sadoul was appointed attaché to the French military mission in Petrograd. In his almost daily notes, Sadoul considers revolutionary events in Russia through the prism of the interests of France and the Entente. But Sadoul was greatly influenced by the revolution itself. He was able to see “along with the inevitable destructive and violent breakdown of the old regime, the admirable creative efforts of the government of workers and peasants of Russia, the ever-increasing trust of the people in Soviet power - undoubted evidence of the consolidation of the forces of the Russian Revolution.” It took the French attaché several months to understand that the impending intervention allied forces to Russia - this is not helping her in the fight against Germany, as he convinced himself and the Soviet leadership at the beginning of 1918, but a fight, first of all, against the revolution.
Having become a member of the French Communist Group, Sadoul appeared in print, wrote leaflets, brochures, and appeals to French soldiers. Explaining true goals interventionists in Russia, set out in a form understandable to ordinary people the tasks and goals of the Russian revolution. The leitmotif of all his speeches were the words “not a single step on Russian soil, against the Russian people!” Not a single shot fired against the Revolution!” In his numerous appeals to the soldiers of France and French workers, Sadoul appealed to their patriotic feelings and awakened their pride in the glorious revolutionary past. “Has the revolutionary flame gone out in us forever, comrades? Let us be worthy of our great past…” read the French sailors in April 1919 in a leaflet secretly delivered to their ship from Odessa and signed with the name of the rebellious captain. At the end of 1918, Sadoul published in Moscow in French the brochure “Long live the Republic of Soviets!”, which received a grateful response from V.I. Lenin3. Memoirs of foreign ambassadors about the Russian Revolution of 1917 are of great interest to researchers. It is no coincidence that the memoirs of the ambassadors of France and England were translated and published in Soviet Russia in the early 20s, and since then have been republished several times. Maurice Georges Palaiologue was the French Ambassador to Russia from July 1914 to May 1917, and his diary entries, later transcribed and expanded, are undoubtedly of great interest. In his diaries, the author evaluates Stolypin's reforms, the deterioration of the situation of workers, rising prices, the rise of the revolutionary movement, etc. The events of January 1917 in Petrograd, various demonstrations, and the session of the State Duma were covered in his memoirs.
In his notes for the days preceding February 23, 1917, he writes: “Petrograd is suffering from a shortage of bread and firewood, the people are suffering.” Among the reasons explaining the situation, he points to objective ones: the railway crisis, a harsh and snowy winter that led to snowy roads, but is silent about the main reason - the inability of the authorities to organize food supplies to the capital. He notes that popular processions and crowded demonstrations took place in Petrograd, shots were heard, and notes that he was concerned about the continuation of the war, “how the armies at the front would accept the events in the capital.” The Russian publicist N. Sukhanov in his book talks about the beginning of the revolution, when he was the editor of the inter-party but left-wing Sovremennik, which took an internationalist course during the war. “On the first day of the revolution, many could not believe it. No party was preparing for the great revolution. Everyone dreamed, thought, anticipated, “felt,” but no one could imagine that it would come so soon. "Revolution! – this is too incredible. Revolution! - this, as everyone knows, is not reality, but only a dream. The dream of generations, long difficult decades…” writes N. Sukhanov.
According to him, the factory rallies went beyond the gates and the government was unable to stop them. At the same time, the weakness of the power of the entire apparatus was revealed, and the city was filled with rumors. The author notes that meanwhile the movement was growing. The powerlessness of the police apparatus became more and more obvious every hour. The rallies took place almost legally, and the military units, represented by their commanders, did not dare to take any active positions against the growing crowds that filled the main streets. On Friday evening, people in the city said that elections to the Council of Workers' Deputies were taking place at the factories. Councils began to be created as bodies of the new government.
In our article we analyzed the memories of Russian and French witnesses February events 1917. Each of them described in his own way the revolutionary days that changed the situation in the empire. The main leitmotif of the memories of Russian eyewitnesses are the issues of food riots, pogroms and the tragedy of an individual family. At the same time, it shows the weakness of the government, mass rallies that grew into demonstrations and the creation of Soviets. French diplomats pay attention to Stolypin's reforms, the worsening position of the working class, rising prices, and the rise of the revolutionary movement. For example, J. Sadoul notes that the goal of Western interventionists was to fight the revolution, while the author himself sympathized with its ideas.
Abdikalikova Dinara Niyazbekovna (Eurasian National University named after L.N. Gumilyov, Republic of Kazakhstan)
The study of various aspects of the revolutions of 1917 is increasingly beginning to be affected by overall change priorities of research issues in modern conditions: special attention to historical memory and the historical consciousness of the era, “spatial” and “visual” turns in the study of the past. However, talking about a qualitative breakthrough in the implementation of new research interests not yet. I would like to hope that the 90th anniversary of the revolutions of 1917 in Russia will become a powerful impetus for further research into its “human dimension.”
A. V. Pridorozhny. Participants and eyewitnesses of the revolution about the reasons for the defeat of the democratic alternative in 1917.
Returning to the events of the revolution, its witnesses and direct participants tried not only to understand their significance for the fate of the country, but also to answer the question: was the historical path that the country took after February the only possible one? In historical works, individual publications, as well as in memoirs written by representatives of various political forces, the analysis of the country's development paths in 1917 occupied an important place.
Interesting information about the struggle for the implementation of the democratic (liberal) alternative and the reasons for its defeat is contained in historical works and memoirs of famous figures of the Kadet Party 2. The main task that the liberals sought to achieve at the beginning of the revolution was most accurately formulated later by P. N. Milyukov: “The revolution could not be prevented, but it was possible to take the revolution into hands during the first time” 1 . He repeatedly proved this point of view, which was shared by other party members, in his historical works. Both in “The History of the Second Russian Revolution” and in “Russia at the Turning Point” full responsibility for Bolshevik coup the leader of the Kadet Party relied on revolutionary democracy. Quite often in his works he wrote about the criminal inaction of the leaders of moderate socialists, their lack of political responsibility, realism and a firm course towards achieving a clearly defined goal. A sharply negative assessment of the activities of the government headed by A.F. Kerensky was contained in “The History of the Second Russian Revolution.” The indecisiveness and passivity that was shown by A.F. Kerensky was considered by P.N. Milyukov as one of the main reasons for the tragic outcome of events 2 . Describing the political processes taking place in the country in the summer of 1917, he reproached the leader of the moderate socialists for completely losing control over the development of events, for delaying the decision of the most important issues and taking urgent measures 3.
Special interest represents the fact that this work was the first to describe the events associated with the attempt to preserve the monarchy at the very beginning of the revolution. The leader of the cadets recalled in detail his hope of persuading Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich to accept what was handed over to him. supreme power. However, Mikhail Alexandrovich’s fear for his fate and the lack of consensus on this issue among the members of the new government did not allow, as P. N. Milyukov believed, to send further development events within the framework of a constitutional monarchy 4. P. N. Milyukov called his failure the first capitulation of the revolution, which created a situation that was defective at its source, from which all subsequent mistakes certainly followed.
The great hopes for the salvation of the country that the liberals pinned on the new monarch are also evidenced by the memoirs of one of the active figures of the Kadet Party, P. D. Dolgorukov 1 . Recalling the first days of the revolution, he did not exclude the possibility that even under Mikhail Alexandrovich the revolutionary wave that had swept over Russia could no longer be contained. Nevertheless, as P.D. Dolgorukov wrote, a positive solution to the issue of succession to the throne provided a greater chance of preserving statehood until the Constituent Assembly, which at that time still seemed salutary 2 .
We find important evidence on this matter from V.D. Nabokov. Reflecting on the events surrounding the attempt to transfer the throne to Mikhail Romanov, he admits that its successful implementation would have been beneficial, or at least giving hope for a successful outcome for the country. V.D. Nabokov also agreed that if Mikhail assumed the throne, first of all, the continuity of the apparatus of power and its mechanisms would be preserved. “The basis of the state structure of Russia would be preserved, and everything would be available to ensure the constitutional character of the monarchy” 3. However, he was less optimistic than his party colleagues about the chances of success of this option. The entire set of conditions, as follows from the author’s reasoning, indicated the impossibility of further transfer of the throne and preservation of the monarchy. To strengthen the position of the new tsar, as V.D. Nabokov wrote, it was necessary to have with real forces, on which one could rely in the event of the inevitable anti-monarchist protests 4. But the government did not have such forces.
Among the various points of view expressed in emigrant literature about the reasons for the defeat of the peaceful democratic alternative in 1917, it is worth highlighting the opinion of the Socialist Revolutionary authors, whose works were distinguished by acute polemics in the analysis of events 1 . In 1917, the Socialist Revolutionaries represented the most numerous and influential political organization in the country. Despite the ideological divisions in the party, the Social Revolutionaries were the force that could have a huge influence on the choice of the future path of Russia in that period. The problem of the reasons for the defeat of the Socialist Revolutionaries in 1917 runs like a red thread through all the articles and writings of the founder, leader, and chief theoretician of the party V. M. Chernov. In his speeches and works, he criticized the policies of his own party for the fact that they did not always meet party interests. The creation of a coalition government, as V. M. Chernov argued, made sense only at the very beginning of the revolution, as a temporary tactical move. The leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries considered it necessary to promptly recognize the coalition government as having survived the stage of the revolution and form a homogeneous government of labor democracy, which, with its decisive policy, could prevent the growth of the “left-maximalist danger.” Unlike his party comrades and political opponents, V. M. Chernov was the first to admit the mistakes of his own party and give credit to his opponents. On the one hand, V. M. Chernov reproached the socialists for their indecisiveness, panicky fear of responsibility for the fate of the country, on the other hand, he also critically assessed the bourgeois camp for underestimating the entire tragedy of the situation, its unwillingness to rise “both above party doubts and above the usual level of bourgeois prejudices » 2.
In 1917, one of the prominent theorists of the left wing of the party, I. Z. Steinberg, criticized the policies of the Social Revolutionaries in exile. Just like V.M. Chernov, he wrote that the government coalition, which was joined by the Mensheviks and socialist revolutionaries of the right wing, was powerless to carry out radical socio-economic transformations in the country and conduct an active foreign policy. October, I.Z. Steinberg came to the conclusion, was caused by the mistakes of March and accomplished what March failed to accomplish 1 .
The famous right-wing Socialist Revolutionary publicist V.M. Vishnyak also agreed with this opinion, who called October the result of the same economic and social contradictions that led to the death of the Russian monarchy in February 2 . Almost all Socialist Revolutionary authors noted that only a timely end to the war, a solution agrarian question and an active policy towards peace could prevent the complete collapse of Russia.
Nevertheless, another point of view was expressed in the Socialist Revolutionary literature, according to which the reasons for the death of the democratic alternative lay not in the mistakes made by the Provisional Government, but in the irresponsible actions of its political opponents. In particular, A. F. Kerensky insisted on this in emigration. The former head of the Provisional Government, Minister of Justice, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and subsequently one of the most active political figures in the Russian diaspora, had a noticeable influence on the course of events in the revolution of 1917. His political and government activity has always attracted the close attention of historians and publicists. Most often, she received an extremely negative assessment, and not only in Soviet Russia, but also among the emigration community itself.
A.F. Kerensky devoted the main place in his works to coverage of the Kornilov rebellion and the activities of the Bolsheviks 1 . He always considered Kornilov and the Bolsheviks to be the main culprits for the defeat of the democratic alternative during the revolution. Recalling the activities of the conspirators, A.F. Kerensky came to the conclusion that its origins lay in the military failures of the Russian army and the July uprising of the Bolsheviks. In almost every work of his, A. F. Kerensky did not miss the opportunity to accuse Kornilov of disrupting the democratic alternative and prove that irresponsible actions rebel general opened the path to power for the Bolsheviks. Unlike V. M. Chernov and his supporters, A. F. Kerensky tried in every possible way to prove the positive role of the coalition in solving economic and social problems. He often argued to his critics that the Provisional Government had done everything possible to bring the country out of the war, carry out an extensive legislative program, laying the foundations for transforming Russia into a developed democratic state, and resolve socio-economic issues.
Not all emigrants agreed to recognize Kornilov as the main culprit in the defeat of the February revolution. Moreover, often, in contrast to the Social Revolutionaries, the defeat of the general was viewed as the death of the last hope for the salvation of Russia in 1917. This is confirmed by the memoirs of famous representatives of the Russian generals - A. I. Denikin, P. Avilov, A. I. Verkhovsky, P. N. Krasnov 2. Their ideological and political beliefs were based on adherence to the traditions and political foundations of the old order. At the same time, it would be erroneous to classify them among the irreconcilable opponents of all social transformation. Even before the revolution, many of them advocated a consistent reform of society, with which, like the liberals, they associated the only chance of saving the autocracy 1 .
The most prominent representative of conservative views in emigration was a former general of the Russian army, one of the main leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement in the country during Civil War A. I. Denikin. As a military man, he devoted most of his memoirs to the topic of war and the state of the Russian army in 1917. In these memoirs, the pain and resentment of a man deeply devoted to his beliefs for all the military defeats of Russia, the collapse of the army, with which A.I. Denikin associated the last hope for saving the country. Yet the former general was confident that the army had enough strength to continue the war and win. If it were not for the actions of the socialists, and first of all the Bolsheviks, who skillfully played with their destructive propaganda on the growing dissatisfaction with the government of the masses, who did not stop at the threat of military defeat and ruin of the country, as follows from the reasoning of A.I. Denikin, then the collapse of the army and the country could have been to avoid. Tremendous fatigue from war and turmoil; general dissatisfaction with the existing situation; the inertia of the majority and the activity of the organized, full of boundless daring, strong willed and unprincipled minority became, according to the author, the main reasons for non-resistance to the reign of Bolshevism 2.
The same idea is heard in the memoirs of one of the direct participants in Kornilov’s speech, P. N. Krasnov. The author conveys in detail the sentiments that reigned in the highest military circles. P. N. Krasnov especially focused on dissatisfaction with the government’s internal policies, the moral decay of the army, and the extremely negative attitude towards A. F. Kerensky in army circles 1 . Justifying the actions of the rebel general, P.N. Krasnov agreed that only a dictatorship could save the country from complete collapse at that time. For the author of the memoirs, as for most representatives of the Russian generals, there was no doubt about Kornilov’s patriotic aspirations. And that only Kornilov's success could ultimately prevent the Bolsheviks from coming to power. Nevertheless, the view of the Kornilov rebellion as a real alternative to the Bolsheviks did not find widespread support in the works of the Russian emigration.
An analysis of the views of representatives of various political movements shows that if the conclusion about the inevitability of the fall of the tsarist regime and the expediency of establishing a democratic republic in 1917 was recognized by almost everyone, then on the question of the reasons and culprits for the defeat of the democratic alternative directly during the revolution itself, their opinions noticeably diverged. All authors, without exception, agreed that the salvation of the country lay in the urgent solution of social, economic and foreign policy problems. However, the possibility of solving them was directly related to the need to create a strong government that enjoys the trust of the people.
R. A. Nasibullin. The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia in the study of G. M. Katkov
In 2006, a fundamental study by the Russian historian, emigrant, professor at Oxford University Georgy Mikhailovich Katkov (1903 - 1985) was published in Russian. February Revolution", which was published in the late 1960s 3. Almost 40 years after the publication of the book, it remains unsurpassed in the depth of its study of key problems and the relevance of scientific results.
G. M. Katkov admitted that he often followed the concept of the famous historian of the Russian revolution S. P. Melgunov (1879 - 1956). According to his assessment, “the works of S.P. Melgunov 1, published in Russian by himself or his widow, represent the first attempt at a scientific study of the period depicted in this work. I found Melgunov's assessment of the multi-volume memoirs with which he became acquainted especially useful. The atmosphere of Goethe’s “Fiction and Truth,” which prevails in most memoirs, is rarely able to withstand a serious test of Melgunov’s analytical mind” 2. Future researchers of the February Revolution cannot help but build on the works of S. P. Melgunov and G. M. Katkov.
The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia “was subject to unconscious distortion and deliberate falsification more than any other event in modern history,” G. M. Katkov rightly noted 3 . Therefore, the author set himself the task of “undertaking a thorough study of hitherto unexplored aspects of the Russian revolution. He hopes to shed some light on a number of confusing issues and show how carefully one should approach many of the established and documented myths that unfortunately accompany the “objective” writing of history.
The work is divided into three parts. The first part discusses some features political situation during the First World War on the eve of the February Revolution, such as: the activities of liberal parties and organizations, revolutionary and socialist parties, the state of the army, the Jewish question, German intervention. The second part is devoted certain events from the history of Russia during the First World War, which, according to the author, are extremely important for understanding the February Revolution and reflect the crisis of Russian educated society on the eve of the revolution, such as: the case of Colonel Myasoedov, who was executed allegedly for treason, a split in the government, slanderous and conspiratorial activities of the liberal-Masonic intelligentsia. The third part outlines the events of the February Revolution from February 23 to March 3, 1917.
According to G. M. Katkov, the February Revolution was not a spontaneous uprising of the majority of the population, embittered by the hardships of the war. It took place in Petrograd (and the rebellion arose among no more than 7% of the population of Petrograd out of 2.5 million people and 5% of the troops - 10 thousand out of 200 thousand garrison), the army, the province, and the peasantry remained calm. The fall of the monarchy was a complete surprise for all of Russia, the peasant majority of which (80%) had not lost monarchical ideas, were not prepared for the loss of the tsarist system, but were faced with the accomplished irreversible fact of double abdication, but at the same time, they were not prepared to defend the monarchy . Political parties - revolutionary - Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and especially liberal ones did not participate in the direct organization riots and the mutiny of part of the Petrograd garrison on February 23 - 27, not a single revolutionary party showed itself in carrying out the revolution.
In Petrograd there was not only no famine, but also no real shortage of bread, there were only queues for bread, there were no cards, no restrictions on the amount of bread purchased, there was only a rumor that the bread would soon run out, and the garrison that decided the success of the uprising did not experience a shortage of food at all. bread A.I. Solzhenitsyn wrote that “no famine causes a revolution if a national upsurge or KGB terror, or both, is supported. But in February 1917 there was neither one nor the other - and give me bread! 1 . Hungry people are fighting for survival, not for a change of power.
G. M. Katkov assumed that the unrest in February 1917 in Petrograd was prepared by German agents and German money: “Perhaps we have not yet reached a level of knowledge that allows us to give a truthful explanation of the events. But this does not at all oblige us to cover up our ignorance with talk of a “spontaneous spontaneous movement” or reasoning that “the patience of the workers has reached the boiling point...”... A mass movement of such a scale and such strength could not have occurred without the influence of some guiding force.”2 . Of the demonstrators' slogans, one worker said grimly: "What they want is to secure bread, peace with the Germans and equal rights for the Jews." At the same time, he “did not attribute the authorship of these slogans to himself or others like him, but attributed him to some mysterious “they” 3. On February 27, there was a mutiny of the Petrograd garrison, the majority of which consisted of mobilized, untrained, undisciplined recruits, and on February 28, the collapse of the tsarist government occurred.
The popular uprising and rebellion of the Petrograd garrison led to the almost bloodless fall of the monarchy only because, as G. M. Katkov rightly points out after E. Carr, liberal circles decided to take advantage of them in order to achieve their goal of coming to power 4 . Not only the weakness of the tsarist government, but also the impatience and irresponsibility of educated society led to a conflict between the authorities, the government and the majority of the intelligentsia. The majority of educated society lost their sense of national solidarity and, in the conditions of the World War, were guided not by national, but by party interests, setting the goal of taking power away from the emperor.
The main reason for the change in the autocratic-bureaucratic system of Russia in 1905 - 1907 was and the fall of the autocratic-representative monarchy in 1917, it was that the monarchy had lost its legitimacy, ceased to correspond to the sentiments of the majority of the Russian intelligentsia, who professed liberal or socialist views, and the conservative-national intelligentsia, which advocated autocracy with legislative and advisory popular representation, was clearly in minority. These layers ceased to support the monarchy, the ranks of its staunch supporters melted, and in the end even the commanders of the fronts stopped following its orders, although they believed that they were participating in the salvation of the dynasty and the monarchy. The struggle for power is waged by the wealthy and educated minority, and the masses of the people, engaged in manual labor and not striving for power and political freedom, can only serve as a weapon for this struggle.
The revolutions of 1905 and 1917, as the conservative thinker I. L. Solonevich rightly noted, were made mainly by “second-rate Russian intelligentsia.” “It’s second-rate,” he emphasized. - Neither F. Dostoevsky, nor D. Mendeleev, nor I. Pavlov, none of the first-class Russians, with all their critical attitude towards separate parts Russian life - I didn’t want a revolution and I didn’t make a revolution. The revolution was made by second-rate writers - like Gorky, third-rate historians - like Miliukov, fourth-rate lawyers - like A. Kerensky. The revolution was made by the almost nameless mass of Russian humanities professors, who from university departments drummed into the Russian consciousness the idea that with scientific point In view of the revolution, it is salutary. The underground activities of the revolutionary parties relied on this array of almost nameless professors. It’s a pity that there isn’t a monument to the unknown professor on Red Square next to the Ilyich Mausoleum!” 1 .
The liberal intelligentsia preached that autocracy as a form of government had historically outlived its usefulness and was doomed to disappear in Russia (as it was in Western countries). Liberals believed that, according to some inexorable law of history, Russian society after 1905 would move from autocracy to a constitutional monarchy, where educated representatives of the propertied classes would gain power, and then, in the process of gradual democratization, power would become the power of the entire people.
“The experience of the Soviet regime over the past fifty years (1917 - 1967) has shown that there is no basis either for analogies with Western monarchies, or for the belief that the autocracy in Russia is outdated, since the autocracy was preserved in spite of the revolution. The very fact that after 1917 the country was ruled almost autocratically for many years by three people, completely different in character and biographies (Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev - R.N.), simply confirms the opinion that there are deep reasons why the political control of one person is easily established and maintained in Russia" 2 . Geopolitical, natural-climatic, ethnic, psychological preconditions predetermine the existence of a strong authoritarian government in Russia. It is obvious that modern Russia, for objective reasons, is actually an autocratic, authoritarian state with the strong power of the president of “all Rus'”.
The Russian intelligentsia did not have sufficient experience of social evil. “The utopia of civil and political rights, supposedly possible only without autocracy, captured minds that did not have sufficient experience of social evil” 3. She acquired this experience at great cost during the period of revolution, civil war, Bolshevik totalitarianism, and emigration. As a result, some representatives of the intelligentsia switched to national conservative positions.
Liberals covered up their struggle for power during the war with the monarchy with patriotic statements that the monarchy was leading the country to a military disaster not only because of its inability to effective management, but also a vicious reluctance or indecision to achieve victory. Liberals spread slander about the omnipotence of Rasputin, about treason in higher spheres, about the preparation of a shameful separate peace by a powerful clique of pro-German “dark forces” surrounded by the Tsar and Tsarina, about the participation of the German Tsarina in the treacherous machinations of pro-German forces 1. This led to the patriotic conclusion about the need to change the king to win the war. The discrediting of the monarchy by liberals paved the way for the success of the uprising and the country's acceptance of the fall of the monarchy. The military revolt in Petrograd largely owed its success to the hesitation of officers who were influenced by anti-government agitation and their absence from the barracks at the crucial moment 2 .
The liberals, whose political aspirations were at one time facilitated by the temporary failures of the Russian army in the war, began to lose ground. If victory in the war, with the help of the Allies, had been achieved in 1917, all the liberals' hopes of coming to power would have been defeated 3. The strategic victory over Germany was already ensured by February 1917, because Germany was exhausted by a war on two fronts and the Allies, without the participation of Russia, achieved victory over Germany in November 1918, and with the participation of the seven million Russian army this victory would have been achieved earlier.
S.P. Melgunov correctly writes: “The success of the revolution, as shown throughout historical experience, always depends not so much on the force of the explosion, but on the weakness of resistance” 1. A.I. Solzhenitsyn, comparing the defeats of 1914 - 1915 and 1941 - 1942, notes: “The Soviet retreat of 1941 - 42 was thirtyfold, it was not Poland that was lost, but all of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia to Moscow and the Volga, and losses in killed and prisoners - twenty-fold, and the hunger everywhere is incomparable, and at the same time the factory and rural tension, people's fatigue, and the ministers are even more insignificant, and of course the suppression of freedoms is incomparable - but precisely because the government did not freeze in the ruthlessness that came to mind no one would have even hinted at distrust of the government - this catastrophic retreat and extinction did not lead to any revolution” 2. He notes that the Tsar and the tsarist government had two paths that completely excluded revolution: to resist or to yield: “Obviously, the authorities had two paths that completely excluded revolution. Or - suppression, any consistent and cruel (as we now recognize it) - the tsarist government was not capable of this, first of all morally, it could not set itself such a task. Or - active, tireless reform of everything that is outdated and inappropriate. The authorities were also incapable of this - due to drowsiness, lack of awareness, and fear. And it flowed in the middle, the most destructive way: with the extreme hateful bitterness of society - neither to press, nor to allow, but to lie across an inert obstacle” 3.
The opinion of S.P. Melgunov seems more correct: “The abnormal conditions of wartime required a “dictatorship”, in the form of which management in Western Europe even in traditionally democratic countries. But there a dictatorship appeared as if with the consent of the public; in Russia such a dictatorship could only be a dictatorship in defiance of the public. This is how an order was created in which wartime conditions, contrary to all vital demands, created a “condition of complete impotence” for the authorities. This “powerlessness of power” was “the reason that the moderate elements... went for a revolutionary coup,” admits the historian (P.N. Milyukov. - N.R.), who at one time, as an active politician, tried to explain the created order “ stupidity" or "treason" 1.
At that time I was not yet fully fifteen years old. I studied in Moscow, one of the centers where the revolution took place most realistically and most clearly, with the exception of St. Petersburg, and therefore my impressions are, to some extent, still childhood impressions. I will try to remember as much as possible - not how it seems to me now, but what feelings I had at that time...
...I was born in 1902 in the city of Staritsa... My father - he would not allow himself to be called a Ukrainian, he would say that he was a Little Russian. My mother is Great Russian, and my relatives were in Staritsa. I spent my childhood there. But I studied in Moscow, in the fourth Moscow gymnasium... At that time, there were already few children of wealthy parents in the gymnasiums who could pay for our studies themselves. There were a lot of scholarships, and the children of poor people filled government educational institutions. My comrades visited our house, my father always only cared that if I gave them something, so that it did not happen in the form of some kind of benefit - the rich son gives it to the poor; he taught me to do this in a more tactful manner, and I remember that all my comrades were children of workers: the son of a machinist, the son of a worker. Their scholarships were partial or full, and the same uniform made everyone equal, when a person could not be richer or poorer dressed. We were somehow not interested in politics in those days. Maybe individuals. But with the revolution, politics still captured everyone...
Everything was shaken up by events. That's how they started. I sat and prepared my homework. According to the old style, it was probably February 27th. Father arrives. As soon as he got there, he says, there was a strike in the city. The trams don't run; I can barely find a cab driver to get me there. Troops are patrolling the city. Then the newspapers did not come out. Everything was fueled by rumors. And only on the first of March it became obvious that the revolution had won. I remember the gymnasium was closed because there was no communication (trams did not run). Moscow is a big city, and most of them did not study nearby at the nearest gymnasium, so they had to walk quite far, across the whole city. When I came for the first time, it turned out that there were no classes on foot: the students did not come. The revolution was already an accomplished fact in Petrograd and Moscow. The newspapers came out; they hadn’t been out for several days before. They were literally torn out of their hands. I remember, I myself snatched from the newspaperman, not the newspaper that we were used to, I didn’t get “Russian Word”, but, it seems, “Morning of Russia” - there was such a newspaper - and on the way I caught the newspaper “Early Morning” . I returned home from the gymnasium with them. The streets were full of trucks; on trucks - soldiers driving by with swaying rifles and bayonets; in the squares and boulevards there were some barrels on which someone was climbing out, “hurray”, “long live” floated in the air. Red flags appeared, the entire soldiery wore red bows, but still had a loose look, but somehow not immediately military - without belts, such a gray look; the streets turned gray from the crowds of people taking to the streets. Here is my external impression of those days...
There was no violence at that time. The police have disappeared. Her - how brave. The streets were left without any representatives of authority and order. If at the same time there was some kind of traffic jam on the street, some efficient soldier stood up: “Citizens, don’t linger, you are interfering with the movement, conscious citizens,” - at that time you could hear continuous calls for “conscious citizens.” These were the first days, and some kind of celebration was spilled everywhere. This is what Blok says in his poems:
Sizzling years:
Is there madness in you, is there hope in you...
This was probably very true, but we ourselves did not notice this madness at that time. A bright life, they say, begins.
I remember it was all connected with patriotic enthusiasm. Everyone felt that the revolution occurred because the tsarist government did not know how to wage war intensively. Maybe this is the impression of the environment in which I was. This was blamed on the old regime. The revolution was carried out as a means to intensively, victoriously end the war, with Constantinople, with the straits; people appeared in power who seemed to be able to accomplish what the incompetent, as they said, routine tsarist government was not able to do...
The students listened, watched, enjoyed and absorbed. So far it has been accepted passively. We immediately liked, of course, a number of concessions. If you haven’t prepared your lessons, nothing, immediately, to some extent, the previous established order in educational institutions, but it was already March, April, mid-May, i.e. before the end of the school year. There were no classes for three days, until there were no trams, there were no other means of communication, and then they began. And we spent a lot of time on political awareness: the teacher sometimes read the newspaper, explained what was happening, talked about a happy future. Our teachers were young. They were all with higher education. I was in a gymnasium where there was a special spirit, so to speak, they were always on a friendly footing with us. But our class mentor was a man, although he was also liberal, but in a strong position. And soon heated debates began, mainly among some of our right-wing high school students. We had two young men who were already overage for our sixth grade class. One was eighteen, the other nineteen. Both fled to the war - not from our gymnasium, even earlier. One now immediately went to the front. And that’s when I was drawn to it. But my father immediately told me: are you crazy? You will study, the country needs educated people. And I dreamed of at least getting a job: in some institution, at a military plant. Work, as it seemed, for victory, for defense. I think now - this was one of the indicators in what mood the February Revolution was carried out among the intelligentsia. No one had any doubts that the war had to be won and that it would now be won.
Then we left for the Crimea for the summer... And already on the way we could see the devastation that had begun. I went in the month of May. The courier trains no longer ran. Previously, the road to Crimea took 26 hours - now I traveled for two days. And already in the month of May, literally all the stations were covered with husks from sunflower seeds, a crowd of soldiers with unbuttoned tabs, in saddled overcoats, with working girls gnawing on these same sunflowers and moving somewhere. According to what documents, I think no one knew this; no one checked anything. But there was still order. In the second-class carriages in which I was traveling, conductors sat and mercilessly, so to speak, pushed out those without tickets; it had not yet occurred to them that they could sit in second class without a ticket and go. They used simpler means of communication: freight trains, maybe third-class carriages, but there was still ticket control.
I returned to Moscow during the Kornilov coup attempt. And already in the seventeenth year, the Kornilov revolution caused me undisguised delight and joy. I was on my way at that moment. I was supposed to start classes on the first of September, and in a few days I left Crimea for Moscow. I was traveling with my sister, they put us on the train and told the conductor: “Don’t let them walk around the stations.” Well, of course, that’s why we walked until the last bell. And here the soldiers were rallying. I remember how one spoke about Kornilov: “I, comrades, know him, one might say, quite closely. I was in his division. If such a person takes power, then all that remains is to “pull your tongue…” - and he named a place where it would be very difficult to drag him in. “Suck your stomach in, hold your breath and say “that’s right.” You can’t joke with something like that.” This simple little soldier, who climbed out onto a barrel in Sinelnikovo, while the train was standing, made this sacramental speech. And I remember, then before this there was the shame of Kalushcha: the shame of defeat when the Seventh Army was advancing, the change of a weak commander-in-chief, the appointment of Kornilov - like a recovery. It seemed that Kornilov’s speech was providing a final turning point towards order and the continuation of the war. But when I arrived in Moscow, the Kornilov case had not yet been clarified. My father met me and, to my delight, told me - yes, but you can’t talk to the government like that: a general subordinate to the government cannot present it with ultimatums, so we will go far. This made me think, but in general, for both my father and me, the breakdown of Kornilov’s speech, for which the blame was placed entirely on Kerensky, pushed our feelings in a counter-revolutionary direction. At that time, it had already become known about the ambiguous role of Duma deputy Nikolai Nikolaevich Lvov, who was an intermediary between Kornilov and Kerensky. He was considered a confusion. The suicide of General Krymov also became known. The suicide of General Krymov, whom my cousin, an officer, knew well; he was his adjutant, and the fact that he told us about this Krymov even before the revolution showed that a man who could stop at nothing died. The cousin soon arrived in Moscow and said that, while he was Krymov’s adjutant, he heard Kornilov ask Krymov, sending him with a cavalry corps to Petersburg: “Well, having occupied Petersburg, what do you think you will do?” “He told him that, of course, the first thing, for show, was to completely liquidate the Council of Soldiers’ and Workers’ Deputies. - “How do you think of eliminating them? - “How many are there?” - he asked Kornilov. - “It seems about one thousand three hundred people.” - “Thirteen hundred people? - I have enough pillars in Petrograd to deal with all of these. Then there will be no more shame, betrayal and blood in Russia.”
What my cousin Nikolai said was confirmed later by my older comrades in exile. For example, some officers told me about Krymov after the civil war.
General Wrangel commanded one of the regiments in his division in 1916, and they say that Wrangel was of his school. Wrangel was a very talented, showy general, but he loved to shout about his successes. Krymov told him: “If you do something at 80 percent, but want to shout at a hundred percent, it’s no good. Do it one hundred percent, and then I won’t protest if you shout one hundred percent,” Krymov said to his subordinate, Wrangel. He, so to speak, taught him (Esaul Kozlov, Wrangel’s adjutant, told me this when Wrangel commanded the Nerchinsk regiment). And the fact that this man, whom we knew from the stories of my cousin, shot himself, seemed to emphasize the hopelessness of the situation.
It must be said that after Kornilov’s speech the collapse went catastrophically. And in connection with this, politicization occurred in our gymnasium. The class, which was largely apolitical and only led to some extent by radical circles that sympathized with socialism, sharply took a right-wing position. I would say this - to the Black Hundred positions. Although we had almost no representatives of the nobility or any nobility. The collapse at the front, the beginning of the persecution of officers, all this, I think, played a big role: young people are always on the side of the weak, at that moment the officers were the weak, persecuted side, and we knew them, they were our brothers, our acquaintances - all young people , students who volunteered during the war...
Our class entered into a violent feud - I was in the sixth grade - with the seventh parallel class. In this seventh parallel class there were leftist sentiments. We had Pushkarev, a big red-haired man who was already 20 years old; he overpowered even the eighth-graders, and here was a single combat, as it was in knightly times: a radical from the seventh grade and a restorer from our class each fought for their class. Then big things happened - general fights, so our classes were divided. That seventh grade class was moved to the far corridor. Thus, in our class there was most of, I would say, conservative-minded. Collectively, we took part in the preparation of the elections to the Constituent Assembly, distributing party programs and ballots. But each class also had its own minority – ours was revolutionary, the other’s was counter-revolutionary. We didn't fight with each other in class. Some of our people distributed leaflets of the Socialist Party, and we - the most right-wing Cadet Party - distributed cadet leaflets. I remember that the class teacher, having learned that one of our very capable students, Yashunsky, a Jew from Poland, a man of truly exceptional talent, a brilliant mathematician, was secretly distributing, it seems, socialist leaflets, and once asked him: “You, Yashunsky, do you sympathize with the socialist party? - "Yes, why?" – he said, a little embarrassed. - “I thought your development was still greater.” But this, as I remember, was the only remark in the teacher’s class. Apparently, fear of the times passing made the right-wing teaching also silent. And so I must say that all this was an incentive for the sharply growing right-wing sentiment in the class. I became much more right-wing, for example, than my father.
When the Constituent Assembly was disrupted - it was dispersed by the sailor Zheleznyak - my father gasped. He pinned his hopes on some crystallizing order associated with this institution. But I remember I told my opinion to my father, and it seemed to me that he was even amazed at my right-wing logic. I told him: “It may be for the best that the Constituent Assembly was dispersed. The Constituent Assembly is socialist-revolutionaries; they can only legitimize the situation in which Russia now finds itself. Then it will be the law. But now everything is illegal, and everything is in motion, and everything can still be liquidated.” My father didn’t say anything to me, but I later heard him remark: “He will be a politician, is that good for him?” Apparently, these were my first spurs of independent thought, which I earned from my father, despite his disagreement with me.
But I must say that life still went on as before, although there was a shortage of food. We didn't have that. To my father for his a good relationship many of the soldiers who served in his hospital brought food, flour, and lard from the villages themselves, so we could share these things with others. But there was a shortage in the city.
This was after the Bolshevik revolution. The Bolshevik revolution itself, I have not yet mentioned it, took place in October, shortly after the start of our studies and after the failure of the Kornilov affair. The Kornilov affair failed in August; two months later there was a Bolshevik coup. At that moment I fell ill with jaundice - from bad bread (this can characterize how quickly, in a rich country, during a revolution, one can reach the point of eating cakes and completely inedible bread). And just when the Bolshevik revolution took place, I was lying sick at home. IN big city you don’t even see the battle itself. The telephone has stopped working, trucks with soldiers are driving by; we lived in a working-class area on the outskirts - Maryina Roshcha, which was immediately embraced revolutionary uprising. The father also stayed at home. “Self-defense” was formed in all houses - a proud name. This self-defense consisted in the fact that the men of each house were on duty at night in groups, since bandits and robbers took advantage of the devastation, entering through a broken window or somewhere through the basement into the house. This is how the guards sat in the front doors. They sat without any weapons, taking an umbrella or a stick, and had political conversations. There were conversations about who was approaching Moscow from which side, which general was already very close (often such generals no longer existed in nature), what Vikzhel - the All-Russian Executive Committee of Railway Workers - thought - they played an important role at that moment, because . could stop traffic throughout Russia with their decree. But they didn't stop anything. They declared, if I’m not mistaken, neutrality in this fight...
In Moscow, the Red Guards took the Kremlin, which was defended by the troops of the Provisional Government. The Winter Palace was taken in St. Petersburg. And in Moscow, cadets and volunteer officers defended themselves from the Red Guard detachments concentrated in Moscow. Aleksandrovskoe was located in the Kremlin military school. And I must tell you, there were many officers in Moscow, but they did not support these youth, cadets and young officers in the Kremlin. In our house, near the Institute of Railways on Bakhmetyevskaya, there were probably about five officers who had already returned from the front and were sitting at home - young people aged 25–30 years. Of these, only one, the brother of one of those who lived in our house, as we knew, made his way to the Kremlin and took part in the struggle. All the other five sat out. We waited for someone to come and restore order.
It was under these conditions that the October revolution took place. We had a break from classes again. And when we arrived afterwards, it felt completely new. That’s when the right-wing radicalization of student youth began as counteraction. It went very far and took bad forms: it took the form of sharp chauvinism and anti-Semitism, it took the form, I would say, of such sharp chauvinism, which, in fact, could never have existed in an ordinary Moscow gymnasium. Right-wing radicalization came precisely from the middle class: such as the children of merchants and shopkeepers. Even conversations began that idealized the “Union of the Russian People,” but, as I recall, this turn to the right was not associated with monarchist sentiments. About the arrested royal family didn't remember.
So, I remember, there was a very strong rightward shift among the student youth in Moscow, despite the sharp leftist mood in the country. And I wonder what opportunities there were back then. The son of my father’s orderly, a young front-line soldier, Knight of St. George, a volunteer of the shock battalion, came to us. And so, in January it was, he said to me: “Let’s go, Nikolai, with you to Red Square, there is a procession of the cross for a prayer service for the overthrow of the godless communist government.”
I told my father. My father says: “There could be trouble. You're not going anywhere." – I answer, I’ll go with Nikolai; he is a hero, our Nikolai. My father thought and said: “Look, Nikolai, I want you to follow my Nikolai and don’t get involved in any nonsense.”
“No,” he answered, “we’ll just go to the cathedral, have a look and come back.” And so we went with him. We saw an impressive picture. Firstly, when we approached the Kremlin, huge barriers of the Red Guard were already in place. He tells me: “Look, all their pouches are full of ammunition. We have to keep our ears open." We entered the Kremlin, it seems, at the Spassky Gate. There was a service in the Archangel Cathedral. The Patriarch was dressed for this prayer service; the service was going on. This was the only time I saw Patriarch Tikhon. He was dressed in the patriarchal robes of the old patriarchs. How he withstood this weight, I don’t know. They dressed him this way and that and then across him with brocade vestments. It would probably take a lot of training to withstand service in all that was put on him. He had a simple, I would say, good peasant face, with a hard nose, gray, calmly looking eyes.
When the service was still going on, Nikolai told me: “We won’t see anything here, now we need to make our way to the square.” We went out and found ourselves in a huge crowd in the front rows. Processions of the cross from all Moscow churches were already gathering on the square. “We need to clear the passage,” said Nikolai, “let’s join hands.” He began to command; we formed a chain, clearing the passage for the procession with the patriarch from the Kremlin. And so we stood, holding on tightly, and in the meantime religious processions with banners were gathering from all sides on Red Square from all churches.
On all the roofs surrounding the square, we saw Red Guards with machine guns, but none of them intervened. There was order in the square, despite the lack of organization of religious processions. They were led by people who took the initiative themselves, like Nikolai. Their orders were carried out unquestioningly by the crowd. Sometimes the following pictures were visible: a religious procession taking place; There are Red Army patrols at the entrance to the square. Suddenly they come out of the religious procession: “Aren’t you going to take off your hats?” “And two or three people knock the hats off five or six people standing armed near a machine gun. They didn't protest. And it was here in the square after the patriarch’s exit that the prayer service took place.
Here is an example of how uncertain the position of power was back in 1818 that such a demonstration, although ecclesiastical, but definitely political, could occur. She made a very strong impression on me. I have forever understood: communism and the people are not the same thing. This remained an impression for the rest of my life. What I saw on Red Square allowed me to realize: between those and the people there is a huge difference. And completely conquer the people new government never can. In this crowd, I felt it for the first time.
That's about what I can say about '17 and early '18. But it is difficult to separate events by year, chronologically. I think that the entire period until the spring, until May 18, this still refers to the communist takeover. The authorities have not yet taken control of the situation. And we felt this at every step. No one was afraid to say anything. There could be no consequences for these conversations, and besides, it was possible to begin to act very decisively. At this time my father returned voluntarily to military service- because General Brusilov asked him about it. My father once, at the front, knew Brusilov, who lived in Moscow and was wounded during the uprising at home by an accidental shell. My father was a fan of Brusilov. He once took me with him when he visited Brusilov in the hospital. And here there was a conversation from which I understood that Brusilov and my father had some secrets. I heard my father tell him: “He’s not a talkative guy, and I’ll still have to let him know the essence of the matter.” But into what, I didn’t know. And only after returning home, I learned that Brusilov at that time - few people know - was in agreement with General Alekseev, who had already been forming a Volunteer Army in the South since November. Brusilov was supposed to send to him what he found suitable from the officer corps. And in order for those volunteers to get to the Don, they needed the appropriate documents. Brusilov asked his father to return to work in the hospital. Such people sent by him will come to him. Their father registered them in the hospital as soldiers who returned from the front and fell ill on the way. They came as demobilized soldiers and were given documents. “Demobilized soldier such and such...” - at that time hospitals could demobilize themselves - “sent to his homeland, to Liski, to Voronezh,” that is, to those areas from where it was easier to get to Volunteer Army. Special sign, I still remember him now, on a letter without a signature from the people who first came to our apartment, he indicated them to us. Whoever came with such a letter, if the father was not there, I had to accept until the father came. Usually young people came, in fact, without any conspiracy, almost openly. This continued until spring.
Here is, to some extent, a general picture of that coup as it seemed to me, a 15-year-old teenager, at that time. Did it feel new? Yes. But it seemed temporary. It seemed like some kind of bad dream for a short time. He himself came, he himself will disappear, it seemed to everyone: Bolshevism is such stupidity that it cannot last long, and in fact no one took any countermeasures. Only a very few, like Alekseev and then Brusilov, who began resistance. But Brusilov soon had a turning point. Soon, as I found out, he told my father: “But I have great doubts. When they carried me out wounded, they, the Red Guards, stopped the battle to carry me out. Having learned that Brusilov was wounded, the soldiers came up to me and asked for forgiveness that they had unwittingly caused me this misfortune - being wounded. I can’t go against them.” My father told me about this when the influx of officers from Brusilov stopped, and I asked my father about the reason for the termination. And when Brusilov later took the red side, I think that to some extent the reason could have been this feeling of gratitude and a certain love for his soldiers, for the Russian soldier, who knew Brusilov’s name from his successes in 1916.
In liberal circles, like my father's circle of friends, I always heard a wide variety of hopes. At first, the allies won’t allow it. But they quickly lost hope in the allies. But at the same time there were already Germans in Ukraine and near Orel! Germans appeared in Moscow - the embassy and those returning from internees. Appeared in Moscow German Ambassador, probably starting in February 1918, so throughout the spring hopes were transferred to the Germans.
My father remained in Moscow in the hospital, continuing the work of sending officers, himself, until September, when he had to flee. This case has been solved. And the Germans took him out of Moscow. He was later sentenced to death in absentia for this activity. And our relatives, my stepmother’s cousin, who was married to a German officer, arranged for my father to be taken away in a timely manner.
Then Ukraine was already occupied by the Germans and completely cleared of Soviet troops. Skoropadsky was in power. It seemed that the time was not far off that the Germans would restore order in the north. No one thought about whether the Germans needed to establish these orders and whether they wanted to impose them. I myself had previously left for the south, quite legally, as a student returning home to Ukraine after an academic year in Moscow (Crimea was then Ukraine). I received a letter from the German embassy, through my father’s acquaintances: “So-and-so is going to Crimea... the German authorities in Ukraine are invited to assist him.” But I had to cross the border illegally... It was between Kursk and Kharkov, near Belgorod. At this moment, in June 1918, the situation was very tense: the Bolsheviks were afraid of the German movement towards Moscow. My father did not want to let me leave Moscow alone. I called my cousin, a well-known legal consultant in Moscow. He advised me not to risk my trip. There somewhere Kornilov is stirring, now he has been replaced by Denikin, the situation in the south is turbulent and unstable. He will be cut off from Moscow and will not be able to return. It doesn’t matter, because things are moving towards the point that the Germans will liquidate all this here. I remember conversations of a similar nature. But I insisted that they let me in, without fear that the Germans would detain me. They weren’t afraid of the Soviet side; they knew it was possible to get through. People came and talked about it. So, I left Moscow with a group of students. Among them were many officers making their way south. My letter helped everyone. The Germans were only afraid of the introduction of infectious diseases and wanted to put everyone in quarantine. My certificate that I had received the anti-typhoid vaccine helped everyone. We passed. Belgorod seemed like a promised land that literally had everything. We ate non-stop for two days after hungry Moscow. But, in fact, I did not realize that a new life was beginning for me - on wheels, in motion. I ended up in Crimea and studied for another year. And then came service in the Volunteer Army...
John Reed. 1910s Library of CongressAuthor
American journalist John Reed (1887-1920) was one of those authors for whom the profession of “frantic reporter” was invented. He wrote about strikes by textile workers in the USA - and ended up in jail along with the strikers. I went to the Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa - and told him, former bandit, about socialism. A graduate of the prestigious Harvard University, Reed connected his fate with the socialist movement and its press. He was a supporter of the Industrial Workers of the World and one of the founders Communist Party USA.
Circumstances of writing
Reed returned to Russia, where he had already visited the fronts in 1915, in the fall of 1917 - and immediately found himself at the center of revolutionary events. The reporter spoke with industrialists, generals and ministers of the Provisional Government, with Bolshevik leaders, with Russian anarchists returning from New York and with ordinary soldiers. Reed knew very little Russian and was forced to use the services of a translator or rely on interlocutors who knew European languages. Moreover, the book, published in 1919, is actually accurate in its descriptions. Reed wrote it already in New York, armed not only with a notepad, but also with piles of newspapers, leaflets and advertisements, some of which he cites as appendices.
First edition of the book. 1919 Boni & Liveright / Lorne Bair Rare Books The omnipresent Reed managed to visit Winter Palace V last hours stay of the Provisional Government there - and return to the Congress of Soviets in Smolny, where the overthrow of the previous government was announced. On the streets of Petrograd he dodged bullets, and near Tsarskoe Selo he was almost shot by revolutionary soldiers. He writes about all this calmly, in a business-like manner. Stalin's name appears in the text only a couple of times - in some lists. More noticeable is the figure of Lenin, who wrote the preface to the American edition (“I wholeheartedly recommend this work to the workers of all countries”). But Lenin hid underground or preferred office work to traveling to hot spots, so most often, among the leaders of Bolshevism, the fiery orator Trotsky flashes on the pages. This explains the fact that after the next Russian-language edition of the book in 1929, it was not republished until the 1950s. Reed's text was rehabilitated only after the 20th Congress of the CPSU.
Peculiarities
Reed, in his words, “tried to view events with the eye of a conscientious chronicler, interested in capturing the truth.” He does not hide his sympathies for the Bolsheviks and their allies, but he does not heroize them - and does not demonize their opponents. He is too honest a reporter to become just a party agitator. Even considering the victory of the Bolsheviks as natural, he does not keep silent about the violence that accompanied this victory. For example, Reed mentions that some of the female death battalion soldiers who defended the Winter Palace, having surrendered, were raped by soldiers who had fallen on the side of the Soviets. However, the journalist also discusses greatly exaggerated reports about this in the “bourgeois” press.
Quote
“We went to the city. At the exit of the station stood two soldiers with rifles and fixed bayonets. They were surrounded by up to a hundred merchants, officials and students. This whole crowd attacked them with shouts and abuse. The soldiers felt awkward, like unjustly punished children.
The attack was led by a tall young man in a student uniform, with a very arrogant expression on his face.
“I think it’s clear to you,” he said defiantly, “that by taking up arms against your brothers, you become an instrument in the hands of robbers and traitors.”
“No, brother,” the soldier answered seriously, “you don’t understand.” After all, there are two classes in the world: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. So, what? We…"
“I know this stupid chatter! - the student interrupted him rudely. - Dark men like you have heard enough of slogans, but who says it and what it means - you don’t know. You repeat like a parrot!..” The crowd laughed... “I’m a Marxist myself!” I'm telling you that what you are fighting for is not socialism. This is just anarchy, and it only benefits the Germans.”
“Well, yes, I understand,” answered the soldier. Sweat appeared on his forehead. “You are obviously a scientist, but I am a simple person.” But I just think...”
“You really think,” the student interrupted contemptuously, “that Lenin is a true friend of the proletariat?”
“Yes, I think,” answered the soldier. It was very difficult for him.
“Okay, buddy!” Did you know that Lenin was sent from Germany in a sealed carriage? Do you know that Lenin receives money from the Germans?“
“Well, I don’t know that,” the soldier answered stubbornly. “But it seems to me that Lenin is saying the very thing that I would like to hear.” And all the common people say so. After all, there are two classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat...”
<…>
“...I am fighting the Bolsheviks because they are destroying Russia and our free revolution. What do you say now?“
The soldier scratched the back of his head. “I can’t say anything!” — his face was distorted by mental stress. “In my opinion, the matter is clear, but I’m an unlearned person!.. It seems like this: there are two classes - the proletariat and the bourgeoisie...”
“Again you with this stupid formula!” the student shouted.
“...only two classes,” the soldier continued stubbornly. “And whoever is not for one class is, therefore, for another...”
Vasily Shulgin. "Days"
Vasily Shulgin (left) and one of the leaders of the Association of Russian Monarchists Pavel Krupensky. 1917© RIA Novosti
Vasily Shulgin in the film “Before the Judgment of History.” 1965© RIA Novosti
Author
Vasily Vitalievich Shulgin (1878-1976) was one of the most prominent figures in the nationalist movement of the Russian Empire. The son of an editor, the stepson of the next editor, and then the editor of the far-right newspaper Kievlyanin himself, in the last years of tsarism Shulgin moved away from traditional monarchist organizations. In 1915, the “Progressive Group of Nationalists”, created in the Duma with his participation, entered a bloc with the liberals. After the revolution, Shulgin participated in the White movement. In 1944 SMERSH SMERSH ("Death to Spies!") — military counterintelligence, created in the USSR in 1943 and existed independently in the army, navy and within the NKVD. According to various sources, during the Second World War, SMERSH arrested from several hundred thousand to several million people. arrested him in Yugoslavia. After spending 12 years in prison, Shulgin reconciled with the Soviet regime and participated in propaganda work.
Circumstances of writing
Finding himself in exile in 1920, Shulgin took up his memoirs. The book “Days,” in which he talks about the February Revolution, was first published in the emigrant magazine “Russian Thought” in 1922. The first separate edition was published in 1925 in Belgrade. Shulgin, who secretly made his way into the USSR that same year, was able to buy a Soviet reprint of his book.
Cover of the 1925 edition Shulgin begins his description of the history of February from afar - from the moment of publication of the October Manifest of 1905, which he blames for the destruction of traditional relations between the monarchy and its subjects. The Constitution “began with Jewish thunder and ended with the defeat of the dynasty.” The author then defended the editorial board of Kyiv-Lyanin from the revolutionary crowd and, at the head of a platoon of soldiers, suppressed pogroms, which, as he believed, were caused by the Jewish attack on tsarism. When Shulgin's anti-government Duma speech in November 1916 was banned by censorship, this marked for him a further breakdown in the relationship between the people and the autocrat. Shulgin, in search of “some way out,” participates in the organization of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and comes to the conclusion about the need for the abdication of Nicholas II. He nervously and misanthropically describes the crowds passing through the Tauride Palace, arrests, political meetings, and the complex relations of Duma members with the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. But he went down in history as a monarchist who accepted the abdication of the last Russian emperor and then the abdication of his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail.
Peculiarities
Shulgin's many years of experience as a journalist and parliamentary speaker helped him describe the revolutionary chaos. However, he admits that his memories are sometimes confused into a “nightmarish mess.” He completely distorts some facts: he claims that Empress Alexandra Feodorovna was in favor of “concessions” to the opposition, and presents Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich as “the personification of fragility,” although he made active efforts to save the monarchy. A modern reader may be shocked by Shulgin's zoological anti-Semitism, although for his time it was quite moderate - it is more disgust than active hatred. The publicist considered Jewish pogroms harmful and spoke out against the fabrication of the “Beilis case” "The Beilis Case"- the trial of the Jew Menachem Mendel Beilis, who was accused of the ritual murder of 12-year-old Andrei Yushchinsky. The process, which was accompanied by an active anti-Semitic campaign on the one hand and protests by the progressive public in Russia and around the world on the other, took place in Kyiv in the fall of 1913. Beilis was acquitted..
Quote
“I don’t know how it happened... I can’t remember. I already remember that moment when the black and gray thicket, pressing in the doorway, flooded the Duma in a continuous rushing stream...
Soldiers, workers, students, intellectuals, just people... They filled the confused Tauride Palace with living, viscous human jam, hall after hall, room after room, room after room...
From the very first moment of this flood, disgust filled my soul, and since then it has not left me throughout the entire duration of the “great” Russian revolution.
The endless, inexhaustible stream of the human water supply threw more and more new faces into the Duma... But no matter how many of them there were, they all had the same face: vile-animal-stupid or vile-diabolically-evil...
God, how disgusting it was!.. So disgusting that, gritting my teeth, I felt in myself only melancholy, powerless and therefore even more evil rage...
Machine guns!
Machine guns - that's what I wanted. For I felt that only the language of machine guns was accessible to the street crowd and that only he, lead, could drive back into his lair the one who had escaped freedom. terrible beast…
Alas, this beast was... His Majesty the Russian people...
What we were so afraid of, what we wanted to avoid at all costs, was already a fact. The revolution has begun."
Vladimir Nabokov. "The Provisional Government and the Bolshevik Revolution"
Vladimir Nabokov. 1914 Wikimedia Commons
State Duma deputies Vladimir Nabokov (left) and Alexey Aladin. Photo by Karl Bulla. 1906 Wikimedia Commons
Author
One of the most important figures of the party of constitutional democrats, Vladimir Dmitrievich Nabokov (1869-1922), was at the very center of revolutionary events. A prominent lawyer, the son of the Minister of Justice in the tsarist government, he co-authored the act of refusing to accept the throne of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, and then was the manager of the affairs of the Provisional Government of the first composition and worked in the government Legal Council Legal meeting- a body created in March 1917 and existed until the October Revolution, whose tasks included legal assessment resolutions, decrees and orders of the Provisional Government, as well as preparation of the Constituent Assembly.. He died in Berlin during an assassination attempt by monarchists on the cadet leader Pavel Miliukov.
Circumstances of writing
After the start of Bolshevik repressions, Nabokov ended up in Crimea. Relying as a source only on the file of the Cadet newspaper Rech, he described his experiences from the February riots in Petrograd to brief arrest in November 1917 in Smolny. The first issue of the almanac “Archive of the Russian Revolution”, which cadet Joseph Gessen began publishing in 1921, opens with Nabokov’s memories of the Provisional Government. In 1924, the book was republished in the USSR.
Title page first volume of the almanac. 1921 Wikimedia Commons Nabokov the memoirist focuses on what he directly observed. Being a military man, he seems to have been one of the last among the cadet leaders to reach the Tauride Palace, where the Provisional Government was being formed. He became almost the last government representative in the Winter Palace, which he left just minutes before the blockade established by Soviet forces.
In his brief notes, Nabokov focuses not on his own role in history, but on those with whom he worked together. He vividly describes his government colleagues, assessing them as politicians, orators, and most importantly, as leaders of the revolution. Minister of Justice Alexander Kerensky is painfully vain and lacks confidence; Chief Prosecutor of the Synod Vladimir Lvov is naive and incredibly frivolous; Minister of Agriculture Andrei Shingarev is capable and hardworking, but lacks abilities on a national scale. Nabokov sees the main political and social contradictions of 1917 clearly, realizing their fatal insolubility - and the fatal unsuitability of almost all leaders to solve the problems facing the country.
Peculiarities
An experienced publicist and the father of a famous writer, Nabokov writes very vividly. The memoirist’s memory is remarkable: more than a year after the events, in 1918, he accurately reproduced the routes he took among the revolutionary crowds of Petrograd in February, July or October.
Quote
“...I still cannot join the stream of blasphemy and anathematism that now accompanies any mention of the name of Kerensky. I will not deny that he played a truly fatal role in the history of the Russian revolution, but this happened because a mediocre, unconscious rebellious element accidentally raised an insufficiently strong personality to an inappropriate height. The worst that can be said about Kerensky concerns the assessment of the fundamental properties of his mind and character. But one can repeat about him the words that he recently - with such an amazing lack of moral sense and elementary tact - uttered to Kornilov. “In his own way” he loved his homeland - he really burned with revolutionary pathos - and there were cases when a genuine feeling broke through from under the actor’s mask. Let us remember his speech about the rebellious slaves, his cry of despair when he sensed the abyss into which unbridled demagogy was dragging Russia. Of course, here there was no feeling of either genuine strength or clear dictates of reason, but there was some kind of sincere, albeit fruitless, impulse. Kerensky was a prisoner of his mediocre friends, of his past. He organically could not act directly and boldly, and, with all his conceit and pride, he did not have that calm and unshakable confidence that is characteristic of truly strong people. There was absolutely nothing “heroic” in Carlyle’s sense.”
Maksim Gorky. "Untimely Thoughts"
Maksim Gorky. Circa 1906 Library of Congress Author
The classic of proletarian literature Maxim Gorky was not just a writer of fiction and a cultural activist. Even before the revolution, he took an active part in the Social Democratic movement. Before World War I, he briefly edited the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda; during the war, his magazine Chronicle was one of the few legal “defeatist” publications Defeatism (defeatism)- the desire to defeat one’s own country in war. Some socialists in Russia, most notably Vladimir Lenin, considered Russia's defeat in the "reactionary" First World War to be a good thing, since it would further the cause of the revolution..
Circumstances of writing
After the February Revolution, Gorky offered his articles to the newly legalized Bolshevik newspapers, but they rejected his texts due to ideological differences. The writer and a number of other publicists close to the Menshevik-internationalists founded the newspaper “New Life” in the spring of 1917, which was published for a little over a year. Gorky’s journalistic texts regularly appeared in it, mainly in his author’s column “Untimely Thoughts.” In 1918, Gorky collected them into two books - “Revolution and Culture” and “Untimely Thoughts”. The writer prepared a third, more voluminous compilation of his articles, but it remained in the archive until the end of the 1980s, until Gorky’s anti-Bolshevik journalism found itself in demand again during the years of perestroika, when it was published.
“Untimely thoughts. Notes on revolution and culture". 1918 Culture and freedom In his “Novozhiznensky” articles, Gorky chronicled the manifestations of “severe Russian stupidity” that outraged him. He wrote about provocateurs, lynchings, humiliations, and the epidemic of violence that gripped the country. The revolutionary people, at least in the form of a cultureless, brutal crowd, for Gorky are the embodiment of “zoological anarchism”, which the intelligentsia must resist. Education, the dissemination of books and scientific knowledge are seen by him as a way to save the country and the revolution. In these articles, Gorky’s admiration for the achievements of a civilization that conquers nature, such as canals or tunnels, is generally noticeable - this admiration will subsequently be felt in Gorky’s praise.
But during the period of “Untimely Thoughts,” Gorky expressed the position of independent socialists. He wrote “about the wild rudeness, about the cruelty of the Bolsheviks, rising to sadism, about their lack of culture, about their ignorance of the psychology of the Russian people, about the fact that they are carrying out disgusting experiments on the people and destroying the working class.” Gorky had every reason to write that he “to the best of his ability” fought against the Bolsheviks. However, he attacked not only them, but also, for example, the policies of the Cadet Party.
Peculiarities
Gorky's articles appeared in the book in almost the same form in which they were published in the newspaper. The texts, however, are redistributed subject-wise - texts about culture, about October, and so on are put together. A significant part of the political struggle in the revolutionary era took place, of course, in the newspapers. In addition to his own observations and conversations, Gorky also draws on polemics with other authors, for example, employees of Bolshevik publications Ilya Ionov or Ivan Knizhnik-Vetrov. The cruel spirit of the times is also manifested in letters from readers, quite a few of whom threatened the publicist with death due to political disagreements.
Quote
“Lenin is a “leader” and a Russian master, not alien to some of the spiritual properties of this class that has gone into oblivion, and therefore he considers himself entitled to carry out a cruel experiment with the Russian people, doomed in advance to failure.
The people, exhausted and devastated by the war, have already paid for this experience with thousands of lives and will be forced to pay with tens of thousands, which will decapitate them for a long time.
This inevitable tragedy does not bother Lenin, a slave of dogma, and his henchmen - his slaves. Life, in all its complexity, is not known to Lenin, he does not know the masses of the people, he did not live with them, but he - from books - learned how to raise this mass on its hind legs, what is the easiest way to enrage its instincts. The working class is for the Lenins what ore is for a metal worker. Is it possible - under all given conditions - to cast a socialist state from this ore? Apparently - impossible; however - why not try? What does Lenin risk if the experiment fails?
He works like a chemist in a laboratory, with the difference that the chemist uses dead matter, but his work gives a result valuable for life, while Lenin works on living material and leads to the death of the revolution. Conscious workers who follow Lenin must understand that a ruthless experiment is being carried out on the Russian working class, which will destroy the best forces of the workers and will stop the normal development of the Russian revolution for a long time.”
Anton Denikin. "Essays on Russian Troubles"
Anton Denikin. 1914 Wikimedia Commons
Anton Denikin. Paris, 1930s© DIOMEDIA
Author
Anton Ivanovich Denikin (1872-1947) - the son of a serf peasant who became an officer, was born and raised in Poland. During the Russo-Japanese War, he carried out bayonet attacks. He received the rank of lieutenant general for the capture of the city of Lutsk in 1915. Denikin began publishing his fictional and journalistic texts back in the 1890s, criticizing bureaucracy tsarist army, rudeness and arbitrariness towards the lower ranks. He accepted the February Revolution, but actively resisted measures to democratize the army, which he considered to undermine discipline, and became one of the leaders of Kornilovsky and then White movement. After the defeat of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia, Denikin resigned and went into exile. During the Second World War, he sharply criticized the collaboration of Russian emigrants with the Nazis; spent the last two years of his life in the USA.
Circumstances of writing
Denikin began work on “Essays on Russian Troubles” in Belgium in 1920, a few months after he left his post as acting supreme ruler Russia, and then the country. In total, Denikin’s historical and biographical work includes five volumes, but the first two are dedicated to the revolution: “The Collapse of Power and the Army. February - September 1917" and "The Struggle of General Kornilov. August 1917 - April 1918." The first part appeared in 1921, the last volume, written in Hungary, was published in 1926. In the USSR, individual excerpts from the Essays were published in the 1920s, but the full edition was published only during the years of perestroika.
Volume one “The Collapse of Power and the Army.” 1921 State Public Historical Library The work of one of the leaders of the White movement is not quite similar to the usual “general’s memoirs.” Not only because of Denikin’s obvious literary talent, not only because of the deeply emotional intonation characteristic of the texts of Russian intellectuals. In the first volume and in the first half of the second, he practically does not talk about the military operations that he led. Instead, Denikin presents a broad picture, based on a wide range of diverse sources, of the life of Russian society, primarily the army and officers, captured by the revolutionary whirlwind.
The author managed to take some of the documents used in his work abroad with him. Some of his comrades, for example Leonid Novosiltsev, wrote memoirs specifically at Denikin’s request. He refers to both newspapers and the works of other participants in the events - both supporters and opponents, sometimes subjecting evidence to a kind of “cross-examination.” But also as a direct observer, Denikin was at the center of many important events. The general could, for example, confidently call the morale of the troops the main reason for the failure of the summer offensive of 1917, since “in all areas of the offensive [Russian troops] had superiority of forces and technical means over the enemy, and in particular an unprecedented amount of heavy artillery.” .
Peculiarities
One of the thoughts that Denikin strongly emphasizes in his description of the events of 1917 is that the officer movement was not monarchical, reactionary, counter-revolutionary in nature and goals. The officers and generals as a whole accepted the February Revolution and understood it as liberation from tsarism, which prevented a successful fight against the external enemy. The Kornilov movement “was caused by high patriotism and a clear, burning consciousness of the bottomless abyss into which the Russian people were madly rolling.” The main reason In this situation, Denikin sees the alliance of the German General Staff and the “invisible, but clearly felt psychological and real threads” of revolutionary democracy associated with it. However, his assertion about the direct connection of the “defeatists” with the German command is as doubtful as the thesis about the massive influx of former police officers and gendarmes into the Bolshevik Party.
The military dictatorship was supposed to change the balance of power and save the liberal democratic gains of February. But Denikin dwells little on the role of the monarchists in the Kornilov movement, presents the confrontation between Headquarters and the Provisional Government as the fault of the latter and his supporters on the left, and also leaves behind the scenes those mass extrajudicial executions, at the cost of which only the temporary success of Kornilov's speech. Such bias is characteristic of all memoirists, even the best of them, but Denikin has the courage to admit that the reasons for the defeat of the coup were “Kerensky’s energetic struggle to maintain power and the struggle of the Soviets for self-preservation, the complete failure of the technical preparation of Kornilov’s speech and inertial resistance of the mass."
Quote
“The old governor’s house on the high, steep bank of the Dnieper, which for six months had witnessed so many historical dramas, remained deathly silent. As the situation worsened, the walls became strangely empty, and an eerie, oppressive silence settled in them, as if there was a dead person in the house. Rare reports and a lot of leisure time. Disgraced Supreme This refers to Lavr Kornilov, who became supreme commander in chief Russian army on July 19, 1917., spiritually shocked, with bloodshot eyes and longing in his heart, he remained alone for hours, experiencing within himself his great drama, the drama of Russia. In rare moments of communication with loved ones, having heard a timidly thrown phrase expressing hope for a quick approach to the capital of Krymov’s troops, he abruptly interrupted:
- Come on, no need.
Everything was falling apart little by little. The last hopes for the revival of the army and the salvation of the country were disappearing.”
Fyodor Raskolnikov. "Kronstadt and St. Petersburg in 1917"
Fyodor Raskolnikov. 1920 TASS Author
Fyodor Fedorovich Raskolnikov (real name Ilyin, 1892-1939) made a fantastic career thanks to his active participation in the Bolshevik party, which he joined as a student. Midshipman Raskolnikov was elected fellow chairman of the Kronstadt Council. He worked actively in the party press and in the Bolshevik movement in the Baltic Fleet. During the Civil War, Raskolnikov fought famously, although with varying degrees of success. In December 1918, the British captured two destroyers under his command in the Baltic, and the naval commander had to spend several months in a London prison. At one time, Raskolnikov served as Trotsky’s deputy naval commissar for naval affairs and commanded the Baltic Fleet for several months. In the 1920s and 30s, he held responsible diplomatic posts, and in 1938 he became a defector, having learned from the newspapers on the way to Moscow about his dismissal from the post of plenipotentiary representative in Bulgaria. A few days after writing an accusatory open letter to Stalin, Raskolnikov found himself in a French psychiatric clinic, unable to cope with the news of the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union,- an agreement signed on August 23, 1939 by the heads of the foreign affairs departments of Germany and the Soviet Union..
Circumstances of writing
Raskolnikov the memoirist made his debut in 1925, publishing after returning from Afghanistan a book of memoirs about his activities in Kronstadt and Petrograd in 1917. The book was republished in a censored version in 1964, after Raskolnikov’s posthumous rehabilitation; completely - during the years of perestroika.
"Kronstadt and St. Petersburg in 1917." 1990 Publishing house of political literature Raskolnikov's memoirs are a fairly simple, unsophisticated narrative. The author generously shares the joy of victory in the revolutionary struggle, which he describes in chronological order. He met the February revolution as a guard, and the party sent him to the “citadel of the revolution” Kronstadt to edit the newspaper “Voice of Truth”; he became one of the leading Bolshevik organizers and agitators in the Baltic. IN July days Raskolnikov “actually turned into an illegal commander of the troops,” which is why he was in Kresty until mid-October. The book ends with a description of Raskolnikov’s adventures in the detachments of Baltic sailors who defended Petrograd from the forces of Kerensky and Krasnov and then captured a white armored train During the Civil War, the army of the White movement actively used armored and armed trains, which helped conduct military operations along the railways.. Raskolnikov's point of view is fully consistent with the orthodox party ideological position, which he set out in articles and at rallies in 1917.
Peculiarities
The censor's pen, or at least the editor's, did not seem to pass through Raskolnikov's text. The text contains stylistically flawed phrases, for example: “the arrival of Vladimir Ilyich generally marked a sharp cutoff in the tactics of the Bolsheviks.” In the mid-1920s, Raskolnikov worked as an editor for magazines and publishing houses, even became the head of the Main Art Department, and editors were not afraid of him. Ideological clichés also come easily to him. Actually, Raskolnikov was one of those who invented them and put them into use.
Quote
“Comrade Lenin appeared on the balcony, greeted by a long, incessant thunder of applause. The ovation had not yet completely died down when Ilyich had already begun to speak. His speech was very short. Vladimir Ilyich first of all apologized for the fact that due to illness he was forced to limit himself to only a few words, and conveyed greetings to the Kronstadters on behalf of the St. Petersburg workers, and regarding political situation expressed confidence that, despite temporary zigzags, our slogan “All power to the Soviets!” must and will win in the end, for the sake of which colossal stamina, endurance and extreme vigilance are required from us. No specific calls, which later tried to be attributed to comrade. Lenin Pereverzevsky prosecutor's office Pavel Pereverzev(1871-1944) - Russian lawyer, immediately after the February Revolution, he first became the prosecutor of the Petrograd Judicial Chamber, and from May 1917 - the Minister of Justice of the Provisional Government. After the anti-government protests of the Bolsheviks in July, he initiated the publication of documents about their connections with the German government, which ultimately led to persecution of the RSDLP (b) and the flight of Vladimir Lenin from Petrograd., his speech did not contain. Ilyich finished to the accompaniment of an even warmer and more friendly ovation.
After these greetings, the Kronstadters, as befits an organized military units and detachments of workers, lined up again and, to the sounds of several military bands that continuously played revolutionary tunes, entered the Trinity Bridge in perfect order. Here we have already become the object of attention from flirtatious, smartly dressed officers, fat, healthy and well-fed bourgeoisie in new bowlers, ladies and young ladies in hats. They drove by in cabs, passed by, holding hands, but on all their faces, looking at us widely with open eyes, genuine horror was imprinted.”
