Evolution is a scientific theory that essentially indicates the change of species over time. There are many different mechanisms for species change, but most of them are based on the idea of natural selection. Evolution by natural selection was the first scientific theory to provide evidence of how animals and plants change over time, as well as the mechanism of how this occurs.

History of the theory of evolution

The idea that traits are passed on from parents to offspring has been around since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers. In the mid-1700s, Carol Linnaeus came up with his taxonomic naming system, which grouped by species and implied that there was an evolutionary relationship between species within the same group.

In the late 1700s, the first theories emerged and changed over time. Scientists such as the Comte de Buffon and Charles Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, proposed the idea that species changed over time, but no one could explain how or why this happened. They also kept their thoughts secret, since their theories were controversial with the generally accepted religious views of the era.

Jean Baptiste Lamarck, a student of Comte de Buffon, was the first to publicly state that species have changed over time. However, part of his theory was wrong. Lamarck proposed that acquired traits are inherited. Georges Cuvier was able to prove this statement wrong. He also had evidence of species that had evolved and gone extinct.

Cuvier believed in catastrophism and believed that these changes and disappearances in nature occurred suddenly and violently. James Hutton and Charles Lyell countered Georges Cuvier's arguments with the idea of uniformitarianism. This theory states that changes in nature occur slowly and accumulate over time.

Darwin and natural selection

Sometimes called "survival of the fittest", "natural selection" is especially known from Charles Darwin's book The Origin of Species.

In the book, Darwin proposed that species with traits best suited to their environment live long enough to reproduce and pass on those “fortunate” traits to their descendants. Over time, only the “fittest” traits of a species are retained. Eventually, over a period of time, these small adaptations can create new species.

At that time Charles Darwin was not the only person who came up with this idea. Alfred Russel Wallace also had evidence and came to similar conclusions as Darwin. They even collaborated and presented joint findings. Armed with evidence from around the world through their extensive travels, Darwin and Wallace's ideas received positive feedback from the scientific community. The partnership ended when Darwin published his book.

One very important part of the theory of evolution by natural selection is the understanding that species cannot evolve. They can only adapt to environment. Adaptations add up over time and ultimately lead to the evolution of a species. It can also lead to the emergence of new species and sometimes the extinction of older ones.

Evidence of evolution

There is plenty of evidence to support the theory of evolution. Darwin relied on similar species anatomy to tie them together. He also had some fossil evidence that showed over time minor changes in the body structure of a species, often leading to vestigial structures. Of course, the fossil record is incomplete and has " missing links" With today's technology, there is plenty of other evidence for evolution. They include the similarity of embryos different types, the same DNA sequences found in all species, and an understanding of how DNA mutations work in microevolution. Even more fossil evidence has been found since Darwin's time, although there are still many gaps in the fossil record.

Controversy over the theory of evolution

Today, the theory of evolution is often portrayed in the media as a controversial issue. The development of primates and the idea that humans evolved from apes have been a major debate between the scientific and religious communities. Politicians and courts have been deciding whether schools should teach evolution or whether they should teach alternative viewpoints such as intelligent design and creationism.

The case of Tennessee v. John Scopes, also known as the Monkey Trial, became a famous legal battle over the teaching of evolution in schools. In 1925, a teacher named John Scopes was arrested for illegally teaching evolution in a Tennessee science class. It was the first major evolution trial and brought attention to a previously taboo topic.

Theory of evolution in biology

The theory of evolution is often seen as the main overarching topic that unites all topics. These include genetics, population biology, anatomy and physiology, and embryology. While the theory itself has evolved and expanded over time, the principles laid out by Darwin in the 1800s still hold true today.

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Scientific theory, its essence, structure and functions. Types of theories

In psychology, generally the same forms of scientific knowledge as in other sciences: concepts, judgments, conclusions, problems, hypotheses, theories. Each of them represents a relatively independent method reflection of an object by a subject, a method of recording knowledge that has developed in the course of the development of universal human spiritual activity.

Among all forms of knowledge, the highest, most perfect and complex in the methodology of science is recognized theory. Indeed, if concepts or conclusions, problems or hypotheses are often formulated in one sentence, then an interconnected, ordered system of statements is necessary to express the theory. Whole volumes are often written to present and substantiate theories: for example, the theory universal gravity Newton substantiated the voluminous work “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy” (1687), which he spent more than 20 years writing; S. Freud outlined the theory of psychoanalysis not in one, but in many works, and over the last 40 years of his life he constantly made changes and clarifications to it, trying to adapt it to the changing social conditions, assimilate new facts from the field of psychotherapy, and reflect criticism from opponents.

However, this does not mean that the theories are super complex and therefore beyond the understanding of the “man on the street.” Firstly, any theory can be presented in a concise, somewhat schematized version, removing the secondary, insignificant, and bracketing out the supporting arguments and supporting facts. Secondly, ordinary people (i.e., those who are not professional scientists) master many theories along with their implicit logic from school, and therefore mature age often build own theories, based on generalization and analysis everyday experience, differing from scientific ones in the degree of complexity, lack of mathematization and formalization, insufficient validity, less systematic and logical harmony, in particular, insensitivity to contradictions. Thus, a scientific theory is a somewhat refined and complicated version of everyday theories.

Theories act as methodological units, a kind of “cells,” of scientific knowledge: they represent all levels of scientific knowledge along with methodological procedures for obtaining and substantiating knowledge. Scientific theory includes and combines all other forms of scientific knowledge: its main “building material” is concepts, they are connected with each other by judgments, from which inferences are made according to the rules of logic; Any theory is based on one or more hypotheses (ideas) that are the answer to a significant problem (or set of problems). If a particular science consisted of only one theory, it would nevertheless possess all the basic properties of science. For example, geometry for many centuries was identified with the theory of Euclid and was considered at the same time an “exemplary” science in the sense of accuracy and rigor. In a word, theory is science in miniature. Therefore, if we understand how the theory is structured, what functions it performs, then we will comprehend the internal structure and “working mechanisms” of scientific knowledge as a whole.

In the methodology of science, the term “theory” (from the Greek theoria - consideration, research) is understood in two main senses: broad and narrow. In a broad sense, a theory is a complex of views (ideas, concepts) aimed at interpreting a phenomenon (or a group of similar phenomena). In this sense, almost every person has his own theories, many of which relate to the field of everyday psychology. With their help, a person can organize his ideas about goodness, justice, gender relations, love, the meaning of life, posthumous existence, etc. In a narrow, special meaning, theory is understood as the highest form of organization of scientific knowledge, giving a holistic idea of the patterns and essential connections of a certain area of reality. A scientific theory is characterized by systemic harmony, the logical dependence of some of its elements on others, the deducibility of its content according to certain logical and methodological rules from a certain set of statements and concepts that form the initial basis of the theory.

In the process of developing knowledge, the emergence of theories is preceded by the stage of accumulation, generalization and classification of experimental data. For example, before the emergence of the theory of universal gravitation, a lot of information had already been collected both in astronomy (from individual astronomical observations to Kepler’s laws, which are empirical generalizations of the observed motion of planets) and in the field of mechanics (Galileo’s experiments on study of free fall of bodies); In biology, the evolutionary theories of Lamarck and Darwin were preceded by extensive classifications of organisms. The emergence of a theory resembles an insight, during which an array of information is suddenly clearly organized in the theorist’s head thanks to a suddenly emerging heuristic idea. However, this is not entirely true: an innovative hypothesis is one thing, and its justification and development is quite another. Only after the completion of the second process can we talk about the emergence of a theory. Moreover, as the history of science shows, the development of a theory associated with its modifications, refinements, and extrapolation to new areas can last tens and even hundreds of years.

There are several positions on the question of the structure of theories. Let's highlight the most influential of them.

According to V.S. Shvyrev, scientific theory includes the following main components:

1) original empirical basis, which includes many facts recorded in this field of knowledge, achieved through experiments and requiring theoretical explanation;

2) the original theoretical basis -- a set of primary assumptions, postulates, axioms, general laws, which together describe idealized object of theory;

3) logic of theory - set of rules of logical inference and proof acceptable within the framework of the theory;

4) a set of statements derived in theory with their evidence, forming the main body theoretical knowledge.

The central role in the formation of a theory, according to Shvyrev, is played by the underlying idealized object - a theoretical model of the essential connections of reality, presented with the help of certain hypothetical assumptions and idealizations. In classical mechanics, such an object is a system of material points; in molecular kinetic theory, it is a set of chaotically colliding molecules closed in a certain volume, represented as absolutely elastic material points.

It is not difficult to demonstrate the presence of these components in developed subject-centric psychological theories of personality. In psychoanalysis, the role of the empirical basis is played by psychoanalytic facts (data from clinical observations, descriptions of dreams, erroneous actions, etc.), theoretical basis consists of the postulates of metapsychology and clinical theory, the logic used can be characterized as “dialectical” or “logic” natural language“, the “multidimensional” model of the psyche (topological, energetic, economic) acts as an idealized object. From here it is clear that psychoanalytic theory is more complex than any physical theory, since it includes more basic theoretical postulates, operates with several idealized models at once, and uses more “subtle” logical means. Coordination of these components and elimination of contradictions between them represents an important epistemological task, which is still far from being resolved.

A different approach to explicating the structure of the theory is proposed by M.S. Burgin and V.I. Kuznetsov, identifying four subsystems in it: logical-linguistic(language and logical means), model-representative(models and images describing the object), pragmatic-procedural(methods of cognition and transformation of an object) and problem-heuristic(description of the essence and ways to solve problems). The identification of these subsystems, as the authors emphasize, has certain ontological grounds. “The logical-linguistic subsystem corresponds to the existing orderliness of the real world or some part of it, the presence of certain patterns. The pragmatic-procedural subsystem expresses the dynamic nature of the real world and the presence of interaction with it by the cognizing subject. The problem-heuristic subsystem appears due to the complexity of the cognizable reality, which leads to the emergence of various contradictions, problems and the need to solve them. And, finally, the model-representative subsystem primarily reflects the unity of thinking and being in relation to the process of scientific knowledge.”

The comparison of the theory with the organism made by the above-mentioned researchers is worthy of attention. Like Living being, theories are born, develop, reach maturity, and then grow old and often die, as happened with the theories of caloric and ether in the 19th century. As in a living body, the subsystems of the theory are closely interconnected and are in coordinated interaction.

The question of the structure of scientific knowledge is addressed somewhat differently by V.S. Stepin. Based on the fact that the methodological unit of knowledge analysis should not be a theory, but a scientific discipline, he distinguishes three levels in the structure of the latter: empirical, theoretical and philosophical, each of which has a complex organization.

Empirical level includes, firstly, direct observations and experiments, the result of which are observational data; secondly, cognitive procedures through which the transition from observational data to empirical dependencies and facts is carried out. Observation data are recorded in observation protocols, which indicate who observed, the time of observation, and describe the devices, if they were used. If, for example, a sociological survey was conducted, then the observation protocol is a questionnaire with the respondent’s answer. For a psychologist, these are also questionnaires, drawings (for example, in projective drawing tests), tape recordings of conversations, etc. The transition from observational data to empirical dependencies (generalizations) and scientific facts involves the elimination from observations of the subjective aspects contained in them (associated with possible observer errors, random interference distorting the occurrence of the phenomena under study, instrument errors) in order to obtain reliable intersubjective knowledge about the phenomena. Such a transition involves rational processing of observation data, searching for stable invariant content in them, and comparing multiple observations with each other. For example, a historian establishing the chronology of past events always strives to identify and compare a multitude of independent historical evidence, which for him serves as observational data. Then the invariant content identified in the observations is interpreted (interpreted), using known theoretical knowledge. Thus, empirical facts , constituting the bulk of the corresponding level of scientific knowledge, constituted by the interpretation of observational data in the light of a particular theory.

Theoretical level is also formed by two sublevels. The first consists of particular theoretical models and laws, which act as theories relating to a fairly limited area of phenomena. The second one consists of developed scientific theories, including particular theoretical laws as consequences derived from the fundamental laws of the theory. Examples of knowledge of the first sublevel can be theoretical models and laws that characterize individual species mechanical motion: model and law of pendulum oscillation (Huygens’s laws), planetary motion around the Sun (Kepler’s laws), free fall of bodies (Galileo’s laws), etc. In Newtonian mechanics, speaking typical example developed theory, these particular laws, on the one hand, are generalized and, on the other hand, are derived as consequences.

A unique cell for organizing theoretical knowledge at each of its sublevels is a two-layer structure consisting of theoretical model and formulated regarding it law. The model is constructed from abstract objects (such as a material point, a reference system, an absolutely solid surface, elastic force etc.), which are in strictly defined connections and relationships with each other. The laws express the relationship between these objects (for example, the law of universal gravitation expresses the relationship between the mass of bodies, understood as material points, the distance between them and the force of attraction: F = Gm1m2/ r2).

Explanation and prediction by theories experienced facts is connected, firstly, with the derivation of consequences from them, comparable with the results of experience, and, secondly, with the empirical interpretation of theoretical models achieved through establishing correspondence between them and the real objects that they represent. Thus, not only are facts interpreted in the light of theory, but also the elements of the theory (models and laws) are interpreted so as to be subject to experimental verification.

Level foundations of science is the most fundamental in the structure of scientific knowledge. However, until the mid-20th century, it did not stand out: methodologists and scientists simply did not notice it. But it is precisely this level that “acts as a system-forming block that determines the strategy of scientific research, the systematization of acquired knowledge and ensures its inclusion in the culture of the corresponding era.” According to V.S. Stepin, at least three main components of bases can be distinguished scientific activity: ideals and norms of research, the scientific picture of the world and the philosophical foundations of science.

In paragraph 2 of Chapter 1, we already looked at the first two components of this level, so we will focus on the third. According to V.S. Stepin, philosophical foundations– these are the ideas and principles that substantiate the ontological postulates of science, as well as its ideals and norms. For example, Faraday's justification for the material status of electric and magnetic fields was carried out by reference to the metaphysical principle of the unity of matter and force. Philosophical foundations also ensure the “docking” of scientific knowledge, ideals and norms, the scientific picture of the world with the dominant worldview of one or another historical era, with the categories of its culture.

The formation of philosophical foundations is carried out by sampling and subsequent adaptation of ideas developed in philosophical analysis to the needs of a specific area of scientific knowledge. In their structure, V.S. Stepin identifies two subsystems: ontological, represented by a grid of categories that serve as a matrix of understanding and cognition of the objects under study (for example, the categories “thing”, “property”, “relationship”, “process”, “state”, “causality”, “necessity”, “accident”, “ space", "time", etc.), and epistemological, expressed by categorical schemes that characterize cognitive procedures and their results (understanding of truth, method, knowledge, explanation, evidence, theory, fact).

Noting the validity and heuristic nature of the positions we have outlined on the issue of the structure of scientific theory, in particular, and scientific knowledge in general, we will try to identify their weaknesses and determine our own vision of the problem. The first, naturally arising question is related to whether the empirical level of science is included in the content of the theory or not: according to Shvyrev, the empirical level is included in the theory, according to Stepin - not (but is part of scientific discipline), Burgin and Kuznetsov implicitly include the empirical level as part of the pragmatic-procedural subsystem. Indeed, on the one hand, theory is very closely interconnected with facts; it is created to describe and explain them, therefore the elimination of facts from theory clearly impoverishes it. But, on the other hand, facts are able to “lead their own life”, independent of a specific theory, for example, “migrate” from one theory to another. The last circumstance, it seems to us, is more significant: the theory precisely describes and explains the facts, is imposed on them, and therefore they must be taken beyond the limits of the theory. This is also supported by the established division of levels of scientific knowledge into theoretical and empirical (fact-fixing).

Therefore, Stepin’s point of view seems to us the most justified, but adjustments must also be made to it related to the understanding of the structure and role of the philosophical foundations of science. Firstly, they cannot be considered as being on the same level with ideals and norms, with the scientific picture of the world, precisely because of their fundamental nature, primacy, as the author himself notes. Secondly, they are not reduced to ontological and epistemological, but also include value (axiological) and practical (praxeological) dimensions. In general, their structure is homologous to the structure philosophical knowledge, which includes not only ontology and epistemology, but also ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, philosophical anthropology. Thirdly, the interpretation of the genesis of philosophical foundations as the “flow” of ideas from philosophy into science seems to us too narrow; the role of the personal life experience of a scientist cannot be underestimated, in which philosophical views, although developed to a large extent spontaneously, are most deeply rooted due to “ emotional, value-semantic charge”, direct connection with what was seen and experienced.

Thus, theory is the highest form of scientific knowledge, a systemically organized and logically connected multi-level set of abstract objects of varying degrees of generality: philosophical ideas and principles, fundamental and particular models and laws, built from concepts, judgments and images.

Further specification of ideas about the nature of scientific theories is associated with the identification of their functions and types.

The question about the functions of theory is, in essence, a question about the purpose of theory, about its role both in science and in culture as a whole. Coming up with an exhaustive list of features is quite difficult. Firstly, in different sciences, theories do not always perform the same roles: one thing mathematical knowledge, dealing with the world of “frozen” ideal entities that are equal to themselves, and another thing is humanitarian knowledge, focused on understanding the constantly changing, fluid existence of a person in the same unstable world. This substantive difference determines the insignificance (often the complete absence) of the predictive function in the theories of mathematics, and, on the contrary, its importance for the sciences that study man and society. Secondly, scientific knowledge itself is constantly changing, and along with it, ideas about the role of scientific theories are being transformed: in general, with the development of science, more and more new functions are assigned to theories. Therefore, we will note only the most important, basic functions of scientific theory.

1. Reflective. The idealized object of the theory is a kind of simplified, schematized copy of real objects, therefore the theory reflects reality, but not in its entirety, but only in the most significant moments. First of all, the theory reflects the basic properties of objects, the most important connections and relationships between objects, the patterns of their existence, functioning and development. Since the idealized object is a model real object, then this function can also be called modeling (model-representative). In our opinion, we can talk about three types models (idealized objects): structural, reflecting the structure, composition of the object (subsystems, elements and their relationships); functional, describing its functioning over time (i.e. those single-quality processes that occur regularly); evolutionary, reconstructing the course, stages, reasons, factors, trends in the development of an object. Psychology uses many models: psyche, consciousness, personality, communication, small social group, family, creativity, memory, attention, etc.

2. Descriptive the function is derived from the reflective function, acts as its private analogue and is expressed in the theory’s fixation of the properties and qualities of objects, connections and relationships between them. Description, apparently, is the oldest, simplest function of science, therefore any theory always describes something, but not every description is scientific. The main thing in a scientific description is accuracy, rigor, and unambiguity. The most important means of description is language: both natural and scientific, the latter being created precisely to increase accuracy and rigor in recording the properties and qualities of objects. Likewise, the psychologist begins the examination of the client by searching and recording significant facts. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that, for example, Freud would build psychoanalytic theory without relying on previous own and other people's clinical experience, in which descriptions of disease histories were abundantly presented with detailed indications of their etiology, symptoms, stages of development, and treatment methods.

3. Explanatory also derived from the reflective function. An explanation already presupposes a search for consistent connections, clarification of the reasons for the appearance and occurrence of certain phenomena. In other words, to explain means, firstly, to bring a single phenomenon under common law(for example, a single case of a brick falling to the ground can be brought under the general law of gravitation, which will show us why the brick flew down (and not up or did not remain hanging in the air) and at exactly such a speed (or acceleration) and, secondly , find the reason that gave rise to this phenomenon (in our example, the reason that caused the fall of the brick would be the force of gravity, the gravitational field of the Earth. A psychologist, however, like any person, cannot do without searching for consistent connections, without finding out the causes of events and). taking into account the influence of various factors on what is happening to him and around him.

4. Prognostic the function stems from the explanatory one: knowing the laws of the world, we can extrapolate them to future events and, accordingly, predict their course. For example, I can reliably assume (and with one hundred percent probability!) that the brick I threw out the window will fall to the ground. The basis for such a forecast, on the one hand, is everyday experience, and on the other hand, the theory of universal gravitation. Involving the latter can make the forecast more accurate. In modern sciences dealing with complex self-organizing and “human-sized” objects, absolutely accurate forecasts are rare: and the point here is not only in the complexity of the objects under study, which have many independent parameters, but also in the very dynamics of self-organization processes, in which randomness, small force influence at bifurcation points can radically change the direction of development of the system. Also in psychology, the vast majority of forecasts are of a probabilistic-statistical nature, since, as a rule, they cannot take into account the role of numerous random factors that take place in social life.

5. Restrictive (prohibiting) function is rooted in the principle of falsifiability, according to which a theory should not be omnivorous, capable of explaining any, primarily previously unknown, phenomena from its subject area On the contrary, a “good” theory should prohibit certain events (for example, the theory of universal gravitation prohibits the upward flight of a brick thrown from a window; the theory of relativity limits the maximum speed of transmission of material interactions to the speed of light; modern genetics prohibits the inheritance of favored traits). In psychology (especially in such sections as personality psychology and social psychology), apparently, we should talk not so much about categorical prohibitions as about the improbability of certain events. For example, from E. Fromm’s concept of love it follows that a person who does not love himself cannot truly love another. This is, of course, a ban, but not an absolute one. It is also very unlikely that a child who missed a sensitive period for language acquisition (for example, due to social isolation) will be able to fully master it in adulthood; in the psychology of creativity, it is recognized that there is a low probability of an opportunity for a complete amateur to do something important scientific discovery V fundamental areas Sciences. And it is almost impossible to imagine that a child with an objectively confirmed diagnosis of imbecility or idiocy could become an outstanding scientist.

6. Systematizing the function is determined by man’s desire to order the world, as well as by the properties of our thinking, which spontaneously strives for order. Theories come out important means systematization, condensation of information simply due to its inherent organization, the logical relationship (deducibility) of some elements with others. The simplest form of systematization is the processes of classification. For example, in biology, classifications of plant and animal species necessarily preceded evolutionary theories: only on the basis of extensive empirical material of the former was it possible to advance the latter. In psychology, perhaps the most known classifications relate to personality typology: Freud, Jung, Fromm, Eysenck, Leonhard and others made significant contributions to this area of science. Other examples are the identification of types of pathopsychological disorders, forms of love, psychological influence, types of intelligence, memory, attention, abilities and other mental functions.

7. Heuristic the function emphasizes the role of theory as “the most powerful means of solving fundamental problems of understanding reality.” In other words, a theory not only answers questions, but also poses new problems, opens up new areas of research, which it then tries to explore in the process of its development. Often, questions posed by one theory are solved by another. For example, Newton, having discovered gravitational force, could not answer the question about the nature of gravity, this problem was already solved by Einstein in the general theory of relativity. In psychology, the most heuristic theory still remains, apparently, psychoanalysis. On this point, Kjell and Ziegler write: “Although studies concerning psychodynamic theory Freud's concepts cannot be proven unconditionally (since the verifiability of the theory is low), he inspired many scientists by showing them in which direction research could be carried out to improve our knowledge of behavior. Literally thousands of studies have been prompted by Freud's theoretical claims." In terms of the heuristic function, the vagueness and incompleteness of the theory are more advantages than disadvantages. That's the theory Maslow's personality, which is more a collection of delightful conjectures and conjectures than a clearly defined structure. Largely because of its incompleteness, coupled with the boldness of the hypotheses put forward, it “served as a stimulus for the study of self-esteem, peak experience and self-actualization, ... influenced not only researchers in the field of personology, but also in the field of education, management and health care.”

8. Practical the function is epitomized by the famous aphorism of the 19th-century German physicist Robert Kirchhoff: “There is nothing more practical than a good theory.” Indeed, we build theories not only to satisfy curiosity, but, above all, to understand the world around us. In a clear, orderly world, we not only feel safer, but we can also function successfully in it. Thus, theories act as a means of solving personal and social problems, increase the efficiency of our activities. In the era of post-nonclassicalism, the practical significance of scientific knowledge comes to the fore, which is not surprising, because modern humanity is faced with global problems, the overcoming of which by most scientists is seen as possible only through the development of science. The theories of psychology today claim not only to solve the problems of individuals and small groups, but also strive to contribute to the optimization of social life as a whole. According to Kjell and Ziegler, psychology has an important contribution to make in solving problems associated with poverty, racial and sexual discrimination, alienation, suicide, divorce, child abuse, drug and alcohol addiction, crime, etc.

Kinds theories are distinguished on the basis of their structure, determined, in turn, by the methods of constructing theoretical knowledge. There are three main, “classical” types of theories: axiomatic (deductive), inductive and hypothetico-deductive. Each of them has its own “construction base” represented by three similar methods.

Axiomatic theories, established in science since antiquity, personify the accuracy and rigor of scientific knowledge. Today they are most common in mathematics (formalized arithmetic, axiomatic set theory), formal logic (propositional logic, predicate logic) and some branches of physics (mechanics, thermodynamics, electrodynamics). Classic example Such a theory is Euclid’s geometry, which for many centuries was considered a model of scientific rigor. As part of an ordinary axiomatic theory, there are three components: axioms (postulates), theorems (derived knowledge), and rules of inference (proofs).

Axioms(from the Greek axioma “honored, accepted position”) - provisions accepted as true (as a rule, due to self-evidence) that together constitute axiomatics as the fundamental basis of a specific theory. To introduce them, pre-formulated basic concepts (definitions of terms) are used. For example, before formulating the main postulates, Euclid gives definitions of “point”, “straight line”, “plane”, etc. Following Euclid (however, the creation of the axiomatic method is attributed not to him, but to Pythagoras), many tried to build knowledge on the basis of axioms: not only mathematicians, but also philosophers (B. Spinoza), sociologists (G. Vico), biologists (J. Woodger). The view of axioms as eternal and unshakable principles of knowledge was seriously shaken with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries; in 1931, K. Gödel proved that even the simplest mathematical theories cannot be fully constructed as axiomatic formal theories (incompleteness theorem). Today it is clear that the acceptance of axioms is determined by the specific experience of the era; with the expansion of the latter, even the most seemingly unshakable truths may turn out to be erroneous.

From the axioms by certain rules the remaining provisions of the theory (theorems) are derived (deduced), the latter making up the main body of the axiomatic theory. Rules are studied by logic - the science of forms correct thinking. In most cases they represent the laws of classical logic: such as law of identity(“every essence coincides with itself”), law of contradiction(“no proposition can be both true and false”), law of the excluded middle(“every judgment is either true or false, there is no third choice”), law of sufficient reason(“every judgment made must be properly justified”). Often these rules are applied by scientists half-consciously, and sometimes completely unconsciously. As noted above, researchers often make logical errors, relying more on one’s own intuition than on the laws of thinking, preferring to use “softer” logic common sense. Since the beginning of the 20th century, non-classical logics began to develop (modal, multivalued, paraconsistent, probabilistic, etc.), departing from classical laws, trying to grasp the dialectic of life with its fluidity, inconsistency, not subject to classical logic.

If axiomatic theories are relevant to mathematical and formal logical knowledge, then hypothetico-deductive theories specific to natural sciences. G. Galileo is considered the creator of the hypothetico-deductive method, who also laid the foundations of experimental natural science. After Galileo this method was used (though for the most part implicitly) by many physicists, from Newton to Einstein, and therefore until recently it was considered fundamental in natural science.

The essence of the method is to put forward bold assumptions (hypotheses), the truth value of which is uncertain. Then, consequences are deductively derived from the hypotheses until we arrive at statements that can be compared with experience. If empirical testing confirms their adequacy, then the conclusion (due to their logical relationship) about the correctness of the initial hypotheses is legitimate. Thus, the hypothetico-deductive theory is a system of hypotheses of varying degrees of generality: at the very top are the most abstract hypotheses, and at the top lowest level– the most specific, but subject to direct experimental verification. It should be noted that such a system is always incomplete, and therefore can be expanded with additional hypotheses and models.

The more innovative consequences that can be verified by subsequent experience can be derived from a theory, the more authority it enjoys in science. In 1922, Russian astronomer A. Friedman derived equations from Einstein’s theory of relativity that proved its nonstationarity, and in 1929, American astronomer E. Hubble discovered a “red shift” in the spectrum distant galaxies, certifying the correctness of both the theory of relativity and Friedmann's equations. In 1946 American physicist Russian originG. Gamow, from his theory of the hot Universe, deduced the necessity of the presence in space of microwave isotropic radiation with a temperature of about 3 K, and in 1965 this radiation, called relict radiation, was discovered by astrophysicists A. Penzias and R. Wilson. It is quite natural that both the theory of relativity and the concept of a hot Universe have entered the “solid core” of the modern scientific picture of the world.

Inductive theories in their pure form in science, apparently, are absent, since they do not provide logically based, apodictic knowledge. Therefore, we should rather talk about inductive method, which is also characteristic, first of all, of natural science, since it allows us to move from experimental facts first to empirical and then theoretical generalizations. In other words, if deductive theories are built “from the top down” (from axioms and hypotheses to facts, from the abstract to the concrete), then inductive theories are built “from the bottom up” (from individual phenomena to universal conclusions).

F. Bacon is usually recognized as the founder of inductive methodology, although the definition of induction was given by Aristotle, and the Epicureans considered it the only authoritative method of proving the laws of nature. It is interesting that, perhaps under the influence of the authority of Bacon, Newton, who in fact relied mainly on the hypothetico-deductive methodology, declared himself a supporter of the inductive method. A prominent defender of the inductive methodology was our compatriot V.I. Vernadsky, who believed that it is on the basis of empirical generalizations that scientific knowledge should be built: until at least one fact is discovered that contradicts a previously obtained empirical generalization (law), the latter should be considered true.

Inductive inference usually begins with the analysis and comparison of observational or experimental data. If at the same time something common and similar is seen in them (for example, the regular repetition of a property) in the absence of exceptions (conflicting information), then the data are generalized in the form of a universal proposition (empirical law).

Distinguish complete (perfect) induction, when the generalization refers to a finitely observable area of facts, and incomplete induction, when it relates to an infinitely or finitely observable area of facts. For scientific knowledge, the second form of induction is most important, since it is it that gives an increase in new knowledge and allows us to move on to law-like connections. However, incomplete induction is not a logical reasoning, since no law corresponds to the transition from the particular to the general. Therefore, incomplete induction is probabilistic in nature: there is always a chance that new facts will appear that contradict those previously observed.

The “trouble” of induction is that a single disproving fact makes the empirical generalization as a whole untenable. This cannot be said about theoretically based statements, which can be considered adequate even when faced with many contradictory facts. Therefore, in order to “strengthen” the significance of inductive generalizations, scientists strive to substantiate them not only with facts, but also with logical arguments, for example, to derive empirical laws as consequences from theoretical premises or to find the reason that determines the presence of similar characteristics in objects. However, inductive hypotheses and theories in general are of a descriptive, ascertaining nature and have less explanatory potential than deductive ones. However, in the future, inductive generalizations often receive theoretical support, and descriptive theories are transformed into explanatory ones.

The considered basic models of theories act primarily as ideal-typical constructions. In the actual scientific practice of natural science, when constructing theories, scientists, as a rule, use both inductive and hypothetico-deductive methodology simultaneously (and often intuitively): the movement from facts to theory is combined with a reverse transition from theory to verifiable consequences. More specifically, the mechanism for constructing, justifying and testing a theory can be represented by the following diagram: observational data → facts → empirical generalization → universal hypothesis → particular hypotheses → testable consequences → setting up an experiment or organizing an observation → interpretation of experimental results → conclusion about the consistency (failure) of hypotheses → putting forward new ones hypotheses The transition from one stage to another is far from trivial; it requires the use of intuition and a certain amount of ingenuity. At each stage, the scientist also reflects on the results obtained, aimed at understanding their meaning, compliance with the standards of rationality, and eliminating possible errors.

Of course, not every hypothesis verified by experience is subsequently transformed into a theory. In order to form a theory around itself, a hypothesis (or several hypotheses) must not only be adequate and new, but also have a powerful heuristic potential and relate to a wide range of phenomena.

The development of psychological knowledge as a whole follows a similar scenario. Let's take, for example, the theory of personality (more precisely, the psychotherapeutic concept as one of its parts) by K.R. Rogers, recognized throughout the world, meeting to a fairly high degree the criteria of heuristics, experimental approbability, and functional significance. Before proceeding to the construction of the theory, Rogers obtained psychological education, acquired rich and varied experience working with people: first he helped difficult children, then he taught at universities and advised adults, and conducted scientific research. At the same time, he studied in depth the theory of psychology, mastered methods of psychological, psychiatric and social assistance. As a result of analyzing and summarizing his experience, Rogers came to understand the futility of “intellectual approaches,” psychoanalytic and behaviorist therapy, and the realization that “change occurs through experience in relationships.” Rogers was also dissatisfied with the inconsistency of Freudian views with the “scientific, purely objective statistical approach to science.”

Rogers bases his own psychotherapeutic concept on the “basic hypothesis”: “if I can create a certain type of relationship with another person, he will discover the ability to use this relationship for his development, which will cause a change and development of his personality.” Apparently, the advancement of this assumption is based not only on the therapeutic and life experience of the author, but also owes its appearance to Rogers’ philosophical ideas and intuitive conviction of its correctness. Particular consequences follow from the main hypothesis, for example, the position of three “necessary and sufficient conditions» successful therapy: non-judgmental acceptance, congruence (sincerity), empathic understanding. Derivation of partial hypotheses in in this case cannot be considered purely logical, formal; on the contrary, it is substantive, creative character, is associated, again, with the generalization and analysis of experience in relationships with people. As for the main hypothesis, it fully complies with the above-mentioned requirements of heuristics and fundamentality, and therefore may well serve as the “ideological center” for building a developed theory. The heuristic nature of the main hypothesis was manifested, in particular, in the fact that it guided many researchers to study the quality of the relationship between the consultant and the client. Its fundamental nature is associated with the possibility of extrapolation to any (not just psychotherapeutic) relationships between people, which was done by Rogers himself.

The hypotheses put forward formed the theoretical basis of client-centered therapy, which then became the subject of objective, rigorous, measurement-based, empirical study. Rogers not only formulated a number of testable consequences due, first of all, to the operationalization of basic concepts, but also defined a program and methods for their verification. The implementation of this program has convincingly proven the effectiveness of client-centered therapy.

From Rogers' theory it follows that the success of therapy depends not so much on the knowledge, experience, and theoretical position of the consultant, but on the quality of the relationship. This assumption can also be tested if we can operationalize the concept of “relationship quality”, consisting of “sincerity”, “empathy”, “goodwill”, “love” for the client. For this purpose, one of Rogers' employees, based on scaling and ranking procedures, developed the Attitude List questionnaire for clients. For example, agreeableness was measured using sentences of different ranks: from “He likes me”, “He is interested in me” (high and medium levels of agreeableness) to “He is indifferent to me”, “He disapproves of me” (zero and negative levels, respectively). goodwill). The client rated these statements on a scale from “very true” to “not at all true.” As a result of the survey, a high positive correlation was discovered between the empathy, sincerity, and friendliness of the consultant, on the one hand, and the success of therapy, on the other. A number of other studies have shown that the success of therapy does not depend on the theoretical position of the consultant. In particular, a comparison of psychoanalytic, Adlerian and client-centered psychotherapy showed that success depends precisely on the quality of the relationship between the participants in the therapeutic process, and not on the basis of what theoretical concepts it unfolds. Thus, particular, and, consequently, Rogers’ main hypotheses received experimental confirmation.

Using the example of Rogers' concept of interhuman relations, we see that the development of the theory is cyclical, spiral in nature: therapeutic and life experience→ its generalization and analysis → putting forward universal and particular hypotheses → drawing testable consequences → testing them → clarifying hypotheses → modification based on refined knowledge of therapeutic experience. Such a cycle can be repeated many times, with some hypotheses remaining unchanged, others being refined and modified, others being discarded, and others being generated for the first time. In such a “circulation,” the theory develops, refines, and enriches, assimilating new experience and putting forward counterarguments to criticism from competing concepts.

Most other psychological theories function and develop according to the same scenario, so it would be legitimate to conclude that the “average psychological theory” combines the features of both hypothetico-deductive and inductive theories. Are there “pure” inductive and hypothetico-deductive theories in psychology? In our opinion, it is more correct to talk about the gravitation of a particular concept towards the pole of induction or deduction. For example, most concepts of personality development are predominantly inductive in nature (in particular, Freud’s doctrine of psychosexual stages, E. Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development, J. Piaget’s theory of stages of intellectual development) since they, firstly, rely on a generalization of observations and experiments, - secondly, they are predominantly descriptive in nature, characterized by “poverty” and weakness of explanatory principles (for example, Piaget’s theory cannot explain, except by reference to observational data, why there should be exactly four (and not three or five) stages of intelligence formation, why only children develop faster than others, why the order of stages is this way, etc.). With regard to other theories, it is often impossible to say exactly which type they are closer to, since the development of universal hypotheses in most cases is equally based on both the experience and intuition of the researcher, as a result of which many provisions of the theories combine the qualities of empirical generalizations and universal hypotheses-guesses .

But why are there so many theories in psychology, what determines their diversity, since we live in the same world, have similar life experiences: we are born, learn language and etiquette, go to school, fall in love, get sick and suffer, hope and dream? Why do theorists interpret this experience differently, each emphasizing their own, paying attention to some aspects of it and losing sight of others, and accordingly they put forward different hypotheses and build theories that are completely different in content from each other? In our opinion, the key to answering these questions lies through the study of the philosophical foundations of psychological theories, to which we now turn.

All modern science has developed from assumptions that initially seemed mythical and implausible. But over time, having accumulated well-reasoned evidence, these assumptions became publicly accepted truth. This is how the theories on which all scientific knowledge of mankind is based arose. But what is the answer to this question you will learn from our article.

Definition of the concept

There are many definitions of this term. But the optimal ones are those used by the scientific community. Such definitions are taken as a basis.

A theory is a certain system of ideas in a given field of knowledge that gives a holistic idea of the existing patterns associated with reality.

There are more complex definition. A theory is a complex of ideas that are closed in relation to rational pursuit. This is precisely the abstract definition of the term “theory” that logic gives. From the standpoint of this science, any idea can be called a theory.

Typology of scientific theories

For a more accurate understanding of the essence of scientific theories, one should refer to their classification. Methodologists and philosophers of science distinguish three main types of scientific theories. Let's look at them separately.

Empirical theories

The first type is traditionally considered to be empirical theories. Examples include Pavlov's physiological theory, Darwin's evolutionary theory, developmental theory, psychological and linguistic theories. They are based on a huge mass of experimental facts and explain a certain group of phenomena.

On the basis of these phenomena, generalizations are formulated, and as a result - laws that become the basis on which the theory is built. This is true for other types of theories as well. But the theory of the empirical type is formulated as a result of a descriptive and generalized nature, without observing all logical rules.

Mathematical theories

Mathematical scientific theories constitute the second type of theories in this classification. Their characteristic feature is the use of mathematical apparatus and mathematical models. In such theories a special mathematical model, which represents a certain ideal object that can replace a real object. A striking example of this type are logical physicists elementary particles, control theory and many others. As a rule, they are based on, that is, on the derivation of the main provisions of the theory from several basic axioms. The fundamental axioms must necessarily meet the criteria of objectivity and not contradict each other.

Deductive theoretical systems

The third type of scientific theories is deductive theoretical systems. They appeared due to the task of rationally comprehending and justifying mathematics. The first deductive theory is considered to be the geometry of Euclid, which was built using axiomatic theory, which is built on the basis of the formulation of the main provisions and the subsequent inclusion in the theory of those statements that can be obtained as a result of logical conclusions from the initial provisions. All logical conclusions and means that are used in the theory are clearly recorded to form an evidence base.

As a rule, deductive theories are very general and abstract, so the question of their interpretation quite often arises. A striking example is the theory. This is a theory that cannot be unequivocally assessed, therefore it is interpreted in different ways.

Philosophy and scientific theory: how do they relate?

Philosophy plays a special, but at the same time specific role. It is said that scientists, formulating and comprehending certain theories, rise to the level of not only understanding a specific scientific problem, but also understanding existence and the very essence of knowledge. And this, of course, is philosophy.

So the question arises. How does philosophy influence the construction of scientific theory? The answer is quite simple, since these processes are inextricably linked. Philosophy is present in scientific theory in the form of logical laws, methodology, in the form of a general picture of the world and its understanding, the scientist’s worldview and all fundamental scientific foundations. In this context, philosophy is both the source and the ultimate goal of constructing most scientific theories. Even not scientific, but organizational theories (for example, management theory) are not without a philosophical basis.

Theory and experiment

The most important method of empirical confirmation of a theory is an experiment, which must include measurement and observation, as well as many other methods of influencing the object or group of objects being studied.

An experiment is a certain material impact on the object being studied or on the conditions that surround it, which is carried out for the purpose of further studying this object. Theory is what precedes experiment.

In a scientific experiment, it is common to isolate several elements;

the ultimate goal of the experiment;
the object to be studied;
the conditions in which the object is located;
means for conducting the experiment;
material impact on the object being studied.

Using each individual element, you can build a classification of experiments. According to this statement, one can distinguish between physical, biological, chemical experiments, depending on the object at which it is carried out. Experiments can also be classified according to the goals pursued when conducting them.

The purpose of the experiment is to discover and understand some patterns or facts. This type of experiment is called exploratory. The result this experience can be considered an expansion of data about the object under study. But in most cases, such an experiment is carried out to confirm a separate hypothesis or the basis of a theory. This type of experiment is called verification. As is known, a fairly clear line cannot be drawn between these two types. The same experiment can be carried out within the framework of two types of experiments, or with the help of one you can find out data that is characteristic of the other. Modern science is based on these two principles.

An experiment is always a kind of question to nature. But it should always be meaningful and based on prior knowledge in order to get a decent answer. It is this knowledge that theory provides, it is precisely what poses questions. Initially, the theory exists in the form of abstract, idealized objects, and then there is a process of testing it for reliability.

Thus, we examined the meaning of the word “theory”, its typology, related connections with the sciences and practice. We can safely say that there is nothing more practical than a good theory.

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What is Theory? Meaning and interpretation of the word teorija, definition of the term

1) Theory- (from the Greek theoria - consideration, research, teaching) - English. theory; German Theorie. 1. A special sphere of human activity and its results, which are a set of ideas, views, concepts, teachings about the surrounding reality. As a mental construction, T. opposes practice and at the same time is in organic unity with it. 2. A form of reliable scientific knowledge that gives a holistic idea of patterns and creatures, the characteristics of objects, based on the surrounding reality.

2) Theory- (from the Greek theoria - consideration, research, teaching) - the term "T." ambiguous; in modern scientific methodology, it is defined in a narrow and specific sense in comparison with interpretation, which is often found in everyday speech, when theory is identified with any set of views and other things that differ from practical actions. In the methodology of science, technology is considered the most complex and developed form of organization in science. knowledge that gives a holistic idea of the essential connections of a certain area of reality - the object of a given T. Other forms of scientific. knowledge - facts, hypotheses, laws, classifications, typologies - can genetically precede technology, interact with it in the system of science, and even be its elements. In modern scientific methodology, it is customary to distinguish the following main components of theory: initial empirical. basis, which includes many empirical ones. concepts, facts that have received or require theoretical explanations; original theoretical basis - a lot of theoretical. concepts, primary assumptions, postulates, axioms, laws of technology, which together describe the idealized object of technology; logical apparatus of T. - rules of logical inference and proof; a set of concepts and statements derived in T. with their proofs, constituting the main body of theoretical theory. knowledge. Methodologically central role in the development of technology, the underlying idealized object, the theoretical, plays a role. a model of the essential connections of reality, represented by certain hypothetical assumptions and idealizations. This model is based on scientific paradigms. The construction of an idealized object is a necessary stage in the creation of any technology in forms specific to different areas of knowledge. An idealized object can act as different forms, to assume or not to assume mathematical. descriptions may or may not contain a moment of clarity, but under all conditions it must be a constructive means of deploying the entire T system. This object becomes not only theoretical. model of reality; it implicitly contains a certain research program, which is implemented in the construction of T. The relationships between the elements of an idealized object - both initial and inferred - are theoretical. laws, which, unlike empirical ones, are formed not directly on the basis of the study of facts, but through certain mental actions with an idealized object. Lit.: Gryaznov V.S., Dynin B.S., Nikitin E. Theory and its object. M., 1973; Stepin B.S. The formation of scientific theory. Minsk, 1976; Ruzavin G.I. Scientific theory. M., 1978; Shvyrev B.S. Theoretical and empirical in scientific knowledge. M., 1978; Experiment, model, theory. M., 1982; Turner J. The structure of sociological theory. M. 1985. Logic sociological research, M. Osipov G.V., Kabyshcha A.V. Paradigm, subject and structure of sociological knowledge // Sociology. Fundamentals of general theory (edited by Osipov G.V., Moskvichev L.N.). M. 1996. A.V. Kabyshcha.

3) Theory- - one of the possible explanations of observed phenomena, representing a certain set of logically interconnected assumptions and propositions (judgments).

4) Theory- – a system of interrelated statements, conclusions, assumptions and hypotheses.

5) Theory - (Greek theoria - observation, consideration, research, speculation, lit. - “spectacle”, “staging”) - the highest form of organization of scientific knowledge, giving a holistic idea of the patterns and essential (structural, functional, causal, genetic) connections of a certain the area of the reality being described (the subject field of explanations and interpretations). In classical science, theory should ideally represent a system of its laws and present the basic categorical and conceptual apparatus of its description (understanding, interpretation, interpretation, explanation and prediction, with emphasis on the last two procedures). It is a deductively (in most cases) constructed system of organizing knowledge, introducing rules for the logical inference of more specific knowledge (consequences) from the most general (in the limit - axiomatic) grounds-premisses for a given theory. Ideally, a “correctly” constructed theory is open both to the study of facts and to metatheoretical research, in which it is consistent with other theories related to a given subject area (“fragment”). Techniques differ in the nature of the problems they solve, the methods of their construction, and the types of procedures implemented. There are: 1) hypothetico-deductive theories, characterized by a hierarchical subordination of their components, ensuring the transition from statements to statements without involving additional information, and a focus on explanation procedures; 2) descriptive-prognostic T., constructed from propositional statements of approximately the same level of generalization (which does not require hierarchical subordination), ensuring coordination with the empirical (factual) level of knowledge and aimed at description (as a possible basis for constructing models and forecasts); in this sense, the term “phenomenological T.” is also used; 3) inductive-deductive T., occupying a middle position between the first and second; 4) formalized technicalities of logic and mathematics. In the structure of a “fully” developed T. there are: 1) a fundamental theoretical scheme - initial principles, universal (for a given T.) laws, basic system-forming categories and concepts; 2) possible additional particular theoretical schemes that specify and project the fundamental theoretical scheme onto adjacent subject areas; 3) an idealized (conceptual) diagram (model, object) of the described area with a “prescription” of the main connections between its elements (structural and organizational cross-section of the subject field), onto which interpretations of all T’s statements are projected. ; 4) the logical scheme of the theory, which includes many rules of inference that are acceptable within the theory, methods of proof, and principles of its “design”; 5) language thesaurus, syntax as norms for constructing correct linguistic expressions and presentation of the results obtained (logical-mathematical logics are generally understood as a set of sentences of some formalized language); 6) an interpretative scheme that programs the possibility of transition from a conceptual (less often, fundamental) scheme to the level of facts and procedures of observation and experiment (setting the operational meaning of T.); 7) a set of laws and statements logically derived from the fundamental theoretical scheme. Thus, T. is a system of logically interconnected statements, interpreted on idealized objects that present ("refer" to) one or another "fragment" of the reality being studied. Otherwise: T. is a network (as an integrity) of constructs built from initial concepts, connected by a certain set of “derived” statements regarding them. T. must explain known facts as completely as possible, “subsuming” them under a system of connections-laws constituted as “underlying them.” At the same time, the heuristic power of T. is determined by its ability to predict still unknown facts, expanding the sphere of the “known.” In relation to T., a number of procedures for its justification are carried out: verification, falsification, methodological reflection of its foundations, falsifying criticism of the foundations of T. “competitors” (especially in socio-humanitarian knowledge), redesign of architectonics and other procedures of a more specific order. In fact, in this case we are talking about the “naturalization” of theoretical schematisms as describing not only ideal, but also “real” objects, i.e. on fixing the scope of application of technology (real situations of experience). The transition from the schematisms of theory to the level of facts is carried out by a fairly mobile (subject to constant reformulation) layer of hypotheses (following from theory, but substantiated by empirical data). Thus, each T. has a certain explanatory and prognostic potential, indicating its “strength”. The latter affects: 1) T.’s ability to “expand” into adjacent subject, even disciplinary areas; 2) the “competitiveness” of technology in its clash with other technologies that claim to explain and predict the same subject area, but on other theoretical and methodological (conceptual) grounds. In the latter case, we can talk about two different epistemological situations: 1) the case of competition between “old” and “new” theoretical systems; 2) the case of competition between two (or more) “new” conceptual schemes (models, hypotheses) that claim to be institutionalized as a T. of a particular subject area. Additional reasons The distinctions between the “strength” of technology are: 1) the criterion of constructiveness (the architectonics of technology), 2) the criterion of simplicity (the ability of technology to “reduce”, “compress” knowledge, and increase its information “capacity” without further complicating its architectonics). From a methodological point of view, any theory should strive for maximum completeness and adequacy of description, integrity and deducibility of its provisions from each other, and internal consistency. The actualization of the topic of “choice” of technology shifted the emphasis of general methodological reflection from problems of the “internal” organization of knowledge to the problems of its “inclusion” in broader knowledge systems, from the logical and linguistic analysis of technology to issues of institutional organization of knowledge, which was enshrined as a transition from the “neopositivist” to the “postpositivist” phase in the development of analytical philosophy, which made scientific knowledge the main subject of its analyzes. In this case, the focus of general methodological reflection is on problems related to the consideration of issues of ideals and norms of scientific knowledge; scientific pictures of the world within which specific technologies are formed, or which are formed (changed) under the influence of certain technologies, as well as strategies used by certain scientific communities to consolidate their dominant position or to achieve it in a particular disciplinary area. In the broadest context, we are talking about the “fitness” of the considered T. into the system of culture as a whole, about their role in the descriptions (self-descriptions) of the latter. In this case, the content of the term "T." expands as much as possible until discussion theoretical component and ways of its “formulation” in the cognitive practices of a particular type of culture. As a result, the concept of T. is subordinated to the concepts (or even replaced by them) of a research program (the term is constituted by Lakatos), as presenting certain research strategies, or paradigms (the term is constituted by Kuhn), as presenting certain visions of the reality under study. At the origins of the “relativization” of the concept of T. was Popper, in whom the beginning and completion of a certain stage of change in knowledge are marked by problems, and knowledge itself is interpreted as fundamentally hypothetical. The tendency to challenge the understanding of the development of technology as a cumulative process originates from postpositivist discourses. Ideas about the “improvement” and “deployment” of technology during the period of “normal science” were supplemented by ideas about: 1) about the “scientific revolution” and the change of competing paradigms (Kuhn), 2) about the reinterpretation of the “protective belt” of the invariant core of the research program (Lakatos ), 3) about “methodological anarchism”, i.e. about the equality of various coexisting T., which alone can serve as a guarantee that the facts will be noticed and properly assessed (Feyerabend). In the same vein, one can understand the concept of episteme introduced by Foucault, as well as the analysis of “epistemological breaks” by G. Bachelard. An important role in the revision of the concept of technology was also played by: 1) Merton’s introduction of the concept of “medium-level technology” as mediating fundamental theoretical and empirical-procedural (factualistic) knowledge; 2) the formation of ideas about the metatheoretical level of organization of knowledge (metatheory and metalanguage), which made it possible to distance ourselves as much as possible from the specific subject “fragments” described by one or another T., and reach the level of methodological reflection on scientific knowledge of one kind or another or on scientific knowledge as such, on the one hand, and on “fitting” theoretical knowledge into the context of culture, on the other. From the middle of the 20th century. There has been a tendency to isolate methodology from scientific-theoretical (and philosophical) knowledge into a special area of knowledge practices (neo-rationalism, system-based mental activity (SMA) methodology, etc.). The universality of theory as the highest form of organization of knowledge has been constantly questioned in socio-humanitarian knowledge (starting with neo-Kantianism). In this regard, such forms of its organization as typology, ideal and constructive types, etc. were discussed. In “softer” versions of criticism, it was proposed to remove the most “strict” requirements imposed on T. of any kind, and she herself actually took on the appearance scientific concept, as setting the vision, logic and means (concepts) for describing a particular area under study. (In the tradition of analytical philosophy, Toulmin holds similar views, considering science as a set of evolving populations of concepts and explanatory procedures.) Significant in this regard was the formulation of the thesis about the fundamental multiparadigm (plurality) of social and humanitarian disciplines. No less important for understanding the essence and nature of scientific knowledge turned out to be the idea of it not only (and not so much) as disciplinary-subject organized (and thereby “striving” to express itself in the form of an extremely heuristic technology), but as knowledge discursive, generating specific discourses and communications of a special kind. See also: Hypothesis, Science, Discipline, Knowledge. V.L. Abushenko

6) Theory- (theory) - 1. (In the physical and social sciences) a set of hypotheses or judgments connected by logical or mathematical arguments; to explain an empirical reality or type of phenomenon. See also Formal theory; Model. 2. (In a looser sense) an abstract general vision of an area of reality, usually including the formulation of general concepts. See also Explanation; Sociological theory. Even in the technical sciences, the meaning of theories in a strictly logical or mathematical form is disputed by a number of philosophers and historians of science (see Scientific paradigm; Kuhn; Feyerabend).

Theory

(from Greek theoria - consideration, research, teaching) - English. theory; German Theorie. 1. A special sphere of human activity and its results, which are a set of ideas, views, concepts, teachings about the surrounding reality. As a mental construction, T. opposes practice and at the same time is in organic unity with it. 2. A form of reliable scientific knowledge that gives a holistic idea of patterns and creatures, the characteristics of objects, based on the surrounding reality.

(from Greek theoria - consideration, research, teaching) - the term "T." ambiguous; in modern scientific methodology, it is defined in a narrow and specific sense in comparison with interpretation, which is often found in everyday speech, when theory is identified with any set of views and other things that differ from practical actions. In the methodology of science, technology is considered the most complex and developed form of organization in science. knowledge that gives a holistic idea of the essential connections of a certain area of reality - the object of a given T. Other forms of scientific. knowledge - facts, hypotheses, laws, classifications, typologies - can genetically precede technology, interact with it in the system of science, and even be its elements. In modern scientific methodology, it is customary to distinguish the following main components of theory: initial empirical. basis, which includes many empirical ones. concepts, facts that have received or require theoretical explanations; original theoretical basis - a lot of theoretical. concepts, primary assumptions, postulates, axioms, laws of technology, which together describe the idealized object of technology; logical apparatus of T. - rules of logical inference and proof; a set of concepts and statements derived in T. with their proofs, constituting the main body of theoretical theory. knowledge. A methodologically central role in the development of theory is played by the underlying idealized object—the theoretical. a model of the essential connections of reality, represented by certain hypothetical assumptions and idealizations. This model is based on scientific paradigms. The construction of an idealized object is a necessary stage in the creation of any technology in forms specific to different areas of knowledge. An idealized object can appear in different forms, and may or may not involve mathematics. descriptions may or may not contain a moment of clarity, but under all conditions it must be a constructive means of deploying the entire T system. This object becomes not only theoretical. model of reality; it implicitly contains a certain research program, which is implemented in the construction of T. The relationships between the elements of an idealized object - both initial and inferred - are theoretical. laws, which, unlike empirical ones, are formed not directly on the basis of the study of facts, but through certain mental actions with an idealized object. Lit.: Gryaznov V.S., Dynin B.S., Nikitin E. Theory and its object. M., 1973; Stepin B. C. Formation of scientific theory. Minsk, 1976; Ruzavin G.I. Scientific theory. M., 1978; Shvyrev B.S. Theoretical and empirical in scientific knowledge. M., 1978; Experiment, model, theory. M., 1982; Turner J. The structure of sociological theory. M. 1985. Logic of sociological research, M. Osipov G.V., Kabyshcha A.V. Paradigm, subject and structure of sociological knowledge // Sociology. Fundamentals of general theory (edited by Osipov G.V., Moskvichev L.N.). M. 1996. A.V. Kabyshcha.

One of the possible explanations of observed phenomena, which represents a certain set of logically interconnected assumptions and propositions (judgments).

– a system of interconnected statements, conclusions, assumptions and hypotheses.

(Greek theoria - observation, consideration, research, speculation, lit. - “spectacle”, “staging”) - the highest form of organization of scientific knowledge, giving a holistic idea of the patterns and essential (structural, functional, causal, genetic) connections of a certain area the described reality (the subject field of explanations and interpretations). In classical science, theory should ideally represent a system of its laws and present the basic categorical and conceptual apparatus of its description (understanding, interpretation, interpretation, explanation and prediction, with emphasis on the last two procedures). It is a deductively (in most cases) constructed system of organizing knowledge, introducing rules for the logical inference of more specific knowledge (consequences) from the most general (in the limit - axiomatic) grounds-premisses for a given theory. Ideally, a “correctly” constructed theory is open both to the study of facts and to metatheoretical research, in which it is consistent with other theories related to a given subject area (“fragment”). Techniques differ in the nature of the problems they solve, the methods of their construction, and the types of procedures implemented. There are: 1) hypothetico-deductive theories, characterized by a hierarchical subordination of their components, ensuring the transition from statements to statements without involving additional information, and a focus on explanation procedures; 2) descriptive-prognostic T., constructed from propositional statements of approximately the same level of generalization (which does not require hierarchical subordination), ensuring coordination with the empirical (factual) level of knowledge and aimed at description (as a possible basis for constructing models and forecasts); in this sense, the term “phenomenological T.” is also used; 3) inductive-deductive T., occupying a middle position between the first and second; 4) formalized technicalities of logic and mathematics. In the structure of a “fully” developed T. there are: 1) a fundamental theoretical scheme - initial principles, universal (for a given T.) laws, basic system-forming categories and concepts; 2) possible additional particular theoretical schemes that specify and project the fundamental theoretical scheme onto adjacent subject areas; 3) an idealized (conceptual) diagram (model, object) of the described area with a “prescription” of the main connections between its elements (structural and organizational cross-section of the subject field), onto which interpretations of all T’s statements are projected. ; 4) the logical scheme of the theory, which includes many rules of inference that are acceptable within the theory, methods of proof, and principles of its “design”; 5) linguistic thesaurus, syntax as norms for constructing correct linguistic expressions and presenting the results obtained (logical-mathematical technicalities are generally understood as a set of sentences of some formalized language); 6) an interpretative scheme that programs the possibility of transition from a conceptual (less often, fundamental) scheme to the level of facts and procedures of observation and experiment (setting the operational meaning of T.); 7) a set of laws and statements logically derived from a fundamental theoretical scheme. Thus, T. is a system of logically interconnected statements, interpreted on idealized objects that present ("refer" to) one or another "fragment" of the reality being studied. Otherwise: T. is a network (as an integrity) of constructs built from initial concepts, connected by a certain set of “derived” statements regarding them. T. must explain known facts as completely as possible, “subsuming” them under a system of connections-laws constituted as “underlying them.” At the same time, the heuristic power of T. is determined by its ability to predict still unknown facts, expanding the sphere of the “known.” In relation to T., a number of procedures for its justification are carried out: verification, falsification, methodological reflection of its foundations, falsifying criticism of the foundations of T. “competitors” (especially in socio-humanitarian knowledge), redesign of architectonics and other procedures of a more specific order. In fact, in this case we are talking about the “naturalization” of theoretical schematisms as describing not only ideal, but also “real” objects, i.e. on fixing the scope of application of technology (real situations of experience). The transition from the schematisms of theory to the level of facts is carried out by a fairly mobile (subject to constant reformulation) layer of hypotheses (following from theory, but substantiated by empirical data). Thus, each T. has a certain explanatory and prognostic potential, indicating its “strength”. The latter affects: 1) T.’s ability to “expand” into adjacent subject, even disciplinary areas; 2) the “competitiveness” of technology in its clash with other technologies that claim to explain and predict the same subject area, but on other theoretical and methodological (conceptual) grounds. In the latter case, we can talk about two different epistemological situations: 1) the case of competition between “old” and “new” theoretical systems; 2) the case of competition between two (or more) “new” conceptual schemes (models, hypotheses) that claim to be institutionalized as a T. of a particular subject area. Additional grounds for distinguishing the “strength” of technology are: 1) the criterion of constructiveness (the architectonics of technology), 2) the criterion of simplicity (the ability of technology to “reduce”, “compress” knowledge, and increase its information “capacity” without further complicating its architectonics). From a methodological point of view, any theory should strive for maximum completeness and adequacy of description, integrity and deducibility of its provisions from each other, and internal consistency. The actualization of the topic of “choice” of technology shifted the emphasis of general methodological reflection from problems of the “internal” organization of knowledge to the problems of its “inclusion” in broader knowledge systems, from the logical and linguistic analysis of technology to issues of institutional organization of knowledge, which was enshrined as a transition from the “neopositivist” to the “postpositivist” phase in the development of analytical philosophy, which made scientific knowledge the main subject of its analyzes. In this case, the focus of general methodological reflection is on problems related to the consideration of issues of ideals and norms of scientific knowledge; scientific pictures of the world within which specific technologies are formed, or which are formed (changed) under the influence of certain technologies, as well as strategies used by certain scientific communities to consolidate their dominant position or to achieve it in a particular disciplinary area. In the broadest context, we are talking about the “fitness” of the considered T. into the system of culture as a whole, about their role in the descriptions (self-descriptions) of the latter. In this case, the content of the term "T." expands as much as possible up to the discussion of the theoretical component and the ways of its “formulation” in the cognitive practices of a particular type of culture. As a result, the concept of T. is subordinated to the concepts (or even replaced by them) of a research program (the term is constituted by Lakatos), as presenting certain research strategies, or paradigms (the term is constituted by Kuhn), as presenting certain visions of the reality under study. At the origins of the “relativization” of the concept of T. was Popper, in whom the beginning and completion of a certain stage of change in knowledge are marked by problems, and knowledge itself is interpreted as fundamentally hypothetical. The tendency to challenge the understanding of the development of technology as a cumulative process originates from postpositivist discourses. Ideas about the “improvement” and “deployment” of technology during the period of “normal science” were supplemented by ideas about: 1) about the “scientific revolution” and the change of competing paradigms (Kuhn), 2) about the reinterpretation of the “protective belt” of the invariant core of the research program (Lakatos ), 3) about “methodological anarchism”, i.e. about the equality of various coexisting T., which alone can serve as a guarantee that the facts will be noticed and properly assessed (Feyerabend). In the same vein, one can understand the concept of episteme introduced by Foucault, as well as the analysis of “epistemological breaks” by G. Bachelard. An important role in the revision of the concept of technology was also played by: 1) Merton’s introduction of the concept of “medium-level technology” as mediating fundamental theoretical and empirical-procedural (factualistic) knowledge; 2) the formation of ideas about the metatheoretical level of organization of knowledge (metatheory and metalanguage), which made it possible to distance ourselves as much as possible from the specific subject “fragments” described by one or another T., and reach the level of methodological reflection on scientific knowledge of one kind or another or on scientific knowledge as such, on the one hand, and on “fitting” theoretical knowledge into the context of culture, on the other. From the middle of the 20th century. There has been a tendency to isolate methodology from scientific-theoretical (and philosophical) knowledge into a special area of knowledge practices (neo-rationalism, system-based mental activity (SMA) methodology, etc.). The universality of theory as the highest form of organization of knowledge has been constantly questioned in socio-humanitarian knowledge (starting with neo-Kantianism). In this regard, such forms of its organization as typology, ideal and constructive types, etc. were discussed. In “softer” versions of criticism, it was proposed to remove the most “strict” requirements for technology of any kind, and it itself actually took on the form of a scientific concept, as setting the vision, logic and means (concepts) for describing a particular area under study. (In the tradition of analytical philosophy, Toulmin holds similar views, considering science as a set of evolving populations of concepts and explanatory procedures.) Significant in this regard was the formulation of the thesis about the fundamental multiparadigm (plurality) of social and humanitarian disciplines. No less important for understanding the essence and nature of scientific knowledge were the ideas about it not only (and not so much) as disciplinary and subject-specific organized (and thereby “striving” to express itself in the form of an extremely heuristic T. ), but as discursive knowledge that generates specific discourses and communications of a special kind. See also: Hypothesis, Science, Discipline, Knowledge. V.L. Abushenko

When solving Unified State Exam tests in social studies, children encounter very great difficulties in determining the nature of their judgments. And although you can find out how to complete this task in this article, I would like to clarify for you what the theory is.

The answer to the question of what a theory is lies in the field of science. Scientific knowledge develops in two planes: in the theoretical plane and in the empirical plane. A theory is the result of understanding empirical material: simply put, the number of facts analyzed by scientists. Any theory has (or should have) an empirical basis: facts that confirm it.

Thus, a theory is a model of the world, based on studied and systematized facts, which is in the mass consciousness of researchers. It is scientists who are the bearers of the modern idea of the world; they are aware of all modern theories.

Ordinary people, managing to live in the 21st century, still believe in omens: the black cat, the “law of meanness”, that when you are sick you need to eat a lot and other rubbish; In order to normalize blood pressure and heart function, you need to read interesting books (literally recently, to my amazement, I heard this on the federal channel in one morning program about health). These nonsense have nothing to do with the scientific picture of the world.

A set of scientific theories from different sciences form a scientific paradigm. In it, in a theoretical paradigm, as in a micromodel of the world, the achievements of modern science in the field of biology, chemistry, physics, sociology, history and other important sciences.

To have such a paradigm in your head, you need to constantly read: scientific and popular science magazines, watch less television, read scientific monographs. It is clear that in order to do this, you must have a scientific worldview, otherwise you simply will not understand anything from what you read. The main thing in drawing up such a scientific paradigm in your head is to be able to operate with facts, scientific concepts and terms.

In addition, it is necessary constantly.

However, it is also important to understand that the existing scientific paradigm is not static - it is constantly in opposition to the existing facts of social and natural life. Roughly speaking, every second new facts appear that contradict existing scientific theory. And when a lot of such facts accumulate that science is unable to explain, this leads to a crisis of the existing theory and the search for a new scientific paradigm.

Thus theory is the highest scientific way generalizations of scientific facts. Many scientific theories form a scientific paradigm, which is not always relevant. Thus, the providential (theological) concept of the universe that dominated the Middle Ages was replaced in modern times by secular knowledge, and Newton’s mechanistic picture of the world, which was dominant in the 18th and 19th centuries, was replaced by Einstein’s theory of relativity at the beginning of the 20th century.

I hope I explained clearly and intelligibly what a theory is. If you have any questions, write in the comments!