Mikhail Boltunov - secret military intelligence operations. The best special operations of Soviet intelligence during the Great Patriotic War

Success in battle or in saving lives comes to those who carefully plan their actions, anticipate the enemy's moves, have the latest intelligence and are able to use all this with maximum efficiency. But sometimes chance helps win a seemingly hopeless battle. Although, this is rather an exception that only confirms the rule.

Soviet operation military intelligence near Stalingrad

Military reconnaissance before the start German offensive on Stalingrad in July 1942, she revealed the grouping of the enemy’s first line troops down to the battalion level, their defense system, established the composition and battle order of many formations in front of the front of our troops. The scouts received valuable information about the composition, weapons, and deployment of the main units of the 4th and 6th German tank armies, 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian armies, on the strength of the 4th air fleet enemy. Radio reconnaissance revealed the transfer of the 24th Tank Division to the breakthrough area (44 km southeast of Kletskaya), the transfer of an assault squadron and two groups of the Edelweiss bomber squadron from the North Caucasus, and the composition of the encircled enemy group was revealed. Aerial reconnaissance promptly uncovered the transfer from the North Caucasus of two tank divisions to the Kotelnikovo area. The data obtained allowed Soviet command accept right decisions, organize a counteroffensive in November 1942 and win Battle of Stalingrad, thereby marking the beginning of a radical change in the course of the war.

Liquidation of Cuba

Soviet military intelligence officers actively participated in sabotage operations in enemy-occupied territories. One of the most notorious acts of sabotage carried out by military intelligence partisans was the liquidation of the Gauleiter of Belarus V. Kube in Minsk in 1943. The conduct of this operation was entrusted to intelligence officer N.P. Fedorov. The direct executors of the action are E.G. Mazanik, who worked as a servant in the house of V. Kube, and M.B. Osipova, who handed her a mine with a chemical fuse. The mine was placed under the mattress of the Gauleiter's bed, and at 2:20 a.m. on September 22, 1943, V. Kube was killed. For this feat E.G. Mazanik and M.B. Osipova was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union, and N.P. Fedorov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Operation Monastery

Operation Monastery was one of the most successful operations Soviet intelligence services during the Great Patriotic War. This operation lasted 4 years from 1941 to 1944.

At the very beginning of the Patriotic War, the need arose to penetrate the intelligence network of the Abwehr (German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency) operating on the territory of the USSR. Lieutenant General Sudoplatov and his assistants Ilyin and Maklyarsky decided to create a legend about the existence in the USSR of a certain organization that welcomed the victory of the Germans and wanted to help them. It was decided to use the Soviet intelligence officer Alexander Demyanov, who already had contacts with German agents. He was transported across the front line, where, having surrendered to the Nazis, he introduced himself as a representative of the Throne organization, which allegedly advocated for the victory of the Germans. The Germans subjected Demyanov to thorough checks and interrogations. In addition, an execution was even simulated.

As a result German intelligence I believed him. Demyanov was later transferred to USSR-controlled territory, where he allegedly got a job as a liaison officer under the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Shaposhnikov. Through this agent the NKVD supplied German command misinformation. The disinformation that was supplied to the Germans was often returned to the Soviet intelligence services as intelligence information from other sources, for example, through British intelligence. The most striking example of such disinformation was the message about an upcoming offensive Soviet troops in the Rzhev region. Troops under the command of Zhukov were transferred there. The Germans also threw here great forces. It is interesting that even Zhukov himself did not know about hidden game. The Germans managed to repulse the attack, but the strategic offensive at Stalingrad, which began on November 19, 1942, unexpectedly for the Germans, ended in complete victory for the Soviet troops. The 300,000-strong enemy army led by Field Marshal Paulus was destroyed or captured.

Operation Entebbe

Popular name for the operation Ball lightning July 4, 1976 - a raid by special units of the Israel Defense Forces to free the passengers of an Air France plane hijacked by terrorists from the PFLP and Revolutionary Cells organizations. Later the operation received unofficial name"Yonatan" in honor of the group's fallen commander, Yoni Netanyahu.

On June 27, 1976, militants from the pro-Palestinian PFLP and Revolutionary Cells hijacked an Air France passenger plane en route from Tel Aviv to Paris. On the orders of the terrorists, the plane landed at Entebbe airport near the capital of Uganda, Kampala. The passengers and crew of the plane were held in the old airport building. On June 29, terrorists separated 83 hostages with Israeli passports from other hostages and transferred them to separate room. Passengers with non-Israeli passports and non-Jewish names were released (47 people in total). The next day, the hijackers allowed 101 non-Israeli hostages to fly on an arriving Air France plane. The plane crew stayed with the hostages on their own initiative. A total of 105 hostages remained - Israeli citizens, Jews and the crew led by its commander M. Bako. They were in danger of death.

The IDF leadership developed and carried out an operation to rescue the hostages. Four planes with a hundred commandos flew 4 thousand km to Uganda. The operation was developed within a week, was carried out in an hour and a half, and as a result, 102 hostages were freed and taken to Israel. Five commandos were wounded, and the team commander, Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan Netanyahu, was killed. Three hostages, all terrorists and 24 Ugandan soldiers were killed, 30 MiG-17 and MiG-21 aircraft of the Ugandan Air Force were disabled. 24 hours later, Ugandan officers killed a hostage in a nearby Kampala hospital.

Operation "Bagration"

70 years ago, one of the largest operations of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War was carried out in Belarus - Operation Bagration. During this operation (June 23 - August 29, 1944), the German armed forces lost 289 thousand people killed and captured, 110 thousand wounded, Soviet troops recaptured Belarus and a significant part of Lithuania, and entered the territory of Poland. This operation is considered the most successful offensive operation of the 20th century.

Operation Saint Nazarius

In occupied France during World War II, the Louis Laubert dock in the harbor of St. Nazarius was the only one that allowed the troops of Nazi Germany to bypass the line of resistance of the Allied army, and it could also accommodate the German battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz. In the event that these huge cruisers were in the dock of Louis Laubert, the management German fleet could have blocked the sea routes through which weapons and food were supplied from America to the British Isles, after which Great Britain would certainly have capitulated.

The British Army, of course, intended to possible way prevent such a situation. In March 1942, a crew of 600 sailors and soldiers, traveling on 18 small boats and a World War I ship called the Campbeltown, set sail for the shores of France. It is worth noting that most of these boats were wooden and often caught fire during the battle.

The boats and the ship with the bomb on board sailed to their destination. The sailors jumped overboard and entered into an unequal battle with the Nazi invaders.

Most small motor boats, on which the sailors were supposed to return, were destroyed and the command ordered a retreat to the Spanish border, ordering the remaining military personnel to fire until the ammunition ran out.

For some mysterious reasons known only to them, the German soldiers did not pay attention to what was on board the Campbeltown and did not defuse the explosive device. The next day the bomb detonated and disabled the dock for the rest of the war.

Of the 600 people, only 228 returned to England: 168 died, 215 soldiers and sailors were captured and were later sent to concentration camps. However, the death toll on the German side was 360, significantly higher than the 169 British. Today the operation is considered "the greatest raid of all time", 38 people who took part in it were nominated for awards and five of them received the Victoria Cross.

Brusilovsky breakthrough

By the spring of 1916, the situation on the fronts of the Great War was strategically developing in favor of the Entente countries. With great difficulty, the Allies managed to withstand the enemy’s onslaught in the hardest battles of 1914 and 1915, and in protracted war sooner or later the superiority of the Entente countries in human and raw materials. In March 1916, at the Chantilly Conference, the Allies accepted strategic decision about general transition on the offensive. And since at that time the superiority of the allies was still minimal, success could only be achieved through joint and coordinated actions in the Western, Eastern and Southern directions, which would deprive the Germans and Austrians of the opportunity to transfer forces. The allies agreed on this.

Contrary to generally accepted tactics, the general proposed abandoning a single main attack and attacking along the entire front at once. Each of the four armies Southwestern Front(7th, 8th, 9th and 11th) struck on their own, not just one, but several. Thus, the enemy was confused and practically did not have the opportunity to use reserves, and our troops in the main directions managed to achieve double superiority, although, in general, Brusilov did not have a serious numerical superiority. Russian reserves were used in those sectors where the offensive developed most successfully and further increased the effect of breakthroughs, of which there were thirteen in total.

The idea turned out to be brilliant, but it is important that its implementation was excellent. The reconnaissance worked well, the front headquarters under the command of General V.N. functioned well. Klembovsky. The artillery, led by General M.V., performed magnificently. Khanzhin. Each battery had a clear target, thanks to which already in the first days of the offensive it was possible to almost completely suppress the enemy’s artillery. It is also important that the Russian troops managed to maintain relative secrecy; in any case, the Austrians and Germans did not expect an offensive in the places where it eventually took place.

The enemy was retreating along the entire front, and several pockets were formed. By May 27, 1,240 Austrian and German officers and over seventy thousand lower ranks had been captured, 94 guns, 179 machine guns, 53 bombs and mortars were captured. In the main Lutsk direction, the Eighth Army of General A.M. Kaledina advanced 65 kilometers deep into the front in a few weeks, and ultimately Russian troops went 150 kilometers. Enemy losses reached one and a half million people.

On November 5, 1918, the Main intelligence agency(GRU) - organ foreign intelligence Armed Forces Russian Federation.

War is inevitable

One of the most famous Soviet intelligence officers is Richard Sorge. He worked as a press secretary at the German embassy in Tokyo and several months before the start of the war, he warned the USSR leadership about a German attack. However, Sorge’s station had come under suspicion since 1937, so her messages came with the mark “politically inferior.” Since March 1941, Sorge has been transmitting reports about the impending war. Sorge was not the only Soviet intelligence officer who warned of an imminent war. Unfortunately, due attention was not paid to this information.

"Comrade Harry" network

In the late 1930s, Soviet intelligence officer Henry Robinson created a reliable intelligence network in Europe that specialized in obtaining information in the field of development military equipment. Robinson's agents reported on the construction of military factories and equipment not only in Germany, but in France, England, Italy and other countries. Of particular value was information on the production and development of new types of weapons. Robinson sent to the Center samples of new shells, German gas masks, oxygen devices for pilots, and samples of armor for tanks. After the outbreak of World War II, Robinson's agents focused on intelligence activities against Germany. Messages were sent to Moscow about the transfer of troops and the plans of the German command. Robinson was one of those agents who reported the impending attack on the USSR.

Luci

Since 1942, one of its most effective agents, Rudolf Ressler, nicknamed “Luci,” began working for Soviet intelligence. Through the intelligence group of the Soviet agent Sandor Rado, he transmitted vital information about German weapons and maneuvers of Hitler's army. Ressler's information made a significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops in Kursk Bulge: details about Operation Citadel appeared in Moscow several months before it began. Ressler also passed on information about German technology, in particular, he reported to Moscow the characteristics of the Panther tank.

Red Chapel

During World War II, an extensive anti-fascist intelligence network operated in Europe, later called the Red Chapel. It consisted of intelligence officers and members of the Resistance from different countries, including GRU agents. One of key figures Soviet intelligence officer Anatoly Gurevich was involved in the work of the Red Chapel. He reported to Moscow that Germany was preparing for war with the USSR back in March 1940. And in 1941, Gurevich announced in advance the planned German offensive in the Caucasus and Stalingrad. This provided Soviet army strategic advantage when repelling attacks.

Crown

By the early 1940s, Soviet agent Jan Chernyak created an intelligence network in Germany under code name"Crown". Chernyak managed to recruit over two dozen agents who supplied vital information about German weapons developments and Hitler’s strategic plans. In 1941, Chernyak obtained a copy of the Barbarossa plan for the Soviet command. Thanks to information from Chernyak’s agents, it was possible to create radar stations that could counteract fascist air raids. Chernyak conveyed information about German tanks and artillery, about the development of jet and chemical weapons, about radio engineering developments. In 1944 alone, he transferred more than 12,000 sheets of detailed technical information and more than 60 samples of radio equipment. The day before Battle of Kursk Chernyak conveyed information about the newest German tanks, the Tiger and the Panther, at that time. Unlike the Red Chapel, exposed by Hitler’s counterintelligence, the Krona intelligence network avoided this fate. None of Chernyak's agents were exposed.

Atomic secrets

Development atomic weaponsthe most important task, which faced the USSR after the end of World War II. And, of course, this could not have happened without intelligence. Efforts were aimed at obtaining Western secrets in the field of atomic weapons large quantity GRU agents. The most important figure in this operation was the German physicist Klaus Fuchs. Above creation nuclear weapons he worked since 1941 as part of the British project Tube Alloys. In the same year, Fuchs first contacted Soviet intelligence and conveyed the first information to the USSR. These materials forced Moscow to speed up development atomic bomb: in 1942, State Defense Committee decree No. 2352ss “On the organization of work on uranium” was issued. In England, through GRU agent Ruth Werner (aka Ursula Kuczynski, aka “Sonya”), Klaus Fox transmitted data on nuclear developments to the Soviet side until 1943, when he and his colleagues went to the USA. As part of the Manhattan Project, American and British scientists joined forces to create an atomic bomb. Fuchs was allowed to participate in all stages of development. He transmitted secret information through his Soviet contact Harry Gold, a chemist from Philadelphia recruited back in 1936. Total from 1941 to 1943 More than 570 sheets of materials on the uranium project were received from Klaus Fox. The information obtained by Soviet agents significantly accelerated the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR.

Arthur Adams Network

To others important source information about the American nuclear project was the intelligence network of GRU resident Arthur Adams. In January 1944, Adams managed to recruit a scientist whose code name was "Kemp" (real name still unknown). The scientist handed over about 1,000 pages of classified materials and samples of uranium and beryllium to the Soviet agent. Total from 1944 to 1946 Adams sent more than 10,000 pages of classified materials relating to the development of nuclear weapons, as well as samples of substances and equipment, to Moscow. Although Adams himself was exposed in 1945, none of his agents were exposed.

The victory at Stalingrad, Kursk and other battles that our grandfathers and great-grandfathers won were the result of the hard work of Soviet intelligence officers, who, spending years of service next to the enemy, informed ours about the time of the attack, the location of the attack, and the number of the enemy.

An interesting selection of stories about battles and the activities of Soviet intelligence officers in them.

OPERATION NEAR KURSK

Largely thanks to the work of military intelligence officers, Soviet troops won the Battle of Kursk. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, front-line intelligence agencies controlled almost all movements of enemy troops, and in their rear they operated large number reconnaissance and sabotage groups.

Intelligence activities on the eve of the Battle of Kursk made it possible to unravel the enemy’s plan, as well as to find out the timing of the start of Operation Citadel. Despite the fact that they were postponed from May 3 to May 15, and then even further, it was military reconnaissance that precisely established that the offensive would begin at 3 hours 50 minutes on July 5, 1943. It was this circumstance that allowed the Soviet command to decide to conduct artillery counter-training on to an enemy preparing to attack.

For six days, the Germans tried to break through with tank divisions in the direction of Tomarovka, Oboyan, Kursk, but to no avail. On July 11, they decided to regroup their forces in the direction of Prokhorovka. But thanks to intelligence officers, information about this was brought to the Soviet command within a few hours.

On the night of July 12, the enemy changed the direction of the main attack from Oboyan to Prokhorovka. Intelligence reported that the SS Panzer divisions "Wiking", " Greater Germany", "Death's Head" and "Adolf Hitler" have turned from the Oboyansky direction and are moving towards Prokhorovka. These data were reported to the commander of the front troops, Army General N.F. Vatutin. At this time, he gave the order to transfer the army from the Prokhorovka area to the Oboyan direction. However, thanks to the data received, the front commander canceled his previous order and ordered the tank army to be prepared for a counter battle with the advancing enemy tank divisions. As a result, what unfolded on July 12 tank battle near Prokhorovka ended in victory for the Soviet troops.

Georgy Zhukov, assessing the work of military intelligence during the Battle of Kursk, wrote: “Thanks to the brilliant work Soviet intelligence in the spring of 1943 we had a number of important information about the group German troops before the summer offensive... Well-functioning reconnaissance was also one of the sum total of the reasons that ensured the success of this greatest battle.”

NEAR MOSCOW

Powers military intelligence played important role in the battle of Moscow. From July 1 to August 1, 1941, about 500 reconnaissance officers, 17 partisan detachments, and 29 reconnaissance and sabotage groups were transferred behind enemy lines. The intelligence officers obtained information that allowed them to receive timely information about the transfer of enemy troops.

In addition to reconnaissance operations, the scouts carried out sabotage operations, destroying highways and bridges over water barriers, which prevented the Germans from using their reserves. “During the battle of Moscow, we knew enough about the enemy to accurately determine the plan, nature and direction of his actions. We knew the degree of tension Nazi troops along the entire front of their advance.

Therefore, the Soviet High Command decided to launch a counteroffensive near Moscow at the most suitable moment for this,” said Army General S.M. Shtemenko, who in 1941 was deputy chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff.

OPERATION "MONASTERY"

Operation "Monastery" was one of the most successful operations of the Soviet intelligence services during the Great Patriotic War. This operation lasted 4 years from 1941 to 1944.

At the very beginning of the Patriotic War, it became necessary to penetrate the intelligence network of the Abwehr (German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency) operating on the territory of the USSR. Lieutenant General Sudoplatov and his assistants Ilyin and Maklyarsky decided to create a legend about the existence in the USSR of a certain organization that welcomed the victory of the Germans and wanted to help them.

It was decided to use Soviet intelligence officer Alexander Demyanov, who already had contacts with German agents. He was transported across the front line, where, having surrendered to the Nazis, he introduced himself as a representative of the Throne organization, which allegedly advocated for the victory of the Germans. The Germans subjected Demyanov to thorough checks and interrogations. In addition, an execution was even simulated.

As a result, German intelligence believed him. Demyanov was later transferred to USSR-controlled territory, where he allegedly got a job as a liaison officer under the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Shaposhnikov. Through this agent, the NKVD supplied the German command with disinformation. The disinformation that was supplied to the Germans was often returned to the Soviet intelligence services as intelligence information from other sources, for example, through British intelligence. The most striking example of such disinformation was the message about the impending offensive of Soviet troops in the Rzhev area. Troops under the command of Zhukov were transferred there. The Germans also sent large forces here. Interestingly, even Zhukov himself did not know about the hidden game. The Germans managed to repulse the attack, but the strategic offensive at Stalingrad, which began on November 19, 1942, unexpectedly for the Germans, ended in complete victory for the Soviet troops. The 300,000-strong enemy army led by Field Marshal Paulus was destroyed or captured.
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LIQUIDATION OF CUBE

Soviet military intelligence officers actively participated in sabotage operations in enemy-occupied territories. One of the most notorious acts of sabotage carried out by military intelligence partisans was the liquidation of the Gauleiter of Belarus V. Kube in Minsk in 1943. The conduct of this operation was entrusted to intelligence officer N.P. Fedorov. The direct executors of the action are E.G. Mazanik, who worked as a servant in the house of V. Kube, and M.B. Osipova, who handed her a mine with a chemical fuse. The mine was placed under the mattress of the Gauleiter's bed, and at 2:20 a.m. on September 22, 1943, V. Kube was killed. For this feat E.G. Mazanik and M.B. Osipova was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and N.P. Fedorov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

UNDER STALINGRAD


Military reconnaissance, even before the start of the German offensive on Stalingrad in July 1942, revealed the grouping of enemy troops in the first line down to the battalion level, their defense system, and established the composition and battle order of many formations in front of the front of our troops.

The reconnaissance officers received valuable information about the composition, armament, and deployment of the main units of the 4th and 6th German tank armies, the 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian armies, and the size of the enemy's 4th air fleet. Radio reconnaissance revealed the transfer of the 24th Tank Division to the breakthrough area (44 km southeast of Kletskaya), the transfer of an assault squadron and two groups of the Edelweiss bomber squadron from the North Caucasus, and the composition of the encircled enemy group was revealed.


Aerial reconnaissance promptly revealed the transfer of two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to the Kotelnikovo area. The data obtained allowed the Soviet command to make the right decisions, organize a counteroffensive in November 1942 and win the Battle of Stalingrad, thereby marking the beginning of a radical change in the course of the war.

During the “cold confrontation” in the middle of the last century, each side tried to get as much as possible more information about your political opponent. Using it for one’s own purposes gave special advantages, so many secret operations were carried out, diplomatic intrigues and conspiracies were woven in order to establish channels for obtaining specific information first-hand.

Such events were usually carefully developed by special secret departments, whose employees underwent repeated testing and were instilled in the trust of opposite side, working, as they say now, “undercover.” Data on such operations were kept for many years in the secret archives of various military organizations and only over time, having lost their relevance, became available to the public. mass media and the public.

Soviet officers give explanations at the location of the discovery of the reconnaissance tunnel

One of these events organized by the intelligence of the United States and Great Britain was Operation Gold or Stopwatch, which in the Soviet Union had another name - the Berlin Tunnel. This operation is rightfully considered one of the largest of its kind. From the day the information is revealed, she attracts special attention journalists, historians and simply interested persons. But despite detailed study materials that were designed in the form of eighteen scientific research and one film with the participation of the main actor those distant events, many questions still remain open.

A similar operation called “Silver” was successfully carried out in 1952 by the Americans, when they successfully managed to listen to all the important negotiations of the Soviet intelligence services in Austria. Inspired by success, having received required experience and this time interacting with colleagues from Great Britain, US intelligence decided to repeat the proven scheme, but now in Berlin.

The start of the operation was preceded by long preparation. The Americans knew that since the late 1940s Soviet intelligence services, operating in Germany and Austria, decided to abandon the use of radio channels, focusing on air and underground cable lines. With the help of employees of the East Berlin postal department, among whom intelligence agents were infiltrated, the CIA was able to obtain detailed diagrams of the cable layout and information on how to use them. The missing information was provided by a map containing indications of the location of the cables, obtained from the German Ministry of Posts and Communications. The search and recruitment of new agents in Dresden and Magdeburg made it possible to learn all the nuances about the functioning of Soviet communication lines. Based on the information received, Americans, starting in the spring of 1953, could already listen to the telephone lines they were interested in from 23 to 2 am. However, this was not enough for them; they were attracted by the prospect of constantly monitoring the information coming through Soviet channels.

To achieve this goal, in August 1953, a construction plan was submitted to CIA Director Allen Dulles for approval. underground tunnel, whose length was 600 meters. Half of the tunnel was supposed to lie under the Soviet occupation zone. Dulles approved the project in January 1954, and three weeks later the work began preparatory work for the construction of the facility, initial stage which was the construction of a special bunker masking the entrance to the tunnel.

Allen Welsh Dulles was born in 1893. His maternal grandfather served as US ambassador to Spain, Russia and Mexico. Older brother John was Secretary of State under Eisenhower. Allen graduated from the prestigious Princeton University. In his youth he traveled a lot and even managed to work school teacher in China and India. In the US service, Dulles began working as a diplomat. Since 1926, he combined work for the government with legal practice. During World War II, Dulles was put in charge of the intelligence center of the Office of Strategic Services (the prototype of the CIA) in Bern.
Allen Dulles was director of the CIA from 1953 to 1961. It was he who determined the style of work of this organization and its place in the American intelligence system. After the failed invasion of Cuba in 1961, Dulles resigned. In retirement, he published several autobiographical books. In 1969, Allen Dulles died of pneumonia.

An officer of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany points to english lettering on equipment in the discovered tunnel

The CIA leadership had no doubts about the success of the launched enterprise - all construction work was carried out in conditions of increased secrecy, quite large funds were allocated to implement the plan, and ultra-modern British equipment was purchased. No strangers were allowed to carry out the work, and all hired workers arrived at the construction site in covered trucks so as not to arouse unnecessary suspicion. Secrecy measures were observed when drawing up construction plans; the circle of people knowing about the operation was limited to a minimum. Thus, at the Anglo-American meeting held in London in December 1953, only eight people were present. At the meeting, issues of further cooperation between American and British intelligence, as well as the current problems of tunnel construction were discussed. However, despite all the above security measures, among these eight, who had access to important secret information, was a person who collaborated with the Soviet intelligence services. His name was George Blake, and later in the capital of England he was able to convey all the information about the object contained in the minutes of the meeting to KGB resident Kondrashov. Subsequently he got a lot more useful information about the construction and operation of the secret tunnel, which allowed the Soviet special services to be aware of what was happening literally first-hand.

According to the plans, the tunnel was dug at a depth of five and a half meters, and the entrance to it was protected by a fireproof iron door. It ended on Soviet territory in East Berlin with a small room from which a direct connection to communication channels took place. This room was connected to a hall where special equipment for recording and processing data was located. The facility was put into operation in mid-1955. After completing all construction work a connection was made to communication lines of interest to American intelligence.

From that moment on, the most interesting things began, when the initiators of Operation Gold greedily absorbed every word that the equipment recorded. The Soviet side, maintaining secrecy and wanting to keep Blake incognito, did not disclose their knowledge and gave the enemy insignificant information. To avoid leakage of information, not a single Soviet citizen working in Germany had information about the secret tunnel. Allen Dulles periodically reported on the success of the operation, which was very fruitful. Every day, data from 121 telephone and 28 telegraph lines was taken from three wiretapped cables, consisting of thousands of communication channels, half of which were active at any time of the day. Later, the Americans reported on 443 thousand recorded conversations, as a result of which 1,750 reports were compiled by analytical departments.

Studying the information obtained, American intelligence reported on important information regarding the USSR nuclear program, the locations of ships and other facilities Baltic Fleet, about data declassifying more than three hundred officers working for the GRU of the USSR, as well as other facts from the activities of Soviet intelligence. In accordance with regular reports of the ongoing operation, the Americans were aware of all the political intentions of the Soviet side, both in Berlin and in other territories. What of the information received was a lie and what was true today is quite problematic to establish. However, no one took the Americans for fools, and Soviet counterintelligence periodically leaked reliable information to them.

The 317-person call center staff worked tirelessly. His main goal was to analyze the information that came in streams. The workers copied each telephone conversation recorded on twenty thousand magnetic reels, containing two hours of conversations. In addition to listening to the Soviet side, the special services also came to the attention of the conversations of the Germans, which were also recorded, but were not subjected to such careful analysis. Of the seventy-five thousand conversations of Germans recorded, only a quarter of the recordings were transferred to paper. In addition to the listed personnel, another 350 employees worked on processing information received via telegraph lines. They had to take data daily from a telegraph tape more than one kilometer long. The workers of this center transferred onto paper data from eighteen thousand six-hour reels with Soviet and eleven thousand reels with German telegrams, some of which were encrypted. By the way, decryption work continued until the end of September 1958, two years after the discovery of the tunnel.

It's not hard to imagine what material costs were necessary to ensure the continuous operation of such a labor-intensive process during the eleven months and eleven days that the tunnel existed. According to information provided by the American intelligence agencies themselves, in total, more than 60 million current dollars were spent on Operation Gold, which was approximately 6.7 million dollars at the time. Most likely, these figures are underestimated.

In the spring of 1956, the leadership of the USSR decided to make public the existence of a secret tunnel. This is presented as a blatant act of violation international law, and, of course, immediately raises the question for the Americans about the veracity of all the information they have processed. On this issue, the opinions of CIA specialists were divided. Some believed that since the Soviet side knew about the existence of “wiretapping”, it was knowingly transmitted through channels. false information. Others were of the opinion that the data obtained were true, but did not have special significance for the USSR, therefore their classification was not given due attention.

Of course, US intelligence faced many problems, but among them the most important was the question of how the USSR learned about the planned operation. Only in 1961, according to the testimony of a certain Goleniewski, who, as an employee of Polish intelligence, conveyed information to the CIA leadership about a Soviet agent in MI6, did it become known about George Blake’s involvement in the failure of the operation. Blake, who was in Beirut at the time, was ordered to return to London, ostensibly to take up a new assignment. But upon arriving at SIS headquarters, he was arrested and interrogated, and overwhelming evidence forced the agent to confess to collaborating with Soviet side. Moreover, Blake’s main emphasis was on the fact that he conveyed information solely on the basis of their ideological considerations, and not under pressure from the KGB. Even the persistent persuasion of the investigators to admit otherwise, in order to simplify the trial, did not force him to change his decision. In May 1961, a trial took place, which became a real sensation and received wide publicity, both foreign and international. Soviet press. According to his decision, Blake was sentenced to forty-two years in prison. And he could have spent the rest of his life behind bars if, after four years, on October 22, 1966, a group of comrades had not helped him escape from Wormwood Scrubs prison, and then transported him to Moscow.

Mysterious historical figure Michal Goleniewski was born in Poland in 1922. He completed only four classes of the gymnasium, after which in 1945 he joined the army, where he did a dizzying career. With the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1955, he went into the reserve and continued his education, and the very next year he received a master's degree in political science.

At the same time, Michal began to collaborate with the KGB, working in Switzerland and West Germany. In 1958, the CIA received a letter from Goleniewski inviting him to become a double agent. Despite big list Soviet intelligence officers handed over by Michal to American intelligence services, the CIA leadership never trusted him, considering him still a KGB employee, “leaking” minor agents to divert attention from truly important spies. In the summer of 1963, Goleniewski managed to achieve American citizenship and left Poland. For treason in his homeland, he was sentenced to death in absentia.

Many of the motives for his actions still remain unclear. Just look at the public statement in 1960 that he was “Tsarevich Alexei Romanov.” In 1964, American intelligence dismissed Goleniewski because of numerous evidence of his mental instability. The “Tsarevich” died in New York in July 1993. All recent years he never stopped throwing mud at our country and, especially, Orthodox Church, who never recognized him as a descendant of the Romanov family.

Today few people know true biography George Blake - amazing person, whom the press once dubbed the “champion of intelligence.” Born George Behar, he changed his last name when he urgently needed to move to England in 1942, where he planned to continue his fight against the Nazis. But, having passed through the entire territory of occupied France, George was arrested while crossing the Spanish border. Having achieved his release, he nevertheless ended up in England, where in 1943 he volunteered to serve in the navy. Later he entered the naval school, and after graduation he was assigned to the submariners.

George Blake's life changed dramatically after he was transferred to British intelligence in the Dutch section in August 1944. At the end of the war, after the surrender of the Germans, Blake moved to Holland to establish connections with British agents abandoned there before the war. After the war, the main object of interest to British intelligence was the USSR, and the already experienced intelligence officer was sent to Hamburg, where George, first independently and then with the assistance of the leadership, studied the Russian language.

Blake became a resident of SIS in October 1948 in Seoul, where he was tasked with collecting information about the eastern territories of the Soviet Union. But the outbreak of the Korean War disrupted the plans and George, along with other representatives of the side at war with Kim Il Sung, was interned and sent to a camp. In the spring of 1951, Blake managed to pass a note through one of the Korean officers to the USSR Embassy, ​​which contained a request for a meeting with a representative of Soviet foreign intelligence. It was at this meeting that a proposal for cooperation was made from Blake, who immediately provided a lot of valuable information about the British MI6 and promised to provide information about all intelligence operations directed against the Soviet Union. Could the leadership of Soviet intelligence refuse such a flattering offer?

At the end of the Korean War in 1953, George returned to London to continue his work in the British secret intelligence service. He was soon appointed deputy head of the technical operations development department, whose functions were to organize secret eavesdropping abroad. While in this post, Blake transmitted to our country valuable reviews of British intelligence, from which, among other things, the Soviet intelligence services could learn how aware political opponents were of the military secrets of the Soviet Union. When at the end of 1953, at a joint secret meeting of the CIA and SIS held in London, it was decided to begin the tunnel operation, Blake immediately informed Moscow, which decided to do nothing and use this channel to disinformation the other side.

Even today, when asked: “Does he regret what he did?” Blake confidently replies that he believes his choice is absolutely correct. He says: “My choice is not connected with various everyday trifles concerning living in the Soviet Union, since I have always followed my personal ideals, which at a certain period of time prompted me to become Soviet agent" George compares his connection with Russia with his love for a beautiful, but rather eccentric woman, with whom a person is ready to stay until the end of his days, both in joy and in sorrow.

In 1956, the existence of a secret tunnel began to threaten the security of the USSR. Khrushchev decided to disclose this information to the general public in order to discredit his opponents political arena. For this purpose, unfavorable weather conditions, who allegedly accidentally contributed to the discovery of a mysterious cable at the site of damaged communication lines in East Berlin.

In fact, the failure is so major operation, on which millions were spent, had an extremely negative impact on the future career of not only Allen Dulles himself, but also members of his family, who also occupied high government positions. Based on the events in question, George Blake, a foreign intelligence colonel, wrote two books: “Transparent Walls” and “No Other Choice.” And in April 2012, a new feature-documentary film was broadcast on Russian television channels, symbolically called “Agent Blake’s Choice,” in which he took part main character, which destroyed Operation Gold and at one time caused a wide public outcry in the world.

On November 11, 2012, on the day of his 90th birthday, holder of many honorary awards and titles, Honored Intelligence Officer George Blake received many congratulations, including a greeting from Vladimir Putin. The President of the Russian Federation thanked the colonel for the successful completion of the tasks assigned to him in a difficult time for the whole world.

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Many major battles, coups, revolutions, a variety of socio-political and economic upheavals in history often became possible only thanks to successfully carried out special operations.

Some operations involved dozens, even hundreds of people, while others were carried out by only one person. Many have thundered throughout the world, while some are practically unknown to anyone.

In any case, each masterly special operation was a complex set of precisely calibrated actions and therefore subsequently always aroused special interest.

Operations "Trust", "Syndicate-2"

In November 1922, the Red Army liberated the Far East from the interventionists, but American and Japanese agents settled in the territory of Primorye and the Far East, and underground sabotage and terrorist formations continued to operate actively.

Intelligence against Japan and China was initially carried out only by authorized representatives of the OGPU on Far East. In 1923, residencies were created in Beijing and Harbin. Soon they began to receive information not only about the activities of the White Guard emigration, but also about Japan and China.

Operation "Information of our days"

Before the rupture of diplomatic relations between England and the USSR in 1927, a “legal” station operated in London, from which important political information was received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, various political parties, British counterintelligence.

In 1933, illegal intelligence officer A. Deitch was sent to London, who actually led the work of the illegal station. In 1933, an outstanding illegal intelligence officer, D. Bystroletov, was sent to him and was tasked with recruiting a cryptographer from the British Foreign Ministry. This recruitment took place in 1934, resulting in foreign intelligence gaining access to British diplomatic secrets.

"Tarantella" was intended to promote targeted information to the ruling circles of Great Britain, as a result of which the Kremlin had unique opportunity help ensure the necessary foreign policy, basic economic programs.

Moreover, the goal of Operation Tarantella, active phase which took place in 1930-1934, was to hinder and suppress the activities British intelligence"Intelligence Service" in the USSR, block the operational activities of this special service, keep its communications and couriers under control. During Operation Tarantella, Soviet intelligence had access to information received from Polish and Romanian intelligence services. Some of these materials gave an idea of ​​​​the awareness of Western intelligence services regarding the state of the Armed Forces of the USSR, its strategic objects, which was taken into account when carrying out measures to protect state secrets, identifying and blocking possible channels of leakage of this kind of data.

"Tarantella" made it possible to learn about the secret preparations of the German aviation industry for the start of mass production of bombers and fighters.

Operation Berezino.

In the summer of 1944, the largest offensive The Red Army, as a result of which Belarus was completely liberated from the Nazis.

However, some German units, who found themselves surrounded, tried to get out of it. Most of them were destroyed or captured. Intelligence took advantage of this circumstance, starting a new radio game with the enemy, called “Berezino”.

Operation Enormous

The splitting problem atomic nucleus Scientists in Germany, England, the USA, France and other countries began to work closely on obtaining a new source of atomic energy since 1939. Similar works were conducted by nuclear scientists in the Soviet Union. However, the outbreak of war and the evacuation scientific institutes interrupted work on the creation of atomic weapons in our country. Availability in Germany strong school physics testified to the danger of the appearance of atomic weapons and the need to determine the reality of creating such weapons not only in Germany, but also in other countries.

Therefore, foreign intelligence was tasked with providing information to the country's leadership about ongoing work to create nuclear weapons in other countries and obtaining scientific and technical information on this topic to facilitate the creation of similar weapons in the USSR.

  • "Exploration and creation of atomic weapons". History of the SVR - Events.
  • "Intelligence Legend", Russia, 01/11/2001.
  • “Russia is doing it itself”, Newspaper, 08/31/2004.
  • “A brilliant organizer, scientist, intelligence officer,” Intelligence and counterintelligence news, 05.26.2005.

Operation "Combat"

At the beginning of 1947, the Roman residency received an assignment from Moscow to obtain a new piece of British military equipment - an anti-aircraft artillery shell with high degree hitting moving targets. It was necessary to obtain technical information about this projectile, codenamed “Boy”, and, if possible, samples of it.

Operation Berlin Tunnel

The history of the Berlin Tunnel, which received the Anglo-American name Operation Gold ("Gold"), became one of the most high-profile intelligence operations of the time " cold war"This is the largest intelligence operation of the American and British intelligence services to penetrate the communications of the Soviets and the GDR using a tunnel dug deep under the Soviet sector.

  • “Representatives of Soviet foreign intelligence and the CIA shared the truth about the confrontation between their special services in Berlin in the post-war period “within the framework of declassified archives”, RIA Novosti, 03/14/2000.

Operation to resolve the Cuban missile crisis

The victory of the anti-Batista revolution in Cuba in 1959 and the coming to power of the progressive regime led by Fidel Castro caused hostility on the part of the United States, which is accustomed to considering Latin America like your own backyard.

In this regard, in 1960, the Center set the foreign intelligence station the task of obtaining reliable political information revealing the secret aggressive plans of the United States regarding Cuba. Soviet intelligence officers, in coordination with Cuban partners, developed and successfully carried out the day before and during Cuban missile crisis a whole series of measures to disrupt and counter the subversive activities of the American intelligence services. The danger of a direct armed conflict that could escalate into a nuclear one was averted.



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