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“THE GREAT LEAP” BY NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
Round "C"
In one of the June issues of the Versiya newspaper for 2000, a document from the “Personal File” of Nikita Khrushchev, the “commissar of the reserves”, was first published. Here it is:
“Certification for the period from June 21 to September 1, 1930.
Personal data: energetic and decisive, disciplined; The hikes were assessed as satisfactory.
Service data: military training, marksmanship mastered satisfactorily; completed the shooting; I mastered the political lessons “Our Western Neighbors” with a satisfactory grade.
Tactical training: understands the situation completely, has the language, there is no system in thinking for assessing the situation and making decisions.
Company commander, political sergeant major Strashnenko. September 3, 1930
I agree with the “Certification” and the conclusions. Beginning under. div. Isaenko. October 17, 1930."
So, from this description we see that the “reserve commissar” clearly did not have enough stars in the sky and, in terms of his personal and official data, did not even reach the “excellent student in combat and political training.”
"Golden Key" by Nikita Khrushchev.
But in the same 30th year, as a student at the Industrial Academy named after I.V. Stalin in Moscow, he is elected (that’s what it means to “have a language” - L.B.) Secretary of the Party Committee of the Industrial Academy. Soon Khrushchev learned that his 29-year-old classmate Nadezhda Alliluyeva, although she did not advertise it, was - who would have thought? - the “first red lady” of the Soviet state, the wife of Comrade Stalin himself, who was already 22 years older than his wife.
Realizing that this is a unique chance for his career, Khrushchev uses the “energy and determination” noticed in him by senior political officer Strashnenko, as well as his ability to “fully understand the situation” and sets a course for rapprochement with Nadezhda Sergeevna, in whom he now sees him “golden key”, that magical “Open Sesame” that will lead him to the Corridors Supreme Power. And he was not mistaken in his calculations! He managed to get Nadezhda Alliluyeva to put in a good word for him (and maybe more than one) with the leader.
And from this moment Khrushchev’s rapid rise to political Olympus began. Since January 1931, Khrushchev was secretary of the Baumansky and then Krasnopresnensky district party committees of Moscow. And already in his Personal file“A new piece of paper appears - “Special remark of the certification commission,” where our “round C student” is translated as “raised in party work to the highest group of political personnel.”
Professor of the Industrial Academy named after I.V. Stalin, Alexander Solovyov wrote in his diary in January 1931: “I and some others are surprised by Khrushchev’s rapid leap. I studied very poorly at the Industrial Academy. Now the second secretary, together with Kaganovich. But surprisingly close-minded and a big sycophant.”
The “big sycophant” was in the forefront of glorifying “the proven brilliant leader and leader of the party and all the working people, Comrade Stalin,” thereby creating a cult of his personality, which he himself would later “overthrow,” and as for “narrow-mindedness,” as he noted Khrushchev’s son-in-law, about whom all of Moscow was talking - “Don’t have a hundred friends, but marry like Adzhubey”: “He only seemed like a simple-minded person and even wanted to look like that.”
Secret " great leap» Khrushchev is that I.V. Stalin believed his beloved wife, not knowing what kind of pig she had played on him...
At the Mausoleum on the eve of the tragedy...
However, on November 7, 1932, there was still no place for Khrushchev on Olympus, the Government Tribune, and he humiliatedly stood in the group of “participants” away from the Mausoleum. Khrushchev recalls this episode like this: “Nadya Alliluyeva was next to me, we were talking. It was cool. Stalin at the Mausoleum, as always, in an overcoat. The hooks of the overcoat were unbuttoned, the floors swung open. Dul strong wind. Nadezhda Sergeevna looked and said: “Hey, I didn’t take my scarf, I’ll catch a cold and we’ll get sick again.” It came out very homely and did not fit in with the idea of Stalin, of the leader, already ingrained in our consciousness...”
The next day N.S. Alliluyeva committed suicide. In his report at the 20th Congress and later in his “memoirs” he will accuse I.V. Stalin in this too: “She committed suicide at mysterious circumstances. But no matter how she died, the cause of her death was some actions of Stalin... There was even a rumor that Stalin shot Nadya...”
"Special merits" of "Faithful Iago".
In any case, the death of N. Alliluyeva did not affect Nikita Sergeevich’s further career. Perhaps even the opposite: I.V. Stalin brought the “faithful Iago” even closer to himself. In 1934, at the “Congress of Winners”, Khrushchev, already as “a proven son of the Bolshevik Party, an outstanding party worker, disciple and closest ally of Comrade Stalin,” was introduced to the membership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
And, pouring tubs of slop on good name I.V. Stalin, 22 years later, vilifying him for his “retribution” against the so-called “Leninist guard” - the delegates of the 17th Party Congress, he did not bother explaining to the stunned audience why such “ special merits before the Motherland and the Party,” he personally was not repressed.
Largest statesman Stalin era L.M. Kaganovich recalled that immediately after the 20th Congress in 1956, V.M. Molotov told him: “It is now Khrushchev who opposes repression, but when he was secretary of the Moscow City Committee, he sent over 50 thousand party members to prison. In 1938, after the removal of Kosior, I.V. Stalin sent Khrushchev to Ukraine. Many delegates to the Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine voted against his election as first secretary. So he imprisoned them all.”
Joseph Stalin's fatal mistake
In the report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” Khrushchev falsely testifies that in the speeches of a number of members of the Central Committee at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937, doubts were expressed about the correctness of the course towards mass repressions: “Stalin oriented the party, oriented the NKVD organs towards mass terror. This terror turned out to be actually directed not against the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes, but against honest cadres of the party and the Soviet state, who were presented with false, slanderous, meaningless accusations of “double-dealing,” “espionage,” and the preparation of some fictitious “attempts” (the latter, it seems , already from the personal Kyiv experience of the most honest cadre of the party and the Soviet state - Nikita Sergeich - L.B.).
“We need to destroy these scoundrels. By destroying one, two, ten, we are doing the work of millions. Therefore, it is necessary that the hand does not tremble, it is necessary to step over the corpses of the enemy for the good of the people,” Khrushchev said in May 1937 at the plenum of the Moscow State Committee of the Party.
However, in that report I.V. Stalin, entitled “On the shortcomings of party work and measures to eliminate Trotskyists and other double-dealers,” which he read on March 3, 1937, not only did not contain any party orientation towards mass terror, but, on the contrary, demands were put forward “in this issue, as in all other issues, to observe an individual, differentiated approach. You can't put everyone under the same brush. Such a sweeping approach can only harm the cause of the fight against real Trotskyist saboteurs and spies.” Word of T. Art. 149. In the same speech, Khrushchev, who was present at that Plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, heard, but for some reason did not take into account such words of I.V. Stalin: “The fact is that some of our party leaders suffer from a lack of attention to people, to party members, to workers. Moreover, they do not study party members, do not know how they live and how they grow, and do not know the workers at all. That's why they don't have individual approach to party members, to party workers. And precisely because they do not have an individual approach when assessing party members and party workers, they usually act at random: either they praise them indiscriminately, without measure, or they also beat them indiscriminately and without measure, expelling them from the party in the thousands and tens of thousands.
Such leaders generally try to think in tens of thousands, without caring about the “units,” about individual party members, about their fate. They consider expelling thousands and tens of thousands of people from the party a trivial matter, consoling themselves with the fact that we have a party of two million and tens of thousands expelled cannot change anything in the position of the party. But only people who are essentially deeply anti-Party can approach party members in this way.
As a result of this callous attitude discontent and bitterness is artificially created towards people, towards party members and party workers in one part of the party, and Trotskyist double-dealers cleverly pick up such embittered comrades and skillfully drag them along with them into the swamp of Trotskyist sabotage.”
Yes, I.V. Stalin warned that “we must remember: no success can annul the fact of capitalist encirclement. As long as there is capitalist encirclement, there will be sabotage, terror, sabotage, spies sent to the rear Soviet Union.
We must smash and discard the rotten theory that with every advance we make, our class struggle will fade away. We lack the readiness to eliminate our own carelessness, our own complacency... Are we really not going to be able to get rid of this funny idiotic disease, we who overthrew capitalism, built, basically, socialism and raised high the banner of world communism?
In the speech of I.V. Stalin, as we see, there is no call for “mass repressions”, but what is put forward is quite expedient for protecting the cause of revolutionary transformations both from external and from internal enemies, the requirement to mobilize all forces Soviet power, including punitive authorities, to fight the “fifth column”, subject to strict adherence to socialist legality, individual, differentiated approach in each individual case, as Stalin himself put it, “do not paint everyone with the same brush.”
“Mass repressions” were precisely the result of sabotage actions and the reason for the inglorious fall of many party leaders who considered themselves to be part of the so-called “Leninist Guard,” who in fact represented a deeply conspiratorial underground of “Comrade Trotsky,” acting on the principle “the worse, the better.” better". In his “Memoirs” years later, Khrushchev writes, justifying Trotskyism: “Oppositional sentiments do not yet mean anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist, anti-party sentiments. No, these people just wanted to replace Stalin in the leadership. But Lenin also wanted this. Consequently, these are not anti-Leninists, but people who stood on the positions of Lenin, believing that Stalin, by his nature, could no longer remain in his previous post and should be replaced... And Stalin destroyed them. Why? Because he considered himself irreplaceable, so the only person, who truly is a Marxist and has the right to lead the country.”
This nonsense hardly needs any comment!
Elsewhere in his “memoirs” he directly writes: “We decided not to raise the question of open processes in my report at the 20th Party Congress. There was undoubtedly a certain ambiguity in this position. But at the trials of Rykov, Bukharin and other leading figures, which ended in their conviction, representatives of the fraternal communist parties. These representatives returned home to their countries and testified that the charges were justified. We did not want to discredit the representatives of fraternal parties who were present at the open trials. Therefore, they decided to postpone indefinitely the rehabilitation of Bukharin, Zinoviev, Rykov and the rest. Now I realize that this decision was wrong.” (Why lie? Khrushchev more than once publicly stated that I.V. Stalin played positive role in the fight against the Trotskyists, Zinovievites and Bukharinites - L.B.).
It is permissible to ask, who at that Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937 most vehemently demanded that Bukharin and Rykov be shot, and then boasted that they had identified more saboteurs in their party organizations? These are the real double-dealers and Jews - Pavel Postyshev, Stanislav Kosior, Robert Eikhe, Vlas Chubar, Alexander Kosarev and... the unexposed Trotskyist Nikita Khrushchev - perhaps the only fatal political mistake of the infallible leader.
Well, I couldn’t see behind the mask of the outward complacency of the “shirt-guy” and the feigned stupidity of the insidious and highest degree an evil and vengeful enemy...
The initiators of "mass repression"
One of the main instigators of “mass repressions” in the USSR, which, after the notorious report at the 20th Congress, will be referred to as “ Stalin's repressions", was Nikita Khrushchev himself. Back in January 1936, he stated in one of his speeches: “Only 308 people were arrested; for our Moscow organization this is not enough.” In his speech at the February-March (1937) Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he said: “Sometimes a man sits, enemies swarm around him, almost climb on his feet, but he doesn’t notice and puffs up, supposedly in my apparatus there are no strangers. This is from deafness, political blindness, from an idiotic disease - carelessness.”
He is echoed by one of the first rehabilitated “victims” of political repression - Robert Eikhe, since 1929 the first secretary of the Siberian and West Siberian regional committees and the Novosibirsk city committee of the CPSU (b), a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee. It was he who said: “We are Western Siberia Many pests were exposed. We uncovered sabotage earlier, than in other parts."
By the way, it was precisely this excessive zeal, the massive scale of unfounded arrests, the encouragement of denunciation and falsification of criminal cases locally that was blamed on them, which is especially evident in the example of the same Trotskyist double-dealer Pavel Postyshev, who dissolved 30 district committees in the Kuibyshev region, whose members were declared enemies of the people and were repressed only because they did not see the image of a fascist swastika on the covers of student notebooks in the ornament! How could Postyshev not be repressed, despite all his past achievements?
In a word, our “hero”, the then “new nominee” Nikita Khrushchev, who with great joy took Kosior’s place in Ukraine and a place in the Stalinist Politburo, was the winner. Already in June 1938, that is, exactly six months after the appointment of Khrushchev, one of the delegates to the Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the future head of the Sovinformburo, Colonel General A. Shcherbakov, noted: “The real merciless defeat of the enemies of the people in Ukraine began after the Central Committee sent Comrade Khrushchev to lead the Bolsheviks of Ukraine. Now the working people of Ukraine can be sure that the defeat of the agents of the Polish lords and German barons will be completed."
In February 1940, Khrushchev made the following statement: “Our enemies have not yet rested and will not rest as long as the capitalist encirclement exists. This must be remembered. We have done a great job of cleaning up our enemies in Ukraine. But some still remain. They feel lonely, they are afraid to raise their heads, but they exist. Therefore, you need to keep your eyes peeled." Children's enc. page 595.
And here are excerpts from another document, which was first published in the first issue of the journal “Bulletin of the Presidential Archives” Russian Federation"for 1995: "Since January 1938, Khrushchev headed the party organization of Ukraine... In total, 167 thousand 565 people were arrested in 1938 - 1940 (that is, even after the new head of the NKVD Lavrenty Beria, with the sanction of I.V. Stalin, began his activities with rehabilitation, as a result of which they were released 327.4 thousand people, as illegally convicted, and among them there were previously repressed military men, who, on the eve of the war, were again returned to the army; in Khrushchev’s “independent” Ukraine, repressions continued almost right up to the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War - L.B.).
Khrushchev personally authorized repressions against several hundred people who were suspected of organizing against him terrorist attack(these are exactly those delegates to the Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine that V.M. Molotov mentioned - L.B.). In the summer of 1938, with the sanction of Khrushchev, a large group of leading officials of party, Soviet, and economic bodies was arrested, including the deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, people's commissars, and secretaries of regional party committees. All of them were sentenced to capital punishment and long terms of imprisonment.”
In the newspaper “Arguments and Facts” (No. 25, June 2003) you can find the following passage: “Already in our days, the words of A.N. became the verdict on Khrushchev. Yakovlev (a figure of the Gorbachev era, an ardent anti-Stalinist and anti-communist - L.B.), head of the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Illegal Repression: “There is no less blood on Khrushchev’s conscience, but compared to some(a hint to I.V. Stalin - L.B.) and more!
The question was whether " political repression"or they weren't there, it's not worth it, they were, and this is a fact that received its historical justification during the Great Patriotic War, when the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat survived, including because it isolated and eliminated its “fifth column” - potential traitors to the Motherland.
But to the question of whether it is right to say that these were precisely “Stalinist repressions” and why they became “massive”, Khrushchev himself answered at the 20th Congress: “Using Stalin’s attitude that the closer to socialism, the more there will be and enemies, using the resolution of the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee on Yezhov’s report, provocateurs, sneaked into the organs state security, and also unscrupulous careerists(emphasis mine. – L.B.) began to cover up in the name of the party and the Soviet state (read: in the name of Stalin) mass terror against the cadres of the party and the Soviet state, against the rank and file Soviet citizens. Suffice it to say that the number of those arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes increased in 1937 compared to 1936 by more than ten times” (Light and Shadows P.64 - 65) report of the chronicle of comrade. 355.
But who is to blame for this - I.V. Stalin, whose name was used to cover up lawlessness, or provocateurs-Trotskyists and unscrupulous careerists-terrorists?
No matter how much Nikita Sergeich wanted to hide the fact that he himself was one of these “unscrupulous careerists”, no matter how much he, while already in power, cleaned out the archives, he was unable to keep the secret of his participation in the organization of “mass repressions”, which were completely law can be called not “Stalinist” at all, but “ Khrushchev's mass political" repression.
In particular, a note from Khrushchev from Kyiv addressed to I.V. has been preserved. Stalin, six months after his election (on the recommendation of a leader who did not recognize his dirty essence) as the first secretary of the Ukrainian party organization, dated June 1938 (remember, it was in the summer of 1938 that the rise (but not yet the peak!) of Khrushchev’s repressions in Ukraine occurred - L.B.): “Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! Ukraine sends 17-18 thousand repressed people monthly, and Moscow approves no more than 2-3 thousand. I ask you to take urgent measures. Loving you N. Khrushchev. (Word to Comrade Stalin. P.355).
From this note it follows:
Contrary to Khrushchev’s false statements at the 20th Congress, he initiated repressions in the USSR (or controlled them - L.B.) not I.V. Stalin, if he is asked to “take urgent measures.”
- the “urgent measures” that Khrushchev proposed could only mean one thing - they say, enemies of “mass repression” have entrenched themselves in Moscow, which are preventing the conduct of large-scale punitive operations, and I.V. Stalin should have ordered that these “enemies” be identified and punished.
That the unscrupulous careerist Khrushchev, who “loved” “dear Joseph Vissarionovich,” wanted to create a favorable impression of his work with the leader with his irrepressible zeal.
And when I.V. Stalin reproachfully asked our “hero” whether he had found too many enemies in Ukraine, he, modestly looking down, replied that “in fact there are much more of them.” Chuev Molotov p.513
Khrushchev was such a trickster that I.V. himself Stalin was “dropped on his ears.”
Just in January 1938, when Khrushchev successfully took the place of Secretary General of the Ukrainian Party organization and in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party met in Moscow, where I.V.’s own handwritten document was adopted. Stalin Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “On the mistakes of party organizations in expelling communists from the party, on the formal bureaucratic attitude towards appeals of those expelled from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and on measures to eliminate these shortcomings”: “It’s time to expose such, so to speak, communists and brand them as careerists, trying to curry favor by expulsion from the party, trying to play it safe with the help of repressions against party members... Such a disguised enemy - a vile double-dealer - strives in every possible way to create in party organizations an atmosphere of excessive suspicion, in which every party member who comes out in defense another communist, slandered by someone, is immediately accused of lack of vigilance and connections with enemies of the people. Such a disguised enemy - a vile provocateur - in those cases when the party organization begins to check an application filed against a communist, in every possible way creates a provocative environment for this verification, creates an atmosphere of political mistrust around the communist and thereby, instead of an objective analysis of the case, organizes a flow of new statements against him.” .
Former Stalinist minister agriculture I.A. Benediktov writes in his memoirs: “Stalin, without a doubt, knew about the arbitrariness and lawlessness that was allowed during the repressions, and took specific measures to correct the mistakes made and release innocent people from prison. Back in January, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1938 openly admitted that lawlessness had been committed against honest communists and non-party members, having adopted a special resolution on this matter, published in all central newspapers. (See Appendix No. 1) The harm from unjustified repressions was also openly discussed in front of the whole country at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1939... Immediately after the January Plenum, thousands of illegally repressed citizens, including prominent military leaders, were released from the camps . All of them were officially rehabilitated, and Stalin personally apologized to some of them.”
November 17 of the same 1938, signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Molotov and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) I. Stalin addressed to the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the allied and autonomous republics, chiefs of the NKVD of territories and regions, heads of district, city and district branches of the NKVD, as well as to the Prosecutors of the union and autonomous republics, territories and regions, district, city and district prosecutors, as well as to the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the national communist parties, regional committees, regional committees, district committees, City and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were sent a Resolution of the Council People's Commissars USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation”, which condemned numerous facts of gross violation of socialist legality and expressed strict demands for the immediate elimination of existing serious shortcomings in the methods of investigation, in particular the following was condemned:
The launch of intelligence work, the practice of mass arrests, the low quality of the investigation;
A simplified investigation procedure, in which the investigator confines himself to obtaining a confession of guilt from the accused and does not care at all about supporting this confession with the testimony of witnesses, expert reports, material evidence etc.
This Resolution stated: “The NKVD workers have become so unaccustomed to painstaking, systematic intelligence work and have become so accustomed to the simplified procedure for conducting cases that until very recently they are raising questions about granting them so-called “limits” for carrying out mass arrests... This kind irresponsible attitude to investigative proceedings and gross violation established by law Procedural rules were often skillfully used by enemies of the people who made their way into the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office - both in the center and locally. They deliberately perverted Soviet laws, committed forgeries, falsified investigative documents, prosecuted and arrested on trivial grounds, and even without any grounds at all created “cases” against innocent people for provocative purposes, and at the same time took all measures to ensure that in order to shelter and save from defeat their accomplices in criminal anti-Soviet activities.”
In total, in 1938, as many as six resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were adopted on facts of violation of socialist legality. In addition to the above, these were: “On changing the structure of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR” (March 28), “On changing the structure of the NKVD of the USSR” (September 13), “On the structure of the NKVD of the USSR” (September 23), “On accounting, verification and approval workers of the NKVD" (November 14), "On the procedure for coordinating arrests" (together with the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on December 1). (V. Nekrasov. P. 226) “Troikas” and “twos” under the NKVD were abolished by order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L.P. Beria - L.B.) November 26, 1938. Massacre Prosecutor's fate M.: Legal. Lit., 1990. P.314)
On February 1, 1939, USSR Prosecutor A.Ya. Vyshinsky reported to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov that the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, at the request of the Secretary of the Vologda Regional Committee, identified facts of especially dangerous crimes committed by a number of employees of the Vologda NKVD. As it was established, the falsifiers of criminal cases drew up false protocols of interrogations of the accused, who allegedly confessed to committing grave state crimes... The cases fabricated in this way were transferred to the troika under the NKVD for Vologda region, and more than a hundred people were shot... During interrogations, they reached the point of fanaticism, using all kinds of torture on those interrogated. It got to the point that during interrogations by these persons, four of those interrogated were killed.”
This case of a grave crime against social justice was heard in a closed session of the Military Tribunal of the Leningrad Military District in the presence of a narrow group of operatives from the Vologda NKVD department and the Vologda prosecutor's office. The accused Vlasov, Lebedev and Roskuryakov, as the initiators and organizers of these outrageous crimes, were sentenced to capital punishment - execution, and the remaining seven of their accomplices - to long terms of imprisonment. L. Mlechin. Death St. P. 215). And there were such Vlasovs, Lebedevs and Roskuryakovs all over the country 11 thousand 842 repressed scoundrels, whom even at the time of Gorbachev’s reckless forgiveness, the notorious commission of Alexander Yakovlev did not consider it possible to rehabilitate. I. Rashkovets. Non-judicial bodies. In the book. Massacre. Prosecutor's fates. C317. m.90. It is on the conscience of these falsifiers of criminal cases, accused of producing unfounded mass arrests, the use of illegal methods of investigation (i.e. torture – L.B.), who even half a century later were denied rehabilitation according to the Decree Supreme Council USSR dated January 16, 1989 - responsibility lies for those very “thousands and thousands of innocently repressed” whom Khrushchev, and then his promoter and student Gorbachev, successfully “pinned” on the late I.V. Stalin.
Let's return again to the XX Congress of the CPSU. We hear from Khrushchev that there was supposedly a “telegram” to the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties national republics dated January 10, 1939, signed by I.V. Stalin: “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the use of physical force in the practice of the NKVD has been allowed since 1937 with the permission of the Central Committee...
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) believes that the method of physical coercion must be used in the future, as an exception, in relation to obvious and undisarmed enemies of the people, as a completely correct and appropriate method.” (When, in one of the conversations with V.M. Molotov, the poet and publicist Felix Chuev asked him a direct question about sanctions on torture: “I heard a conversation that Stalin and you gave a directive to the NKVD authorities to use torture,” - V.M. Molotov answered negatively, not admitting this sin to himself - L.B.) Molotov p.469.
I do not undertake to state categorically whether such a telegram existed in nature or not. But you can take my word for it: no matter how many times and no matter where I came across this “ciphergram,” there was always a footnote with it that referred to the same source—you guessed it correctly—to N.S.’s report. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU! At least once, for the sake of decency, it was indicated archive, where even one single copy of the original of such a “document” of special importance is stored.
Never! There is neither an original nor even a fake. And this proves: Khrushchev blatantly lied!
This comparison was prompted by an article by Khrushchev’s granddaughter.
In that article, she said with malice that the Russians needed a cruel tsar, like Stalin, and not “their own man in a Ukrainian shirt,” like her remarkable grandfather.
However, it is worth comparing Khrushchev and Stalin to understand how rational and justified such an attitude towards both “leaders” is on the part of the people.
Point 1. First of all, as is known, Khrushchev himself accepted direct participation in all Stalinist repressions, and participation was the most active. This means that Khrushchev, in principle, had no moral plan to condemn Stalin's repressions. If Stalin was a criminal, then Khrushchev was no less a criminal, and in this regard he was also obliged to appear before the court... Or, in any case, to resign from his position. If he remained in power, then he himself had no opportunity to organize a public condemnation of Stalin and his repressions. He should have only stopped the repression itself and no longer pursue such a policy, since he condemned it. However, everything turned out exactly the opposite: Stalin and his cult of personality were branded, repressions continued... and Khrushchev remained in power.
Let's say moreover - Khrushchev's guilt, as one of the direct perpetrators of repressions during Stalin's time, is no less than that of the "Kremlin highlander" himself. It is performers like Khrushchev who are to blame for the degree of cruelty and uselessness of these repressions.
Because there is a fundamental difference between repressions under Lenin and under Stalin. Lenin's repressions were directed primarily against the people - in order to completely suppress all their resistance and completely subordinate them to the will and goals of the CPSU (b). And Stalin initially followed the same course, which resulted in “dekulakization” and “Holodomor”. However, it was precisely these events that showed that the main problem for the Soviet government was the “apparatus,” which consisted to a large extent of unprincipled, illiterate and greedy “collaborators” attracted by the rich smell of revolutionary robbery. Such an apparatus was extremely ineffective and uncontrollable, which for a totalitarian Soviet state, in which everything depended on the apparatus - it was like death.
It was since then that Stalin made repressions important institution government and a means of keeping the “apparatus” in check. Naturally, the apparatus became the main object of these repressions. Moreover, repression has become an important tool of state building. Stalin assumed that the corrupted Soviet apparatus could be transformed into a functioning bureaucracy only after several stages of repression. And we cannot but agree that the people who unleashed the revolution and destroyed millions of people, such as all these Tukhachevskys, Uborevichs, Yakirs, Bukharins, in any case deserved capital punishment. Justice demanded this. It doesn’t even matter what they were accused of - anyway, they could not be officially tried for their true crimes against the Russian people.
So from a moral point of view, this stage of repression was completely justified - as the restoration of justice and “Soviet Thermidor”.
However, people like Khrushchev did everything possible to give these repressions the most anti-people character, as in Lenin’s times. And it must be said that due to some of Stalin’s personal problems and due to the specifics of the Soviet apparatus, they succeeded, but Stalin’s plan was still not fully realized.
Point 2. But under Khrushchev himself, repressions against the people continued in full swing. The difference was that they did not apply to the device, so no one noticed them. And so... just remember Novocherkassk. Especially with new strength repressions against the Russian Orthodox Church resumed. By the way, the notorious “Nikodimovism” dates back to Khrushchev’s times. And it was Khrushchev who for some reason promoted the expansion of Catholics and Protestants into the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church, but from our Church he demanded participation in all kinds of ecumenical organizations, communication with heretics and schismatics (meaning the Catholic schism)... and, in fact, forced our The Church humiliates itself and curries favor with the Vatican.
Point 3. It is worth remembering that it was Khrushchev who mainly spoiled relations with the West in the post-war era.
Stalin knew how to build relationships with Western leaders. He was not so much feared as respected. Not considering now domestic policy Stalin, in foreign policy we see that the IVS tried to build an international security system based on several leading countries, and tried to return our country to its former respectability of times Russian Empire. He was quite flexible, as evidenced by, for example, his post-war politics in relation to Finland. And he intervened in the politics of CEE countries quite carefully and deliberately. It is enough, for example, that in Poland and Hungary complete nationalization of property was never carried out, and land resources generally remained private to a large extent. In addition, in Poland, for example, there was practically no persecution of the Catholic Church.
Khrushchev, not possessing any diplomatic talents, as well as political ones (not counting a penchant for palace intrigue), based his entire policy on intimidating the West - fortunately, Stalin left him all the tools for this: a ready-made nuclear bomb and practically ready-made intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear weapons. Of course, having a hundred-megaton bomb and the means of delivering it to any point globe, any idiot will be able to build the whole world according to strings, even Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev.
It was Khrushchev who promised to show “Kuzka’s mother” and said: “We will bury you.” And, given the above, it was impossible not to believe him. Stalin never allowed himself to do this.
As a result, naturally, the intimidated West was forced to unite against the USSR and increase the intensity of the fight against it - with all available methods, both obvious and secret. And also to fight dissidents who sympathize with socialism within your own bloc. By the way, if not for Khrushchev’s incompetent policies, France and Italy could well have become socialist countries by the 60s. And England was not far from this. And then the whole picture of the world could be completely different. Probably better than now... Because all the energy and all the resources spent on the “struggle between two systems” would have been used for better purposes.
Khrushchev’s policy towards Central and Eastern Europe was distinguished by the same boar-like grace. Hungary in 1956, crisis in East Germany and the construction of the Berlin Wall, and, in fact, Czechoslovakia-68, which lies in the same direction: these are the results of Khrushchev’s “European” policy. To top it all off, he managed to quarrel between the Soviet Union and China. It's not a big deal, but it's nice.
In addition, Stalin never got involved in the affairs of completely distant countries and did not try to establish socialism there by force, if there was no viable basis for this. Stalin would never have fallen into the Afghan trap, would not have tried to build a socialist society in African countries with the ancient culture of cannibalism is none of our business. And then we would not have on our conscience responsibility for millions of people who normal life was destroyed and a new one was never built.
Point 4. But it is curious that it was with the Khrushchev family that the active flight of the “children of the Central Committee” to the West began. In particular, the children of Khrushchev himself - now almost all of his descendants are comfortably settled in the West. And it was precisely from the time of Khrushchev that “evil tongues” began to speak about the foreign capital of Soviet leaders - no one could blame Stalin for this.
Point 5."The collective farmer surrounded himself with collective farmers." It was with Khrushchev that the trend of progressive degeneratization of the Soviet authorities began. If, for example, Molotov was one of the best diplomats in the world, and communicated not only on equal terms, but also in superior positions with foreign “colleagues,” then Khrushchev’s entourage could only disgrace Russia by international arena. This process went on without exception - from the very top to the very bottom. To this we can add constant “government reforms,” including the notorious “economic councils.”
Point 6. By the end of the war, Stalin was quite ready to allow small private property and a certain liberalism in the economy in the CEE countries. About the same could be expected in Russia. By the beginning of the 50s, protection against food risks was ensured in Russia, industrialization was fully carried out, and in such a situation, Stalin’s pragmatic mind could well allow private initiative to begin to develop. However mental abilities Khrushchev was clearly not enough for this. He only knew how to repeat what others had already done before him. Moreover, Khrushchev launched a fight against individual farms and finally finished off the peasantry. After him, the Russian village was already completely “cleared” - there was no chance of recovery. And in general, a chance for economic modernization and gradual development market relations there was none left. While Stalin in post-war years clearly set a course for gradual restoration pre-revolutionary Russia- from the return of the Orthodox Church and the introduction of the “old” military ranks to separate education in schools and the revival of Russian patriotism. But Nikita Sergeevich put an end to this revival.
The cultural degradation of the country, which occurred as a result of Nikita Sergeevich’s overly original artistic perception of the world, is obvious to everyone. If under Stalin art was totalitarian, then under Khrushchev it became nothing. In previous examples of art they looked for traces of the “cult of personality”, in new ones - traces of abstractionism and modernism, so that all that was left of all the art was portly Ukrainian girls dancing the hopak on the walls of the Kievskaya metro station.
I just don’t want to talk about Khrushchev’s other “arts”, starting from Crimea stolen from Russia, and ending with corn and the development of virgin lands - everyone is already in the know.
So, let’s compare the personalities of Khrushchev and Stalin. Yes, Stalin was personally guilty of many bloody crimes. Besides, he was originally a bandit.
But it is also worth taking into account the state in which Stalin assumed power. A collapsed, blood-drenched country in which best people either killed, or driven abroad, or in prison, and scoundrels, marginals, slackers, insolent, rebellious lackeys climbed to the top. In which power belongs to a bunch of criminals and tyrants, each of whom wants to become the only one and destroy all competitors. Which is in a state of latent war with the entire civilized world. In which the scientific and cultural values, not to mention spiritual. In which it is a crime to be Russian and Orthodox... as well as to have a nationality and religion in general.
It is to this situation that Churchill’s words that Stalin “received Russia with a plow and left with nuclear bomb". Yes, of course, by 1917 Russia did not come only with a plow. Only all this was lost during the years of the revolution.
And by 1953, the USSR/Russia again became one of the first countries in the world...
If we take Nikita the corn grower, then the situation is exactly the opposite. Having assumed control of a rapidly developing and respectable country, he made it a disgrace and horror to the whole world, and quickly brought it to a critical state. After Khrushchev, the collapse of the USSR and the crisis of the 90s became irreversible.
So Stalin - for all his crimes and mistakes - is respected.
Khrushchev is an eternal shame. Let everyone remember that he was a weak, mediocre, thieving, cowardly, shameful ruler who brought nothing but harm to the country.
http://www.rustrana.ru/article.php?nid=7846
"Our past is powder keg"- said Mandelstam. In this case, it is completely understandable why our archives are regularly guarded by the police: their racks and shelves are simply filled with explosives. It is also clear why historians were not and are not always allowed there now. Like, they are not sappers. And before a document is published or even comprehended, it must be examined and rendered harmless, then put on fuse, that is, closed, which is what the protective-ideological authorities did so successfully and for so long, strictly monitoring the level of openness in society and sparingly dosing it.
The archival revolution of the early 1990s temporarily forgot about these golden rules, and lo and behold: it exploded here, then it crashed here, but as a result, the long-awaited contours of a real, well-sourced history emerged.
Historians received so much at once that they retrained as publishers for a long time, not having time to comprehend what they found and what they published. Now, thank God, there is no archival revolution (evil tongues are even talking about a creeping archival counter-revolution), so you can think about a lot of things in the free time that has suddenly appeared. But over the course of a decade, so much has been dug up (and even now discoveries happen from time to time) that it is impossible to resist the temptation to turn directly to archival document and fall down to the “river called fact.”
Hence the appearance of a new column in Novaya Gazeta - “Your Documents!” It will publish a lot found in various Russian and foreign archives. Documents often speak for themselves, so the commentary will generally be as brief as possible.
The section opens with a selection of documents showing the relationship between two political figures that still excite the public consciousness - Stalin and Khrushchev - from an unknown perspective. These documents were found in the Russian state archive socio-political history (RGASPI).
In the field of vision of Stalin N.S. Khrushchev got caught 80 years ago, in 1929, when he studied with the leader’s wife at the Industrial Academy. In 1935, he was already the 1st Secretary of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and from 1938 to 1949, with a short break in 1947, the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. In 1949, Khrushchev returned to Moscow as Secretary of the Central Committee and 1st Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
It cannot be said that the relationship between Stalin and Khrushchev was cloudless, and Stalin did not have such relations with anyone; the dictator is obliged to periodically show who is boss, but in general, Khrushchev’s career developed quite well.
In the documents below, Khrushchev looks much more humane and even wiser compared to the leader and teacher.
The year 1946 in Ukraine turned out to be very difficult. On top of everything else, there was a terrible crop failure the previous year. Hunger became not a threat, but a reality. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, as the 1st Secretary of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, sent messages to Moscow about plight republic and asked for help.
But here is the leader's answer:
Comrade KHRUSHCHEV,
Copy TO POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES.
I received a number of your notes with digital data on the yield in Ukraine, on the procurement capabilities of Ukraine, on required quantity rations for the population of Ukraine and the like.
I must tell you that none of your notes deserve attention. Such unfounded notes usually fence off some dubious politicians from the Soviet Union in order not to fulfill the party's assignments.
I warn you that if you continue to stand on this non-state and non-Bolshevik path, things may end badly.
20.Х.46
I. STALIN
(RGASPI F. 17 Op. 167 D 72 L. 87)
But everything worked out then. Khrushchev did not die from hunger or opposition in 1946. In contrast to approximately a million citizens of the USSR (nothing compared to 1933). And Stalin strengthened his aura of the Great Agrarian.
Clouds had gathered over Khrushchev's head more than once before. Here is another angry message from the leader - on the twentieth day of the Patriotic War:
Kyiv, Comrade KHRUSHCHEV.
Reliable information has been received that all of you, from the commander of the Southwestern Front to the members of the Military Council, are in a state of panic and intend to withdraw troops to the left bank of the Dnieper.
I warn you that if you take even one step towards the withdrawal of troops to the left bank of the Dnieper, you will not defend the Urov areas to the last opportunity ( fortified areas. - Note ed.) on the right bank of the Dnieper, cruel punishment will befall you all, as cowards and deserters.
Chairman
State Committee
Defense (I. STALIN)
11/VII.41
(RGASPI F.17 Op.167 D.60 L.26)
It happened this time too: no cruel punishment followed. The result was the largest disaster of the Patriotic War - the troops were not withdrawn to the left bank of the Dnieper and all four armies in time Southwestern Front(commander Colonel General M.P. Kirponos) were surrounded in September in the Lubna area and completely destroyed. Here is another hypostasis of Joseph Vissarionovich - the Great Commander.
Let us note that Stalin was not always so strict with Nikita, who amused him so much at feasts at a nearby dacha. It happened that he entrusted him with the most complex and delicate tasks. Including during the war:
Comrade KHRUSHCHEV.
I received your encrypted message about your departure to the 2nd Guards Army to work there. I believe that for the next 2 months you will have to stay there in the Military Council of the 2nd Guards Army and have serious supervision over the work of Malinovsky. It is no coincidence that during the retreat Southern Front Malinovsky’s personal adjutant left our front and supposedly joined the partisans, but in reality apparently went to the Germans. It is also no coincidence that a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Guards Army and personal friend Malinovsky Larin committed suicide, leaving an incomprehensible note, strange content. What should the phrase “I have nothing to do with” mean in Larin’s note? What is his justification here? Why Larin could think that we would touch his family is also unclear. Why does Larin’s note talk about Rodion as an intelligent person? And Malinovsky took water into his mouth and remained silent, as if it did not concern him. Ask Malinovsky about all this, as well as about his personal adjutant, and we’ll see what he says. Take several people, experienced special officers, and with their help organize the strictest surveillance of Malinovsky. If any falsity is revealed in Malinovsky’s behavior, immediately signal me to immediately release him under one or another plausible pretext and replace him with another. Collect data on Kreiser, it is possible that he will be quite suitable to replace Malinovsky, if this replacement turns out to be necessary. Inform me regularly about the results of your observation.
January 1943 STALIN
(RGASPI F.17 Op.167 D.65 L.3)
This episode also appears with discrepancies in N. Khrushchev’s “Memoirs” (in Stalin’s telegram, the leader’s “naivety” is especially touching: how could brigade commissar Illarion Larin think “that we would touch his family”?..).
To Khrushchev’s credit, he did not live up to the leader’s paranoid hopes. Lieutenant General Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, who in December 42 took over the 2nd Guards Army, at the beginning of 1943 he held the Stalingrad pincers around Paulus from Manstein, and already in March he headed the South-Western (future 3rd Ukrainian) Front. And as a result, out of Khrushchev’s close “tutelage” at Stalingrad, not a denunciation of Malinovsky was born, but friendship, the crown of which was the appointment of the marshal as Minister of Defense in 1957. 10 years later, being 70 years old, Malinovsky died as a minister (the second case in history: the first was Frunze). He was buried near the Kremlin wall, not far from Stalin, who was thrown out of the Mausoleum by Khrushchev.
The choice of religion by a people is always determined by its rulers. The true religion is always the one professed by the sovereign; the true god is the god whom the sovereign commands to be worshiped; Thus, the will of the clergy, which guides the sovereigns, always turns out to be the will of God himself.
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was born in mid-April 1894 in the village of Kalinovka. His father, Sergei Nikanorovich, worked as a leading miner. The family did not live well, which is why Nikita worked as a shepherd in the village during the summer holidays.
At the age of fourteen, Khrushchev was forced to move with his family to the Yuzovki mine. Subsequently, Nikita Sergeevich masters the skills of an apprentice mechanic, and after studying he works at a mine in his specialty. Comparison of the policies of Stalin and Khrushchev Due to the specifics of his work, Khrushchev did not go to the front (1914).
1918 is a landmark year for Nikita Sergeevich, as he joins the Bolshevik Party. He leads the “Red” detachment in Rutchenkovo, becomes commissar of the second battalion on the Tsaritsyn Front, after which he serves in the political department in Kuban.
Nikita Sergeevich's family life was very tragic. His first wife, Pisareva Efrosinya, died in 1920. From this marriage, Nikita Sergeevich left a son, Leonid, a pilot, and a daughter, Yulia, who will marry the director opera house in Kyiv.
Khrushchev's 2nd wife, Nina Petrovna Kukharchuk, was 6 years younger than Khrushchev. And although the wedding took place in 1924, they signed only in the sixties.
At the end of the twenties, Khrushchev took exams in Industrial Academy where he studies successfully. In 1938, Nikita Sergeevich was elected secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
Khrushchev went through the war and ended up as a lieutenant general. Since December (1949) he has been secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee.
Having buried Stalin (in 1953), Nikita Sergeevich became the main initiator of the arrest and removal of Beria from all posts. At the 20th Congress, Khrushchev makes a report on Stalin's repressions. In 1958, Nikita Sergeevich was elected chairman of the Council of Ministers. Comparison of the policies of Stalin and Khrushchev Having practically unlimited power, Khrushchev adopted the “Kosygin reform”, trying to introduce it into the social economy various elements market economy.
In 1958, Khrushchev pursued a policy against subsidiary plots that were for the personal use of people. People were forbidden to keep livestock; personal livestock was purchased by the state. Due to the current situation, the number of poultry and livestock has sharply decreased, and the financial situation of peasants has worsened.
While retired, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev recorded multi-volume memoirs on a tape recorder. Khrushchev died in 1971 on September 11. After Khrushchev’s resignation, for about 20 years, the name of Nikita Sergeevich was consigned to oblivion, and in the encyclopedia he was given only a small paragraph with a brief description.
However, after the death of Khrushchev in some Soviet magazines His “Memoirs”, written in retirement, were published.
Happiness has no tomorrow; he doesn’t even have yesterday; it does not remember the past, does not think about the future; he has a present - and that is not a day - but a moment.
The XX Congress of the CPSU took place. The most notable event These February days of 1956 were not loud praises from a high rostrum, but a behind-the-scenes secret report condemning Stalin’s personality cult. Criticism of the cult of personality was voiced at a closed meeting of the CPSU Central Committee at the end of the congress.
Here there is more of a question of the struggle for power. There were internecine conflicts within the Politburo itself. Apparently, the thaw went further than expected, and the idea of strong power arose again. Such a transition from pseudo- or semi-democracy to strong government. And in addition to this, it was necessary to show that Khrushchev was wrong in something, including this. That is, this is a departure from Khrushchev’s principles, a departure from Khrushchev.
- The period after the 20th Congress - the “thaw” - contributed to the emergence of dissidents in the USSR, but it was not their movement that destroyed the country, but the party elite itself. To what extent is this the result of that congress?
You know, the victory of the revolution is not an indicator of the strength of the revolutionaries, but of the weakness of the authorities. There was dissidence in Stalin times. The movement existed in other forms and was not called dissidence. Resistance Stalin's regime, resistance to the Soviet regime existed throughout all the years of Soviet power, sometimes taking bizarre forms. It was not the dissidents who destroyed it, but the elite who turned out to be incapable of governing. Just as the collapse of the Russian Empire was largely the result of the miscalculations of Nicholas II and his style of government, in the same way the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely the result of the miscalculations of Gorbachev. Revolution is a sign of the weakness of the elite.
Interviewed by Marina Arkhipova
Prepared the interview for publication
