To the mid-1850s. it was clear that there was an urgent need in the country to abolish serfdom. Defeat of Russia in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. presented the government with a choice: either maintain the existing order in the country and, as a result, ultimately lose not only prestige and position great power, but also to jeopardize the autocracy itself in Russia, or to begin to carry out bourgeois reforms, the need for which was discussed at the beginning of the century.
Alexander II.
In 1855, amid military failures, Nicholas I died and Alexander II (1855-1881) ascended the throne, who chose the path of reform.
The first reform was the abolition of serfdom in Russia (1861). They prepared for it for a long time. In 1857, the Secret Committee was created, and then provincial committees to discuss the peasant question. Despite
the fact that the reform projects were distinguished by a variety of approaches, the main thing in them was the desire to protect the interests of landowners. The final version of the reforms was signed by the emperor on the sixth anniversary of his accession to the throne - February 19, 1861, and on March 5 the most important documents of this reform were published: the Manifesto on the abolition of serfdom and the Regulations on peasants emerging from serfdom (Regulations of February 19, 1861 .). In accordance with them, peasants received personal freedom; they could now freely dispose of their property, engage in commercial and industrial activities, enter the service, receive an education, and manage their family affairs (for example, get married on their own).
Peasants (or rather, peasant community) were endowed with land, but they could use it only for a ransom, a certain fixed rent, or serving corvee. " General position» determined the structure, rights and responsibilities of the peasant bodies public administration(rural and volost) and volost courts, the “Local Regulations” regulated the size of land plots and the duties of peasants for their use. These sizes had to be recorded in charters, which were drawn up by landowners for each estate and signed by the landowner and the rural society (community), which guaranteed the landowner to receive a ransom.
The peasants were given the right to buy out the estate and, by agreement with the landowner, the field allotment. Before this was accomplished (before the transition to redemption), they were called temporarily obliged peasants. The term of the temporarily obligated relationship was not established, the landowners were in no hurry to draw up statutory charters, and the peasants’ transition to ransom lasted for several decades. The law on compulsory redemption of plots from January 1, 1883 was issued on December 28, 1881 already Alexander III. The transfer to compulsory redemption was completed by 1895.
The basis for calculating redemption payments was not only the market price of land, but also the assessment of feudal duties. When the deal was concluded, the peasants paid 20% of the amount, and the remaining 80% was paid to the landowners by the state. The peasants had to repay the loan provided annually in the form of redemption payments for 49 years, taking into account accrued interest. The purchase price of the land significantly exceeded its price (by an average of 38.4%).
The law was based on the fact that the peasants were allocated the plot of land that they used before the reform, and if this plot was larger highest standard for a given area, the landowner had the right to cut off the surplus to the established norm. In fact, about 20% of their land was cut off from the peasants (they were called “cuts”).
In total, 22.5 million were freed from serfdom. landowner peasants both sexes with an average allotment of 3.4 acres of land.
The abolition of serfdom also affected appanage peasants, who, by the “Regulations of June 26, 1863” were transferred to the category of peasant owners through compulsory redemption under the terms of the “Regulations of February 19, 1861.” The law of November 24, 1866 began the reform state village. According to the law of June 12, 1886, state peasants were also transferred to ransom. State and appanage peasants received an average of 4.8 dessiatines per capita. The peasant reform of 1861 entailed the abolition of serfdom in the national outskirts of the Russian Empire.
Under the influence of the revolutionary events of 1905, the tsarist government was forced to cancel redemption payments on January 1, 1907. From 1861 to 1906, the government recovered over 1.6 billion rubles from former landowner peasants and received an income of about 700 million rubles as a result of the redemption operation.
The peasant reform legally abolished serfdom, marked the beginning of capitalist development. However, while preserving landownership and feudal remnants in the countryside, the reform did not improve the situation of the peasants, which ultimately led to growing discontent and aggravation of contradictions. The peasants protested against the preservation of corvée, the payment of quitrents and various taxes, the existence of plots of land and in-kind duties. Particularly large scale peasant movement acquired in the Volga region, Ukraine and the central black earth regions. Military teams were used to suppress peasant uprisings.
After the peasant reform of 1861, the development of Russia proceeded with such speed that in a few decades changes took place that took entire centuries in other countries. This was a natural process of the country’s development along the capitalist path, due to the presence of huge reserves of minerals, the emergence (after the abolition of serfdom) of free hired labor, and the ever-increasing expansion of the domestic market.
The peasant reform of 1861 led not only to changes in the socio-economic structure of society, but also caused the need to transform the political system.
The most important step on this path was the zemstvo reform (1864). The regulations on counties and provinces of 1864 introduced elected bodies into them local government- zemstvos, whose competence included issues of economic development and communications local significance, mutual insurance, combating livestock mortality, public education, public charity, etc. The decisions of the zemstvos were advisory in nature and were under the control of the governor and the minister of internal affairs. Participation in zemstvo councils
leniya (zemstvo assembly or zemstvo council) was determined by property qualifications.
The zemstvo reform spread only to 34 provinces; the activities of zemstvo institutions were controlled by governors and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In 1870, a city (urban) reform was carried out. All residents who owned any real estate or paid taxes had the right to participate in city elections. The following governing bodies were established: city council, elected for 4 years; city government (executive agency), elected by the Duma; city mayor. The Duma's responsibility included concerns about urban management and urban improvement.
The city reform deprived all those who did not own real estate of voting rights (in St. Petersburg, the number of voters was less than 2% of citizens). A significant part of the budget went to the maintenance of the police, improvement central regions cities where the aristocracy and bourgeoisie lived.
One of the most important and most bourgeois was judicial reform(1864), without which it was impossible to ensure the inviolability of person and property. The judicial statutes adopted on November 20, 1864 reflect a number of bourgeois principles of the judicial system and legal proceedings: separation of the court from the administration, irremovability of judges and investigators; creation of a jury of 12 people; establishment of the legal profession and notary office; proclamation of transparency and competitiveness of the process; free assessment of evidence; election of justices of the peace.
Criminal cases were tried with the participation of jurors, who rendered a verdict on the guilt or innocence of the defendants. Cases of lesser importance (civil cases) were decided by justices of the peace, who were elected by district zemstvo assemblies and city dumas from among local residents who had an established qualification (level) of education and property. District courts became the highest authority for resolving criminal and civil cases.
For jurors, a fairly high property qualification was envisaged, mandatory residence in the given area was taken into account professional activity, their good intentions were tested. Jurors could not include clergy, military personnel, public school teachers, and people in the service of private individuals (servants). As a result, about 5% of the population was included in the jury lists; the bulk of peasants and almost all workers were deprived of the right to serve as jurors.
The chairmen, members of the judicial chambers and district courts were approved by the emperor, and justices of the peace - by the Senate. Once approved, they were irremovable and independent of administrative power. In organizing destinies
The principle of competition and transparency dominated the process. It is no coincidence that the art of oratory flourished during these years. Lawyers N.P. Karabchevsky and F.N. Plevako became especially famous.
New judicial statutes were distributed only in half of the provinces and were introduced gradually over 30 years. At the same time, the judicial reform retained a number of elements of the former estate court: participation in the process of estate representatives, special jurisdiction over cases of senior officials; estate courts for the clergy, military, peasants and “foreigners” (i.e., non-Russians). At the end of the 1870s. political cases were removed from jury trials.
In the second half of the 19th century. military reform was carried out (1861,1874). Back in 1861, the service life was reduced by half, corporal punishment was abolished, military districts and educational institutions for training military personnel were created. In 1874 conscription was replaced by the principle of universal military conscription from the age of 20 (later from the age of 21). The period of active service was determined to be six years in ground forces and seven years in the Navy. Those who completed military service were in the reserves for a number of years. In the future, the actual service life depended on the educational level. Military reform meant abandoning the class principle of army formation, creating a trained reserve and training officers.
Reforms were also carried out in education, the press, finance, etc. All of them weakened the class division, contributed to the formation of elements of civil society, and the transition from agricultural to industrial development.
At the same time, the concept of reform was sharply criticized from both the right and the left from the very beginning; it was half-hearted and inconsistent. Many dignitaries expressed concern that the reforms could become the beginning of mass protests. For example, peasant reform did not solve the land issue, the peasants received less land than they cultivated before 1861. A heavy burden they were subject to additional taxes and redemption payments. Preservation of the community made management and tax collection convenient, but restrained the economic interest of peasants in the development of the economy. Other reforms were also incomplete.
As the country developed, the demand for industrial goods and agricultural raw materials increased. This contributed to the growth of industry, the construction of large factories and factories, railways, waterways communications, development of agricultural production (for the foreign market), strengthening the role of banks and credit. In the 1860-1890s. in Russia such large industrial centers, like the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Polish, Donetsk metallurgical and coal, oil industrial region in Transcaucasia. On a new capitalist basis
The old Ural industrial region also developed. Along with the absolutely predominant number of small handicraft and semi-handicraft industries, large capitalist enterprises appeared - factories and factories.
Outside general process reforms remained the highest authorities state power. Alexander II firmly believed in the autocratic monarchy as better shape board and resolutely suppressed attempts to create a Cabinet of Ministers and establish the post of Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers (Prime Minister). By the beginning of the 1880s. has developed in the country political crisis, caused by public dissatisfaction with the results of the reforms, mass protests gained momentum. For fear of derogation royal power, Alexander, in this situation, only at the beginning of 1881 agreed with the proposals of the Minister of Internal Affairs M. T. Loris-Melikov and the Minister of Finance A. A. Abaza on preparing a reform of the highest echelons of power. Despite all the modesty of the planned changes in this direction, the preconditions for the emergence of Russian parliamentarism were laid.
In March 1985, M.S. became the head of the party and the country. Gorbachev. By this time, it became clear that both the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR had reached a dead end. It was necessary to urgently change the guidelines. This process went down in history under the name “perestroika”.
The idea of reforms of the first stage was outlined by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev at the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and developed at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU at the beginning 1986 The ideological core of the first stage of reforms was the “presumption of innocence” of socialism in the economic stagnation of society. Therefore M.S. Gorbachev decided to reform not the system, but technology. In this regard, a course of “acceleration” was set.
Main goal“acceleration”, according to Gorbachev, was to bring the Soviet economy to the world level, i.e. catch up with the advanced countries of the West. A feature of the first stage of modernization was that to achieve economic level The West was assumed without any borrowing of economic and political mechanisms Western civilization, but only with the help of traditional command-administrative methods and reforms that were already used by N.S. Khrushchev and Yu.V. Andropov. The emphasis was on strengthening production and performance discipline, improving work with personnel, as well as strict control over the quality of manufactured products. Among the command-administrative measures of the “acceleration” policy, the most famous were the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism,” adopted immediately after the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and the Law on State Acceptance, on the basis of which the services of state inspectors were created for supervision of the quality of industrial products.
Almost all the reforms of the first stage brought results opposite to those expected, and only aggravated economic problems Soviet society. The anti-alcohol law, instead of reducing drunkenness, caused crushing blow according to the state budget: revenues to the treasury from the sale of alcohol over the course of three years decreased by 37 billion rubles. Capital investments in mechanical engineering and import purchases for it, without giving a real return, only led to an overstrain of the budget, creating a budget deficit. The school reform stalled immediately after its proclamation. At the turn of 1986 - 1987. Gorbachev had to admit the failure of the chosen reform strategy.
IN January 1987 The second stage of reforms began: an attempt to replace the command-administrative system with a model of democratic socialism. The “acceleration” course was abandoned, and the main slogans became “perestroika,” “glasnost,” and “democratization.” This required different approaches to economic reform. Two trends were visible here: the expansion of independence of state-owned enterprises and the expansion of the scope of activity of the private sector.
The main instrument for these reforms was the Law on State Enterprise (Association), approved in June 1987. The law was adopted to replace the old “administrative socialism” with a new “self-supporting” or “market” one. “New socialism” was supposed to be based on three “pillars” - self-financing, self-sufficiency, self-government of all enterprises. The role of central planning bodies was limited to preparing development targets and determining government orders, the share of which was supposed to be constantly reduced. Products produced in excess of government orders could be sold at a free price on the market. Theoretically, the market environment was supposed to act as a regulator of profitability, profits, and wages.
It was assumed that from January 1, 1988 the law would be extended to 50% of enterprises, and in next year- for all the others, but already in 1988 the law stalled, and the next year it was a fiasco. The reason for the failure was that there were no conditions for the implementation of the law. The country completely lacked infrastructure that would correspond to market relations. There were no intermediary organizations, commodity exchanges, or banks that would allow us to establish mechanisms for the purchase of raw materials and sales of products, loans and investments. In such conditions, most managers preferred not to take risks, but to receive the maximum government order, which served as a guarantee of centralized supply and sales of finished products.
The second direction of economic reform was to expand the scope of private initiative. Adopted on November 19, 1986 and amended in 1988, the law legalized individual labor and cooperative activities in more than 30 types of production of goods and services. Those who wanted to open their own business had to register, and their income was subject to taxation of up to 65% (in 1988 the tax was slightly reduced). In the spring of 1991, more than 7 million citizens (5% active population) were employed in the cooperative sector. In addition, 1 million people received patents or registration permits for self-employment labor activity. It should, however, be noted that there are significant shortcomings of the young sector of the economy, namely: high prices for products, which are by no means oriented towards the average purchasing power of the population; development of side activities. Public opinion also opposed the cooperators.
Of course, these attitudes also affected the development of private initiative in agricultural production. Since 1988, the introduction of lease agreements began, according to which one or several families leased land for a long period (up to 50 years) and had full control over the products. In the new regulations on collective farms ( March 1988.) it was stipulated that the area of an individual plot and the number of livestock on a personal farm would be established by the collective of each collective farm, depending on the participation of its members in social work. But these measures yielded only minor results. Thus, by 1991, rental farms had only 2% of cultivated land and 3% of livestock. In addition, leases could be terminated by local authorities with 2 months' notice.
Thus, none of the reforms launched in the economy practically gave positive results. First of all, their duality and inconsistency affected: on the one hand, being the product of a political compromise, they were not effective enough - the most socially painful measures (reforms of prices, credit, supply of enterprises) were postponed; on the other hand, they were too radical, causing resistance from both the population and those in power, who sought to preserve their privileges and old connections. Therefore, throughout all the years of M.S.’s reign. Gorbachev, the economic situation continued to deteriorate. Since 1988 - 1989 Agricultural production began to decline noticeably, which immediately affected the deterioration of food supplies. Industrial production growth rates continued to decline, reaching in 1989. zero level, and in the first half of 1991 its ten percent reduction was recorded. By the summer of 1991, inflationary processes intensified due to the large budget deficit, which already exceeded in 1988-1989. 100 billion rubles. (11% of gross national product). Officially estimated at about 10% in 1990, inflation soared during 1991, reaching 25% per week by the end of 1991. At the same time, the ruble exchange rate fell from 10 rubles. for 1 dollar at the beginning of 1991 to 110 - 120 rubles. at the end of the year.
These circumstances led to the fact that the exchange, barter1 economy firmly reigned in the public sector, and in the private sector entrepreneurs sought immediate speculative gain, abandoning the prospect of developing the production of goods and services. We must not forget that the USSR economy was 70% dependent on the military-industrial complex. All these circumstances predetermined failure economic reforms M.S. Gorbachev.
The first perestroika measures in the economy showed that it is impossible to achieve dramatic changes, still relying on the power of call or order. The needs of society for political changes became obvious. First of all, this was reflected in the significant renewal and rejuvenation of the Politburo. After more than twenty years of stability in the personnel of the “Kremlin elders,” conservative-minded individuals were gradually removed from their positions. In the Central Committee, personnel renewal during the 5 years of perestroika reached a scale unprecedented in the history of party building - 85%. However, the Brezhnev “guard” was replaced by a new group of party leaders led by E.K. Ligachev. They believed that renewal was possible without breaking the command-administrative system, while maintaining ideological purity.
The speech of B.N. sounded with sharp dissonance at the October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1987. Yeltsin. It was a sharp criticism of the indecisiveness and inconsistency of reforms. Personal criticism of E.K. Ligachev, the mystery surrounding the speech, the subsequent condemnation of the speech by party leaders and the resignation of B.N. Yeltsin - created in the mass consciousness of people the image of the latter as a martyr and fighter for justice. Thus, the basis was laid for the return of B.N. Yeltsin in big politics, but in a new quality.
The work of the commission on additional study of materials related to Stalin's repressions, the rapid growth of the “samizdat” press, attempts to gain own position, independence of judgment, overcoming censorship by many official press organs - helped people get rid of stereotypes in the perception of history and modernity, from a dogmatic vision of the world.
An immediate impetus for political and organizational reforms were the decisions of the January (1987) plenum of the Central Committee. For the first time, alternative elections began to be held, secret voting for the election of responsible party workers, elections of candidates at the enterprise itself, and new forms and mechanisms for workers’ participation in enterprise management were introduced. But practical results These innovations remained modest until the spring of 1989. Thus, during local elections in the summer of 1987, alternative candidates were represented in only 0.4% of electoral districts, and even then they passed through the sieve of party structures.
However, the period 1988 - 1990 was characterized by a rise political activity people, the rapid growth of non-traditional, informal groups, organizations and movements began. In 1989, there were already up to 30 thousand amateur public associations various directions(environmental, national, political, etc.). Since 1989, Soviet society began to become multi-party. This was especially clearly demonstrated at the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU ( June - July 1988). For the first time in the years of Soviet power, the question was raised about the need for a deep reform of the political system aimed at achieving the full power of the Soviets and the formation of mechanisms of civil society and the rule of law.
This reform led to the establishment of a two-tier representative system - the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (elected from the congress deputies), as well as the establishment of the post of President of the USSR, endowed with broad powers. The former Supreme Council - a pseudo-parliament, a machine for approving party and government decisions - was replaced by a new one Supreme Council, numbering 544 deputies elected by secret ballot at the Congress of People's Deputies (2,250 people), of which 1,500 were elected in the country's districts and 750 by the party, trade unions and public organizations. The functions of the congress included carrying out constitutional, political, social and economic reforms, as well as electing the president of the country, who led foreign policy and defense, appointed the prime minister, etc.
The authors of the reform thereby wanted to achieve a decisive victory for their supporters and avoid surprises in the elections in the districts. Having established a strong presidential power in the face Secretary General The Central Committee of the CPSU, the legitimacy of which indirectly depended on the expression of the people's will, they tried to protect it from the party apparatus (to prevent the “Khrushchev” option of leaving). On March 15, 1990, the Union Congress of People's Deputies elected M.S. President of the USSR. Gorbachev. From that moment on, power rapidly began to leave the hands of the Communist Party.
This constitutional reform aroused criticism from both conservatives and radicals, led by B.N. Yeltsin. For his supporters, the reform was flawed, since the electoral system was neither direct nor equal and, moreover, concentrated too much power in the hands of the president - the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In addition, the electoral law left wide opportunities for manipulation during the elections, which was confirmed by election campaign in March 1989. The media actively reacted to this, which, of course, contributed to the politicization of Soviet society. Unlike Gorbachev B.N. Yeltsin managed to take advantage of this situation, decisively taking the democratic path. Elected in the general elections as President of Russia, in terms of legitimacy, he surpassed the President of the USSR, who received his post from parliamentarians. However, objectively, the elections of people's deputies in March 1989, and then in the spring of 1990, meant a complete break with political practice, established after 1917
All this happened against the political background of democratization public life, the flourishing of various informal associations. The CPSU, on the contrary, sought to maintain a one-party system and a monopoly on solutions to conceptual issues of public life. Since 1990, the transition to a multi-party system has become an issue that requires immediate resolution. This was facilitated by Yeltsin’s victory in the elections and his subsequent resignation from the party at the 28th Congress of the CPSU.
Reforms carried out by N.S. Khrushchev in economics, did not affect its basic principles and were carried out mainly in the management and administrative sphere. Thus, in 1957 it was carried out industrial management reform. Instead of the sectoral principle (through the relevant ministries), a territorial one was introduced. Union industrial ministries were abolished and replaced by councils national economy(economic councils) and which at the local regional level had to manage enterprises and establish direct connections with each other. This had a short-term effect, expanding the possibilities of cooperation and specialization of enterprises. But very soon, in the conditions of a strictly centralized planned economy, parochial and isolated tendencies prevailed, violations in the unified technical policy, etc. began to appear. They tried to overcome this in 1962 by consolidating the economic councils. Republican economic councils and the Council of the National Economy of the USSR were created, as well as state committees by industry, but the desired effect did not work. Parochial and duplicative tendencies continued to persist.
Khrushchev's leadership of industry led to the late 1950s and early 1960s. to the emergence of the following unfavorable economic trends:
– a significant increase in capital investments and rapid growth of loans exceeding the capabilities of the state budget, uncontrolled growth of industry of group “A” (production of capital goods);
– massive influx low-skilled labor force from rural areas and increased staff turnover;
– a significant decrease in economic growth rates.
The situation was aggravated by the division of party bodies into industrial and rural, which ultimately led to various kinds of inconsistencies and caused discontent among party and government officials.
In the area agricultural policy As a rule, two stages of the agrarian transformation activity of the Khrushchev decade are distinguished.
First stage dates back to 1953–1958. and is characterized as the most active and effective, since during this period there was an increase in agricultural production due to the provision of greater independence to the peasantry and collective farms in planning and strengthening production, the introduction of the principle of material interest in labor, and the development of virgin lands.
By the end of 1958, the volume of total gross output increased by almost 1.5 times, commodity production by 1.8 times, and livestock production by almost two times.
Second stage dates back to the late 1950s–1964. and is characterized by increased administrative and bureaucratic pressure on the agricultural sector.
The first administrative reform in the region agriculture consisted of the liquidation of MTS (machine and tractor stations) and the forced transfer of equipment into the ownership of collective farms with retention of their value, which completely absorbed the financial resources of agricultural producers accumulated as a result of increasing purchase prices. Negative consequences This reform resulted in the loss of the majority of machine operators as a result of their departure to cities and workers' settlements, as well as a reduction in the fleet of agricultural machinery.
The second reform was aimed at consolidating collective farms (83 thousand in 1955, 68 thousand in 1957, 45 thousand in 1960) with the aim of forming strong large farms, which, in essence, revived the rejected I.V. Stalin's idea of creating agro-cities reflected the desire to accelerate the social transformation of the countryside.
N.S. Khrushchev, as a reformer of the Bolshevik school, firmly believed in the omnipotence of organizational measures, sometimes not supported by either serious scientific calculations or the necessary material and financial capabilities, therefore most of the reforms were carried out in the form of various campaigns. For example, the most famous is the “corn campaign,” which ended disastrously and led to general decline grain collection in the country.
The campaigns should also include a number of party decisions aimed at limiting and eliminating personal subsidiary plots of citizens, the implementation of which had severe consequences for the country. The food supply of people deteriorated sharply, and citizens' discontent began to grow.
In this situation, the government for the first time began to carry out mass purchases of grain abroad, although the average annual grain harvest in the country did not decrease and was even higher than in the previous period. It averaged 129.3 million tons in 1959–1964, against 80.9 million tons in 1949–1953.
The main role, according to agricultural historians, was played by the demographic factor and the consumption crisis. We are talking about an increase in migration from rural to urban areas (i.e., a reduction in the number of those producing agricultural products and an increase in the number of those consuming them in the city), which is associated both with subjective miscalculations in the agrarian policy of N.S. Khrushchev, and with the objective processes of urbanization and the influence of the scientific and technological revolution on society.
In June 1962, prices increased by 30% for meat and 25% for butter. A wave of strikes swept across the country. The most impressive protest was in Novocherkassk, where there were bloody events. By order of the highest party and state authorities, numerous workers' demonstrations were shot. Party propaganda constantly convinced that reforms themselves should lead to positive changes in society.
The XXII Congress of the CPSU (October 1961) approved new program parties. An illusory conclusion was made about the complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR and the country’s entry into the period of building communism. It has been argued that the current generation Soviet people will live under communism. Soviet historical experience showed the utopian nature of the noble aspirations of party leaders.
Khrushchev's impulsive reforms, despite all their costs, had a pronounced social focus on improving the living conditions of the population. Wages in industry increased regularly. In 1956, the anti-labor law of 1940, which attached workers to enterprises, was repealed. From now on, it became possible to change jobs by notifying the administration two weeks in advance. The duration was also reduced working week from 48 to 46 hours, mandatory government loans. The size of pensions was doubled, and the retirement age was reduced to 60 years for men and 55 years for women. However, we found ourselves deprived villagers, who received the right to a pension only in 1964, and their pension barrier was five years higher than that of other categories of workers.
The most significant social measure in the Khrushchev decade was big program housing construction. From 1955 to 1964, the urban housing stock increased by 80%, i.e. 54 million people received housing (every fourth resident of the country).
At the same time social policy in these years was characterized by a certain duality and inconsistency. On the one hand, practical measures of an unprecedented scale were taken to raise the living standards of the population, and on the other hand, the measures taken were of an equalizing and distribution nature, which led to huge growth public consumption funds, which objectively were a heavy burden for the planned economy.
The reign of Alexander 1 can be divided into three stages:
1801-1812 Reform period( Decree on free cultivators 1803: landowners were allowed to free the peasants; policy liberal reforms, formation secret committee: reforms of the public administration system: 1. Formation of ministries; 2. Senate of the highest judicial and supervisory body; 3. State Council (1810) legislative body under the emperor); education: opening of a university, network is being deployed cadet corps, opening Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum for the training of high-ranking officials (1811).)
1812-1815 Patriotic War And foreign trips
Invasion of 06/12/1812, the ratio of forces was 640 thousand (French) - 230 thousand (Rus), in August M.I. was appointed commander-in-chief. Kutuzov, Borodino 09/26/1812, Leaving Moscow Tarutino world. Guerrilla warfare (Davydov, Figner); December 1812 expulsion of Napoleon.
It is important to note that Barclay de Tolly (a monument on a par with Kutuzov) played an important role in this war (in particular in the Battle of Borodino).
1815 Vienna Agreement. Peace in Europe.
1815-1825 Cancellation of reforms. After the war '12: Removal of M.M. Speransky, New confidant- A.A. Arakcheev, creation of military settlements (!); censorship is intensifying, the Chuguev Uprising (an anti-government uprising in June - August of military settlers of the Chuguev Ulan Regiment, caused by the brutal regime and hard labor conditions in military settlements. Covered the territory of over 28 thousand people. The rebels demanded the abolition of the settlements and return the lands taken from them to the peasants. It was brutally suppressed by the tsarist troops (2 thousand participants were arrested, over 300 people were put on trial, and many were subjected to corporal punishment). Performance of the Semenovsky regiment against the Arakcheev authorities (1820) Ended with the reorganization of the regiment, the formation of the noble opposition (secret societies). The initial period of the reign of Alexander I until 1812 is called by historians the “era of liberalism”. Having come to power, Alexander I returned to the nobility the privileges eliminated by his father Paul I, and adopted a number of decrees that made him popular among the nobility. It should be noted that Alexander I had to resolve issues that were extremely painful for Russia: peasant question and the issue of reforming the apparatus public administration. With all the complexity and contradictions of the personality of Alexander I and the policies he pursued, it is difficult to doubt the emperor’s desire to implement liberal reforms in Russia, the basis of which was to be the granted constitution and the abolition of serfdom. However, the plans were not destined to come true. Various versions have been put forward to explain this. It is necessary to indicate the most important: - the overwhelming majority of the nobility did not want liberal reforms. Reform projects that did not meet with support from the ruling class turned out to be unviable; - in carrying out reforms, Alexander I could only rely on a very narrow circle of senior dignitaries and individual representatives nobility. Alexander I could not ignore the opinion of the majority of the nobles, fearing palace coup; - the inexperience of the reformers, the lack of thoughtfulness of the reforms, the lack of a social basis for the reforms, ultimately could lead the country to chaos, collapse and
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However, Dmitry Medvedev intends to follow his example
In Maoist China it was not customary to directly criticize one or another politician. If the newspapers cursed “Empress Ci Xi” (Manchu ruler late XIX- the beginning of the twentieth century, “famous” for the endless losses of wars with Europeans and incredible corruption) - everyone knew that we were talking about the wife of “Chairman Mao” Jiang Qing. If, on the contrary, the official press suddenly, out of the blue, began to scold Confucius, it means that the largest shadow politician Deng Xiaoping was in trouble.
This old story came to mind when I read about the ceremonial events dedicated to the abolition of serfdom in Russia. The official praise of the Tsar-Liberator Alexander II, as well as his reforms, his contrast with his predecessor (Nicholas I) reminded me of China. Indeed, current President Dmitry Medvedev clearly compares himself to the reformer Tsar. Vladimir Putin, obviously, gets the role of “Nikolai Palkin,” as the “progressive public” insultingly nicknamed one of the greatest tsars in our history.
Speaking at the conference “Great Reforms and Modernization of Russia,” Dmitry Medvedev emphasized: “Today we are trying to develop our still imperfect democratic institutions, we are trying to change our economy, we are changing political system. In essence, we are all continuing the course that was laid out a century and a half ago. Moreover, I would like to draw attention to the fact that it was not the fantasies about a special path for our country and not the Soviet experiment that turned out to be viable, but the project of a normal, humane system, which was conceived by Alexander II. And ultimately, on a historical scale, it was he who was right, and not Nicholas I or Stalin.”
The president's unexpected appeal to the name of Alexander II is a beautiful gesture. Very often politicians try to find forerunners and like-minded people in the past in order to demonstrate that they own program rooted in the history of the country. For Dmitry Medvedev this is extremely important. After all, until now he had claimed that Russia had existed for only 20 years. And, therefore, he himself could only refer to the experience of Boris Yeltsin, hated by the people, contrasting him with his immediate predecessor, Vladimir Putin.
References to the authority of Alexander II allow Dmitry Medvedev not to look like a blinkered liberal fanatic, as his surroundings stubbornly position him. It turns out that in the history of Russia Medvedev has predecessors even better than Yeltsin.
But is Alexander II really a good example of a successful reformer?
Let's start, perhaps, not with him, but with his father, Nicholas I. This emperor in the Soviet historical tradition It is customary to insult and consider it a retrograde. Meanwhile, Nicholas I is our “Sun King”, during whose reign the Russian Empire reached the peak of its power. At the same time, an unprecedented cultural flourishing occurred. The era of Nicholas I is associated with the names of Zhukovsky, Karamzin, Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol. At the same time, Russia is strengthening its position as a pan-European leader. Perhaps, during this period, Russia was the second most influential European, and, therefore, world power after Britain.
Like Louis XIV, at the end of his reign Nicholas I was forced to wage war on all of Europe. In 1854-1855 Russia was opposed by the most advanced European powers - Great Britain and France, which, with Piedmont and the Ottoman Empire joining them, defeated Russia in the Crimean War. This brought about the reforms of Alexander II. The golden age of power of the Russian Empire is over.
The transformations of Tsar-Liberator Alexander II are usually assessed with approval public opinion. He freed the peasants, carried out judicial, military and many other reforms. Established zemstvos. He greatly weakened the censorship that prevailed under Nicholas I. However, if we consider these reforms impartially, it turns out that he failed in many ways. The main thing is that he could not solve the peasant question. Russia after its transformations remained an agricultural country. Peasants freed from serfdom were either forced to pay ransom for decades or were for many years attached to the ground as “temporarily liable”. As a result, redemption payments were finally abolished by the tsarist government only in 1907, and even then following the results of the First Russian Revolution.
Note that Japan, which began its reforms almost simultaneously with Russia, by the beginning of the twentieth century had turned into a strong industrial power, which managed to single-handedly defeat Russia in the war on Far East. Let us remember that 50 years earlier this required the combined might of the great Western powers.
In short, Alexander II's reforms turned out to be inconsistent and unsuccessful. He failed to solve the basic problem of Russia - to build a modern society, industrial capitalism. Russia paid for this in the 20th century with a bloody revolution and terror. Industry and modern society were created by Stalin.
But it was precisely against Stalin that Dmitry Medvedev spoke out in his speech. It turns out to be a paradox: it was the reforms of Alexander II that gave rise to Joseph Vissarionovich’s rise to power, but the reformer tsar is contrasted with Stalin, while he was one of his forerunners.
The experience of all industrial countries shows that it is impossible to create a modern economy simply by mindlessly copying the experience of advanced countries. Any state following the path of industrialization must rely on its experience, its tradition, and find in its own culture and religion grounds for reforms. If these foundations are rejected, then this always leads to a crisis and collapse of any most beautiful-minded transformations.
It’s too far to go – Boris Yeltsin’s reforms ended unsuccessfully, and yet he, following Alexander Yakovlev, sought to “break the back of Russia.” The backbone may have been broken, but no healthy society emerged. Which is not surprising: if a person’s back is broken, he will become paralytic.
Great Britain, the first country in which the industrial revolution took place, carefully preserves its traditions. The same can be said about Japan. Modern China carried out unprecedented market reforms, relying on the structures of the Communist Party created in the previous era and, it would seem, completely unnecessary for capitalism.
Only Russia still wants not to rely on tradition, but to discard it. Dmitry Medvedev himself emphasizes that “it was not the fantasies about a special path” for Russia that turned out to be viable, but the “project” of Alexander II.
Mr. President! Alexander II’s “project” failed both from a historical point of view, for the grandson of the Tsar-Liberator ended his days in the Ipatiev House, and from a personal point of view: the emperor was killed by Narodnaya Volya terrorists.
If the history of Alexander II teaches anything, it is only that any consistent reform must be based on tradition, on custom, on a special path. If there is no support, it is doomed to inconsistency, to rejection from society and, ultimately, to collapse.
If Dmitry Medvedev seriously takes Alexander II as a role model, he must remember that historically the Tsar lost and not repeat his mistakes. Reform without reliance on national tradition ineffective and harmful. The next round of “liberal” reforms in the style of Boris Yeltsin will inevitably end in defeat, because it will be rejected by society. However, modern liberal reformers are still unwilling to learn this lesson from history.
