The power of Russia was built on the talent of its people, Orthodox Faith and the combat effectiveness of the army. Almost every Russian tsar, starting with Ivan III, contributed to the future great victories of Russian weapons

Cannon Yard

Young Russian state under Ivan III, it found itself in tight isolation from the countries of Western Europe, which was carried out by Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Teutonic and Livonian Order who did not want to strengthen Muscovy. To break through this “iron curtain”, not only a modern army was needed, but also a personality at the head of the state, capable of carrying out his plans. Matching the Grand Duke was a government that acted “according to the laws of an enlightened mind.” Attempts were made to improve the army, which numbered 200 thousand people in its ranks, “the arts that were most necessary for military and civilian success were called upon.” So, in 1475, the Italian architect and military engineer Aristotle Fiorovanti appeared in Moscow, whom Ivan III appointed head of the Russian artillery. During the siege of Novgorod in 1479, Moscow gunners showed their skills. In 1480, the “Cannon Yard” was built in Moscow - the first state enterprise, which marked the beginning of the development of the Russian defense industry.

Pishchalniki

Under Vasily III, detachments of “squeakers” were created in the Moscow army, and artillery and infantry began to be gradually introduced into battles. However main force The army, as in former times, still consisted of cavalry. The guns were not considered very necessary in the field: cast by Italian craftsmen for the defense and siege of cities, they stood motionless in the Kremlin on carriages.

Sagittarius and hollow cores

Ivan the Terrible attempted to break through to the Baltic Sea and unleashed Livonian War. This required the king to constantly build up and improve his armed forces. In return for the oprichnina army, which had lost its combat value, in 1550, a streltsy army was created, which began to receive cash salaries, firearms (hand-held arquebuses) and uniforms. Ivan IV placed particular emphasis on the development of artillery: by the end of the 16th century, Russia had the most powerful artillery in Europe. In the middle of the 16th century. guns with a caliber of 24–26 inches and a weight of 1000–1200 pounds, as well as multi-barreled guns, were already being cast. Regimental artillery appeared. During the siege of Pskov in 1581 by the troops of Stefan Batory, Russian gunners used hollow cannonballs filled with saltpeter-sulfide powder, being 60 years ahead of the countries of Western Europe in this. For their production, a special facility was built in Moscow. technical institution"Grenade Yard"

New military regulations

Vasily Shuisky tried to strengthen the army after the humiliating defeats inflicted on the tsarist army by supporters of False Dmitry. Under him, a new military charter “Charter of military, cannon and other matters related to military science” appeared in Russia. Here detailed information was given about the organization and armament of infantry, cavalry and artillery, as well as data on the actions of troops on the march and in field warfare. Of the 663 articles of the charter, 500 are devoted to issues of Pushkar business (casting and installation of guns, production of ammunition, their combat use, etc.). Much attention in the regulations is paid to the siege and defense of fortresses, the disposition of troops in a fortified camp and in order of battle, rules of command and control of troops on the march and in battle. The appearance of the charter contributed to the emergence of Russian artillery science. The Charter was a new stage in the development of Russian military theoretical thought. In terms of the depth of development and coverage of issues, it stood above many Western European statutes of its time.

Military-industrial complex

The first “Romanov” tsar, Mikhail Fedorovich, began with the restructuring of the “Rurik” military organization of the state. Its main disadvantages were the slow mobilization of local militia, the lack of a centralized supply of ammunition and food, insufficient maneuverability due to the abundance of convoys, a low level of discipline, etc. The identified shortcomings prompted the king to form regiments of a foreign system. The rank and file of these soldier, dragoon and reiter regiments were formed from forcibly recruited datnikov from the tax population, as well as volunteers - “willing” people from the free population. This matter was dealt with by the Orders for the collection of datochny people and the collection military people. The advantage of the Reitar regiments on the battlefield led to a consistent reduction in the Streltsy army. In the 30s In the 17th century, the government of Mikhail Fedorovich made the first attempt to expand metallurgical production by using foreign experience and attracting foreign capital. By 1637, the Dutch industrialist A.D. Vinius built three water-powered plants in the Tula region, which constituted a single industrial complex. In addition to military products (cannons, cannonballs, muskets), they also produced agricultural implements.

Conscription and rearmament

Alexey Mikhailovich continued the dismantling of the “Rurik” military system. One of important decisions, aimed at increasing the combat capability of the state, was the organization of forced recruitment into the army. In addition, Alexei I re-equipped the army from heavy and inconvenient arquebuses to lighter and more convenient muskets and carbines. WITH mid-17th century century, military districts began to be created on the most dangerous sections of the border, in which all guard, village and patrol services were concentrated. The increased production of weapons was carried out by enterprises and craftsmen subordinate to the Pushkarsky order, the Armory Chamber and the Barrel Order.

Regular army

The eldest son of Alexei Mikhailovich and the elder brother of Peter I, Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich, did a lot to strengthen the Russian army. Fate gave Tsar Fedor only 6 years to live. transformative activities, but he managed to lead exhausted Russia out of bloody war With Ottoman Empire and begin a radical reform of the army, making 4/5 of its composition regular. Soldiers and archers continued to be armed with uniform muskets and melee weapons (sabers, swords, reeds and pikes). Both already had regimental artillery and grenadiers trained in throwing heavy hand grenades. Horse artillery of dragoons and a very maneuverable Pushkar regiment appeared - the prototype of the future reserve of the main command. By the end of his reign, a wide variety of cannons were being cast at the Vinius factories. The purpose, weight and caliber of the guns were also very diverse. Guns were cast: for aimed shooting - squeaks, for mounted fire - mortars, for action with buckshot - shotguns, for firing in one gulp - "organs" - multi-barreled guns of small caliber. Corresponding technical manuals, such as: “Paintings of food samples of the old and new plant” and “Exemplary paintings of artillery guns with all sorts of supplies that are needed for that building, and why those guns became so expensive.” In the Moscow region, 121 blacksmiths produced 242 hand-held arquebuses per year. According to the list of 1679/80, the army accounted for 62.2% of the expenditure portion of the state budget.

The article uses materials from V.A. Ermolov “Rulers of Russia and their role in the formation of the armed forces”

Let's start with the myth that Peter the Great allegedly created a regular army in Russia. But this is completely untrue. The creation of a regular army in Russia began in Time of Troubles and completed in 1679–1681. In 1621, just 8 years after Mikhail Fedorovich’s accession to the throne, Anisim Mikhailov’s son Radishevsky, clerk of the Pushkarsky order, wrote the “Charter of military, cannon and other affairs related to military science" - the first military regulations in Russia. The charter of Anisim Radishevsky began to be written back in 1607; it generalized the experience of the Time of Troubles and contained translations of many foreign books. On the basis of almost 663 articles of the new Charter, the regular army of the Romanov era began to form. Half a century before the birth of Peter.

According to the Charter, the army retained the Streltsy troops and noble militia, but in parallel with them, “regiments of a foreign system” were introduced: soldiers, (infantry); dragoons (horseback); Reitarsky (mixed). According to this Charter, the ranks are “voivodship” and “general”. A well-ordered hierarchy of lieutenants, captains, colonels, topped by generals, helps control troops and psychologically facilitates rapprochement with Europe. The charter determined who they were, colonels and lieutenants, and what place they occupied in the hierarchy, and used foreign words only when it was difficult to do without them.

In 1630, the army consisted of the following groups of troops:
Noble cavalry - 27,433
Sagittarius - 28,130
Cossacks - 11,192
Pushkari - 4136
Tatars -10 208
Volga peoples - 8493
Foreigners - 2783
Total 92,500 people

The composition of the army is traditional irregular troops, except for mercenary foreigners. The government, preparing for the war for Smolensk, intends to change this tradition, and in April 1630, an order was sent to all districts to recruit homeless nobles and boyar children into the military service, and then everyone who wanted it. This gave an excellent result, and soon 6 regiments of soldiers were created - 1,600 privates and 176 commanders. The regiment was divided into 8 companies. Average command staff:
1. Colonel
2. Lieutenant Colonel (large regimental lieutenant)
3. Maeor (watchman or okolnichy)
4. 5 captains
Each company had:
1. Lieutenant
2. Ensign
3. 3 sergeants (Pentecostal)
4. Quartermaster (officer)
5. Kaptenarmus (watchman under arms)
6. 6 corporals (esauls)
7. Doctor
8. Clerk
9. 2 interpreters
10. 3 drummers
11. 120 musketeers and 80 spearmen

In December 1632, there was already a Reitar regiment of 2000 people, in which there were 12 companies of 176 people each under the command of captains, and there was a dragoon company of 400 people. By 1682, when Peter was 4 years old, the formation of foreign regiments as the basis of the Russian army was completed.

And Peter allegedly destroyed the completely medieval noble militia and the useless archers.
But the noble militia has not been medieval for a long time, since 1676. Peter, indeed, began to disband the Streltsy troops after the Azov campaigns. But after Narva, having become convinced of the qualities of the Streltsy army, he interrupted the disbandment. The Streltsy took part in both the Northern War and the Prut Campaign of 1711. Until the 1720s, there was, in the words of an authoritative reference book, “a gradual absorption of the Streltsy by regular troops.”
But this is part of the regular central army. And before late XVI The service people of the old services survive to the 2nd century, and among them are the city archers. As they carried out police service, they carried out the entire 18th century.

Some are also convinced that Peter invented the baguette bayonet and shooting with plutongs. (Every innovation in Russia that occurred during the Petrine era is immediately attributed to Peter)
Shooting with plutongs was invented in 1707 by Marquis Sebastian le Pierre Vau Ban, Marshal of France, famous Marshal of Louis XIV.
Previously, one line would come forward, shoot, and leave. The 2nd rank advanced, etc... Now one rank lay on the ground, the 2nd knelt, and the 3rd fired while standing. The intensity of the fire attack increased sharply, and such shooting began to be adopted by all armies. Russian too.

It would be more correct to call a baguette a bayonet. It was invented in the city of Bayonne, in the French Pyrenees. Local residents, professional smugglers, needed protection from French and Spanish border guards. Well, they came up with a bayonet that, after firing, can be inserted into the barrel of a gun. Considering that several minutes passed between shots, the advantage was given to the one who could instantly turn his gun into a spear.

Peter actually used the bayonet under the Russian pseudonym baginet, and the only army reform that he actually carried out is connected with this. It is surprising why supporters of Peter and the reforms he carried out do not use this example. After all, after the terrible defeat of the Russian army from the Swedes in Grodno in 1706, Peter, indeed, reformed the army.
Then, in January 1706, Charles XII, having lost 3,000 soldiers frostbitten and sick, with a sudden rush he surrounded and blocked the Russian army in Grodno. It was possible to withdraw the army from complete defeat only in the spring, taking advantage of the ice drift and throwing more than a hundred cannons into the river. Because of the ice drift, Karl could not cross to the other side of the Dvina and pursue the fleeing Russians.

Until this time, the army created by Fyodor Alekseevich and his generals in 1679–1681 fought. The Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments were formed according to all the rules of this army: the same uniforms, the same metal helmets, the same 20 or 30% of the available personnel - spearmen, without firearms. Now Peter completely removed the spearmen, replacing them all with musketeers, introducing the bayonet-baginet. And he introduced soft cocked hats instead of helmets, green uniforms, which the guards were proud of even under Catherine: they say, our uniform was introduced by Peter the Great!

Some military historians believe that here, too, Peter did not act independently. In all European armies of that time, the helmet disappeared as an unnecessary detail, and the baguette was introduced everywhere. Peter was just playing pranks on Europe once again.

Not only did the Naryshkins’ reign turn out to be like a steamroller for the army: the nobles who supported the Naryshkins sought “relaxations” and, according to Prince Ya.F. Dolgorukov, “unthinking, they ruined everything established by the previous tsars.” Peter, if he wanted to fight, had to start a lot all over again. And accustom the local cavalry to the order introduced in 1681, and create new “regiments of foreign order.”

It was possible, of course, to call up those who had already served in such regiments, but Peter took a different path. In 1698–1699, he began to enroll freed slaves, peasants, and even serfs into the regiments without the consent of the owners. Such an army, according to the Austrian Korb, was “a rabble of the worst soldiers recruited from the poorest mob.” In the kinder words of the Brunswick envoy Weber, “the most sorrowful people.”

Peter's first army in the Northern War was composed in a similar way: 29 new regiments of freemen and datochny, 1000 people each, were attached to 4 old regiments, 2 guards and 2 personnel. Narva discovered their fighting quality.

True, the “second army of Peter” was not recruited from the most the best people. Selecting and training the “best” takes time, and in just 10 years of war, recruitment pumped out about 300,000 recruits from a population of 14 million. If in 1701 the regular army complex was 40,000 people, then in 1708 it was 113,000 people.

By the end of Peter’s reign, there were already from 196 to 212 thousand regular troops in the Russian Empire, and 110 thousand Cossacks and foreigners who fought “in their own formation” - Bashkirs, Tatars and peoples of the Volga region. This horde of armed men in 1712 was commanded by two field marshals, Menshikov and Sheremetev, and 31 generals, of which only 14 were foreigners.

Huge recruitment packages were needed not only to replenish the army, but also to cover the colossal losses that Peter’s army suffered even in peacetime- from hunger and cold. Weber believed that for every one killed in battle, two or three died from cold and hunger, sometimes even at assembly points. Because, having captured a recruit, they put shackles on him and made a tattoo in the shape of a cross on his right hand. (All that remained was to assign numbers to the recruits instead of names)

And the recruits were kept “... in great crowds, in prisons and prisons, for a considerable time, and thus exhausted on the spot, they were sent, without considering, according to the number of people and the distance of the journey, with one unfit officer or nobleman, with insufficient food; Moreover, having missed a convenient time, they will lead to a cruel thaw, which is why many illnesses occur on the road, and they die untimely, while others flee and join the thieves' companies - neither peasants nor soldiers, but they become ruiners of the state. Others would willingly go into service, but when they first see such disorder among their brethren, they fall into great fear.”
This quote is not from the writings of Old Believers or disgraced nobles, it is from the report of the Military Collegium to the Senate in 1719. The report was required after in 1718 there were 45 thousand “unrecruited recruits” in the army and 20 thousand on the run.

Topic No. 2. Army of the Russian Empire

Lecture No. 2. The emergence and strengthening of the regular Armed Forces

Russian Empire.

Study questions:

Military reform of Peter 1. Creation of a regular army, recruitment, composition, weapons.

Wars of the Russian Empire in the 18th century. The military art of Peter 1, P.S. Saltykova, P.A. Rumyantseva, A.V. Suvorova, F.F. Ushakova.

Introduction

The end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries were turning points in the history of the Russian state. This period is characterized by the completion of the formation of an absolutist (unlimited monarchy) state. Time demanded the strengthening of central government power. The formation of the noble empire was accompanied simultaneously with the reorganization of the entire state apparatus and the creation of a regular army and navy.

The implementation of Peter's reforms was significantly complicated by the unfavorable historical situation for Russia.

As a result of the fact that Russia was under the heavy Tatar yoke for a long time, it lagged behind the advanced countries of Western Europe economically and culturally.

Russia's loss of access to the Baltic and Black Seas also hampered the further development of the Russian economy and prevented economic and cultural communication with Western Europe.

In the conditions of rapid capitalist development of Western Europe, Russia's economic backwardness threatened in the future with the loss of its economic and national independence.

The main stage of Peter the Great's military reforms took a little over a decade and a half. In terms of scale, speed and effectiveness, they have no equal in world history. Not a single reformer had to bring the army to the advanced level in such conditions and in such a short period of time.

Historians have argued and argue a lot about the originality of the imitation of Peter's reforms. It should be noted that any military reformers in the world were guided by some models. Of course, one cannot deny the foreign (European) influence on Peter’s reforms. But Peter did not take anything on faith, did not borrow anything mechanically. The determining factors in his transformations were Russia's own military experience and national interests.

1. Military reform of Peter 1. Creation of a regular army, recruitment, composition, weapons.

In the Russian state of the late XVII - first half of the XVIII centuries. Major economic and political changes are taking place. This period is characterized by the development of manufacturing, the growth of the all-Russian market, the formation of the Russian noble empire, and the increase in serfdom of the peasants.

Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century. turns into a powerful power.

The end of the XVII and the beginning of the XVIII centuries. were turning points in the history of the Russian state, there was a need for reforms that would affect all spheres of life and activity: the economy, government, social relations, military affairs, culture and everyday life.

Professors of Moscow University, historians and lawyers S.M. Soloviev (1820-1879) and K.D. Kavelin (1818-1885), exploring the pre-Petrine era, were inclined to think that Russia in the seventeenth century. reached a state crisis, complete failure, moral, economic and administrative, and could only get on the right road through radical reforms.

As a result of the fact that Russia was under the heavy Tatar-Mongol yoke for a long time, it lagged behind the advanced countries of Western Europe economically and culturally.

Russia's loss of access to the Baltic and Black Seas also hampered the further development of the Russian economy and prevented economic and cultural communication with Western Europe. In the conditions of rapid capitalist development of Western Europe, Russia's backwardness threatened in the future the loss of its economic and national independence.

One of the most important tasks facing the Russian state was gaining access to the Baltic Sea. The economic growth of the Russian state required extensive connections with international markets.

However, the Russian armed forces by the end of the 17th century. did not meet the requirements of the time and could not solve new problems that arose before the state.

The conservative state structure and economic backwardness predetermined the conservatism of the military organization.

The Old Moscow army of more than a hundred thousand looked impressive in appearance. The command staff, imitating the Polish example, had expensive weapons of the eastern type, thoroughbred argamaks in harnesses with precious stones and luxurious clothes.

Ordinary warriors, armed mainly with edged weapons, endured the hardships of marching, cold and hunger well. The local cavalry was armed with various types of bows, sabers and javelins and became obsolete. Unlike the Swedish and French nobility, the Prussian Junkers and the Polish gentry, the Russian nobles were deprived of military ambition and incentive to serve for the estate. Their service at that time was lifelong, compulsory, but temporary and episodic.

The once dashing Streltsy were more concerned with the problems of personal farming, trade and crafts, but having significant strength and influence, they sometimes interfered in state affairs and the life of the court, becoming uncontrollable and dangerous for the tsar himself and state authorities. IN Azov campaigns Peter I, the archers showed low fighting qualities and reliability in comparison with the newly formed regular regiments: Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky.

Soldiers, spearmen, reiters and dragoons of the troops of the “new” or “foreign” system, who made up 60-70% of the total number of armed forces, experienced a great desire for service and turned, in fact, into a militia, like local cavalry.

The prestige of the Russian army was low both among Europeans (Russia was in twelfth place in the tables of European states) and among the Ottoman Turks.

However, the great economic and human potential allowed Russia to maintain a large army, fairly strong heavy artillery, as well as regular units of Cossacks and steppe inhabitants.

Military doctrine of the 17th century. can be called defensive, cautious, like foreign policy. Western military art, advanced at that time, and the experience of organizing an army were practically not used in the Russian armed forces.

Heavy defeats at Konotop (1659) near Lyakhovichi and Chudnov (1660), the failure of the Crimean campaigns (1687 and 1689), and the shameful flight of the local cavalry from the battlefield near Narva in 1700 raised the question of urgent military reforms.

Thus, transformations seemed to be a natural historical necessity.

The solution of pressing problems for Russia at that time is associated with the activities of Tsar Peter I (the Great) (1672-1725), who carried out at the end of the 17th - first quarter of the 18th centuries. major economic, political and military transformations.

The amazing energy of Peter I, the speed and sharpness of the transformative movement, selfless devotion to the idea, selfless service to the cause, the genius and character of Peter I provide the full historical content of the thought of organic connection reforms with the general course of Russian life.

Therefore, the time of the reign of Peter I appears to our consciousness as the line that separates old Rus' from transformed Russia.

Peter I is highly regarded as a statesman, military leader and commander. F. Engels called Peter I “a truly great man.” A.V. Suvorov called Peter I “the first commander of his century.” Being a talented commander, naval commander and military theorist, Peter I laid the foundation military school, from which Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov emerged.

The military reforms of Peter I in scale, speed and effectiveness have no equal in world history. Not a single reformer had to bring the army to the advanced level in such conditions and in such a short period of time.

The military reforms of Peter I were not an imitation of the Western European system, they were a further step in the development of the Russian armed forces.

In some works of pre-revolutionary military literature, especially by “Westernists,” Peter I is described as a brilliant specialist in “transferring to Russian soil” foreign Western European experience, albeit taking into account the Russian situation. This interpretation of the role of Peter I leads to the denial of independence in the development of Russian military art and proclaims its dependence in basic matters on Western European models. Such views distort history.

You cannot fight the enemy without studying the organization of his army, weapons, methods of war and combat. That is why Peter I was interested in and studied the structure of Western European armies and knew their strengths and weaknesses. Peter I did not fence himself off with a “Chinese wall” from the combat experience of Western European armies; at the first stage of his activity, he often invited foreigners to Russian service and trusted them excessively. However, this does not give the right to reduce the activity of an outstanding commander to the “skillful transfer” of Swedish, Prussian or any other military models to Russian soil.

Peter I developed as a commander based on the study and use of domestic military experience. He knew well the military activities of his predecessors. Thus, he considered Ivan IV (the Terrible) his “predecessor and model.”

The historical role of Peter I in the development of Russian military art lies in the fact that he, relying on the centuries-old military practice of Russia, ensured the further development of military affairs in accordance with contemporary historical conditions.

What socio-economic conditions ensured the implementation of military reforms? The basis of the social system of the Russian state during the time of Peter I was feudal economy. The social content of the reform was the strengthening of the class positions of the nobility and merchants, the peasantry merged with servitude into one tax category, came under the personal power of the landowner, the townspeople received organization, the right of self-government and some privileges.

As a result of the emergence and growth of manufactories, the development of domestic and foreign trade, the feudal economy inevitably had to be increasingly drawn into market relations and adapt to the domestic market. It does not follow from this, however, that Peter’s period was a period of destruction of feudal forms of economy. Elements of new relations of production were growing, but were still not sufficient to change the organization of the feudal economy.

The government of Peter I set as its main goal the access of Russia to the shores of the Baltic Sea, the return of lands that had belonged to Russia from time immemorial. This task required exceptional effort from all the forces of the Russian state.

Military reforms covered all aspects of the life of the Russian army in the first quarter of the 18th century; the result of their implementation was that in terms of organization, weapons, and combat training, Peter I promoted the Russian army and navy to the forefront in Europe.

The main directions and content of the military reforms of Peter I:

Creation of the Russian (national) regular army and navy;

Introduction of a recruiting system;

Formation and introduction of the same type of organization and weapons in the infantry, cavalry and artillery;

Introduction of a unified system of military training and education, regulated by charters;

Centralization of military command;

Replacement of Orders - by the Military Collegium and the Admiralty - by the Collegium;

The establishment of the position of commander-in-chief, under which a field headquarters was created headed by a quartermaster general;

Opening of military schools for officer training;

Regulation of officer service;

Carrying out military judicial reforms.

Carrying out military reforms required enormous efforts from the entire state, and internal activities themselves became dependent on military needs. Peter I was looking for ways to raise the economic condition of the state, to encourage industry and trade, which he always saw as a powerful source of people's well-being.

The new administrative structure took on its finished, slender form. Transformations were carried out regarding estates, management, church administration.

The nobles were involved in serving public service in the army and navy with great severity, indefinitely, as long as they had enough strength. No more than one third of each “surname” was allowed into the civil service. Under Peter I, the differences between local and patrimonial ownership were eliminated. The decree of 1714 prohibited the fragmentation of land holdings when bequeathing to sons. This made it possible to actively attract public service children of noble landowners.

In 1708, Russia was divided into provinces (the provinces were divided into districts), headed by governors.

In 1711, the Senate was established - the highest administrative body of the state with judicial function, but without legislative power. Under the jurisdiction of the Senate there were a number of central institutions of collegiums; they were established in 1718. Twelve collegiums were established in all, including foreign affairs, military, admiralty, justice collegium, etc. Each had its own charter, which determined its department and office work.

As a result of measures taken regarding industry, more than 200 factories and factories were founded in Russia under Peter I, and many branches of production were launched. Reconnaissance was undertaken natural resources, which Russia had. Foreign technicians were invited to Russia to train Russians in production, and Russians were also sent abroad to study various branches of Western industry.

Peter I connected his new harbor of St. Petersburg with Moscow waterways, built (in 1711) the Vyshnevolotsk canal, and then the Ladoga canal.

The Ural metallurgy, having overtaken the English and Swedish ones, has taken first place in the world. Great development got a mining job. Tula arms factories were expanded. High-quality Ural iron made it possible to produce cast-iron tools of a quality no worse than bronze ones, which greatly expanded the production base of the Russian military industry.

Peter I imposed more stringent requirements for the standardization of weapons production.

To meet the army's need for guns, it was necessary to increase the production of firearms and master the production of new models. Despite the difficult conditions already in 1708-1709. the production of guns was 15-20 thousand pieces per year, and by 1711 it reached 40 thousand pieces. This number of guns fully satisfied the needs of the armed forces.

By 1710, the creation of a new military-industrial base was basically completed, completely satisfying the needs of the army and navy. Further rapid growth of industrial production expanded and strengthened it.

Military reforms and war required large amounts of funds. Peter I managed to significantly increase government revenues by increasing indirect taxes and reforming direct taxes. This was achieved by the creation of new taxes, strict collection of old taxes, i.e. a greater degree of exploitation of the people's payment forces. After 1700, salt pans, beekeepers, fishing, mills, became quitrent items of the state treasury. Sometimes, from our point of view, wall taxes were also introduced: a duty was imposed on the beards of “bearded men” who did not want to shave; they took taxes from the baths; Very high price They took for oak coffins, the sale of which became a state monopoly. The Raskolniks had to bear a double tax salary. Stamped paper is being introduced for office work, filing complaints and petitions. State-owned drinking and tobacco monopolies are flourishing. Indirect taxes under Peter I accounted for more than half of state income.

The other half was a direct capitation tax. Each landowner peasant paid 70 kopecks. per year, state peasant - 114 kopecks. city ​​dweller - 120 kopecks.

New taxes heavy burden fell on the shoulders of the tax-paying people, discontent of the people arose, and escapes under Peter assumed large proportions.

However, thanks to financial measures, Peter I significantly increased the amount of state income (at the end of the 17th century, income was 2 million rubles, in 1710 - 3 million 134 thousand rubles, in 1722 - 7 million 850 thousand rubles, in 1725 - 10 million 186 thousand rubles), which made it possible to significantly reduce the huge deficit of the beginning of the 18th century.

In the field of church administration, Peter I abolishes patriarchal power, and on February 14, 1721, the “Holy Governing Synod” was opened. The composition of the Synod and its external organization were similar to the secular colleges. The question of the relationship between church and state was resolved in favor of the latter.

Thus, by establishing the Synod, Peter I retained authoritative power in the Russian Church, but deprived this power of the political influence with which the patriarchs could act. In the era of Peter, the attitude of the government and the church towards Gentiles became softer than it was in the 17th century. In 1721, the Synod issued an important decree allowing marriages of Orthodox Christians with Protestants and Catholics.

Along with religious tolerance, there were repressions against schismatics, since Peter saw them as opponents of his civic activities and the dominant church.

Attitudes to Peter's reforms and innovations were varied. Not everyone understood what Peter was striving for, not everyone could consciously relate to the transformations. To the masses, the reforms seemed strange, unnecessary and attributed to the personal whim of their king. People were dissatisfied, various rumors appeared about the personality of the king and his activities. But discontent did not turn into general open resistance to Peter. The people, however, left the burden of state life in whole masses - to the Cossacks, to Siberia and even to Poland. In 1705 there was a riot in Astrakhan. In 1707, there was a revolt among the Bashkirs and on the Don among the Cossacks under the leadership of Ataman Bulavin. The revolt was strictly suppressed. Peter did not weaken government control over the Cossacks.

However, many individuals, not only from the upper strata of society, but also from the masses, became active collaborators of the sovereign and apologists for his reforms.

When Peter I died and his reform activity ended, when his successors, not understanding him, often stopped and spoiled what he had started, Peter’s work did not die and Russia could not return to its previous state. The fruits of his activities - the external strength of Russia and the new order within the country - were before everyone's eyes, and the burning hostility of the dissatisfied became a memory.

“We now fully understand that his personality and vices are a product of his time, and his activities and historical merits are a matter of eternity.”

Peter I is without a doubt one of the brightest and most talented statesmen Russia. The time of his reign fell on the 18th century and it was under him that Russia finally turned into one of the strongest states in Europe, primarily in military terms. The topic of the reign of Peter I is very extensive, so we will not touch on all of his many achievements, but will only talk about Peter’s reform of the Russian army. The reform envisaged the creation of a new type of army, more efficient and combat-ready. The further course of events showed that Peter’s plan was a brilliant success.

1. What is a regular army and how did it differ from the “old type” Russian army?

First of all, let us note the difference between the personnel (regular) army that Russia acquired during the reign of Peter, and the army that Russia had before the military reforms. The Russian army of the old type was actually a militia that gathered in case of military necessity. Such an army was completely heterogeneous in composition - it was recruited from among service people, most of whom in peacetime lived on lands allocated to them by the state for service and were engaged in activities far from military affairs (boyars, stolniks, Duma clerks, etc. ) This unit, which formed the basis of the Russian army before the reforms of Peter the Great, was distinguished by the lack of constant military training, uniform weapons and supplies - each soldier was equipped at his own expense.

Another small part of the old type army, somewhat reminiscent of the future regular army, was recruited for permanent service and received a salary from the state (gunners, archers, etc.) This part of the army was more combat-ready and trained, but still its training left much to be desired the best. The numerous difficulties that such an army encountered when faced with well-trained, prepared and armed troops like the Swedish ones put Russia at an extremely disadvantageous position in the event of a war with such a serious enemy.

What is it fundamental difference regular army from the old type army? First of all, a regular army is a standing army. Such an army does not disband in the absence of military necessity, but exists and is in a state of combat readiness even in peacetime. In the absence of hostilities, she is engaged military service, training soldiers and officers, maneuvers and tries in every possible way to strengthen its combat potential.

Such an army has a uniform uniform and weapons, as well as a system of organization. The regular army is maintained and supplied by the state. It is more mobile, better armed and trained, and, accordingly, much better suited for solving foreign policy problems than the militia. Peter I understood all this very well. It was simply impossible to create one of the strongest states in Europe without a regular army - and Peter enthusiastically took on this task.

2. Why was a regular army necessary for Russia?

The main foreign policy task of Peter I was to establish control over the Baltic and access to the Baltic Sea, which provided Russia with beneficial economic and political situation. The main enemy standing in Russia's way in this matter was Sweden, which had a strong, well-equipped and trained regular army. In order to defeat the Swedes, gain a foothold in the Baltic and finally resolve the issue of control over Baltic Sea In its favor, Russia needed an army not inferior to the Swedish one.

Peter diligently, step by step, moved towards reforming the troops. He drew conclusions from the severe defeat of the Russian army near Narva in 1700, after which he consistently strengthened the combat capability of the Russian army. Gradually, in terms of order, training and organization, the Russian military forces not only reached the level of the Swedish army, but also surpassed it. The Battle of Poltava in 1709 marked the rebirth of the Russian army. Competent tactical actions of the new Russian regular army became one of the significant reasons for the victory over the Swedish troops.

3. How was the regular Russian army created?

First of all, Peter I changed the order of recruiting troops. Now the army was equipped with so-called recruitment kits. A census of all peasant households was carried out and the number of recruits - soldiers who were to be sent to the households to replenish the Russian army - was determined. Depending on the army’s needs for soldiers, from a certain number of households in different times could take different numbers of recruits. During active hostilities, more recruits could be recruited from the yards, and accordingly, in the absence of an urgent need for people, fewer recruits. Recruitments were held annually. Peasants who thus became soldiers received liberation from serfdom.

However, it was not enough to recruit soldiers and form an army - it had to be trained. To do this, Peter I began to hire military specialists from Europe for a lot of money, as well as train his own officers. Military schools were opened - artillery, engineering, and navigation. Commanders were trained on the basis of the best regiments of the Russian land army - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky. in 1716, a military charter was created that determined the procedure for military service.

A well-trained and prepared army required good logistics and supplies. This problem was also brilliantly solved by Peter. As a result of the transformation of the control system, Provisions, Artillery, Naval orders, etc. appeared. We are not talking about orders - these “orders” were institutions that supplied the army and were responsible for a certain area.

All these measures made it possible to radically transform the Russian army, which literally in 15 years transformed from a “conciliar” army into a modern well-organized and armed army, with trained soldiers and officers. Now Russian troops were in no way inferior to European armies. Peter did a truly grandiose job - without the creation of a regular army, the transformation of Russia into a great power with weight in Europe would have been impossible.

The need to create a regular army

The Russian army, created during the reform in conditions of grueling Northern War, won numerous victories over strong opponents. The old armed forces, which Peter inherited from the Moscow state at the beginning of his reign, were unable to cope with such tasks, which was clearly demonstrated during the Crimean campaigns, and then by the failure near Narva at the beginning of the war.

The armed forces of the Russian state in the 17th century had a structure that was characteristic of earlier times: noble cavalry, urban (city army) and rural (staff) militia, as well as the Streltsy army, which appeared under Ivan the Terrible. The local and settled system of maintaining troops, when after the end of hostilities the nobles returned to their estates, and the archers and staves returned to their crafts and agriculture, did not contribute to increasing the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

It was traditional to invite foreigners to Russian service, and since the end of the 16th century this process has been significantly intensified. This made it possible to become more familiar with Western military systems and gradually learn their positive experience. From the second half XVII century according to the model Western formations Already from Russians, so-called regiments of a foreign system are being created - foot and horse, whose commanders and officers were foreigners invited to Russian service. The greatest preference in hiring was given to the British and Dutch, because Russia had long-standing trade relations with these countries. But still, the majority of the army was made up of local cavalry, armed in various ways and mostly unsatisfactory.

Time increasingly urgently demanded the creation of a new type of professional armed forces. It was necessary to tear the warrior away from the land or craft, to make military service the only source of his existence.

Beginning of the formation of the regular army

The formation of a new type of regular army began with four regiments: Lefortov and Gordon, Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, which together numbered just over 20 thousand people. Created and trained in accordance with Western standards, they became the backbone and source of personnel for the new Russian army. After the defeat of the Streltsy uprising, these formations became almost the only fighting force on which the tsar could fully rely. Many people from them later became officers of other units of the regular Russian army.

In the fall of 1699, the Streltsy regiments in Moscow were reformed, and a number of Peter’s associates were instructed to form three divisions of nine regiments each, recruited from datochny people from all over the state, as well as from the “willing” people of Moscow. During the winter of 1699/1700, recruits were delivered to Preobrazhenskoye, where Peter personally, with a list in his hands, determined the suitability of each and himself distributed them into regiments, the command of which was assigned to foreigners who had previously commanded regiments of the “foreign system”. The officers were either mercenaries who were at the disposal of the Foreign Order, or Semyonovtsy and Preobrazhensky soldiers who had undergone good training in the amusing regiments. There was practically no time to train the newly recruited units (only about three months), which resulted in a crushing defeat near Narva. Peter drew the right conclusions from this defeat. It was decided to more actively begin to create a new regular army, especially since the situation was favorable since Charles XII, considering the Russian army completely defeated, turned his main forces against Augustus II.

Since 1699, the principle of recruitment has changed. A recruiting system is being gradually introduced. Militarily, it was progressive for its time, although it placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the common people. The living conditions of the recruits were unbearably harsh, which led to high mortality and mass escapes.

By the end of the first decade of the 18th century, the active field army consisted of 54 infantry regiments (in their including the Guards - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky) and 34 cavalry regiments. The borders and cities were guarded by the so-called garrison regiments - 2 dragoons and 40 infantry, which were formed partly from former regiments of the “foreign system”, and partly from archers.

As for the number and distribution of personnel within each branch of the military, the situation here has changed over time. The infantry was divided into two types - grenadiers and fusiliers. By 1710, in addition to the two guards regiments, 5 grenadier and 47 fusilier regiments were formed. After the victory at Poltava, it was decided to have only 42 regiments field infantry: 2 guards, 5 grenadiers and 35 fusiliers. The remaining field regiments were to be disbanded. The staff of the regiments changed. Until 1704, the regiment had 10 fusilier companies and only a few - 9 fusiliers and 1 grenadier. Since 1704, all regiments had 8 fusiliers and 1 grenadier company. Since 1708, after the unification of all grenadier companies into special regiments, 8 companies remained in the field regiments, reduced to 2 battalions. Only the Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky and Ingermanland regiments had a three-battalion composition (12 companies). By state in 1711 the number infantry regiment amounted to 1487 people. According to the states of 1720, the number remained almost the same (1,488 people), but the ratio of combatant and non-combatant ranks in the regiment changed somewhat. This situation is typical for the main structure of the Russian infantry, if you do not take into account some special formations.

A similar process was going on in the cavalry. In 1702, 10 dragoon regiments were formed, in 1705 - the Life Regiment (the first guards cavalry regiment). According to the states of 1711, it was determined to have 33 dragoon regiments, not counting the life regiment, whose staff consisted of 10 companies (a total of 1328 people in the regiment). According to the states of 1720, there were 33 dragoon regiments and a life regiment left in the cavalry. Among the 33 field regiments, 3 were grenadiers and 30 fuiliers. The strength of the regiment was 1253 people. In 1721, the life regiment was transformed into an ordinary dragoon regiment.

The first regular artillery unit was the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1701 a special artillery regiment, consisting of Pushkar companies and four bombardment teams, which also had a pontoon and engineering company and assigned ranks. The regiment's stable staff was determined in 1712. Now it consisted of one bombardment and four gunner companies, pontoon and engineering teams and regimental ranks. According to the states of 1723, the structure remained the same, but the number of people increased. All artillery was divided into regimental, field and siege. The regimental was part of the field, but was attached directly to the regiments.

At the same time, the unification of weapons of all types of troops is being carried out, a single military uniform. The transition to linear tactics, which in Russia had specific features.

Thanks to such transformations, Peter managed to create a mobile, clearly organized and well-armed regular army in a short time. Such a system, despite minor changes, was extremely cumbersome and inconvenient, especially at the level of local territorial administration. All this required the most radical restructuring.

Peter I is without a doubt one of the brightest and most talented statesmen of Russia. The time of his reign fell on the 18th century and it was under him that Russia finally turned into one of the strongest states in Europe, primarily in military terms.

The topic of the reign of Peter I is very extensive, so we will not touch on all of his many achievements, but will only talk about Peter’s reform of the Russian army. The reform envisaged the creation of a new type of army, more efficient and combat-ready. The further course of events showed that Peter’s plan was a brilliant success.

1. What is a regular army and how did it differ from the “old type” Russian army?

First of all, let us note the difference between the personnel (regular) army that Russia acquired during the reign of Peter, and the army that Russia had before the military reforms.

The Russian army of the old type was actually a militia that gathered in case of military necessity. Such an army was completely heterogeneous in composition - it was recruited from among service people, most of whom in peacetime lived on lands allocated to them by the state for service and were engaged in activities far from military affairs (boyars, stolniks, Duma clerks, etc. ) This unit, which formed the basis of the Russian army before the reforms of Peter the Great, was distinguished by the lack of constant military training, uniform weapons and supplies - each soldier was equipped at his own expense.

Another small part of the old type army, somewhat reminiscent of the future regular army, was recruited for permanent service and received a salary from the state (gunners, archers, etc.) This part of the army was more combat-ready and trained, but still its training left much to be desired the best.

The numerous difficulties that such an army encountered when faced with well-trained, prepared and armed troops like the Swedish ones put Russia at an extremely disadvantageous position in the event of a war with such a serious enemy.

What is the fundamental difference between a regular army and an old-type army? First of all, a regular army is a standing army.

Such an army does not disband in the absence of military necessity, but exists and is in a state of combat readiness even in peacetime.

In the absence of military action, she is engaged in military service, training soldiers and officers, maneuvers and tries in every possible way to strengthen her combat potential.

Such an army has a uniform uniform and weapons, as well as a system of organization. The regular army is maintained and supplied by the state.

It is more mobile, better armed and trained, and, accordingly, much better suited for solving foreign policy problems than the militia. Peter I understood all this very well. It was simply impossible to create one of the strongest states in Europe without a regular army - and Peter enthusiastically took on this task.

2. Why was a regular army necessary for Russia?

The main foreign policy task of Peter I was to establish control over the Baltic and access to the Baltic Sea, which provided Russia with a favorable economic and political position.

The main enemy standing in Russia's way in this matter was Sweden, which had a strong, well-equipped and trained regular army. In order to defeat the Swedes, gain a foothold in the Baltic and finally resolve the issue of control over the Baltic Sea in its favor, Russia needed an army that was not inferior to the Swedish one.

Peter diligently, step by step, moved towards reforming the troops.

He drew conclusions from the severe defeat of the Russian army near Narva in 1700, after which he consistently strengthened the combat capability of the Russian army. Gradually, in terms of order, training and organization, the Russian military forces not only reached the level of the Swedish army, but also surpassed it.

The Battle of Poltava in 1709 marked the rebirth of the Russian army. Competent tactical actions of the new Russian regular army became one of the significant reasons for the victory over the Swedish troops.

3. How was the regular Russian army created?

First of all, Peter I changed the order of recruiting troops. Now the army was equipped with so-called recruitment kits. A census of all peasant households was carried out and the number of recruits - soldiers who were to be sent to the households to replenish the Russian army - was determined.

Depending on the army's needs for soldiers, different numbers of recruits could be taken from a certain number of households at different times. During active hostilities, more recruits could be recruited from the yards, and accordingly, in the absence of an urgent need for people, fewer recruits. Recruitments were held annually. Peasants who thus became soldiers received liberation from serfdom.

However, it was not enough to recruit soldiers and form an army - it had to be trained.

To do this, Peter I began to hire military specialists from Europe for a lot of money, as well as train his own officers. Military schools were opened - artillery, engineering, and navigation. Commanders were trained on the basis of the best regiments of the Russian land army - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky. in 1716, a military charter was created that determined the procedure for military service.

A well-trained and prepared army required good logistics and supplies.

This problem was also brilliantly solved by Peter. As a result of the transformation of the control system, Provisions, Artillery, Naval orders, etc. appeared. We are not talking about orders - these “orders” were institutions that supplied the army and were responsible for a certain area.

All these measures made it possible to radically transform the Russian army, which literally in 15 years transformed from a “conciliar” army into a modern, well-organized and armed army, with trained soldiers and officers.

Now Russian troops were in no way inferior to European armies. Peter did a truly grandiose job - without the creation of a regular army, the transformation of Russia into a great power with weight in Europe would have been impossible.

18th century, History and politics

Creation of a regular army under Peter I

Recruit kits

Peter did not see the defeat of his army - he was no longer in the camp under the walls of Narva: literally on the eve of the battle, he left for Novgorod, taking with him his favorite Aleksashka Menshikov and the commander-in-chief of the army, Field Marshal F.

A. Golovina.

Of course, the fact that the king abandoned the army the day before decisive battle, does not adorn a great commander. But this act was not evidence of cowardice or weakness. It showed Peter's inherent rigid rationalism, a sober recognition of the impending inevitable defeat, a desire to survive in order to continue the fight with redoubled energy.

Subsequently, many years after the Battle of Narva, Peter, filling out his famous “Journal, or Daily Note,” came to the idea not only of the inevitability then, in 1700, of defeat, the pattern of this shame, but even of the undoubted benefit that The ill-fated Narva brought everything that had begun.

Of course, the thought of the benefits of defeat initial stage war, far from the vital centers of the country, came later, and in the first days after the “Narva embarrassment” he thought about something else: how to preserve what was left and not succumb to panic and despair, because indeed the victory of the Swedes was then “sadly sensual "for Peter.

Internal affairs were more serious: after Narva, Peter clearly realized that the Russian army was not ready to fight its enemy - the Swedish army of Charles XII.

Naturally, the question arises: why was army reform necessary after Narva?

The fact is that the defeat at Narva was on a par with the defeats that plagued the Russian army in the second half of the 17th century. And Peter understood this clearly.

Peter understood the reason for the chronic defeats of the army; he saw that it was necessary to change the very basis on which the military organization was based.

At its core, the regiments of the “new order” were a type of local army, a new shoot on an old tree. The officers and soldiers of the “new manner” regiments served “from the ground”, enjoyed estate rights, that is, they were landowners.

Peter had no doubt which way to go.

It was in the absence of “order” - a clear organization, “regularity” (a concept that embraces and expresses the meaning and purpose of army reform) - that Peter saw as the reason for the failures of the Russian army in the 17th century, as well as near Narva.

It should be noted that he took the path of “regularity” long before the war with the Swedes. As you know, in 1687, 15-year-old Peter created two “amusing” regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky (named after the palace villages where they were stationed), in which noble children and royal servants served.

Without a doubt, for Peter and his associates, service in the "amusing" became that invaluable military school that gave the young king his initial military education and developed those natural gifts that made him an outstanding commander and reformer of military affairs.

In terms of methods and techniques of training, the “amusing” regiments, based on the “regular”, that is, not on the local 6az, became the prototype of the army that Peter began to create on the eve and especially in the initial period of the war with Sweden.

The signal for the creation of regular regiments as the main ones was the dissolution of the Streltsy regiments in 1699 after the suppression of their rebellion in 1698.

In Peter's decrees and other government decrees for 1699, a whole program for creating a new army on principles significantly different from those on which the army of the 17th century was built is clearly visible.

To form new regiments, two methods were chosen: the admission of those who wished - volunteers - as they said then, into the “freedom”, as well as the recruitment of “dachas”.

Everyone was accepted into the “freedom”, with the exception of peasants who were tax-paying, that is, paying state taxes. Among the free people could be, according to the tsar’s decrees, “children of boyars, and from the undergrowth, and Cossack, and Streltsy children, and brothers, and nephews, and backbenchers, and from all other ranks, and from hired working people who sail on ships , except for retired Moscow regiments of archers, and by no means to take tax-paying peasants from the arable land.”

“Datochnye” are basically those armed serfs who previously, together with their landowner masters, went out to a review or war in accordance with established proportions, for example, the landowner had to present at least one armed soldier from every twenty households of his estate.

Now the recruitment of freemen and “dachas” (this practice, which was generally common in the 17th century), acquired a different character, having been changed radically: volunteers were not assigned to soldier regiments of the old, local type, and the “dachas” no longer served, as before, in auxiliary troops - they all became “correct” soldiers of regular regiments.

They were trained according to new regulations and supported by state funds, and they became lifelong military personnel who were not sent home after the war.

Since 1705, the government has taken the next step - it stops accepting the “freemen” and moves on to recruiting so-called recruits directly from the peasant population, which was not the case before.

This was caused by an acute shortage of people in the army, the needs of which could no longer be met by volunteers and “dachas”.

The recruiting system was introduced in 1699. It was based on the system of recruiting soldier and dragoon regiments, established in the second half of the 17th century. The merit of Peter I was that he, having rejected all other methods of recruitment, used domestic experience, which has justified itself in practice.

With this method of recruitment, the class principle of army organization was firmly established. The soldiers were recruited from peasants and other tax-paying classes, and the officers from the nobles.

All those who signed up were given a salary of 11 rubles a year and food money on a par with the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. The registration of freemen was entrusted to a special commission. Having verified all the data with the census books, the commission decided to collect data from among landowner peasants and courtyards. It was proposed to recruit into the service only from boyar children, underage Cossacks and Streltsy and free people.

Later, it was allowed to recruit from the Danish people, except “from the arable lands of fugitive peasants.”

The end of recruitment was envisaged in Moscow by December 1, 1699, and in Nizhny Novgorod and lower towns - by January 25, 1700.

All those who wished to enroll as soldiers were offered to be accepted at the gathering yards “without any delay or bribes.”

As a result of the activities of both commissions, 22,514 people were accepted into the new soldiers of Golovin’s commissions, of which 10,727 people were datochnye and 11,787 people were free, and in the Repnin commission 10,720 people. A total of 33,234 people. Of this number, 32,130 people were sent to the army, and 1,104 people to the navy.

From this contingent, 27 new regiments of soldiers were staffed.

Of these: 8 - in Moscow, 9 - in Novgorod and 10 - in lower cities. In addition to the infantry regiments, at this time two dragoon regiments were formed, staffed by boyars and noble children who reported for military service with their datochniki.

Thus, the beginning of the recruitment system was laid by the decree of 1699, but the decree did not resolve all the organizational issues that arose during the recruitment.

The decree outlined only common features recruitment system. Subsequent decrees, supplementing the law of 1699, completed the formalization of the recruitment system, which finally took shape only in 1705, when they were developed common principles recruiting field troops. The garrison troops continued to be recruited in the same way.

The collection of recruits was usually carried out by the Local Order through the so-called stations.

Upon receipt of the decree, people were collected at the stations using census books, and here they were formed into “parties” (teams) of 500-1000 people, sworn in and forced to give so-called “mandatory notes” so that the recruits would not run away.

After this, the recruiting teams were transferred to the Military Order, which sent them to the regiments.

In order to clarify the contingent of service people who were supposed to serve as privates, at the end of 1699, a check of their composition was carried out, as a result of which minors aged 15 years and above were enrolled in the service.

The ongoing war required continuous reinforcements.

In this regard, a number of decrees were issued in 1703. Thus, on July 31, 1703, it was proposed to submit personalized lists of all minors to Moscow, and on October 1, it was ordered to send them to military service.

After the registration, all the youngsters who had not previously appeared at the review were ordered to appear for assignment to the dragoon regiments.

The lack of soldiers forced Peter to issue a decree in 1704 to collect previously released Moscow streltsy and streltsy children to Smolensk and enroll them in field and garrison regiments.

The need to replenish the infantry suffered during the war big losses, forced the decision to collect one person from two courtyards from the Moscow Yamsk town settlements.

To replenish the fleet personnel, a recruitment was carried out, which provided 1000 sailors.

The transition to a unified recruitment system could not be carried out without a firm record of the people who were subject to enlistment for military service. The government decided to first conduct such a census in the Moscow district. The decree of August 17, 1704 on the general census was intended primarily to solve this problem and, in addition, to streamline the flow of funds for the maintenance of the army. However, this could not be done.

The complexity of the task undertaken forced the census to be temporarily stopped. Despite the lack of accurate data on the number of peasants, the government continued to carry out conscription.

In this decree, which required one person at the age of 20 from every 20 households to be sent as soldiers, the word “recruit” was mentioned for the first time, which included a certain content. Attached to the decree were articles given to the officers regarding the collection of Danish soldiers or recruits.

18 articles outlined the basic principles of the recruitment system. Particularly important was the 12th article, which stated, “if out of all the guards, at stations or in his sovereign service, who dies or kills, or runs away, and instead of those, have as soldiers the same people from whom they will be taken, so that those soldiers will always be fully prepared for his sovereign service.”

It was intended to create permanent recruitment areas in this way. However, this system created uneven replenishment conditions. That is why this order of recruitment was maintained for a relatively short time, and then it was necessary to abandon the tempting system of “immortal recruits” altogether and move on to carrying out widespread recruitment according to special decrees. The recruitment of 1705 was somewhat delayed and was extended until September. Thus, from this set a unified acquisition system was established.

Subsequent recruitments were still carried out by the Local Order.

The unevenness of recruitment had a particularly hard impact on the new provinces, which had to be freed from recruitment. The government shifted the recruitment to the rest of the provinces and proposed to be guided by the census books of 1678, and not by the data of 1710.

Since 1711, recruitments were carried out according to orders of the Senate.

In 1711 several recruitments were carried out. Special recruitments were carried out among clerks, coachmen and monastery servants and courtyard people. The first intake included 4,200 people. And the two subsequent recruitments yielded 47,712 people. In the same year, the government tried to create a reserve of recruits. The decree of 1711 clearly expresses this idea: “for the current real military situation, collect again 25 thousand recruits from all provinces; and 7 thousand horses for the dragoon service.” The decree was confirmed in 1712, and it also determined the norms for reserves in the provinces: “recruits must be collected without any delay, so that in each province there will be a recruit in reserve against the regiments assigned to the province.”

The number of reserves was to be half the number of recruits for the field army.

It was proposed to keep recruits at stations in the Moscow, Siberian, Kyiv, Azov, Smolensk, Kazan and Arkhangelogorod provinces and “train them in military art, so that they are in every readiness for service.”

But in 1713, recruitment under this decree was suspended, and again it was decided to recruit regiments from all over the state.

Since 1724, the distribution of recruits was carried out not from house to house, but from person to person. The transition to such a system became possible after the first revision, completed in 1721.

The levies fell heavily on the serfs and state peasants.

The army absorbed the best elements of the village.

The main form of protest against lifelong military service was escape.

Escapes of recruits also occurred in subsequent years. The government resorted to the most severe measures. Military courts sentenced fugitive recruits to whipping, exile to hard labor and even death.

So, in 1701, Peter ordered runaway recruits to be hanged by lot or sent to hard labor. In 1702, he wrote to boyar T. Streshnev: “When you receive this letter, please immediately find these damned fugitives..., having found everyone, beat them with a whip and cut their ears, and in addition, on the 5th of the lot, exile them to Taganrog...”

Decrees on severe punishments for fugitives were issued almost every year.

However, harsh measures did not lead to the desired results. The escapes continued. The concerned government decided to study the reasons for the mass escapes.

A special investigation conducted in 1710 showed that recruits were afraid of the prospect of lifelong service and the inhumane treatment they received during recruitment. According to the instructions of the government, attention was paid to better maintenance of recruits and the responsibilities of the population were somewhat eased.

At the end of 1712, the government announced that the conditions for recruiting would be improved, and took upon itself the supply of recruits along the route.

While improving recruitment conditions, the government at the same time gave instructions to strengthen monitoring of recruits.

In an effort to improve the situation of the recruits, the government for a number of years issued decrees on the forgiveness of fugitives and on their voluntary appearance.

Returning fugitives were not hanged, but were sent to Azov, Siberia or St. Petersburg to serve their service. All cases of fugitive recruits were handled by a special court at the Military Collegium, which was called the Lower Military Court.

Summing up the manning of the Russian army in the first quarter XVIII century, the following should be noted:

The recruiting system significantly changed the face of the Russian army.

In the class army, soldiers were recruited mainly from serfs and state peasants, and officers were recruited from nobles.

Recruits were taken on for lifelong service. After taking the oath, they themselves and their children ceased to be serfs. This, of course, was not universal conscription, as noble military historians tried to portray the recruitment system, for the entire burden of recruitment fell on the peasants. The clergy were exempted from military service, and the merchants were paid off and thereby introduced elements of bourgeois relations into the recruitment of troops.

Already at the beginning of the century, the government’s attitude to the issue of recruitment was determined.

It viewed conscription duties in relation to peasants not as personal, but as zemstvo or communal. Legal entity the government considered “yards”, and later “taxable souls”, united in a community. Having presented the requirement to supply a certain number of recruits, the government did not care about how the community would organize the selection and in what order the recruits would be distributed among families.

The communities developed a system of priority for families when supplying recruits.

These spontaneously formed rules of “Russian recruitment” were then used by the ruling circles to their advantage. The landowners turned the community (the world) into an instrument of influence on the peasants, allowing them to keep them in line. In the army, the communal principle was also used in the interests of the ruling classes. It made it possible to unite soldiers into artels and oblige them to mutual responsibility.

At the same time, such a selection system played a significant role in strengthening camaraderie among the soldiers, who looked at their unit as “the world,” which increased the morale of the troops.

During the first quarter of the century, the forms of troop mobilization were completely determined.

The collection of recruits took place in the provinces and provinces, and from the 20s, the regiments received their own districts and were replenished on a territorial basis. Beginning in 1716, each regiment assigned officers to a special command to deliver its recruits. The recruits then went directly to the regimental commanders, who distributed them at their discretion. Recruitment made it possible to significantly increase the size of the army and make it combat-ready.

The constant replenishment of the army with untrained recruits created many difficulties: it was necessary to annually train the field army in the basics of military service.

Recruit(from the French récruter - to recruit an army) - a person accepted into military service through conscription or hiring.

• 1 History
• 2 Recruit regiments
• 3 Recruit set
• 4 Recruit families
• 5 Schools
• 6 Famous Recruits
• 7 In other countries
• 8 See
• 9 Literature

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Main article: Recruitment duty

In the Russian army and navy (Armed Forces) from 1705 to 1874 - a person enrolled in the armed forces under conscription, to which all tax-paying classes (peasants, townspeople, etc.) were subject and for whom it was communal and lifelong and they supplied a certain number of recruits (military personnel) from their communities. The recruitment of serfs into the armed forces freed them from serfdom.

The nobility was exempted from conscription duties. Later this exemption was extended to merchants, families of clergy, honorary citizens, residents of Bessarabia and some remote areas of Siberia.

Since 1793, the indefinite period of service was limited to 25 years, from 1834 - to 20 years, followed by a stay on the so-called indefinite leave for 5 years. In 1855 - 1872, 12-, 10- and 7-year service periods were successively established and, accordingly, 3, 5 and 8 years of leave were established.

Recruitment sets were not produced regularly, but as needed and in varying quantities.

Only in 1831 were annual recruitments introduced, which were divided into regular: 5-7 recruits per 1,000 souls, reinforced - 7-10 people and emergency - over 10. In 1874, after the start of the military reform of Alexander II conscription replaced by universal conscription, and the word "recruit" was replaced by the word "recruit". In the USSR and modern Russia the term “liable for military service” is applied to persons subject to service and called up for service.

Recruit regiments

After the introduction of the recruitment system for staffing the armed forces, all regiments were divided into field and garrison ones.

The garrison regiments were training regiments, and reserve ones to replenish field units.

Peter I developed a system in which each recruit had to go through field regiments, garrison regiments (from 1764 garrison battalions), service in civil departments (watchman, messenger, from 1764 in a disabled team), settlement, dismissal for his own support, or to a monastery or almshouse.

The goal of the recruitment system is to maximize full use human resource.

Recruitment set

A personal decree on the recruitment of recruits was issued in the 18th century in September-October (less often in July-August), in the 19th century - in the 30th century. 40s (July), 1844-1855 - different times (most often July-August-September), 1862-1873. - mostly October-November. The recruitment was supposed to take place within 2 months.

Recruits had to be at least two arshins and two vershoks (155 cm) tall, healthy and not disabled.

Each recruit had to have clothes, shoes and food with him. The delivery of recruits to the place of service was ensured by “teachers”: Cossacks allocated by the voivodeship office and soldier teams.

According to the norms of 1766, there were two old soldiers for every 10 recruits, one non-commissioned officer for every 20 recruits, and one chief officer for every 50 recruits.

It was supposed to travel to the place of duty by “direct routes”; in good weather it was supposed to cover 20-30 versts. In bad weather, crossings were reduced by half. Every third day was set aside for rest. Roll call was held twice a day. To prevent escapes, the Senate in 1738 introduced the practice of cutting foreheads at county recruiting points.

Upon arrival at the scene, a medical examination was carried out. Up to 10% of recruits turned out to be unfit for service due to illness or young age (there are known cases of recruiting 14-year-olds).

Before being distributed among the regiments, the recruits were read military articles weekly and were taught daily drill and rifle techniques. In the barracks it was commanded “not to waste money and provisions and not to waste them on drink.”

Caricature of the recruitment institute.

Recruit families

Recruits, as a rule, were single, but the wives of recruits were allowed to follow their husbands to the place of duty.

During his service, a soldier could get married with the permission of his regimental superiors. In 1798, 29% of soldiers in the Irkutsk garrison regiment had families. Soldiers' children from 2 to 6 years old received government support.

Schools

At first, there were numerical and, in 1732, regimental or garrison schools under the regiments. Boys began education at the age of 7, and orphans began earlier, as they had no means of food.

After entering school state maintenance stopped, and a salary was paid instead. In 1731, in the first year - 1 ruble 35 kopecks; after training in writing, singing, arithmetic, music, plumbing and clerking, the salary increased to 1 ruble 59 kopecks per year. After studying geometry and fortification, the salary increased to 2 rubles 7 kopecks per year. In addition, every month a schoolchild was entitled to two quadrangles of flour (two pounds), 1/8 of a quadrangle of cereals, and 2 pounds of salt.

Once every three years, a uniform, a sheepskin coat, trousers, and a hat were issued. Every year, material was supplied for ties, two shirts, two ports, two pairs of shoes with buckles and stockings. Third grade students were given a red cloth to wear on the collar of their caftan.

By decree of September 3, 1736, the education of soldiers' children became compulsory. Those who evaded were subject to a fine of 100 rubles. Since 1721, each garrison regiment created 50 places for soldiers’ children in digital schools.

According to the decree of September 2, 1732, there were 8 student places per company and 64 places per regiment. Since July 1735, it was allowed to accept over-class students. In 1744, digital schools were combined with garrison schools, and everyone was allowed to study in them at their own expense.

Soldiers' children entered service at the age of 15. Those fit for height and age were sent to regiments, the rest were assigned to clerks, apprentices of mechanics and blacksmiths, to non-combatant ranks.

In 1805, all soldiers' children were given the name cantonists.

Famous Recruits

• Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich
• Shevchenko, Taras Grigorievich

In other countries

In the armed forces of some other countries, recruits are those who have the lowest military rank.

Recruit means literally “recruited”, “recruited” - that is, a person who has already been accepted into the service, but has not yet received even basic training).

See also

• Military rank
• Table of ranks
• Recruit army
• Military duty
• Person liable for military service
• Recruiting Sergeant (English Burletta)

Literature

• Beskrovny L. G. " Russian army and the fleet in the 18th century."

  Moscow, 1958

• Bykonya G. F. “Cossacks and other service population Eastern Siberia in the XVIII - early XIX century. Demographic and class aspect." Publishing house Krasnoyarsk ped.

  University named after V. P. Astafieva. Krasnoyarsk, 2008. ISBN 978-5-85981-287-5

• Hiring a recruit in the half of the 19th century in the Arkhangelsk province. Arkhangelsk, 1912 (Electronic copy of the book)

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