The 8th Airborne Brigade was formed on the basis of the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On new formations in the Red Army” No. 112-459ss dated April 23, 1941. The brigade became part of the 4th Airborne Corps of the Western Special Military District, location: Pukhovichi, Byelorussian SSR 1. The personnel of the 214th Air Force were recruited airborne brigade and the 231st Infantry Division.

By May 15, 1941, the brigade was completed and immediately began combat training.

According to the organizational chart, the brigade included 2:

Brigade management (military unit number 3647) - 146 people;

1st Parachute Battalion (military unit number 3480);

2nd Parachute Battalion (military unit number 3500);

3rd Parachute Battalion (military unit number 3520);

4th Parachute Battalion (military unit number 3540);

Separate artillery division (military unit number 3560) - 265 people;

Junior Command School (military unit number 3580) - 146 people;

Separate reconnaissance and scooter company (military unit number 3600) - 16 people;

Separate anti-aircraft machine gun company (military unit number 3621) - 39 people;

Separate communications company (military unit number 3640) - 44 people.

The parachute battalion had three parachute rifle companies (141 people in each), six separate platoons: machine gun (four heavy machine guns), mortar (six 50-mm mortars), artillery (two 45-mm anti-tank guns), reconnaissance, sanitary, and communications platoon. The number of personnel in the battalion was 546 people, in total there were 2,940 fighters and commanders in the brigade.

The third platoons of parachute companies were armed with ROKS-2 backpack flamethrowers, 24 units. The ROKS-2 flamethrower was developed in 1941 by designers M.P. Sergeev and V.N. Klyuev. This was a “pre-production” model intended for military testing. The flamethrower, weighing 23 kg, held 10 liters of fire mixture, could fire up to 8 short shots at a range of up to 30 meters. In total, the brigade had 288 flamethrowers.

Backpack flamethrower ROKS-2

In September 1941, a new staff was introduced for the airborne brigade. The strength of the parachute battalion increases to 678 people. To the three rifle and parachute companies, a mortar platoon is added, as well as a sapper and demolition platoon. This significantly increases the tactical independence of the battalion.

The brigade was part of active army from June 22 to September 14, 1941. She took part in defensive battles in Belarus as part of the Western Front.

From January 27 to June 27, 1942, she participated in the Vyazemsk Air Force. landing operation. On August 2 of the same year it was reorganized into the 110th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 38th Guards Rifle Division 3.

The brigade was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Alekseevich Onufriev.

1. Pukhovichi is a town in the Minsk province, Igumen district, near the Svisloch River.

2. http://www.soldat.ru/doc/dis/zap/ - List and location military units, peacetime institutions and establishments of the Western Special Military District on May 30, 1941. TsAMO, Western Front Fund, op. 2579 (organization and staffing department), no. 7.

3. Directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces No. 168780-1956 (List No. 7, M., 1956).

Airborne bases in the Moscow region. 1941-1945

G.V. Rivne

Places where airborne units are formed in the Moscow region:

Vnukovo– 10 airborne infantry battalion, 8th airborne infantry brigade (1943), 7th airborne infantry brigade, 10th airborne infantry battalion (1943/4), 7th airborne infantry brigade (1943);

Dmitrov– 1942 - 3rd and 4th maneuverable airborne brigades and brigades of Pacific sailors. fleet - 10 guards VDD ( Dmitrov, Yakhroma, Katuar, Orudyev o):.2 zap. Airborne Division (1943), 19th and 20th Guards Brigade (1943);

Zvenigorod– 12th Guards Brigade (1943),

Lyubertsy– 1st Airborne Division, 1942 - School of Airborne Instructors, 4th Airborne Division (1943), 11th Guards Brigade (+ Kopotnya, 1943);

Art. Monino– 16th Guards Brigade (1943);

Noginsk– 6th Airborne Corps (1942 – Glukhovo, Elektrostal), 6th Guards Infantry Division (1943), 6th Guards Infantry Brigade (1943);

Ramenskoye- 5th Airborne Division, 7th Guards Airborne Division (1943), 9th and 10th Guards Brigade (1943);

Stupino– 17th Guards Brigade (1943);

Fryazino– 3rd Guards Brigade (1942/3), 3rd Guards Brigade (1943), 13th Guards Brigade (1943/4);

Shchelkovo– 8th Airborne Brigade (1942 - 19th Airborne Brigade, 17th Art. Chkalovskaya, 18 – Raiki), 3rd Airborne Division (1943), 13th Airborne Brigade (1943/4);

Yakhroma– 18th Guards Brigade (1943).

Bases of the Moscow Military District

Kirzhach(Vlad region) - 9th Airborne Brigade (1943), 5th Airborne Brigade (1943); 14th and 15th Guards Brigade (1943/4).

Teykovo(Ivan region) – 4th airborne battalion, 1st airborne battalion, 1st, 2nd and 8th guard brigade (1943)

1941

By the beginning of the war landing units there were many in the Red Army, but their formation was closer to future military operations in the West and in the East in Primorye. Most of them took part in the fierce battles of June-August 1941. In those events, high energy and pressure in the battles of the paratroopers were already noted. History of the Airborne Forces This period of the war includes several effective airborne assaults, including in the Moscow region. The best known is the airborne assault in the Vyazemsk operation of 1941-42. But our topic is somewhat different - about the places where new airborne units were formed in the Moscow region, which became airborne bases throughout the war years.

IN pre-war time There were no airborne formation bases in the Moscow region. In September, the Airborne Forces became a special branch of the Red Army. The deployment of new corps and brigades of paratroopers began in the Volga Military District and in the Kirov Region.

On December 21, when the German troops were driven back from Moscow, the paratroopers received an Order to redeploy to the Moscow region, where district military commissars began work on preparing their deployment.

Directive VGK rates № 005920
Commander of the Volga Military District
on the redeployment of airborne formations

ordered:

1. Send the following military formations by rail to the points of new destination:

a) 1st - air-des. body - st. loading Pokrovsk 10.00 12/21/1941;

b) 4th - air-des. body - loading at station Anisovka 12.00 12/21/1941;

c) 2nd airborne. brigade - loading - st. Red Kut 4.00 12/23/1941;

d) 3rd air force. brigade - loading - st. Nameless 12.00 12/23/1941;

e) 7th air-des. body - loading - st. Nameless 12.00 12/22/1941;

f) 8th air-des. body - loading - st. Red Kut 12.00 12/22/1941;

g) 9th air-des. body - loading - st. Nameless 6.00 12/23/1941;

h) 10th air-des. body - loading - st. Adadurovo 6.00 12/23/1941.

2. Send the indicated formations fully with existing weapons, equipment, special property.

3. Provide those sent with: ammunition - 1.5 rounds of ammunition, fuel - 2 refills. Food - three days for the route and, in addition, a three-day unloading supply.

4. Confirm receipt. Deliver the execution.

On behalf of Headquarters Supreme High Command
Boss General Staff B. Shaposhnikov

New town.

This is now the name of the military town of paratroopers (Airborne Signal Regiment) on Shchelkovskoye Highway near Bear Lakes. And it began in pre-war times, when the airfield of the Experimental Test Site of the Airborne Forces was built here.

His boss was the Honored Master of Sports of the USSR in parachuting, Colonel A.I. Zigaev. (pictured, from V. Romanyuk’s book “Notes of a Test Parachutist”)

The flight tests were led by the famous designer of landing gliders, military engineer Pavel Tsybin. Testing of landing parachutes, especially parachutes with weapons and equipment (artillery and light tanks), testing of landing gliders and other landing equipment was carried out day and night.

They say that on the Bear Lakes, in October 1936, the first experiments were carried out on landing T-37A amphibious tanks on the water.

The first combat vehicle was dropped into Great Bear Lake from the lowest possible height - only 15-20 meters. In total, three T-37A (without crew) with different shock absorption options were landed in the same way. However, the designers were in for severe disappointment - all the tanks received serious damage to the bottom when they hit the water and sank. Therefore, further experiments on dropping combat vehicles were stopped.

But amphibious tanks still saw action. They were actively used during the offensive of Soviet troops in Karelia in the winter of 1939-1940, during the “winter war” with the Finns. Then the T-37, having easily crossed the water barrier, captured a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the Svir River...

In September 1942, it was in Bear Lakes that two glider air regiments were formed, each armed with 12 tugs and 30 gliders. Glider pilots flew behind enemy lines at a distance of up to 500-800 km, delivering ammunition.

During the war, glider pilot S.N. served at the training ground. Anokhin, later a prominent test pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union (1956), and G.B. Pyasetskaya, a famous parachutist even before the war. And after the war, Galina repeatedly achieved all-Union and world record results and was awarded the title “Honored Master of Sports of the USSR.”

1942 First stage

Before the New Year 1942, airborne corps began to arrive in the Moscow region.

1st Airborne Division in Lyubertsy.

4th Airborne Division in Ramenskoye,

6th airborne battalion in Noginsk (corps commander, Major General A.I. Pastrevich; (11th and 12th airborne brigade in Elektrostal, 13th airborne brigade in Glukhov - a suburb of Noginsk).

7th Airborne Division to Moscow (comoral corps major general I.I. Gubarevich).

8th airborne battalion in Shchelkovo (corps commander, Major General V.A. Glazkov).

9th Airborne Division to neighboring Kirzhach Ivanovo region(Corporate Commander Major General I.S. Bezugly).

10th Airborne Division in Vnukovo (corps commander Colonel N.P. Ivanov).

Combat training continued again.

To the defense of Stalingrad

By decree of the State Defense Committee dated July 29, 1942, 8 Airborne Forces received an urgent order to reorganize into guards rifle divisions. By STAVKA directives of August 2 and 5, 7 divisions were sent to the South near Stalingrad, where they took baptism of fire in the Battle of Stalingrad, confirming the title of the Guards with their heroism.

These were Shchelkovskaya 35th Guards sd, Kirzhachskaya 36th Guards sd, Lyubertsy 37th Guards sd, Teykovskaya 38th Guards sd, ramenskaya 39th Guards sd., Noginskaya 40 Guards sd, Vnukovskaya 41st Guards sd.

By directive of August 5, the administration of the 1st Guards Army(5 paratrooper divisions - No. 37-39) - commander - general. Lieutenant Golikov N.F.

A week later they already entered into battle on the northern face of the German wedge. Everyone knows what fierce battles took place in Stalingrad. And on the distant approach to it the fighting was no less fierce. The divisions were halved in size in 2 weeks.

During the battles for Stalingrad, General V.I. Chuikov, who commanded the 62nd Army that held the city, especially distinguished the paratroopers Lyubertsy 37th Division of General V.G. Zholudev: "...young, tall, healthy, many dressed in paratrooper uniforms, with daggers and finks on their belts. When struck with a bayonet, they threw the Nazis over themselves like sacks of straw. They stormed in groups. They did not know retreat, surrounded by them, they fought to the last "

Shchelkovskaya 35th Division of General V.A. Glazkov (pictured). On September 4, 1942, the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper wrote about the 35th Guards. SD: “Where an indestructible defense has been created, where the defenders of the battle line are determined to die rather than let the enemy through, no advantage in tanks, no air impact helps the Germans. In the battles for Stalingrad, many units of the Red Army showed outstanding heroism and resilience. An example would be guards division, commanded by Major General Glazkov. Stubbornly defending the approaches to Stalingrad, the courageous warriors of this division mercilessly destroy Germans and equipment.”

The general died in these battles; his overcoat, riddled with bullets and shrapnel, hangs in the Museum of the Battle of Stalingrad as a monument to commanders and paratroopers.

In the ranks of 35 Guards. SD fought with Guard Art. lieutenant Ruben Ruiz Ibarruri, son of the leader of the Spanish Communist Party Dolores Ibarruri, organizer of the struggle of the Spanish people in 1938-1939. with the rebel troops of Franco and their German allies. ... Pulrota commander Ruben Ibarruri died of his wounds on September 3. Having learned about the death of her son, Dolores Ibarruri wrote in a letter to Ruben’s comrades, the company’s machine gunners: “... when you defeat fascism and the Red Banner of the proletariat flies over Berlin, I will know that on this banner there is a drop of my Ruben’s blood.”

In February 1943 our divisions were withdrawn beyond the Volga for reorganization. Several hundred fighters remained from them. After the reorganization, the guardsmen still had a long battle ahead.

The words of Ruben’s mother prophetically came true - precisely at the position of the 35th Guards. SD came out as a truce in Berlin German army with agreement to surrender.

1942/43 Second stage

At the empty airborne bases, in August, the formation of a new composition of the same corps and brigades began, which, according to the Order of the NKO, by order of the NKO of December 8, 1942, were also transformed into rifle divisions, leaving the name of the airborne and with the addition of the guards.

Teykovo Ivanovo region - 4th airborne division -. V 1st and 2nd Guards. Airborne Division);

Fryazino and Shchelk. r. - 8th Airborne Division - 3rd Guards Airborne Division;

Lyubertsy – 1st brigade, 2nd and 5th maneuver. vdbr, Control 1 vdk - 4th Guards vdd.

Kirzhach Vlad. region - 9th Airborne Division - 5th Guards Airborne Division;

Noginsk- 6th Airborne Division - 6th Guards Airborne Division;

Ramenskoye- 5th Airborne Division - 7th Guards Airborne Division;

Vnukovo- 10th Airborne Division - 8th Guards Airborne Division.

Moscow region(location not determined) - 204th and 211th Airborne Brigades, 1st maneuver. vdbr – 9th Guards vdd.

Dmitrov- 3rd and 4th maneuverable airborne brigades and brigades of Pacific sailors. fleet - 10th Guards Airborne Division(Dmitrov, Yakhroma, Katuar, Orudevo).

In mid-February they were sent 30-40 km south of Staraya Russa, according to Marshal Zhukov’s plan (“ North Star") to participate in the creation of another cauldron like at Stalingrad.

B 1 shock army The 2nd (from Teykovo), 3rd (from Shchelkovo) and 4th Guards entered. Airborne Division, yes 16th Guards. sk consisted of the 6th (Noginsk) and 9th Guards. vdd. Their task from the south is to punch a hole to the west in the strong German defenses with dense minefields, defended by two infantry divisions.

Into a powerful Special group gene. M. Khozin sent the 1st (Teykovo), 5th (Kirzhach), 7th (Ramenskoye), 8th (Vnukovo) and 10th (Dmitrov) Guards to the 68th Army. vdd. Its task is to enter the breakthrough and begin encirclement with a strike to the north. large group German troops. This was part of Operation North Star.

From the Headquarters Order of February 6, 1943: “.. The main forces, in cooperation with the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, encircle and destroy the Volkhov and Leningrad enemy groups.

5. Confirm receipt, report the decision by 02/16/1943.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN, G. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D.103. L. 253, 254. Original.”

In 2012, I had to prepare a book on the 3rd Guards. Airborne Division, on the anniversary of its formation.

Study the events in these battles in detail.

February 4-5, 1943, units of the 3rd Guards. airborne forces in vehicles are sent to Northwestern Front to concentration points. Then, by night marches on foot, they arrived at the front line on February 20th.

Heavy snow and warming (everyone was dressed in wet felt boots), lack of tank support led to large losses in the personnel of the 2nd, 3rd and 9th military divisions.

3rd Guards the airborne division, which lost more than half of its personnel here, but could not complete part of the task. Despite this, her result of advancing 3 km was the most effective in the 1st Shock Army.

Thus was the baptism of fire of the 3rd Guards. Airborne Division (commander - Colonel I.N. Konev ., in the photo) where she proved that she rightfully bears the title of Guards. But it was paid for in too much blood.

Let's compare two groups of numbers - before and after the operation:

At the end of March, all guards. The airborne divisions were put into reserve, re-formed and made it to the Battle of Kursk, where the final result was already different.

But let's return to the bases left by the paratroopers.

1943 Third stage. Year of the Dnieper airborne operation

By order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0067 dated April 15, 1943 7 new guards airborne brigades (from 1 to 7) were formed on the territory of the Moscow Military District.

The brigades were deployed:

1st Guards Airborne Brigade - Teykovo (place of deployment of the 4th Airborne Division, 1st Guards Airborne Division);

2nd Guards Airborne Brigade - Teykovo (place of deployment of the 4th Airborne Division, 1st Guards Airborne Division);

3rd Guards vdbr – Fryazino village and the city of Shchelkovo (location of the 8th Airborne Division, 3rd Guards Airborne Division);

4th Guards Airborne Brigade - Ramenskoye (location of the 5th Airborne Division, 7th Guards Airborne Division);

5th Guards vdbr - Kirzhach(place of deployment of the 9th Airborne Division, 5th Guards Airborne Division);

6th Guards Airborne Brigade - Noginsk (place of deployment of the 6th Airborne Division, 6th Guards Airborne Division);

7th Guards Airborne Brigade - Vnukovo village (place of deployment of the 10th Airborne Division, 8th Guards Airborne Division).

In accordance with the same order, the 2nd reserve airborne regiment from the village. Mokrous Saratov region was redeployed to Dmitrov, the 7th reserve airborne regiment from the village. Miuss, Saratov region in Zvenigorod.

The fate of most of these brigades is known.

In September, the 3rd and part of the 5th Guards. The Airborne Brigades were airborne behind the Dnieper to block the Germans' approach to the newly captured Bukrinsky bridgehead.

2nd Guards Airborne Brigade - became part of the formed 11th Airborne Division.

4th, 6th and 7th Guards. The airborne brigades strengthened the airborne forces group of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which they wanted to use during the liberation of Crimea. In December 1943, the 4th and 7th Guards Airborne Brigades were returned to the Moscow Military District and on January 15, 1944, they were introduced into the city of Stupino along with the 16th Guards. airborne brigade in the formation of the 16th Guards. Airborne Division (Vostryakovo, Vnukovo, Stupino).

On the night of September 25, 5 thousand paratroopers of the 3rd (entire) and 5th (third) brigades were parachuted across the Dnieper.

Unfortunately for them, a day earlier, the retreating German XXI Panzer Corps was unexpectedly introduced into the same territory through the Kanevsky Bridge, closing the approaches to the bridgehead. Half of the landing force, literally thrown “on the enemy’s head,” died or was captured in the very first days. The wooded area and the mistakes of the pilots saved us from complete defeat - the landing party was scattered over 50-70 km instead of 15 km.

Having broken up into small groups and united with the partisans, the paratroopers fought heroically behind enemy lines. In early November, by order of the command, the joint military brigade (com. - Colonel of the 5th Guards Brigade M. Sidorchuk, in the photo) captured a bridgehead on the Dnieper from Cherkassy, ​​which significantly facilitated the crossing of the approaching units and their losses in the process.

Traditional exciting meetings in the 1st school with paratroopers have been an important patriotic event in the city of Fryazino since 1978. On the days of landing anniversaries, Fryazino residents also take part in meetings in Cherkassy and at battlefields.

After assessing the many errors of the operation, the massive airborne assaults were canceled by order of Stalin.

1943/44 Fourth stage – Svirsky

On June 4, 1943, GKO Resolution No. 3505ss “On the additional formation of 13 Guards Airborne Brigades” was issued.

"Top secret.

State Defense Committee

Resolution No. GOKO-3505ss

On the additional formation of 13 Guards Airborne Brigades

The State Defense Committee decides:

1. To oblige the Chief of the Main Form of the Red Army, Comrade Shchadenko, together with the Military Council of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army, to form by June 25, 1943, an additional 13 Guards Airborne Brigades according to staff No. 035/23 - 035/30, numbering 3,480 people . each.

2. Establish a three-month period for combat training and formation for the newly formed airborne brigades, completing it by October 1, 1943.

3. The deployment of the airborne brigades being formed will be established by the commander of the Moscow Military District, Comrade Artemyev, placing them on the basis of the airborne divisions previously formed in the district.

4. Oblige t.t. Shchadenko, Golikova, Voronov, Vorobyov and Peresypkin to fully staff the newly formed brigades in the following specialties no later than June 20, 1943:

a) well-trained junior command personnel no older than 30 years old, who have combat experience and meet the requirements of service in the airborne forces;

b) ordinary personnel at the expense of cadets of infantry, machine-gun-mortar, artillery-anti-tank, communications and military engineering schools, reduced by Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3282 of May 2.

The selection will be made from cadets of military schools with at least 3 months of training and fit for service in the airborne troops.

5. Oblige the head of the Main Personnel Directorate, Comrade Golikov, the heads of the main departments and the heads of the military branches to staff the formed brigades with selected personnel no later than June 15 command staff, with combat experience, if possible from among those who previously served in the airborne forces.

6. The head of the GAU, Comrade Yakovlev, must provide the brigades being formed no later than June 25, 1943 with all required weapons and artillery property.

7. The heads of the central supply departments must fully provide the brigades being formed no later than June 25, 1943.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee
I.Stalin

Military personnel of the Guards also arrived from hospitals to staff the brigades. SD and Guards airborne forces who were wounded at Stalingrad and Staraya Russa. They were in almost every company.

New brigades were deployed:

8th Guards vdbr - Teykovo;

9th Guards vdbr - Ramenskoye;

10th Guards vdbr - Ramenskoye;

11th Guards vdbr – st. Lyubertsy;

12th Guards vdbr - Zvenigorod;

13th Guards airborne brigade - Shchelkovo (three battalions in Shchelkovo, 4th infantry brigade in Fryazino, 7/28/1943);

14th Guards vdbr - Kirzhach;

15th Guards vdbr - Kirzhach;

16th Guards vdbr – st. Losino-Petrovskaya, Monino ( by order- Monino);

17th Guards vdbr - Stupino;

18th Guards vdbr – Yakhroma ( by order- Dmitrov);

19th Guards vdbr - Dmitrov;

20th Guards vdbr - Dmitrov;

The number of each brigade according to staff No. 035/23 - 035/30 is 3480 people.

The six-month period has begun combat training paratroopers. At the end of December 1943, the brigades were consolidated into guards airborne divisions - the 14th Guards. airborne division (16th, 6th and 13th airborne brigades - headquarters in Noginsk), 13th Guards. Airborne Division (Dmitrov - 18th, 19th and 20th Guards Airborne Brigade), .15th Guards. airborne division (Ramenskoye - 9, 10 and 12 airborne brigade).

1944 airborne rifle divisions cross the Svir on the Karelian front

On January 19, by order of the NKO, the 13th Guards. The airborne division was reorganized into the 98th Guards Rifle Division and reinforced with appropriate artillery. and a tank. regiments, 14th Guards. Airborne Division - in 99 Guards. SD, 15th Guards Airborne Division in 100 Guards. sd. They entered the 37th Guards. page corps, which in the summer of 1944 was sent to the south bank of the Svir to the 7th Army of the Karelian Front.

The famous false landing with stuffed animals on rafts on Svir of 12 volunteers of the 300th Guards. sp. (b. 13th Guards Airborne Brigade, Shchelkovo) made it possible to identify the remaining unaffected Finnish firing points and destroy them, which made it easier for divisions and regiments to cross the Svir.

All 12 paratroopers survived and were nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Thus began the Svir-Petrozavodsk offensive operation. The divisions, suffering losses when breaking through a 20-kilometer defense line that had been heavily fortified for three years, reached the Finnish border through rivers and forests. The Finns asked for peace.

1944/45 Outside the Moscow region.

But the bases continued to exist, receiving returning paratroopers from hospitals and infirmaries.

Creation of a base of landing equipment and equipment in Kolomna.

Memory

The Moscow land remembers the paratroopers of the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War. Many schools have collected a lot of materials about the exploits of heroes who became our fellow countrymen. They lived with our land for six months and sometimes up to a year... There are many examples when after the war they returned to our cities and started families. On the days of the anniversaries of the airborne units, their Veterans Councils more than once organized trips to these cities. We arrived on May 9 and took part in both the procession and rallies.

Streets in cities near Moscow were named in memory of the paratroopers: in Noginsk - street Airborne paratroopers, in Fryazino (Passantnikov Passage, in Shchelkovo - Svirskaya Street (along the 99th Svirskaya Guards Rifle Division, former airborne division), in Ramenskoye - Desantnaya Street, in Kirzhach - Paratroopers Street.

Glory to the Heroes!

ZIGAEV Alexander Ivanovich, Colonel of the Airborne Forces, born in 1905, in the Red Army from 1922, training. war with Finland in 1939/40. (title of the Red Star hordes"), in Otech. war 24.6.-3.9.41. From awards. sheet March 1943: “has been training paratroopers since 1934. He worked a lot on improving the equipment of parachutes. He was one of the authors of the manual for training paratroopers. He took an active part in supporting all military operations in 1942... He personally redesigned the landing parachute, which sharply reduced injuries during jumps... works a lot on testing multi-seat gliders and other parachute equipment. In preparation, dropping behind enemy lines and supporting the actions of the 4th Airborne Forces, he showed excellent examples of work... he prepared and sent weapons, ammunition and food on time. Worthy of being awarded the horde. Otech. Wars of the 1st degree... Commander of the Airborne Forces, Major General Glazunov. February 22, 1943." In 1943 beginning. 6th Airborne Forces Headquarters Directorate. Honored Master of Sports of the USSR.

TSYBIN Pavel Vladimirovich, engineer-lieutenant colonel at the disposal of the Airborne Forces, born in 1905, in the Red Army from 1927, seriously wounded in a plane crash, training. battles on CF X-XII.42. From load sheet for the first order (“Red Star”): “...organized the work of the Airborne Forces glider group and carried out a wide operation to deliver Belorussians. partisans with more than 40 tons of ammunition and the landing of 150 paratroopers in the most difficult period offensive of punitive detachments...". Famous designer of heavy gliders, cruise missiles, “Buran”, etc. He was awarded many orders.

ANOKHIN Sergei Nikolaevich, born in 1910, a glider test pilot known even before the war, parachute master. sports of the USSR (1941), from Dec. 41 - art. Lieutenant, commander of the test detachment. The Airborne Forces air squadron is testing landing equipment at the Experimental Test. Airborne Forces training ground in Bear Lakes. In August-September 1942, he conducted unique tests of the “T-60 flying tank”, to which wings and a tail were attached. On the Kalinin Front - commander of the flight detachment of the 19th Airborne Brigade, then in the LII Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union (1956), colonel.

PYASETSKAYA Galina Bogdanovna (1915-2007), lieutenant colonel, Honored Master of Sports (parachute) (1935 – Order of the Red Star).

The situation in the Western Front by January 25, 1942 and the action plan of the 4th Airborne Corps

Thus, the strike group of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, numbering about 10 thousand people without artillery, moved towards Vyazma from the southeast. From the east, the western group of the 33rd Army under the command of M. G. Efremov (about 18 thousand people) was advancing here, literally “pushed” by Zhukov into the gap in the German defense. In the north, where the troops of the Kalinin Front managed to break through the enemy defenses near Sychevka, the 29th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, the cavalry group of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, rushed to the south. On the morning of January 26, Sokolov’s cavalrymen reached the Minsk highway and the railway to Smolensk, 12 km west of Vyazma. However, in the group that broke through here (parts of the 18th, 24th and 82nd cavalry and 107th motorized rifle divisions) there were only 5,800 people, 5,000 horses, 35 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber, 47 anti-tank guns and two 122 mm howitzers, as well as 7 heavy KV tanks.

A “layer cake” had formed behind the main German defense line; The communications of the main forces of Army Group Center - the 9th and 4th Tank Armies - were under threat of interception by Soviet troops. The order of the commander of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps No. 009, issued at 16:45 on January 27, 1942, read: "7th Guards. The cavalry corps goes out into the raid in two night marches and connects with Sokolov’s cavalry group, cutting off Vyazma from the west and squeezing large enemy forces into the encirclement ring.”

This was the situation at the time of the landing. Since over the past two weeks (until the Belov group broke through Warsaw highway) on the left flank of the Western Front it remained practically unchanged, the use of initial developments in the landing operation plan was completely justified.

On January 24, the corps commander received an order for the operation from the commander of the Western Front:

“Comrade Levashev. Objective: 26–27.1 disembark the corps and occupy the lines according to the map. The goal is to cut off the enemy's retreat to the West. Zhukov."

According to the map attached to the order, the corps was supposed to take up defense with part of its forces in the area from Rebrovo to Berezniki along our line defensive structures autumn 1941, but with a front to the east. This front intercepted the railway and the Moscow-Minsk highway west of Vyazma. The corps reserve (up to a brigade) was concentrated to the west of the indicated line in readiness for action both towards Vyazma (to the east) and towards Smolensk (to the west). One reinforced battalion was supposed to occupy the defense east of the Dnieper with a front to the west.

Guided by this map, at 18:00 on January 26, the commander of the 4th Airborne Corps, in the presence of the Military Council of the Airborne Forces, the commander of the transport air group, General Gorbatsevich, announced to the brigade command the decision on the landing and further combat operations of the corps.

The main forces of the corps should have been landed southwest of Vyazma in the area of ​​Ozerechnya, Kurdyumovo, Komovo. After the landing, it was planned to capture the area of ​​Yamkovo, Mosolovo, Pleshkovo, Azarovo, cut off the main communications of the enemy’s Vyazma group, preventing both the enemy’s withdrawal from the Vyazma area to the west and the approach of reserves to Vyazma from the west. Part of the forces was deployed for reconnaissance and sabotage operations on important ways enemy approach to the landing defense area and for communication with cavalry corps. Thus, the corps was supposed to assist the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts in completing the encirclement of the enemy’s Vyazma grouping.

Breakthrough of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps through the Warsaw Highway and the drop of the 8th Airborne Brigade

The corps units are assigned the following tasks:

The 8th Airborne Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Onufriev (the first echelon of the corps) was supposed to land the forward detachment (2nd battalion) in the Ozerechnya area. The detachment had to choose a place here for the landing of the remaining forces, clear it of the enemy, organize a defense, at the same time marking a landing site and ensuring that the brigade was received there. After this, the main forces of the brigade occupied the line of Rebrovo, Gridino, Berezniki in order to prevent the enemy from withdrawing from Vyazma along the Vyazma - Smolensk and Vyazma - Dorogobuzh roads.

The 9th Airborne Brigade, after landing after the 8th Brigade, was supposed to capture the Goryanovo, Ivanniki, Popovo line and prevent the enemy reserves from approaching from the west.

The 214th Airborne Brigade with the corps' artillery division was concentrated in the center of the defended area (Vekhotskoye, Pleshkovo, Uvarovo) in readiness to carry out counterattacks against the enemy units that had broken through and to strengthen the defense of the other two brigades.

In addition, it was planned to create seven reconnaissance and sabotage groups of 20–30 paratroopers each and drop them on possible ways enemy approach to the landing defense area. Four more small groups were sent out to communicate with the cavalry corps. The landing of these groups took place simultaneously with the landing of the advance detachment of the 8th Airborne Brigade.

The hull was landed from the Kaluga airfield hub on PS-84 and TB-3 aircraft according to the preliminary landing plan. In total, to transfer the corps behind enemy lines, it was necessary to make 550–600 flights, that is, with the available number of vehicles, the landing should have taken two to three days, provided there were 4–5 flights for each vehicle per day. The duration of the corps' combat operations behind enemy lines until the arrival of the troops of the 33rd Army and cavalry corps was also determined to be two to three days.

“Inform Levashov that the cavalry of Sokolov’s group has entered the area that I marked on the map. Therefore, the situation is easier for Levashov. Think over communication techniques and give instructions to people so that there are no misunderstandings.”

The first to be sent from the Zhashkovo airfield in the afternoon of January 27 was the 2nd battalion of the 8th brigade, which had the task of preparing a snowy airfield for receiving the rest of the brigade. The battalion was commanded by Captain M. Ya Karnaukhov, and with him in the flagship plane was the head of the reconnaissance department of the corps headquarters, Captain A. A. Tsvion. However, due to a mistake by the pilots, the landing party was not dropped at Ozerechnya, but 15 km to the south, in the area of ​​the village of Tabory. The release was carried out in one go, with high altitude, so the paratroopers were scattered over a very large area (up to 20–30 km). By the morning of January 28, only 476 people out of 638 dropped had reached the village of Tabory, which was free from the enemy. But the situation was worse with the battalion’s radios: the radio operator with the powerful Sever radio station could not be found, and it was impossible to establish contact with the army radio stations from the existing radios, since the code tables were with the battalion communications chief, but he was also not there.

Soldiers of the 8th Airborne Brigade before boarding planes

Without waiting for the detachment to be fully assembled and the cargo dropped, Karnaukhov and Tsvion with the main forces of the battalion headed towards Ozerechnya. A small group of paratroopers was left in Tabory with the task of collecting stragglers and directing them along the route, and also, just in case, laying out identification marks for the next landing echelon.

Having received no news from the advance detachment, the corps commander decided to continue the landing. On the night of January 28, the 3rd battalion of the 8th airborne brigade (commander - Major A.G. Kobets) was sent from the same Zhashkovo airfield. This time, some of the planes dropped paratroopers in the Ozerechnya area, and some, having discovered signal fires in the area of ​​​​the village of Tabory, dropped troops here.

Without waiting for the battalion to be fully assembled and having orientated himself on the terrain, Major Kobets decided to carry out the task assigned to him and headed north, to the railway and the Vyazma-Smolensk highway. The paratroopers blew up the tracks on the Izdeshkovo - Alferovo stretch and subsequently continued to operate here.

Meanwhile, on the evening of January 28, the 2nd battalion approached Ozerechnya and attacked it. Two attacks were repulsed by the Germans, but the third time, already in the dark, paratroopers burst into the village, completely destroying the German garrison.

The remaining units of the 8th Airborne Brigade were supposed to land from the airfields of Grabtsevo and Rzhavets. However, German reconnaissance aircraft discovered the concentration of our transport aircraft. On the same night of January 28, the Germans attacked the Grabtsevo airfield with 24 Ju-88 and Me-110 aircraft, as a result, 7 TB-3 vehicles, one fighter and a fuel depot were destroyed here, there were killed and wounded among the paratroopers and transport personnel aviation.

As a result, flights from the Grabtsevo airfield were stopped altogether. In the following nights, the remaining two airfields were raided. Previously, they were used by German aviation, and the Germans knew their location, approaches and defense features very well. However, the Germans were unable to repeat the success of the first raid - landing missions from the Zhashkovo and Rzhavets airfields continued.

Under such conditions, until February 2, only 2,323 paratroopers of the 8th Airborne Brigade and 34,400 kg of cargo were landed. The parachutists were dropped off at large area, therefore, only 1,320 people went to the assembly areas, and 1,003 people (43% of those who landed) never came to the brigade.

Having never received reports from the brigade command by radio, the corps headquarters was forced to establish contact with it by sending Pe-3 reconnaissance aircraft and liaison officers in light U-2 vehicles with ski chassis. Subsequently, with the help of such aircraft, the brigade headquarters, which for some time was located in the village of Androsovo, 12 km south of the village of Alferovo, established contact with other units of the brigade.

Commander of the 8th Airborne Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Onufriev and Brigade Commissioner I. V. Raspopov (right)

On February 6, the brigade, like the 250th Airborne Regiment, was also subordinated to the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. On February 7, the brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Onufriev, received an order from General Belov to cut the Vyazma-Smolensk railway:

“...with all the forces of the 8th Airborne Brigade, advance into east direction and capture Gredyakino (which is near the railway), intercept the Vyazma - Izdeshkovo railway, preventing the movement of enemy trains, enter into contact with 75 cd, which advances east of Gredyakino, and with Sokolov (11th Cavalry Corps), about which I wrote You earlier."

On February 10, the 8th Airborne Brigade, after a difficult battle for Pesochnya and Staroye Polyanovo, moved to the defense of the Marmonovo and Dyaglevo area. The brigade's losses were 140 killed and wounded; according to the operational report of the headquarters of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, the headquarters of the 176th artillery regiment and the 1st battalion of the 13th motorized regiment of the 5th tank division of the Germans, while over 200 vehicles were captured. According to other sources, in the battles from February 1 to 8, units of the brigade captured 72 vehicles (obviously, here we mean only serviceable ones), 4 tanks, a tractor, 19 motorcycles and two regimental banners.

On February 2, General Belov’s corps approached Vyazma, and the day before the advanced units of the 33rd Army advancing from the east arrived here. The enemy's Yukhnov grouping, that is, the core of the forces of the 4th German Army, whose commander since January 21, instead of General Kübler, was appointed infantry General Heinrici, lost contact not only with the left wing of the army, but also with its rear and was actually surrounded.

However, the Soviet shock units no longer had the strength to hold the ring. Parts of the 11th Cavalry Corps were driven north from Vyazma in early February. Since January 26, there were continuous battles in the area of ​​the Shan plant - units of the 4th German Army of General Heinrici tried to break through to the north and connect with the 4th Tank Army of General Ruof. In the end, on February 3, they succeeded - four divisions of the 33rd Army (113th, 138th, 160th and 329th) were cut off from the main forces of the front and took up a perimeter defense southeast of Vyazma. At the same time, German troops managed to restore the integrity of the defense along the Warsaw Highway, and Belov’s corps also found itself surrounded.

In total, about 10 thousand people from the corps broke through the Warsaw Highway. About 18 thousand people from the 33rd Army were brought into the breakthrough before it was closed by the Germans on February 3. Thus, south of Vyazma there was a group of Soviet troops numbering up to 30 thousand people. However, it was scattered over a large territory, had very little artillery, and the only transport was the horses of the cavalry divisions. For some time (until the beginning of March), the lack of ammunition and supplies was compensated for by trophies and local resources, which also included warehouses left by Soviet troops in the Vyazemsky encirclement in October last year...

The operational department of the 4th German Tank Army, in a report to the headquarters of Army Group Center No. 517/42 dated February 9, estimated Soviet forces on a 120-kilometer front south and west of Vyazma at 12 thousand combat personnel. 9 infantry and 5 security battalions held the defense against them "with several heavy guns and small, partly stationary artillery"; two more ski battalions were being transferred to the area. In total, the enemy had about 7 thousand combat personnel here. This ratio did not take into account the forces of the 20th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Army, operating from the east against the western group of the 33rd Army, as well as units allocated against cavalrymen and paratroopers from the 13th and 43rd Army Corps in the south and southeast of the region.

In general, the Germans assessed the situation near Vyazma as follows:

“...The numerical balance of forces is unfavorable for us. Russian forces are much more mobile in winter conditions and have excellent signalmen and reconnaissance officers who are very quickly oriented in their own country and inform about our slow-moving troop movements.

This disadvantage cannot be fully compensated for by the fact that the Russians have very little artillery. But, despite this, it is possible that individual enemy groups will be defeated one after another. To do this, however, it is necessary to prevent the Russians from transferring new forces and supplies by air and land. According to repeated reports available so far, the Russians, mainly by air(landing forces) in the area around Luga, as well as by land transport through Bogoroditskaya, constantly receive reinforcements with people and presumably various materiel.”

So, after strengthening German front along the Warsaw Highway, the only way to change the situation in the Vyazma area was the “airmobile operation” - the airlift of troops and supplies for Belov’s forces, waging a fierce struggle for the communications of Army Group Center in the Vyazma area.

Commander of the 9th Airborne Brigade, Colonel I. G. Kuryshev

On February 1, by order of the Headquarters, a single Main Command of the Western Direction was created to manage all operations west of Moscow, headed by G. K. Zhukov. The command decided to resume the release of the remaining forces of the 4th Airborne Corps to help units of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the 33rd Army. The landing force was to include the remaining two brigades of the corps - the 9th Colonel I. I. Kuryshev and the 214th Lieutenant Colonel N. E. Kolobovnikov, as well as the last battalion of the 8th Brigade.

On February 10, the corps was transferred from subordination to Headquarters to subordination to the command of the Western Front. On the same day, he received from the front headquarters the task for a further operation. The area of ​​the same village of Zhelanye was designated as the landing site. east of the station Ugra, where at that moment Soldatov’s group (250th Airborne Division) and the partisan detachment of Colonel M. G. Kirillov, which by this time numbered about 1,200 people, were operating. After the landing, the landing party was supposed to advance to the southeast, reach the area of ​​​​the village of Pesochnya, occupying the lines of Kurakino - Borodina - Podsosonki and Klyuchi - Tynovka - Leonova. Subsequently, he was instructed to strike the enemy from the rear, reach the Warsaw Highway 25–30 km southwest of Yukhnov and connect with the advancing units of the 50th Army, thus again clearing the communications of Belov’s group.

The leadership of the landing was entrusted to Airborne Forces Commander Red Army. The initial area of ​​operation was designated as the Moscow airfield hub, well covered by air defense forces - the Lyubertsy and Vnukovo airfields. The landing site was 300 km away. For the operation, a special air transport group was created consisting of 64 aircraft - 23 TB-3 ships and 41 PS-84 aircraft. The landing force landed in two groups: the rest of the 8th Airborne Brigade - in the area of ​​Putkovo, Beli (25 km southeast of Vyazma), and the remaining two brigades of the 4th Airborne Corps - in the area of ​​Velikopolye, Lugi (40 km southeast of Vyazma ). In addition, on the night of February 17, the same group in the area of ​​the Monchalovo station, to support units of the 29th Army, cut off 15 km west of Rzhev, dropped the 4th battalion of the 204th brigade of the 5th airborne corps under the command of lieutenant P. N. Belotserkovsky.

Due to the small number of vehicles, the landing was again carried out in groups over several nights. To ensure the accuracy of the drop, it was planned to first send signal groups with three radio stations to the landing area, the activities of which were to be supported by the partisans. However, “for technical reasons” this was never done.

The situation in the Western Front by mid-February 1942 and new plan actions of the 4th Airborne Corps

However, it’s hardly a task ton Guiding aircraft using three weak driving radio stations was feasible in practice - it required good direction-finding equipment and the highest qualifications of navigators and radio operators. Besides active work The radio would inevitably attract the enemy's attention to the landing site and could cause major trouble for the planes with paratroopers.

All transport vehicle commanders were strictly warned about their responsibility for the accuracy of the paratroopers' release. As a result, the pilots preferred not to throw out their groups and return back with the paratroopers if the signs laid out on the ground were in doubt. This significantly increased the accuracy of the landing - but at the same time led to an increase in the number of flights and a delay in the operation.

The first to fly on the night of February 17 was a group of 20 TB-3 aircraft with a battalion of the 214th Airborne Brigade. However, 19 vehicles did not find the landing area and returned back. One plane dropped troops, but these paratroopers and the brigade subsequently never connected, and there was no further information about them.

The next night, a group of PS-84 aircraft with the 4th battalion of the 8th airborne brigade took off from the Vnukovo airfield to the Putkovo, Beli area. However, only 12 vehicles were able to carry out the drop; they landed 293 people from the 4th battalion of the 214th airborne brigade and 32 bales of weapons. The remaining crews did not complete the mission because the drive radios did not work, and many different fires were burning on the ground.

Paratroopers boarding planes, winter 1941/42

On the night of February 19, the landing of the 9th and 214th brigades began in the Velikopolye, Lugi area. It was more successful - a few hours before the departure, the headquarters of the Western Front announced a new signal for the drop: seven fires in the letter “G”. In total, during the night, PS-84 transport aircraft and TB-3 heavy bombers carried out 89 sorties - that is, some aircraft made two flights. 538 people and 96 bales of cargo were thrown out.

On the night of February 20, the landing was especially massive - 2,551 people landed behind enemy lines. The next night, the landing force was limited due to deteriorating weather (fog, cloud height 300–400 m). Despite this, 37 crews carried out the landing, 476 people and 73 bales of weapons were thrown out.

On the night of February 20-22, no landing took place. But on the night of February 22, it was again massive - 1,676 people were landed. On February 23, 1,367 people landed. That night the headquarters of the airborne corps was to land; contrary to instructions, all of it was in one TB-3 aircraft. It had to happen that this particular vehicle was attacked by a German Me-110 night fighter! The commander of the 4th Airborne Corps, Major General A.F. Levashov, was killed by machine gun fire and several officers of his headquarters were wounded. However, pilot Mosolov managed to land the heavily damaged car in the snow and save the rest of the paratroopers. Chief of Staff Colonel A.F. Kazankin took command of the corps.

On the night of February 24, 38 sorties were carried out and 179 paratroopers were dropped. This completed the landing of the corps.

In total, from February 17 to 24, 612 sorties were carried out to drop airborne troops, of which 443 were successful. 3 crews did not return from the combat mission. During this time, 7,373 people and 1,524 bales of ammunition, weapons, food and various property were landed and thrown out.

However, due to the high altitude of the drop (1–2 km instead of the planned 600 meters) and errors in determining the location of the drop, the paratroopers still found themselves scattered over a large area. As a result, the collection of the corps proceeded slowly. In the first days, only half of the personnel gathered, and up to 30% of the paratroopers never connected with their units. Some of these people went missing, about 1,800 people ended up among the partisans or other formations of Belov’s group and the 33rd Army (300 people came to the latter’s location). Nevertheless, already on the night of February 21, the main part of the 214th Airborne Brigade concentrated in the area of ​​​​the village of Gryada, southeast of the original landing site. To the right and further south of it the 9th Brigade was concentrated. The final assembly of the landing party was completed by the end of February 23.

Only towards the end of February 23, the corps began to fulfill its task of assisting the 50th Army. On the night of February 24, the 9th Airborne Brigade launched an attack on the villages of Prechistoye and Kurakino, but was stopped by enemy fire. Only one of the companies on the right flank of the brigade achieved success, capturing the Werterhovo station on the Vyazma-Bryansk railway road with a surprise attack, destroying the German garrison of 80 people. The 214th brigade attacked Ivantsevo, Kostinki and Zherdovka, but had no success during the night and was only able to occupy Tatyanino on the afternoon of February 24.

The commander of the 4th Airborne Corps, Colonel A.F. Kazankin, assigns a combat mission to the paratroopers

By the end of the day, after a heavy battle, the 9th brigade reached the line Klyuchi, Dertovochka, the 214th brigade - Tatyanino, Ivantseva, Zherdovka. The brigade's losses that day amounted to 280 people. There were only a dozen kilometers left to the front line of the 50th Army. However, the army's offensive, which began on February 23, was unsuccessful. In addition, the corps command did not have a direct connection with the headquarters of the 50th Army, so the paratroopers could not coordinate their actions with the army.

The right flank of the 9th Brigade, operating along the railway, achieved somewhat greater success. The Derbyansky and Subbotniki crossings were occupied here, seven were captured railway platforms with aerial bombs and a wagon with ammunition, as well as a food warehouse.

Heavy and largely inconclusive offensive fighting continued in the following days. Only on February 27, units of the 9th Brigade managed to capture the large village of Klyuchi, 7 km from the Warsaw Highway. Here the headquarters of the 12th German infantry regiment was destroyed, large trophies were taken (including 50 horses and up to 200 carts); according to our data, total losses the enemy numbered 600 people. In subsequent battles, units of the 214th brigade managed to advance another couple of kilometers, occupying the village of Gorbachi, but the offensive stalled. From the beginning of March, the corps went on the defensive on a front of 35 km, almost parallel to the front of the 50th Army behind the Warsaw Highway. The total losses of the two brigades of the corps by this time amounted to 1,200 people killed and wounded.

By March 5, 1942, the combat strength of the corps (without the 8th airborne brigade and rear) included 2,484 people, 7 45-mm anti-tank guns, 16 82-mm and 22 50-mm, as well as 93 (!) 37-mm mortars, 39 anti-tank rifles, 126 light machine guns, 707 machine guns and 1276 rifles. By this time, the corps was securing the eastern, southern and southeastern borders of a vast area south of Vyazma, occupied by Soviet troops. In the north and northeast of this area, Belov’s group defended itself; in the west (where the enemy was weaker) partisans operated, supported by individual cavalry units. The 33rd Army was located east of Belov, but in early March it was completely cut off from our main group and subsequently acted independently (with the exception of the 329th Infantry Division, which was included in Belov’s group).

From that moment on, the corps acted as a light infantry unit, forced to perform tasks unusual for it - instead of sabotage actions in the weakly protected enemy rear, try to break through the positional front.

On March 4, the commander of the Western Front gave the commander of the 4th Airborne Corps A.F. Kazankin and the commander of the 50th Army I.V. Boldin an order for a new operation to break through German positions along the Warsaw Highway. At the same time, the main task of the paratroopers remained the same - to intercept the Vyazma-Smolensk highway. On March 3, the commander of the 50th Army sent the head of the intelligence department of the army headquarters to the location of the airborne corps on a U-2 plane. Due to the failures of the offensive in the previous direction, the army intended to attack main blow in the direction of height 253.2. The offensive was planned for the morning of March 6. Kazankin was required to attack in the direction of the village of Malyshevka, then advance on Bobynino, located only 800 meters from the Warsaw highway. The operation was carried out by the 9th Guards Airborne Brigade with the support of part of the forces of the 214th Brigade.

The attack was scheduled for 3 a.m. on March 6, but already the evening before, the 2nd battalion of the 9th Guards Brigade, a kilometer south of the village of Klyuchi, came under heavy enemy fire and lay down without advancing further. The 3rd battalion secretly approached Malyshevka and at dawn, without waiting for the approach of other brigade forces, attacked it from the northeast. A little later, the 4th battalion attacked Malyshevka from the north-west. The paratroopers managed to break into the village, but they were unable to gain a foothold in it, largely due to the fragmentation of actions. In the morning, both battalions were forced to retreat to their original position.

On March 7, units of the airborne corps unsuccessfully tried to drive the enemy out of Ekaterinivka and Pesochnya. At this point, active operations ceased again - moreover, the enemy went on the offensive. The 131st Infantry Division acted against the paratroopers, which was gradually approached by new units - so, on March 18, prisoners of the 107th Regiment of the 34th Infantry Division, transferred from the Yukhnov area, were taken.

On March 11, the Germans launched an offensive from the east towards Andronovo and Yurkino against the 4th battalion of the 214th brigade. Having occupied Yurkino, on March 13 the enemy attacked the village of Gorbachi, located closest to the Warsaw highway - 4 km. The village was defended by the 4th battalion of the 9th Guards Airborne Brigade; in the evening one company of the 2nd battalion of the brigade was transferred to its aid. Moving on skis, the company quietly reached the edge of the forest north of Gorbachy and unexpectedly attacked the Germans in the flank and rear. This decided the outcome of the battle - by 18 o'clock the last Germans were driven out of the village. According to our data, the enemy left over 200 killed on the battlefield. Two anti-tank guns and a mortar, 4 heavy and 8 light machine guns and 150 rifles were captured - last digit indirectly confirms the number of killed. In addition, during the battles for the villages of Novaya and Mokhnatka these days, according to reports from units, 350 enemy soldiers were killed.

Position in the zone of the 4th Airborne Corps by March 18, 1942 and repelling the enemy offensive

On March 15, the combat strength of the two brigades of the corps numbered 2001 people, the number of 82-mm mortars increased to 18, but the rest became much smaller (14 50-mm and 8 37-mm). There were only 13 anti-tank guns left, but 6 45-mm anti-tank guns appeared in the hull. At the same time, Belov’s group had 6,250 people, 5,160 horses, 24 76 mm guns, 13 anti-tank guns (two of them captured 37 mm) and 61 mortars of various calibers.

Headquarters did not give up hopes of using the group of Soviet troops operating in the German rear to turn the situation around Vyazma and further advance against the flanks and rear of Army Group Center. At 4:00 on March 22, 1942, the command of the Western Front sent directive No. 048/op to the commanders of the 43rd, 49th, 50th and 5th armies:

"1. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command indicates that the liquidation of the Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Vyazemsk enemy group has been delayed, the 1st Guards. The cavalry corps, the western group of the 33rd Army and the 4th Airborne Forces continue to remain isolated from all rear and other armies of the front.

The bet ordered:

1. Defeat the Rzhev-Vyazma-Gzhatsk group of the enemy and, no later than April 20, leave and gain a foothold on our previous defensive line along the line Bely, Gulyashevo, Dorogobuzh, Yelnya, Snopot, Krasnoe.

2. The immediate task of the Western Front is joint efforts The 43rd, 49th and 50th Armies, no later than March 27, clear the supply routes of the 33rd Army and Belov’s group from the enemy, connect with them and subsequently destroy the enemy group in the area of ​​Ralaki, Milyatino, Vyazma.

On the right - the 5th Army completes the north-east breakthrough. Gzhatsk with the task of capturing Gzhatsk no later than April 1, after which, with a strike on Vyazma, assist the 33rd, 43rd, 49th and 50th armies in destroying the enemy near Vyazma. On the left is the 10th Army, actively defending itself, providing the flank of the 50th Army in the Roslavl direction.”

The enemy also well understood how dangerous the situation was for him. To attack the Soviet group from the south in the rear zone of the 4th German Army, a special “Haase group” was created under general management Chief of Logistics of Army Group Center. The group included the 211th Infantry and the remnants of the 10th and 11th Tank Divisions. The operation, codenamed "Munich", had the following objectives:

1. Destroy the partisan forces south of the Sukhinichi-Smolensk railway and release Yelnya.

2. Advance north along the Kirov-Vyazma railway and, in cooperation with German troops in the Vyazma area, dissect and subsequently destroy the Soviet group north of the Sukhinichi-Smolensk road.

On March 18, the Haase group went on the offensive. The 211th Infantry Division operated in the direction of Yelnya, units of the 10th and 11th Tank Divisions attacked Vyazma against the forces of the 4th Airborne Corps. With an attack in the zone of the 9th brigade, the Germans occupied the village of Pushkino, putting the 4th battalion of the 214th brigade in the area of ​​the village of Klyuchi at risk of encirclement. The battalion was forced to leave Klyuchi and retreat west of the village of Kurakino, with only 30 people left in it.

On March 20, with the permission of the front commander, the paratroopers straightened their line of defense, retreating to the line station Verterhovo, Bogoroditskoye, Akulovo, Prechistoye, Kurakino, Novinskaya Dacha. At this moment combat strength The corps was reduced to 1,483 people with four anti-tank guns, fifteen anti-tank guns, ten 82- and eight 50-mm mortars.

However, the German offensive stopped there - the enemy was also exhausted. On March 25, Zhukov reported to Stalin:

“...Units of the 4th Airborne Forces repelled the attacks of the enemy trying to capture Kurakino. There were no changes in the position of the hull parts during the day.

...There were no changes in the position of the units of the [Belov] group. A detachment consisting of a cavalry regiment and 300 infantry men is concentrated in Bol. Elenka. Reconnaissance in the direction of Sizovo clarifies the enemy's position for active actions detachment in this direction."

In turn, on March 24, the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder expressed serious concern:

“The situation is unfavorable in the rear of Army Group Center (Yelnya), where the partisans, together with the personnel units remaining surrounded, are conducting fierce attacks. It will take at least two days to transfer enough of our forces here.”

The next day Halder stated:

“The situation in the rear of [Army Group Center] (the actions of the Guards Cavalry Corps against the Haase group) is of particular concern.”

Thus, the presence in the German rear of a large organized group Soviet troops with artillery and tanks (Belov even had repaired heavy KB) not only disorganized the communications of the Center group, but also diverted significant German forces. This in itself justified the decision to carry out the operation without sufficient support, made at the end of January by the command of the Western Front.

On March 25, after artillery preparation, units of the 131st Infantry Division attacked Kurakino, defended by the 4th battalion of the 9th Airborne Brigade. The Germans managed to capture the eastern half of this settlement. Street fighting continued all day and all night. The battalion's losses in the first day of the battle alone amounted to 38 killed and 91 wounded. The battle continued until March 27, but the Germans failed to completely occupy the village.

On March 31, the enemy launched a new offensive with three battalions, supported by artillery, tanks and aviation. He managed to capture the villages of Dubrovnya, Prechistoye and Kurakino. There was a danger that the Germans would reach the railway, where a large enemy garrison (up to 800 people) was blocked at the Ugra station from March 13 by partisans and Belov's units.

On the morning of April 3, the Germans, with the support of tanks, attacked the positions of the 214th Airborne Brigade (Lebedev’s detachment), capturing the villages of Akulovo and Bogoroditskoye (10 km east of the Werterhovo station) and threatening to dissect the area occupied by the corps. The brigade retreated to the forest north of Bogoroditsky, losing 150 people in this battle. Enemy losses were estimated at 300 people and 4 tanks.

At the same time, to the east of this area, the 2nd battalion of the 9th brigade, with the support of artillery, attacked and by the evening again captured the southern outskirts of the village of Prechistoye, capturing here one heavy and 6 light machine guns, 24 rifles and a destroyed tank; Up to 30 enemy soldiers were killed. In this battle the battalion lost one man killed and 7 wounded. On the left flank, Major Jabot's detachment with his 1st battalion tried to attack the village of Voznesenye on the night of April 3, but was repulsed, losing one soldier killed and 15 wounded.

On the same day, the remnants of the 8th Airborne Brigade, numbering about 500 people, arrived in the corps from Belov’s group. The brigade occupied defenses north and northeast of Werterhovo with a front to the west, to the Ugra station. The corps headquarters was located in the village of Preobrazhenskoye.

Operation Munich and the withdrawal of German troops by the end of March

Meanwhile, the enemy began an attack on the Ugra from the south, where the small 2nd Guards was defending behind the right flank of the 214th brigade. cavalry division. As a result, on January 9, the Werterhovo station had to be abandoned, and the next day the Germans released the garrison at the Ugra station. On April 10, Zhukov reported to Headquarters:

“... over the past day 9.4.42... on the front of Belov’s group there was a battle with the advancing enemy with a force of up to two infantry battalions. Parts of the 2nd Guards. CD under enemy pressure on the southern sector of the front was abandoned. The battle continues for Ilyinka.”

At this point the front stabilized again. Moreover, the Germans even had to start retreating - on April 10, Halder’s diary stated: “The Haase group has taken the lead and is now being pulled back.”

On April 12, the enemy abandoned the Ugra station. This was a great success for us, since the station was located almost in the center of the area occupied by Soviet troops, between Belov’s group and the 4th Airborne Corps. However, by this time the command of the Western Front had given up the idea of ​​capturing Vyazma - although it tried to hold as much as possible more strength next to the communications of Army Group Center. On April 11, the 33rd Army was given the order to leave the encirclement to the east.

Even earlier, on March 31, the command of the 1st Guards Cavalry and 4th Airborne Corps received the task from the headquarters of the Western Front - to prepare a new operation to connect with the troops of the 50th Army, which on April 5 launched a new offensive against the 40th Motorized Corps of the 4th German Army on the Warsaw Highway. However, by order of Zhukov dated April 11, the commander of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps was strictly forbidden to weaken other areas of defense for this purpose - in particular, in the area of ​​​​the city of Dorogobuzh, occupied in mid-February. The new offensive was to be carried out southwest of the area of ​​the previous operation, along the Vyazma-Kirov-Bryansk railway in the direction of the city of Milyatino, that is, directly to the south. The 4th Airborne Corps was directly subordinate to General Belov.

The offensive of the 50th Army began on April 13, the 4th Airborne and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps - on April 14. The 8th and 9th brigades began advancing through the forest to the left of the railway; to their right was the 214th brigade, whose open flank, in turn, was covered partisan detachment Jabot; To the left of the railway the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division operated.

By the end of this day, the paratroopers occupied the Verterhovo station, the villages of Terehovo, Bolshaya Myshenka and Bogoroditskaya, and on the night of April 15 they captured the villages of Platonovka, Baraki, and Plotki. On the left flank of the offensive, the 214th brigade occupied the village of Akulovo, abandoned on April 4, but was unable to advance further. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division, attacking from the west, fought a stubborn battle for the Baskakovka station, 10 km south of Werterhovo.

On April 16, units of the 50th Army resumed attacks on the Warsaw Highway. At the same time, the front command decided to reinforce the paratroopers by landing a battalion of paratroopers from the air. The release began on the evening of April 15 and continued on the night of April 16-17. In total, until April 18, 559 people were collected in the corps’ area of ​​operations; Basically, they went to reinforce the smallest 8th brigade.

On the evening of April 17, the 8th and 9th brigades captured the Buda station, 8 km south of Baskakovka, capturing large trophies here - 129 horses, 400 carts, 12 light and 4 heavy machine guns, 185 rifles and three warehouses; 5 prisoners were taken. However, in the evening next day the enemy managed to recapture the station. Further attacks on it, as well as on Askerovo and Novoye Askerovo (6 km southeast of Buda) were unsuccessful. These villages were the last strongholds separating the airborne corps and the troops of the 50th Army, which this time was only 5–7 km away. But again it was not possible to overcome them - the 50th Army was again unable to move forward and stopped the offensive by April 18. On this day, Zhukov reported to Headquarters:

“...773, 146 and 198 Rifle Division, having consolidated on the achieved lines, conducted reconnaissance, transported ammunition and prepared to continue the offensive. The left-flank divisions of the army's strike group, advancing on the northern forest front. Gorelovsky, Malinovsky continue the battle, meeting stubborn enemy resistance.”

The offensive of the 4th Airborne Corps on Miliatno

By April 23, the offensive was finally stopped. Operation Munich only partially achieved its goals - the siege of Yelnya was lifted and the partisan group was scattered south of the Sukhinichi-Smolensk railway. North of this road, in the area of ​​operations of the 1st Guards Cavalry and 4th Airborne Corps, the enemy, despite the introduction of large forces, did not achieve any results.

By this time, the combat strength of the airborne corps (including arriving reinforcements) numbered 2,027 people. On April 26, by order of General Belov, parts of the corps were withdrawn to straighten the front line. The 8th brigade took up defensive positions on the approaches to the Werterhovo station, the 9th - to the village of Bogoroditsky; The 214th Brigade continued to defend at the line Dubrovnya, Prechistoye, Novinskaya Dacha.

Over the next month, there was virtually no fighting due to muddy roads and river floods; the airborne corps and Belov’s group continued to occupy their previous positions. Landing sites were created, to which regular flights of aircraft were made from " Mainland" - including even heavy TB-3. The wounded were taken out on return flights - 1,209 people were evacuated from the site in the Bolshoi Vertov area alone. Air evacuation stopped in mid-May, but up to this point, about 3,000 people had been evacuated.

At this time, the command of the Western Front again began to prepare offensive operation 50th Army, in connection with which on May 9, the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General S.V. Golushkevich, arrived at the location of Belov’s group by plane. However, the operation never took place.

By mid-May 1942, the 4th Airborne Corps consisted of 2,300 regular soldiers, 1,700 partisans, and about 2,000 wounded and sick. The corps had 7 anti-tank guns, 37 anti-tank guns, and 34 battalion 50-mm mortars.

In turn, the Germans prepared Operation Hanover I with the goal of completely defeating Belov’s group. It was supposed to start on May 24, people were supposed to take part in it following forces:

XXXXVI Tank Corps - 5th Tank, 23rd and 197th Infantry Divisions;

XXXXIII Army Corps - 19th Tank, 34th and 131st Infantry Divisions;

11th Panzer Division, 221st Infantry Division, 442nd Division special purpose, field gendarmerie regiment "Center".

The total number of troops allocated for the operation is difficult to determine - but in any case, it was many times greater than the number of the Soviet group, estimated by the Germans at 15–20 thousand people, of which personnel units (including those mobilized in the German rear) amounted to less than 10 thousand.

According to the operation plan, it was initially planned to attack the eastern part of the area, clear the Bryansk-Vyazma railway line, while simultaneously tightly blocking the Soviet group from other sides. Then the Soviet troops were pushed back to the west and destroyed there, deprived of the opportunity to break through the front line.

Before the start of the operation, it was planned to carry out a sabotage action against the headquarters of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps to eliminate its leadership. For this purpose, a special group “Graukopf” of about 350 people was created from prisoners of war recruited in the camps. The group was commanded by Colonel Sakharov, operating under the name Rogozhin. His deputy was Major Bocharov (in some documents and in the memoirs of General Belov, mistakenly referred to as Bogatov), ​​the former commander of the 462nd separate engineer battalion of the 160th Infantry Division of the 33rd Army, who surrendered on April 16, shortly before the defeat of the remnants of this army.

However, on May 23, the Graukopf group was betrayed by its own members, who defected to the Soviet troops - according to German data, these were two officers, according to the memoirs of General Belov - a foreman, whose last name remained unknown. The main detachment of the group was ambushed by units of the 8th Airborne Brigade and was scattered. To defeat the saboteurs, two companies of the 8th Airborne Brigade were urgently allocated, which ambushed the group along the route and scattered it with an unexpected fire strike. Most of the saboteurs were killed, several dozen were captured; Only about a hundred people were able to reach the German troops.

Nevertheless, the Germans assessed the results of the actions of the Graukopf group as “ important success“,” especially noting that it was “the first attempt to use the Russian unit in combat operations on our side.” They sincerely believed that “in the first phase of Operation Hanover, the enemy was deprived of a unified system of troop leadership... Despite the difficult terrain conditions, this unit caused significant unrest and pinned down large enemy forces.”

At a meeting on May 26, the commander of the XXXXIII Army Corps painted a rosy picture of the results of the actions of the Graukopf group:

“...The very appearance of a White Guard detachment in the Soviet rear certainly caused confusion... telephone connection was violated, commissars and political instructors were killed, several hundred enemy soldiers were captured, and weapons captured from the enemy were destroyed; The unit contributed by participating in several battles with enemy units called by radio or telephone, which suffered heavy losses, resulting in real panic...

In the end, the Reds, in the confusion, shot at each other (according to the prisoners)... The commissars and political instructors allowed themselves to be misled and handed over their weapons along with their subordinates...

Prolonged contact with the enemy led to major losses in the formation (at the moment, out of 350 people, only about 100 have returned) ... "

The above examples well illustrate the characteristic property of German reporting documents - a riot of imagination in the absence of accurate data or when these data do not contain good news. In reality, the action of the Graukopf group only revealed the upcoming Operation Hanover - the captured Major Bocharov reported that the Germans were preparing an offensive against the Belov group.

On May 24, the Germans attacked the airborne corps' location simultaneously from the south and north along the railroad; No active operations have yet been carried out in other sectors of the Soviet defense. On the first day of the operation, Halder’s diary assessed the results as “good,” but the very next day they turned into “insignificant.” Only on May 27 did actions begin to “bring success” again.

As a result, a threat of dense encirclement was created, so the commander of the airborne corps decided to go west through the area south of the Ugra station and the Ugra River to directly connect with Belov’s group. This maneuver was carried out between May 26 and May 31.

German command gave great value the destruction of Belov's group - the results of actions against it are noted in Halder's diary (by this time it had become extremely stingy) almost every day.

“In the center, new successes have been achieved in eliminating the remnants of the enemy in the rear. Belov’s troops that broke through are being pursued.”

“The elimination of enemy remnants in the rear of the 4th Army is proceeding successfully. Unfortunately, the main forces of Belov’s cavalry corps and the 4th airborne brigade [correctly - corps] are leaving to the south.”

However, already on July 16, Halder was forced to state: “At the front of Army Group Center, the troops of the Russian General Belov again broke through in the direction of Kirov. This does us no credit!” The next day, Halder actually summed up the entire operation: “General Belov’s cavalry corps is now operating west of Kirov. After all, he diverted a total of 7 German divisions to himself.”

The first phase of Operation Hanover I. The departure of the 4th Guards Airborne Corps to join the main forces of the Belov group on May 24–29, 1942

Breakthrough of Belov's group from encirclement, crossing the Warsaw highway and reaching the area west of Kirov

According to German data, during Operation Hanover I, only in the zone of the XXXXIII Corps (which bore the brunt of the operation) 2,943 people were killed, and about 1,150 more people were killed by other German formations. In total, the Germans captured 5,630 prisoners - most likely, most of them were traditionally local residents of all ages. According to the American historian G. Weiberg (in teamwork edited by J. Armstrong) the Germans during the operation lost 468 people killed, about 200 missing and about 1,300 wounded.

Most likely, these figures are underestimated - German statistics traditionally took into account irrecoverable losses retroactively, after lengthy clarifications; The updated data was not always included in army and corps reports, especially if the unit was transferred from one unit to another. It is known that the 221st Infantry Division alone lost 133 soldiers missing in action.

Commander of the 23rd Airborne Brigade, Colonel A. G. Milsky

From the beginning of June about keeping the Germans behind the lines large district there was no longer any question. Now the 4th Airborne Corps operated in a dense group with the remnants of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. From May 29 to June 3, 1942, the 23rd (Colonel A.G. Milsky) and 211th (Colonel M.I. Shilin) ​​airborne brigades were sent to strengthen this group - a total of about 4 thousand people. With them were sent 131 anti-tank rifles, 184 light machine guns and 48 battalion mortars.

At the same time, the command of the Western Front agreed to the request of General Belov to allow his group and paratroopers to leave the German rear. It was decided to make the exit in a roundabout way. To do this, it was necessary to carry out a raid of 160–200 km in a large arc - first go to the southwest along the Warsaw Highway, and then from the west reach the defense bulge of the 10th Army in the Kirov region. The withdrawal of Belov’s group from June 4 was covered by the fresh 23rd Airborne Brigade, which held defenses near the villages of Gavryukovo and Volochek. On the night of June 6, the brigade was the last to withdraw to a new line.

Entry of the 4th Airborne Corps into the 10th Army zone in the Kirov area

On June 14, when breaking through the Warsaw Highway, units of the 4th Airborne Corps defeated a large enemy group and captured the banner of the 398th Infantry Regiment. Due to the fact that only part of the corps’ forces could immediately overcome the highway, its commander decided to change the route and move south of what was planned earlier, waiting in the partisan zone southwest of Kirov. From June 18 to 21, the seriously wounded in the group were taken from the partisan airfield in the forest north of Kopali. On the night of June 28, the remnants of the 4th Corps, numbering 2,800 people, entered the defense zone of the 10th Army near Zhilino (northwest of Kirov), losing 120 people killed and wounded in this battle.

Two days earlier, directly west of the Kirov front, control and part of the forces of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps passed over. General Belov and corps commissar A.V. Shchelakovsky, by order of Zhukov, were taken out by U-2 aircraft on June 24, when 50 km remained to the front. The remaining units of the cavalry corps left the German rear until the end of June, and small groups - in July.

G. P. Sofronov. Airborne landings in the Second World War. M.: Voenizdat, 1962.

I. I. Lisov. Paratroopers (Air landings). M.: Voenizdat, 1968.

Soviet airborne forces. Military historical essay. M.: Voenizdat, 1986.

A. G. Fedorov. Aviation in the Battle of Moscow. M.: Nauka, 1971.

M. M. Malakhov. Strike of the Horse Guards. Essay on the military operations of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (November 1941 - June 1942), M.: Voenizdat, 1961.

P. A. Belov. Moscow is behind us. M.: Voenizdat, 1963.

I. G. Starchak. From the sky - into battle. M.: Voenizdat, 1965.

B. M. Shaposhnikov. The defeat of German troops near Moscow (Moscow operation of the Western Front November 16, 1941 - January 31, 1942). M.: Voenizdat, 1943.

Russian archive. Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997.

Military Historical Archive, 1988, No. 3.

N. Soldatov, A. Korolchenko. Znamensky landing // Military-historical magazine, No. 12, 1972.

Ya. Samoilenko. From the experience of controlling airborne assault forces during the war // Military History Journal, No. 12, 1979.

F. Halder. War diary. Volume 3, book two. M.: Voenizdat, 1971.

K. Reinhardt. Turning near Moscow. Per. with him. M.: Voenizdat, 1980.

J. Armstrong. Guerrilla warfare. Strategy and tactics. 1941–1943. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007.

Notes:

This remark does not detract from the value of Yu. A. Vinogradov’s works on the battles on the Moonsund Islands.

The Soviet troops failed to finally achieve such success in 1942, but for some time the only communication line of the 9th and 4th tank armies of the Center group remained the Minskoye Highway leading to Smolensk, periodically cut off by cavalrymen and partisans. However, a counterattack by the German 5th Tank and 208th Infantry Divisions in early February prevented the cavalrymen of the Kalinin and Western Fronts from making reliable contact.

According to the work of Sofronov. In the book by A. G. Fedorov “Aviation in the Battle of Moscow” a different figure is indicated - 2497 people.

I. I. Lisov. Paratroopers (Air landings). M.: Voenizdat, 1968. P. 109.

Collection of materials on the study of war experience. Issue 5 (March 1943). M.: Voenizdat, 1943. P. 30.

On March 11, the Western Group of the Army numbered 12,780 people; the group's total losses from February 1 to March 10 amounted to 5,245 people. See: Military Historical Archive, 1988, No. 3. P. 160, 162. However, according to other data, the group’s losses from February 1 to March 13 amounted to only 3821 people (ibid., p. 103).

Military Historical Archive, 1988, No. 3. P. 160

According to a report from the division headquarters on March 13, 1942, in battles on both fronts (against the western and eastern groupings of the 33rd Army), it lost 3,699 people killed, wounded and sick.

Military Historical Archive, 1988. No. 3. p. 105.

Former commander of the 38th Don Division, which was surrounded near Vyazma in October 1941.

According to Fedorov's work - 72 aircraft.

From the battalion (425 people), 312 paratroopers were dropped, another 38 people mistakenly parachuted in their rear (near Staritsa), and 75 soldiers did not make the jump and were brought back. However, only 166 people made it to the location of the 29th Army, while one of the groups of paratroopers managed to destroy an enemy artillery battery. A week later, on the night of February 24, units of the 29th Army broke through in a southwestern direction and linked up with units of the 39th Army.

A. G. Fedorov. Aviation in the Battle of Moscow. M.: Nauka, 1971. P. 236. Thus, there were 25 people and 2-3 bales per car!

A. G. Fedorov. Aviation in the Battle of Moscow. P. 237.

Not to be confused with the Dorogobuzh station, which continued to remain in enemy hands.

Military Historical Archive, 1988, No. 3. p. 101.

J. Armstrong. Guerrilla warfare. Strategy and tactics. 1941–1943. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. P. 67.

According to other sources, even 9 divisions acted against the Soviet group. See: J. Armstrong. Guerrilla warfare. Strategy and tactics. 1941–1943. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. P.

Memoirs of V. Mironov - former commander airborne mortar division 211 Vdbr

From January to May 1942, on the territory of the Smolensk region in the area of ​​Yelnya and Dorogobuzh - Smolensk, a formation of Soviet troops under the overall command of General P. A. Belov smashed the enemy rear of the armies of the Center group. This group included the 1st Cavalry Corps, 4th Airborne Corps, 1st Partisan Division "Grandfathers" and other small units. The enemy carried out operations Seydlitz and Hanover against the troops of the Belov group. The territory of the "small Soviet land"began to shrink.
The situation was extremely difficult. In such a situation, the commander of the Western Front, G.K. Zhukov, decided to send the 211th and 23rd airborne brigades to help the Belovtsy. They were taken from the General Headquarters reserve and, maintaining strict secrecy, were sent to the Smolensk region. 28 years have passed since then. What is the fate of these brigades?
I don’t know how the 23rd brigade operated, but I can tell you about the 211th, because in it I had to command an airborne mortar division and see the actions of all parts of the brigade and its command. In heavy battles in the Smolensk region, all our documents were lost. The Podolsk archive of the Ministry of Defense contains only a statement for the issuance of allowances to paratroopers who flew to Smolensk land and orders from the command of the Western Front on rewarding paratroopers who distinguished themselves in battle. In addition, one more confirmation has been preserved - this is an article by (now deceased) General P. A. Belov in military history magazine No. 8 for 1942 - “Five-month struggle behind enemy lines.” But he wrote more about cavalrymen, but only about paratroopers mentioned. As for the memory of the heroes who survived (whose addresses have now become known), it is fresh, as before, and carefully preserves the events of 1942.
So, the 211th Airborne Brigade, under the command of a remarkable commander, former Chapaevite and parachute researcher Methodius Ivanovich Shilin, took off from the Moscow airfield on the night of May 29-30, 1942. Many PS-84 aircraft circled over darkened Moscow and headed for the Smolensk region. The line of the Western Front passed near Vyazma, the City was burning, and to the south of it, flickering lights were visible from a height of 5,000 meters. It was the enemy anti-aircraft gunners who fired at us from cannons and machine guns, illuminating our planes with the blue beams of searchlights. We had no casualties. We successfully broke through to the Dorogobuzh and Elninsky regions under the cover of night fighters.
At dawn on May 30, paratroopers were dropped. I rushed into the white morning darkness, and immediately my heart seemed to freeze from a rapid fall. I looked at the sky, it was all dotted with parachutes. After landing, the division headquarters gathered at the school in the village of Oeyishche, Dorogobuzh district, and the division was located in the nearest forests north of Yelnya. The 1st battalion of “winged” infantry, together with brigade commander M.I. Shilin, brigade chief of staff Major Grigory Andriyanovich Bocharov and commissar Pavel Dmitrievich Kotov, landed partly near Mytishino, and partly five kilometers south of Dorogobuzh. Immediately all units were thrown into battle.
Here are some examples of the heroism of our paratroopers.
Brigade commander M.I. Shilin (native of Novouzensk) with great energy and skillfully led the battle, maneuvering the main forces of the brigade. On June 8, he was wounded, and at the same time he began to have an attack of stomach ulcers. General Belov ordered him to be sent to Mainland from a partisan airfield. With tears in his eyes, Shilin left the brigade. He was carried by prosecutor Zvyagintsev, adjutant Gashimov, translator Krylova, and chief Gorodetsky. I found Krylova’s diary in Moscow from relatives. She writes that they were attacked on the way
enemy planes. Nachkhim, Lieutenant Sasha Gorodetsky (originally from the Moscow region) shielded the brigade commander from bomb fragments with his body and died.
In Novye Luki, Methodius Ivanovich Shilin was provided with medical assistance, but he did not live to see the plane arrive.
The unforgettable feat of the commissar of the 3rd battery, political instructor Mushet Ivanovich Amirkhanyan. When we broke through from the Dorogobuzh region into the Bryansk forests, I ordered Amirkhanyan to command the rear outpost. She held back the onslaught of superior enemy forces. Mouchette was wounded and fired back to the last bullet. And he spent the last cartridge on himself.
I remember the feat performed by cryptographer officers Lieutenants Lisin (originally from Engels) and Tikhonenko (from Lyubertsy). They ran into a German ambush near the village of Shui. They were fired at from machine guns. Ivan Gerasimovich Tikhonenko with secret documents and turned back into the forest in code, while Lisin remained to cover his retreat. The documents and code were saved, but Lisin died.

Amirkhanyan Mushegh Ivanovich, born 1918, ur. Georgian SSR, Tetritskaro district, village. Daget-Khachin, senior lieutenant, battery commissar, political instructor (p/p 1904) Omd is listed as missing
http://www.obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=72572335&page=2
In fact, he died in the Dorogobuzhsky district of the Smolensk region

The 8th Airborne Brigade was formed in March 1941 from personnel of the 231st Infantry Division.

On June 22, it was part of the 4th Airborne Forces of the Western Special Military District and was located together with other corps brigades in the area of ​​Pukhovichi (50 km southeast of Minsk).

The staffing of the brigades was completed by June 1, 1941, but providing them with military equipment in sufficient quantity before the start of the Great Patriotic War it was not possible.

In the Western direction, the paratroopers entered the battle at the end of June, when fascist German tank groups, having broken through east of Minsk, rushed to the Dnieper and Smolensk. The command of the Western Front made every effort to delay the enemy as long as possible at the last advantageous line - the Berezina River and deprive him of the opportunity to break through to the Dnieper on the move. To this end, the 4th Airborne Corps was ordered to move to the area south of Borisovo and take up defensive positions along the Berezina River. Here, units of the corps stopped the formations of the 24th motorized corps, moving in the direction of Berezino and Svisloch, did not allow the enemy to cross the river on the move and delayed further promotion enemy tanks.

For six days, the paratroopers repelled massive attacks by tanks of the German 24th Motorized Corps.

At 3 o'clock on July 15, up to a hundred tanks with enemy motorized infantry broke through the front at the junction of the 42nd and 55th rifle divisions, captured the city of Propoisk and rushed along the highway to Krichev.

The commander of the Western Front gave the order to detain the enemy and prevent him from breaking through the Sozh River, entrusting this task to the commander of the 4th Airborne Division. The front had no other forces here.

On July 15 and 16, the paratroopers, fighting heavy holding battles, retreated to the Sozh River and by the end of July 16 moved to the defense of river crossings in the area of ​​​​the city of Krichev. During July 17, the corps successfully repelled attacks by enemy tanks. however, the enemy, having brought up reserves, on the night of July 18, as a result of subsequent attacks, captured Krichev, crossed Sozh and captured a bridgehead on the left bank of the river.

The fighting for Krichev continued. The enemy sought to develop his success at any cost. The paratroopers, holding their positions, launched counterattacks.

By this time the situation in the western direction was very difficult. And the order of the commander-in-chief of the western direction indicated that the enemy, having concentrated large forces in the Vitebsk and Mogilev directions, broke through the front in the area of ​​Shklov and Bykhov and went out in mobile groups to the area of ​​​​Velizh and Gorki, trying to break through to Smolensk and encircle the Vitebsk-Orsha grouping of Red Army troops. Subsequently, enemy groups continued to advance east with the goal of cutting off the main communications and reaching deep behind the Soviet troops in this direction. The loss of the water line between Sozh and Krichev further aggravated the situation that had developed by the beginning of the second half of July.

The commander of the 4th airborne battalion, Major General A. S. Zhadov, was summoned to the command post western direction, where Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko gave him the task of restoring the situation on the Sozh River and driving the Germans out of the city of Krichev.

To coordinate the actions of the corps and other units to carry out the combat mission set by S.K. Timoshenko, on July 18, the commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General V.F. Gerasimenko, arrived in the Krichev area.

On the morning of July 19, parts of the corps reached their starting position for the attack on Krichev. With a decisive rush, the paratroopers reached the left bank of the river. But it was not possible to develop success. Having neither aviation nor sufficient artillery support, parts of the corps could not overcome the defenses and cross the river and retreated to the Krasny Bor, Mikheevichi, Velikan line, where they began to put themselves in order and prepare for a new counterattack.

A repeated attempt to return Krichev was also unsuccessful. The 8th Brigade was late in reaching the attack line and was unable to take part in the battle.

On the morning of July 21, the corps again attacked the enemy in the direction of Krichev. The 7th Brigade reached Korenaya and the forest to the west of it, where it was stopped by enemy fire from the Mikheevichi side. The 8th Brigade, having reached the forest east of Pondokhovo, was also stopped by concentrated enemy artillery and mortar fire.

Hard fights beyond Krichev continued for several more days. On July 22 and 23, the 4th Airborne Corps continued to persistently attack the enemy defending the left bank of the Sozh River at Krichev. However, the attacks were not successful.

On the evening of July 29, a combined detachment of paratroopers under the command of the chief of the operational department of the corps headquarters, Major V. S. Timchenko, despite heavy enemy fire, crossed the Sozh River and broke into the city. All night there was a fierce battle with the Nazis in the area railway station, near the military registration and enlistment office, as well as in the villages of Voronevo and Zadobrost adjacent to the city. Two enemy battalions were almost completely destroyed, only individual soldiers managed to escape from the city. However, at dawn the Nazis launched a significant force of infantry and tanks into a counterattack. The paratroopers were forced to leave the city. In this battle, Major V.S. Timchenko was mortally wounded.

Subsequently, the 8th Airborne Brigade fought as part of the 4th Airborne Corps in the Unecha, Pogar, and Starodub areas.

On August 18, the corps received the task of breaking through the enemy defenses between Unecha and Starodub and reaching the line Lipki, Alenovka, Ryuhovo, Neutopovichi and going on the defensive. The paratroopers successfully completed this task, improving general situation for the 13th and 21st armies. Subsequently, the corps defended for seven days and delayed the enemy’s breakthrough in the eastern direction. By August 24, the corps reached the Suzemka area, where it was withdrawn from the 13th Army.

Since the brigade always operated as part of the 4VDK, a more detailed history of the brigade’s combat operations can be found in history.