The largest military-strategic operations were:
Final withdrawal 900 day siege of Leningrad in January 1944;
Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Liberation Right Bank Ukraine;
In the summer of 1944, as a result of Operation Bagration, one of the strongest enemy groups, “Center,” was defeated, Belarus was liberated, and the liberation of the Baltic states (autumn 1944) and Poland (early 1945) began;
During the Iasi-Chisinau operation, Chisinau was liberated.
In 1944, the entire territory of the USSR was liberated from Nazi occupation. The Soviet Army began to liberate Eastern Europe. Soviet troops liberated Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia.
In June 1944, Soviet troops launched Operation Bagration in the Belarusian direction. A 100,000-strong group was surrounded by two counter strikes east of Minsk German troops. Soviet troops rushed into the resulting 400-kilometer breakthrough. Towards the end of the operation, when it began general offensive, almost the entire territory of the USSR was liberated. The Soviet Army entered East Prussia and the territory of Poland. The Allies launched a general offensive in Northern France at the end of July. In August, American and French troops landed in the south of France. The Allied offensive coincided with the beginning of an anti-fascist uprising in the country. On August 18 it began in Paris and after 4 days the entire city was in the hands of the rebels. When the Allies approached the city, the blockaded garrison of Paris capitulated. By the end of 1944, France and most of Belgium were liberated. The Allies stood at the borders of Germany. The military failures of Germany and Japan in 1944 further aggravated the crisis of the ruling regimes. In Germany, it manifested itself in a conspiracy against Hitler, organized with the active participation of a group of senior Wehrmacht officers. The main participants in the conspiracy were quickly arrested, 5 thousand people were executed, including 56 generals and one field marshal, 4 field marshals committed suicide without waiting for arrest. The conspiracy gave impetus to the tightening of repression, and the destruction of all imprisoned opponents of the Nazi regime began.
In July 1944, a major offensive by Soviet troops began on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. In August, the Soviet Army entered Romania. King Michael ordered the arrest of Prime Minister General Antonescu and declared war on Germany. In the armistice signed on September 12, Romania confirmed the transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. On September 5, Bulgaria also requested a truce. Miklai Horthy also tried to sign a truce with the allies, but intervened German command. It displaced him. Power in Hungary passed into the hands of local fascists, who declared their intention to stand with Germany to the end. In September, the Soviet Army entered the territory of Yugoslavia, a significant part of which had already been liberated from German troops by the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, led by Josip Broz Pito. The entry of the Red Army on a broad front into Central and South-Eastern Europe immediately raised the question of further relations between the countries of this region with the USSR. On the eve and during the battles for this vast and vital important region The USSR began to support pro-Soviet politicians in these countries - mainly communists. At the same time, the Soviet leadership sought recognition from the United States and England of their special interests in this part of Europe. Given the fact of the presence of Soviet troops there, Churchill in 1944 agreed with the inclusion of all Balkan countries, except Greece, in the sphere of influence of the USSR. In 1944, Stalin achieved the creation of a pro-Soviet government in Poland, parallel to the exile government in London. The armed forces of the latter waged an armed struggle on the territory of Poland against both German and Soviet troops. In August 1944, they launched an uprising in Warsaw, which was ruthlessly suppressed by the Germans almost in full view of the Soviet Army. Sharp disagreements arose between the USSR, on the one hand, and England and the USA, on the other hand, regarding what kind of government should exist in Poland.
The final stage of the Second World War.
Winter 1944
The main goal is to lift the blockade of Leningrad and liberate right-bank Ukraine
In January it was finally the blockade of Leningrad was lifted, which lasted 900 days. The northwestern part of the USSR territory was liberated.
In January it was held Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya operation, in the development of which Soviet troops liberated Right Bank Ukraine and southern regions USSR (Crimea, the cities of Kherson, Odessa, etc.).
Summer 1944 The Red Army carried out one of the largest operations of the Great Patriotic War("Bagration"). Belarus was completely liberated. This victory opened the way for advances into Poland, the Baltic states and East Prussia. In mid-August 1944, Soviet troops westward reached the border with Germany.
IN end of August started Yassko-Kishinevskaya operation, as a result of which Moldova was liberated. The opportunity was created for the withdrawal of Romania, Germany's ally, from the war.
Vistula-Oder operation January 12 – February 3, 1945, Poland, most of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were finally liberated.
· In April 1945 - Berlin operation . It was aimed at the final defeat of fascism. Troops of the 1st (commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov), 2nd (commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky) Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian (commander Marshal I.S. Konev) fronts destroyed the Berlin enemy group and captured about 500 thousand people, great amount military equipment and weapons.
The fascist leadership was completely demoralized, A. Hitler committed suicide. On the morning of May 1, the capture of Berlin and the Reichstag was completed(German Parliament) the Red Banner was hoisted, a symbol of the Victory of the Soviet people.
May 8, 1945 in the suburbs of Berlin - Act of unconditional surrender. 9th May The remnants of German troops in the Prague area were defeated. Therefore, May 9 became Victory Day of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.
Victory:
Sources:
Mass heroism
Unity of front and rear
Successes of the partisan movement
Military art of commanders
Results:
The defeat of fascism
Expanding the country's borders
The beginning of the creation of a world system of socialism
Price:
Russia - 27 million people (10 million in combat, 17 million - civilians)
Germany – about 8 million people
During the winter offensive, the Armed Forces of the USSR finally thwarted the plans of the Nazi command, which sought to restore the defense of German troops along the Dnieper and hold heavily fortified positions near Leningrad and Novgorod. The winter campaign of 1944 clearly showed the illusory nature of the enemy's calculations of the insurmountability of his defense. Soviet troops, having the initiative, having a large impact force, reserves, surpassing the enemy in the art of war, broke into the defensive fortifications of the Nazis, inflicted enormous damage on them in manpower and military equipment, surrounded and destroyed individual groups of enemy troops. During the winter campaign on the Soviet-German front, 30 divisions and 1 brigade were completely destroyed and 142 divisions and 5 brigades of the enemy were defeated; of these, 14 divisions and 3 brigades suffered such heavy losses that they were disbanded. The enemy lost more than 1 million soldiers and officers, 20 thousand guns and mortars, 4,200 tanks, 4,200 assault guns and about 5 thousand aircraft.
Soviet troops advanced hundreds of kilometers in the Southwestern and Northwestern theaters of military operations, menacingly enveloping the flanks of the German Army Group Center, defending in Belarus, on the most important routes to the German borders. Our troops operating in the central sector of the Soviet-German front now had favorable conditions to deliver a crushing blow to this powerful enemy group. In the south, Soviet troops, having reached the Carpathians, cut the front of the enemy defense and isolated the army groups “Northern Ukraine” and “Southern Ukraine” from each other. The Red Army gained the opportunity to advance on Lvov, Lublin, as well as Bucharest and deep into the Balkan Peninsula. In connection with the liquidation of the Crimean enemy group, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front were released, which made it possible to strengthen the strategic reserves of the Headquarters Supreme High Command. In the North-Western theater of military operations, the Red Army, as a result of the defeat inflicted on Army Group North, could organize an offensive to liberate the Baltic states and Karelia. The strategic situation has changed favorably for the Baltic and especially the Black Sea fleets.
The operations carried out by the USSR Armed Forces in January - May 1944 testified to the further development of Soviet military art. Strengthening the composition of the fronts, armies and corps, as well as the reserves of Headquarters, the increase in military equipment, the growth of the skill of command personnel, the high morale and military skill of the soldiers provided a solution for more high level a number of basic problems of military art.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, possessing the strategic initiative, continued to impose its will on the enemy. Hitler’s generals hoped that the “rotten” winter in the north and the early mud in the south would allow them to put their troops in order after the defeats suffered in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. However, the Soviet command, having deployed offensive actions on the Right Bank of Ukraine, near Leningrad and Novgorod, deprived the fascist German troops of respite. Previously existing ideas about the impossibility of conducting large-scale combat operations in conditions of muddy roads, impassability, and spring flooding of rivers were overturned.
The strategic offensive carried out in the winter of 1944 had another very remarkable feature. Unlike the previous three offensive campaigns, which usually began with a counteroffensive following heavy defensive operations and then developed into a general offensive, the winter campaign began after a successful strategic offensive in the summer and autumn of 1943. In the direction of the main attack, in Right Bank Ukraine, it unfolded without a pause and was, as it were, a continuation of the previous campaign. This raised many difficult problems for the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff. It was necessary to develop plans for operations of enormous scope, taking into account the grouping of troops that had developed during the offensive; carry out intra-front and inter-front regroupings in a very limited time and create powerful groups in the directions of the main attacks; to pull up the rear of armies and fronts that are far behind and ensure that the troops are provided with everything they need in conditions of muddy roads; replenish the army, which suffered significant losses in the summer-autumn offensive, with people and equipment; create large reserves of the Headquarters by the beginning of the winter campaign. The Soviet Supreme High Command, on the whole, successfully coped with these tasks.
The strategic operations of the winter campaign unfolded on wide front. Offensive operations, which began in December 1943 in a strip of about 500 kilometers, in February - March 1944 were already carried out on a front stretching 1300-1415 kilometers. The depth of advance of Soviet troops in the winter campaign was about 400 kilometers. The enormous scope of operations required the Supreme High Command to organize clear strategic interaction between fronts, fleets, air force, troops air defense countries and partisans. Headquarters set tasks for them in a timely manner and skillfully used all forces and means, including strategic reserves.
The offensive operations of the fronts and armies were distinguished by an increase in their scope, a skillful choice of the direction of the main attack, the massive use of forces and means in selected directions, well-prepared and skillfully executed fire strikes that crushed enemy defenses, and a more advanced use of tank and mechanized troops, which made it possible to develop the success of the breakthrough and achieve high rates of pursuit. As an example of encirclement operations, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation entered the history of Soviet military art. However, Soviet troops failed to successfully complete the encirclement of large enemy groups near Leningrad, in the areas of Kamenets-Podolsk, Bereznegovatoye - Snigirevka. In the first case, the main reason was primarily the insufficient pace of the offensive. Difficult meteorological conditions played a significant role in this. In other cases, the main thing was that the front command did not provide the necessary forces to the internal and external fronts of the encirclement.
In the winter of 1944, Soviet troops continued to advance in the face of fierce enemy resistance. Thus, in Right-Belarus Ukraine alone, the enemy launched 10 counterattacks in the tactical defense zone and 2 counterattacks in the operational depth. From 2 to 15 divisions were involved in their implementation, with 2-4 tank and motorized divisions participating in each of them. Most of the counterattacks were repelled by Soviet troops. The decisive condition for success in this case was rapid maneuver of forces and means.
Even prominent bourgeois military historians are forced to admit the greatness of the victories of the USSR Armed Forces in the winter campaign of 1944. D. Fuller, regarding the last (Crimean) operation of this campaign, writes: “... the Russian winter offensive of J 944 ended with one of the most brilliant campaigns of this amazing year in terms of concept and execution.” Hitler’s General G. Guderian assesses the consequences of the campaign this way: “Heavy bloody winter battles completely knocked out the main command ground forces out of a rut."
With every month of 1944, the front inexorably rolled back to the west. There was no doubt that the aggressor was doomed to defeat. But it was also clear that he would resist to the end. Countries anti-Hitler coalition made a joint decision: the only way The end of the war is the unconditional surrender of Germany.
By the beginning of 1944 the troops Hitler's Germany and its allies still held a significant part of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, stood at the walls of Leningrad, on Karelian Isthmus. A significant part of Europe was under Hitler's heel. The Allies fought in southern Italy. Germany managed to increase the production of weapons and carry out total mobilization, but the strategic initiative had already been lost by Hitler’s generals. The sharpness and correct assessment of the situation disappeared in their decisions. And vice versa, a number of operations of the Soviet command at the final stage of the war became exemplary in the history of military art.
In 1944, attempts at a large-scale offensive along the entire front were no longer made, but operations were carried out sequentially in various sectors. This transfer of attacks from one direction to another forced the German command to transfer forces from one section of the Soviet-German front to another.
The fighting qualities of the Red Army personnel have increased. The warriors gained experience, skillfully acted in the offensive, and were eager to expel the invaders from their native land as quickly as possible. Hatred towards the invaders grew during the liberation of cities and villages, when soviet soldiers saw traces of destruction, violence and atrocities committed by the Nazis against the local population. Nothing could stop such soldiers.
The year 1944 began with an offensive near Leningrad, as a result of which the city was completely released. Almost simultaneously with this, the operation to liberate Right Bank Ukraine developed. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 2nd Ukrainian Front (I.S. Konov) surrounded the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky enemy group. The onset of a thaw made combat operations difficult. The enemy tried to break the ring. A group of German troops managed to break through the formations of our troops in the Vatutina sector.
In mid-April, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front approached the foothills of the Carpathians. And by the end of March 25, formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the state border of the USSR.
Exit to the border. The summer of 1944 arrived. The German command believed that the Red Army would continue its offensive in the southern direction. However, from the spring of 1944, preparations were underway for the operation under code name"Bagration". The configuration of the front at the site of the operation represented a huge ledge. The flanks were the most protected. It was for them that they were planned powerful blows. The terrain with its rivers, lakes, swamps, forests was convenient for the defenders and, on the contrary, created big problems for the attackers. In three years, the Nazis turned the cities of Belarus into strong fortified zones. What was so easily abandoned in 1941, now, in the summer of 1944, had to be recaptured, relying on the courage, heroism and dedication of Soviet soldiers.
The Belarusian operation began on June 23, 1944. Thus, the Soviet Union fulfilled its obligation to conduct a major operation simultaneously with the opening of a second front. On June 6, Allied troops crossed the English Channel and fought their way across (Northern France.
The offensive in Belarus was carried out by forces of four fronts. Zhukov was at the command post commander 3rd) by the army of General A.V. Gorbatova. A participant in the civil war, one of the few survivors of the meat grinder of the repressions of the 30s, subjected brutal torture in the dungeons of the NKVD, but did not incriminate himself or any of his comrades (like K.K. Rokossovsky), he was released shortly before the 1st war. The army commander was concerned with achieving victories while saving as many soldiers' lives as possible. Having data about weaknesses enemy defense, he suggested that Zhukov change the breakthrough site. Zhukov supported him. A bold strike by the tank corps managed to capture the crossings across the Berezina, and a significant group Nazi troops ended up in the cauldron. The aviation dealt blow after blow. Burnt fuels and lubricants, military equipment, covering the battlefield with ominous fire. Hundreds and thousands of German soldiers died, deceived by Hitler.
A well-thought-out, long-term enemy defense system turned into “cauldrons” - Bobruisk, Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk. On July 3, Minsk, or rather its ruins, was liberated. The Soviet soldiers were met by the few surviving residents of the Belarusian capital.
Having superiority in forces, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed an offensive. However, the enemy, skillfully maneuvering, organized short counterattacks. On July 29, the advanced units of the front reached Viola and immediately began crossing it. Most of those who crossed in the first ranks died, but the bridgehead on west bank rivers bkl withheld. Stern and rarely revealing his feelings, Zhukov, talking about his meeting with the surviving soldiers, wrote: “... I could not listen without excitement and a feeling of bitterness that such brave people were dying.”
The victories won by the Red Army in Belarus and the western regions of Ukraine contributed to the offensive allied forces in the West. The Germans had to leave Normandy. And gradually they began to retreat to the borders of Germany.
The successful operations of the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus led to the withdrawal of one of Germany's allies, Finland, from the war. The Baltic enemy group, numbering more than 30 divisions, was squeezed into a small part of the territory of Latvia, where it was captured in May 1945. In the struggle for the liberation of the Baltic states from Nazi troops, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian military formations that were part of the Red Army took an active part Army. Vilnius, Tallinn, and Riga were liberated.
The general contours of the Red Army's combat operations were outlined back in November 1944 by the forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. It was necessary to defeat German group armies "A", completely liberate Poland. This operation went down in history as the Vistula-Oder operation. The start of the offensive was accelerated by events on the Western Front. At the end of December 1944, German troops launched an offensive in the Ardennes on Belgian territory and began to push back the Allied troops, who found themselves in an extremely unfavorable, almost hopeless, position. However, fulfilling their allied duty and at the request of the leadership of the United States and Great Britain, Soviet troops went on the offensive on January 12, 8 days ahead of schedule, pulled back some of the divisions from the west and thereby saved the Anglo-American units from defeat.
On January 17, 1945, Warsaw was liberated. The offensive developed so rapidly that at times the advanced units of the Soviet troops found themselves surrounded by the retreating Wehrmacht forces. In February, Red Army units crossed the Oder, the last major water barrier before Berlin.
The fighting on the bridgeheads captured after crossing the Oder was unusually fierce.
On these same days, when Soviet troops were fighting from the Vistula to the Oder, the operation began in East Prussia. The enemy resisted desperately, the advance of our troops was slow. Everything on this land was adapted for defense: both Teutonic castles and fortresses of the times Seven Years' War, And reinforced concrete pillboxes, even cities and villages. In these battles, the commander received a mortal wound Zm Belorussky front I.D. Chernyakhovsky is the youngest of all front commanders. He was not yet forty years old. The soldiers loved him for his fearlessness and simplicity. He never allowed himself to humiliate a subordinate. A.M. took command of the front. Vasilevsky. A former tsarist staff captain, he was drafted into the Red Army in 1919 and linked his fate with it. Calm, decisive, proactive, Vasilevsky always behaved with dignity.
The culmination of the operation was the assault on Koenigsberg. Perfectly defended and provided with everything necessary, with a selected garrison, the city seemed impregnable. But, having carefully prepared, the Soviet command unleashed the full power of artillery and aviation on the enemy. Assault groups burst into the city. Its commandant O. Lash noted: “It was impossible to imagine before that such a fortress as Konigsberg would fall so quickly.”
Battle for Berlin. It was April 1945. The Red Army was preparing to storm Berlin. Everyone wanted to end the war as soon as possible and understood that this would happen in a matter of weeks. The death of each of his comrades was all the more bitter. After the war, some military leaders, for example General A.V. Gorbatev, expressed the opinion that it would be enough to surround Berlin and squeeze out the remnants of Hitler's troops, force them to capitulate, saving the lives of many Soviet soldiers. At Headquarters in the spring of 1945, questions were not posed this way. The leaders of the USSR believed that delaying hostilities could lead to the Germans opening a front in the west. He announced that Hitler committed suicide on April 30 and proposed to begin negotiations on a truce. This was reported to Stalin, who demanded to negotiate only on unconditional surrender. There was no response from Hitler's successors, and hostilities resumed. But the next day, at 15:00, the Berlin defense headquarters ordered the cessation of hostilities. Berlin has fallen. During the assault on the German capital, Soviet troops lost 300 thousand killed and wounded. Remains of German troops in northern Germany, pressed to the coast Baltic Sea, also capitulated. On May 9, the act of unconditional surrender of Germany was signed. It was Victory.
« A great victory The Soviet Army in 1944 was a new triumph of the most advanced Stalinist military science in the world. Ten Stalinist crushing blows were distinguished by their exceptional determination, they were united by a wise strategic plan and the will of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. In operations unprecedented in scale, new methods of warfare and major operations were applied with the greatest skill. All operations were carried out in the style of a decisive Stalinist strategy of gigantic proportions... Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin, implementing the plan for the 1944 campaign, unerringly chose such directions of the main attacks that led to the defeat of the most important enemy groupings and were unexpected for the enemy.”
In 1944, the Soviet Armed Forces achieved outstanding successes: the territory of the USSR was completely liberated, Hitler's allies were withdrawn from the war, and the Red Army reached the borders of the Third Reich.
This was facilitated by various political, economic and military factors: the immeasurable superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition in resources, the depletion of German potential, the growth of technical equipment and, most importantly, significant qualitative changes in the Red Army, the invaluable assistance provided to the Soviet Union by the allies (Hitler, on the contrary, had to spend funds , to arm Hungarian and Romanian soldiers), opening a second front in Europe.
After the war, most of these factors were declared “bourgeois falsifications” designed to “downgrade the role of the USSR” in the overall victory. And the main thing is that the socialist system was the most advanced, the Soviet leadership was the most wise and error-free, Soviet military art- the most skillful Soviet commanders- a galaxy of outstanding strategists trained Communist Party.
For example, a political worker in life, General Krainyukov, knowledgeably reports: “The operational plans of General N.F. Vatutin, like the plans of any Soviet military leader, were developed on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army... Despite the difficulties of front-line life and enormous employment, Nikolai Fedorovich repeatedly turned to the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, as well as to the works of prominent Soviet military theorists "
Here is another generalization of the war experience: “To master the Soviet military art in the Great Patriotic War, a deep knowledge of the decisions of congresses and conferences of the Communist Party is required Soviet Union, works by V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, which cover issues related to military science, as well as the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee “Fifty Years of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.”
We have already said that the overwhelming majority of Soviet military leaders in the first period of the war demonstrated their professional unsuitability, their inability to organize, train troops and manage them competently. In three years, although not all of them, they learned a lot. True, these were three years of brutal war and training was expensive. But not the generals.
« All these commanders learned war from war, paying for it with the blood of our people» , - Zhukov writes in an official document, but points not at himself, but at the regimental and battalion commanders and the mistakes of the General Staff, which he himself led, in training personnel. In fact, the phrase “all these commanders” really refers to everyone - from the Supreme to the squad commander.
Nevertheless, we learned. As A. Werth notes: “Over the past two years, the USSR, despite extremely heavy losses in people and military equipment, day after day created an exceptionally combat-ready, skillful and technically superbly equipped army, while Germany’s reserves were steadily depleted.”
Overwhelming superiority in technology and qualitative changes in organization allowed the Red Army to carry out outstanding operations in 1944 to encircle large enemy groups near Korsun-Shevchenkovsk, Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Minsk, Lvov, Iasi and Chisinau, which went down in history as examples of military art. They were proof of the growth and maturity of the soldiers, officers and generals who, during the war, mastered this form of strategic and operational-tactical maneuver. Numerous strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command made it possible to continuously increase the force of strikes during operations and develop them to great depth.
In the field of operational art, the issues of organizing and implementing a breakthrough of enemy defenses and crossing water barriers were successfully resolved. The art of maneuvering troops after the completion of a defense breakthrough rose to a new level.
Further development The tactics of the Red Army also received. In offensive combat, it was characterized by the rejection of linear tactics, high maneuverability, and the massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack. Since the summer of 1943, troops switched to deep formation of combat formations, which led to a narrowing of offensive zones, breakthrough areas, and an increase in tactical densities.
But this is only one side of reality, overshadowing everything else. Artillery Marshal N.D. Yakovlev writes about this: “Unfortunately, most of them, that is, articles, conversations, memoirs, are somehow similar to each other. In many cases, they carry a patina of boring praise addressed to a number of military leaders, descriptions of the exploits of individual soldiers, political workers, commanders, and partisans.”
The congenital vices inherent in the Bolshevik system remained unchanged: total control, the reduction of the individual to the level of a cog, neglect of the individual training of a soldier, ruthlessness towards his own soldiers.
Yes, such talented military leaders as Rokossovsky, Tolbukhin, Chernyakhovsky came to the fore in the war. But at the same time, Gordov, Sokolovsky, Maslennikov and other “lords” continued to command the armies and fronts, or, as division commander Gladkov calls them, “chiefs of a different type”:
“...for them the subordinate commander was empty space, in extreme cases, a cog in the iron mechanism of obedience: tighten the nuts and that’s it! One of these military leaders, General Maslennikov, made me go through a lot...
Today he orders one division to attack, tomorrow - another, giving absolutely no time to organize the battle. And, of course, we suffered unnecessary losses. Maslennikov threatened, punished people, apparently thought he would win the battle in this way. No! The battle can only be won by skill.
One day, army headquarters reported that the group commander had left for our division and would soon be at the command post. I was delighted, thinking that I would be able to report to the big boss the situation in my area, offer my thoughts on overcoming difficulties and receive instructions. As a new person, I needed to look around and get comfortable. And I waited for the boss to help me.
I didn’t have to wait long... I was told that Commander Maslennikov was calling. He quickly took the map, got into the car and drove off with the lieutenant colonel. Before reaching twenty meters, I jumped out of the car and just wanted to introduce myself to Maslennikov, when he began to insult me at all costs: “I’ll take you down. I'll send you to a penal battalion. I’ll shoot you... Why don’t you advance?”...
I stood in front of him in full uniform, and he, sitting in the car, continued to scold, and I saw not a wise boss who could teach a subordinate how to beat the enemy on the battlefield, but a bundle of nerves, incapable of managing not only people, but and by yourself. It was disgusting.
Having finally seized the moment, I told Maslennikov that in order to advance, it was necessary to organize an offensive, allocate the appropriate amount of ammunition and time for preparation. The answer was no better than the beginning: “Are you going to teach me? There is no ammunition - go on the attack yourself! In such a situation, one could say only one thing: “I obey, go on the attack yourself...” With a heavy soul, I returned to the command post. The thought was racing in my head: have we really been taught military science for years in vain, will no one understand that we cannot trust the fate of the troops to such people, that the losses that our units suffer largely depend on such commanders, who lose their heads in a difficult situation. Maslennikov was not strong in military affairs. He was transferred to the army on the eve of the war, and before that he worked in the internal affairs forces. He was unable to organize an offensive operation: he lacked knowledge and organizational talent. Then I thought that the party would figure it out, it would ensure that real leaders were at the head of the troops everywhere.”
The party sorted it out: Maslennikov, who had ten classes of external education, extensive experience in serving in the NKVD and did not know how to “organize an offensive operation,” two years after the described meeting was appointed commander of the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front, awarded the title of army general and Hero of the Soviet Union “for skillful leadership of troops and the courage shown at the same time.”
It was painfully difficult, in the fight against the inertia of one’s own superiors and their fear of taking responsibility, under the watchful supervision of the “authorities”, new tactics were born. Mostly battlefield officers did this, and at the risk of their lives. Acting in accordance with pre-war regulations, it was possible to kill an entire regiment in one attack, but God forbid you lose even a rusty shovel “not according to instructions.” Great pilot and teacher of air fighters A.I. Pokryshkin was put on trial for his experiments. The widow of the ace who created the tactics of Soviet fighter aviation says: “I especially want to talk about what Pokryshkin’s new tactical developments led to. Alexander Ivanovich was accused of violating fighter aviation regulations. He was expelled from the party and regiment lists, removed from squadron command, banned from flying, his documents for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union were revoked, and he was also transferred to a reserve regiment, which was extremely offensive for a combat pilot. And what’s worst is that a criminal case was opened against Pokryshkin. According to the laws of war, he was threatened with execution.”
Despite the fact that he shot down more than anyone else in the regiment. Later, the political instructors-entertainers would come up with a chant: “Where Kozhedub and Pokryshkin are, the fascist is screwed,” and then the vigilant comrades could well have “covered the lid” of Pokryshkin himself.
Tankers had similar problems when, at their own peril and risk, in violation of instructions, they introduced an attack with open hatches or used battle formations not provided for by the regulations, as Generals Arkhipov and Beloborodov recall.
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, in response to censorship complaints about the film “They Fought for the Motherland” regarding the fact that there was no place for a single Soviet general in the film, said that the colonels won the war.
And that is to say, the following, for example, reasoning could have arisen in the heads of Gordov and Mehlis: “Studying the effects on methods of warfare new technology and weapons, we at the same time considered the role of the main factor ensuring military success - the role of the individual soldier. Trained?… Right! American soldier has high fighting qualities, but there is a limit for him. Therefore, preserving his individual strength and the strength of the collective is one of the most important tasks of the commander.”
The Red Army, although it transferred the war to “foreign territory,” still fought with great bloodshed, the “most important task of the commander” was to carry out the order at any cost, and the “main factor” was to show mass heroism: “Until the very end of the war, the Russians, without paying any attention to attention to losses, they threw the infantry into the attack almost in close formations.”
Its losses in 1944 amounted, according to incomplete data,
6.5 million soldiers and officers were killed and wounded, that is, as in previous years, the active army was “expended” by 100 percent. Almost one and a half million of them are irrevocably lost. Surpassing the Third Reich in human resources by two and a half times, the USSR began conscripting seventeen-year-old boys at the same time as Germany. Wehrmacht losses on all fronts during the same period amounted to 1.6 million people.
German conscripts were transferred to active army after four and six months of training they received in the Army Reserve. Moreover, they were distributed among newly formed or restored divisions in the West so that, if possible, they could get to the front later. The Soviets rushed into battle on the move, sometimes without having time to change clothes and get weapons. In the first two years of the war, enormous sacrifices were made to avoid defeat, and in the last two, to hasten victory.
23,700 burned in 1944 operations Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns - the most high rate for the entire war. The Wehrmacht lost 11,860 combat vehicles, but the Eastern Front accounted for slightly more than half of the panzer motorized divisions (as of June 1, 26 out of 48). Tankers, without counting, were thrown into breakthroughs and unsuppressed defenses, used to close gaps in their fronts and storm cities, sent on deep raids without air cover, and drove entire armies into swamps. The pinnacle of the Soviet “art of war” was the destruction of two tank armies in Berlin, in the hasty assault of which, in general, there was no particular military necessity.
The official data of the Russian General Staff on air force losses is simply amazing. In 1944, losses in combat aircraft amounted to 24,800 aircraft, also the maximum during the war. But something else is shocking: of this number, only 9,700 died in battle, and 15,100 belong to non-combat losses. On the one hand, Soviet military acceptance at factories turned a blind eye to defects and real “flying coffins” often arrived at the front. On the other hand, the level of training of the “Stalinist falcons”, especially the replenishment, still remained extremely low. Former commander of the 4th Air Army, Marshal K.A. Vershinin recalls preparations for Belarusian operation: “Three aviation divisions arrived to us from the 1st Air Army... We learned that the 309th Air Force was 60% staffed by young pilots who arrived from schools. 22 of them completed the flight program only on the Po-2 aircraft and did not fly on a combat aircraft at all. The situation was no better in the 233rd shad. It consisted of 32 young pilots. In both divisions, the personnel had a long break in combat operations.”
That's why absolute domination it was not possible to conquer in the air in 1944 either.
Until recently, Soviet generals and marshals preferred the shortest routes and the simplest solutions. If there were enough forces, as at Berlin, to push through, they didn’t fool themselves by coming up with a maneuver. As a matter of fact, since the fall of 1944, all Soviet operations have been a continuous assault on the “lair of the fascist beast.” The outcome of the strategic operations of the Soviet troops was always ultimately decided by the overwhelming superiority in the number of personnel and the amount of military equipment.
One can boast in retrospect that the Red Army would have defeated Germany even without a second front. It’s just unclear, if all 30 German tank and 17 motorized divisions and all Luftwaffe aviation were on the Vistula and Danube, with whom would Zhukov and Konev storm Berlin in 1945, with fifteen-year-old youths?
In conclusion, a characteristic touch. In August 1945, Dwight Eisenhower visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of Stalin. The small American delegation was greeted with great pomp and attention, there were many meetings, receptions and toasts. They drank to every allied leader, every marshal, every general, admiral and air commander present, in general to each other and their loved ones. Only one officer said: “I want to make a toast in honor of the most important Russian man in World War II. Gentlemen, I propose to drink with me to an ordinary soldier of the great Red Army!” Is it a coincidence that it was not Zhukov who offered to drink to the Russian soldier, not soviet marshal or a general, or a lieutenant in the American army?
The summer-autumn campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1944 occupies a prominent place in the history of the Great Patriotic War as one of the most significant in its political and military results. Having completed the liberation of Soviet land from Nazi invaders, The Red Army completely fulfilled the most important political task assigned to it by the Communist Party and the Soviet government. State border The USSR, treacherously violated by the Nazis in June 1941, was restored along its entire length from Barents Sea to Cherny. In the summer-autumn campaign, the Red Army liberated about 600 thousand square kilometers of Soviet territory from the occupiers, on which about 20 million people lived before the war. In total, during two campaigns in 1944, 906 thousand square kilometers of Soviet land were cleared from the enemy , where in pre-war time About 39 million people lived and worked. If we take into account that the troops of Nazi Germany and its satellites during the war temporarily occupied 1926 thousand square kilometers of the territory of the USSR, the population of which before the war was about 85 million people, then it turns out that in 1944 46 percent of the territory subject to occupation was liberated .
With great sympathy and active support from the working people of European countries, the Soviet Armed Forces in the summer of 1944 began to carry out the following important task- providing assistance to the peoples of Southeast and Central Europe in their liberation struggle. The Communist Party proceeded from known position V.I. Lenin about the international responsibilities of the socialist state, about the liberation mission of its armed forces. Hitler's invaders were expelled from Romania, Bulgaria, a large part of Poland, and most of Hungary. The Red Army entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, bringing liberation to its people. Soviet troops, cooperating with the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, cleared the eastern regions of the country from Nazi enslavers. Under the direct influence of the victories of the Red Army and under the blows of the people's armies of Albania and Greece, the occupiers were forced to leave these states in the fall of 1944. The Red Army brilliantly justified the hopes placed on the Soviet Union as their liberator and friend by the peoples of Europe who had suffered under Hitler's yoke.
The transfer of the war to the borders of Germany and to the territory of the countries - its vassals was the most important military-political result of the summer-autumn campaign of the third period of the Great Patriotic War. The blows inflicted by the Red Army on Hitler's Wehrmacht led the coalition of fascist powers to the collapse. The victories of the Soviet troops not only put an end to participation Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in an aggressive, unjust war. They contributed to the fact that the peoples of these countries, with the support of the USSR, were actively involved in the fight against Germany, and the armed forces of Romania and Bulgaria, starting in September 1944, shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army, fought against the Germans. fascist troops.
In the summer-autumn campaign, the Red Army thwarted the foreign policy plans of the Itler elite. Its plans to stop the Soviet Armed Forces at a great distance from the borders of Germany and its satellites failed. Fascist Germany lost its European allies and found itself in a position of international isolation. The hopes of the Hitlerites for clashes within the anti-fascist coalition did not materialize. .
The defeats suffered by the German fascist army on the Eastern Front in the summer and autumn of 1944, sharply worsened the internal situation in Germany. With the liberation of the Soviet Baltic states, Belarus, western regions of Ukraine and Moldova by the Red Army German fascists lost the opportunity to shamelessly plunder these vast areas and satisfy at their expense the economic needs of their armed forces and rear. After the expulsion of the occupiers from the countries of South-Eastern Europe, Germany could no longer barbarously use the human, industrial, agricultural and other resources of these countries to wage war on German factories Romanian oil, Hungarian bauxite, nickel from Pechenga stopped flowing The appearance of Soviet troops in the Balkans forced the ruling circles of Turkey to finally abandon the supply of strategic raw materials to Germany The exit of the Red Army by the end of 1944 to the borders of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and entry into East Prussia posed a threat in these areas German military industry.
The armed forces of Nazi Germany suffered colossal damage in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. All army groups - “North”, “Center”, “Northern Ukraine” (“A”), “Southern Ukraine” (“South”) - were subjected to a crushing defeat. A significant part of their troops was surrounded and either destroyed or captured. The remaining part of Army Group North was blocked by Soviet troops in Courland. In total, during this campaign, the Armed Forces of the USSR completely destroyed or captured 96 divisions and 24 brigades, defeated 219 divisions and 22 brigades, of which 33 divisions and 17 brigades suffered so much big losses that the city was disbanded. The Nazi army lost 1,600 thousand people, 6,700 tanks, 28 thousand guns and mortars, and more than 12 thousand aircraft in the summer-autumn campaign.
Repentance and huge losses the vaunted Wehrmacht Soviet-German front opened to the German people eyes on the true hounds of Germany Although the Hitler clique still kept the population and army in obedience, no efforts of Goebbels propaganda could hide from the German workers the fact that the territory of their country had become a theater of military operations
The growing economic power of the USSR, the grandiose victories of the Red Army, Lenin's foreign policy in relation to the peoples liberated from the fascist yoke, aroused warm sympathy for the Soviet Union and support for it among the masses European countries. The most important result of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944 was the further increase in international authority
Soviet Union, strengthening the coalition of anti-fascist states. In the second half of 1944, the coordinated military actions of the coalition participants produced the most effective results. Opening of a second front in Western Europe meant the victory of the common cause of the anti-fascist coalition. Thanks to the victories of the Armed Forces USSR There was a further expansion of the coalition - Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary joined it.
The rapid offensive of the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1944 southern section The Soviet-German front finally buried the intentions of British reactionary circles to forestall Soviet troops in entering the Balkans. Their plans for armed intervention in the countries of South-Eastern Europe failed (with the exception of Greece). The Red Army and the forces of democracy thwarted the plans of the American-British imperialists to send their troops into Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, to establish anti-people regimes in these countries and turn them into satellites of Washington and London.
The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the states of South-Eastern Europe shackled internal reactionary forces that sought to preserve the old social order. The victory of the Red Army over Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary deprived the internal reaction of these countries of the last opportunity to use their main support - the army - in the struggle against the working people. The presence of the Red Army on the territory of the countries it liberated was of great revolutionary significance for them, as it created a favorable environment for strengthening democratic forces. The popular masses of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, led by the communist and workers' parties, launched a struggle for the creation of new social and state orders based on the principles of people's democracy.
The victories of the USSR Armed Forces in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944 dramatically changed the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front. As a result of the strike by our troops in Belarus and the combined strike in the western regions of Ukraine a large number of Soviet combined arms, tank and air armies, as well as reinforcement facilities were withdrawn to the eastern and southeastern border of East Prussia, in Eastern Poland, to the Vistula line. These forces turned out to be the shortest route to the central regions of Germany and to its heart, Berlin. The subsequent strikes of our troops in the Baltic states and south of the Carpathians led to the defeat of the enemy in these areas as well. As a result of the catastrophic defeat of the Nazi troops in the south, the people's liberation armies of Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania were given the opportunity to interact with the Red Army on the left flank of its strategic front and conduct even more active actions against the occupiers on the territory of their countries. Thus, by the end of the summer-autumn campaign, the Red Army occupied very advantageous strategic positions for delivering final blows to Germany from the northeast, east and southeast.
The operations carried out in 1944 marked a new stage in the development of Soviet strategy. The experience of centralized leadership of the armed struggle accumulated by the Headquarters over the previous years made it possible to organize even more clear interaction between the fronts and branches of the Armed Forces during the summer-autumn campaign. In the second half of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command applied more fully than in any other campaign before, a system of successive attacks on the enemy on various, often very distant from each other, sectors of the front. The political and strategic goals of this campaign were achieved through a complex of operations carried out by a group of fronts, or less often by a single front. The blows were delivered sequentially both along the front and in depth. In the operations carried out in the summer and autumn of 1944 in the Western and Southwestern theaters of military operations, the dependence of one operation on the other, their interdependence, was especially clearly revealed. Each of them not only led to a change in the strategic situation or major political changes in a given area, but also created favorable conditions for striking in other areas or even in other theaters of military operations.
In the summer-autumn campaign, the Soviet Armed Forces fought on their own soil and on the territory of eight foreign countries. The offensive was carried out along the entire Soviet-German front - from the Barents to the Black Sea. The depth of advance of our troops has reached unprecedented proportions. For example, in the Southwestern Theater of Operations it was more than 1,200 kilometers. The pace of the Red Army's advance was high. So, in some operations it ranged from 15-20 to 30-35 kilometers per day.
The increased level of art of troop movement made it possible to achieve encirclement of enemy troops in many operations of the summer-autumn campaign. This campaign stands out from all the campaigns of the Great Patriotic War in that it involved the largest number of encirclements of large enemy groups: near Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Minsk, Brody, Chisinau and Budapest. The time to eliminate an encircled enemy was significantly reduced. If near Stalingrad, for example, this took more than two months, then east of Minsk - seven days, and near Chisinau - mostly five days. Great success achievements were also made in the development of methods for creating an external front of encirclement. Only west of Budapest did Soviet troops switch to defensive actions on the external front. In other cases, the troops located on the outer front of the encirclement continued the rapid offensive and thereby provided the troops with internal front the best conditions for eliminating an encircled enemy group.
A huge role in achieving such brilliant results in encirclement operations belonged to armored and mechanized forces. Tank armies, separate tank and mechanized corps, as a rule, were intended to develop operations after breaking through the enemy’s defenses, to pursue and encircle his groups, to combat suitable enemy operational reserves. The entry into battle and the rapid advance of tank armies into the depths of enemy defenses in order to capture important operational or strategic objects were main task. This rich combat experience can be successfully used by highly mobile ground forces in modern warfare.
Equipping the Red Army with continuously improved military equipment in 1944 greatly increased its offensive capabilities. The operations acquired an even greater scope and were distinguished by the decisiveness of their goals. Increasing the effectiveness of the fire strike of artillery, tanks and aviation made it possible to break through enemy defenses at a high pace, and the rapid introduction of large masses of mobile troops into battle made it possible to rapidly develop achieved success, pursue and defeat the enemy. Characteristic feature The tactics of the Soviet troops in many operations of the summer-autumn campaign was to carry out a non-stop breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line on the first day of the operation. Neither the rains and impassable mud in the spring and autumn of 1944, nor the water barriers and difficult mountainous terrain of the Carpathians, nor the difficult conditions of the Arctic could stop the Red Army.
Thus, the operational art and tactics of the Soviet Armed Forces met the objectives of the strategy, which led to the achievement of the goals of the campaigns. It should be noted, however, that in some operations the fronts did not solve all the tasks assigned to them. Such operations include: the offensive of the 2nd Baltic Front in January - February; Proskurov-Chernovtsy operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front in March - April; offensive Western Front in the central section in January - April; Riga operation of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts in September - October.
The achievement of major victories by the Red Army in 1944 became possible thanks to the greatest patriotic enthusiasm and combat skill of the soldiers. The enemy hoped that with the transfer of the war to the territory of foreign states, the morale of the Red Army personnel would decrease. But his calculations failed. Inspired by humane ideas liberation struggle, Soviet soldiers were filled with an unshakable determination to overcome all difficulties on their battle path. They showed truly massive heroism. Over the period of two campaigns in 1944, the number of recipients in the army and navy doubled, reaching 3 million people. The number of Heroes of the Soviet Union - the best sons and daughters of our Motherland - has almost doubled. In 1944, the famous fighter pilot twice Hero of the Soviet Union A.I. Pokryshkin was awarded the third medal “ Golden Star", and twenty other Heroes of the Soviet Union - the second Gold Star medal. In the same year, Colonels I. N. Boyko, A. V. Vorozheikin, S. F. Shutov, I. I. Yakubovsky and Captain 3rd Rank A. O. Shabalin were awarded this highest military award twice.
The gigantic scale of the armed struggle in 1944 required the rear of the Red Army to carry out large transports. If in 1943 the total volume of centralized supply transportation amounted to 1,164 thousand wagons, then in 1944 it reached 1,465 thousand wagons. During this year, about 118 thousand wagons of ammunition alone were shipped to the Fronts. A huge amount of work was done by road transport. In 1944, 50 percent of the cargo transported during the entire war fell. The Red Army consumed over 3.8 million tons of fuel in 1944, compared to 3.2 million tons in 1943, which amounted to about 30 percent of the fuel consumed during the entire war. The military medical service coped well with its tasks.
The battles of the 1944 campaigns confirmed that the Red Army had grown into a formidable force, superior to the enemy in all respects. In 1944, it inflicted major defeats on Nazi Germany and the armies of its satellites. During both campaigns, 126 divisions and 25 brigades were completely destroyed or captured, 361 divisions and 27 brigades were defeated, of which 47 divisions and 20 brigades suffered such damage that they were disbanded. These losses amount to about 65 percent of the total number of enemy divisions and brigades destroyed, captured and defeated on the Soviet-German front in the offensive campaigns of 1941-1944. Such losses were irreparable for Nazi Germany. The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General Guderian, in a certificate of losses dated November 2, 1944, was forced to admit: “ Heavy losses in August - October 1944 led to a significant aggravation of the situation with personnel in the field ground army". The document provides the following data: in August, September and October, the losses of ground forces on the Eastern Front amounted to 672 thousand people, and at the same time the troops received reinforcements (including those who recovered) of 201 thousand people, including battalions Marine Corps. Consequently, the numerical composition Eastern Front in just three months it decreased by almost 500 thousand people. “After the losses suffered in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944,” admits K. Tippelskirch, “and after the Allies managed to carry out the invasion, the German army had absolutely no prerequisites for successfully conducting even defensive actions... General situation in all theaters of the war it was approaching the one that had developed in early June 1940 in France: militarily it was irreparable.” The successful military operations of our troops in the 1944 campaigns played a role decisive role in the final defeat of the Nazi armed forces in 1945, predetermined the outcome of the Second World War.
The enormous scale of combat operations that unfolded from sea to sea required skillful leadership from the Supreme High Command, front and fleet commands, commanders of branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the military, and the skillful use of colossal masses of military equipment and material support. The command of the fronts, fleets and armies invested a lot of creative initiative in the implementation of the plans of the Headquarters. In the campaigns of 1944, the most prominent Soviet commanders L. A. Govorov, I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovsky, K. A. Meretskov, K. K. Rokovsovsky, F. I. Tolbukhin for their skillful leadership of the operations: their radios troops received the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The rank of Admiral of the Fleet was given to I. S. Isakov, Chief Marshal of Artillery-N. N. Voronov, and the Chief Marshal of Aviation - A. E. Golovanov and A. A. Novikov. Such prominent military leaders as F. A. Astakhov, M. P. Vorobyov, G. A. Vorozheikin, S. F. Zhavoronkov, I. T. Peresypkin, P. A. Rotmistrov, N. S. Skripko, F. Ya. Falaleev, Ya. N. Fedorenko, S. A. Khudyakov, M. N. Chistyakov, I. D. Yakovlev, received the rank of marshals of the military branches.
The historical victories of the Red Army in 1944 were a natural consequence of the great heroism, ardent patriotism and military skill of soldiers, officers and generals at the front, as well as selfless labor Soviet people in the rear. Ideological and political-educational work in the country and the army was raised to a higher level. Inspired and directed by the Communist Party, the working class, collective farm peasantry and Soviet intelligentsia provided the country's Armed Forces with everything necessary to defeat the enemy.
