God knows how to work. The Torah says that work that is creative and aimed at a specific result is not easy. People who choose an obviously easy path to success often do not achieve the desired success. Precisely because the lightness in them is lost

FROM WHEN CAN YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A VICTIM? Officially, the department, headed by Jochim Gauck, is called: “Federal Commissioner for Ministry Documents state security former German Democratic Republic" Autumn 1989

Ability to count A child learns to count, gradually comprehending the world around us. When a child, every time he sees a car on the street, asks: “Car?”, he thereby shows that he distinguishes a car from other objects and understands that there are many of these objects.

Tip #103 Consider the tread type! Tires with finely dissected tread pattern B perform better on ice severe frost ice “holds” the tire better than snow because it melts less under the tread. Some drivers believe that a tire with a large tread

The US military leadership continues to invent and publish in the media so-called violations by Russia of the provisions of the INF Treaty. Thus, the Washington online publication Daily Beast, citing authoritative government experts, stated that the Russian side, under the guise of developing ICBMs, is testing medium-range missiles that are prohibited by the agreement. It's about about the launches of the RS-12M Topol (SS-25) ICBM along a “short” route between the Kapustin Yar and Sary-Shagan test sites, which the Americans qualified as violations of the INF Treaty. Meanwhile, based on the results of many years of inspections of mobile ground-based missile systems (MGRS), the US State Department and the Pentagon are well aware that the products of this type They are not medium-range missiles.

In the author’s article “What to consider, work for gossips...” (“NVO” No. 25, 07.19.13) it was proven that Russia responsibly and punctually fulfills its treaty obligations when developing the relevant types of strategic offensive weapons. Therefore, US claims about Russian violations of the INF Treaty are groundless. It was also recommended that American experts turn to the basics of ballistics of strategic missiles and study the dependence of their flight range on data parameters combat use, entered into the missile control system.

Nevertheless, the Daily Beast, at the suggestion of the same experts, announced that Russia had also violated the “Hague Code of Conduct on Preventing the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles,” which has nothing to do with the INF Treaty and missile launches.

In this regard, it seems relevant to analyze the “fresh” violations by the Americans of the INF Treaty and other non-proliferation and disarmament agreements.

VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATY DURING ANTI-MISSILE LAUNCHES

Paragraph 5 of Article II of the INF Treaty defines: “The term “intermediate-range missile” means a GLBM or GLCM whose range exceeds 1,000 kilometers but does not exceed 5,500 kilometers.” The Treaty also noted that “each of the Parties will eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and will not have such weapons in the future.”

Let us once again recall the opinion general designer unique PGRK "Topol", "Topol-M", "Yars" and SLBM "Bulava-30" by academician Yu.S. Solomonova: “The Americans, in violation of the INF Treaty, actually created a medium-range missile for testing.” This made it possible to conduct about 22 successful anti-missile interceptions and put the Standard-3 anti-missile missile into service. The first stage of creating the European missile defense system has been completed and the deployment of the Aegis Ashore ground-based anti-missile system has begun in Romania.

Unfortunately, Russian officials, various experts and “wise men” do not notice that the Americans are violating the provisions of the INF Treaty when conducting test launches of GBI (Ground-Based Interceptor – GBI) interceptor missiles, designed to intercept strategic missiles in the middle part of their flight path. It is known that interceptor missiles of this type have been adopted and deployed in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base.

At the same time, bypassing the INF Treaty, the American side:

1) develops medium- and intermediate-range target missiles for testing anti-missile interception tasks;

2) introduced the term “intermediate range” without agreement with the Russian side;

3) did not submit the target missile for demonstration and display of its distinctive features;

4) did not declare the launch sites of target missiles;

4) does not transmit notifications about the status and movement of target missiles.

As part of the still “old” START-1 Treaty, they carried out an undeclared conversion of five silo launchers (silos) at Vandenberg Air Force Base and placed GBI interceptor missiles in them, committing a similar list of violations of treaty obligations. Moreover, about the purpose and tactical and technical characteristics Little is known about these products. Data on their anti-missile capabilities have not been confirmed by treaties, except through spectacular illustrations in the media.

This year, the Russian inspection at the Vandenberg AB did not reveal any work on the silo conversion, and the Americans did not show the type of products loaded into the silo.

Conducting unannounced launches of GBI anti-missile missiles from silos could create the preconditions for nuclear incidents between the United States, Russia and China. This is explained by the fact that notifications of launches of anti-ballistic missiles GBI in relation to the “Agreement between the USSR and the USA on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missiles submarines dated May 31, 1988" are not provided. As a consequence, it is possible to provoke a retaliatory missile strike due to the false classification of the launch of the GBI anti-missile missile and its incorrect identification in flight, especially if crisis situation in the world. This is explained by the identical size of the GBI anti-missile missile with the Minuteman-3 ICBM and the similarity of the ICBM warheads and the interceptor stages of the GBI anti-missile missile. Therefore, it is quite difficult to distinguish between an attacking ICBM and a “harmless” anti-missile missile in flight.

In addition, AFB Vandenberg conducts combat training and test launches of Minuteman-3 ICBMs using standard radars of the nuclear missile strike warning and control system outer space, control points various levels, infrastructure facilities of the terrestrial data transmission network. In addition, there is an insufficient level vocational training American strategic nuclear forces specialists and nuclear support units who were allowed into recent years several nuclear incidents that gained worldwide fame. If necessary, one can also recall nuclear incidents related to undeclared missile launches and failures in American missile launchers.

The governing bodies of the Russian Federation know that the Americans, within the framework of the “old” START-1 Treaty, assured the Russian side: test launches of GBI anti-missile missiles will be carried out from an experimental silo. However, these promises are not kept.

General Designer Yuri Solomonov has repeatedly emphasized that “despite the fact that theoretically the target missile is a surface-to-air missile, modifying it to the surface-to-surface class is not a problem. Because after the active section it will not be difficult to fly along a ballistic trajectory to the ground.” Of course, such capabilities can also be implemented in the GBI anti-missile missile, since its flight range is about 4000 km.

It should also be emphasized that the work final stage modernization of these anti-missile missiles (by 2016) will require the creation of intercontinental-range target missiles, which will be associated with further US violations of the START Treaty.

VIOLATIONS OF START AND OTHER AGREEMENTS

An analysis of foreign information materials has revealed new aspects of the Americans’ violation of Article XIII of the START Treaty: “The Parties do not transfer to third parties strategic offensive weapons subject to this Treaty... This provision does not apply to any practice of cooperation existing at the time of signing this Treaty, including obligations in the field of strategic offensive weapons between one of the parties and a third state.” At the same time, the term “existing practice of cooperation” and areas of cooperation are not disclosed in the START Treaty. It is also unclear how many “third” countries there may be.

The essence of the “fresh” violation of this article is that the Americans are carrying out the practice of cooperation with Great Britain, which was not declared at the time of signing the START Treaty (April 8, 2010), in terms of preparing and conducting combat control launches of Trident-2 SLBMs with US Eastern Missile Range, for which a British SSBN arrives at the range. In recent years, about 15 launches have been carried out, which are classified as successful. At the same time, the Americans refuse to submit notifications about the upcoming launch, explaining this by the fact that Great Britain is not a party to the START Treaty.

Based on the results of launches of British (or American) SLBMs, telemetric information Russian side is not transmitted, which may mean a secret improvement in the tactical and technical characteristics of the missile and combat equipment. Also, notifications are not provided about the storage locations of British and American SLBMs, about special identification marks, the location of each of the missiles and other information. However, paragraph 7 of Section II of the Protocol to the Treaty is puzzling: “Notification provided no later than five days after the completion of the transfer of SLBMs to a third state or receipt of SLBMs from a third state in accordance with existing cooperation practices.” Of course, we are talking about the reception and transfer of American SLBMs between the US and British Navy. It’s hard to even imagine that Russia will transfer its SLBMs to a third state - they themselves have a shortage, the Yuri Dolgoruky SLBM is still without missiles. A reasonable question is: why are the Bulava-30 SSBNs and SLBMs declared as existing in the START Treaty, which made them targets for American inspections?

Content next violation Article XIII is that at the time of signing the START Treaty, the Americans did not declare any practice of cooperation in the field of START with their nuclear ally, France, but it does take place. So, information materials indicate that the United States, in violation of a similar article of the “old” START-1 Treaty, provided assistance to France on the design of ballistic missiles and ensuring the technical safety of nuclear materials. France, in turn, provided the United States with a variety of information based on the results of modeling tests of nuclear warheads for ICBMs. There is a “Memorandum of Agreement” between the states on cooperation in the field of ensuring nuclear safety and protection against unauthorized access. The document contains a section “Monitoring the state of the nuclear arsenal,” which regulates cooperation in the field of theoretical, numerical and experimental methods modeling, and the section “Nuclear Technical Safety and Protection from Unauthorized Access” determines the procedure for exchanging information on the design nuclear weapons, research, development, testing, manufacturing, transportation and dismantling of components made from nuclear and explosive materials.

Within the framework of the Memorandum, there is also an agreement “Long-term participation technical staff in joint projects and mutual site visits.” After the signing of the Comprehensive Ban Treaty nuclear tests(CTBT) nuclear cooperation between the United States, France, and Great Britain focused on maintaining the combat readiness and reliability of arsenals without conducting full-scale nuclear tests. In 2010, an agreement was signed between France and the UK, which provides for the creation of joint radiographic hydrodynamic centers, one in France and one in the UK, necessary for computer modeling tests of nuclear components, which the United States is interested in. In this regard, trilateral cooperation between the United States and its nuclear allies, which was not stated in the START Treaty, is developing. In this case, one of the states is an intermediary in the transfer of information between the other two. A reasonable question is: when will the US Congress ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?

The American side is also violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by carrying out technical cooperation with Japan in the creation national system PRO. Thus, the joint development of the Standard-3 Mod.2A anti-missile missile falls under the restrictions of Category I of this Regime, which prohibits the transfer to other states of: missiles with a maximum range of 300 km or more with a payload weight of 500 kg, as well as engines; control and communication system elements; software and other technologies. By the way, this missile defense will be deployed at the third stage of the European missile defense system (2018) and poses a threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces. In addition, Russian claims against the Americans who are assisting Israel in deploying its own missile defense system based on Arrow-type interceptor missiles remain in force.

Thus, the United States itself is violating the “Hague Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” the “Missile Technology Control Regime,” and the “Agreement between the USSR and the United States on the Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Based Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.”

The American leadership continues to fail to comply with the provision stated in the preamble of the START Treaty: “... recognizing the existence of a relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons, the increasing importance of this relationship in the process of reducing strategic nuclear weapons and the fact that current strategic defensive weapons do not undermine the viability of and the effectiveness of the Parties’ strategic offensive arms.” Thus, the Americans successfully completed the program of the first stage of creating a European missile defense system; announced their intention to strengthen the defense of US territory against attacks by ICBMs and SLBMs by deploying 14 more GBI anti-missile missiles and began selecting a position area; are deploying the Standard-3 Mod.1B ground-based anti-missile system in Romania, capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs; provide assistance to Japan and Israel in the deployment of national missile defense systems, as regional missile defense systems, aimed primarily against Russia. In connection with the progress of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, the US and NATO leadership do not plan to adjust plans for creating a European missile defense system. Thus, NATO has already stated that “the European missile defense system is not aimed at protection from any specific country. It's about protecting against a real and growing threat, and against real threat we need real defense.”

It should be noted that the US State Department once again violated the requirements of paragraph 5 of Article VII of the START Treaty: “Each Party has the right to make public data regarding its strategic offensive weapons.” Thus, the combat composition of Russian strategic nuclear forces was published on the State Department website in October: 473 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles; 1,400 warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear warheads; 894 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed TB. By the way, how is the counting rule implemented in the table: for each TB there is one warhead and how many TB warheads are there in total? The question of the mechanism for transferring Russian data for inclusion in the US State Department certificate is also relevant.

Next. The US government, by deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on the territory of a number of NATO member countries, violates the first article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As you know, this article introduces a ban for nuclear powers to transfer or provide control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states, and the second article of the NPT is a ban on non-nuclear weapons states to acquire and use nuclear weapons.

Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Antonov said: “The deployment by the United States of tactical nuclear weapons in non-nuclear countries goes beyond the NPT. Tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe could theoretically be short time deliver to the borders of the Russian Federation, while Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons cannot be moved in a short time to the US border, and they do not pose a threat to American security. Nuclear weapons must be returned to the United States and the associated infrastructure destroyed.”

IT'S TIME TO UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING OBJECTIVELY

It is important to note that Russian President Vladimir Putin said for the first time that the INF Treaty does not fully meet the interests of ensuring military security states: “Other states are actively improving medium-range missiles, and around us, almost all of our neighbors are developing these weapons systems. The Soviet Union in its time and, naturally, Russian Federation abandoned medium-range missiles by signing a corresponding agreement with the United States. This is not very clear, since for Americans these systems are not relevant at all, since there is nowhere to use them, but for Soviet Union and for today’s Russia, especially considering that our other neighboring countries are developing these strike systems, such a decision was, to say the least, controversial.”

The head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Sergei Ivanov, emphasized: “The Americans do not need this class of weapon at all, they did not need it either before or now. Because with the help of such weapons they can theoretically fight only with Mexico or Canada, and their flight range does not allow them to hit targets in Europe.”

The failure of the Russian-American initiative to globalize the INF Treaty, which was announced at the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly in 2007, also causes concern. This is largely due to the lack of interest of the American leadership in promoting the initiative. As a result, the number of countries possessing medium-range missiles is growing, and not a single one of them has expressed a desire to join the open-ended INF Treaty.

It seems that this policy statement of the President of the Russian Federation and his instructions at the meeting in Sarov make it possible to begin an objective analysis of the START Treaty for compliance with the interests of the military security of the state - after all, more than two years have passed since the date of its entry into force.

As an example, let's look at two articles that are detrimental to Russia. Thus, paragraph 7 of Article III states: “For the purposes of this Treaty: a) a missile of a type designed and tested exclusively for the interception of objects and the fight against objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered as ballistic missile, which is subject to the provisions of this Agreement." It must be admitted that the clause was creatively copied from the INF Treaty and direct relationship does not have any relation to the START Treaty. There is no doubt that the Americans will continue to develop medium-, intermediate- and intercontinental-range target missiles, and the topic of analyzing violations of the INF Treaty and filing claims can be closed.

The wording of paragraph 2 of Article X is puzzling: “The obligation not to use camouflage measures includes the obligation not to use them at test sites, including measures leading to the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers or the relationship between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing.” .

Thus, the Russian side is asked not to carry out operational camouflage measures: when conducting combat training (test) launches of new missiles, testing promising types of combat equipment and missile defense control systems with the provision of telemetric information to the Americans; when testing new forms and methods of action of the Topol, Topol-M and Yars PGRKs. At the same time, the Americans do not plan to develop new strategic missiles in the near future, except for test launches of Minuteman-3 ICBMs and Trident-2 SLBMs in order to extend their service life. In this regard, the composition and content of telemetric information based on the results of launches existing type American missiles special interest they don't represent.

We have to state that the START Treaty, its Protocol and its Annexes significant amount restrictive and harmful provisions regarding Russian PGRKs, which the Americans do not have. Conclusions from the analysis of their content will be presented in a separate article.

Mirror and monkey drawing

Fable The Mirror and the Monkey read text online

Monkey, seeing his image in the Mirror,
Quietly push Bear with his foot:
“Look,” he says, “my dear godfather!
What kind of face is that there?
What antics and jumps she has!
I would hang myself from boredom
If only she was even a little like her.
But, admit it, there is
Of my gossips, there are five or six such crooks:
I can even count them on my fingers." -
"Why should gossips consider working,
Isn’t it better to turn on yourself, godfather?” -
Mishka answered her.
But Mishenka’s advice was wasted.

There are many such examples in the world:

I even saw this yesterday:
Everyone knows that Klimych is dishonest;
They read about bribes to Klimych.
And he furtively nods at Peter.

The Mirror and the Monkey - Moral of the fable by Ivan Krylov

There are many such examples in the world:
No one likes to recognize themselves in satire.

Moral in your own words, the main idea and meaning of the fable The Mirror and the Monkey

Often people do not notice shortcomings in themselves, but they readily criticize others.

Analysis of the fable The Mirror and the Monkey

In the fable “The Mirror and the Monkey,” fabulist I. A. Krylov showed a casual conversation between two animals, in which the bear poked his face at the monkey’s ignorance and pointed out the shortcomings of people. The monkey, looking at her reflection, for some reason saw the shortcomings of all her friends and acquaintances, but not her own.

The author ridicules such people through his works, translating their behavior into the image of a particular animal. But quite often there are individuals who have too high an opinion of themselves, in contrast to the stupid and unattractive surroundings. Many have encountered at least once such ignorant people who do not notice their own shortcomings, but actively point out those of others and laugh at them. So in this fable, the monkey is unable to admit that the little creature he sees is himself, and does not pay attention to the bear’s advice at all, letting it fall on deaf ears.

People who are depicted in the fable as a bear are often silent and try not to interfere with the behavior of the “monkeys,” which further emphasizes the latter’s confidence in their rightness. But it's probably not the right decision and such ignorance and arrogance should be stopped.

Heroes of the fable

Monkey

Represents people with high self-esteem who only see the shortcomings of others

Bear

A wise person who can see more from the outside and who gives good advice, but the monkey does not listen to him.

Winged expressions that came from the fable The Mirror and the Monkey

Listen to Ivan Krylov's fable The Mirror and the Monkey

Sound filmstrip. Read by Ilyinsky

Encyclopedic dictionary of popular words and expressions. - M.: “Locked-Press”. Vadim Serov. 2003.

See what is “Why should godmothers work? / Isn’t it better to turn on yourself, godmother?” in other dictionaries:

Union. 1. Attaches a revolution or adverb. sentence with the meaning of comparison, comparison of whom, what, l. with what is said in the main thing. Talk louder than usual. In the south the stars are brighter than in the north. The mountains were higher than anyone expected. 2... Encyclopedic Dictionary

Turn around, turn around, turn around, completely. (to turn around) (simple). The same as turning into all values ​​except 7, and turning into 1 and 2 values. “Rather than consider working as a godmother, isn’t it better to turn to yourself, godfather?” Krylov. “Here he is to the point... ... Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary

Union. 1. comparative. Introduces into the composition simple sentence comparative turnover, explaining which l. member of this sentence expressed by the form comparative degree adjective or adverb, as well as words: “other”, “different”, “otherwise”, etc... Small academic dictionary

He covers someone else's roof, but his own roof leaks. My uncle would gasp, looking at himself. Wed. Why should godmothers work hard? Isn’t it better to turn on yourself, godfather? Krylov. Mirror and Monkey. Wed. Willst du fremde Fehler zählen, heb an deinen an zu zählen: Ist mir recht,… … Michelson's Large Explanatory and Phraseological Dictionary