As for Angola, this has - at least recently - become relatively clear. There is such a respected organization as the Council of Veterans of Angola, which also conducts educational work, trying to convey to the public consciousness that there were no formidable Soviet top-secret Rambs in Angola, who almost single-handedly fought against “hordes of South African mercenaries.” The service was difficult, full of difficulties and sometimes dangers. There were also fighting, there was the usual routine. There were heroic deeds, but they did not consist of solitary walks across the savannah with a bayonet in his teeth, but in the performance of official duties in fantastically difficult conditions.
The good news is that through their efforts, at least the number of articles on the eternal topic “Soviet special forces in Africa” has decreased. Like an interview with a certain captain/major/colonel who accomplished imaginable and unimaginable feats on the Dark Continent, was awarded all the orders of independent Africa at number 1, and the Motherland, what a pity, never found out about this.
Lyrical digression. No, this is still an eternal topic... After all, people still don’t get tired of asking on forums in the spirit of: “Tell me about how the GRU fought in Africa, always with names, details of the battles, military ranks participants and photographs.” And to these questions there immediately follows a bunch of answers like: “In 1977 (1981, 1986, 1989) the cousin of the brother-in-law’s father’s elder brother’s wife’s godfather of my uncle fought in Angola (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Congo, Somalia). They landed from a bomber (cruiser, helicopter, submarine) at dawn (at night, at sunset) on parachutes (inflatable boats, canoes, with scuba gear) and with machine guns smashed a company of commandos (mercenaries, blacks, green berets).”
It's clear. Well, people want to believe that once there was a Great Empire, and its centurions menacingly walked across the planet. And in its most exotic places. Moreover, nothing interfered with this empire, not even the most malicious military-industrial complex The United States and President Ronald Reagan personally, no matter how angry they were, no matter how much they put a spoke in the wheels, could not harm the cause of building socialism in different countries and continents. And at the forefront of all this is the heroic Soviet special forces (which, God forbid, a hundred people in the entire Union knew about before 1991, but now only babies have not heard of it), which shoots with everything they can and cuts everything that moves, parachute onto Everest, jungle and desert, mines The White house and Tower, captures submarines, hijacking them to the USSR, etc.
True, such articles still appear - unfortunately. Like, for example, enchanting nonsense “Soviet special forces: ups and tragedies” some Mark Steinberg, published in the Russian-language American publication “Russian Bazaar”. Moreover, the author seems to be a military man, that is, he knows from which end the arquebus should be loaded. However, it carries something that makes a decent gray mare will flush with shame. And the Soviet special forces fought there, and made their mark here, and hijacked helicopters in Vietnam, and fought with Rhodesian scouts, well, just in Antarctica, I didn’t play with penguins, saving centuries-old ice from the invasion of leopard seals... I don’t really want to comment on this stream of consciousness, and anyway there is no point - just read a couple of normal sources like Kozlov or Pashits for all questions to disappear.
Naturally, the author's imagination works to its fullest when it comes to Africa. The passage about the “special forces battalions” that arrived in Angola evokes nervous laughter - well, Comrade Steinberg Bushkov must have misread himself. But for Bushkov, tales about how Soviet special forces are damned abroad are excusable, and moreover, permissible. He's a writer, after all, that's his job good story bungled, so that the reader impatiently turns over the pages of the book, but as for historical truth, this is the fifth or sixth thing.
Again, how many of Steinberg’s special forces “died” - the count goes into many thousands; in my opinion, there were never so many special forces servicemen in the entire Soviet army. Bushkov - at least he puts his heroes from the Special Forces into “pleportion”; in every short story about the brave naval saboteur Mazur, a couple of people die, well, or three - in short, plausibility is maintained. And Steinberg on blue eye states: “The scale of these actions [in Angola] became known only now, when they started talking about the losses of Soviet special forces in Angola - about 700 soldiers.”
700 dead Special Forces soldiers in Angola alone is, you know, a bit too much. According to the Angolan Veterans Council, from 1975 to 1992, about 30 Soviet citizens died in Angola. And oh, how not all of them were special forces. The war (with Soviet participation) went on there for 13 years, from 1975 to 1988. According to Steinberg, it turns out that on average 50 Soviet special forces soldiers per year died there. Seriously, you know... If the supermen-special forces, who are not taken (well, it is generally believed so) by neither a foolish bullet, nor a brilliant bayonet, nor even a burst from a DShK or KPVT, but only a directed one nuclear explosion, and even that is not a fact, so if 50 special forces soldiers died a year, then how many ordinary infantry or gunners, soldiers, brave guys, died in the jungle? And how many officers? In fact, the death of so many military personnel could not have been hidden even by Glavpur with its ability to masterfully turn black into white. Not to mention the fact that the shoulder straps would fly like a fan from top to bottom all year round and around the clock.
In general, my friend writes nonsense. It is clear that the African theme is a fertile thing. As Angola veteran Sergei Kolomnin absolutely accurately noted in the book “Russian Special Forces in Africa”: “This phenomenon can be explained simply: that war remains largely unknown today. An aura of mystery and enigma is created around the presence of Soviet military personnel in Angola. Therefore, it is possible, playing on people’s ignorance of what actually happened, to fantasize and simply lie... they say that there is Afghan, Afghan - this is so, for children. Here is Angola - yes! It was there that our special forces fought, where our good white guys crushed the bad blacks in the impenetrable jungles of Africa.”
Okay, we'll leave that to the paperback mystery fans. Alexander Bushkov writes, of course, in a fascinating way, but one must not confuse an elephant with a teapot, they are only similar in profile. The real facts are much more interesting.
The facts are that in reality military personnel special purpose were present in Africa. Again, a word from Kolomnin: “Employees of the GRU and the KGB of the USSR worked as advisers and instructors in training centers for the training of SWAPO and ANC partisans...Were there many “real” special forces in Angola? Let us immediately determine that by this term we mean not only GRU and KGB special forces soldiers, but also intelligence and sabotage specialists belonging to other departments: the army, Marine Corps, Navy and Airborne Forces... Among the 12 thousand Soviet military personnel who officially passed through Angola from 1975 to 1992, there were many specialists in this profile. Since the Angolan army was built according to Soviet image and in its likeness, sabotage, reconnaissance and other special units were formed in it, as it should be... In addition to them, there were also special formations border troops, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Security. The personnel of these Angolan special units trained by Soviet specialists with appropriate qualifications, including those who had been through Afghanistan. But I want to emphasize: all of them were dispersed throughout the locations of units of the Angolan army, performing advisory and instructor functions, and did not constitute any separate special unit.”
So, if special forces were present, it was as advisers. And sometimes these advisers died in clashes. Since this happened in another country where Soviet military specialists were present - in Mozambique.
While quite a lot is known about Angola, thanks to the efforts of NVA, much less is known about Mozambique. Firstly, it was not a priority for the USSR, even in the African departments of the relevant departments. Secondly, the number of Soviet specialists who trained in Mozambique is not comparable to Angola - more than 12 thousand in Angola and a little over 4 thousand in Mozambique. The result is fewer documents, fewer participants, less evidence. However, there is something there. Something appears later and sheds light on some facts that previously seemed unknown.
It is difficult to say exactly how many Soviet specialists died in Mozambique while performing their duties. According to official data, for the period from 1975 to 1991, the number of irretrievable losses amounted to 21 people. Sometimes there is information that is slightly more - from 30 to 40. But in in this case It doesn’t matter - it’s still not hundreds. The circumstances surrounding the deaths of at least five of them became known only in the 1990s. But not all. It’s not that the time has come to tell the truth, God forbid from such pathos, it’s just, as always, interesting to compare different descriptions of the event and try to get a picture that is a little more in line with reality.
So... Mozambique - formerly Portuguese East Africa, not a colony, but an overseas province of the metropolis. Not the best rich country in southern Africa, but until 1974 it barely subsisted from maize to beer. After 1974 the situation naturally changed. One of the consequences of the 1974 leftist coup in Portugal was that Lisbon effectively abandoned its overseas territories. There were also objective reasons- the empire simply wore out; after all, Portugal was the first empire on the Dark Continent and its flag flew over Africa for almost 500 years. After the Second World War, when the winds of change blew and the process of liberation began throughout Africa, “national liberation movements” began to emerge in varied numbers. In Mozambique, this was FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front, created in 1962 by Eduardo Mondlane. Having received weapons from the countries of the socialist camp, FRELIMO turned around and staged a “fair struggle for liberation from the colonial yoke.” True, from the point of view of the authorities, FRELIMO was engaged in ordinary terror, but the progressive liberal point of view severely condemns such assessments, ordering the bandits to be considered liberators and fighters for the people's happiness.
It should be noted that the Portuguese authorities, in their fight against FRELIMO, faced one unpleasant problem - the army simply did not want to fight. The period of compulsory military service in Portugal was 4 years, of which at least two soldiers were required to spend in one of the overseas provinces. But the soldiers, simple Portuguese guys who arrived in these provinces, had absolutely no idea why they had to die here, in the sultry bush, under the scorching sun - in the name of what idea, for what exactly? As a result, by the early 1970s, Mozambique had developed strange situation - most of Portuguese troops preferred to sit in garrisons and do nothing, occasionally undertaking some kind of campaign. Surprisingly, it was mainly Rhodesians who drove FRELIMO through the Mozambican bush - informal agreements were concluded between the two states, according to which the natives of Bulawayo and Salisbury, dressed in jungle-green, were given almost complete freedom of action east of Umtali. According to numerous testimonies from Rhodesians, both from the SAS and from the RLI, the Portuguese were not suitable as soldiers even for guarding a dilapidated field toilet. No, of course, there were exceptions, like Francisco Rocho, there were individual special forces units that fought toughly and skillfully, but in general the Rhodesian soldiers did not even try to hide their contempt for their Portuguese colleagues.
At the same time, FRELIMO was not such a formidable force as it was later exhibited in works dedicated to the heroic struggle of the Mozambican people. The FRELIMO leadership understood that it did not have enough strength to overthrow the colonial regime. And even more so, it did not think about what would happen if FRELIMO came to power. Meanwhile, this is exactly what happened. After the fall of Caetano's government, Lisbon actually handed FRELIMO the keys to Mozambique on a silver platter. The logic was generally clear - the main headache was Angola, where 3 groups, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, fought for power. In Mozambique, FRELIMO had no real rivals, and power simply fell into the hands of the rebels.
Samora Machel became the president of the republic, announcing the socialist path of development of the country. African-style socialism immediately bore fruit - a poor, but relatively stable and more or less developed country turned into virtual ruins in two years. The white skilled population left, the black population immediately broke everything they could reach, everything that could be nationalized, and work strangely stopped - and then famine began in the country. Local residents were surprised to find that their lives were much worse than under the damned colonialists. Add to this such delights as a one-party system, maximum concentration of power in the hands of the center, a hastily created repressive apparatus - and the picture begins to play with additional colors. Discontent began to brew in the country.
The resourceful Rhodesians were quick to take advantage of this. With their help, the Mozambican National Resistance - RENAMO - was created. Initially, it was a small group, if not a gang, dissatisfied with the Machel regime. But gradually their number began to grow. And given the fact that the combat training of RENAMO partisans was carried out by instructors from the Rhodesian SAS, very soon RENAMO from a “bothersome fly” turned into an enemy that must be taken seriously. RENAMO fighters turned out to be ideal allies of the Rhodesian saboteurs. It was with their help that the Rhodesian SAS carried out all major operations in Mozambique in the late 1970s, including the famous R go to Munhava.
Again, it must be added that immediately after coming to power, the Machel government fell ill with the traditional disease of almost all newly formed independent states, and in its most severe African form - persecution mania. On official language this is called the “problem of ensuring the country’s defense capability.” Its symptoms are well known: it begins to seem to the young state that everyone around is hatching plans for capture-invasion-overthrow, that the whole world is asleep and sees how to trample and shoot the new independent government, and from here the first thing that arises is the question of maximum armament and training of the armed forces.
There were formal grounds for such fear - after all, South Africa and Rhodesia were located next door, and they had no sympathy for the new socialist state. But the paradox was that these countries were not going to attack Mozambique. According to the then leadership of South Africa, Pretoria already had headache- socialist Angola, and the South Africans did not want to get a second front on their northeastern borders. They solved the problem easier - than putting pressure on Mozambique military force, it was decided to crush it economically, which, in general, worked out and later bore fruit. As for Rhodesia, the last thing Smith's government wanted was to invade Mozambique and overthrow Machel's cabinet. Although, there is no point in dissembling - Rhodesian special forces carried out cross-border raids into Mozambique constantly, destroying ZANLA militants, to whom Samora Machel happily provided refuge. At the same time, the Rhodesians simultaneously destroyed FRELIMO fighters. But from Salisbury's point of view, Mozambique was to blame - there was no point in giving shelter to terrorists.
After the fall of Rhodesia, RENAMO quickly took over South Africa - suffice it to say that they trained fighters at the bases of South African reconnaissance and sabotage detachments, in particular in Ba Phalaborwe. As a result, RENAMO became not just a formidable force, but something truly capable of sweeping away the Machel regime. Fortunately, the Mozambican government managed to persuade the South Africans, and they, from the mid-1980s, stopped helping the militants (although they did not completely stop). Nevertheless Civil War in Mozambique continued until the early 1990s. And Soviet specialists took part in it, the first group of whom arrived in the country back in 1976. The advisers began work on creating a General Staff and the main branches of the armed forces and branches of the military. Some military experts, like G. Kanin, were there as military intelligence specialists of the General Staff of the Mozambican national army and helped government forces establish and coordinate radio interception and human and radio intelligence work. Others, like N. Travin, were involved in training air defense personnel to man MNA units. A group of specialists led by Colonel V. Sukhotin managed to train Mozambican military personnel in handling all anti-aircraft artillery cannon systems and the Strela-2 missile system.
In the late 1970s to Mozambique from the USSR full swing Military equipment and weapons began to arrive. Thus, in 1979, 25 MiG-17s arrived in the country, and in 1985, a MiG-21bis squadron was formed in the Mozambican Air Force. In addition, officers Soviet airborne forces a parachute battalion was formed and trained, and border guards deployed four brigades of border troops. The military was created educational establishments: military school in Nampula, a training center in Nacala, a training center for border troops in Inhambane, a school for junior aviation specialists in Beira, a driving school in Maputo.
Let us repeat - there was a civil war in Mozambique from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. And Soviet citizens also became victims of this war. In the book “Russia (USSR) in the wars of the second half of the 20th century,” published in Moscow in 2002, the following point is given: “
On July 26, 1979, four of our advisers and a translator, working in the 5th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the FPLM, were returning to Beira from the training area. On the road, their car was ambushed by armed bandits. The car, fired from a grenade launcher and machine guns, caught fire. Everyone in it died ».A more detailed version is also given there - in the article “Bitter Smoke of the Savannah” by I. Semenchik ( first published in the Sverdlovsk newspaper “Na Smenu”, February 23, 1991, abbreviated).
“In November 1978, Major arrived in Mozambique Soviet army Adolf Nikolaevich Pugachev, who was seconded from the Leninsky district military registration and enlistment office of Sverdlovsk to Mozambique - as a specialist in the organization and creation of military commissariats. A few months later, Pugachev, an adviser to the head of the organizational and mobilization department of the General Staff of the MNA, was sent to the province of Sofala.July 1979 almost became the last in the life of Adolf Nikolaevich. On July 20, the brigade, on orders from the General Staff, straight from the exercises, which Pugachev was also present at, was sent to destroy a gang that had infiltrated from Rhodesia, where, near the border with Mozambique, near the village of Odzi, on the land of a rented tobacco farm called "Animal Farm" another was deployed one MNF base, which by that time numbered about 500 trained bandits. It was very easy to enter Mozambican territory: border service by that time practically did not exist. “I remember how in March, when I went to one of the regions, a soldier-driver, who didn’t really know the road, took me to Rhodesia, and only the corporal accompanying me finally determined that we had gone to the wrong place,” says A. Pugachev . So the gangs, moving freely, destroyed entire villages, sparing neither children nor the elderly, and when government troops approached, they preferred to flee beyond the cordon.
For a week, the brigade pursued the gang, inflicting significant losses on it. But some of the bandits survived and took refuge in the forests. On July 26, the brigade returned to its location. Pugachev decided not to wait for the advisers who were supposed to follow with the column, but left in a Ford half an hour earlier.
“On the route, I came across single posts of military traffic controllers, but it was impossible to make out who they were - soldiers of the republic or bandits. Everyone wore the same uniform. Nobody touched me, and I reached home safely, warning the councilors' wives that their husbands would soon arrive too. Less than an hour had passed when the commander of the 1st battalion came into my apartment along with the political officer. Seeing their pale, upset faces, I involuntarily shuddered. “Trouble, camarados, all of you are dead,” they told me in a mixture of Russian and Portuguese.
When we arrived at the scene, to my horror, I saw a burning UAZ and in it the bodies of my colleagues - military advisers to the brigade commander, political officer, deputy technical engineer and translator. The adviser to the commander of the artillery battalion, who was sitting behind him (and the tent was raised), was thrown outside by the blast wave, and he was hit by a machine gun fire. During the medical examination, it turned out that the car was probably stopped by imaginary traffic controllers and at that time they hit it with a grenade launcher, because the bodies of the dead were cut by shrapnel. The next day, the wives, distraught with grief, took the remains of their husbands to Moscow.”
“Returning from Mozambique to my homeland, I visited a school in the Tushinsky district of Moscow, where the deceased translator, junior lieutenant D. Chizhov, a 2nd year student at the Institute, studied international relations, who completed his internship in Mozambique...
Dima Chizhov, like his comrades in misfortune, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star. And in the hall where Dima’s bust is installed, there is a guard of honor,” recalls Adolf Nikolaevich.”
Here are the names of those who died then:
- ZASLAVETSNikolai Vasilievich, born in 1939. Ukrainian. Lieutenant Colonel, Advisor to the Commander of the Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Mozambican Armed Forces. Died July 26, 1979 Awarded the Order Red Star (posthumously).
- ZUBENKOLeonid Fedorovich, born in 1933. Russian. Lieutenant Colonel, Advisor to the Political Commissar of the Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Mozambican Armed Forces. Died on July 26, 1979. Awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
- MARKOVPavel Vladimirovich, born in 1938. Russian. Major, technical adviser to the deputy commander of the motorized infantry brigade of the Mozambique armed forces. Died on July 26, 1979. Awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
- TARAZANOVNikolai Alexandrovich, born in 1939. Russian. Major, Advisor to the Chief of Air Defense of the Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Mozambican Armed Forces. Died on July 26, 1979. Awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
- CHIZHOVDmitry Vladimirovich, born in 1958. Russian. Junior lieutenant, translator Portuguese language. Died on July 26, 1979. Buried in a cemetery in Moscow. Awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Well, now - the most interesting part. It was believed - and probably still is considered, since there is not a single publication in Russian dedicated to this event, except for the above-mentioned source - that Soviet military specialists died at the hands of RENAMO partisans . In fact, the incident on July 26, 1979 is, apparently, the ONLY COLLISION IN THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF THE RHODESIAN WAR between SOVIET ARMY AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF RHODESIA. Because the car with the Soviet officers was destroyed by SAS saboteurs of Rhodesia. Here is the Rhodesian version of events.
By mid-1979, Special Services Superintendent Winston Hart, responsible for overseeing the ZANLA camps in Mozambique, received preliminary information that the area known as the Chimoyo Circle had once again become used by militants. Previous camps in the Chimoio area were destroyed by the SAS, and attempts by terrorists to re-establish bases there were thwarted by several attacks by fighter jets. For some time, Chimoyo became a peaceful region.
However, intercepted terrorist documentation and testimony from captured militants forced Hart to become convinced that a new huge base had been created in the area, which, according to preliminary data, included three separate camps. Gradually, Rhodesian intelligence services came to the conclusion that New Chimoyo was perhaps the most important ZANLA camp in Mozambique. This was indirectly confirmed by the fact that such important people as Josiah Tongogara and Rex Ngongo (Solomon Mujuru) - the top of ZANLA - often visit New Chimoyo.
The destruction of this camp removed a lot of problems for Rhodesia. In particular, in this case, the flow of militants through eastern border would actually dry up and the Otboyschik operational zone would be “clean” for a long time. What freed up the military units was that the infiltration of terrorists into the republic was an avalanche, and the troops simply did not physically have time to react.
Intelligence began to piece together all the information - the design of the camp, key figures, but the most important detail remained behind the scenes: where exactly is the camp located? Interrogations of captured terrorists yielded nothing: “From Vanduzi behind the railway... by truck for an hour and a half... along the power lines on foot for another hour and a half...” - this was the maximum that Hart and his subordinates could achieve.
Intelligence knew that the camp was located near a river, that the camp itself was located on a hill and that it was approximately located east of the Chimoio-Tete road. But that's all. The command also had information that there were at least 2,000 ZANLA militants in New Chimoyo. As a result, it was decided to send a group of SAS operatives on reconnaissance. In addition to reconnaissance, the saboteurs were supposed to set up an ambush in the proposed area of the camp in order to intercept or destroy someone from the middle or senior command of the militants. Intelligence had information that Land Cruisers often came to the camp, which meant, first of all, visits from ZANLA hierarchs.
Command of the group was entrusted to SAS Lieutenant Andrew Sanders, from 1st Platoon. His deputy was Dave Berry. In addition, the group included another 9 SAS operatives and 4 RENAMO partisans. The Mozambicans were needed. Judging by the old Portuguese maps, the group had to operate in a densely populated region, and the partisans acted as a “smoke screen”.
During the operation, the commander of the first SAS platoon, Captain Rob Johnston, decided to deploy a relay station near the border with Mozambique. In principle, this was rarely practiced in the SAS, unlike the Selous Scouts. When conducting deep reconnaissance, as a rule, operatives used a bulky short-wave transmitter, which made it possible to work at long distances. But it was necessary to install an antenna - and this took time.
In this case, Johnston said that if everything went wrong, the group simply might not have enough time to deploy the radio station. Therefore, the group was given a less powerful transmitter with a rigid antenna - however, the power was enough to contact the relay station, and they, in turn, were constantly in contact with the Grand Reef airbase. Ensuring the operation of the station, deployed on a hill in Rhodesia, about 15 kilometers from the site of the intended ambush, was entrusted to SAS operatives Bruce Langley, Henny Pretorius, Barry Deacon and Rob Epple.
The transfer of 11 SAS operatives and 4 RENAMO partisans to Mozambican territory was carried out using helicopters. The saboteurs landed about 40 minutes before sunset, after which the helicopters immediately turned around and left for the Grand Reef, and the operatives and guerrillas began to march.
Unfortunately, the night turned out to be practically moonless - as a result, around 23:00, complete darkness set in and the saboteurs were forced to stop moving. At dawn the group resumed its movement, moving at an accelerated pace through very rough terrain in the approximate direction of the camp. The group only had old maps - this created additional difficulties; Thus, the saboteurs discovered a road that was not marked on the map; moreover, some hills and lowlands on the map were marked not where they were actually located. In the afternoon the group came to a large hill, and Sanders decided to position himself on the slope until the end. daylight hours. To reach the site of the intended ambush, they had to cross one low ridge, but the SAS men decided not to risk it - the activity of the local population, from the point of view of the operatives, was too high.
The rest of the day passed quietly, but towards evening a group of ZANLA militants appeared on the road. Some of them examined the road for possible mines, the rest scattered in combat guards, inspecting the bush. The militants did not notice the SAS patrols. In principle, the appearance of terrorists was expected - the militants probably heard helicopters last evening and decided to check the road for night mining. The only thing that the operatives did not expect was that the militants would appear so close. Therefore, Sanders suggested that the terrorist camp was much closer to the border than analysts believed.
After consulting, the group commander decided to stay at the position for another day to gather more more information before setting up an ambush. With Sanders' consent, RENAMO guerrillas went away to talk with local population. The news they brought was stunning: the reconnaissance group was located some five kilometers from the camp.
The night passed without incident, but in the morning, at 08:00, a ZANLA patrol of 10 people appeared. The militants walked exactly to where the SAS patrols were located - in the end they had no choice but to open fire. Two militants died immediately, eight immediately disappeared into the bush and rushed back. Half a minute later, mortars hit the SAS soldiers from a nearby hill. The fire was not aimed, but for the operatives the mortar shelling meant one thing - they had been identified, and the mission could be curtailed.
Despite this, Sanders and Berry decided to move to another section of the road, in the hope that the ambush could somehow be implemented. The chances of this were slim, but Sanders decided to make at least something out of the situation. In principle, he understood that the group’s position was only getting worse, and the saboteurs should have left without looking back. Moreover, the group had no idea how many militants were in the camp, what the chances were of a collision, etc.
The shelling was short-lived. SAS and RENAMO managed to run further down the road. Moreover, it turned out that the operatives moved even closer to the camp. Suddenly, the sound of cars was heard from the direction of the camp. Sanders decided to use the opportunity to destroy the column. A certain risk was as follows: the group consisted of 15 fighters, and the saboteurs did not know how many cars were moving towards them, and how many terrorists were in these cars. In addition, the group had only one RPG-7. Although operative Dave Bradley in the SAS was considered an ace in handling a grenade launcher, the operatives were still nervous - the lead vehicle had to be knocked out the first time.
After reconnaissance, Sanders and Berry chose an ambush site, and the saboteurs took their positions. SAS soldiers planted several Claymore mines along the sides of the road. After that they could only wait.
After some time, a man appeared on the road. At Berry's signal, the bystander was knocked down and tied up. A quick interrogation revealed that he was a local resident who was trading with militants in a terrorist camp. The operatives decided to take him with them - as it turned out later, it was correct solution. Already in Rhodesia, counterintelligence officers extracted a lot from the merchant useful information. An hour and a half later, the noise of cars was heard. Five minutes later, two Land Cruisers drove into the ambush location. By chance, at that very second, the second car tried to overtake the first...
What happened next happened almost instantly. Operative Dave Bradley stepped out onto the road, aimed his RPG and fired at the first car. The grenade hit the radiator and the car, traveling at a speed of about 40 km/h, stopped dead in its tracks. Actually, there were 8 people in the car - three in the front and five in the back. In addition, in the rear of the car there was a 200-liter gasoline tank. A security soldier was sitting on it. The explosion of the grenade threw him off the tank, but despite the shock, the soldier managed to jump to his feet and rush into the bush. He was lucky - in that battle he was the only survivor. Simultaneously with Bradley’s shot, SAS and RENAMO opened fire on the car and literally three or four seconds later the tank in the rear of the Land Cruiser exploded. The car instantly turned into a huge sheaf of flame.
Meanwhile, other operatives shot the driver and passengers of the second Land Cruiser with machine guns, and the second car also caught fire - an incendiary bullet hit the gas tank. One of the passengers of the second car, a couple of seconds before the explosion, managed to jump out of the car and ran away. He was shot in a short burst.
In a few seconds it was all over. Two cars were burning on the road, the enemy lost 14 people killed. Dave Berry tried to get closer to the burning cars, and maybe search them for documents, but he couldn’t get close to them - the flames were so intense. It seemed to him that among the burning bodies he noticed several that clearly belonged to whites.
There was no time to lose, and the saboteurs ran away from the burning cars. Andrew Sanders contacted the relay station, requesting an emergency helicopter evacuation. The request was immediately transmitted to Grand Reef. Upon receiving the signal, 1st Platoon Leader Rob Johnston took off in a reconnaissance helicopter to coordinate the operation.
Meanwhile, the saboteurs and the prisoner they had taken with them fled towards the Rhodesian border, looking along the way for open clearings in the bush suitable for landing helicopters. Finally, the right place was found. It later turned out that there was another one a kilometer away from this site, but the first one was located higher, which made it an ideal position. The area was quickly cleared, and the operatives took up a perimeter defense in the long grass, eagerly awaiting the Alouettes.
Suddenly, ZANLA fighters appeared 100 meters east of the site. The female trackers walked ahead, followed by the bulk of the terrorists. Having approached another 20 meters, the militants opened fire, noticing one of the saboteurs. The SAS men immediately responded, killing six militants. After this, a battle ensued.
Reinforcements began to arrive to the militants. The forces were clearly unequal - against 15 saboteurs there were from 50 to 70 militants armed not only with machine guns, but also with mortars, rifle grenades and machine guns. The firefight lasted about 10 minutes, after which Sanders gave the order to withdraw. The operatives began to retreat, snarling fire. In response, the militants tried to cover the retreating people with mortar fire.
At that moment, Rob Johnston's Lynx appeared over the battlefield and the militants' fire stopped. 4 Alouettes should have arrived within a few minutes for evacuation. Unexpectedly, the pilot of one of the helicopters asked Johnston for a report on the situation at the landing site - the pilot did not really want to land the precious helicopter directly on the battlefield. Johnston assured the pilot that the firefight had stopped and the Alouettes could land safely, although in fact the shooting continued.
Pursued by militants, the operatives fled from last bit of strength, through the bush, which then gave way to small corn fields, through lowlands and hills, and could not find a suitable place to land the helicopters that had already appeared on the horizon. Finally the site was found. The pilots were not particularly surprised that Johnston outright lied - when the helicopters appeared, the militants only intensified their fire.
Seeing the landing of the Alouettes, the saboteurs accelerated their run. Fortunately, there was enough space in the helicopters for everyone - the Alouette took 4 people on board, not counting the pilot and gunner. So 4 helicopters could easily carry away 11 SAS soldiers, 4 RENAMO soldiers and a bottom prisoner. The only thing is that part of the cargo had to be thrown, almost on the heads of the approaching militants. After a moment's hesitation, the helicopters gained altitude and left towards Rhodesia.
Further radio interception carried out by the Rhodesians revealed the following: during the ambush set up by the SAS, three died Soviet adviser. One of them was in high rank, presumably it was a general.
Plan
Introduction
1 Early period wars
1.1 Beginning of the war: 1975-1976
1.2 1980s
1.3 1990s
1.4 2000s
Bibliography
Civil War in Angola
Introduction
The Angolan Civil War (1975-2002) was a major armed conflict in Angola between three rival factions: MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. The war began in 1975 after the end of the Angolan War of Independence and lasted until 2002.
1. Early period of the war
1.1. Beginning of the war: 1975-1976
Even before Angola declared independence, on September 25, 1975, troops from Zaire entered the territory of Angola from the north, supporting FNLA units, and on October 14, the South African army also invaded the territory of this country from the south, supporting UNITA (due to the fact that the MPLA supported SWAPO , which fought for the independence of Namibia, neighboring Angola, from South Africa). At the same time, detachments of the Portuguese crossed the Angolan border from the territory of Namibia. liberation army(ELP), who acted on the side of forces hostile to the MPLA. Their destination was Luanda.
In this situation, MPLA Chairman Agostinho Neto turned to the USSR and Cuba for help. Cuban leader Fidel Castro reacted immediately by sending volunteer Cuban troops to Angola to help the MPLA. The arrival of Cuban military specialists in Angola enabled the MPLA to as soon as possible form 16 infantry battalions and 25 anti-aircraft and mortar batteries of the armed forces People's Republic Angola (NRA). Until the end of 1975, the USSR sent about 200 military specialists to help the MPLA, and they also arrived on the Angolan shores warships USSR Navy. The USSR and its allies supplied the MPLA with many different weapons.
12 November column of South African troops " Zulu"went on the offensive. In 20 days, South African troops advanced more than 700 km into Angolan territory. However, already on November 17, MPLA troops, with the support of the Cubans, managed to stop a South African armored column at the bridge over the Kewe River, north of the city of Gangula. A few days later, MPLA troops launched an offensive in the Porto Ambain area. By December 5, the combined forces of FAPLA and Cuban volunteers pushed back the opponents north and south of the capital by 100 km.
On January 6, 1976, Carmona (Uigi), the main FNLA base in northern Angola, fell into the hands of the MPLA. A week later, the FNLA troops took a panicked flight and left Angola. The MPLA was able to transfer its forces to the south. Heavy fighting took place in the areas of Vila Luso and Teixeira de Sauza. Savimbi was forced to announce UNITA's transition to guerrilla warfare.
At the beginning of February 1976, fighting on the northern front was already taking place in the border zone with Zaire. On February 8, MPLA fighters liberated an important strategic city Santo Antonio do Zaire, and the next day - already in a southern direction - they entered the city of Huambo (Nova Lizboa). Building on their success, MPLA units took the port cities of Benguela, Lobita and Sa da Bandeira over the following days. With the capture of the city of Pedro da Feitis on February 18, MPLA forces established control over the northern border of the country.
By the end of March 1976, the armed forces of the NRA, with the direct support of a 15,000-strong contingent of Cuban volunteers and the help of Soviet military specialists, managed to oust the troops of South Africa and Zaire from Angola.
The Angolan authorities recorded 529 cases of violation of the Angolan border by the South African armed forces from January to June 1980.
In August 1981, South African motorized columns numbering 11 thousand people, supported by heavy artillery, airplanes and helicopters, invaded the Angolan province of Cunene, advancing 150-200 km in some areas. But near the city of Cajama, their path was blocked by FAPLA (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) units. At the end of the summer of 1982, 4 additional motorized infantry brigades, 50 aircraft and 30 helicopters were transferred here. During this period, an attempt was made to capture the settlements of Kuvelay and Letala. At the end of 1982, the Angolan and South African governments began negotiations on a ceasefire, but on January 31, 1983, units of the South African army entered the province of Benguela and blew up a hydroelectric power station, which led to a new round of escalation of the conflict. Only in March 1984 did the parties sign a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka. But the war with UNITA continued.
In the summer-autumn of 1987, another large-scale FAPLA offensive failed, the goal of which was to finally put an end to the UNITA partisans. In November 1987, UNITA troops attacked the government garrison in Quinto Quanavale. Cuban units came to the aid of government troops, and then the South African army intervened in the battle. Fighting continued until August 5, 1988, when a ceasefire agreement was reached with the South African government in Geneva. The South Africans and UNITA were unable to dislodge the government troops. Savimbi did not recognize the decisions of the peace agreement and continued the war.
On June 31, 1991, the Lisbon Peace Accords were concluded between the MPLA and UNITA on holding free elections. In the summer of 1992, the MPLA won the elections. Savimbi refused to admit defeat and resumed hostilities. The most intense fighting took place in the province of Huambo. Intense fighting continued until mid-1994 and ended due to Savimbi being seriously wounded. Soon a truce was signed. From time to time the war broke out with renewed vigor.
In February 2002, Savimbi was killed in a shootout with government forces near the town of Lucousse, in the eastern province of Moxico. New leader UNITA - António Dembo signed a ceasefire agreement in Luena on March 30, ending the war.
In total, from 1975 to 1991, 10,985 Soviet military personnel visited Angola.
Bibliography:
2. FNLA in the anti-colonial struggle and civil war in Angola. Regional public organization of participants in the provision of international assistance to the Republic of Angola.
3. Khazanov A. M. Agostinho Neto: biographical sketch. - M.: Nauka, 1985. - P. 150.
4. Khazanov A. M. Agostinho Neto: biographical sketch. - M.: Nauka, 1985. - P. 152.
5. Khazanov A. M. Agostinho Neto: biographical sketch. - M.: Nauka, 1985. - P. 154.
6. Khazanov A. M. Agostinho Neto: biographical sketch. - M.: Nauka, 1985. - P. 155.
7. Kalley Jacqueline Audrey Southern African Political History: a chronological of key political events from independence to Mid-1997. - 1999.
8. Zotov N. M. Angola: the struggle continues (from the national front to the vanguard party). - M.: Nauka, 1985. - P. 99.
9. Zotov N. M. Angola: the struggle continues (from the national front to the vanguard party). - M.: Nauka, 1985. - P. 100.
Civil War in Mozambique
An indirect continuation of this conflict was the civil war in Mozambique (1976–1992). Rhodesian intelligence services in 1976 created their own insurgency PEHAM0 (Mozambican National Resistance), which declared war on the Mozambican government. RENAMO was also supported by the South African authorities. Thus, FRELIMO, in addition to supporting the Rhodesian rebels and opposing the aggression of the South African Republic, had to throw a significant part of its forces against its Mozambican oppositionists. The basis of RENAMO's tactics was to cause damage to the FRELIMO government by any available means - killing officials, attacks on infrastructure, destruction of hospitals, schools, roads. Almost all of the country's armed forces had to be involved in security, as well as contingents from Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi.
In January 1983, RENAMO carried out its largest act of sabotage, blowing up the railway bridge over the Zambezi. In 1984, Operations Red August and Black September were carried out. Despite the large-scale plans - destroying FRELIMO's foreign supply channels and inflicting a decisive defeat on it - they all failed. A serious blow to RENAMO was dealt by the Non-Aggression and Good Neighborhood Agreement (1984) between Pretoria and Maputo, according to which FRELIMO closed the bases of the African National Congress in exchange for the cessation of South African aid to the RENAMO rebels. But this did not stop the war; South Africa did not fulfill its obligations.
Neither side had the opportunity to win the war. After the death of the country's first president, Samora Machel, in a plane crash in 1986, opponents began to look for ways to reconcile. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, Soviet military assistance. The Mozambican government's peace agreement with the rebels was signed in 1992. RENAMO turned into a political party, and in the elections that followed, FRELIMO won.
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Before the New Year, the Mozambican opposition party RENAMO stopped all military operations against government troops for a week. Representatives of the party leadership said that they were giving the people the opportunity to celebrate the holidays in peace. But will the country have hope for a truce? For a long time, it seemed that the horrors of Mozambique's bloody civil war were a thing of the past. But only in 2016, as a result of renewed fighting between the country's two largest political parties - FRELIMO and RENAMO - dozens of Mozambican citizens died.
The civil war in Mozambique did not reach the same scale as in another former Portuguese colony, Angola, but it also brought a lot of grief to the people of the country. The origins of the confrontation between the two main political forces countries, like Angola, go into a war of independence. Portugal tried with all its might to retain its African colonies. This fit into the concept of the Portuguese leadership that only colonies make a small European country a world-class player. However, since the late 1950s, national liberation movements intensified in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, which soon turned to armed resistance against the colonialists. In the struggle for independence, military assistance from the Soviet Union and other countries played a special role. socialist countries, first of all – Cuba.
The Mozambican War of Independence began in 1964. The rebel forces were led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). At the first stage of the struggle, he acted from the territory of neighboring Tanzania, whose leader Julius Nyerere was considered one of the main patrons revolutionary movements in neighboring countries of Eastern and Southern Africa. Under the command of the Mozambican revolutionary Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO troops began to attack Portuguese colonial troops from Tanzania. The Mozambican War of Independence lasted ten years and claimed at least 50 thousand lives of Mozambican civilians and another 10-30 thousand lives of FRELIMO fighters. On April 25, 1974, the Carnation Revolution took place in Portugal, which became the starting point for fundamental change colonial policy countries. On June 25, 1975, the independence of Mozambique was declared. Like other former Portuguese colonies, Mozambique chose the path of “socialist orientation,” which neither the West nor its neighbors, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, liked. Opposition sentiments also intensified within the ranks of the Mozambique Liberation Front, which came to power. Many yesterday's partisans were not satisfied with the pro-Soviet regime established by FRELIMO leader Samora Machel. One of the opposition-minded officers of the Mozambican army was André Matade Matsangaissa (1950-1979).
Andre Matsangaissa joined the anti-colonial movement as a very young man. After Mozambican independence was declared, he continued to serve in the Mozambican army and was promoted to lieutenant. Matsangaissa served as an army quartermaster in the city of Dondo. But he was soon arrested on criminal charges and imprisoned in a reform camp in Gorongosa. Since during the events described, Mozambique was in the stage of armed conflict with neighboring Rhodesia, units of Rhodesian special forces periodically carried out raids on Mozambican territory. During one of these raids, the Rhodesians attacked the Gorongosa camp and freed the prisoners. Matsangaissa, how former officer Mozambican army, interested Rhodesian intelligence officers and was taken to Salisbury. There he was offered to lead the anti-communist movement in Mozambique, to which the former intendant immediately agreed.
This is how the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) appeared, which was destined to become the largest opposition military-political organization in Mozambique for the next four decades. At the beginning of its existence, RENAMO received assistance from Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Malawi - one of the few African countries that maintained contacts with the “racist” regimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. On May 30, 1977, almost forty years ago, the civil war began in Mozambique, which was unleashed by the RENAMO organization against the government forces of FRELIMO. At first, the leadership of the Mozambican rebel formations was carried out by Andre Matsangaissa. However, on October 17, 1979, Matsangaissa, who personally participated in RENAMO military operations, died in the Gorongosa area in a shootout with government troops. After his death, RENAMO was headed by Orlanda Cristina, a Mozambican politician closely associated with Rhodesian intelligence and considered a conduit of Southern Rhodesian influence in Mozambican politics. Afonso Dhlakama concentrated the military leadership of RENAMO in his hands. This man is still alive and it is he who still heads RENAMO as the largest opposition organization in the country.
Afonso Dhlakama with his RENAMO comrades
Afonso Dhlakama was born on January 1, 1953 in Mangunda in the province of Sofala. In 1977, he joined the armed struggle launched by the RENAMO movement against the FRELIMO government and quickly made a career in the RENAMO formations, receiving officer rank and becoming the commander of one of the partisan detachments. After the death of Matsangaissa, it was his fellow countryman Dlakama who led the military structure RENAMO. On April 17, 1983, in Pretoria (South Africa), Orlanda Cristina, who was carrying out political leadership RENAMO. After this, Afonso Dhlakama became both the military and political leader of this largest Mozambican anti-government organization. Under his leadership, RENAMO launched military operations in the northern regions of Mozambique, as well as in the province of Sofala. RENAMO was supported by the most conservative, anti-communist forces in world politics, primarily the regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, as well as Malawi, conservative circles in the USA, Germany and Portugal.
Until 1980, RENAMO's main patron and sponsor was the Southern Rhodesian regime. However, in 1980 Southern Rhodesia ceased to exist. It was renamed Zimbabwe, and representatives of the Zimbabwean national liberation movement led by Robert Mugabe came to power in the country. They worked closely with FRELIMO, so RENAMO as an opposition organization immediately lost support from this country. Then the intelligence services of the Republic of South Africa, which remained the last stronghold of the “whites” in the south of the African continent, took over the “patronage” of the Mozambican rebels. We can say that RENAMO only benefited from the transition under the auspices of South Africa. South Africa had more impressive resources and capabilities, so the organization soon moved from occasional attacks from the border areas to a full-scale civil war with Mozambican government forces. RENAMO training camps were relocated to South Africa - to the Transvaal province, where Mozambican militants were trained under the guidance of South African and American instructors. By intensifying support for RENAMO, the South African authorities were, of course, guided by their own interests. The fact is that Mozambique provided serious support to the African National Congress, which fought against the government of the Republic of South Africa. Starting a civil war on Mozambican territory was a way to distract the Mozambican authorities from the situation in South Africa. In addition, the overthrow of the FRELIMO regime in Mozambique would contribute to the “de-Sovietization” of South Africa, which was extremely important in the context of the ongoing Cold War.
The first half of the 1980s entered the period of the most successful actions of RENAMO. At this time, the organization carried out its most effective acts of sabotage, for example, the explosion of a railway bridge over the Zambezi in 1983. Back in 1981, South African troops invaded the territory of Mozambique, who also began to provide massive support to RENAMO formations. The rebels carried out sabotage against government troops and civilian infrastructure. Both sides of the conflict did not spare the civilian population, who became victims of shelling, “cleansing operations,” and mine explosions. In total, at least 1 million civilians died during the civil war in Mozambique, which lasted from 1977 to 1992.
However, RENAMO’s activities raised many questions and negative assessments from Western politicians. More detailed acquaintance with RENAMO made it possible to see that this organization does not at all adhere to the “European” values of democracy and human rights. RENAMO was an ordinary Afro-nationalist organization that expressed the interests of the traditional elite of Mozambican villages, whose positions were undermined by the socialist experiments of the FRELIMO leadership. In addition, RENAMO militants showed extreme cruelty towards the civilian population, recruited minors into their ranks, and committed numerous criminal offenses, which also could not arouse sympathy for this organization from the Western public. The wise course of the Mozambican government also played a role in preserving FRELIMO’s position. The Mozambican leadership managed to maintain a good relationship not only with the USSR, but also with the USA, and even achieved financial assistance from American government. In 1984, Mozambique entered into an agreement with South Africa. After this, RENAMO lost most of the assistance coming from South Africa, although it continued to enjoy the support of conservative circles and intelligence services. The situation began to change seriously after the Cold War came to an end. The cessation of support for FRELIMO from the Soviet Union forced the Mozambican leadership to look for new partners in the West. In turn, American and European political circles realized that it was better to deal with “re-educated” representatives of the current Mozambican elite than with the RENAMO rebels.
Afonso Dhlakama
Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano entered into negotiations with the leadership of RENAMO. In 1992, a long-awaited truce was concluded, ending fifteen years of bloody civil war in Mozambique. RENAMO was legalized as an opposition political party, and its leader Afonso Dhlakama began to take part in the presidential elections. He ran for president in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. Dhlakama's participation in the presidential elections was accompanied by various excesses. For example, RENAMO did not recognize the results of the 1999 elections. Activists of the Mozambican National Resistance held numerous protests; several members of the opposition, under strange circumstances, died in prison after being detained. But these mass protests did not develop into a phase of active hostilities.
For a long time, RENAMO leaders did not lose hope that sooner or later they would come to power as a result of elections, since the country's population would become disillusioned with the policies pursued by FRELIMO. But legal political struggle never brought the RENAMO party the long-awaited victory. Moreover, after being discovered in Mozambique gas fields and the beginning of their operation, FRELIMO’s position began to strengthen. At the same time, a tightening began political regime in the country. As a result, in 2012, RENAMO activists began to clash with government forces. The party expressed a desire to revive its armed forces and training camps, explaining this by the desire to “resist the dictatorship of FRELIMO.” Thus began a new phase of aggravation of the internal political situation in Mozambique.
President Filipe Nyusi
In 2013-2014 Armed clashes continued between RENAMO forces and government forces. IN recent history They entered Mozambique under the name “low-intensity rebellion”, because these clashes were still far from heating up the situation like the civil war era. On October 15, 2014, FRELIMO representative Filipe Nyusi, who served as the country’s Minister of Defense from 2008 to 2014 and was thus one of the direct leaders of the suppression of RENAMO protests, was elected as the new president of Mozambique. The opposition did not recognize the election results, which led to a new escalation of violence. On June 14, 2015, RENAMO militants attacked the positions of the Mozambican military police in the province of Tete, resulting in the death of 45 government soldiers. Afonso Dhlakama hastened to declare that he personally ordered the attack. Thus, the civil war in Mozambique has actually resumed, albeit in a less active form than before 1992.
Afonso Dhlakama admitted that he was “tired of political games FRELIMO." In fact, behind these words of the rebel leader one can feel deep disappointment - RENAMO was never able to turn into a serious political party that could “bite off” at least a small part of the power from FRELIMO. The Mozambican leadership, supported by the West, feels its strength and no longer intends to reckon with RENAMO. In the current situation, it makes no sense for the West to provide financial, military, and organizational support to RENAMO, since FRELIMO appears to be a more serious and thorough partner. Many countries and corporations have sustainable economic interests, and a civil war in this state is not at all included in their plans. It will be another matter if such influential players as the USA or China decide to “divide” their spheres of influence on the African continent. Then some of them will be able to remember the rebels and rebel armies.
Little is said about this, but during the Cold War, the USSR defended its interests not only in the countries of the social bloc, but also in distant Africa. Our military has been involved in many African conflicts, the largest of which was the civil war in Angola.
Unknown War
For a long time it was not customary to talk about the fact that the Soviet military fought in Africa. Moreover, 99% of USSR citizens did not know that there was a Soviet military contingent in distant Angola, Mozambique, Libya, Ethiopia, North and South Yemen, Syria and Egypt. Of course, rumors were heard, but they were treated with restraint, not confirmed by official information from the pages of the Pravda newspaper, as tales and speculation.
Meanwhile, only through the 10th Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces from 1975 to 1991, 10,985 generals, officers, warrant officers and privates passed through Angola. During the same time, 11,143 Soviet military personnel were sent to Ethiopia. If we also take into account the Soviet military presence in Mozambique, then we can talk about more than 30 thousand Soviet military specialists and rank and file on African soil.
However, despite such scale, the soldiers and officers who fulfilled their “international duty” were as if non-existent, they were not given orders and medals, and no one wrote about their exploits Soviet press. It was as if they were not there for official statistics. As a rule, the military cards of participants in African wars did not contain any records of business trips to the African continent, but simply contained an inconspicuous stamp with the unit number, behind which the 10th Directorate of the USSR General Staff was hidden. This state of affairs was well reflected in his poem by the military translator Alexander Polivin, who wrote during the battles for the city of Quitu Cuanavale
"Where have you and I taken us, my friend?
Probably a big and necessary thing?
And they tell us: “You couldn’t be there,
And the land did not turn red with the blood of Russian Angola"
The first soldiers
Immediately after the overthrow of the dictatorship in Portugal, on November 11, 1975, when Angola received its long-awaited independence, the first military specialists, forty special forces and military translators appeared in this African country. After fighting colonial forces for fifteen years, the rebels were finally able to come to power, but that power still had to be fought for. At the helm of Angola was a coalition of three national liberation movements: People's movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). The Soviet Union decided to support the MPLA. With the departure of the Portuguese, Angola became a real battleground for geopolitical interests. The MPLA, which was supported by Cuba and the USSR, was opposed by UNITA, FNLA and South Africa, which, in turn, were supported by Zaire and the USA.
What did they fight for?
What did the USSR achieve when it sent its “African special forces” to distant lands, to distant Africa? The goals were primarily geopolitical. Angola was seen by the Soviet leadership as an outpost of socialism in Africa; it could become our first enclave in South Africa and could resist the economically powerful South Africa, which, as is known, received support from the United States.
During the Cold War, our country could not afford to lose Angola; it was necessary to do everything in our power to help the new leadership of the country, to make the country a model African socialist state, guided by its own political tasks on Soviet Union. In respect of trade relations Angola was of little interest to the USSR; the countries' export areas were similar: timber, oil and diamonds. It was a war for political influence.
About significance Soviet aid Fidel Castro succinctly said at one time: “Angola would not have had any prospects without the political, logistical and technical assistance of the USSR.”
How and in what did you fight?
From the very beginning of the USSR's military participation in the African conflict, they were given carte blanche to conduct military operations. This was reported by a telegram received from the General Staff, which indicated that military specialists have the right to take part in hostilities on the side of the MPLA and Cuban troops.
In addition to the “manpower”, which consisted of military advisers, officers, warrant officers, privates, sailors and combat swimmers (the USSR sent several of its military ships to the shores of Angola), weapons and special equipment were also supplied to Angola.
However, as Sergei Kolomnin, a participant in that war, recalls, there were still not enough weapons. However, he was also missing opposing side. Most of all, of course, there were Kalashnikov assault rifles, both Soviet and foreign (Romanian, Chinese and Yugoslav) assembled. There were also Portuguese Zh-3 rifles left over from colonial times. The principle of “we will help in any way we can” was manifested in the supply to Angola of the remains from the times of the Great Patriotic War reliable, but somewhat outdated by that time PPD, PPSh and Degtyarev machine guns.
The uniform of the Soviet military in Angola was without insignia; at first it was customary to wear the Cuban uniform, the so-called “verde olivo”. It was not very comfortable in the hot African climate, but military personnel, as a rule, do not choose their wardrobe. Soviet soldiers I had to resort to military ingenuity and order a lighter uniform from tailors. Lieutenant General Petrovsky once planned to make changes to the ammunition at the official level, add insignia to it and change the material, but his proposals were met with hostility by the command. People were dying on the Angolan fronts; dealing with issues of uniform in such conditions was considered frivolous.
Change of course
We missed Angola, as well as Lebanon and other African countries. Now we can talk about this. When the USSR collapsed and the political course in the country changed, our military contingent was recalled from Africa. A holy place, as we know, is never empty. The President of the same Angola, Dos Santos (who, by the way, graduated from the University of Baku and is married to a Russian) had to look for new allies. And, not surprisingly, they turned out to be the United States.
The Americans immediately stopped supporting UNITA and switched to helping the MPLA. Today there are American workers working in Angola oil companies, Angolan oil is supplied to China, has interests in Angola and Brazil. At the same time, Angola itself remains one of the poorest countries in the world with a poverty rate of 60 percent, outbreaks of the HIV epidemic and total unemployment.
Soviet Africa turned out to be an unfulfilled dream, and several hundred Soviet soldiers who came there to fulfill their “international duty” will never return.
