The book "The Last War of the Russian Empire".

Questions:
1. General characteristics of the course of the First World War.
2. Eastern (Russian) Front - the main front of the Twin World War.

The 20th century went down in history not only with unprecedented achievements of human genius, science and technology, but also with one of the bloodiest wars in human history - the First World War, in which Russia played one of the main roles.

First World War began on August 1, 1914 and lasted 4 years, 3 months and 10 days (until November 11, 1918). It ushered in an era of global armed conflicts and social revolutions.
38 countries were drawn into the orbit of the war (34 on the side of the Entente and 4 on the side of the Austro-German bloc) with a population of over 1.5 billion people (three quarters of the world's population). The armed struggle covered the territory of Europe, Asia and Africa. Active fighting were carried out not only on land, but also at sea and in the air. The number of active armies exceeded 29 million people, the number of mobilized people was 73.5 million people. The war brought unprecedented hardships and suffering, general hunger and ruin to humanity. During it there was mass destruction material assets, the total cost of which amounted to 58 billion rubles. The total losses during the war amounted to 9.5 million people killed and died from wounds and 20 million people wounded (of which 3.5 million people were left crippled).
The First World War was inevitable in the prevailing socio-political conditions in the world at that time. It was the brainchild of the emerging era of imperialism, when contradictions sharply intensified: economic, political, ideological, ethnic, religious, etc.
The causes of the war were the uneven economic and political development capitalist countries, which led at the beginning of the 20th century to a change in the balance of forces on the world stage and rivalry between the largest imperialist countries for markets, sources of raw materials, and for the redistribution of the already divided world (colonies). The most acute contradictions that led to the World War were between Germany and Great Britain.
Each country pursued its own goals in the war. Germany sought to defeat Great Britain by depriving it of its colonies; defeat France and secure the regions of Alsace and Lorraine; capture the colonies of Belgium and Holland; weaken Russia by taking away Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states; subjugate Turkey and Bulgaria to its influence and, together with Austria-Hungary, strengthen its position in the Balkans. Great Britain wanted to eliminate Germany as its main competitor, and at the same time weaken its allies - Russia and France. France intended to regain Alsace and Lorraine. Russia sought to delay the expansion of Austria-Hungary into Serbia, Herzegovina and Bosnia, seize the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, consolidate its positions on the Balkan Peninsula and take Galicia from Austria-Hungary.
Preparations for the First World War were launched major powers long before it started. Back in 1879, Germany entered into a military alliance with Austria-Hungary, directed against France and Russia. Italy joined it in 1882. An aggressive military-political bloc has formed - Triple Alliance.
In contrast to him, Russia and France in 1891-1893. concluded a Franco-Russian alliance. In 1904, an Anglo-French agreement was signed on the division of spheres of influence in Africa, and in 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement on the division of spheres of influence in Asia (Iran, Afghanistan, Tibet). The bloc of Great Britain, France and Russia was called the Triple Entente, or Entente. In 1915, Italy came over to his side, having received the promise of profitable territorial acquisitions.
Although the Triple Alliance began to prepare for hostilities in advance, no unified coalition plans for waging war were developed. Each country had its own strategic plan, which reflected primarily own interests in war.
The German plan was based on the need to avoid a war on two fronts. It provided for a lightning strike first on France and then on Russia. It was planned to defeat France in 6-8 weeks during one strategic operation. After the victory in the west, it was planned to quickly transfer all forces to the Eastern Front and, in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army, defeat Russian troops in Poland.
The Russian war plan, developed by the General Staff, was offensive in nature. It provided for active operations simultaneously against Germany in East Prussia and against Austria-Hungary in Galicia. There were two versions of the plan. Option “A” was designed in case Germany concentrated its main forces against France. Then the main efforts of the Russian troops were directed against Austria-Hungary. The second option was put into effect on the condition that Germany delivered the main blow against Russia. In this situation, the main forces of the Russian army were sent to repel this attack. In case Turkey entered the war, the Caucasian Army was created.
At the beginning of the war, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, General N.N. was appointed Chief of Staff of the Headquarters. Yanushkevich. From August 23, 1915 to March 2, 1917, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was Emperor Nicholas Ch, the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters was General M.V. Alekseev. After the February Revolution, the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was occupied by: M.V. Alekseev (March 19-May 21, 1917), A.A. Brusilov (May 22 -July 19, 1917), L.G. Kornilov (July 19 - August 27, 1917), A.F. Kerensky (August 30 - November 1, 1917), N.N. Dukhonin (November 1-9, 1917); post-October revolution - member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee N.N. Krylenko (November 9, 1917 - March 1918).
At the beginning of the war, Russia deployed two active fronts (North-Western Front - against Germany and South-Western Front - against Austria-Hungary) and two separate active armies: the 6th (Petrograd) - to guard the Baltic Sea coast and the 7th ( Odessa) - to protect the Black Sea coast.
With the declaration of war on Russia by Turkey (October 1914), the Separate Caucasian Army was formed, which deployed in 1917 to the Caucasian Front (existed from April 1917 to May 1918).
In the autumn of 1915, after the withdrawal of our troops from Poland and Lithuania, the North-Western Front was divided into two: Northern (consisted of armies operating on the roads to Petrograd, with the addition of the 6th Separate Army), Western (consisted of armies operating on the routes to Moscow).
In connection with the defeat of the Romanian armies by German troops in September-November 1916 and the need to provide military assistance and support to the new ally (Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente in 1916), by decision of the Russian government the Romanian Front was created (existed from November 24, 1916 until the beginning of 1918).
The reason for the war was the murder on June 28, 1914 by the Serb G. Princip of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. On July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Serbia was supported by Russia, Austria-Hungary by Germany. Having learned about the general mobilization of the Russian army that began on July 30, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, then on France on August 3, and sent its troops into Belgium. On August 4, England declared war on Germany. Thus began the war in Europe, which very soon grew into a world war. Austria-Hungary was joined by Turkey and Bulgaria, and England, France and Russia by Italy, Romania, Japan and the USA.
The main military events of the war unfolded on the Western (French) and Eastern (Russian) fronts, the North, Mediterranean and Baltic seas.
It should be noted that the main burden of the war fell on the shoulders of Russia, which throughout the war did not receive any help from its allies, and the main theater of war was the Eastern (Russian) Front.
During the First World War, Russian military art enriched with the experience of breaking through the enemy front during an offensive operation simultaneously in several directions, as well as the experience of joint actions ground forces and the fleet in the coastal direction. The defense of the troops became deeper and stronger; it was based on 2-3 fortified lines. Mobile barrage fire - a fire shaft - began to be used as artillery support for infantry. The method of conducting offensive operations by launching simultaneous attacks on several sectors of the front became further widespread.
Great changes took place in the organization and armament of the army, automatic weapons began to appear and be used more widely, the number of artillery increased, tanks, aircraft and methods of their use were improved. New methods of interaction between infantry and tanks, artillery and aviation were developed.
It was the First World War that was a testing ground and application by the warring countries different ways chemical weapons. In total, 180 thousand tons of various toxic substances were produced during the war, of which about 125 thousand tons were used. At least 45 different types of chemical substances, among them 4 are blister, 14 are suffocating, 27 are irritating. Total losses from chemical weapons are estimated at 1.3 million people, including up to 100 thousand fatalities.
An exceptional tactical success with enormous operational consequences was the use of gas launchers by German troops on October 27, 1917 against Italian troops at Caporetto, known in history as the “miracle of Caporetto.” Here, in the direction of the main attack, against the Italian battalion, which was blocking the exit to the river valley. Isonzo, a salvo of 894 gas launchers (8 tons of phosgene) was fired. In a short time, all life in the valley was destroyed. The entire battalion was killed, and this made it possible for the strike group of Austro-German troops to break through the entire Italian defense and force two Italian armies. More than 500 people were found dead on the battlefield, many of whom were wearing gas masks.
Many went through the harsh school of the First World War Soviet commanders and military leaders: G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, B.M. Shaposhnikov, M.N. Tukhachevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky, V.K. Blucher, A.I. Egorov, I.E. Yakir and others. For example, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny participated in World War I as a senior non-commissioned officer of the 18th Seversky Dragoon Regiment on the German, Austrian and Caucasian fronts.
In the military historical literature there are different points of view on the periodization of the First World War. Some authors, based on the nature of its conduct, divide the war into three periods:
- first - the failure of the German strategy of lightning defeat of France and Russia, the maneuverable nature of the war, the formation of continuous fronts and the transition to a long positional struggle (1914-1915);
- second - the failure of the Entente strategy of defeating the opposing coalition, mutual bleeding in a positional war (1916-1917);
- third - the collapse of the German strategy of achieving two victories over the Entente and Soviet republic, general offensive The Entente and the military defeat of Germany (1918).
Other authors also divide the First World War into three periods, but give them a different name:
- maneuver period (in the Western European theater - the campaign of 1914, in the Eastern European theater it lasted until the autumn of 1915);
- positional period (campaigns of 1915-1917);
- final period (campaign of 1918).
The third group of historians divides the First World War into four periods:
- the first - a strategic maneuver of large scope (2 months);
- second - positional war (3.5 years, from the end of October 1914);
- third - the stage of large German offensives (about 4 months, from March 21 to July 18, 1918);
- fourth - the period of large French offensive operations (about 4 months, from July 18 to November 11, 1918).
And finally, a number of researchers (primarily Russian authors) divide the First World War into periods based on the campaigns of 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, since the strategic plans and nature of the actions of the warring parties changed Every year.

The 1914 campaign on the Eastern (Russian) Front began with the East Prussian offensive operation (August 17 - September 15, 1914). During this operation, on August 20, 1914, the Battle of Gumbinnen-Goldap was successfully carried out against a German strike force consisting of five divisions that tried to take Russian troops in a pincer movement. The Germans lost up to 8 thousand people and 12 guns.
However, the commander of the Russian troops, General Rennenkampf, did not use the success achieved to complete the defeat of the enemy, and the East Prussian offensive ended in failure. Russian troops lost about 250 thousand people and a large number of technology. The reasons for this were the unsatisfactory leadership of the troops by the front command and the actual betrayal of Rennenkampf. And yet, the operation had important strategic results: the German command was forced to transfer 2 corps and 1 cavalry division. In addition, another corps located in the Metz area was prepared for redeployment to East Prussia. This significantly weakened strike force German troops advancing on Paris, and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the Germans in September 1914 at the Battle of the Marne.
Simultaneously with the fighting in East Prussia, fierce battles broke out in Galicia on the southern flank of the East European theater of operations. On the front between the Vistula and the Dniester, 320-400 km wide, about 2 million people and up to 5 thousand guns took part on both sides. As part of the unfolding Battle of Galicia (August 18 - September 21), Russian troops carried out the Lublin-Kholm (August 23 - September 3) and Galich-Lvov offensive (August 18 - September 3) operations.
As a result of the Battle of Galicia, Russian troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the Austro-Hungarian army, occupied Galicia and reached the foothills of the Carpathians, throwing the enemy 280-300 km to the west. During the battle in Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian army lost more than a third of its strength - about 400 thousand people. (including more than 100 thousand prisoners), 400 guns and until the end of the war could not independently carry out large offensive operations without the support of the Germans. The losses of Russian troops amounted to 230 thousand people. Germany, saving its ally from final defeat, hastily began to transfer large military forces from the Western to the Eastern Front. During this battle in the area of ​​​​the city of Zhovkva (now the Lviv region of Ukraine), staff captain P.N. Nesterov was the first in the history of world aviation to use air ram and shot down a two-seat Austrian reconnaissance aircraft.
After the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian troops in the Battle of Galicia, a real possibility of an invasion of Russian armies into German Silesia was created. To this end, the Russian command, having regrouped its armies in the period from September 28 to November 8, 1914, carried out the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. This operation in its scope (front over 300 km, depth up to 140 km, about 900 thousand people participated) became one of the most major operations First World War. The operation is characterized by the regrouping of large forces during the enemy's offensive and the crossing of a large water barrier - the Vistula River. One of the reasons for the slow development of the offensive was weak command and control of the troops and the unpreparedness of the rear, which were more than 150 km behind. Despite heavy losses(up to 50%), the Austro-German troops managed to avoid complete defeat.
After the success achieved in the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation, the Russian Supreme Command Headquarters planned to continue the attack on Poznan deep into Silesia. The German command, having learned about this from intercepted radiograms, transferred its 9th Army to the area southwest of Thorn with the task of a sudden attack on the flank and rear of the 2nd and 5th Russian armies to encircle and defeat them in the Lodz area. As a result of the Lodz operation (November 11 - December 19), the German plan encirclement of the 2nd and 5th Russian armies. Carrying out an encirclement maneuver, the German troops themselves fell into a “bag”, from which they were able to get out only due to the erroneous actions of the commander of the 1st Russian Army, Rennenkampf. The Russian plan for a deep invasion of Germany was also not carried out. The Lodz operation was of an exclusively maneuverable nature; oncoming battles were widespread.
On the Caucasian front, the 1914 campaign ended with major successes for the Russian Caucasian Army of General I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Sarakamysh operation was carried out (December 22, 1914 - January 18, 1915).
In the 1915 campaign in the Western European Theater of Operations, military operations were of a restrictive positional nature, which allowed the German command to transfer formations to the Eastern Front.
Russia, despite big losses and limited material resources, she still planned to conduct an offensive in two strategic directions: in East Prussia against Germany and in the Carpathians against Austria-Hungary. Germany, realizing the futility of waging a long war on two fronts, decided to transfer its main efforts to the Eastern European theater and withdraw Russia from the war.
The Russian Supreme Command Headquarters, in turn, approved the plan for the Carpathian strategic offensive operation (January 23 - April 24), the plan of which included defeating opposing troops enemy and the invasion of Hungary. In difficult mountainous winter conditions, numerous oncoming battles took place, as a result of which the Russians were able to make only slight progress. Bloody battles in the Carpathians, large losses of personnel, and spring thaw forced the Russian command to stop at the achieved positions. However, Russian troops did not last long on the occupied lines. As a result of the Gorlitsky breakthrough (May 2 - June 23), they suffered heavy losses and abandoned all of Galicia.
As a result of the Carpathian operation, Russian troops lost about 1 million people and, despite the failure, attracted significant forces of the Austro-German troops, which allowed the Allies to intensify military operations in the Balkan theater of operations. The enemy lost about 800 thousand people and was also unable to complete the assigned tasks. One of the reasons for the defeat in the Gorlitsky breakthrough was major mistakes of the Russian command in assessing the situation, using reserves, and organizing rear defensive lines.
Troops North Western Front in order to repel the attack of German troops on the flank and rear, from February 7 to February 26, 1915, they carried out the August defensive operation, which, despite the defeat, failed overall plan German command for military operations in East Prussia. And in the spring and summer of 1915, Russian troops carried out the first Prasnysh operation (February 20 - March 1), as a result of which the German offensive plan in Poland was thwarted.
In connection with the success achieved in the Gorlitsky breakthrough, the German command returned to the plan of encircling Russian forces in Poland. For this purpose, a new operation was planned to be carried out in the area of ​​​​the city of Prasnysh. But as a result of the second Prasnysh operation (July 13-17), the strategic plan German command was disrupted again. The Russian armies were withdrawn from the Polish salient to new defensive lines, and the troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front retreated to the Western Dvina.
The troops of the newly created Western Front, from August 22 to October 2, 1915, carried out the Vilna defensive operation, as a result of which the offensive of German troops in the direction of Sventsyany, called the Sventsyany breakthrough, was stopped.
On the Caucasian front, neither side achieved any significant results, while at the same time Russia strengthened its position in Transcaucasia and Northern Iran. The most intense actions took place in the area of ​​Lake Van. The Russian army successfully carried out the Alashker defensive (July 9 - August 3) and Hamadan offensive (October 30 - December 22) operations.
A particularly important influence on the course of the 1916 campaign was had by the actions of Russian troops in the East European Theater of Operations, where 129 Russian divisions were deployed against 87 Austro-German divisions on a front of 1200 km. At the request of the allies, caused by their difficult situation at Verdun, the Russian command conducted the Naroch offensive operation on March 18-30 in the area of ​​​​Dvinsk and Lake Naroch. The offensive began before the concentration of Russian troops was completed. The fighting was fierce. The offensive was carried out during the spring thaw; due to a lack of shells and heavy artillery, the German defense was not suppressed, troops were brought into the battle in parts, reserves were late. The Russians suffered significant losses.
The greatest operational successes in 1916 were achieved by the Russian Southwestern Front (commander General A.A. Brusilov, chief of staff General V.N. Klembovsky), which in the period from June 4 to August 13 broke through the Austro-German front from Lutsk to Chernivtsi and advanced 60-150 km.
In preparation for the offensive, the command of the Southwestern Front paid special attention to thorough, including aerial, reconnaissance; training troops to overcome fortified positions similar to those occupied by the enemy; practicing the interaction of infantry with artillery.
This well-prepared offensive of the Russian troops, which went down in the military history of Russia under the name of the Brusilov breakthrough, was a major achievement of military art, which proved the possibility of overcoming positional defenses and played a large role in the outcome of the campaign.
In contrast to the practice adopted by the Anglo-French troops of breaking through defenses in one sector, the Brusilovsky breakthrough was the new kind a front-line offensive operation, during which each of the four armies of the Southwestern Front (8th, 11th, 7th and 9th) broke through the enemy’s defensive fortifications in its sector at the same designated time. This achieved operational camouflage of the main attack, which was delivered by the forces of the 8th Army in the direction of Lutsk, and excluded the maneuver of enemy reserves on in the indicated direction. As a result of synchronized crushing strikes, Russian troops broke through the enemy’s positional defenses virtually across the entire width of the Southwestern Front (550 km). Subsequently this new way overcoming fortified German positions was developed by the allies in the Western theater of operations.
To stop the advance of Russian troops, the enemy was forced to transfer over 30 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions to the Eastern Front from the Western European and Italian theaters of operations.
Russian troops inflicted irreparable losses on the Austro-Hungarian army - over 1.5 million killed and wounded, more than 420 thousand prisoners, 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns, 448 bomb throwers and mortars were captured. An area of ​​more than 25 thousand km2 has been liberated from enemy troops. No Allied offensive operation achieved such results in 1915, 1916 and 1917. However, the increased resistance of the Austro-German troops in connection with large reinforcements received from other fronts, Brusilov’s lack of reserves and the inconsistency of the actions of the neighboring Western Front did not allow the command Southwestern Front develop achieved success, and it was forced to stop the offensive in September. The losses of Russian troops amounted to 500 thousand people.
On the Caucasian front there were major victories Russian troops. Thanks to operational camouflage and disinformation of the enemy, the Erzurum operation was successfully carried out (January 10 - February 16), as a result of which the Erzurum fortress was taken by storm, and the Turks were thrown back 70-100 km from Erzurum. As a result of the Trebizond offensive operation (February 5 - April 18), Russian troops occupied Trebizond, through which the 3rd Turkish army maintained maritime communications with Istanbul.
To strengthen its position in the summer of 1916, the Caucasian Army, as a result of the Ognotic operation (July 21 - August 29), inflicted a heavy defeat on the 2nd Turkish army, and during the Erzincan operation (May 17 - July 20) defeated the enemy's 3rd army and captured the city Erzincan.
In accordance with the general strategic plan Entente campaign of 1917 The Mitau offensive operation was carried out from January 5 to 11 in the East European Theater of Operations by the Russians Northern Front(General N.V. Ruzsky), but ended in failure.
On February 27, 1917, the February bourgeois-democratic revolution took place in Russia. The Provisional Government that came to power, headed by A.F. Kerensky continued the war. Having deceived the masses of soldiers with promises of soon achieving peace, the Provisional Government began the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front in June 1917 (June 29 - August 3). Despite the initial success achieved, it ended in failure (Russian troops lost over 132.5 thousand people in it).
The Riga offensive operation of the German troops (September 1-15) ended in failure for the Russian troops, but thanks to the steadfastness of the Russian soldiers, especially the Latvian riflemen, the plan of the German command was thwarted. Also, the German command’s plan to break through to Petrograd was thwarted as a result of the Moonsund defensive operation (October 12-20).
On October 25, 1917, the Great October Socialist Revolution took place in Russia. And the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which became the highest authority in Russia, unanimously adopted the Decree on Peace and addressed all the warring powers with a proposal to conclude a just democratic peace without annexations and indemnities. Due to the refusal of the Entente and the United States to accept this proposal, the government of the Soviet Republic was forced, without their participation, to conclude a truce with the German coalition on December 2, 1917 and begin peace negotiations. Russia left the war. Subsequently, without receiving the support of the Entente countries, the Soviet government unilaterally signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and its allies in March 1918.
A characteristic feature of the 1918 campaign was the struggle of the German coalition and the Entente against Soviet Russia. Both groups, each with their own goals, undertook military intervention against the young Soviet Republic.
Having neither the material nor the moral strength to continue the war, in an environment of continuous retreat at the front and the outbreak of revolution within the country, Germany signed the terms of the Compiegne Armistice on November 11, 1918. Germany and its allies were defeated. The final results of the war were summed up by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.
Without resolving any of the previous contradictions, the First World War radically changed the political map of the world and gave rise to new serious contradictions that created the ground for subsequent military conflicts.
In December 2012, the President of Russia approved an amendment to the Federal Law of Russia “On Days of Military Glory and Memorable Dates of Russia”, which came into force on January 1, 2013, according to which August 1 is declared the Day of Remembrance of Russian Soldiers who died in the First World War 1914-1918 years.

Guidelines
In preparation for the jam, it is necessary to prepare for display campaign maps and slides with objective statistical data indicating the results and losses of the belligerents in the First World War.
In the introductory remarks, it should be noted that the experience of the First World War had a great influence on military construction, the organization of the armed forces and the development of military art in Russia in the period /920-7939.
When illuminated educational issues in addition to revealing the course of hostilities, it is necessary to objectively show the world-historical significance, role and place of the First World War in Russian historiography.
Class it will be more interesting, if we consider in detail the factors contributing to both the success and failure of Russian troops during military campaigns.
At the end of the lesson you need to do brief conclusions, answer questions from listeners, give recommendations for studying literature.

Recommended reading:
1. Korin S. The Last War Russian Empire// Reference point. - 2008. - No. 6.
2. Military-historical atlas of Russia. - M., 2006.
3. Utkin A. The First World War. - M.: Eksmo, 2002.
4. Zayonchkovsky A. The First World War. - M.: Polygon, 2002.

Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry SAMOSVAT

"Landmark" 09/ 2013

The Russian Civil War is defined by an armed struggle for power between representatives various classes, social strata and groups of the former Russian Empire with the participation of the troops of the Quadruple Alliance and Atlanta.

The main causes of the Civil War and military intervention appeared: the irreconcilability of the positions of different political parties, groups and classes in matters of power, economy and political course of the country; the bet of opponents of Bolshevism on the overthrow of Soviet power by armed means with the support of foreign states; the desire of the latter to protect their interests in Russia and prevent the spread of the revolutionary movement in the world; the radicalism of the Bolsheviks, who considered one of essential means achieving their political goals, revolutionary violence, the desire of the Bolshevik Party to realize the ideas of “world revolution”; the desire of both sides for the complete defeat of the enemy's armed forces.

Creation of the Red Army

The Red Guard was the predecessor and embryo of the Red Army. Primary units were created in factories and factories and united into platoons, platoons into companies or squads, companies into battalions or detachments of up to 600 people. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, and revolvers. City or district headquarters were created. In October 1917, the armed forces of the revolution in Petrograd numbered more than 20 thousand Red Guards, 60 thousand sailors Baltic Fleet and up to 150 thousand soldiers of the Petrograd garrison.

First Soviet organ military administration - Committee on Military and Naval Affairs. Further transformed into the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, and then into the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs.

On January 15, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted the historic Decree on the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Union. The decree strictly emphasized class character the army being created. New army was staffed by volunteers, commanders were not appointed, but elected. The first KA detachments had different numbers and organization, but already in April 1918 a gradual transition to a single staff structure began.

In May 1918, the All-Russian Main Headquarters, and in March 1918 the Supreme Military Council, headed by M.D. Bonch-Bruevich.

In April 1918, universal military training. Men aged 18 to 40 were required to pass military training according to the 96-hour program and register as conscripts. For volunteers, a period of compulsory service was established for at least 6 months. The text of the solemn promise was adopted. Electivity command staff replaced by an assignment system. In April - May 1918, unified states were introduced.

Spring 1919 army size up to 3.8 million. In December 1920 already 5.5 million people.

The most important problem is the training of command personnel. By the end of 1918, there were 63 military educational institutions (6 academies). By the end of 1920 there were 153 educational institutions. During the period civil war More than 48 thousand officers of the old army were drafted into the spacecraft.

Brief overview of military operations during the civil war and military intervention

The Civil War is considered in four periods:

1st period - beginning of the civil war (October 1917 - May 1918)

2nd period - the deployment of the military intervention of the Entente and the civil war (May 1918 - March 1919)

3rd period - decisive victories of the spacecraft over the combined forces of external and internal counter-revolution (March 1919 - March 1920)

4th period - repelling the attack of Poland and defeating Wrangel’s army (April - November 1920)

Beginning of the Civil War

(October 1917 - May 1918)

In November and December 1917, the Soviet government (SP) stopped the offensive of General Krasnov's troops near Petrograd and suppressed the uprising of the cadets in Petrograd.

Major counter-revolutionary protests took place on the Don (Ataman Kaledin), Ukraine, Belarus and the Urals (Ataman Dutov). Germany violated the truce and went on the offensive along the entire front. Ukraine, Belarus, Crimea, part of the Baltic states and the Caucasus were captured.

February 23, 1919 was declared Red Army Day to commemorate the beginning of mass mobilization of forces and courageous resistance of the spacecraft detachments.

The initial period of the civil war is characterized by actions separate units and units of various organizations and numbers. The offensive developed along railways and highways. This method of action was called “echelon warfare.” The artillery was in combat formations and supported the infantry with fire from open positions. Defensive actions were short-term in nature, after which detachments and units either moved from defense to offensive or retreated.

Deployment of Entente military intervention and civil war

(May 1918 - March 1919)

In March - April 1918, Anglo-French and American troops landed in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, the Japanese and British in Vladivostok. The interventionists occupied the entire Far East. German and Turkish troops invaded Transcaucasia. In the Don and North Caucasus, the White Guard movement led by generals Krasnov, Mamontov, Kornilov and Alekseev intensified.

In May 1918, along the route of the Czechoslovak corps (60 thousand people) along the Siberian railway (7000 km), cities and stations began to be captured. From Penza to Vladivostok.

In mid-1918 the country found itself in ring of fire. Three quarters of its territory were in the hands of the white movement and their allies.

In the summer and autumn of 1918, fierce battles broke out in the Don, North Caucasus and Lower Volga.

In November 1918, a revolution broke out in Germany. The joint venture declared the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk invalid and began to expel the interventionists. Entente forces occupied Batumi, Tiflis, and Baku. New contingents of British, American and Japanese troops landed in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Vladivostok.

In Omsk, Admiral A.V. Kolchak declared himself the “supreme ruler of Russia.”

In November-December 1918, the main danger moved from east to south, where Krasnov’s Don Army and Denikin’s Volunteer Army were advancing. WITH Eastern Front Units with extensive combat experience were transferred to Yuzhny. As a result, Krasnov's Don Army was defeated. By the spring of 1919, the German, British, French, American and other invaders were defeated.

From “echelon warfare” the conduct of combat operations moved to the conduct of operations by fronts and armies. The interaction of infantry, cavalry and artillery units and subunits was organized more skillfully, and armored trains and armored vehicles were used more effectively.

Decisive victories of the Red Army over the combined forces of external and internal counter-revolution (March 1919 - March 1920).

In the spring of 1919, the White Guard units of Admiral Kolchak in the east, General A.I. Denikin in the south and Yudenich in the north-west were to launch a new offensive.

On March 4, 1919, the army of A.V. Kolchak (300 thousand) went on the offensive and broke through the defenses of the troops of the Eastern Front. Developing the offensive, she captured the cities of Ufa, Votkinsk, Orsk, Aktyubinsk, and approached a distance of 85-100 km from the Volga. At the same time, the White Guards became more active in other directions. The spacecraft fought at a front of up to 8000 km.

The Eastern Front was divided into two operational groups: Northern and Southern. The Eastern Front was commanded by S. S. Kamenev.

From April 28 to July 19, 1919, the counter-offensive of the Eastern Front. The Buguruslan, Belebeevsk and Ufa operations were carried out, as a result of which Kolchak’s forces were defeated. The beginning of 1920 ended with the defeat of Kolchak’s troops.

In the spring of 1919, Denikin's army went on the offensive. White Guard troops captured Kharkov, Tsaritsyn, and a significant part of Ukraine and Crimea. By the summer of 1919, Denikin had well-equipped armed forces numbering 110 thousand. As part of the spacecraft Southern Front there were five armies - the 14th, 13th, 8th, 9th and 10th, a total of 86 thousand. The joint venture strengthened the Southern Front with significant forces (reserves of the Commander-in-Chief, a number of formations from other fronts). A.I. Egorov became the commander of the front. At the same time, the troops of N.N. Yudenich launched an offensive with the goal of capturing Petrograd. In the north, Miller’s troops went on the offensive, and in the west, the Polish armies.

On October 10, 1919, the KA troops of the Southern Front launched a counteroffensive. During the Oryol-Kromskaya and Voronezh-Kastornenskaya operations, the White Guard corps of General Kutepov was defeated, and the cavalry corps of General Mamontov suffered heavy losses. From November 19 to January 10, 1920, the general offensive of the spacecraft developed.

In 1919, in the spring and autumn, the spacecraft stopped Yudenich’s troops, drove them back, and then finally consolidated their success. In February - March, spacecraft troops inflicted a decisive defeat on the “Denikinites” in the North Caucasus. In the south of the country, only Crimea remained unliberated.

Thus, by the spring of 1920, the spacecraft defeated the main White Guard forces and interventionist troops in the east and south, near Petrograd and in the north of the country.

Repelling the Polish attack and defeating the army

Wrangel

(April-November 1920).

In the spring and summer of 1920, the Polish army, led by Pilsudski, opposed Soviet power. White Guard troops were concentrated in Crimea under the command of P.N. Wrangel.

Polish troops consisted of five armies (148.5 thousand bayonets and sabers). They were opposed in Belarus by the 15th and 16th armies of the Western Front, and in Ukraine by the 12th and 14th armies of the Southwestern Front, which had 65,264 bayonets and sabers. In Crimea, the White Guard troops numbered about 25 thousand soldiers and officers against 13 thousand people of the 13th Army of the South-Eastern Front.

On April 25, 1920, Polish troops went on the offensive, striking against the Southwestern Front, under the command of A.I. Egorov, and broke through the defenses of the 12th Army. On May 6, 1920, Kyiv was abandoned. By mid-May the front had stabilized. October 12, 1920 The Polish government agreed to make peace.

On September 21, the Southern Front was opened consisting of the 6th, 13th and 2nd Cavalry Army (F.K. Mironov). M.V. Frunze was appointed commander of the front. On October 28, the troops of the Southern Front went on the offensive. Wrangel tried to hold out in the Crimea, with a heavily fortified defense. The White Guard units offered fierce resistance, but it was decided to take them into account. On November 17, Crimea was taken.

The signing of a peace treaty with Poland and the defeat of the White Guards in Crimea marked the end of military intervention and civil war. In Transcaucasia, Turkestan and Far East The last groups of White Guards and interventionists were liquidated in 1921-1922.

CONCLUSION:

The fighting during the civil war took place simultaneously in many regions of the country, the front line was enormous, and the number of forces and means used was limited. This led to relatively low densities manpower and equipment, significantly less than it was in the operations of the First World War. The absence of continuous fronts, the presence of gaps in combat formations and open flanks created conditions for outflanking and enveloping the enemy, maneuvering, deep penetration into enemy rear lines and action in directions. acquired significantly greater importance than in the First World War independent actions not only divisions and brigades, but also units and subunits.

On the eve of the war, former Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Durnovo warned Nicholas II in an analytical note about the danger of drawing the country into a confrontation with Germany. Even victory in this war, according to Durnovo, would not give anything valuable to Russia, and in case of failure, the likelihood of revolution would increase:
“The defeated army, having lost its most reliable personnel during the war, and captured for the most part spontaneously by the general peasant desire for land, will turn out to be too demoralized to serve as a bastion of law and order. Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be predicted.” It was as if a perspicacious politician was looking into the water.
On July 29, 1914, Nicholas II sent a telegram to German Emperor Wilhelm II with a proposal to “transfer the Austro-Serbian issue to the Hague Conference.” Wilhelm did not answer her. "My conscience is clear. “I did everything to avoid war,” wrote Nicholas II.

War for prestige

The official version of Russia's entry into the war is the fulfillment of allied obligations to Serbia. Indeed, Russia, according to the agreement, was obliged to provide military assistance to Serbia in the event of attacks on the latter’s territorial integrity.
On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and on the same day began shelling Belgrade, but Russia did not rush things. The reaction followed only two days later - on July 31, when general mobilization was announced in the country.
Germany, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded that Russia cancel the mobilization, which was refused.

August 1 German ambassador In St. Petersburg, Count Friedrich Pourtales handed over a note declaring war to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov, after which, according to the minister’s recollections, he “went to the window and began to cry.” On August 2, Nicholas II signed the manifesto on the beginning of the war.

Row domestic historians We are sure that when entering the war, “the fear of losing prestige and influence in the Balkan countries” played a role. Serbia was not just an ally, but also an important strategic foothold for Russia in the Balkans.
Historian Boris Kolonitsky is convinced that when exploring the reasons for the outbreak of the war, one should not underestimate the power of public opinion. In his words, there was “strong pressure from the street.” Those around Nicholas II noted that in those days the tsar felt such a unity with the people that had not been experienced during the previous twenty years of his reign.

In the first days of the war, mass demonstrations in support of the Serbs took place on the streets of Russian cities, and at the same time spontaneous actions arose (pogroms of German offices and shops). Anti-German sentiment and patriotic euphoria turned out to be a factor that largely predetermined Russia's entry into the war.

Russian interests

American historian Sean McMeekin explains the causes of the First World War by rivalry and territorial claims Russia and Germany. This idea is reinforced by the French diplomat Maurice Paleologue in his book “Tsarist Russia during the World War,” citing the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov: “My formula is simple, we must destroy German imperialism. We will achieve this only through a series of military victories; We are facing a long and very difficult war. The Emperor has no illusions in this regard. But so that the “Kaiser” does not rise again from its ruins, so that the Hohenzollerns can never again lay claim to a world monarchy, great political changes must take place.”
Boris Kolonitsky expresses the opinion that Russia's goal was the unification of the Polish territories that were part of Austria-Hungary and Germany, as well as the need to establish control over the Bosphorus.
A note addressed by Sazonov to the French and British ambassadors (M. Paleologue and J. Buchanan) confirms that, on the eve of the expected attack by the allied forces of the Bosphorus, Russia hastened to “stake out” Constantinople and the Straits. In particular, it says the following:

"Move latest events leads Emperor Nicholas to the idea that the issue of Constantinople and the straits must be finally resolved and in accordance with the centuries-old aspirations of Russia.”

British historian Geoffrey Hosking writes about this in his book “The West’s View of Russia”: “By the spring of 1915, Russian diplomats finally reached an agreement with the governments of Great Britain and France that after the war, Constantinople and most of the straits would become Russian territory.” .

Tsar at war

Many photographs have been preserved where Nicholas II takes the oath, arrives at the front and eats from the field kitchen, where he is “the father of the soldiers.” Nicholas II really loved everything military. He practically did not wear civilian clothes, preferring uniforms.

It is generally accepted that the emperor himself led the actions of the Russian army in the First World War. However, it is not. The generals and the military council decided. Several factors influenced the improvement of the situation at the front with Nicholas taking command. Firstly, by the end of August 1915, the Great Retreat was stopped, the German army suffered from stretched communications, and secondly, the change in the commanders-in-chief of the General Staff - Yanushkevich to Alekseev - also affected the situation.

Nicholas II actually went to the front, loved to live at Headquarters, sometimes with his family, often took his son with him, but never (unlike cousins ​​George and Wilhelm) never came closer than 30 kilometers to the front line. The Emperor accepted the Order of St. George, IV degree, shortly after a German plane flew over the horizon during the Tsar’s arrival.

On domestic policy The absence of the emperor in St. Petersburg had a bad effect. He began to lose influence on the aristocracy and government. This proved to be fertile ground for internal corporate splits and indecision during the February Revolution.

From the emperor's diary on August 23, 1915 (the day he assumed the duties of the Supreme High Command): "Slept well. The morning was rainy; in the afternoon the weather improved and it became quite warm. At 3.30 I arrived at my Headquarters, one mile from the mountains. Mogilev. Nikolasha was waiting for me. After talking with him, the gene accepted. Alekseev and his first report. Everything went well! After drinking tea, I went to explore the surrounding area. The train is parked in a small dense forest. We had lunch at 7½. Then I walked some more, it was a great evening.”

Russia's main goals in the First World War were to weaken its main rivals - Germany and Austria-Hungary, and eliminate threats to German hegemony and Austrian dominance in the Balkans 2. At the same time, the Russian leadership believed that it was necessary to delay the brewing all-European war for at least several years 3 in order to stabilize internal position and complete the implementation of the “Great Program to Strengthen the Army”, approved by Nicholas II on June 24, 1914 4

First World War 1914-1918 - a war between two coalitions of powers - Russia, France, England and Italy on the one hand, and the countries of the Central Bloc - Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria on the other 1.

_______________________________
1 Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. M., 2005. P. 78.

The implementation of the “Great Program...”, developed taking into account the forces of the main potential opponents of Russia, was supposed to be carried out before 1917. 5 Its authors expected that the war would be short-lived and victorious. Based on this, they considered it necessary to concentrate their main efforts on increasing the size of the peacetime army.

According to the “Big Program...”, the peacetime army staff increased by 468,200 lower ranks (or by 39.2%) and by 11,772 officers (or by 28.2%) 1 . This provided for both the formation of new units and an increase in the staff of existing field troops 2 . It was planned to establish such a staff number military formations V Peaceful time, which would provide the most Fast passage units to wartime states with insignificant replenishment of the army.

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1 RGVIA. F. 2000. Op. 2. D. 50. L. 2.
2 Ibid.

The most important preparation for war undertaken by the Ministry of War at the beginning of the 20th century was the radical revision of the “Regulations on field control of troops in wartime” 6. Supreme body In order to control the army in the Theater of Military Operations (TVD), the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was established, under which a separate headquarters was formed 7 . Also, the “Regulations...” introduced a new authority - Front 8, whose headquarters was the body operational management. Logistics and technical support for the troops was entrusted to the chief supply officer of the front armies and the departments and departments subordinate to him.

During the same period, the Ministry of War developed the “Regulations on the preparatory period for war” 9, according to which participation in preparations for hostilities officially became mandatory for all departments included in the military command system 10.

The beginning of the preparatory period was determined by the supreme authority. The “Regulations...” stated: “The preparatory period for war is the period of diplomatic complications preceding the opening of hostilities, during which all departments must take the necessary measures to prepare and ensure the success of the mobilization of the army, navy and fortresses and the concentration of the army to the threatened border.”

First of all, this order concerned the War Ministry itself. Immediately after the release of the “Regulations...” the department began to prepare even more intensively and purposefully for a possible war.

In particular, in February 1912, the War Ministry held a meeting with the chiefs of staff of military districts, as a result of which it was developed new project strategic deployment of Russian armed forces. Two options for the development of military operations were outlined, which included a clear indication of the methods of striking. According to Plan A, the main blow was to be delivered to Austria-Hungary. Plan "D" provided for an attack on Germany 11.

The overall objective of Plan A was “to go on the offensive against the armed forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary with the aim of transferring the war within their borders” 1 .

Under option “D,” the general task was formulated as follows: “going on the offensive against German troops threatening us from East Prussia is aimed at paralyzing the enemy’s actions on other fronts.”

Both strategies included a pincer capture of East Prussia or Galicia. The center of gravity of the blow was transferred to “deep envelopment from the right bank of the Vistula region,” which should have led to a quick and confident victory 2 .

1 RGVIA. F. 200. Op. 1. D. 1833. L. 2 vol.
2 Ibid. L. 4v.

In addition to these documents, the Russian General Staff developed plans in the event of Turkey's involvement in the war on the side of the Central European powers. The troops of the Caucasian Military District, which were consolidated in wartime into three united corps, were intended for actions against the Sultan.

From the beginning of 1913, the General Staff began to develop basic considerations for the strategic deployment of Russia's armed forces. The document was based on mobilization schedule No. 20 and “ Big program to strengthen the army,” approved by the emperor on September 25, 1913. 12 The plan was supposed to be put into effect in the fall of 1914. However, the General Staff was unable to complete the work begun: the war began earlier than expected. As a result, the Russian armed forces were forced to become more active in the summer of 1914 on the basis of mobilization schedule No. 19, introduced back in 1910.

On the eve of the war, the War Ministry did great job to develop a plan that defined “all preparatory strategic operations”: the creation of armies, the preparation of the theater of military operations in engineering terms (fortresses, communication routes), mobilization, transportation of troops and supplies by railways, and, finally, the strategic deployment of the army 13. However, a lack of financial resources and miscalculations in planning did not allow the planned activities to be fully implemented.

On the eve of the war, the number of railway lines leading to western border, amounted to: from Russia - 13, from Germany and Austria-Hungary - 32. Russian command could deliver 223 trains to the front every day, the German - 550, the Austro-Hungarian - 226 1. The level of development of transport in Germany and Austria-Hungary allowed these countries to carry out a concentration of forces in 13-15 days, while Russia could carry out a similar operation in only 28 days, and even then not completely.

______________________________________
1 Ushakov K.P. Preparation of Prussian military communications for world war. M.-L., 1928. P. 82.

In addition, the Military Department also made miscalculations in the field of providing the active army with weapons and military equipment. Hoping for a quick end to the war, the ministry considered it unnecessary to prepare the country's economic structures for long-term service to the needs of the front. According to the Russian military leadership, the accumulated reserves were sufficient to carry out a short-term operation.

The actual need during the war years far exceeded not only the established, but also the proposed norm. For example, when calculating the required ammunition standards, outdated data on ammunition consumption in Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905 1 Only 1000 rounds were allocated for the 76 mm field gun, 76 mm horse gun, 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers, and 1200 rounds each for the 76 mm mountain and 107 mm guns. This norm was clearly too low. In France, for example, the corresponding figures were 1300-1500, in Germany - up to 1500 shells per gun 2. Some representatives of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) raised the issue of increasing the rate of shots per gun to 1,500, but they did not receive support. As a result, the established norm was spent during the first four months of the First World War, and the batteries of the Southwestern Front fired their shells in the first 16 days of hostilities. The number of rifles and machine guns available in the country also did not correspond to the actual needs 3 .

_______________________________________
1 RGVIA. F. 2067. Op. 1. D. 510. L. 220.
2 Rostunov I.I. Decree. op. P. 98.
3 RGVIA. F. 2000. Op. 1. D. 2283. L. 170.

An important area of ​​work of the War Ministry on the eve of the First World War was combat training troops. It was carried out according to a pre-planned plan, and to ensure uniformity of training, uniform programs, special instructions and regulations were developed and published 14.

On the eve of the First World War, the Russian army was prepared quite well. In 1910, 1911 and 1912, maneuvers were held three times, in which troops from the western border districts were involved. This made it possible to practice the actions of border armed forces in the event of a possible mobilization of the army.

With the beginning of the war, in accordance with the “Regulations on field control of troops in wartime 1914” In Russia, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was formed. This position was taken by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (and in 1915-1917 - Emperor Nicholas II himself). The former head of the General Staff, Infantry General N.N., became the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. Yanushkevich (in 1915-1917 - M.V. Alekseev) 15.

As for the War Ministry itself, its work was aimed at meeting the needs and requirements of the front. The department as a whole and its supporting main departments continued to carry out their activities on the basis of laws and other provisions in force for peacetime conditions.

Thus, from the beginning of mobilization and throughout the war, the country found itself divided into two separate, independently governed centers. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief controlled the troops in the theater of war. At the same time, the Ministry of War was responsible for the operation of the defense system in the internal (rear) territory of the state.

As noted at the meeting of the Commission on Military and Naval Affairs of the State Duma of the IV convocation on February 23, 1916, this circumstance could not but “reflect extremely negatively on the defense of the state, which requires, first of all, unity of action throughout the entire space of the Russian Empire” 16.

The dire situation with the provision of weapons and ammunition to the active army, which had developed by the autumn of 1914, as well as the acute shortage of many types of industrial raw materials, fuel and food, forced the government to create in the summer of 1915 special state bodies for leadership war economy Russia and supply regulation 17.

Since June 1916, coordinating functions in this direction were carried out by the “Special Meeting of Ministers to unite all measures for supplying the army and navy and organizing the rear”, headed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Central location Among the bodies created by the government was the “Special Meeting on State Defense.”

The “Special Meeting” performed the following functions: control and financing of industrial enterprises that manufactured weapons and military supplies; distribution of military orders among them; regulation of production and supply of the Russian army and industry from abroad through the Anglo-Russian and Russian-American procurement committees. The “Meeting...” included representatives of various departments, zemstvo and city unions and other public organizations. The Minister of War was appointed chairman of the body. He was given extensive rights to “authorize the production of procurement by all means and on all conditions recognized by him as appropriate, without limiting the amount” 1 .

___________________________________________
1 Polivanov A.A. From diaries and memoirs of the post of Minister of War and his assistant 1907-16. M., 1924. T. I. P. 161.

At the same time, providing the army with all the necessary means for conducting military operations “not only did not move at the pace at which it was expected during their formation, but, on the contrary, in many respects it went worse than if the supply business had remained in the hands of the provisioning departments themselves.” " 18 .

In 1916, through the joint efforts of the War Ministry and all the authorities created to “help” it, it was possible to increase military production and improve the supply of the active army - primarily with weapons, shells and cartridges.

However, the mobilization of everything National economy country, in a volume that fully met the needs of the active army, was never fully implemented during the First World War. Attempts to place military orders abroad also did not pay off. The Russian army fought in 1914-1917. mainly using domestically produced weapons.

The experience of the First World War showed that the so-called active army and the rear must form a single whole. To wage war effectively, it was necessary to involve not only military command and control bodies, but also all sectors of the national economy. At the same time, preparations for war had to be carried out under the guidance of the united will of the supreme power.

It should be noted that these lessons were fully taken into account during the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War 1941-1945 Thanks to the enormous effort of the entire multimillion-dollar Soviet Union, a national economic complex was created that worked non-stop for the needs of the front, which was the key to the Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.

In October 1917, the Bolshevik Party, which seized power, began to dismantle the previous governing bodies. New structures were created in their place. By decision of the Council People's Commissars Russian Federal Republic(from January 1918 - RSFSR) on October 26, 1917, the Committee on Military and Naval Affairs was created within the Council of People's Commissars 19. He was placed “at the head of the old Ministry of War” with the task of reorganizing and “cleaning” the old military apparatus 20.

_____________________________________________
The section was prepared based on materials from the book "Essays on the History of the War Ministry." 1802-2002 M., 2003.
2 Essays on the history of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1802-2002. In 3 volumes. T. 1. M., 2002. P. 565.
3 Ibid. P. 528.
4 RGVIA. F. 2000. Op. 2. D. 50. L. 2.
5 Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. M., 2005D. 302. L. 23-27.
6 It was approved on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War - July 3, 1914.
7 Rostunov I.I. Russian front of the First World War. M., 1976. P. 3.
8 Rostunov I.I. Decree op.. P. 18.
9 It was approved by Nicholas II on February 17, 1913.
10 See: International relationships in the era of imperialism (MOEI). Ser. 3. T. 5. Appendix. M., 1936. P. 97-113.
11 Zayonchkovsky A.M. Preparing Russia for World War. pp. 235, 243, 244.
12 RGVIA. F. 200. Op. 1. D. 1833. L. 2-16.
13 Mikhnevich N.P. Strategy. Book 1. St. Petersburg, 1911. P. 120
14 “Plan for the distribution of annual training in the infantry”, “Regulations on the training of lower ranks”, “Manual for officer training”, “Manual for conducting training in the cavalry”, “Field Service Charter” 1912, “Manual for Infantry Operations” in battle" 1914, etc.
15 Kavtaradze A. From the history of the Russian General Staff (August 1914 - May 1918) // Military History. magazine. 1976. No. 3. P. 103.
16 RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 1. D. 744. L. 378.
17 These “special bodies” were 5 special meetings, which complemented various commissions and committees.
18 Manikovsky A.A. Combat supply of the Russian army during the World War. Ed. 2nd. T. 2. M.-L., 1930. P. 36.
19 Until February 13, 1918, all dates are given according to the old style.
20 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 1. D. 720. L. 2

World War I. Countries with a total population of about 1,000,000,000 people were drawn into the war, which was approximately 60% of the world's population. Humanity could not yet know that this global “meat grinder” would last 4 years and 3 months, claim millions of lives, change the political map of the world and the fate of many nations beyond recognition. But all this is yet to come, but for now... EUROPE IN 1914-1918. FIRST WORLD WAR (1914 - 1918) First World War Statistics Duration 07/28/1914 – 11/11/1918 1568 days Number of mobilized people 74 million Number of participating countries 33 About 10 million killed and over 20 million wounded Dupuis, R. Ernest. The World History wars: Harper's encyclopedia of military history with comments from the Polygon publishing house. – St. Petersburg. : Polygon; M.: AST. Book 3: 1800 – 1925. – 1998. – 1016 p. "Harper's Encyclopedia of Military History" is a publication that gives a complete picture of world history, development armed forces and military affairs since 3500 BC. to 1997. The reader will find in R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuis a description of the battles of world history, an analysis of military systems from prehistoric times to the present day, and articles about outstanding commanders. The publication, consisting of 4 volumes, shows the development of methods of combat operations, the emergence different kinds troops and their impact on strategy and tactics. Much attention focuses on the role of technology and weapons in the military history of mankind. The encyclopedia contains a large number of different facts, dates, names; more than three thousand illustrations. It will help the reader to consider the past through the prism of wars, which throughout the entire period of human existence determined the way of life and the direction of thought of the entire civilization. The publication will be of interest to both professional historians and amateurs. Chronology Russian history: encyclopedic reference book. – M.: “International Relations”, 1994. – 303 p. “Chronology of Russian History” was created under the leadership of the famous French scientist, professor of Russian history and culture at the University of Paris-Sorbonne Francis Comte, based on many years of studying documents from Russian archives. This collective work was written in order to try to more clearly outline the main lines of Russian history. Each chapter includes a commented chronology of political and state life, economic and social development, foreign relations and culture. Michel Koschul, as well as Catherine Gousseff and Yves Sansonnens, took part in the work on the book under the guidance of Francis Comte, professor of Russian history and culture at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, president of the French Association of Russian Studies. The book is intended for a wide range of readers - from secondary school students to historians. Danilov Yu.N. Russia in the World War 1914-1915. – Berlin: Slovo, 1924. – 396 p. “This book was written by me in Paris, in the conditions of emigrant life and after ten - long, painful for all of us, Russian people - years, since Russia entered the world war. I spent this entire war at the front; during the first year I, in the position of Quartermaster General under Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I had to stand not only very close to the events, but also take part in their general direction as much as possible. No less close to me was the work that was done in Russia after unsuccessful war 1904-1905, in order to restore the military power of our Motherland. I took an active part in this work through my service in the Main Directorate of the General Staff. A description of the conditions under which our fatherland had to enter into the struggle, and then wage it during the first years of war, – and constitutes the main content of my present work. This period is of particular interest in the sense that during it the role and significance of Russia in the unfolding world events were fully determined.” Yu. N. Danilov ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Yuri Nikiforovich Danilov (August 13 (August 25) 1866, Kyiv - February 3, 1937, Paris, France) - Russian military leader, infantry general (1914). In 1918 he served in the Red Army and headed a group of military experts with the Soviet delegation at negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. On his initiative, the experts sent a note with arguments against the conclusion to the head of the Soviet delegation G. Ya. Sokolnikov Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was not taken into account. In March 1918, he was a member of the Commission of Military Specialists to develop a plan for the transformation of the military center for the reorganization of the armed forces, but this plan was not approved by the Council of People's Commissars. On March 25, 1918 he retired. Went to Ukraine, then moved to the location Volunteer Army . In the fall of 1920 he served as assistant chief of the Military Directorate of the Russian Army in Crimea. He emigrated to Constantinople, then lived in Paris. The author of military-historical works devoted to the participation of the Russian army in the First World War (his study on the first stage of the war, published in Berlin in 1924, is especially valuable). Biographer of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Entente countries England France Russia Italy Sought to preserve its naval and colonial power, to defeat Germany as a competitor in the world market and to suppress its claims to redistribute the colonies; counted on seizing oil-rich Mesopotamia and Palestine from Turkey, which Germany also claimed. She wanted to return Alsace and Lorraine, taken from it by Germany in 1871, and seize the Saar Basin, laying claim to the role of hegemon in Europe. She wanted to achieve free passage of the Black Sea Fleet through the Bosporus and Dardanelles into the Mediterranean Sea; annex Galicia and the lower reaches of the Neman River. Even being in an alliance with Austria-Hungary, she dreamed of returning Trentino, Trieste and Fiume, which were part of the Austrian possessions. In 1914, Edmond Thary's book "Russia in 1914. Economic Review" was published in Paris. Teri E. Russia in 1914: economic review. – Paris: Ymca-press, 1986. – 158 p. Much has been written about the economic situation in Russia on the eve of the First World War, and thus the revolution, but always fragmentarily. There has not yet been a general detailed review in Russian. This book is a translation of the most significant chapters of an extensive statistical report compiled in 1914 by the once famous French economic commentator Edmond Théry. Anyone who carefully reads this impartial analysis will understand that Russia before the revolution was a rich, economically developed country. TRADE IN FOOD (in millions of francs) average annual average growth nature of trade 1988-1902 1908-1912 overall exports 1,195.6 2,315.7 1,120.1 93.7 imports 312.4 519.6 207.2 66, 3 export surplus 883.2 1,796.1 912.9 103.4% GRAIN PRODUCTION IN RUSSIA (millions of centners) average annual average growth cereals 1898-1902 1908-1912 total % wheat 117.5 161.7 44.2 37.5 rye 209.9 215.0 5.1 2.4 barley 57.4 93.7 36.3 62.2 oats 111.2 134.5 23.3 20.9 corn 11.9 17.2 5 .3 44.8 grains in general 507.9 622.1 114.2 22.5 potatoes 250.0 329.1 79.1 31.6 sugar beets 74.5 105.8 31.3 42.0 “POPULATION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE ( by decade) (in millions of people) area in thousand square meters. km. territ. division 1902 1912 increase in 1912 total density % 1902 1912 4,889 Europe. Russia 101.6 122.5 20.9 20.5 21.0 25.0 127 Poland 10.2 12.8 2.6 25.5 80.0 101.0 374 Finland 2.7 3.1 0.4 15.6 7.0 8.0 469 Caucasus 9.7 12.3 2.6 26.3 21.0 26.0 3,489 Central Asia 8.8 10.7 U9 22.0 2.5 3.0 12 394 Siberia 6.3 9.6 3.3 52.7 0.5 0.7 21,742 overall 139.3 171.0 31.7 22.7 6.4 8.0 PROBABLE POPULATION OF THE LARGE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE in 1924, 1936 and 1948 vols. in accordance with the increase recorded between 1900 and 1912. (in millions of people) countries actual population 1910 proportional increase in 1912 1912% probable population based on growth between 1900 and 1912 1924 1936 1948 Russia 135.6 171.1 26.2 215.9 272.5 343.9 Germany 56 .4 65.8 16.7 76.8 89.6 104.6 Austria-Hungary 45.4 52.6 15.9 61.0 70.7 81.9 England 41.2 45.6 10.7 50.5 55 .9 61.9 Italy 32.2 35.1 9.0 38.2 41.6 45.3 France 38.9 39.7 2.1 40.5 41.4 42.3 Europe. countries combined 214.1 238.8 11.5 267.0 299.2 336.0 The French scientist provides convincing data on the economic state of Russia and concludes: “By the middle of this century, Russia will dominate Europe both politically and economically and financially." Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. War plan. – Paris: Publication of the Main Board of the Foreign Union of Russian Military Disabled Persons, 1936. – 158 p. From the author: “Drawing up a war plan is the most difficult and the hard part work of the General Staff. As a result, numerous blunders and major mistakes are quite natural. This can easily be seen by studying not only our war plan, but also the plans of our allies and our enemies. I consider it necessary to draw the reader’s attention to this before he begins to read the text of my book itself. The truth that is revealed in it is very sad. And not “to court and not to condemnation,” but only so that future generations of our General Staff could avoid repeating at least some of the mistakes made. War is becoming more and more scientific. For mistakes you have to pay with the blood of your troops, and sometimes with defeats. With the hope that faith in science will strengthen in our new generations of the General Staff, I dedicate this book to my many students.” N. N. Golovin Rare small-circulation emigrant publication. Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia. – Prague: Flame, 1926. – 436 p. The book by General N. N. Golovin “From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The Beginning of the War and Operations in East Prussia" is a military-historical study of events on the Russian Front during the First World War (1914). The main goal of the study is to study this war as a series of interconnected events and causation phenomena. (The Battle of Gumbinen, the battles of General Samsonov’s army, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, etc.) A major work on the military history of Russia. Rare small-circulation emigrant publication. The day of the declaration of war by the Sovereign Emperor on July 20, 1914 in the Winter Palace. Year of the war from July 19, 1914 to July 19, 1915 - M., 1915. - 588 p. The compiler of the collection of documents points to a change in the nature of the war. The First World War was a war of a new type, the likes of which had never existed before. And a number of features of its information coverage are associated with this. The war has ceased to be a sum of isolated and short-term battles that previously lasted no more than three days. The publication contains documents characterizing the actions of the Russian army on the fronts during the first year of the struggle. Information in the press maintains a delicate balance between dry and brief statements of past events and misinformation. There were many omissions in the Russian press of that time, and a specially developed language made it possible to camouflage certain information. That is why this collection of documents was so important then and retains historical value to this day. It became one of the first publications of complexes of sources on the history of the First World War. The presented documents are interesting from different points of view. The Tsar's manifestos and decrees of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief demonstrate ideological rhetoric. Reports of the General Staff in a dry, business-like form report on events on the fronts of the war, including in the naval theater: the deployment of troops, rapprochement with the enemy, the conduct of a particular operation, its results and trophies, the geography of the advance of troops of the warring parties; about the actions of military leaders: generals Brusilov, Rennenkapf and many others. They talk about difficult situations on the fronts, a shortage of modern powerful artillery in certain areas. Enemy atrocities against prisoners and civilians are also reported. The documents also illustrate the information war waged by the opposing powers. The book contains almost no information about the cost of the war for the Russian side - losses and expenses, but this could not have been in a collection of documents that was intended to inform citizens about the successes of Russian weapons on the fronts. Special journals of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire: 1914. – M.: ROSSPEN, 2006. – 700 p. This publication presents documents unique in their origin and content - Special Journals of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, reflecting the main directions of government activity on the entire range of problems of domestic and foreign policy, religious, national issues, in the field of education and culture. This volume includes, in addition to the corpus of Special Journals for 1914, an introduction and notes, as well as a list of documents not included in the publication. The outcome of the First World War was decided by massive armies on the land fronts. However, naval warfare played an important role. The naval forces of the parties, acting independently and in cooperation with ground forces, contributed to the achievement of operational and strategic goals. Moreover, the main content of the fighting was the struggle on maritime communications. In these types of operations, submarines took first place. German submarines sank about 6,000 merchant ships and up to 150 warships. Surface ships were also used. German raiders sank 7 warships and 139 merchant ships during the war. Lorey G. German-Turkish operations naval forces in 1914-1918 – M.: State Military Publishing House, 1924. – 320 p. The publication is dedicated to the military actions of the German-Turkish naval forces in the First World War. The author of the work, Rear Admiral G. Lorey, a direct participant in operations in Turkish waters, provides rare documents and copies of authentic military maps of that time. The activities and fate of the cruisers Goeben and Breslau are covered in detail, about which there was no complete information even in Germany before Lorey’s publication in 1937. G. Lorey describes the fighting in the Black Sea, covers them in sufficient detail and consistently, naturally, mainly on the German-Turkish side. This work represents great value for readers interested in military history, since the Black Sea, located far from world communications, has never received in historical literature the assessment that it deserved in accordance with its size and political significance. Activities were covered very sparingly Black Sea Fleet in the First World War and in Soviet literature. The publication of Lorey's book in 1938 largely filled this gap. Unfortunately, this work was never reprinted in the future, so given that the circulation was only 3,000 copies, the book has now become a true bibliographic rarity. The translation was made by E. Shvede, the preface was written by I. Ludri, and the notes were written by N. Novikov. Geyer A. German submarines in the war of 1914-1918. – L.: Sector UVMS RKK, 1933. – 184 p. The book sets out, month after month, the actual side of the combat activities of the German submarines and the conditions for combat training of German submariners during the war, issues of construction and basing of German boats. All this is given in Guyer's work with great detail, so that in some parts it resembles a daily record of boat operations. The sinking of three British cruisers by the submarine U-9 under the command of O. Weddigen on September 22, 1914. The sinking of three British cruisers by the submarine U-9 under the command of the German submarine O. Weddigen on September 22 U-14. 1914 Sinking of the German submarine U-8 off the coast of Dover. March 5, 1915. From the beginning of the war until January 1918, the author was the commander of the III Submarine Flotilla. Real work introduces submarine operations during the war of 1914-1918. The greatest attention is paid to submarine operations in the North Sea and special issues underwater shipbuilding. With 2 maps attached: Submarine operations in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea. Argus is a monthly illustrated art and literary magazine. Published in St. Petersburg from 1913 to 1917. Published works of fiction, popular science articles, well-executed drawings, and photographs. Prominent writers of various ideological trends took part in Argus. In 1914-1917 paid a lot of attention to the events of the First World War in the sections “Military Pages” and “Reviews of Military Operations”. He called for “defense of the Fatherland.” Argus. – 1915. – No. 2. Argus. – 1915. – No. 2. Argus. – 1915. – No. 2. Argus. – 1915. – No. 7. Argus. – 1915. – No. 4. Argus. – 1916. – No. 4. Argus. – 1916. – No. 5. War can have good consequences among savages, contributing to the selection of the strongest and most persistent, but on civilized peoples its influence is usually the most detrimental: it leads to mutual extermination of the best and bravest. Fullier “It’s scary to count the millions of dead. It's sad to see the state broken down. The mockery of fate, which at the “last moment” excluded Russia from among the victorious countries, is insulting. Even more terrible and bitter, and more offensive is the silent tracelessness of the tragedy in our history. Not a single war was so erased in the consciousness of descendants as this one. It “turned into a civilian” and, as it were, ceased to exist. Europe is all covered with monuments to the soldiers of 1914-1918 - we don’t have them. The millions of victims of the First World War were covered by tens of millions of victims of the second, domestic one. The heroes of that first one hid their awards from the new government. Generations killed in 1914-1918 are calling to us from obscurity.” L. A. Anninsky On November 11, 1918, the Compiegne Armistice, which meant the surrender of Germany, ended the First World War. Almost 10 million people died in its fire, and about 20 million were injured. Humanity has never known such losses before. An equally significant result of the war was the radical reshaping political map peace. Germany was forced to unilaterally demobilize its army, hand over its aviation and navy to the winners, renounce its colonies, as well as Alsace-Lorraine, Polish provinces and a number of other territories, and pledged to pay gigantic reparations to compensate for damage from the war. Its allies, Austria-Hungary and Türkiye, were dismembered. Bulgaria survived as a state, but suffered significant territorial losses. The last continental empires in Europe - German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian - perished in the fire of World War I. The Ottoman Empire collapsed in Asia.